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LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION AND UNITED NATIONS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA PAYAS R. MOREMIA THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS (LL.M.) OF THE OPEN UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA 2013CERTIFICATIONThe undersigned certifies that he has read and hereby recommends for acceptance by the Open University of Tanzania a thesis titled “Legal Dimension of the Role of African Union and United Nations in Conflict Resolution in Africa” in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Award of Degree of Master of Laws (LL.M.) of the Open University of Tanzania. …………………………………………….Prof. (Dr.) Mohammed Saheb Hussain(Supervisor)Date………………………COPYRIGHTThis thesis is a copyright material protected under the Berne Convention, the Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act, 1999 Act No.7 and other International and National Enactments. It may not be reproduced by any means, in full or in part, except for short extracts in fair dealings, for research or private study, critical scholarly review or discourse with an acknowledgement, without written permission of the Directorate of Research and Post-Graduate Studies on behalf of both, the Author and the Open University of Tanzania.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTI would like to express my thanks to Prof. (Dr.) Mohammed Saheb Hussain who was the supervisor of this thesis. He continuously encouraged me throughout the preparation and writing of this thesis, untiring directives to me and thoroughly correction until it was accomplished. Works of this nature had never been easy, they are usually the result of devoting time, excluding oneself and hibernate from others throughout the period of its preparation.Thanks a lot to Dr. Khotti Kamanga, Dr. Suzan Kolimba, Mrs. Riziki Shahari, Mr. Mohammed Othman, Mr. Nasser Mwakambonja, for their material support, encouragement and continuous inspiration towards the accomplishment of this work. I feel highly indebted and grateful to all who assisted in this study in providing necessary information which guided me in improving the work greatly. This work would not have been possible without the help of some staff management within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation specifically the African Desk and Department of Multilateral Cooperation. Also special thanks to my friendly wife Genoveva Kiliba for being tolerant for the time allowed to spent for the purpose of fulfilling this job out of the family, she has been so understanding and encouraged me in my desire to excel more in academic, she gave a big support in this job, sometimes she wake up in the minight to make refreshment or coffee for me, really she deserve special gratitude to the final release of the thesis. Above all, I thank our Almighty God for blessing me to this level. I glorify HIM!DECLARATIONI, Payas R. Moremi, do hereby declare that this thesis is my own original work, and that it has never before been presented to any other University for a similar or any other degree award.Signature…………………………… Date ………………………………..DEDICATION“I dedicate this work to my lovely wife Genoveva P. Moremi, my father Reuben Moremi and mother Debora’’ ABSTRACTThis study examines the legal dimensions as to the role of the AU in conflict resolution in Africa specifically on the point of its ineffectiveness and capability in the region to implement its objectives related to conflict resolutions vis-à-vis the UN mandate and other related factors. The study shows how impartial does the regional arrangements can be adhered by the UN or regional organizations much as conflict resolution is concerned as per the UN Charter of 1945, to demarcate clearly the legal position input of priority to resolve the African conflict problems in future. This thesis employed both qualitative and quantitative research designs. Data were obtained through questionnaires, interviews and document review respectively.The findings reveal that, the legal dimensions of the role of AU over the conflict resolution in Africa becomes incapable for the factors including the superiority of the UN mandate under the Security Council to maintain international peace and security, also alienation of the AU member states participation in peace-basket over conflicts management and resolution in Africa. The study found that conflict of obligations and interests of the member states in the AU at the same time in UN under pancta sunta servanda, reflects stagnation of smooth intervention of conflicts in the region. This study recommends that, to successful conflict resolution and sustainable relative peace in Africa, the International legal commission must review and or reconstructs Article 33 and 52 of the UN Charter for the regional conflict arrangements to be bonafidely accommodated regionally to their desired resolutions. The AU and member states must be given first priority as to legal dimension to handle regional conflicts in their solidarity and interest.TABLE OF CONTENTS TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u Certification PAGEREF _Toc359595782 \h iCopyright PAGEREF _Toc359595783 \h iiAcknowledgement PAGEREF _Toc359595784 \h iiiDeclaration PAGEREF _Toc359595785 \h ivDedication PAGEREF _Toc359595786 \h vAbstract PAGEREF _Toc359595787 \h viTable of Contents PAGEREF _Toc359595788 \h viiAbbreviations and Acronyms PAGEREF _Toc359595789 \h xivList of Cases PAGEREF _Toc359595790 \h xxiList of Legislations PAGEREF _Toc359595792 \h xxiiCHAPTER ONE PAGEREF _Toc359595795 \h 11.0 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY PAGEREF _Toc359595796 \h 11.1 Introduction PAGEREF _Toc359595797 \h 11.2 Statement of the Problem PAGEREF _Toc359595798 \h 31.3 Objectives of the Study PAGEREF _Toc359595799 \h 51.3.1 General Objective PAGEREF _Toc359595800 \h 51.3.2 Specific Objectives PAGEREF _Toc359595801 \h 51.4 Hypothesis PAGEREF _Toc359595802 \h 61.5 Significance of the Research PAGEREF _Toc359595803 \h 61.6 Research Methodology PAGEREF _Toc359595804 \h 71.6.1 Population and Sample Procedures PAGEREF _Toc359595805 \h 71.6.2 Data Collection Techniques and Instruments PAGEREF _Toc359595806 \h 81.6.3 Data Analysis PAGEREF _Toc359595807 \h 81.7 Literature Review PAGEREF _Toc359595808 \h 91.8 Limitations of the Study PAGEREF _Toc359595809 \h 151.9 Conclusion PAGEREF _Toc359595810 \h 15CHAPTER TWO PAGEREF _Toc359595811 \h 162.0 KEY CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES PAGEREF _Toc359595812 \h 162.1 Introduction PAGEREF _Toc359595813 \h 162.2 Key Concepts of Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595814 \h 162.3 The Nature of Responses to Conflict (Prevention, Management, Resolution, Post Conflict Reconstruction) PAGEREF _Toc359595819 \h 212.4 International Law in Relation to Domestic Law PAGEREF _Toc359595821 \h 232.5 Jus in bello PAGEREF _Toc359595824 \h 242.6 International Humanitarian Law PAGEREF _Toc359595825 \h 262.7 Jus ad bellum PAGEREF _Toc359595826 \h 272.8 Conclusion PAGEREF _Toc359595827 \h 29CHAPTER THREE PAGEREF _Toc359595828 \h 313.0 ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICTS AND OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION PAGEREF _Toc359595829 \h 313.1 Introduction PAGEREF _Toc359595830 \h 313.2 Emergency of Conflicts PAGEREF _Toc359595831 \h 313.2.1 Triggers/Legal Dimensions PAGEREF _Toc359595832 \h 323.2.2 Root causes of Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595833 \h 343.2.2.1 Ethnicity in African Society PAGEREF _Toc359595834 \h 343.2.2.2 Economic Factor PAGEREF _Toc359595835 \h 383.2.2.3 Political Leadership/Democratic Principles PAGEREF _Toc359595836 \h 403.2.2.4 External Forces and Interests PAGEREF _Toc359595837 \h 403.3 Types of Conflict Resolution PAGEREF _Toc359595838 \h 413.3.1 Mediation PAGEREF _Toc359595839 \h 423.3.2 Intervention PAGEREF _Toc359595840 \h 423.3.3 Post-Conflict Transformation PAGEREF _Toc359595841 \h 433.3.4 Compromise PAGEREF _Toc359595842 \h 463.3.5 Voting PAGEREF _Toc359595843 \h 473.4 Conclusion PAGEREF _Toc359595844 \h 47CHAPTER FOUR PAGEREF _Toc359595845 \h 494.0 THE AFRICAN UNION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION SYSTEM PAGEREF _Toc359595846 \h 494.1 African Union PAGEREF _Toc359595847 \h 494.2 African Union Constitutive Act, 2002 PAGEREF _Toc359595848 \h 564.3 Legal Framework of the AU PAGEREF _Toc359595851 \h 574.3.1 The Legal Counsel Mandate PAGEREF _Toc359595853 \h 574.3.2 The AU Legal Adviser Activities PAGEREF _Toc359595854 \h 594.4 UN and AU Regions Conflict Management PAGEREF _Toc359595855 \h 624.5 EU and UN on Regional Arrangement on Conflicts PAGEREF _Toc359595856 \h 644.6 African Conflict Resolution Mechanism PAGEREF _Toc359595857 \h 654.6.1 Views of the African Peace and Security Academy PAGEREF _Toc359595858 \h 674.6.2 AU Capacity Building PAGEREF _Toc359595859 \h 684.6.3 Conflict Management and Resolution Overview PAGEREF _Toc359595860 \h 694.7 AU and G8 Consultations PAGEREF _Toc359595861 \h 704.8 Peace Facilitators and the Civil Societies in Conflict Management PAGEREF _Toc359595862 \h 714.9 Sight on Single and Multipartism in Africa PAGEREF _Toc359595865 \h 724.10 Good Governance and Skills of the AU with the EWS PAGEREF _Toc359595866 \h 734.11 Role of Courts in Conflict Resolution PAGEREF _Toc359595869 \h 754.11.1 International Criminal Court (ICC) PAGEREF _Toc359595871 \h 754.11.2 ICC action in DR Congo PAGEREF _Toc359595872 \h 774.11.3 African Court of Peoples Human Rights (ACPHR) PAGEREF _Toc359595874 \h 794.11.4 ACPHR and the Commission for Human Rights PAGEREF _Toc359595875 \h 804.11.5 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) PAGEREF _Toc359595877 \h 844.12 Conflict Resolution Mechanism In Africa PAGEREF _Toc359595880 \h 854.12.1 Conflict in Sudan PAGEREF _Toc359595883 \h 854.12.2 AU in Sudanese Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595885 \h 864.12.3 UN in Sudanese Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595886 \h 944.12.4 Analysis of Sudanese Conflict Resolution PAGEREF _Toc359595887 \h 1004.13 The 2007 Kenyan Election Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595888 \h 1034.13.1 AU in Kenyan Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595889 \h 1054.13.3 UN in Resolving the Kenyan Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595890 \h 1064.13.3 Analysis of Kenyan’s Conflict Resolution PAGEREF _Toc359595891 \h 1084.14 The 2008 Zimbabwe Elections Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595892 \h 1114.14.1 Role of AU/SADC PAGEREF _Toc359595894 \h 1164.14.2 Role of UN PAGEREF _Toc359595895 \h 1194.14.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Zimbabwe PAGEREF _Toc359595896 \h 1204.15 The Anjouan Island Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595897 \h 1204.15.1 Role of AU in Comoro PAGEREF _Toc359595899 \h 1224.15.3 Role of UN/France PAGEREF _Toc359595900 \h 1244.15.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Anjouan PAGEREF _Toc359595901 \h 1274.16 Libyan Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595902 \h 1294.16.1 Role of AU in Libya PAGEREF _Toc359595903 \h 1324.16.2 Role of UN in Libyan Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595904 \h 1344.16.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Libya PAGEREF _Toc359595905 \h 1354.17 Chad Conflict (2005–2010) PAGEREF _Toc359595906 \h 1364.17.1 Role of AU in Chad PAGEREF _Toc359595907 \h 1384.17.2 Role of the UN in Chad PAGEREF _Toc359595908 \h 1394.17.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Chad PAGEREF _Toc359595910 \h 1414.18 Ivory Cost Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595911 \h 1424.18.1 Role of AU in Ivory Coast PAGEREF _Toc359595912 \h 145 4.18.2 Role of UN/ France in Ivory Coast PAGEREF _Toc359595913 \h 1474.18.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Ivory Coast PAGEREF _Toc359595913 \h 1474.19 Egypt Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595914 \h 1474.19.1 Role of AU in EGYPT PAGEREF _Toc359595915 \h 1504.19.2 Role of UN/Arab League in Egypt PAGEREF _Toc359595916 \h 1524.19.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Egypt PAGEREF _Toc359595917 \h 1524.20 Liberia Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595918 \h 1544.20.1 Role of AU in Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595919 \h 1584.20.2 Role of UN Liberia PAGEREF _Toc359595920 \h 1614.20.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Liberia PAGEREF _Toc359595921 \h 1644.21 Madagascar Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595922 \h 1664.21.1 AU in Madagasca Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595923 \h 1674.21.2 Role of UN in Madagascar PAGEREF _Toc359595924 \h 1684.21.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Madagascar PAGEREF _Toc359595925 \h 1704.22 Conflict in DRC PAGEREF _Toc359595926 \h 1724.22.1 Background of the Conflict in DRC PAGEREF _Toc359595927 \h 1724.12.2 Role of UN in DRC PAGEREF _Toc359595928 \h 1754.22.4 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in DRC PAGEREF _Toc359595929 \h 1804.23 Somalia Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595930 \h 1834.23.1 Role of UN in Somalia (UNOSOM), 1993–94 PAGEREF _Toc359595931 \h 1884.23.2 Role of AU in Somalia PAGEREF _Toc359595932 \h 1914.23.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Somalia PAGEREF _Toc359595933 \h 1935.13.4 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Somalia PAGEREF _Toc359595934 \h 1974.24 Central Africa-Eritrea Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595935 \h 2004.24.1 Background of Eritrea Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595936 \h 2014.24.2 Role of AU in Eritrea PAGEREF _Toc359595937 \h 2034.24.3 Role of UN in Eritrea Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595938 \h 2044.24.4 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Eritrea PAGEREF _Toc359595939 \h 2054.25 Mali Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595940 \h 2064.25.1 Role of AU in Mali Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595941 \h 2084.25.2 Role of UN in Mali PAGEREF _Toc359595942 \h 2104.25.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Mali Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595943 \h 2134.26 Conflict in Burundi PAGEREF _Toc359595944 \h 2154.26.1 Background of Burundi Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595945 \h 2164.26.2 Role of OAU/ AU PAGEREF _Toc359595946 \h 2184.26.3. Role of UN in Burundi PAGEREF _Toc359595947 \h 2214.26.4 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Burundi PAGEREF _Toc359595948 \h 2234.27 Rwandese Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595949 \h 2234.27.1 Role of AU in Rwanda Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595950 \h 2264.27.2 Role of UN Rwanda PAGEREF _Toc359595951 \h 2294.27.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Rwanda PAGEREF _Toc359595952 \h 2324.28 Conflict in Nigeria PAGEREF _Toc359595953 \h 2354.28.1 AU in Nigeria Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595954 \h 2384.28.2 Role of UN in Nigeria Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595955 \h 2434.28.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Nigerian PAGEREF _Toc359595956 \h 2444.29 Conflict in Uganda PAGEREF _Toc359595957 \h 2484.29.1 AU in Uganda Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595958 \h 2494.29.2 Role of UN in Ugandan Conflict PAGEREF _Toc359595959 \h 2514.29.