1 - Indiana Military



UNIT CITATION

OF

81st ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION

(106th Infantry Division)

UNITED STATES ARMY

FOR

CONDUCT IN GERMAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE

16 TO 23 DECEMBER, 1944

WITH

SUPPORTING NARRATIVE

HEADQUARTERS 106TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO # 443, U. S. ARMY

25 May 1945

200.6 (A)

SUBJECT: Unit Citation

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth United States Army

APO #408, United States Army

1. Uinder the provisions of Section IV, Circular No. 333. War Department, 1943 and pursuant to authority contained in Section VII, Memorandum No. 21. Headquarters, Fifteenth U. S. Army, 4 March 1945. subject: “Awards and Decorations«, it is requested that the enclosed citation of the 81st Combat Battalion be approved by the Army Commander.

1. Narrative.

In the early morning of 18 December 1944, a heavy artillery barrage was heard at the command post of the 81st Combat Battalion at Heuem, Belgium. At approximately 0800, a messenger from Company “A” arrived to report considerable activity in the sector of the 422d Infantry, to which the company was then attached.

A short time later Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Biggs, Jr., Battalion Commander, returned from the Division CP at St. Vith with reports of a concerted German attack along the Division front, and orders to assemble the Battalion to be immediately deployed as infantry. Schonberg, Belgium was chosen as an assembly point, and a quartering party dispatched there to choose covered assembly areas for each company. Members of the S-3 section went to Schonberg to establish an operational CP.

Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Lewthwaite, who had gone with the quartering party, returned with the report that Schonberg was at that time undergoing a severe shelling by heavy artillery, most of which was falling near the bridge in the center of town. It was realized that the destruction of this bridge would seriously cripple both lateral and vertical communications in the Division sector, since Schonberg was the central point in the Division road net. Immediately, Colonel Riggs sent Lieutenant Souers and two members of the reconnaissance section to obtain data on the bridge and possible fords. They reported to Colonel Riggs that due to the heavy shelling, Schonberg vas no longer a feasible assembly area for the Battalion. This together with the fact that it had been learned that all of C and D Companies and one platoon of A Company had already been committed to the fire-fight with their respective combat teams, forced abandonment of the previous plan. Lieutenant Sowers, Lieutenant Hayden and Mr. House were ordered to return to Schonberg and evacuate all the heavy equipment which D Company had left there when committed. After considerable difficulty occasioned by the shelling of the area around the bridge, within which the bulldozer, the prime mover and the trailer were all located, and due to the necessity of searching the town for other pieces of equipment, all equipment was evacuated except one 1-ton trailer which was hit by a shell before it could be moved. The operational CP was at the same time evacuated from Schonberg only a few minutes before it was hit by a shell-burst. Inspection of one of the shell craters and measurement of a fragment of one of the shells revealed this extended barrage to be from guns of approximately 380 mm. presumably railway guns. This was later confirmed by Division Artillery Headquarters.

Meanwhile, A Company was in the thick of the fight. The company commander had dispatched his work parties at 0800, and had departed for Battalion Headquarters to report the early morning activity and to attend a scheduled meeting of company commanders. The 1st Platoon, under Lieutenant Coughlin, commenced work near Regimental Headquarters of the 424 Infantry. The 3rd Platoon, under Lieutenant Voerner. was laboring in the area of the 3d Battalion, and became engaged in the fire-fight early, losing all contact with the Company from that time on. The remainder of the Company, located at Auw, Germany, first heard rifle and automatic weapons fire in the near vicinity at about 0930. Due to the snow suits which the enemy was wearing and foggy conditions, visibility was poor, and elements of the attacking enemy forces had advanced to within several hundred yards of Auw and delivered direct rifle fire on members of the company before the situation was fully appreciated. Immediately, the 2nd Platoon was dispersed and sent Into previously prepared positions from which they commenced the defense of the town. Company headquarters personnel took up positions in the building which housed the CP and began to return the fire.

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At this point, the 1st Platoon, having heard firing from the direction of A. returned amidst heavy fire which was directed at then awl their vehicles. quickly dashed into the hone in which they were billeted and started returning the enemy five. At about 1100, members of the let Platoon, using tracer ammunition for the purpose. set fire to a barn across the road from their position. idle attess ttng to escape the blase. ten Barran infantrymen, who had been firing from the barn, wer, shot down by the cooks from Company Ssadqnarters.

Before noon enemy tanks entered Amy with additional infantry support for the attackers, and the three groups of A Company were isolated from each other. In order to avoid complete encirclement, Lieutenant Purtell's 24 Platoon withdrew up the Andler load shortly after soon. The enemy tanks proceeded up the main street with open turrots, carrying infantry. Man from the let Platoon and Company Raadquarters opened fire an them and infl is ted a considerable number of casualties. Thus action was followed by an intense fire from the enemy infantry while the tacks maneuvered into position to start firing on the houses occupied by the defenders. After tb• tanks opened fir*. Lieutenant Rutledge found it necessary to withdraw toward Andler with his Company Headquarters group. Turning their concentrated fire directly upon the one remaining point of resistance, the German tanks and infantry laid down a withering storm of

steel directed at the house occupied by Lieutenant Cotghlia's 1.5 Platoon. light rounds of point..blank fire from the tanks burst in the building, and the small arms fire increased in fury. B•allsing the position was untenable. Lieutenant Coughlin gave the order for withdrawal, which commenced at about 1500. At this point Tee 5 Edward S. Sri tbee insisted on remaining behind with his it-3 Sub..aachins gun to cover the Platoon's withdrawal across the open field at the rear of the house, even though he realised that death or capture would result. Tor this heroic action, Teo 5 Mithee (still MU.) was awarded the iistinguished Service Cross. This platoon joined a unit of the 5924 Field Artillery Pattnlfon and was eveonated to St. oith, where they made contact with. the remainder of their company the follow! ng day. The total casualties at Aar were twenty men. The 3d Platoon, committed with the 422d Infantry, is assumed to have been surrounded and captured with that regiment several days later.

