LittleBang



Consciousness

Preface

This paper deals with consciousness as it appears in the Pali Suttas. Because the word ‘consciousness’ has a different connotation to that which appears in the suttas it needs to be understood properly, both in the common sense, scientific and neurological sense, and subjective psychological sense – and these should be compared with the sutta version. Thus I deal with both sides of the story; the sutta model and the common understanding of the word.

Regarding the sutta model: This aspect of consciousness is far from being a single word that needs defining, or summarized according to its usage in the suttas, but is a complete model of the working of the mind. Does the model hold up with the knowledge we have of modern science? Is the model relevant?

The model of consciousness that appears most frequently is that relating to the six senses. But it also takes on a pivotal role in Dependent Origination. Finally, we have to consider the limitations of consciousness and look at what lies beyond it. In this regard the models that are presented in the suttas are merely tools for practise and are not designed to be complete and fulfilling descriptions of the way the mind works. They are designed to highlight certain aspects the seeing of which generates wisdom.

Introduction

‘Viññāna’ appears frequently throughout the suttas and is almost universally translated as ‘consciousness’. In this paper I will show that this is an inadequate translation and offer a better transliteration of ‘cognition’. That too is however, not quite fully encapsulating the precise meaning and ramifications of viññāna. Indeed there is good argument supporting the proposition that translations which we have inherited from the Pali Text Society and from the early pioneers of translation in Sri Lanka should be adhered to, for better or worse, since they are now the accepted vocabulary. Changing these words makes for some confusion especially for beginners and more especially when the Pali word is not provided in brackets or as a foot/end note. In particular, words like ‘suffering’ and ‘mindfulness’ should probably now be upkept so as to maintain continuity and readability. Consciousness might well fall into this category, but either way its proper function in the machinations of the mind should be understood as they were originally meant, and not confused with the modern psychological or scientific understandings of the word, since these are quite, quite different.

• Modern psychology has a number of notions of how and what consciousness is, none of which is entirely satisfactory, especially to other psychologists. The Freudian model is perhaps the most common interpretation and while it may have some things to add to the Buddhist understanding, has largely been rejected by both Buddhists, scientists and other psychologists.

• Science has pursued consciousness through a top down and bottom up methodology, again largely failing to produce any explanation that relates to this feeling of aliveness and awakeness that is subjective experience.

• Gestalt psychology probably has most to offer Buddhists in their pursuit of understanding what it feels like to be conscious of something. Adding in research on memory, we start arriving at a theory in science that closely echoes that of Buddhism, albeit without the concept of enlightenment.

When it comes to Buddhism we can look at viññāna from two angles. First, trying to find in the lexicon of Pali vocabulary what word or words best sums up what we feel in English, when we refer to ‘consciousness’. In this sense Viññāna does not measure up to the job. Alternatively we can look at what viññāna means in the suttas and try to find suitable English words to describe it. The lack of clarity between these two angles of approach has lead, in my own humble opinion to some severe mix-ups of meaning that need to be addressed.

As a final part to the paper, we will consider the limitations of viññāna and look for clues as to what might lie beyond it. Most especially, does the unconditioned proscribe of any form of consciousness?

Common ‘Consciousness’ in the English language

In the Western understanding of the word, consciousness is something that continues throughout your lifetime. It may retreat somewhat while you are sleeping but most people hold that their consciousness continues in some form and only ends upon the final death of the physical body. In this sense, ‘consciousness’ is fulfilling that desperate human need to posit a soul or self, even if only by bearding a quality of this self, rather than pointing out the actual self in experience. In Thai the common understanding of ‘Winyaan’ is something similar, being an undefined kind of spirit or disembodied ghost. In fact this understanding of the word consciousness is only a common mans understanding and not really a definition or technical explanation. I bring it up at this point to point out that the vague and unexamined idea of consciousness being a permanent quality of the ‘self’ pervades the English language, and can infiltrate people’s understanding of the word when they come to Buddhism.

Let me show an example from a personal message from Bhikkhu Pesala, a well known Western monk of many Pansa when responding to the proposition that consciousness must cease in the Buddhist understanding of Enlightenment (an idea I shall discuss later):

Nibbāna is not the cessation of consciousness. If one is not conscious, then one is either fast asleep, in a coma, or dead, but the meditator who realises nibbāna is said to be wide awake, hence Buddha = the Awakened One. Nibbāna is sometimes referred to as the cessation of perception and feeling, but not as the cessation of consciousness. Nibbāna is the object of the supramundane magga-citta and phala-citta — which are supramundane types of consciousness.

If you're talking about parinibbāna, then that is a different thing to realising nibbāna. At the moment of parinibbāna, then the consciousness of the Arahant or Buddha ceases never to arise again.