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Uganda PAGEREF _Toc359595960 \h 2524.30 Conclusion PAGEREF _Toc359595961 \h 257CHAPTER FIVE PAGEREF _Toc359595962 \h 2605.0 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS PAGEREF _Toc359595963 \h 2605.1 Overall View PAGEREF _Toc359595964 \h 2605.2 Findings PAGEREF _Toc359595965 \h 2605.3 Conclusion PAGEREF _Toc359595966 \h 2665.4 Recommendation PAGEREF _Toc359595968 \h 274BIBLIOGRAPHY PAGEREF _Toc359595969 \h 279APPENDIX PAGEREF _Toc359595970 \h 296ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSACPHR African Court for Peoples Human RightsACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of DisputesACCS African Centre for Civil SocietyADB African Development Bank AFL Armed Forces of Liberia AMIB African Mission in Burundi – the pioneering African Union in Burundi.AMIS African Union Mission in the Sudan APF Africa Peace Facility APA African Peace AcademyAPO Ouagadougou Political Agreement APSA African Peace and Security Architecture ARS Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia in DjiboutiAU African UnionAUSC African Union Security CouncilAFTS2 Africa Region Environmentally & Socially Sustainable Development DepartmentAQIM Islamist Ansare Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb BBCBritish Broadcasting CorporationCAF Conflict Analysis FrameworkCEWS Continental Early Warning System CCM Chama cha Mapinduzi CUF Civic United FrontCIDA Canadian International Development Agency CNDD Conseil National pour la Défense de la DémocratieCNDD- FDD Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie CNDP Congrès National du PeupleCLPC Permanent Local Conciliation Committees in DRC CPA Comprehensive Peace AgreementCPR Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction CCS Center for Creative Solutions, HargeysaCDD Community-Driven DevelopmentCRD Center for Research and Dialogue, MuqdishoCRN Country Re-engagement NoteCSAE Centre for the Study of African Economies CTITF UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force in NigeriaCOPAC Constitution Parliamentary Affairs (Select) Committee launched in 2010. Harare, Zimbabwe.DFID Department for International DevelopmentDIS Chadian Integrated Security DetachmentDDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and ReintegrationEAC East Africa CooperationECA Economic Commission for AfricaECOWAS Economic Community of the West African States ECOMOG Economic Community Monitoring GroupEIPR Egyptian Initiative for Personal RightsEU European Union FAB Forces Armées Burundaises, the former government armyFARDC Forces armées de la République démocratique du CongoFDD Forces pour la Défense de la DémocratieFDN Forces Nationales de la Défense, the new, integrated Burundian armyFDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of RwandaFNL Forces Nationales de Libération – the major remaining armed group still fighting with the Burundian Government.FTA Forces Technical AgreementFRODEBU Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi – the long-standing non-armedParty associated with the Hutu ethnic group and the winner of the elections of 1993 under President Melchior Ndadaye.GPA Global Political Agreement in ZimbabweICC International Criminal Court ICTR International Criminal Tribunal of RwandaICT International Criminal Tribunal of YugoslaviaIDPs Internally Displaced PersonsIGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on DevelopmentIGNU Interim Government of National Unity INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of LiberiaIMC Implementation Monitoring Commission – led by the United Nations, this commission was charged with verifying the implementation of the Arusha Agreement.ISS Institute of Security StudiesJOMIC Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee, 2011. Harare, ZimbabweJCC Joint Ceasefire CommissionJEM Justice and Equality Movement in ChadJWTZ Jeshi la Wananchi wa TanzaniaLAS League of Arab StatesLICUS Low Income Countries Under StressLDF Lofa Defense Force LPC Liberia Peace CouncilLPI Life and Peace Institute, LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy LRA Uganda-based Lord’s Resistance Army MCMPR Mechanism for Conflict Management, Prevention and ResolutionMDRP Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration ProgrammeMDC Mouvement de libération du CongoMDC-M Movement for Democratic Change led by Arthur Mutambara,MDC-T Movement for Democratic Change (led by Morgan Tsvangirai)MFAIC Ministry Of Foreign Affairs And International CooperationMONUCUnited Nations Organisation Mission in Congo- 28th May 2010, the UN adopted Resolution 1925, renaming MONUSCO MONUSCO United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in Congo MNLA Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of AzawadNAI New Africa InitiativesNARA National Accord and Reconciliation Act in KenyaNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNEPAD New Economic Partnership for African DevelopmentNCP National Congress Party in SudanNIF National Islamic Front NPFL National Patriotic Front of LiberiaNPFL-CRC National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council NRF National Redemption Front in SudanOCHA U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsOFPRA Office Fran?ais de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides; ONUB Opération des Nations Unies au BurundiODM Orange Democratic MovementPNU Party of National UnityPSOs Peace and Security OperationsPSD Peace and Security Department PARENA Partie pour le Redressement National, the party for national redress, a Predominantly Tutsi party led by former President Jean-Baptiste BagazaPDRC Puntland Development Research Center, GarowePRDP Peace Recovery and Development Program in Uganda RDR Rassemblement Des Dépublicains REC’S Regional Economic Communities RUF Revolutionary United Front in LiberiaSACB Somalia Aid Coordination Body mechanismSADC Southern Africa Development CommunitySDV Social Development Department SLA/MM Sudan Liberation Army faction of Minni Minawi STERP Short Term Emergency Recovery Program of Government of Zimbabwe, 2011SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SNM Somali National MovementSSDF Somali Salvation Democratic FrontTJRC Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission TFG Transitional Federal GovernmentTNG Transitional National GovernmentTDTF Transitional Darfur Task Force TGoB Transitional Government of BurundiUDSM University of Dar es salaamUDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948UN OCHA U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNOSOM United Nations Operation in SomaliaUNISFA UN Interim Security Force for Abyei UNOCI Operation in C?te d’Ivoire UNSC United Nation Security Council UNOB The UN Office in Burundi-ONUB’s predecessor, a political office active from the early 1990sUNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan UPRONA Union Nationale pour le Progrès – the main non-armed political party Associated with the Tutsi ethnic groupULIMO United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy ULIMO-J United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson faction ULIMO-K United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah factionUSAID U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWBI World Bank Institute WD World Bank WSPInternational War-torn Societies Project-InternationalSAF Sudanese Armed Forces SADC Southern Africa Development Community ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African Union Party-Patriotic FrontLIST OF CASESAfrican Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriy, (Application No.004/2011) ACHPRCharles Taylor v. ICC, (April 26, 2012) The HagueMichelot Yogogombaye v. Republic of Senegal, 104 Am. J. Int’l L. 620, 620-28 (2010)Laurent Gbagbo v. ICC, (April 2011) The HagueMohamed Bacar vs Republic of Comoro, ("Court dismisses case against Comoros rebel leader". via Lexis Nexis) (March 29, 2008)Mtikila v. Republic of Tanzania, (appeal ACHPR Arusha) 10 of 2010Muamar Gadafi & Others v. ICC, (July 28, 2011) The HagueNuremberg War case, "The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (1945-1949) GermanyPresident Al-Bashir of Sudan v. ICC, (July, 2009) The HagueThomas Lubanga v. ICC, (July 11, 2012) (The Hague)Uhuru Kenyata & others v. ICC, (2008) The HagueLIST OF LEGISLATIONSInternational InstrumentsAfrican Union Constitutive Act, 2002The United Nations Charter, 1945The QAU Charter, 1963Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948Geneva Conventions I-IV, 1949Sirte Declaration, 1999Genocide Convention, 1948United Nations Convention Against Torture, 1984 Geneva Conventions including Protocol I, 1977Convention on Conventional Weapons, 1980Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980London Charter (known also as the Nuremberg Charter) of 1945 The Protocol established the ACHPR, 1998African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981Rome Statute, 1998The Hague Convention of 1907Legislation from Other JurisdictionNational Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008)CHAPTER ONE1.0 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY1.1 Introduction In this highly sensitive period of transition from war to peace in respect to conflict resolution, Africans are painfully aware of certain realities which include their dead relatives and loved ones who will never be brought back to life again. People who lost or damaged possessions for their entire lives, focus on women and girls who have been raped and abused in other ways will forever live with the physical pain and emotional trauma associated with such acts. People whose limbs have been cut off due to war will forever remain deformed. Think about the future of which what has been done by violence and un-sustained human sufferings cannot be undone, hence people must look forwards, towards the reconstruction of African society by way of arriving permanent conflict resolutions. This will be implemented by the Africans themselves with a clear legal base in their Constitution and all AU member states. With this view therefore, the African Union (AU) with 53 member states, having at least teeth to challenge the existing international legal stands can stop the Africans sufferings where conflicts exists. Under the legal dimension, AU must have the critical approach as well as full mandate to intervene and resolve every conflict timely much as the African Continent development is concerned, AU Constitutive Act must focus on all targets or the needful to peace, tranquillity and cooperation as the European Union (EU). The study will focus on the shortcomings which moved the transformation of OAU to AU specifically on the question of the lacuna over the legal systems and the capacity building of the organization across its organs and institutions, also on the other hand viewing the financial and material aspect too. In principle, the study will suggest on how AU should acquire the independent legal status and stability so as to create a sovereign organization of which will operate independently and enforce its member states to sanctions with a strong or enforced committed organ having power to end the Africans conflicts and bring fast harmony to the African society and development of the continent. Furthermore, the study will evaluate the AU present statutes against its objectives and the UN Security Council mandate under the UN Charter in respect of conflict resolutions to see so far since the inauguration of AU the year 2000 to date, how the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution can be regarded as a success step by the current member states cooperation vis-as-vis Africans independent initiatives to resolve conflicts within states. Review can be done on Anjuwan’s case, Kenyan 2007, 2008 Zimbabwe Post Election conflict, Darfur case vis-as-vis President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan and the ICC issue of Arrest Warrant, Sudan is not a member bound with either Protocol or Convention of the ICC so far, then exclusive to any legal act.Eventually, this dissertation will ultimately provide room for the recommendation for the effective future AU Constitutive Act which is structured to implement practically and address properly the African conflicts resolution in the continent without the assistance or obstacles of the big nations through the UN mandate on conflict management and resolutions. To see how they dictate or implement neo-colonialism in Africa, briefly they normally act whenever they have a particular interest to that particular area in conflict or with economic gain to them as we are going to see hereunder the chapters in research of studies.1.2 Statement of the ProblemThe unprecedented conflicts in Africa result from the incapacity of the organization (AU) lacking powers to address the conflicts and how to resolve them and its administration. In 2002 in Durban-South Africa, AU member states through an integral part of the Constitutive Act to the Institutional framework of the organization, re-affirmed validity and amended terms of the Constitutive Act, practically to employ a speed function of the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolutions. The major factor among the failure signals of the conflict management purely reflected to poor involvement of member states in contributing to the organization, undefined legal position of the African Organization as against UN Security Council mandate in conflict management and resolution, hence poor performance to handle the peace or conflict management which then leads to inability to administer peace and conflict resolutions in the African continent.Normally conflicts erupts where we are lacking internal or external peace and security in our region territories, and always the UN assistance is delivered by the hand of the Security Council as they wish with their other interests or priorities. Hence, the overview problem of conflict resolution in Africa in a nutshell reflects lack of scope of power to the organ governed by AUSC. Again it is a potential problem with the UN Security Council mandate as against the AU responsible Council for peace and conflict management, and again lack of cooperation of the member states in the event referred to incapability of the then OAU which thereafter been transformed to the current AU, which again may inherit the weakness of the former organization if Africans will not alarm for it. The support of African States is very crucial and necessary for Africans conflict management or rather I call the “peace basket” thus peace making, peace building and peace keeping and African security to be legally enforced and more elaborative in the International system and legal dimensions . The hostile African States have definitely made the AU look ineffective to provide proper services by its organs to conflict resolutions process. Generally the statement of the problem must see to it or evaluate the International Law and the multilateral agreements in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (1945) and the present AU Constitutive Act (2002) with regard to the African Conflict Management in order to maintain peace and security of the African States, However to digest whether AU can operate independently without the interference with UN members obligation as per the UN Charter that calls for regional arrangements towards conflict resolution. The African states are facing a double obligation as well as the standard mandate to handle their conflicts much as the AU objectives are concerned in their Constitution, it is emphasized that, AU shall be to encourage international cooperation, taking into account the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, as well as promote peace, security and stability on the continent. Which one to prevail, the regional or universal obligation?1.3 Objectives of the StudyThis work will examine both the general and specific objectives which are stated below 1.3.1 General ObjectiveTo analyse legal dimensions of the AU mechanisms in resolving the African conflicts vis -a- vis the UN mandate and regional arrangements.1.3.2 Specific ObjectivesExplaining AU legal objectives in managing and resolving conflicts in Africa. Showing and evaluating the AU legal capacity and its effectiveness to African conflict resolution. Analysing the current legal challenges facing AU with regard to member States obligations with other organisations in African conflict resolution.1.4 HypothesisThe following hypotheses are expected to be tested in this thesisThat AU is ineffective in implementing its objectives to conflict resolutions in African region, see its capability;That Member states of AU do alienate on contributing or initiating,encouraging and or maintaining the momentum of conflict negotiations and resolution in African conflicts; andThat Africans be aware with Article 52 of the UN Charter over the regional arrangements on conflicts implementation or is on interests of the big nations, subsequently everyone will play his role.1.5 Significance of the ResearchThe study will explain the need to have a powerful organization with legal capacity which if need can implement sanctions by its own joined forces over the passed resolutions by the Africans or the member states rather than depending on the approval from the UN or forces supported by the UN. The study will also contribute legal dimensions regarding AU position on managing conflict resolutions in African region.1.6 Research MethodologyMixed approach was used to collect materials of this dissertation, to include qualitative and quantitative design field work as to personal or face to face interviews or personal observations. Furthermore, internet materials, journals, international instruments, research papers, articles, papers, magazines and the library books used for extensive reading in the literature of the AU objectives its operations to the Africans conflict management and resolutions in relation to UN. Also the questionnaires were distributed to the Africa- Europe Desks and Department of multilateral cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Republic of Tanzania. 1.6.1 Population and Sample ProceduresIn this study, the targeted population was 18 states in Africa not all conflicted African states. The African Desk records in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation were much useful in this thesis. From this Ministry records, random techniques was used on interviewing citizens or individual employees’ feelings over the Regional Cooperation and AU responsibilities on peace and security, specifically the Department of Multilateral Relations members. In order to obtain information, the research conducted interviews with the staff management in the Ministry to access details on the role of the AU’s conflict resolution in Africa. Sampling technique considers the on going African states civil wars among the 53 countries being caused either politically, economically and ethnicity or socio-cultural disadvantages to the African societies and the world at large.1.6.2 Data Collection Techniques and InstrumentsA combination of both primary and secondary data collection techniques were employed to gather data to respond to the research questions. Face to face interviews to the employees within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other citizens were conducted. Questionnaires were also distributed to the staff in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. It involved the collection of ideas from books, dissertations, articles, newspapers, journals and the visit to the web to get current developments. The study also extended to key libraries and documentation centers such as the Open University of Tanzania main library, UDSM and the library in the Centre for Foreign Relations-Dar es Salaam to search for relevant data pertaining to this research. 