At approximately 1030 on the moraine of 16 Decsmber, 3 Company vas ordered

by the Commanding Offieer of the 423d Regimental Combat Team to clear the village of

Blaialf. Germany of an occupying force of enegy which had infiltrated into that loans lion during the preceding night and early morning. tntracking at Schonberg, the company moved to a point about a half mile vest of Bletalf. from which they oontinosd on foot,

leaving the drivers and several machine gunners to protect the vehicles. Captain

Hynes directed Lieutenant Gordon to take one platoon into Bletalf to make a recon-

naissanoe in force, while the rest of the company covered their progress from positions

overlooking the town frost the south. Chief warrant Officer Carmichael arrived with

a truckload of ammunition at this point and aeeospanied Lieutenant Gordon and his man

on their mission. Upon entering the town, the platoon was met by a withering fire

from a aussbor of building• in which the Germans had set tip positions designed to hold the tow until reinforcing elements arrived. The engineer troops immediately deployed into vantage points for firing and begs to engage the enemy. Lieutenant Gordon.

displaying a disregard for his own safety and outstanding devotion to duty, continuously

moved from building to building, until he had accurately located each house in which the enemy troops were stationed. Mr. Carmichael then made his Bray out of the town with this information and made contact with a platoon of tank destroyer guns which wire located on the outskirts of town. By directing the fire of these guns on the occupied buildings, Mr. Carmichael enabled then to kill or monad a large pereentag! of the enemy and render the remainder ineffective, to that Lieutenant Gordon's platoon

could advance and mop up the occupied buildings. Kr. Carmichael thereafter returned to Battalion Headquarters. This was the last direct contact with that company.

The drivers. who had remained with their trucks, later reported that the tows underwent a terrific shelling by artillery in the lath afternoon and early evening of 16 December. The shelling vas partially directed at the track bivouac area, and

contias d intermittently e11 night. Just before dawn the following morning, the drivers were contacted by an artillery officer who ordered then to the rear, stating that his unit had been ordered to shell DIaiajf and the surrounding area. After telling his of the presence of their company in Bletaif and in defensive positions around it. they moved to Schonberg. where they remained until about 0715, when Berman tank* approached the village. At this time the drivers moved their vehicles to Heiem. where the Battalion Ct was located. reporting the uresenc• of tanks in Schonberg. his neceeittated the evacuation of the CA from that location.

Bo further contact with B Company was over made, but two reports of their actiri ty rev: received through other sources. After the retaking of the torn of Schonberg In January 1945. civilians in the town stated that that company had made its final stand in and about Schonberg about two days after the action had occurred at Bleialf. aye to the fact that B Company had been billeted to Schoxberg. the civilians were able :o id*atify members of the company. including Lieutenant Gordon. Also, in subsequent report on interrogation of a German officer it was revealed that the only place along this section of the front which appeared to have a defense organised in depth was in ohs vicinity of Bletalf. With the exceotion of a number of drivers, the company clerk Lad several men who were on detached service, the entire company is listed as missing In action. I t Is assumed that they were surrounded and captured by the enemy forces which aeoonpli shed the encirclaaent of the 423d Infantry, whom they .cure supporting.

Meanwhile. Headquarters and Service Company, located at Houem. Belgium. was

~ttempttng to keep abreast with the fast-changing situation and to effect the evacuation if the heavy equipment of the Battalion. The heavy shelling of Schonberg on the morning

of 16 December. and the shell t ag of Heuem in tha early of to moor of that d . coupled with sabotage by civilians and the infiltrating en+rmy effectively destroyed all wire communication. Constaat use of radio by the units in direct contact with the enemy made this means of communication with Division Headquarters ineffective. due to the priority of the never.ending stream of messages sent by the other units. Thus, the slog process of sending and receiving messages by actor messenger was necessary. As a result, orders were slow in arriving and information was always far behind the current situation when it was received.

All of the heavy equipaeat of the Battalion. •xceit one bvlldoeer, was succews. fully evacuated under the direction of the reconnaissance section. All Rvacuations were effected under hoary fire and the last vehicle from C Company in this convoy was trailed up one portion of the Vint*rspel t- ckhalenfeld !oad by machine gun and mortar fire.

portions of A Company Headquarters, under Lieutenant Rutledge . had arrived at the Battalion C? in the late afternoon of 16 Tcember and were used to reinforce the defensiTe positions in that vicinity. Captain Harmon returned to the C? at Ecuem that night with about a dozen men who were the survivors of his attempt to fight his way back to Avv on orders from the 42d 2egimental Combat ?ea Commander. As this group had approached Auv, they were hit by a volley of time-firs which burst directly above them. ?en casualties were suffered from this action.

Withdraving units passed through Reuem all through the night of 1-..17 December. After questioning of several units as they passed through, it became apparent that by very early on the morning of the 17th there was nothing between the C? anti the enemy except a light screen of achani sed cavalry. At 0230 Cal. Riggs returned from Division Headquarters with the information that the 7th Armored 1 ivision and Combat *Command B of the 9th Armored Division were arriving and an attack would commence at 0700 the following morning, aided by all the air support necessary. units of the 7th Armored Division were scheduled to pass the Yngineer Battalion CF Just prior to 0700 on the morning of the 17th. 'Roads were cleared to facilitate this m+at and Beadnarters and Service Company consolidated its position at He em. to pursuance of this plan. S Sgt Moyer and S $gt Deming of the reconnaisesnce section made their pay into Fchorbert at about 0430 to check the condition of the bridge in that torn and to gain information of possible enemy infiltration. They reported that the bridge was intact

that the town appeared to be clear of the enemy.