Sankhāra paccaya viññāna — formations condition consciousness — means that the nature of consciousness depends on the mental formations. One does not precede the other, but they arise together. Sankhāra means any of the fifty mental states (cetasikā) that arise together with consciousness and have the same object. Vedanā and saññā — feeling and perception — are the other two cetasikā and also the other two of the five aggregates — form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness.

Consciousness is not a thing, but a process. Each moment of consciousness is conditioned by preceding moments of consciousness, and the present consciousness conditions subsequent moments of consciousness.

(Bhikkhu Pesala via Internet forum, e-sangha, , 5 Nov 2006)

The discrepancy seems to arise with the unexamined idea that consciousness is a pervasive medium, into which things arise and cease. In this sense it is confused with the Pali concept of ‘citta’, which itself actually has a number of definitions and connotations in the Suttas. Abhidhamma scholars claim that citta and consciousness, as well as mano[1], all refer to the same thing. Further through this paper we will see that viññāna arises and ceases continually: that means not just the object of consciousness, but consciousness itself ceases and arises. As each moment of consciousness ceases another arises to take its place, giving the illusion of continuity. If this is indeed the case, then there can be no problem with the idea that consciousness must cease in order to attain enlightenment.

Consciousness in Psychology

Psychologists have an interesting approach to consciousness. Despite the best efforts of the brilliant William James in the early 1900s, psychology chose to pursue consciousness via empirical objectivism, and not subjectivism. By the subjective approach James reasoned that one can learn about the nature of consciousness by listening and reporting the descriptions of different patients in various states of mind (both healthy and ill). This was ruled out as too vague by the fearsome march of empirical research intent only upon descriptive models that could be measured. Behaviourism was later born, which measured an animal’s behaviour as a description of its consciousness. In fact, consciousness was discounted entirely in favour of behaviour. Who cares what the experience is? – all that matters is what the animal does!

The Fourth Edition of Themes and Variations in Psychology, Wayne Weiten, 1998 Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, is a good example of the approach of psychological research into consciousness. In an almost tacit acknowledgement that they have no idea at all what consciousness actually is, it immediately focuses on variations in consciousness – again with the unwritten assumption that consciousness is a continuous medium through which perceptions pass. First up is the EEG sensor, which is a crude measurement of electrical activity of the neo-cortex. Considering there are more connections between neurons than there are stars in the universe, 20-30 electrodes on the skull can hardly show what consciousness is. Still, it is something that can be measured, and on of the first researchers in this field, Joe Kamiya[2] did train patients to alter their EEG readings and then ask the subjects to describe what they had done. Famously, none of the subjects could give coherent or conforming descriptions. The book goes on to report on differences in body and EEG scans during REM sleep, waking, excitement, and deep sleep. One thing the research does show is that at all levels of ‘consciousness’ there is activity, supporting the notion that one is always conscious, but that this consciousness is altered in forms of sleep or loss of ‘consciousness’. Perhaps they should concentrate their consciousness research on Boxers.

To the book’s credit, it does mention meditation and Eastern meditative traditions. Only to then measure those states on the trusty old EEG or on oxygen/carbon dioxide consumption, rather than look at some of the theories and understandings of consciousness from India. It continues by analysing the effects of drugs on consciousness, or more accurately, the effect on mood and behaviour. Dependence, physical effects, chemicals that are used by psychiatrists … all there, and not a word about what consciousness actually feels like. No word on how it works. The drugs however, do lead on to the next port of call along the road of the Great Western Blind Spot. Neurotransmitters – those tiny quantities of hormones that increase or decrease the synaptic junction’s connectivity; more qualitative than quantitative.

Consciousness in Neuro-science

There was a time when the biological cell was considered to be the building block of all matter. In a way it is, but at that time it was understood there would be nothing smaller. Modern science of the era had discovered the building blocks of life. When Czech Jan Evangelista Purkyne observed small granules while looking at plant tissue through a microscope, they were almost considered to be organic atoms – the smallest organic units that could exist. Years earlier in 1665 Robert Hooke had given the name ‘cells’ to this strange wonder, almost in premonition that these tiny spots would contain something further – a black box. Then cell theory, developed in 1839 by Matthias Jakob Schleiden and Theodor Schwann, stated that all organisms comprise one or more cells, and all cells come from pre-existing cells. Vital functions of an organism occur within cells, and all cells contain the hereditary information necessary for regulating cell functions and for transmitting information to the next generation of cells. Years later cells were broken and analysed, and finally the DNA double helix was identified. The DNA breaks up and reforms using material in its immediate environment, forming polypeptide chains that spontaneously ‘fold’ and make proteins and enzymes, the functions of which are only just being unravelled in the mid 2000s.