1.6.3 Data Analysis The qualitative data analysis in the form of content of conflicts analysis of different areas and how was addressed particularly by AU and or UN was the main data analysis technique which was employed in this research. Data from the interviews were coded, analyzed and organized according to different themes which provided answers to the research questions. In some instance, accepts of responses from the interviewees or scholars were used to provide the actual feel of the phenomena under study. Citizens’ alarm in streets over the hypothesis of the research also appeals to the centre of the data analysis. In one way or another, conversations in TV and Radio programmes have been used much in a qualitative methodology to gather information of conflicts in the continent of Africa, hence critical analysis of the datas have been in the way of interview of the feeling of individuals in the area. 1.7 Literature Review The subject matter of this work much as conflict resolution is concerned, has for various reasons attracted diverse views among scholars in the international law jurisprudence. Literatures consist of articles, journals books and news paper. Some of them have been written or published specifically to form part of the collection of articles or books covering other subjects in international law which is the area of interest as far as this study is concerned. Scholars have pinpointed on the question that, why these efforts of managing African conflict have not been successful to date? Can AU build its capacity through member states to participate voluntarily under the legal aspect in order to achieve the conflict management and resolution in the continent? This study will comment on few available literature and recommend in respect of the actual need and interest of the Africans much as AU legal power on conflict resolution is concerned.Historically, among the six continents in the world, Africa falls into the most undeveloped and poor continent. The rest of the worlds do normally find means and any kind of infrastructures to exploit Africa as much as they can. This is due to the Africans limited legal power and knowledge as well as ability to utilise the available natural resources created by our beloved God. Lori Newman and Anand Balachandran, in their text Managing conflicts in Africa: Building the capacity of the OAU, wrote that, in 1998 alone, Africa experienced seven major conflicts, 33 lower intensity conflicts and 37 violent political conflicts. One out of 48 recorded genocides since 1945, twenty took place in Africa and claimed an estimated eight million lives. These conflicts, fuelled by underlying socio-economic factors such as poverty, poor access to food, health care and education, an inefficient infrastructure, rising ethnic tensions, the proliferation of weapons, and repercussions of colonialism, challenge the well-being of every African. While the African continent overflows with natural resources and cultural wealth.Schmid and Jongman, with the same approach to the above scholars, these researchers generally came out with the idea that, conflict resolution in Africa requires the proper address of insecurity matters facing the African continent. Also, they insisted on the citizens of Africa to be totally committed to their International Organization and to realize its potential as long as they have to grapple with such violent conflicts. The Sudan is one of the African states having the longest history of internal conflict. So many efforts on peace initiatives have been tried in vain. According to Jok, the conflicts in Sudan are a function of a failure of consensus on core issues necessary for the running of the state. The conflicts in Sudan comprise a mixture of religious, regional, racial and ethnic discrimination. The religious factor was exacerbated by El-Bashir regime in 1989.El-Bashir went against all Koka Dam agreements including the holding of the National Constitutional Conference to discuss substantive national issues which divide the Sudan people. The National Islamic Front (NIF) want to impose Islamic rules on the Sudanese non-Muslims and moderate Muslims. This religious factor accounts for much of repeated failure of peace initiatives undertaken by various mediators.According to Kok, partition can be a better option to end the long lasted conflict in Sudan. While the South which is oppressed and undermined favours this option, the North was against the idea as they foresee the disadvantages of the partition, he writes that:“Partition would most likely leave both the North and the South weaker and more vulnerable than they are at the present. It is unlikely that the North would survive as a unit especially if partition was compelled by a military collapse of the government forces in the South…The South may live on the euphoria of victory for a while but if effective arrangements of governance are not put into place sooner, intertribal conflicts may surface which can be destabilizing by themselves or offer opportunities for destabilizing by third parties”.Marrack, makes a critical view on roles of different actors played in conflict resolution in Africa. Marrack mentions OAU now AU, the UN and sub regional groups as the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). He further mentions regional governments like the East African governments which imposed sanctions on Burundi after the military coup in 1996. The scholar lists other actors such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). An example is the Rome-based NGO Saint’ Egidio that took the lead in negotiating the peace settlement in Mozambique. Saint’ Egidio made some attempts to bring belligerents into a negotiating table in the DRC conflicts.The African conflict prevention, management and resolution were discussed following the recommendation generated in one of the commemoration event of the Pan-African’s scholars convened in Dar es salaam in April 2009, to evaluate the ideas marked to unite the continent of Africa and to have a strong United States of Africa alarmed by the late Kwame Nkrumah and Mwl. J.K.Nyerere since 1958, the article put an important remark on conflict resolution in the continent. The scholars argued that OAU failed to manage and achieve resolution for the Africans conflicts, and then people expected the new organization AU could bring changes and more progress in Africa. As a matter of fact AU has so far experienced a number of conflicts since the transformation made from OAU in the year 2002 after the Sirte Declaration (1999).Abrahamson and Nilsson illustrated that one amongst the causes of unsuccessful peace negotiations in many of the African countries is the fact that belligerents are often military groups hence not much suited to political procedures. Therefore they lack experience and personnel peace skills hence fail in negotiation process. Researchers argue that the conflict resolution through mediation is the best approach in ending prolonged conflicts in Africa.With a view of different researchers in the current situation much as African conflict resolution are concerned, so far there is a percentage of failures as to a point of law for analysing a clear and sustainable alternatives to the conventional routes to reconciliation of the African conflicted parties. A good number of researchers have studied the exact early African lives and their development which at the end of the day they found that it is a pool of poverty of knowledge and cooperation of the Africans which leads to where Africa is today.As a matter of fact AU have so far experienced a number of conflicts since the transformation made from OAU in the year 2002 after the Sirte Declaration (1999).With a view of different researchers in the current situation much as African Conflict Resolution are concerned, so far there is a percentage of failures as to a point of law for analysing a clear and sustainable alternatives to the conventional routes to reconciliation of the African conflicted parties. Scholars traced their minds on the approaches to resolve low-intensity conflicts in Africa, they emphasized on two things regardless of any mediator or reconciliator of African Conflicts. First, they discovered that there is a failure to address the specific character of such conflicts and an entire absence of attempts to seek to ground reconciliation efforts in the established sphere social relations and institutions of local communities. Second, low-intensity conflicts are viewed in narrow, euro centric fashion and without appreciation of the composite nature of such conflicts. Then from the above emphasis, one may come up with the reflection that for the current researchers to this particular study, that one have to go deep into a source of conflicts erupted in a small scale or local communities which would be linked to the resolution ahead and the legal capacity of the body concerned, ie AU mandate to address properly the African peace and security much as conflict resolution is concerned as against or with a use of the UN Charter. This literature review was also evidenced by the day to day TV News and different Papers in Africa and the world as a whole, the research associated case studies of conflicts in Rwanda, Darfur, Zimbabwe, Kenya, DRC, Somalia, etc with consideration of time factor today in respect of the changes and developments of issues globally as well as regionally under the AU Constitutive Act reservation.1.8 Limitations of the StudyThis includes scope of the study limits, huddles on finance to cover geographical survey or ability to reach all the victims of the conflicts in Africa and all relevant authorities to this study. Data were collected from Tanzania only, to a certain extent this might have affected the conclusion. Large part of this research relied on secondary data, this might not depict the feelings of other Africans whose countries have undergone severe civil wars like Sudan, DRC, Somalia, etc at the grass root level. This might have affected the quality of data. Lack of adequate time to collect, daily changes of conflict resolution or peace development process or negative peace management, to analyze, interpret, and finalize the final report affected the time set to accomplish the study properly in some of conflicted societies in Africa. 1.9 ConclusionThis thesis comes out with a view of the Africans themselves to work up and manage their own troubles much as conflicts resolutions are concerned in their continent. On the same trend, AU as the sole organization in the continent with 53 member states must have capacity to mobilize and implement the African objectives for the expected good future of the independent continent which is rich in all resources in the World but poor continent to stand for herself. AU finally should work independently without the UN assistance at any point, this situation may set aside interests of the big nations in selecting which conflict is beneficial to them. Eventually Article 52 of the Charter is reconstructed for its reality and legality on conflict resolutions in regions. CHAPTER TWO2.0 KEY CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES2.1 IntroductionThe subject matter of this work will for various reasons attracted diverse views among scholars in the international law jurisprudence. Literatures consist of articles, journals books and news paper. Some of them have been written or published specifically to form part of the collection of articles or books covering other subjects in the political science but mostly are those which have touched legal issues. This chapter provides an overview of the issues related to the study including the theoretical bases for different bodies involved in conflict resolution in Africa. 2.2 Key Concepts of Conflict Conflict reduction involves the use of specific strategies in reducing the escalation of conflict once it has occurred. The strategies including the institution of consultation projects whereby the key parties to the conflict are identified and their demands are clarified as well, the promotion of public awareness and protests to end conflict, offering support to all actors and undertake negotiations.Conflict management is the process of planning to avoid conflict where possible and organising to resolve conflict where it does happen, as rapidly and smoothly as possible. It refers to the long-term management of intractable conflicts. It is the label for the variety of ways by which people or states handle grievances, standing up for what they consider to be right and against what they consider being wrong. Those ways include such diverse phenomena as terrorism, warfare, genocide. Which forms of conflict management will be used in any given situation can be somewhat predicted and explained by the social structure or social geometry of the case.Conflict prevention is an ongoing process that changes according to given circumstances. It should strengthen existing processes for peace, respond to crises, help generate an environment and create mechanisms through which conflicts can be resolved non-violently. It is also a central feature of the United Nations that authorizes the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the General Assembly to settle disputes peacefully and to prevent the outbreak of wars and other forms of armed confrontation. Conflict prevention consists of a high degree of local ownership of conflict prevention strategies and initiatives and the strengthening of democratic institutions and empowerment of local actors through continuous consultation, assistance and training.To attain these goals, first and foremost it is important to have a thorough understanding of the factors, actors and conditions exacerbating conflict. NGOs, academics, policy-makers and practitioners have to develop a series of approaches to improve understanding of conflict, including analyses, development of indicators and possible scenarios to help identify the actions that need to be taken. In practice, the international community has focused its work on conflict prevention at two points in a typical conflict’s life cycle where violence has already erupted, but there is a possibility of preventing its escalation. For example, in 2004 following strong condemnation from the media, NGOs and human rights groups, the UN have taken steps warning the Sudanese government to stop genocide in the Darfur region, where conflict has recently ended, but peace is still fragile and thus the re-emergence of violence is a distinct possibility. In such cases the international community often sends peacekeepers to bring some security and enable the political structures to gain strength, such as deployments of UN peacekeeping forces to Liberia in 2004 and Darfur in 2010.Peacekeeping is a strategy that contributes to the furthering of a peace process once established. This includes but not limited to the monitoring of withdrawal by combatants from a former conflict area, the supervision of elections, and the provision of reconstruction aid. The United Nations defines it as a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the Organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace. Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements they may have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. The United Nations Charter gives the UNSC the power and responsibility to take collective action to maintain international peace and security. For this reason, the international community usually looks to the Security Council to authorize peacekeeping operations. Peace building is a process requiring the establishment of a climate of tolerance and respect for the truth. It is a complex and lengthy process that encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms. This includes the reintegration of soldiers and refugees and removal of other war debris, emergency relief, the repair of roads and infrastructure and economic and social rehabilitation. Peace building usually involves efforts to increase normal and cooperative contacts between opponents. Efforts are made to open channels of communication, get people involved in joint projects, work with the media and the educational system to try to break down stereotypes and reduce prejudice and discrimination. The goal of all of these efforts is reconciliation getting the people to accept each other as part of their own group or be reconciled to mutual co-existence and tolerance.Some of the activities and issues to consider in peace building include: Humanitarian relief and development that is delivering aid food, water, health care and reconstruction of infrastructure to communities that have suffered conflict. This needs to be carefully managed to avoid deepening divisions between groups or prolonging the conflict; Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants transforming ex-combatants into peaceful and productive members of society is a critical but challenging task. Removing weapons, returning ex-combatants to their homes and supporting return to civilian life are all vitally necessary. Economic development assisting communities to become self-supporting after so much has been destroyed is vital.Peace management is an important strategy and action which is taken to ensure that the situation of peace existing in a particular state is maintained. This requires skills, commitment and trusts. In this regard, peace management will of necessity call for the general involvement of all citizens in a particular state, that is; from leaders level to the ordinary citizens level. Internationally, the General Assembly enjoys a prerogative in the management of international peace. The Security Council relies on the General Assembly for the fulfilment of its primary function of managing peace. Of course, implementing sanctions or military measures by the Security Council is not an easy choice unless an overwhelming majority expresses its support. Although the General Assembly does not have the power to provide binding mechanism for peace enforcement, the indirect influence of the organ in practice is very much apparent, which ensures complementary role of the General Assembly in peace management. 