Shortly after daybreak on the morning of 17 December, some enemy smell area firs was directed at personnel dug in on the bills surrounding !euea. Reinforcing guards were sent out to protect the C? in the belief that the position could be held until the erpeoted. attack commenced. At 0& drfv ors of the B Cos ny trucks arrived at Heuem, a distance of about one and one-half miles. At the same time, orders were received by motor messenger from Division Headquarters to evacuate Kenem and assemble the available units of the Battalion at Rodt, several miles west of St Tith. The evacuation was accomplished with the loss of a 3/4 ton truck, carrying an SCR 193 radio, which became stuck in a ditch and had to be destroyed. As the last vehicle left Keuem. personnel riding in it saw as enemy tank around the corner on the approach road into the tows. As a delaying action, a platoon of A Company Blot Ingineer Combat 1attalion, was left aid was joined by two N-3$ from the 14th Cavalry group. This group forced deployment and del r of this estimated force of four enemy tanks and an infantry company.

At 1000 on 17 December, Lt Col Riggs received orders to assemble all avail.. able men from the Slot rngine.r Combat Battalion and the 168th 7ngineer Combat Battalion (an attached unit) and organise a task force for the def~(ane of the ep"roach

to st rith from the east s1ona the : nbexE-st Vith fit. T . total atr t avail.. able wee sliotly sore than two des, comprising all of Headquertars sM !lsnrice Co,paziy and about on...nhird of A Company of the Blot sneer Combat Battalion with

about one oospars7 from the 168th Rngi ex Combat Battalion. ertgtmn.t plan to orinise this defense about two atlas east of St Yith was diseartled when it vac found that the speed of the iir.or d edvunee had placed that point within onesy territory. '!. defensive position was then aeA up idong a wooded ridge about one all* east of It Qi th. near Pramerborg (set operational sap. inelossu a 2) . Rear 110„ all heavy equipment had been placed under onutrol of 'rrant Off tear (Jo) }ions* and evacuated to a wooded area northeast of Rod%, Belgium.

The enemy moral• at that tine was very high and the success of their initial attacks and the exploitation of their break-through combined to render the situation ertreaelp difficult for the defending forces. The main ene3pr thrusts of infantry supported by tanks had been effected on the north through Auw. (ermany, and oe the swath through Bleialf. Germacy, joining these two prongs at Schonberg. )olgiva, and continuing the attack to the vest toward the main communications center of the sector. %t Vith..bare Division Seadquarters vas located. This Juncture of the two attack-tug salients had cut off the 422d and 42d Combat Teams from the remainder of the Division, leaving St Pith open to a frontal attack by those two enemy elements. The larger picture revealed that deeper initial penetrations had been made to the is ediats north of ft with and a few alley south of St. with. In order for full exploitation of these smceesse• to be effected by the enemy, the oapture and use of the road oenter of St tith was necessary, so ass to provide lateral communication between thee* salient.. Thus, the defense of the town became extremely important, and the sole units initially undertaking that defense were the badly battered reanents of the 81st ingtneer Combat Battalion and the available portion of the 168th Xngtneer Combat Battalion under the eoawnd of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J Riggs, Jr., of the former unit.

Despite the many difficulties encountered from lack of adequate clothing. weapons and entrenching tools, and in the face of the confident attackers• superior both in numbers and available fire-power, the morale of the defenders was remarkably good. Available automatic weapons were amused and all positions dug in by 1600 hours. At least an hour previous to this completion of the defensive positions. four Gera hen y tanks, aaooapanl.d by at least a battalion of infantry. made their appearance on the edge of the woods about 1.000 yards east of these positions. At this point. an anti-tank gun from the Division Headquarters t'sfense Platoon opened fire on then. but the dun was knocked out tamed lately.

A platoon of six tank..destroyer cans from the 8224 Tank Destroyer Battalion was initially set up ahead of the first MIR with a platoon of engineer* screening then. Shwa tank destroyers, with new gums received only that morning without sights, fired by sighting over the tubes and forced the advancing tanks to take corer, without casualties to the German tanks. To consolidate the position on the final TR, these guns were ordered to proceed at once to positions in the forward edge of woods to their immediate rear about 100 yards. The tank destroyers moved north to accomplish this but were never reported again. After this exchange of fire, the enemy tanks turned their 8 guss on a group of son from the 168th Ingiaeer Combat Battalion who were

firing on then from positions on the south side of the road, overlooking the enemy positions, and inflicted severe casualties.

f~eanwwhile a forward observation post, about 400 yards in front of the

defending positions had been established in the edge of the woods with Lieutenant

Colonel William M. Slayden. Headquarters. 1III Corps and Lieutenant Levrthvalt~ . Lieutenant Sonars and T Sgt psolka of the gilt Tnaineer Combat Battalion manning the ~. by .aas of telephone oceanuication, they were able to pin-point the positions of the tanks and infantry for the ooa~and group on the hill at ?rumsrbezg .

This information was relayed to Division Artillery, but no units were in position to fire the mission. Therefore, the Division Air-Ground Liaison Officer wide contact with an American 1P .47 aircraft which was in the vicinity. and directed it to

the spot. ?he plane made four passes directly over the tanks before it located then. and then only one of the tanks had made the mistake of opening fire on the plane.

Thereafter, it made seven passes over the tanks. firing at them. and starting a fire

which disabled one of then. Casualties to the ground troops in the immediate vicinity were considerable. This was revealed by !so 4 Labes of the 81st Pigtneer Combat Battalion who was lying in the woods nearby while still in the process of infiltrating back to our lines from Herren. Sergeant Labe. had remained behind to destroy the 3/4 ton radio truck and the Signal Operations Ins truuctions, during the evacuation of the Battalion OP froe Hsu a*.