There is no corresponding black box when it comes to neurology. The entire neuron has been examined in every detail. There is nothing we do not know about the neuron, except perhaps the guiding mechanisms for their growth. Neurons fire if there is enough charge built up fast enough in the dendrites. Then the axiom fires a single pulse, always of the same duration and voltage. Science has seen and know the neuron in its entirety, and has no idea how it ‘works’. Neurons are hard wired too. They do not move, break up, reform as one thinks or cognizes. They make no chemical factories in the way that DNA does. There are no even half convincing theories of how neurons can make up thoughts, images, sounds or make decisions. Consciousness has evaded detection on every level of the neuron.

On the Macro scale, the larger picture of overall brain activity and its relation to consciousness, there has been just as little success. EEG scans can only measure the generalised activity of the neo-cortex. PET scans reveal the glucose absorption of the areas of the brain, showing in real time, among other things, that the more we think, the more the brain absorbs blood glucose. The Buddha actually pointed this out in the dvedāvitakka[3] sutta when he said that indulging in kusala thoughts, even all day and night, is blameless, but makes the body tired. We can now see that thinking cranks the brain into overdrive so that it absorbs blood sugars at a faster rate even than majour muscle groups. No wonder office work is so tiring.

The watchword in the first decade of the 21 century is fMRI scans which reveal which areas of the brain ‘light up’ when doing what tasks. Thus we can see that language tends to be received in one area, Wernicke’s area, and formulated in another Brocca’s area. ‘Light up’ is hardly consciousness. Quite what is happening is beyond understanding just as it is on the micro level. Only crude ‘maps’ of generalised areas have been laid out. So far, there have been no black boxes to hold promise of later enlightenment. We can see all the physical material involved, but still have no idea how or if it forms consciousness.

Psychology’s Contribution

One of the few things we have learned from psychology is that the brain has an evolutionary line. Brain stem functions seem to be more basic than neo-cortex functions. In fact, when differences are monitored or induced in brain stem functions they are rarely reported as ‘conscious’. They may well have a conscious effect – such as disabling the Hippocampus prevents short term memory being passed into long term storage. Other areas can induce or prevent sleep. But one thing we have learned is that practically all ‘conscious’ perception and behaviour is carried out in the neo-cortex – the cauliflower like outer layer of the brain where it meets the skull. This is significant, since practically all the functions of the neo-cortex have corresponding areas in lesser mammals and other creatures in the brain stem regions. For example, all animals, even those without a neo-cortex, have a motor-cortex centre of the brain in the brain stem. Humans do too, but it seems to be overridden by the outer layers. For example the cerebellum at the rear of a human’s head controls movement that is automated. It can do the walking for ‘you’ while ‘you’ are off thinking. You can see the significance here. The lower brain areas and brain stem can control practically all aspects of our behaviour and activity, but not consciously. Consciousness seems to be a higher brain function. In Buddhist terms you can do an action unconsciously, and there is little karmic weight attached to that. If you do an act with clear intention and mindfulness, there is more karmic weight. Psychology has proven that ‘lesser’ animals have problems learning with any speed, while higher animals exhibit ‘insight’ learning, meaning that once they have ‘figured out a problem’ they can adjust all following behaviour accordingly. Cats for example, have very little insight learning, no matter how intelligent you think your cat is. The lesson to learn from this is that much of our brain functions can continue all by themselves, without our ‘conscious’ involvement. Does this prove Freud was right ? Is there a seething ocean of unconscious? Is there a barely knowable sub-conscious lying beneath the tip of the iceberg of the mind? It seems to be vindicated here. However, the presentation of Karma in Buddhism, as something that relates to your future, and not as your past dictating how you are, suggests that the Freudian view of consciousness has little place in Buddhism. Find attached in Appendix I a report that outlines research into the idea that your decisions are made long before you consciously ‘decide’ them – giving substance to the idea that the ‘lower’ brain regions equate to our subconscious.

On the other hand, the idea that the developed neo-cortex is responsible for ‘consciousness’ and that many if not most of our activities are carried on by the automated unconscious areas of the brain leaving the conscious, perceptive cortex to worry about conscious issues, fits nicely with the 6 sense model of viññāna, reincarnation notwithstanding. On this note, the Buddhist aversion to abortion is argued against by Dzochen Buddhist Sam Harris who points out that an embryo used in stem cell research comprises only about 150 cells. Compare this with a common fly which has over 150 000 cells in its brain. If there is any relation at all between neurological complexity and consciousness we should, Harris argues, allow stem cell research to be carried out without worry of harming anything conscious. To the argument that the embryo has the potential to be a human, he shows that all cells have such potential, having a full DNA set, and therefore every time you blow your nose you are committing a holocaust.