2.3 The Nature of Responses to Conflict (Prevention, Management, Resolution, Post Conflict Reconstruction)This is a range of methods for alleviating or eliminating sources of conflict. Processes of conflict resolution generally include negotiation, mediation, and diplomacy. The processes of arbitration, litigation, and formal complaint processes such as ombudsman processes, are usually described with the term dispute resolution.There are many tools available to people who work in conflict. How and when they are used depends on several factors such as the specific issues at stake in the conflict and the cultural context of the disputants. In such cases, a conflict atlas is used to show the major issues, which led to the conflict. The list of tools available to practitioners includes:? negotiation, mediation, community building, advocacy, diplomacy, activism, nonviolence. In real-world conflict situations, which range in scale from small scale bullying to genocide, practitioners will creatively combine several of these approaches as needed. Additionally, conflict resolution is a step towards the conclusion of the management of conflict.This is a process that involves different activities aimed at addressing the root causes of a dispute that led to the conflict. Due to the fact that the causes of conflict vary, the operational resolution of conflict calls upon a multi-faceted response from different components. This means that, different expertises are needed to address the economic, social and political causes of the conflict as they manifest themselves. Conflict resolution can only succeed with the intense involvement of the policy in question, that is; the ideas of solutions to the conflict must be conceived or agreed upon by the locals. The role of the outsiders in resolving the existing conflict must be benevolent one informed by the willingness to support the process of conceiving of these ideas and providing resources to translate them into solutions, as any components in the conflict spectrum, must be viewed as dynamic and not in isolation from the other activities aimed at continuously containing the conflict and finding solutions.Despite all the efforts towards resolving conflicts in Africa, still the state of peace and security on the continent remains a pre-occupying phenomenon, with successes and continuing challenges. Indeed, alongside the steady progress of the newly established African Union (AU) continental peace and security architecture continues to bear the marks of several latent crises. There are also marks of multiple full blown conflicts in the face of which peace efforts are often met with opposition or simply foiled by the existence of diverse challenges which are often based on the logic of confrontation and on rivalries between the states.Nature of responses of conflict in Africa reflects alienation of AU member States much as inability or rather capability of parties to a conflict invites big nations to interfere and to impose their interests as well for that particular conflict. Under the International perception parties to a conflict are the one to lead the resolution provided no violation of human rights as to peace and security arena. 2.4 International Law in Relation to Domestic LawMuch as International Law, Conventions and Treaties are concerned, domestic laws are there to implement them by way of ratification and codification done by the parliament of that particular state. It is always a rule or law under the principle of pacta sunta servanda that if that particular state is signatory to a convention or treaty in international law it should adhere to implement what the treaty or convention provides. From the same approach, for example, the International Humanitarian Law, International Refugee Law, Jus in bello, Jus ad bellum and the UN Charter must be accomodated in all domestic laws where by that state have signed the Conventions or Treaties regarding the conflict management and resolution in respect of international peace nd security is concerned.UN Charter and Constituve Act of AU are all under international law hence one should expect all the two origins to be accomodated in domestic laws and in case of conflict of law always UN Charter prevails. Therefore, which is which? Particularly, on conflict management and resolution domestic law may have big opportunity to overcome or resolve the conflict as a nearby hand to the event. Then the question remains behind is, who is more precise to handle or manage his conflict, a neighbour or a party to a conflict?2.5 Jus in BelloOnce war has begun, just war theory Jus in bello directs how combatants are to act or should act. Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of distinction. The acts of war should be directed towards enemy combatants, and not towards non-combatants caught in circumstances they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no military target and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against civilians.Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of proportionality. An attack cannot be launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. The conduct should be governed by the principle of minimum force. An attack or action must be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy, it must be an attack on a military objective, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction. By contrast, agreements defining limits on acceptable conduct while already engaged in war are considered "rules of war" and are referred to as the jus in Bello. Thus the Geneva Conventions are a set of jus in Bello. Doctrines concerning the protection of civilians in wartime, or the need for "proportionality" when force is used are addressed to issues of conduct within a war, but the same doctrines can also shed light on the question of when it is lawful or unlawful to go to war in the first place. Some of the central principles underlying laws of war are; wars should be limited to achieving the political goals that started the war for example territorial control and should not include unnecessary destruction, wars should be brought to an end as quickly as possible, people and property that do not contribute to the war effort should be protected against unnecessary destruction and hardship. To this end, laws of war are intended to mitigate the hardships of war by: protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians and facilitating the restoration of peace. To fulfill the purposes noted above, the laws of war place substantive limits on the lawful exercise of a belligerent’s power. Generally speaking, the laws require that belligerents refrain from employing violence that is not reasonably necessary for military purposes and that belligerents conduct hostilities with regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry. However, because the laws of war are based on consensus, the content and interpretation of such laws are extensive, contested, and ever-changing.2.6 International Humanitarian LawThe principles of Humanitarian Law are thought to apply in conflict, and to regulate the conduct of military forces. The rules of warfare aim to safeguard human life and some other fundamental human rights, and to ensure that war is limited in its scope and level of violence. Total war, where neither discrimination nor proportionality serves as mitigating considerations, is to be avoided.Interpretations of International Humanitarian Law change over time and this also affects the laws of war. For example Carla Del Ponte, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia pointed out in 2001 that although there is no specific treaty ban on the use of depleted uranium projectiles, there is a developing scientific debate and concern expressed regarding the effect of the use of such projectiles and it is possible that, in future, there may be a consensus view in international legal circles that use of such projectiles violate general principles of the law applicable to use of weapons in armed conflict. This is because in future it may be the consensus view that depleted uranium projectiles breaches one or more of the following treaties: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Charter of the United Nations; the Genocide Convention; the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the Geneva Conventions including Protocol I, the Convention on Conventional Weapons of 1980, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Modern laws of war, such as the Geneva Conventions, also include prohibitions on attacking doctors, ambulances or hospital ships displaying a Red Cross, a Red Crescent or other emblem related to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It is also prohibited to fire at a person or vehicle bearing a white flag, since that indicates intent to surrender or a desire to communicate. In either cases, persons protected by the Red Cross/Crescent or white flag are expected to maintain neutrality, and may not engage in warlike acts; in fact, engaging in war activities under a protected symbol is itself a violation of the laws of war known as perfidy. Failure to follow these requirements can result in the loss of protected status and make the individual violating the requirements a lawful military target. 2.7 Jus ad Bellum People have tried to reconcile the competing moral principles of nonviolence or violence, and the evil of taking a human life with the need to protect an innocent human life, no lives needed to be protected at all, through the use of force. The essential six elements for "The Just War Framework" that is the way to reason a violent act, are as follows; Just cause, proper authority, right intention, reasonable hope for success, proportionality and last resort. In other words, right to wage war reflects just war. This refers to a set of criteria that are to be consulted before engaging in war, in order to determine whether entering into war is justifiable. Jus ad bellum is sometimes considered a part of the laws of war, although the term "laws of war" can also be considered to refer to jus in bello, entailing whether a war is conducted justly regardless of whether the initiation of hostilities was just.An international agreement limiting the justifiable reasons for a country to declare war against another is concerned with jus ad bellum. In addition to bilateral non-aggression pacts, the twentieth century saw multilateral treaties defining entirely new restrictions against going to war. The three most notable examples are the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war as an instrument of national policy, the London Charter (known also as the Nuremberg Charter) defining crimes against peace as one of three major categories of international crime to be prosecuted after World War II.In addition, the Nuremberg War Trial judgment on "The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity" held under the guidelines Nuremberg Principles, that treaties like the Hague Convention of 1907, having been widely accepted by all civilized nations for about half a century, were by then part of the customary laws of war and binding on all parties whether the party was a signatory to the specific treaty or not, also the United Nations Charter, which binds nations to seek resolution of disputes by peaceful means and requires authorization by the United Nations before a nation may initiate any use of force against another, beyond repulsing an immediate armed attack against its sovereign territory. After a conflict has ended, persons who have committed or ordered any breach of the laws of war, especially atrocities, may be held individually accountable for war crimes through process of law. Also, nations which signed the Geneva Conventions are required to search for, then try and punish, anyone who has committed or ordered certain grave breaches of the laws of war. 2.8 ConclusionMuch as concept and theoretical perspective is concerned, Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human life, something that is desirable. Stedman is of the view that; “Conflict stems from the basic fact of human interdependence. Seeking to satisfy their needs, wants and desires, people make demands upon themselves, upon the physical environment, upon other people, and upon whatever organization and institutions that appear to be in a position to help them” In otherwords the concept reflects as perceived divergence of interest or action seeking inconsistent goals. Hence stratergies are made to concept of peace building, management, maintenance, making, transformation, etc in any conflicting society so as by way of regulations, treaties, conventions and other laws relevant to the subject resolution can be attained. Peace keeping as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter, yet it is often described as falling between Chapter VI and Chapter VII and other international and local instruments.CHAPTER THREE3.0 ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICTS AND OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION3.1 IntroductionWith regard to causes of Conflict different approaches have been destined on the situation where two parties or more are in antagonism, while some attribute conflict to structural phenomena others say they are inevitable and ingrained in human primordial behaviour. Still others see conflict as manufactured by specific individuals who seek power and control. While it is impossible to attribute most conflicts to a single factor, many elements are clearly decisive when it comes to a conflict's escalation. Louis Kriesberg notes that leadership is imperative in the polarization and escalation process because group members must be convinced that their grievances can be attributed to the adversary or other. Followers must also be convinced that the change and particular course of action suggested by the leadership is possible.3.2 Emergency of ConflictsBasically in any good end result of any conflict resolution, negotiator must scrutinise root causes of that particular conflict. But again it is also important to distinguish between root causes and triggers. While root causes refer to the underlying fundamental incompatibilities of a conflict, triggers constitute more proximate events or factors that cause a conflict to escalate. This distinction is relevant for understanding both the sources and the dynamics of a conflict, as well as for coordinating the efforts of management and resolution. Triggers must be identified and tackled for effective preventive action. Root causes must be addressed and eradicated in order to find long term and sustainable solutions of conflicts or successful conflict resolution.Michael, in his book The International Dimension of Internal Conflict, writes that the literature identifies five main clusters of variables that "predispose" some places in the world to conflict, while not others. They are Structural Factors (weak states; intra-state security concerns; ethnic geography), Political Factors (Discriminatory political institutions; exclusionary national ideologies; inter-group politics; elite politics), Economic/Social Factors (Economic problems; Discriminatory economic systems; modernization), Cultural/Perceptual Factors (patters of cultural discrimination; problematic group histories), and Legal dimensions to the systems in the society (segregations racism, grouping rights, discrimination of equality before the law).3.2.1 Triggers/ Legal DimensionsIf we were to know exactly the circumstances that precede conflict, and in which order they occur, it would be possible (given the right resources) to prevent conflicts from taking place. However, under the legal dimensions these circumstances would have to be universally recognized for external actors to be willing to invest in an intervention in order to avoid more costly endeavours in the future. Moreover, the parties themselves would have to be willing to relinquish their hopes of gains from any future escalation of the conflict.The Minorities at Risk Project collects data about 275 minorities in the world, in order to determine the most important factors responsible for the onset of inter-group violence. By categorizing minority groups according to specific characteristics such as the degree of mobilization or discrimination, it becomes possible to determine the degree of risk entailed for each case in terms of escalating violence. In his presentation of the results of the project in the book People vs. States, Gurr writes that four general variables help us understand the outbreak of ethno political or identity-based conflict. They are the salience of ethno cultural identity, extent of collective incentive, extent of capacity for collective action, and the availability of opportunities increasing the chance of success. The explanation of conflict may be external or internal. External factors include those discussed above, where a collective is threatened either by rival group or by another state. The causes for conflict and the material stakes become salient from the interaction and rivalry between two groups. The "inside perspective" that we refer to here is the scapegoat theory, claiming that it is the internal experience of a group (i.e., its lack of cohesion) that gives rise to its inter-group behaviour. According to this explanation, leaders sometimes resort to violence against an outside group in order to evade internal dissention or weakness.3.2.2 Root causes of ConflictSekou Toure argues that, there are legitimate and illegitimate conflicts. Legitimate conflicts are those that are concerned with struggle for liberation from oppression and exploitation. The objective of legitimate conflict is to liberate the society from oppression, humiliations, segregation, marginalization and exploitation. Example of this type of conflict according to Sekou Toure is those which took place during the liberation of Africa from colonial rule. On the other hand, illegitimate conflict refers to conflicts aiming to sabotage or causes violence, threat to people with the view of satisfying few in a society, for instance, overthrowing a legally and democratically elected government in order to satisfy desires and demands of developed capitalist states. However, it should be noted that, aggrieved party to conflict consider any action against his or her wishes to be in justifiable while the other party consider his or her action justifiable. This can be demonstrated of the conflicts taking place