Shortly thereafter, visibility beeeme to poor that the OP could no longer

operate effectively. and it was removed to the rear. At this time, the men from

aeedgnarters and Service Company. 81st Bngineor Coabat Battalion. who had up until that time occupied positions an the north side of the Schonberg-st "kith Road were

removed and directed to protect the right (or south) flank of the position on the hill. Their previous position was filled by elements of the B Troop, 87th Reconnaissaaoe Squadron, which had arrived together with a platoon of medium tanks to pa rticipate in the defense. While Headquarters and Service Company was crossing the open

area between the woods on the north and south sides of the road, an enemy tank which

had worked its way up through a fire break in the woods. supported by infantry, opened fire on the company from a range of about 100 yards. Tee 6 aettersaz of Headquarters and Service Company was seriously wounded from this 88mm fire.

Thereupon. Captain ward of Headquarters and Service Company. 81st &ngine,r Combat Battalion. attempted to got one of the medium tanks to advance and fire on this tank. Tbs tank by that time . bad been issobil i ud by a group of engineers who pulled a 'daisy chain' of mines across in front of its advance, and snail sans fire had drirsn off its supporting infantry. The tank commander refused to expose his tank to the !lire fire, but after Captain V.td offered to ride behind the turret of the tank to direct it, the tank cosndsr agreed. Advancing to the crest of the bill, the two tanks began to exchange volleys. The first round of 88mm fire knocked Captain Yard from the tarrst of the Sharman tank, but he was uninjured. The third rood from the American tank knocked out the enemy tank, and our tank withdrew to defilade.

Lieutenant Colonel Riffs established his task force C? in the basement

of the house on the northwest ed*tser of the cross-roads s.t Pruaerberg, about fifty yards fro. the most forward Remy •lsiments. At about 1900. an enemy combat patrol of approximately twenty sun armed with automatic weapons penetrated the lines about thirty-six yards from this C?, and the darkness was pierced by a seemingly endless stream of tracer ammunition from the firing of both forces. Only about three casualties

resulted from this •znhan~e. although one aid can was subsequently shot while attaepttnj to reach one of the wounded non. The patrol was repulsed, but many of its wetb•rs still remained on the groves in the immediate vicinity. During the rest of the night. Americans and Geraaas were cc mingled in the front lines, and eo(ssent of any sort was very dangerous.

The only artillery support received by these defenders during the first several d&ys of the defense was that afforded by an armored Yield Artillery Battalion, whose liaison officer reported in to the task force Cr that night. and later arranged for a registering mission in the early hours of dawn.

Present at one time or another for the planning which took piece in the task force CP that night were officers of both engineer battalions, the B hoop of the 87th Bsconnaissance Scuadron. the 38th Armored Infantry. the Above aentiorad artillery battalion and attached platoon of media tanks from the 7th Armored Division. At about midnight. it was arranged to have Company B of the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion. 7th Armored Division. relieve the 188th Engineer Combat Battalion troops by digging in on the west side of the fire break which was to the rear of the existing positions. Platoon leaders of the engineer units were to establish contact with their asn and infore than of t? . relief so that they would not fire on the relieving Infanntry. The engineer officers were then to lend the infantry platoon leaders to their respective areas. After the positions were dug in and organised the engineers were to withdraw to the rear of the hill to be reorganised and immediately recommitted on the right (or south) flank of the position. atteecting thereby to establish contact with an adjacent coapsny of the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion to the mouth. This plan was worked out so as to separate Lee ricens from Germans who were intermingled all along the front line. By about 0300. the relief had been effected.

The engineer troops withdrew and reorganized. Then, reinforced by a platoon of heavy machine guns from Headquarters Company. 38th Armored Infantry, the engineer troops went into position on the right flank of the bill, as sho" is Operations gap. Inclosure 43. The officers and son from the 168th Engineer Combat Battalion sow nnebersd over two companies, one company having arrived during the night; both can-panics were committed on the south as shown in the sketch. The provisional piatoon of Headquarters and $er(iee Company on the south flank was withdrawn to a reserve position behind B Company, 38th Armored Infantry. l eanwhile the task force CP had been moved from atop the hill to a building at the foot of the hill. Colonel Riggs -die..

pa tohed a somber of his staff to contact the company commander of the M. Armored Infantry unit on the right to acquaint his with the proposed linking up.

Against this line-up, the Germans launched minor attacks in the early morning Ro,.xrs of 18 Xeeeaber, all of which were easily repulsed. At 0930, a stronger attack was mad. by a company of enemy supported by one Tiger tank in the sector of A Company. 81st Engineer Combat Battalion. This attack wee stopued and the tank was kAocked out while trying to turn around by fire from one of the Amerioan tanks of the 7th Armored Division, which had been placed in support of the engineer troops. This tank was directed up to its firing position for this mission by son from A Ceepeny, 81st Dimmer Combat Battalion. During this attack. Lieutenant Rutledge of A Co ray, 81st Engineer Combat Battalion. acting company commander, had moved ahead of his company line so as to determine the direction of enemy attack end better direct the fire of his company, which than consisted of sixty-four men. In the third attack. Lieutenant Rutledge was wounded in the shoulder, but still refused to

leave his position. Yinslly, daring the fourth attack he was killed. His personal ~xarsp1e of coolness under fire and extremo courage so inspired his wren that they were able to throw back successive attacks by numerically superior enemy forces and held

A vital section of the line. This action w s recognized by the posthumous avnrd of the 3roaso Star Medal to Lieutenant Rut,Iedga.

At approximately 1500 another attack of comvany strength was launched against the same sector and effected a penetration between A Como(. 81st !ngineer Combat Battalion end A Company, 23d Armored Infantry Battalion. Approximately two squads of Gorman infantry broke through into the rear area. The nenetr*tion which had occurred in the A Company sector extended to a depth of about seventy-five yards to the next successive fire break. At about 1600. A Company, 38th Armored Infantry relieved 3 Troop. 87th Reconnaissance Squadron. enabling it to be moved over to reinforce the sector where the penetration had occurred. While in the previous position, this troop h-ad lost about forty officers and men. A Company, 81st 7ngineer Combat Battalion end A Company, 23d Armored Infantry Battalion, had suffered about twenty per cent losses duringthe day's action.