Memory

In this regard psychology’s research into memory is most relevant. It seems we have a short-term memory of most of our sensory input, that rapidly dissolves if attention is not paid to it. However, if there is something that catches the attention, something with some karmic weight, then we are able to turn attention to that thing, and it appears in the conscious mind. This is entirely in line with what we know of the sutta version of viññāna. Take for example the situation where you are reading a book, and are absorbed in it. Are you hearing the sounds that are around you ? Are you ‘conscious’ of them? Can you taste the tastes in your mouth or feel the sensations in your feet ? If however, someone says your name, suddenly your attention is turned to that. You know what was said a few seconds beforehand, even though you were reading. If you had not placed attention on to the sound, it would have slipped by and forgotten with out the sounds ever reaching consciousness. Similarly the sensations in your feet, while you are reading, are not felt. If however something slithers across them, your attention is grabbed, and turned to your feet. In that instant you are not feeling the clothes on your back, or the sounds in your ears. This directing of attention around the sensual experience is the process that is described in the suttas.

But to finish off the psychological angle before moving on; psychologists have studied memory in detail. One detail is, if you do not give special attention to something, you will not remember it. This kind of conscious focussing is called ‘selective attention’ and it acts as a filter to screen out unsought stimuli, and to reinforce consciousness of objects you wish to attend.

Sensory Memory : - This is a very short term memory indeed – lasting less than a second. It allows all sensory input to be available for a brief moment. If something stands out or is important to you depending on your karmic interests or something jars your constructs, then you have a split second to put your attention on it. Otherwise it fades from the zone of retrievable memory. A typical experiment around this was conducted by psychologist George Sperling (1960) who flashed three rows of 4 letters on a card to subjects. Moments later a buzzer would indicate which row of letters was to remembered. If the buzzer went less than a second later, the subjects could remember the row, but anything longer and it was rapidly vanishing from memory. Similar experiments show sound last slightly longer. The advantage with Sensory memory is that it covers a lot of input. It can hold a lot of information, more than you can be consciously aware of.

Next is short-term memory, and this lasts for up to 20 seconds. You will experience this when you remember a phone number, but without repeating it to yourself or using some such memorisation trick, it will fade from your conscious reach after about 20 seconds. Rehearsal is the method to transfer to long term memory. A way to measure the endurance of short term memory is to flash a set of numbers to a subject and then require them to count backwards from 100 in increments of 3. This stops the subject rehearsing the item to be remembered. In compliance with Gestalt perception, a sequence of letters like FBI is registered as one thing, where QUB has to be registered as a sequence of three letters. How do you rehearse ? You repeat the thing to yourself consciously. Here again conscious attention is creating a strong karma around the thing to be remembered. It seems consciousness is a tool for accelerated learning.

Conclusions

We can see that psychology has a lot of research into areas of perception and consciousness that relate to Buddhism, and to the six sense model that the Buddha used repeatedly. It can also shed light on Dependent Origination, though that is too in depth to be handled here, primarily due to the multiple ways to (mis)understand the model.

Following is how consciousness arises in the suttas in the six sense model, and how it is relevant to our practise. Throughout we will refer to the psychology outlined above.

Consciousness in Buddhism

While we have seen that there are different ways to measure and think about consciousness according to modern lineages of investigation, all the borders and distinctions tend to break down on close inspection. Superficially sleep would seem to be unconscious, but EEG and other scans shows that there are various layers of sleep with varying activity of the brain recorded. The link between neo-cortex (particularly frontal where perception ‘lights up’) activity and conscious experience also breaks down into loose correlation upon close inspection. On the other hand consciousness in Buddhism, as viññāna is clear and precise.

Before looking at this model it should be noted that the broad definitions that we found in the English sense of the word actually cover a variety of words in the Buddhist lexicon. For example, sampajañña, which is nicely rendered as ‘awareness’ is what we talk about in English when referring to that feeling of being here, being alive. ‘Awareness’ (Sampajjañña) indeed is closer to the English meaning of ‘consciousness’ than any other word in Buddhism, and is a good argument for changing the standardised transliterations of Buddhist key words. Paired with the word sati – to call in to mind – we have a clear meaning of ‘being aware of your own consciousness’ or being self conscious in the present. This rendering is maintained in the Thai which translates Sati + Sampajañña as ‘Ruu Dtua’ – to know yourself. This is being conscious, as opposed to the rather more vague ‘consciousness’. Sati is also memory in the sense of recall. In the experiments above the subjects attempts at remembering the letters flashed on the cards is recall. On the other hand, the sensory perception, and the associations derived therefrom, are saññā – perception. When you perceive something, you know its use. For example, you see a rose. You do not perceive a stalky piece of wood and oval red shapes stuck to it, but a complete rose. Same for a spoon – you perceive it according to its use, which relies on memory. Mix in with these words ideas of citta/arammana, and vitakka vicāra and we can see that there is a whole range of words that Buddhism will use in connection with consciousness that are used in varying connotations.