in Africa.3.2.2.1 Ethnicity in African SocietyMost of the Africans society lives under customs or norms inherited from poor families. Briefly, ethnicity can be defined as a collection of people where by its membership is largely determined by ancestry and which regards its place in society in terms of tribalism. Thus the test of differences in physical appearance, national origin, or religion is not the difference parse. This argument can well be used to explain what has been happening in Africa. The demarcation lines of among Africans are best known by themselves but not by an outsider. In Africa, historically, power was in the hands of chiefs hence different ethical groups stood independently as social and cultural distinct from each group, this situation denied one group participation in political system. Ethnic and identity affiliations are often blamed for instigating violence and prolonging the duration of a conflict. However, they cannot solely explain the advent of conflict. Instead, they often act as triggers. Laitin & Rothchild identify the main cause for ethnic conflict as being a collective fear for the future, lived through the past. They see ethnic membership, political ideologies or religion serving as rallying cries in the mobilization and politicization of a collectivity. Land, economic resources, or other forms of control, are the stakes.Collective fear for survival or physical safety occurs when a state loses its ability to arbitrate between rival groups. The state either becomes so weak that it loses legitimacy with its people, or its operations are biased in favour of one particular group. Combined with collective perceptions of diversity and diffidence, such circumstances can lead to the creation of a "security dilemma." In his book, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, Barry R. Posen explains that the security dilemma can often explain escalations in conflict. Holsti identifies the cause of state failure in the erosion of vertical and horizontal legitimacy. This refers to the recognition of the right to rule (vertical) and the cohesion of the community (horizontal). Inefficient, unfair and discriminatory policies alienate the loyalty of the people and divide society along regional and ethnic lines. Although the root causes of a conflict may be different for each case, the severance of inter-personal communications across group lines produced by the polarization process often leads to the development of policies of dehumanization and discrimination towards the adversary as well as a heightened sense of zero-sum thinking.Where conflicts occur in ethnic diverse societies, they will look and sound as those which were caused by ethnic hatreds. A more remarkable example is the conflict in Somalia. Somalia is one of the most ethnically homogenous societies in the world although, as in all traditional societies, within the single ethnic group are many lineage or kin-groups. In the initial post independence period, political power had been shared reasonably comfortably among these clan groups. However, in the instability following a dictatorship, a political opportunist, Ayeed, induced the group living around the national arsenal to seize its considerable contents. The group then proceeded to build an army around these armaments. Building an army fast, Ayeed based recruitment on his clan and its proximate lineage groups in the absence of ethnic distinctions, clan membership was the only basis for creating cohesion in a fighting force. The excluded clans naturally felt threatened by this bid for power and so armed themselves in response. The resulting violent conflict in effect turned what ad a patchwork of closely related clusters been of people, into large rival groupings which hated each other. The conflict created the equivalent of inter-ethnic hatred in an ethnically unified society. A surprisingly similar example is the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The DRC is at the opposite end of the spectrum to Somalia, a society which is highly ethnically diverse. When President Kabila the First fell out with his Tutsi military support, he needed to build an army to oppose them. Because the DRC was so ethnically divided, this was difficult. Kabila needed to recruit across ethnic boundaries in order to build a sufficient fighting force. He therefore manufactured an encompassing ethnic grouping, of which all groups other than the Tutsis were members, namely the Bantu. Just as in Somalia, Ayeed had forged several clans into a common fighting group distinct from the excluded clans, so Kabila hoped to forge several ethnic groups into a common fighting group.In both cases, the conflict created a need to manufacture inter-group hatred, but the basic conditions for it was a society divided into two large groups, did not exist. In both cases military necessity led to the invention not just of the grievances but of the groupings themselves. Even if conflict is not caused by divisions, it actively needs to create them. When such conflicts are viewed during or after the event, the observer sees ethnic hatred. The parties to the conflict have used the discourse of group hatred in order to build fighting organizations. It is natural for observers to interpret such conflicts as being caused by ethnic hatred. Instead, the conflicts have caused the inter-group hatred and may even, as in Somalia, have created the groups.3.2.2.2 Economic FactorBy contrast, economic characteristics, dependence on primary commodity exports, low average incomes, slow growth, and large Diasporas are all significant and powerful predictors of conflict to civil war. These characteristics all make rebellion more materially feasible, that they enable rebel leaders to buy the guns and feed the soldiers, and furthermore to perpetrate large scale killing without themselves being killed in the process. A viable private army, which is the distinguishing feature of a civil war, is extremely expensive to maintain over the long periods that such wars typically last. Where a private army is viable, the agenda of its leadership could potentially be anything. It may be public spirited demand for improved governance. It may be a megalomaniac with an agenda of sadism. It may be a mafia-style grab for loot. It may be little more than insanity Jonestown or Waco with the violence turned outwards instead of inwards on the devotees.Over the years of a conflict the agenda is likely to evolve, with any political objectives eroding and eliding into rebellion as business. Hence, it is these factors that determine viability rather than objective grievances that are the true root causes. Which conflict prevention must address if it is to be successful. Since to date conflict prevention has paid scant attention to these causes of conflict, there is probably considerable scope for policy, both domestic and international, to prevent civil conflict more effectively. While objective grievances do not generate violent conflict, violent conflict generates subjective grievances. This is not just a by-product of conflict, but an essential activity of a rebel organization. Rebel military success depends upon motivating its soldiers to kill the enemy, and this, as in the classic Leninist theory of rebel organizations, requires indoctrination. Hence, by the end of a civil war, there is intense inter-group hatred based upon perceived grievances. A conflict has been generated which has no boundaries between political and violent actions. The task in post-conflict societies is partly, as in pre-conflict societies, to reduce the objective risk factors. However, post -conflict societies are much more at risk than implied by the inherited risk factors, because of this legacy of induced polarizing grievance. Either boundaries must be re-established between the political contest and violence, or the political contest must be resolved. Neither of these is easy, which is why, once a civil war has occurred, the chances of further conflict are so high.3.2.2.3 Political Leadership/ Democratic PrinciplesFrom a political perspective, inclusive government is not simply a matter of democracy; majority based democracy can lead to oppression of minorities. Conflict is greatest in semi-democracies or governments in transition and least among established democracies and authoritarian regimes. Democratic institutions must be inclusive at all levels for example, voting systems should ensure that all major groups are represented in government. The recent constitution adopted for government in Northern Ireland and the proposals for Afghanistan and Burundi are examples of this. 3.2.2.4 External Forces and InterestsThe research summarized above suggests some important policy conclusions for conflict-prone countries. One is that policies to tackle poverty and environmental degradation will reduce the likelihood of war, as well as being critical development objectives. Reducing large horizontal inequalities is essential to eliminate a major source of conflict. Policies that diminish private incentives to fight, especially once conflict is under way, are also needed. Above all, there is a need to secure inclusive government from political, economic, and social perspectives and a flourishing economy so that all major nations and most individuals gain from participation in the normal economy.From a political perspective, Economic and social policies are needed to systematically reduce horizontal inequalities. Policies towards investment, employment, education, and other social services should aim at reducing imbalances and inequalities. Such policies need to be introduced cautiously since action to correct horizontal inequalities has occasionally provoked conflict by the nations whose privileged position is being weakened. Outside agencies can point to the need to reduce horizontal inequalities, but ultimately such policies must depend on domestic actors. Although this article has concentrated on the causes of conflict within countries, much of the analysis is relevant to the international situation. The sharp economic and social differences between Western societies and the Muslim world are a clear example of international horizontal inequalities. These, together with the widespread impoverishment in many Muslim countries, permit leaders such as Osama Bin Laden and Al shabab etc, to mobilize support only too effectively along religious. Above all, there is a need to secure inclusive government from political, economic, and social perspectives and a flourishing economy so that all major nations and most individuals gain from participation in the normal economy.3.3 Types of Conflict ResolutionThere are number of conflict resolution in the field of conflict subjects, but this study will go through the most popular types so as to work on particular area of the African continent. Among them few are mentioned during negotiation table to include mediation, intervention, post-conflict transformation, and so forth.3.3.1 MediationMediation is the process of bringing together parties to conflict to discuss about their differences. The intention is to find a viable solution which will make their relationship smooth. Mediation is considered to be a well developed field in conflict resolution. In mediation, a third party is involved as a facilitator to assist smooth conclusion of agreement. Sometimes, mediation becomes impracticable because parties refuse to provide access to outside community in a particular conflict. The difficulty in mediation occurs when the parties to conflict become tired of the effect of long-term conflict, hostilities a chance for parties to sit together and negotiate. In intra-state conflict the third party need not necessarily come from outside the country. An individual with a particular status, who has experience in mediation, may assist to do the job. Individuals with religious roles, retired statesmen, businesspersons or any other influential figure may take charge. 3.3.2 InterventionThis is the process of sending of peacekeeping force in a conflict ridden area for the purpose of compelling conflicting parties to stop fighting. Intervention need strategic approach, it should look at when, why intervene and lastly long term impact. Some times if intervention is not properly conducted may steer the conflict instead of reducing. The intervention should be based on neutrality. It should focus on assisting civilian population; identify beneficiaries of conflict so as to avoid more complication of conflict resolution. For the purpose of this study intervention will refer to a way of conflict resolution where the use of military power, sanction and embargoes brought forward to force disputants to stop fighting. Embargoes includes cutting off trade links and supply of foods and other necessary needs while sanctions target the closure of bank accounts and other assistance which will compel parties into mediation.3.3.3 Post-Conflict TransformationPost conflict transformation refers to the process of transforming conflict from conflict habituated situation into a more conducive environment of peace, love and democracy. The process should combine peace making and peacekeeping operations. It must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody of possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation. For the purpose of this study, Post-conflict transformation will mean the whole process and initiatives from stopping fighting to the building mechanisms which will support restoration of permanent peace and order. The process includes addressing the root causes of the conflict and making sure there is no element of revenge in the community. Conflict resolution is expected to go further and address the root causes of the conflict. It should concentrate more on the situation which leads into serious fighting. Addressing the root cause, should go hand in hand with transformation of negative feelings between the conflicting parties. Counselling of injured, psychologically affected persons should be a significant issue to deal with.In resolving intra-state conflicts, there should be some issues to put in mind. First and fore most, parties should consider important matters related to power. These include democratization as a key element in the settlement. Parties should build mechanism, which will allow people to participate in decision making and in the planning of various state affairs. Solutions obtained may encompass procedures for transferring the struggle into constitutional and not violent form. Conflicting parties should be provided with freedom of association, there should be an independent election commission, fair election and respect to human rights. Secondly, the society should be reconstructed. The spirit of broader participation into state affairs should be imparted, a sense of security to leaders and the people should be given priority in ensuring that, while there is reconciliation and forgiveness, and measures are also taken to ensure that justice is done.The research summarized above suggests some important policy conclusions for conflict-prone countries. One is that policies to tackle poverty and environmental degradation will reduce the likelihood of war, as well as being critical development objectives. Reducing large horizontal inequalities is essential to eliminate a major source of conflict. Policies that diminish private incentives to fight, especially once conflict is under way, are also needed. Above all, there is a need to secure inclusive government from political, economic, and social perspectives and a flourishing economy so that all major groups and most individuals gain from participation in the normal economy.From a political perspective, inclusive government is not simply a matter of democracy; majority based democracy can lead to oppression of minorities. Conflict is greatest in semi-democracies or governments in transition and least among established democracies and authoritarian regimes. Democratic institutions must be inclusive at all levels for example, voting systems should ensure that all major groups are represented in government. The recent constitution adopted for government in Northern Ireland and the proposals for Afghanistan and Burundi are examples of this. Economic and social policies are needed to systematically reduce horizontal inequalities. Policies towards investment, employment, education, and other social services should aim at reducing imbalances and inequalities. Such policies need to be introduced cautiously since action to correct horizontal inequalities has occasionally provoked conflict by the group whose privileged position is being weakened, notably in Sri Lanka. A major problem is that the government of a conflict-prone country may resist such action, since it may be the beneficiary of the imbalances. Outside agencies can point to the need to reduce horizontal inequalities, but ultimately such policies must depend on domestic actors. In the short term, policies to change private incentives to fight include providing employment schemes and credit to young men. In the longer term, extending education and achieving inclusive development will enhance peacetime opportunities. Better control and legitimacy of international markets in drugs, timber, diamonds, etc, should reduce opportunities to profit from illegal trade during war. Although this article has concentrated on the causes of conflict within countries, much of the analysis is relevant to the international situation. The sharp economic and social differences between Western societies and the Muslim world are a clear example of international horizontal inequalities. These, together with the widespread impoverishment in many Muslim countries, permit leaders such as Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to mobilize support only too effectively along religious lines.3.3.4 CompromiseThis type of conflict resolution gives a clear surrender of each party’s rights in order to arrive into mutual