With the provisional platoon from Hoadcu.arters and Serrice Company near the task force CP, Colonel Riggs personally lad the counterattack beck up the hill to eliminate the two squads of Germans in the rear area. Despite intense small arms and automatic weapons fins!, the positions were retaken. and the position consolidated before nightfall. This enabled the defenders to close the action of the 18th of December with a continuous line of defense extending from the positions of CO, 9th moored Division, on the south to a point northwest of St 7ith. (Sea inclosure 4). The provisional platoon under Captain yard had bean committed to close a gap between the 168th ngineer Combat Battalion and A Company. 234 Armored Infantry.

At 1700 Information was received by Colonel Riggs that the 106th Division Headquarters was moving west to Tielsalm and that the 81st 7ngirheer Combat Battalion was attached to the 7#.b Armored Division.

In the early morning hours of 19 December, B Company. 38th Armored Infantry attacked on orders and reestablished their portion of the MIA to the right of the Schonberg-8t with Road alczig the line of the original MIB established by the engineer troops on the 17th. About 0900 a provisional platoon from elements of the 423d Infantry who had infiltrated back to St Tith reported to Colonel Riggs and were placed In reserve directly behind B Company, 38th Armored Infantry. (So* inclosure b) . The only activity in this sector on the 19th and 20th of December was vigorous activity by combat patrols of the enemy and intermittent shelling of the positions. No coordinated attack upon the positions occurred but it appeared that the enemy was building up his fora* for a concerted attack to take Si 11th. I acing the afternoon a report was received from the forward observer of the supporting armored field artillery battalion that his unit was running very low on ammunition and that no future missions of greater than a battery conoantration could be fired.

At about 1900 19 Deoeaber Lieutenant Colonel Fuller, commanding the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion$ arrived to take command of the task force sector and Lieutenant Colonel :Riggs was made, his executive officers That night a letter was received from Brigadier General Clark, Commanding General of COB. 7th Armored Divi ion. citing the defense of St Tith as being the most easterly and most stubborn point of resistance in the entire current defensive operation.

During the night of 19-20 rec.i ber hasty mine fields wore laid along possible avenues of tank approach. chiefly in the area of Troop B. 87th Reconnaissance Squadron and A Company 81st ?ngineer Combat Battalion. The mines were laid by men taken from

A Company from their foxholes for the job, who immediately thereafter retnrn•d to their foxholes.

;luring the morning of 21 December the combat patrol activity continued and increased in intensity. At about 1500. a concentrated barrage commenced which covered the entire position (see inclosure 6) consisting of fire from 88mm guns. nebelverfsrss field artillery and mortars. This hell of steel continued until 1730. In the midst of this barrage it report from the supporting artillery was received that constant counter battery fire had now completely exhausted the battalion's aiesrnattion supoly, putting it out of action.

Despite the fact that the troops had earlier covered their'forhales halfway with logs and earth for protection against the ever present tree bursts, the losses frcaa this shelling were enormous. In B Troop, 87th Reconnaissance Squadron, of an original strength of approximately 125, there were only about 30 left by the evening of 21 December. Of an original 65 or more officers and men from A Company. 81st bgtnssr Combat Battalion, there were only about 25 who were not casualties. A tree burst is the C? of A Company. 38th Armored Infantry, killed the company commander, the sue-porting tank unit commander, and two casualties who had Just been siacu*ted to that point. This barrage to weakened A Company, 38th Armored Infantry, that the provisional platoon from the 4234 Infantry Regiment was committed jut north of the dt Yith-Schonberg Road and attached to A Company to enable than to cover their existing company front effectively. The provisional platoon of aeadquarters and Service Company. Blot tugineer Comb&t Battalion was then ordered from the sector to a reserve position behind

B Company, 38th Armored Infantry.

About 1800 Lieutenant Colonel Taller. 1escring Lieutenant Colonel Riggs in command wont to CCB, 7th Armored 'Division C? to get future dispositions if present positions became untenable. The orders still remained as originally assigned to hold these positions in defense of St Yith.

About 2200 a general German attack was initiated with a force of six teaks with supporting infantry. subee entlyr revealed as a battalion driving straight into the position along the St Yith.Schonberg Road. This particular point was reinforced with four American medium tanks strategically located to cover the Bross roads. Qse of mines on this ro,sd had been forbidden to allow the still promised counterattack to roll through.

A Berman patrol broke through in front of the German tanks and dispersed in the rear of Comp*ny B. 38th Armored Infantry. The provisional platoon of Headquarters and S•rvia• Company, Blot Bnginser Combat Battalion was onsmittod to exterminate the for*•. The German tanks, four Tiger tanks sad two Kark IT. then engaged the four American tanks at point blank range. The American armor was gtlhomettad by illuainPing flares launched from the German tanks to a position behind the American tanks. The American tanks called for and got the support of their other two tanks located at the time behind the bgineer positions to the south. The night battle was one-sided. however. and after losing three of their amber the three remaining American tanks ooafnced a delaying action and fell back into St Tith.

This tank battle occurred on the crest of the hill position about 200 yards from the house in which the defenders' Op was located and orogrsssed to the OP. Just before the German tanks. which were firing point-blank into the preceding three houses, arrived it the OP. Lieutenant Colonel Bi;gs instxuoted the headquarters personnel to report to the Battalion Gp in St 11th and explain the situation, instrnoting than finally that he was moving to a forward CP of B Company. 38th Armored Infantry in the woods to the south.

Communications at this point ware totally out and had not Dean restored from the of ternoon' a barrage.