Six Sense Model

Of all the models the Buddha used to describe experience and the Path, the six sense model occurs the most – more than even the four noble truths, the eightfold path or dependent origination. It relates to the forming of moments of consciousness dependent on one of the six senses.

There are these six classes of consciousness: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind M 9.9

Note these are six different classes, and not one consciousness that jumps between them.

Just as a monkey faring through the woods, through the great forest catches hold of a bough, letting it go seizes another, even so that which we call thought, mind, consciousness, that arises as one thing, ceases as another both by day and by night. S II 95

In classifying the forms of consciousness, we see they are dependently arisen on the fuel that feeds them. Like any fire, no matter how long it has been burning, take away the fuel and the fire rapidly fades.

Just as dependent on what ever condition a fire burns, it comes to be reckoned in terms of that condition i.e. a log-fire, a grass-fire, dung-fire, even so consciousness is reckoned by the condition on which it arises, ie.e eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness etc…

In the Simile of the Elephant’s Footprint, sutta 28 Majjhima Nikaya, the progress of the citta as it embarks on a trail of conscious formation, is broken into elements that reflect what we looked at in the psychological models.

When the eye is intact and external forms hove into range, and there is the corresponding [conscious] engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. M28

The ‘engagement’ is tajjo samannāhāro and is explained by the commentary to mean manasikāra, or attention. Narada’s translation of the Abhidhammattha Sangaha explans manasikāra as follows:

The literal meaning of the term is ‘making in the mind’. Turning the mind towards the object is the chief characteristic of manasikāra. It is like the rudder of a ship, which is indispensable to take her directly to her destination. Mind without mansikara is like a rudderless ship. Manasikāra directs the mind to the object, Vitakka throws the mind onto its object.

This form of attention, is very much reminiscent of the 5 door adverting consciousness also found in the same manual.

So here is a description that was later echoed by psychology – that you need not just the eye and forms in order to see, but also conscious engagement. Then consciousness arises dependent on that sense. And so on for the other senses. Once there is consciousness added to the mux, then comes ‘Contacting’ or Phassa. I call it ‘contacting’ rather than contact because it follows after the object has arisen in as consciousness according to the directive of attention. Venerable Nyānatiloka agrees in a note in the Abhidhamma Sangaha p79, he suggests impression, sense impression or conscious impression as words for Phassa. Thus it is not contact between the sense and object, but the sense and object meeting, spotlighted by attention, that forms the subjective sense of Contacting the object. Thus we see in innumerable suttas that contact comes after the consciouness based on the sense has arisen. For example M137 lists:

• Six internal sense bases

• Six external bases

• Six bases of consciousness

• Six bases of contact

• Eighteen bases of mental exploration (six x joy, grief, equanimity)

Or at M18, The Honeyball, we find it categorically stated:

Depending on eye and forms eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contacting. With contacting as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives that one thinks about. What one thinks about one mentally proliferates.

So here we see what psychology has been investigating. That somehow one senses the environment first on a broad scale, but something catches the attention. Then Manasikāra directs the mind to that object (it must have arisen in some way for manasikāra to know to direct the attention there), and consciousness arises dependent on that object. From there the whole gamut of suffering is spawned. Buddhism makes no mention of the prior Sensory memory, as it is only concerned with the consciousness that arises dependent on focussing attention. Perhaps we can illustrate this by pointing out the difference between hearing and listening, or seeing and looking at. In both cases there is a conscious engagement and focussing of the mind on that particular sense.

Case for Cognition

Because of this discrepancy between the western concept of consciousness, and the Buddhist terminology, I propose that a far superior word for viññāna is cognition. When there is conscious engagement, one cognizes the object – this is a stage in the process that comes after simple sensory perception. Not only is cognition the correct word for this phenomenon, but also it avoids all the confusion with the sense that consciousness is a continuous medium. I do grant however, that the latter has grounds for argument based on the suttas, but it is not a view I hold, nor is it very tenable in the face of countless suttas that describe the cessation of consciousness.