understanding. Asking each party to give a little and take a little by arranging a compromise between the two. Asking both of the members to come to your offer and talk the problem through with them, presenting potential compromises and allowing them to mull these options over. By arranging a compromise instead of just selecting one member's interests over the other, you can reduce the likelihood that one staff member feels slighted by the way in which the conflict was resolved. This process basically gives large percent of parties to surrender their freedom or liberty for the purpose of conflict resolution.3.3.5 VotingBasically this type of conflict resolution signifies democratic principles much as majority against minority facts are concerned.If you simply must put a conflict on the round table, voting can be an effective method to resolve that conflict at hand. If, for example, two employees are arguing over a potential advertising campaign or other business endeavor, set up a vote and allow other employees to weigh in. The numbers will solve the conflict and serve as a once-and-for-all answer.This type is more useful in election struggle to lead a certain society.3.4 ConclusionBriefly, in conclusion much as key concepts, theoretical perspectives and legal dimensions are concerned in African conflict resolutions, this thesis evaluates the above researchers and at the end will analyze the context and the relevance of the literature in relation to the current situation in Africa and the AU over the successful conflict resolution. With regard to that, also justify on the critical point of the priority to the legal mandate of the regional organization vis-à-vis African interests and the Universal obligation of member states to intra or inter states conflicts. This thesis supports the above readings of different writers with provisions across the hypothesis of the study, which AU is well structured over the legal mechanism as well as management of African conflicts in papers, but implementation reflects to zero or negative performance relatively to conflict resolution in Africa. The study will comment. CHAPTER FOUR4.0 THE AFRICAN UNION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION SYSTEM4.1 African UnionOn the formation of the OAU in 1963, the organisation realized that conflict being a natural concomitance of human (and state) interaction, must arise and therefore established a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. This was the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA). The Commission’s protocol was signed by OAU member states, and it came into effect in the same year, but its Bureau was not set up until 1968. The member states of OAU however kept away from this commission partly due to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of members. They thus took to ad hoc committees in managing conflict in the continent.By 1971, the commission was liquidated without handling any serious dispute despite the numerous conflicts bedeviling the continent. Having liquidated the commission and having made no charter provision for mounting peace-keeping operations, the OAU depended on ad hoc mechanisms for conflict prevention and management. Such measures included the special (consultative) Committees, Council of Ministers, Assembly of Head of State and Government, Good offices etc. Conflict requiring peace-keeping troops were left to the UN. This explains the inability of the OAU to send a peacekeeping force to the border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia (1964) Ghana and Guinea (1966) Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire (1967). In 1993 the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) at its headquarters in Addis Ababa. The MCPMR still exist till today. It is built around the Bureau of Heads of State and Government, with a decision-making organ called the Central Organ, and a secretariat headed by the Secretary General. The Central Organ has three levels of authority, ie Ambassadorial, Ministerial and Heads of State and Government levels. Operationally, the MCPMR revolves around the General Secretariat, the office of the Secretary General and the Division of Conflict Management, utilizing the gains of the early warning system. The mechanism is funded from the peace fund set up by the OAU to be financed from 5% OAU regular budgetary appropriation, as well as voluntary contribution from Africa and non-African sources. The MCPMR was established through the Cairo Declaration which provides that: “The Secretary General shall under the Authority of the Central Organ, and in consultation with parties involved in the conflict, deploy efforts and take all appropriate initiation to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts.” The Cairo Declaration further stated in relation to the MCPMR that “In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. In this respect, civilians and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited cope and duration may be mounted and deployed. In conforming to the UN procedure of resolving international conflicts, the Cairo declaration envisaged the role of the UN in as follows:“In the event that conflict degenerates to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance where appropriate, the services of the UN be sought under the general terms of its Charter. The MCPMR has obviously made efforts to cope with the scourge of conflict on the continent. Notwithstanding, several of these conflicts persist with new ones emerging. This may have informed the perception by critics that the OAU mechanism has not been able to operate as effectively as envisaged.” The OAU Secretary General gave credence to this argument when he stated that, “The ugly scourge of conflict continues to ravage the continent despite the ardent efforts exerted by our leaders and peoples. Thus the Mechanism seems not to meet the expectation of African leaders, hence, the formation of an African Union with strengthened mechanism.”The AU was formed in Lome, Togo on 11 July 2000 with improved objectives, principles and organs. Since order and peace are sine qua non for development and growth, it became imperative that Africa stems the continuing underdevelopment and dehumanisation that has been her lot through conflicts. Although the AU Mechanism transformed from that of the OAU, the Act establishing the Organisation departs clearly from the regime to the OAU Charter in the area of collective security. Consequently, the inclusion in the various provisions of the AU Act of some key issues of economic development, gender equality, good governance, condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government, establishment of a common defense policy for Africa and the right of the Union to intervene in Member State is a clear indication of the desire of Africa leaders to depart from the former approach of the OAU to a fundamentally different approach toward the maintenance of peace, security and stability.Despite the formation of AU, Africa leaders still find it difficult to implement its conflict resolution mechanisms and strengthen its capacity to support Peace and Security Operations (PSOs). This is due to the following critical limitations:Lack of Funding: Most regional organizations are cash strapped and therefore lack the capacity in the relevant structures and capacity to support PSOs. For example while the AU appropriations 6% from the regular budget (about $1.8m) is considered grossly inadequate for the tasks at hand, external funding, which formed a larger portion of contributions came slowly and with conditions. The way out is for regional organizations to have effective and realistic funding mechanisms to support their peace support roles. Continuous appeals must also be made by the organizations to donors to channel their assistance through centralized endowment orpeace funds.Lack of effective coordination and harmonization between regional and sub-regional organizations’ security mechanisms.Insufficient expertise in multi-dimensional command and control functions at brigade and higher levels due to lack of funding and equipment.Inadequate equipment and logistics.Inadequate staffing of appropriate branches.Lack of regional cohesion involving linguistic divide, lead nation crisis, duplication of effort as well as political will to substantially, if not fully, empower some relevant structures.Mechanism capabilities are yet to meet the standard set by the Report and recommendations of the Brahimi Panel. These raise the need for consultation between AU, ECOWAS, the UN and international community.Lack of viable structures for strategic level management of Peace Support Operations.The inability to establish an African Standing Force (ASF) has also undermined the capability of AU to mount PSO. Thus the issue must be urgently addressed to enhanced rapid deployment of regional forces to crisis areas. On this issue, Lt-Gen Martin Luther Agwai the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff points out the following:Self sustainment of Sub-regional brigade-sized forces 60 days after the issuance of relevant mandate by the AU.Multi-dimensional strategic and mission levels management capacities. The deployment of the ASF will require speed and this has implications for training and management of the stand by force structures and units. This in turn calls for the establishment of a planning component at the regional and sub-regional HQs to augment the various military HQ staff. In addition the planning component like in the UN should be supported by an On-call list of trained staff, for effective management of both the ASF and on going mission. Standardization of Doctrines SOPs and Regional Centers of Excellence. There is the critical need to harmonize the various SOPs and doctrines of member states in line with the UN to enhance the peace support capabilities of ASF and minimize the risk of confusion during ops. The existing AU generic SOPs therefore need to be reviewed along with the need to improve the AU training capability both at the regional, sub-regional and national levels.Briefly AU as the sole African continent organization which succeeded the former OAU under the AU Constitutive Act formed in Lome, Togo must arise and ensure that a proper established mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution is performing accordingly. This Commission for mechanism must be able to manage conflict in the continent and all peace-keeping operations by using the gain of Early Warning Systems. Previously, the OAU depended on ad hoc mechanisms for conflict prevention and management. Such measures included the special (consultative) Committees, Council of Ministers, Assembly of Head of State and Government, Good offices. Conflict requiring peace-keeping troops were left to the UN, hence AU shall now do it by its forces contributed by all member states. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred in Africa, it will be the AU full responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. In the same manner, civilians and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited cope and duration must be mounted and deployed therein. For instance the Comoro Operation by the troops from Tanzania, Sudan and Uganda to remove dictator Col. Bacar at Anjouan island who presumed Presidency of part of Comoro against their Constitution.Much as UN intervention and policing is concerned, the assistance where appropriate, the services of the UN be sought under the general terms of its Charter. The mechanism must lead the effective services in the Continent so as to achieve the needful of the conflict resolutions in Africa. Consequently, the inclusion in the various provisions of the AU Act of some key issues of economic development, gender equality, good governance, condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government, establishment of a common defense policy for Africa and the right of the Union to intervene in Member State is a clear indication of the desire of Africa leaders to depart from the former approach of the OAU to a fundamentally different approach toward the maintenance of peace, security and stability. Despite the formation of AU, Africa leaders still find it difficult to implement its conflict resolution mechanisms and strengthen its capacity to support PSOs. 4.2 African Union Constitutive Act, 2002With reference to the Sirte Declaration of July 1999 African States through OAU Head of States and Governments determined to have AU by delivering their objectives in a document which is now referred to a Constitutive Act of 2002. This Act has formalized organs and institutions to implement their objectives to include Commission for Peace and Security Council. This is more or less like the UNSC, instead it stands for the African region Security Council.In fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintanance of peace, security and stability in the continent, the Peace and Security Council do cooperate closely with other international organisations and the UN which has the primary responsibility for the furtherance and maintenance of international peace and security. The UNSC also work closely with other relevant UN Agencies in promoting peace and security in Africa. Such organisations do also get invitation to address the AUSC on issues of common interest, when the latter considers that the efficient discharge of its responsibilities does so require.4.3 Legal Framework of the AUBasically the Office of the AU Legal Counsel is structured at the level of a directorate and is placed under the Office of the Chairperson. The current establishment for the Office of the Legal Counsel as approved by the Third Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the AU which was held in Sun City on May, 2003. The approval was for the staff to complement six professional staff including one documentalist, and supported by three general service staff.4.3.1 The Legal Counsel MandateThe Office of the Legal Counsel was vested with legal powers monitored by the broad terms of reference of the Office are as follows:To provide legal advice and opinions to the Chairperson of the Commission and all Directorates, Services and Units of the Commission of the AU; To provide legal advice to all organs of the Union, particularly the policy organs; To provide technical backstopping in all meetings of the Union whenever issues of a legal nature arise; To represent the Union in all meetings of a legal nature; To draft treaties, cooperation agreements, host agreements, rules of procedure;Vetting and clearing all contracts before they are signed; To ensure that the privileges and immunities of the organization and staff are protected; To provide interpretation of all treaties, agreements and other legal instruments, To carry out Legal Research and Codification; To perform depositary functions on behalf of the Chairperson of the Commission in respect of all the AU treaties.Much as the hereinabove terms are concerned, this office is directly involved in the AU perception over all legal lacuna and matters for the better African resolution in their conflicts. As per the conflict of obligation of the member states of the AU and at the same time member states of the UN, this office have a duty to analyze and advise with reflection to the AU objectives. Under the direction and supervision of the Chairperson, the Legal Counsel and his office perform the following duties:To catalogue decisions taken by the AU Policy Organs to ensure effective follow-up; To provide legal advice to all Departments of the Commission and Representational Offices in order to ensure legality in decision making and compliance with the Constitutive Act, the AEC Treaty and other treaties and legal instruments of the AU; To ensure that all decisions and actions undertaken by the AU Policy Organs are in conformity with the provisions of the Constitutive Act, the AEC Treaty and other treaties and legal instruments; To ensure that the legal interaction between the Commission and Member States, other organizations, individuals and other legal entities are regulated in such a manner that the interests of the Union are safeguarded; To ensure that the privileges and immunities granted to the Union and its staff, and representatives accredited to it are assured and protected as provided for in the Headquarters Agreements and the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the OAU; To advise on and coordinate the preparation and elaboration of draft treaties and conventions as well as cooperation agreements for approval by the policy organs;To prepare host agreements for hosting AU meetings, conferences, etc.4.3.2 The AU Legal Adviser ActivitiesThe Office of the Legal Counsel of the AU is acting as the Legal Adviser to the Chairperson of the Commission, the Union’s Policy Organs, the Commission and its regional and representational offices and all other organs of the AU. Furthermore, this office shall perform other activities for AU, such as:Manage and coordinate all activities of the Office of the Legal Counsel, assign tasks and routine work, prepare the work programme and the budget of the Office of the Legal Counsel and prepare reports on its activities.Provide necessary legal advisory services to the various AU Policy Organs and the AU Specialized Agencies. Advice on all legal aspects pertaining to the implementation of the AEC Treaty and on the establishment of such bodies as may be established by the Union. Advise on, and coordinate, the preparation of draft treaties and conventions as well as cooperation agreements between the AU and Member States or other organizations. Advise on the harmonization and coordination of legal strategies and policies of Member States within the framework of the Union and on decisions taken by other relevant bodies of the AU. Advise on legal issues relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution. Advice on the legal aspects of conventions and agreements to