Arriving at the forward CP, Lieutenant Colonel Riggs learned that the iso.al*to front had been comparatively a..t. Activity had been heard but not confirmed from the left flank. Rscormaissance revealed that the tanks had knocked out all forhols% positions twenty yards from the road and that German troops were moving Into 13t 11th in a solid double file oolmmn of infantry. wagons, and guts. A patrol to the south revealed that tbe 9th Armored had withdrawn at approximately 2100 and had been accompanied by A Company, 236 Armored Infantry. less one platoon which was still in position. Up the road to St 11th also at this point Gore" infantry elements were marching into st 11th.

Contact was made and disposition reported through the FA forward observer's radio. to CCB, 7th Armored Division (use inclosure 7). An order to attack St. 11th was received at 0230 22 December 1944 through this radio.

A rendesvous point was picked to the rear on a ridge overlooking St 11th and an order to move was given. At the rendezvous at approximately 000, the designated time, Lieutenant Colonel Riggs arrived to find epprortaat.ly 75 men and two officers. The remainder, in the heavy snow and darkness, had evidently become lost or engaged. Disregarding the attack order. due to so few hen, their •rbausted condition, their many wounded and presence of only small arms, the force was divided into patrols for infiltration. These patrols were oriented and given instructions from the sole map present, and dispatched. All of these patrols were eventually picked up by mopping up squads of the enemy. Infiltration was defeated primarily by the heavy snowfall which mad! camouflage Impossible.

Thee small remaining bends of the tenacious and gallant defenders of St Tith, though completely exhausted, both mentally and physically, without food and low on ammunition, struggled on in the snow in a vain attempt to reach their own lines. The last known patrol was not taken by the enemy er until 23 December and during this period of two days these patrols continued as a hindrance to enemy rear activities.

Of the men itho became separated from the rest of the defsndind force in the breakthrough on the might of December 21-22, only eight officers and men from A Company and thirty-three officers and sera from Headgaartars and Service Company, 81st Engineer Combat Battalion, were able to "Join their unit at Tielsala. Total casual.. ties of these two units from the defense of St Vith alone totalled fire officers and seventy men.

By the stubborn resistance of this engineer force. assented from time to time by other units of various types, which eventually b.caae a polyglot *task forces, Marshal, ton 3undst•dt's final, grand Aid for victory lost much of its drive. ?bough

speedy penetrations had been made toward 6tanelot and fdalaedy on the north and Bastogas and Kash* on the south, this virtual island of resol*te resistance denied to the saes3

for five days the town of St Ytth which constituted the tactical nerve center of the

entire salient. The entire engagement has been described by neutral observers as one of the most heroic feats of American arms, and the (3erssaas' ultimate complete failure in the attack was such as to not gainsay this appraisal.

At the beginning of the enemy couAte r-of fenaive on 16 December. C Company. 81st Tagineer Combat Battalion was located at Heokhaleafeld, Garay. The company had been constructing dugouts for the 424th Infantry and performing general road maintenane in the regimental area. Carly on the morning of 16 December an enemy artillery barrage fell on Ueakhalenfeld. No casualties were suffered by the Tngtneor Company. While the company was preparing for work, considerable small arms fire could be hoard from the east. Before the men had left for work details the company received orders from the commander of the 424th Regimental Combat Team to dig in on the east side of Heckhalen.. fold until the afternoon of 16 December at which time it was ordered to fill a gap in the front lines betwen hsckhalsnfeld end Winterspslt, 3traagy. Arriving at dusk the company dug in in dense woody and remained until 0230 1? December at shish ttm* it was ordered to Vinterrpelt, The mission was to hold a German force in Winterapelt until. armor could arrive. The company arrived at Winterspelt about 0500 and dug in southwest of the town.

The 1st and M platoons were placed on line with the 3a platoon in eu port.

The right flank was in contact with the 2d Battalion, 424th Infranntry, end the left flax was secured by the 1st Battalion, 424th Infantry. The company received considerable artillery fire during the day and were pinned dorm all day by small arms and machine gum fire. About 2030 1? December the 3d platoon was ordered to evacuate toward 8t Vith The remainder of the company was ordered to pull back at 2100. The vehicles had been moved from Heakhalenfeld and were then at Brecht. Belgium. Captain Wells, the company commander, left for Brecht with a small group of men. leaving Lieutenant Matter in charge of the remainder of the company with orders to break off contact with the enemy following a stream bed as Captain Wells had directed. After two or three miles they reached a fork in the stream where they meet a group of infantry which joined the engineers. The right fork was followed until the deserted village of 7!lch*rath was reached. This village had been evacuated by American forces earlier that day but as no enemy were present, the company spent the night of 17-18 December in the village.

larly on the morning of 18 December the men were awakened by enemy artillery falling on tlobsratb. Machine gun fire could be heard from the northeast side of the village. The company assembled and left before daylight 18 December and moved west to Mammoras, Germany, which also was deserted. Hers they found a large number of vehicles of the 424th Infantry Service Company which had beensbmndoned. Lieutenant Maier decided to attempt fording the trucks across a stream in the center of the town. The only brid6re was a footbridge since all other routes had been occupied by the enemy. Taking all necessary drivers and a few helpers from the two platoons, arep&rations were made for fording the stream. Lieutenant Fuller took the remainder of the company on foot to Brecht, Belgium.

This tr s k mounted a winch, and by us@ of the winch, all the trucks were eventually

pulled across. Pfc Reynolds volunteered to wade waist deep into the icy strosa to fasten the winch cable to the front of each truck. Sash truck We its way up a stoop bank. across a field, and thence individually to Braebt. Lieutenant Maier reported to Captain dells at 0830 at the new ceapaay CP in that village. It was later lsarned that Sarrioe Company. 424th Infantry. which had oeca'ted Ne aers in December 17Th had been forced to leave the village and prevented from r adhing the trucks by Getman mortars, artillery and cross fire of machine gum. ?bs trucks were returned to that wait.