A couple of examples might help matters at this point. Psychology shows that a tennis player does not cognize the tennis ball until after it has been served and hit. He will have no conscious knowing of the ball and its trajectory, until after his body has already started moving in response. In purely neurological terms this is not so surprising, as the lower brain stem functions, which are unconscious, are taking charge of the action (based indeed upon previous conscious and intentional learning). The conscious thinking mind is way behind, only providing commentary after the ball has been returned. This is why many meditation teachers describe thought as an impostor, or as a commentator. It comments on actions already taken (see Appendix I)

Similarly a runner will only be ‘conscious’ of the starting gun, after it has fired and he ahs already started running. Other research shows just how much of our activity can be controlled by unconscious neural functions while the ‘conscious’ element is otherwise engaged. The best example is work by Earnest Hilgard in 1989 and 1992 where the term highway hypnosis was coined. This should be a familiar experience to all drivers – you can drive a long distance, lost in thought and have no conscious experience of indicating, braking, etc… as one is otherwise engaged. Thus it would be more accurate to describe where cognition is rather than where consciousness is. Cognition is with thinking about the football game you just watched. Though the brain has been taking care of driving, where have YOU been, the driver ? cognition was with thinking. And with cognition is the sense of self. If one is to experience non-self, one will see the end of this form of cognizing based on the senses.

On a final note here, though cognition has been studied independently of other factors, the teachings on the Khandhas repeatedly tell us that no one of the khandhas can arise independently of the others.

M102, Pañcattaya Sutta

That any recluse or Brahmin could say: “apart from material form, apart from feeling, apart from perception, apart from formations (Sankhāra), I shall describe the coming and going of consciousness, its passing away and reappearance, its growth, increase and maturation, that is impossible.

The sutta tellingly continues

That is conditioned and gross, but there is the cessation of Sankhāra. Having known ‘there is this,’ seeing the escape from that, the Tathāgata has gone beyond that.

“Monks, whoever says “separate from materiality, separate from sensations of feeling, separate from sense-awareness, separate from volitional-cognition, I will establish the coming and going of consciousness; its disappearance, rebirth, continuance, growth and development” ~ Such a condition does not exist.” [SN. 22.53]

I might finally make mention there that ‘cognizing’ also steers the understanding properly distant from any lingering Freudian notions of sub-conscious and unconscious, neither of which have anything to do with what you are cognizing with your senses and conscious engagement. In fact, throughout Buddhism there is no real counter part to the sub-conscious and unconscious, except some vague connections with karma and bhavanga.

Cessation of Consciousness

Cognition of materiality (nāmarūpa) is the cause; cognition of materiality is the condition for the recognition of the base of consciousness. [MN.109]

And what is consciousness? Monks, there are these six collectives of consciousness; consciousness of the eye, consciousness of the ear, consciousness of the nose, consciousness of the tongue, consciousness of the body and consciousness of the mind. This, monks, is called consciousness. With the arising of cognition of materiality (nāmarūpa) is the arising of consciousness, with the extinction of cognition of materiality is the extinction of consciousness. [SN.22.56]

For some reason when the idea of cessation of consciousness is raised, so are Buddhist’s hackles. As we saw in the Bhikkhu Pesala letter at the opening of this paper, most people feel that if there is no consciousness, then one is either dead, comatose, or very firmly asleep. But the suttas abound with references to the cessation of consciousness. Perhaps if we use the words ‘cognizing’ and ‘contacting’ rather than consciousness and contact, the aversion is, so to say, avoided.

If the cause of the arising of eye-consciousness should altogether , in every way, utterly come to cease without remainder, would any eye-consciousness be evident?

Surely not

Well, it is by this method that the Tathāgata has explained and shown that this consciousness also is without self. [S IV 103]

There is lots of evidence to show how the sense of self arises with the sense of consciousness, and how the former disappears when the latter finds no base.

There is cessation of formations. Having known ‘there is this’ and seeing the escape from that, the Tathāgata has gone beyond that. [M102.24]

In this sutta the Buddha tells us that Nibbāna is attainable here and now, when Sankhāra cease. In Dependent origination we know that when Sankhāra cease, so do consciousness, name-and-form, six sense base etc… Again it is overlooked by most people who cannot envision the six sense bases disappearing, since even the Buddha still had the six senses after enlightenment. But when you consider that the six senses only arise after conscious engagement, it becomes plain that it is not the eye that vanishes, but only the conscious engagement of it, and losing oneself in the signs and feelings that arise dependently on it. Could the Buddha still see? The range of mind of an enlightened one is imponderable – and your head will split into seven pieces before you understand it. But it is clear enough that the conscious engagement of the senses has been put aside. Other mystics such as Eckhart Tolle describe conscious engagement and thinking as arising only sporadically, without attachment, as needed by the demands of the present moment.

In him who contemplates the enjoyment of all that makes for enfettering, there comes descent of cognizing. Name-and-form are conditioned by cognizing, the six senses by name-and-form …. When there is no such contemplation, there is no cognizing etc…. [S II p64]

So if consciousness ceases, and as we have seen, Sankhāra also cease, we have a working model of consciousness/cognition that fits in well with dependent origination, where we see in reverse cycle that all the links independently cease. Consciousness and sankhāra have to cease in order for ignorance to cease.