which the AU is a party, including the interpretation of any provision of such instruments as may be referred to the Office of the Legal Counsel.. Draft or assist in the drafting of administrative contracts and agreements such as contracts of engagement of personnel, consultants and contracts awarded for the procurement of goods or services. Prepare contracts to which the AU may be party and provide advice on issues and disputes that may arise from their application. Prepare reports for submission to the Executive Council and the Assembly of the Union. Act as custodian of all AU treaties or conventions and other legal instruments of which the Commission is a depository and constantly communicate to Member States the status of signature and ratification of the said instruments.Participate in meetings of a legal nature or where legal issues may arise on behalf of the Commission. Ensure that the privileges and immunities of the Organization and its staff, representatives accredited to it and experts on mission for the Union are assured and protected as provided for in the Headquarters Agreements and the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the OAU. Provide legal advice to institutions envisaged under the Constitutive Act, e.g. the Pan African Parliament, the Court of Justice and the various specialized Technical Committees, the Financial Institutions, etc. Prepare the necessary documentation and conduct all elections before the Assembly of the Union and the Executive Council. Deal with all issues relating to the granting of observer Status in the AU. Represent the Chairperson before the Administrative Tribunal in all disputes between him/her and staff members. Perform any other duties that may be assigned to him/her by the Chairperson. Process applications for observer status to the AU and follow-up on the activities of the institutions that granted observer status. Follow closely the legal texts being considered and adopted by the Regional Economic Communities (RECS), such as protocols, to ensure uniformity with each other and especially with the provisions of the Constitutive Act and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, as an essential and urgent step towards the building up of the Union. Constantly review the Headquarters Agreements, negotiate and conclude new Agreements and harmonize all these legal instruments. Ensure strengthened cooperation in the legal field between Member States as well as between the AU and African Regional and sub-regional organizations and other international institutions. Ensure the systematic classification of instruments in the custody of the Chairperson of the AU Commission together with the decisions of the Executive Council, the Assembly and the specialized institutions of the AU, and Closely follow up on international developments in some major legal issues, e.g. Economic Integration, Legal aspects of Conflict Prevention and Resolution, International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law, Public International Law, Extradition, Treaties on ban of weapons, etc.4.4 UN and AU Regions Conflict ManagementFollowing the joint meeting between the AUSC and the UNSC that was held in 2008 at Addis Ababa, indicated clearly the efforts of resolving conflicts in Africa.The cooperation ties achieved in recent years shows that the implementation of the calls on regional arrangements making efforts in achieving pacific settlement of disputes before referring them to the Security Council by both parties, has progressed positively.The consultation meeting between the AUSC and the UNSC aimed at reinforcing the working relationship between the African Union and the United Nations in general and to consolidate the cooperation ties between the African Union Peace and Security Council and the UNSC in particular.This is a clear indication of the political will of the UN Security Council, which will enable a better understanding of the problems faced by Africa so as to find appropriate solutions to help or face different conflicts in the continent. The delegates expressed satisfaction towards the efforts undertaken so far by both parties in a bid to resolving peace and security issues in Africa. The visit of the UNSC delegation to the AUSC field gives them the opportunity to touch and feel the reality on the ground so as to enable them understand the real problems the population living in conflict areas are facing on a daily basis. The adoption of some of the most pertinent presidential Declaration and Resolutions ie on peace and security in Africa as well as regular consultations between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations are indications that things are moving towards the right direction. In this channel, Africans do appreciate of the interest expressed by the UN Security Council, to support the African Union in its efforts in resolving conflicts in the continent.The African Union has made of the pillar on “Peace and Security”, one of its priorities and is committed to work closely with its partners such as the United Nations Security Council, in finding a durable solution to the problems of peace and security in Africa.According to the Conflict Analysis Regional Report on Somaliland, as it stands, the Beel System tends to be inefficient, with clan members who are uninformed and ineffective. The report also points out that the judiciary is biased and unfair and the presidency is showing tendencies towards authoritarianism. Such weak institutions can easily disintegrate in an emerging state where peace is relatively precarious, and Somaliland’s official status is undetermined. The presidential elections of May 2003 were plagued with accusations of vote-tampering and electoral hijacking. While the opposition ultimately accepted the results in the interests of peace, continuing poor governance could break the tenuous peace of Somaliland. Such a breakdown in governance and potential violent confrontations between the regional administration and opposition groups could increase the influence and power of religious fundamentalists.4.5 EU and UN on Regional Arrangement on ConflictsA conflict normally leads to destruction. It is also a driving force in history of humanity and a powerful motivation in the peace-building process. Good example is in the first half of the 20th century, Europe was with its two world wars, its totalitarian regimes, its concentration camps and its civil wars the most violent region of the world. With the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Union in the second half of the 20th century, today the continent has become one of the freest, most secure and most prosperous regions of the planet. Why does the EU accessing wider mandate to manage other regions conflicts than AU!This is a great descripancy over the legal aspect to UN as against AU on conflict management and resolution. Under the UN mandate all the regions are equally mandated but in reality from the ability and capacity these are the two different levelled regional arrangements.eg EU is currently well participating to resolve the CCM and CUF conflict in zanzibar in MUAFAKA document, but for instance in Darfur, one can see AU was overpowered by the UN by the issue of the arrest warrant of the President Al bashir while it was not a stand for the AU member states, and the ICC order of arrest is there to exist todate,why?.Can’t the Africans resolve their own conflicts really? There must be a problem of conflict of interest or law at a point in study.4.6 African Conflict Resolution MechanismAfrican continent has the largest number of member states compared to other continents in the World. Hence, one should expect to find the strongest continent organization with the compatible and keen conflict resolution mechanism. These mechanisms for various reasons have not been implemented effectively since the era of OAU to date. Some of the African regional organizations that have created conflict resolution and management mechanism include ECOWAS, SADC, ECCAS, EAC, IGAD, COMESA and UMA. The OAU by then, now AU mechanism will be discussed to give a better understanding of how these mechanisms fails to function, will be successful in future.Much as the African conflicts are concerned, the study amplifies to the present Conflict Resolution Mechanism to undergo on it from the philosophical approach as to how, what, when, and which categories to be addressed for the successful and an independent continent to resolve its own conflicts. Basically skills of the personnel of the commission is of utmost need, the mechanism in length must be aware of the Early Warning Systems, triggers or root causes of the conflicts, The knowledge of the round table in negotiations with particular cultures of the area in conflict.The need for a conflict-free Africa need not be overemphasized. On their part, African countries continue to spearhead peace processes aimed at the peaceful resolution of existing conflicts. The resolution of the conflict in Burundi was a classic example of a region-led initiative supported by the AU, the UN and a high profile Facilitator. The main challenge to Africa is lack of assured means of financing these efforts, especially peace support operations which require huge amounts of funding, and post conflict reconstruction. Support and more support from development partners shall continue to play a significant role. The other form of support would be in the current negotiations for a funding role by the UN. This study appeals that, as Africans, must be determined to consolidate and preserve the hard-won gains and to ensure peace prevails in the continent for sustainable development to ensue.Much as the framework of the Joint Africa and G8 Plan to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace support operations is concerned, the annual consultation between the Commission of the AU, members of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, representatives of the G8 member countries, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and other partners took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2008. The meeting provided an opportunity to update and review the progress made in the past year in the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the implementation of the overall AU peace and security agenda, and to look at ways of addressing the challenges ahead. 4.6.1 Views of the African Peace and Security AcademyThe participants welcomed the progress made in operationalization of the APSA, and reiterated the need to put in place effective and sustainable structures to enable the AU meet the many peace and security challenges facing Africa and to see the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF). The partners pledged their full support towards the implementation of the recommendations of the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security.The participants welcomed the significant progress made towards the operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) by 2009, and encouraged the Commission to pursue and intensify its efforts. The partners pledged their support, including for the acquisition of the required IT equipment and software, as well as the strengthening of the capacity of the AU Situation Room and equivalent structures in the Regional Mechanisms.The meeting noted with satisfaction that some partners have expressed their willingness to support financially the work of the Panel, including the early recruitment of the required support and technical staff, and emphasized the critical role that the Panel is expected to play in conflict prevention, in support of the efforts of the SC and the Chairperson of the Commission. The meeting noted with satisfaction that, in pursuance of the Protocol, and as part of the capacity building component of the Africa Peace Facility (APF) put in place by the EU at the request of the AU, a number of Regional Mechanisms have already deployed Liaison Officers with the AU in Addis Ababa.4.6.2 AU Capacity BuildingThe participants recognised that, despite the progress noted above in implementation of?the APSA, much greater progress could be made if?the Peace and Security Department (PSD) had?more capacity, including more personnel. Conversely, and as a result of the lack of adequate capacity, some partners were encountering difficulties in providing funding?to PSD. Participants noted the recommendation regarding the strengthening of PSD and subsequent discussions at the extraordinary session of the Executive Council held in Arusha, Tanzania, in early May 2008, and welcomed the fact that some work has already been initiated in this respect, with the view of submitting concrete proposals as soon as possible. Partners offered their full support to the AU Commission, the Regional Mechanisms and Member States in their endeavour to strengthen capacity in PSD. The meeting emphasized that, beyond the PSD, there is need to enhance the overall capacity of the Commission, including improvement and streamlining of procedures, in order to enhance the financial and management capacity of the AU. Partners pledged their support for the operationalization of the ASF and the building of the required capability, including the police and civilian components, by 2010. In this respect, they welcomed the development of EURO RECAMP, as an important contribution to the efforts aimed at the operationalization of the ASF.4.6.3 Conflict Management and Resolution OverviewWhile noting the progress made in the resolution of the conflicts facing the continent, the Consultation agreed on the need for continued and sustained efforts to consolidate peace where it has been restored, as well as prevent and resolve conflicts. In this respect, the Consultation recognized the key role being played by the SC and the increasing interaction between this organ and the UN Security Council, as shown by the now yearly meetings between these two organs. The meeting looks forward to the planned cooperation between the SC and similar structures in other organizations, such as the EU Political and Security Committee. Participants welcomed the work being done between the AU and several partners to establish a mechanism to jointly provide funding for the AU Liaison Offices in conflict and post-conflict areas, emphasizing their role in conflict prevention and resolution, as well as in peace building. Furthermore, Partners pledged continued support to the follow-up and implementation of the AU Framework on Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development.4.7 AU and G8 ConsultationsThe meeting reiterated the need to find a sustainable solution to the funding of AU led peace support operations. In this respect, the meeting welcomed the decision to establish a High-Level UN-AU panel pursuant to UN, to consider in-depth the modalities of how to support AU- led peacekeeping operations, in particular start-up funding, equipment and logistics.? Participants encouraged the Panel to?report by the end of the year with forward-looking recommendations. The AU and the Partners stressed the need to further harmonize efforts among donors in order to reduce transaction costs and to prevent duplication in assistance, based upon the Paris Declaration. Expectation was expressed by the AU and the Partners that agreement on joint reporting system for the programmes financed by the Partners will be concluded by parties concerned as soon as possible, and this will be a stepping stone for further coordination.The Consultation welcomed the decision of Germany to fund up to 20 million Euros a new building for PSD to accommodate additional personnel and provide the Department with the requisite facilities for the effective discharge of its mandate. The meeting expressed appreciation for the financial, technical and logistical support extended to the AU for the conduct of its peace support operations and for capacity building and other activities, since the last Consultation, by several AU partners, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA, as well as by the EU and the UN and its agencies. The AU and the Partners agreed that the interaction between the AU and the Partners will be strengthened, and the progress made will be reviewed regularly so that the partnership between AU and Partners will be further enhanced.4.8 Peace Facilitators and the Civil Societies in Conflict ManagementIn most parts of African continent,various peace initiatives are gathering momentum although at a very low pace. Some facilitators who have been participating in resolving conflicts in Africa including; Nelson Mandela who was negotiating the Burundi conflict, Thabo Mbeki in Zimbabwe, President Jakaya Kikwete the former AU Chairman in Anjouan conflict and Kenyan Post-election conflict, Salim Ahmed Salim in Sudan, etc do play a big role in this area.Records refers most conflict resolved armicably globally, the negotiator have been influantial and capable to handle the round table as per their experience and the convincing ability to negotiate and reasonable power to initiate peace plan. This study will recommend the necessary part of their involvement in the Conflict Resolution Mechanism in Africa as how others are performing in their continents. Much as civil societies are concerned, the conflict atmosphere did not entertain any, until the Peace Agreement were signed between states. African states had suffered many civil wars characterized by state bias towards the interest of the elite, a lack of impunity and rule of law, and poverty and discrimination, particularly against the indigenous population. Although there has been no return to armed violence, the democratization of society remains incomplete, significant social and economic problems continue, criminal and domestic violence have escalated. 