Meanwhile. the 3d platoon. under Lieutenant Prey. find hitchhiked to Lit Vith.

arriving at midnight December 17.48. The remainder of the sight was spent In St Yith. and Lioutenant trey reported to for Marshalln the marina of 18 December. The platoon than dug in around the Dt isioa CP. Captain Wells, returning to St Yifih that. afternoon, took the platoon to Grufflingen to rejoin the remainder of the comrany. .

In Brecht, the lot platoon found two bridges already prepared for demolition.

They pr p rod others and placed guards on them with orders to blow thee if necessary. Two men were placed on each bridge. The night of December 18th, two of the *rtie• blow their bridges due to heavy concentrations of enemy artillery fire in their rici..

n:ty forcing their evacuation. The other two parties remained on guard on their bridges through the day and night of 19 December.

Two members of Company C had been assigned a bridge that was well out in front

of the front line infantry. These men occupied a position about 400 feet im roar of the bridge, where observation on the bridge was good without revealing their position.

On the morning of 20 December at ap'-roximately 0800, the men heard the sound of

approaching vehicles. The conditions of risibility were poor at this hour. and the men could not recognise the approaching vehicles. Soon they were able to make out a Germs motorcycle and command car approaching the bridge. Pfc Connell contacted an infantry officer for instructions, but this officer left the decision to the engineer soldiers. The motorcycle and the command car drove up to the bridge and stop.

three occupants stepped out and walked onto the bridge, examined the demolitions, +mod a~rparentiy started to remove the wires and cape. At this moment The 5 Linson

and Pfc Connell detonated the bridge, destroying it. killing the enemy, and disabling the two vehicles.

Company C loft Brecht. 18 Deooxber. at approximatelyUOO moving by motor to Grufflingen, Belgium, when they remained until 20 December when tanks of the 9th Armored Division arrived. The company then acting as infantry reserve dug is around the tanks. During the night of 20 December. the 3d platoon received heavy artillery fire resulting in three casualties who were evacuated. On the 21st of December. the xst platoon moved to a point east of Grufflingen to act as infantry in support of light tanks. Early on the morning of 22 December. a German patrol estimated at tan men approached the position. The engineers killed the entire patrol without suffering any casualties.

At 1000 on 22 December, the remainder of the company moved by motor to Neuville. near Yielsalm. Belgium. Tracks were sent back for the let platoon which followed about 1100. On 23 December the entire company moved to the rear to the vicinity of lay.

Belgium. A total of six casualties was suffered by Company C during the action from 16 December 1944 to 23 Ae csabo r 1944.

3. At !t Yith, Belgi a from 16 December to 22 December 1944, the 81st Mnginear

Combat Battalion distinguished itself in battle with such extraordinary heroisa, gallantry, determination, and esprit d• corps in oTercoming unusually difficult and hazardous conditions in the face of a numerically superior enemy. as to set this battalion apart and above other units participating in this see engagement.

D. A. iWE

Major Gene rel, U. S. Army Commanding.

9 1 ncls

Incl 1 - Proposed Citation tncl 2 - Overlay. Task force Tncl 3 - Overlay. Task Force I nc1 4 - Ore rlgtr, ?`ask Force 1ac1 5 - Overlay, Task Pores Iacl 8 - Overlay, Task Force Iucl 7 - Overlay, Task Force I s1 8 - After Action "epo; t Intl 9 - Itatement of Lt Col

Disposition. Disposition. Di sposition. Disposition. Iieposition, ?disposition.

gistgr C Riggs

1400 1? Dec 44 0300 18 Dec 44 2000 18 Dec 44 0900 19 Dec 44 1600 21 Dec 44 0200 22 Dec 44 Vin. 18._24 Dec 44

The 81st Zngtneer Combat Rattalion is cited for outstanding performance of duty in armed conflict with the enemy from 16 December 19" to 23 Deaeaber 1944. On 16 Decembor 1944 line companies of the 81st Inginee: Combat Battalion were deploy.d on various sectors of the front of the 106th Infantry Division, in support of the three combat teams of the division which were committed in defense in the ¶chase !if•i area of the Siegfried Line. In the early morning of 16 December 1944 powerful German forces of tank.-supported infantry launched a full-scale offensive which eventtianr surrounded elements of the division and forced other elements to retire slowly as they stubbornly %ou,&t to to the snany advance . All elenento of the Blot Tngtnear

Combat Battalion were from the start of the en aping decisive action committed as faMry and successfully fought without rest or relief for five days to hold an

force of far aiperior numbers and fire power. When the anemy effected local pene~. trattons in the sectors of the three combat teams, the z*spective line companies of the Blot Xngineer Combat Battalion stubbornly counter.ettcked and effected de1aytn nitttone in Auv8 B1ai&lf and Wtnterepelt. Gostra y. bzn forced to withdraw with the 424th Regimental Combat Tease, Company C, 81st !ngineer Combat Battalion. prepared demolitions on bridges and is one case blew the bridge ae the enemy stood on it. Menbere of the some ooaapanyg despite intense artillery fire and stomding in icy waters, used winch cables to pull a large number of trucks abandoned by another unit across a stream and returned them to their unit for use in evacuation. Company B® Al at Engi near Combat 3attalion, fought steadfastly with the 42M Regimental Combat Teem* displaying courage and initiative under heavy fire, until completely cut off from other units of the division. On 1? December 1944 rthen the enemy effected a serious penetration with armor and infantry in the canter of the division eeator nd were advancing rapidly on the Division Headquarters in the vital road center of St Tithe Belgium, Eeadquarterc and service Company, and remaining elements of A Company. 81st ~ngtneer Combat tel ,ion. together with other reinforcing engineer troops were given the misolon of steenteg the enemy advance. Tstab1tehing a defenoe line astride the read from Schonberg, Delgiess to St Tith, they effectively halted the enemy eolma( one mile east of St Tith. although they were outnumbered and ant-gunned. Prom 18 December 1944 until the early morning of 22 Deosnber 1944 with reinforcements of infantry and armor, these units composed a task force which repeatedly threw ,back vicious attacks