But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of consciousness; with the cessation of consciousness cessation of name-and-form. [M 38]

May it be Lord that a monk can acquire such concentration that in this body, together with its consciousness he has no notion of ‘I’ ‘mine’ or any tendency to vain conceit

In this matter, a monk has this idea: this is the calm, the excellent state – to wit, cessation from all activities (Sankhāra), the forsaking of all subsrate of rebirth, the destruction of craving, passionless, making to cease, nibbāna. That is how. [A I 115]

It should be clear by now that cognizing has to cease for nibbāna to arise.

The ‘I’ in Mine

Consciousness and/or cognizing is intimately bound up with the sense of self. Psychology has been seeking consciousness itself, in the hope that the answers wherefrom will lead to an understanding of what the self is. Other psychologists have a different take on it, feeling that the sense of self and the sense of consciousness as the feeling of ‘I am’ are intimately bound up together. One must then surmise that if you can find the ‘self’ then you will have a basis for understanding what consciousness is. After all, consciousness is the one thing that is uniquely and irreversibly ones own, Yung’s universal consciousness not withstanding. In the quote above we found that the sense of ‘I’ disappears with the fading away and cessation of mind states (sankhāra). In which case it makes sense that it is with mind states, and the following conscious engagement of the senses, that the sense of self arises.

Samanupassanásutta.m

(Viewpoints)

At Sávatthi. “Monks, there are ascetics and Brahmins who hold to the conceited viewpoint of a ‘Self’, in various and particular ways, all of which pertain to the five-bases of conditionality subject to be identified with. Which five?”

“Monks, there is an untaught-commoner who does not take notice of the Wise Ones, who is not trained in the Doctrines of the Wise Ones nor is he possessed of the wisdom of the Doctrines of the Wise Ones - who does not take notice of Refined Persons, who is not trained in the Doctrines of the Refined Persons nor is he possessed of the wisdom of the Doctrines of the Refined Persons, He is of the viewpoint that materiality is ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ possesses materiality, or materiality is in ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ is in materiality. He is of the viewpoint that sensations of feeling are ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ possesses sensations of feeling, or sensations of feeling are in ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ is in sensations of feeling. He is of the viewpoint that sense-awareness is ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ possesses sense-awareness, or sense-awareness is in ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ is in sense-awareness. He is of the viewpoint that volitional-cognition is ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ possesses volitional-cognition, or volitional-cognition is in ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ is in volitional-cognition. He is of the viewpoint that consciousness is ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ possesses consciousness, or consciousness is in ‘Self’, or ‘Self’ is in consciousness.

Therefore because of these viewpoints this ‘I am’ has not vanished. Therefore, monks, because this ‘I am’ has not vanished, he is beset with these five characteristics; the eye characteristic, the ear characteristic, the nose characteristic, the tongue characteristic and the body characteristic. There exists, monks, the mind; there exists its phenomena and there exists the factor of ignorance. Born of ignorant contact, monks, the untaught-commoner is influenced by sensations; thus it occurs to him ‘I am’, thus it occurs to him ‘I am this’, thus it occurs to him ‘I exist’, thus it occurs to him ‘I shall not exist’, thus it occurs to him ‘I shall be composed of materiality’, thus it occurs to him ‘I shall not be composed of materiality’, thus it occurs to him ‘I shall be composed of sense-awareness’, thus it occurs to him ‘I shall not be composed of sense-awareness’, thus it occurs to him ‘I shall consist of neither sense-awareness nor not of sense-awareness’.

But the learned Noble Disciple, does not relate to sensate events arising within the khandhas as ‘self’.

Monks, the five characteristics exist right there, although for the learned noble disciple; ignorance has been abandoned and knowledge has arisen. Therefore with the fading away of ignorance and the arising of knowledge [read ~ seeing things as they truly are]; thus it does not occur to him ‘I am’, thus it does not occur to him ‘I am this’, thus it does not occur to him ‘I exist’, thus it does not occur to him ‘I shall not exist’, thus it does not occur to him ‘I shall be composed of materiality’, thus it does not occur to him ‘I shall not be composed of materiality’, thus it does not occur to him ‘I shall be composed of sense-awareness’, thus it does not occur to him ‘I shall not be composed of sense-awareness’, thus it does not occur to him ‘I shall consist of neither sense-awareness nor not of sense-awareness’.

“Monks, whoever says “separate from materiality, separate from sensations of feeling, separate from sense-awareness, separate from volitional-cognition, I will establish the coming and going of consciousness; its disappearance, rebirth, continuance, growth and development” ~ Such a condition does not exist. [SN. 22.53]

So we can draw the conclusion, that according to Buddhism, cognizing can cease, and with it the sense of self. What then remains? Is one finished, with no more awareness remaining? The Buddha was asked this question often in the form of Does the Tathāgata remain after the passing away of the mortal body? He would always avoid a direct answer, as this any answer would misdirect the listener. But at other points he did make some description that is sufficient to know that one is not dissolved and dissipated to the corners of the universe, but experiences the bliss of nibbāna.

Unbounded Consciousness

Consciousness which is non-manifestive, endless, lustrous on all sides… Here it is that earth, water, fire and air no footing find. Here again are long and short, fine and course, pleasant and unpleasant, and name-and-form cut off without exception. When consciousness comes to cease – all these are held in check herein. [D1.223]

There monks, I declare is no coming, no going, no stopping, no arising or passing away. It is not established, it does not go on, it has no subject. This indeed is the end of suffering. [Ud 80]

Why does consciousness crop up here? The main point is that with the cessation of cognizing and the whole gamut of dependently originated suffering, there is a form of knowing and being that is blissful. Sariputta commented on this saying “This nibbāna is bliss, this nibbāna is bliss” and when asked how nibbāna can be blissful when there is no feeling (vedanā) he replied “ it is precisely because there is no vedanā that it is blissful”.

The freed consciousness, or awareness that is not tied to cognizing certain senses, is not a heavenly state, being superior to all the deva realms:

Consciousness which is non-manifestive, infinite and lustrous all round: it does not partake of solidity of earth, cohesiveness of water, hotness of fire, or the movement of the air, the creaturehood of creatures, the devahood of devas, the pajāpatihood of Pajāpati, the Brahmahood of Brahma, the radiance of the Radiant ones, the lustre of the Lustrous ones, the Vehapphalahood of the Vehapphala Brahmas, the overlordship of the Overlord and the allness of the all. D 11

There is monks that sphere wherein there is neither earth, water, fire, nor air, wherein is neither the sphere of infinity of space, nor the infinity of consciousness, nor that of nothingness, nor that of neither perception nor non-perception. Whereing there is neither this world not a world beyond, nor moon or sun. There monks I declare is no coming, no going, no stopping, no passing away or arising. It is not established [appavattam] it has no object [anārammanam] This indeed is the end of suffering. [Ud 80]

It is through wisdom that one stops the mind still, with the cessation of Sankhāra, there comes the insight into the way things really are, and the liberated heart – vimutti ñānadassana.

This mind monks is luminous, but it is defiled by extraneous defilements. That the uninstructed ordinary man does not understand as it really is. Therefore there is no mind development for him I declare.

This mind monks is luminous and it is released from extraneous defilements. That the instructed noble disciple understands as it is. Therefore there is mind development for him I declare. [A I , 10]

Then one knows as it really is the misery of the condition of the unenlightened mind, and the cognizing that is its function:

That impermanence, that suffering, that instability which is consciousness, that is the misery of consciousness. That restraint of desire and lust, that renouncing of desire and lust which are in consciousness that is the way of escape from consciousness. [S III, p27]

Conclusions

I have shown clearly in this paper that when we talk about consciousness we are all talking with different understandings of the word. This includes Buddhists, who have a common or psychological understanding pervasive in their interpretation of viññāna. Coupled with the rather problematic interpretations of dependent origination, we have a genuine problem within Buddhism on how to understand this term. The problem is generally hidden by giving different meanings to viññāna and other key terms depending on the context – for example the unfortunate tendency to consider ‘consciousness’ in Dependent origination as referring to relinking consciousness or rebirth. Hopefully I have highlighted some of the issues here in advance of my upcoming thesis on this topic, where I will outline a new interpretation of dependent origination that conforms to psychological models, common sense, and most importantly, the suttas.

Bibliography

* The Middle Length Discourses, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy 19995 Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi

* The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, Wisdom Publications, Boston, 2000, Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi

* The Long Discourses of the Budhda, Wisdom Publications, Boston, 1995, Translated by Maurice Walshe

* Path of Purification, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy 1991, Bhikkhu Ñānamoli

* Pāli Text Society, Translations of Vinaya, Abhidhamma, Anguttara Nikaya, and Khuddaka Nikaya.

* Pali Buddhist Dictionary, by Ven. Nyanatiloka, Buddha Shamma Education Association Inc, PDF internet publication.

* Indian Buddhism, A survey with Bibliographical Notes, Hajime Nakamura, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi, 1987

* Buddhism – a History, Noble Ross Reat, Jain Publishing Company, 1994

Summaries of majour psychological Personality Theories, Dr C. George Boeree, Shippensburg University, web page viewed on June 2 2008:

*The Fourth Edition of Themes and Variations in Psychology, Wayne Weiten, 1998 Brooks/Cole Publishing Company

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[1] According to the Abhidhammatth Sangaha

[2] Nowlis & Kamiya, 1970

[3] Sutta 19 Majjhima Nikāya

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