of combined infantry and tank forces, constantly attacking end regaining previous positions when forced to withdraw temporarily. At all times a high fighting spirit was naintsined in the face of withering fire from artillery(, mortars, and rocket guns. After the position east of St Tith had been completely overran by a powerful force of infantry and tanks on the night of 21- December 1944, elements of Headgvarters and :ervica Company and A Company, 81st ngineer Combat Battalion® formed patrols which harried the enemy's rear and attempted to return to friendly lines until captured two days later. Th. selfless devotion to duty and unyielding fighting spirit d.ispleyed by the 81st Ingtneer Combat Battalion in the defense of a vital communications canter effectively impeded the progress of the extensive German counter-

offensive

in the Ardennes forest. This display of stubborn courage and initiative under fire in its initial committment to battle reflects great credit on itself and the armed force$ of the United states.

Af=R AC?ICK UPOR? - 81$? =QlUn C01UU? BA'!'WdCI

16 DX 44 _ Xqu and R 4 t Co. received 6 rounds ene artillery fire estimated as 380 ape. from the tI at around. 1230-1300. The Co. formed a defensive position around the C.?. ?he Bn heavy sqnips~snt was •vSo'uatsd to via of lodt, Belgium. Co A received enemy shell fire during period 0600 to 0686. At 0900 all three platoons commenced work on roads in regimental area. At approximately 1030 the •navy were r*ported moving into Aid(. The Co. 0.0.. Capt. Harold M. Harlon, one platoon lsadsr, Lt. Pnrtsll. and about two sods evacuated AW and returned to Battalion. seven sea of the first platoon later returned to In and rejoined their Co. All of Co. A present left at 1230 for Andler to assist 422 1nt. t in counter-attack on AUW. The Co. EEs, under Lt. Rutledge, were reported resisting the essay from a hilltop near Ate. and later rejoined coapsny. Co. at 1636 reported holding VI$SCEBID. In the evacuation of AUW. the PO ? trailer was hit by artillery and the D.,B doter and trailer were abandoned. Ybe 6? prime mover pulled a trailer and •7 doter from the 168th 2r Combat In to safety to the rear. Cc B received continuous artillery fire estimated at 380 m during the morning starting at 0600.

The company was atchd to 423 Inf t and moved from C.P. at 0930. On the morning of the 16th a patrol led by Lt, Gordon entered Distal! with mission to drive large enemy patrol from town. The Lerman patrol was pushed out of town and artillery firs from a TD laid on them. All heavy .Quipsent was evacuated to the rear. Co. C yeas al.rted to act as Infantry in rtgtaantal reserrs and formed a defensive posit ion along the ridge running I and d through Reehalemf.ld.

1? to 21 - Hqs. I & S Co. and Co. A (less third platoon missing since 0900, 16 Doe

DC 44 44 and first platoon missing since action near Al ) moved to via Rodt, bslgisia. at 0900. At approximately 1100 the first platoon of Co A reported to the Bit at Rodt hawing entered 'St Vith, and reportod to Div Hq during the night. At approximately 1200 H & I Co. and Co. A moved to a defensive position 1000 yards last of St •ith. This position hold for five days against repeated attacks by the enemy. (see attached copy Warratirs of Defsas• of It Yith by companies A and 8 4 S. 81st min,.

ear Combat Battalion and aco tug map) Co B, atchd to the 4234 Int. Rgt. was not heard from after the patrol was reported entering Bleialf. Co C attached to the 424th let Belt fell back with the withd.raval of the Refit. after preparing the Bailey Bridge at (87d77S) for demolition. JC the Our Rimer, 25 vehicles of the 424 Urria• Co. were winched across the river and emanated to the rear. hawing been found abandoned. At approxisatel7 2300 on Bl Deo 44 units of Co A end H & 3 Co began arriving at Div fed echelon at Vielsala, Se1gi®.

22 DIG 44 All contact with Co I was beyond possibility. The battalion began reorganization with Major Walter A. Iarsball, former xeauttve Officer, as Commanding Officer. At 1950 %he unit awed by motor to vicinity of Ferrieres. Belgium, leaving a forward C.A. at Vielsala (Major Walter A. Marshall, Major Garr! D. Visas. Capt. gal M. Poseloy) to assist to the yithdravul of the units across the river through the town.

AS to 24 M4vsace C.?. vjWAmw fro* Ytaisatn end reJeiesd mail at ? rrieree. At SUM Uttaliat (C .) 4 d a Coal) mowed to Y' (463030) eaosl In at 1620.

A f COPYt

(8ka d) Marvin 1. bash

NAXTIN 8 RC8,

Capiais. ?t.2d iriill.rj. Assistant to ACOf$, C-I.

vo1 mtari3jr returntns to the 41st iaeer Coabat Battalion sftor bsvtn bean in turn a Gorssa POW Iron 23 Decoabor 1944 to 23 Jsnnery, 1945. an escapee in Poland for two days, and finally an American with the ]!assts forces for a period of approximately eight v.*s the undersigned has furnished most of the uterial in the foregoing aar-

ratiys.

As one time eo*aander and later exscativs officer of the task f ores and a s an evader after the fall of St Pith, the andtrsigned was able to apply most of the details of the operations around It Vith 17_23 December 1945. as covered in the foregoing oar_ ratire.

As Coansndtng Officer of the 81st !nginesr Combat Battalion, the undersigned to deeply• concerned that the tuinssr Battalion on its secondary Meet on as infantry in its first battle action be duly recojnissd for its ooura s *ad tenacious resistance ejtnst a constantly greater a n7r force.

(Signed) Thomas J. Riggs. Jr.

TSCMAS J. RIGGS, JR.

Lt Col, Slit gr (C) Rn Coi andin,g

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