4.9 Sight on Single and Multipartism in AfricaAfter years of relative political stability and prosperity until the 1980s, the consequences of single-party rule and mismanagement of the economy became increasingly felt and there has been a marked increase in violence in several African States, good example is Kenya, since the first multi-party there are endless conflict elections in 1992. Ethnic clashes, land and water conflicts, cattle rustling and criminality remain prevalent across the country. Since the beginning of democratization process in Africa, new political and social space has opened room for civil societies. Civil societies in Africa are large and active, however, the nature and background to its emergence in the country is based on very different historical, political, economic and social contexts. Nevertheless, while traditional development activities are still prominent, in the country civil society organizations have played an important role in peace building processes at the local and national levels.Some NGOs do face similar challenges despite their differences in nature or focus. There are still limited numbers of NGOs in African states that represent broad-based social constituencies with the view of shallow and unreliable resources from the donor communities for advocacy, justice, peace building and political reform hence remains a major challenge. But again lack of freedom of operation from government pressure or control is a common experience for African NGOs. 4.10 Good Governance and Skills of the AU with the EWSAfrican problems are not only due to lack of good governance of the state. They are also related to lack of management and eradication of negative ideologies inherited from colonial times. Nepotism, clientelism, corruption and exclusion which have been practiced by the successive powers in African states since they acceded to independence,eventually have led to social split and identity-based fission and, also to the crystallization of conflict-generating cleavages. The role of politicians continuously remains at the heat exacerbation of identity-based conflicts, which are tearing African peoples apart. Identity-based wars would not occur today in Rwanda if post-colonial leaders had not systematically built their political discourse on themes dividing communities. Bad governance as a causal factor has formed around three fundamental structures: A bad start of independences, unequal distribution of national resources and conflict-generating systems. Over time, there are indications that there is a risk of weak in political cohesion in Africa. Conflict and other vices in society have been on the increase a situation that has raised a great concern. The role of law is weak, as there is a weak review on national institutional and organizational structures to cope with the demands of the African people.It is desired that the African society to be characterized by strong adherence to and respect for the role of law, absence of corruption and other vices. Governance must be made an instrument for the promotion and realisation of peace, equity and unity as demanded by the rule of law and involving public participation in the war against conflicts and other vices in African continent.Good governance must ensure socio-political coordination for development. Also good governance should be archieved by promoting the culture of accountability to people leaving apart their races and other vices for the better maintanance of peace in the society. AU Constitutive Act established early warning system to enable facilitation of the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in the continent. The information gathered through EWS is used to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and gives recommendation on the best course of action. This EWS is also functioning upon collaboration with the UN, its agencies, other international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and NGO’s to facilitate its effective functioning.4.11 Role of Courts in Conflict ResolutionAmong other things in Conflict Resolution machinery, courts are also used to deter or rehabilitate the culprits or victims of the conflicts. Africa does not have a dependable court active for her cases to be intertained, or the available court(ACHPR) is incapable to do so for various reasons. 4.11.1 International Criminal Court (ICC)Basically ICC is an organization established by the Rome Statute, it was formed and established during one of the bloodiest decades in human history, after the Rwandan (African state) and Bosnian genocides. It is the sole Court which investigates and prosecutes genocide, crime against humanity and war crimes when national authorities are unable or unwilling to do so. Records today reflect 116 countries have ratified the Court’s Treaty, Rome Statute, and the ICC is now presiding trials with exception of the Americans. Basically it is critical to both the Court’s success and US foreign policy objectives. Thus, building American support for the ICC is a primary citizen for Global solutions mission. Citizens for Global solutions has been an active supporter of the ICC while court’s inception working toward the goal of US ratification of the Rome Statute. ICC is the world’s first permanent war-crimes tribunal. So far, 139 countries have signed the international statute creating the court and 100 have ratified it.Several cases have been referred to the ICC by the UNSC to include Sudanese Conflict where by ICC issued three arrest warrants against President Al Bashir currently ruling North Sudan for charges inter-alia genocide. This study finds that the AU as the Regional Organization was to be the first to reconcile the conflict in Libya but funny enough NATO mobilised the Rebels to meet the mediators in a very short time or facilitated impossible mediation in respect of the procedures and time frame to do the proper negotiation so as to arrive a proper conflict resolution and not NATO to invade that sovereign and wish to do revolution as it did a thing which was not in the passed resolution as Russia and China remarked the situation in June 2011 through TV. That can be referred to aggression under the International Law also to offences against humanity, but here the study found that ICC shows a clear biased picture which in a way discourages all advocates for equality before the law, and whether it is true existing for dispensing justice or, under the interest of the US welfare!4.11.2 ICC action in DR CongoIn April 2004, the situation in the DRC was referred to the ICC. On 23 June 2004, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC announced his intention to open a formal investigation into events which had occurred in the DRC from 1 July 2002 (the date on which the Rome Statute came into force).Since then, five arrest warrants relating to events in the DRC have been issued. Of the five indicted individuals, three (Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui) are currently standing trial before the ICC; a fourth, Callixte Mbarushimana, was arrested in France on 11 October 2010 and extradited to The Hague on 25 January 2011.A number of other ICC actions are also closely tied to the DRC. Jean-Pierre Bemba, a former Vice-President and Senator of the DRC and leader of the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MDC), is currently on trial at the ICC for crimes allegedly committed whilst leading the MDC in the Central African Republic. Joseph Kony, leader of the Uganda-based LRA, responsible for much of the violence in Province Orientale, has also been indicted by the Court, but remains at large. For a month by month report on the conflict in the Congo since September 2003.Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is expected to be determined in late summer 2011.Other cases reported to ICC includes ICTR and ICTY trials, nevertheless, ICC have issued arrest warrant for six Kenyans who were involved for the 2007/8 Post-election Conflict of Kenya, the accused have already appeared before the court at the Hague to be prosecuted by Moreno O’campo and currently some are already been posed with a case to answer. Recently in June 2011, the ICC issued arrest warrant for crimes against humanity in Libya after the Libya situation had been referred to the ICC by the UNSC several months earlier.Much as the ICC is concerned and the overview above, Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo had his views after investigation of which he is now prosecuting people whom he feels were the source of the post-election conflict in Kenya, probably to see justice is dispensed in the Kenyan society. Again, with regard to this study, the available relative peace in Kenya is going to be very much disturbed due to any allegation of the few mentioned political allies believed to be involved in the thirty days post-election violence. Practically and in reality, it was very difficult to demarcate a line of the actual doers and the perpetrators in the conflict. Definitely, whoever was mentioned and confront the prospect of sharing the doc at The Hague had to raise alarm in public that he or she was innocent. This atmosphere may puncture National Accord and Reconciliation Act, or damage the available relative peace found in this transitional period to the next election of 2012.But then with regard to the Libyan Conflict, this study have question marks on the issue of the crime against humanity, evidence shows that the UN passed resolution to restrict killings of the civilians through NATO forces or Americans and the allied forces, but the news reports that NATO are the killers of the Libyans,vivid example is the Priest of Roman Catholic at RC Church in Tripoli perceived NATO forces killing the 80 believers who were worshiping inside,and he spoke loudly and the world humanitarian agencies some like Amnesty International alarmed in Al jazeera TV,etc and todate no one has been arrested to be prosecuted at the Hague for the same.4.11.3 African Court of Peoples Human Rights (ACPHR)The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established by a protocol to the African Charter “to complement the protective mandate” of the African Human Rights Commission. The Protocol was adopted by the OAU in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on June 10, 1998; it came into force on January 25, 2004. The Court became operational about two years after its first judges were sworn in. Its permanent seat is in Arusha, Tanzania. As of March 11, 2011, twenty six of the fifty-three members of the AU have ratified the Protocol. The Court was ready to receive cases after it finalized its rules of procedure with the African Commission, and rendered its first judgment on 15th December in the case of Michelot.The ACHPR would be a clear destiny to dispense justice in Africa much as people’s human rights are concerned. But again this institution seems to be neglected and or disliked by the member states although numerous events of disobidience of human rights are committed without action taken, records reflects that a very small percent supported its establishment. Among the 53 African member states only 26 members signed the instrument,and only 4 states admitted their individuals to be entertained in this court. How many cases are ever brought since its establishment! Good example in Tanzania where the Court resides, this study found only Mtikila’s case which was filed recently 2011 by the Tanganyika Law Society with reference to the decision of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. This was case number 9 since it was established. The study finds that, this creates a big lacuna in the region to arrive a successful conflict resolution in Africa. With the weak court system in Africa today the ICTR is there at Arusha, Tanzania to resolve the African Rwanda conflict for the culprits of the human rights violation.4.11.4 ACPHR and the Commission for Human Rights History tells that, on September 9, 1999, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted the Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of the African Union (AU), with increased emphasis on democratic governance and human rights. The AU’s chief organs include the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council. The American Society of International Law ASIL The purpose of ASIL Insights is to provide concise and informed background for developments of interest to the international community. The American Society of International Law does not take positions on substantive issues, including the ones discussed in this Insight. Educational and news media copying is permitted with due acknowledgement. The Insights Editorial Board includes Human Rights Commission and the African Human Rights Court. The African Human Rights Commission had been created by the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted in 1981 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU. The Charter, known as the “Banjul Charter,” came into force on October 21, 1986, and enjoys universal participation by all fifty-three AU members.The African Human Rights Commission is an autonomous, quasi-judicial treaty body within the AU, which focuses on promotion and protection of human rights in Africa and on the interpretation of the provisions of the Charter. The AU exercises important leverage in relation to the Commission. First, the African Human Rights Commission’s eleven members are elected by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Second, the AU exercises the “power of the purse” over the African Human Rights Commission: the finances and the budget of the African Commission are apportioned by the African Union in consultation with the Commission. Moreover, the Commission must inform the AU of funds from other donors. Third, the Commission does not have an independent power to implement its decisions. In accordance with the Article 54 of the African Charter, the Commission must ask the Assembly of States Parties of the AU to take specific and necessary measures for the implementation of its decisions.The relationship between the African Human Rights Commission and the Court is governed by the principle of complimentarily, requiring general ongoing cooperation and consultation between the two bodies. In particular, according to the Protocol, the Commission has standing to bring cases before the Court. The relationship between the African Court and the AU is similar to the relationship between the African Human Rights Commission and the AU. First, the judges of the African Court are elected from among the nationals of member states to the Protocol by the Assembly of the AU. Second, as with the African Commission, it is the AU that determines the budget and bears the expenses of the Court in accordance with the criteria previously laid down in consultation with the Court. Third, the Court does not have independent enforcement power of its own orders or judgments. The Court reports annually to the Assembly, specifying the states that did not comply with its judgments. The AU Executive Council monitors the enforcement of the African Court’s judgments on behalf of the Assembly. Ultimately, the African Union can impose sanctions on a member state for its failure to comply with its decisions and policies. Sanctions may be of a political or economic nature, including the denial of transport and communication links with other Member States.The entities that can make submissions of cases before the Court are: the African Commission, any state party (either as Applicant or Respondent), any state party whose Citizen is a victim of a human rights violation, African intergovernmental organizations, and, with the Court’s permission, non-governmental organizations with observer status and individuals. It should be noted that the Court does not provide for the direct right of individual petition, a hallmark of the European system of human rights protection. Individuals and organizations that have observer status before the African Human Rights Commission acquire standing before the Court only after a state party delivers a specific declaration recognizing their capacity to do so. The Protocol to the Charter specifically prohibits the Court from receiving petitions in the absence of such a declaration. So far, only five countries Ghana, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, and Tanzania have made such declarations.Parties to a case, the African Human Rights Commission, or the Court proprio motu can Order interim measures “in the interest of the parties or of justice.” The Court may ask the parties to provide it with information on issues relating to the implementation of the requested measure. In the event of non compliance with the measure, the Court may put forward specific recommendations in the annual report that it presents to the AU Assembly.The establishment of the AU has brought a new hope in the African continent as it provides for a need to pursue a deliberate strategy for conflict resolution on the continent. Among other institutions of the AU, the ACPHR would be a clear destiny to dispense justice in Africa much as peoples human rights are concerned. See bibliography on 1st July, 2008, AU adopted protocal to the African Charter emerging the AHR Court with Court of Justice of the AU into one Court. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: “The change will become effective when 15 states deposit there instrument of ratification. 4.11.5 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR)The ICTR was clearly established under the influence of the UN and the Rome Statute particulary to prosecute those people involved in the masacre in Rwanda after the planned death of their late Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi accidented by the aircraft shot at Kigali in 1994. With the weak court system in Africa today the ICTR is residing at Arusha, Tanzania to resolve the African Rwanda conflict for the culprits of the human rights violation commited in 1994 or later.Records shows that among the 90 culprits todate 63 were arrested,62 cases are already determined and one case is still entertained on hearing stage. Gachacha tribunals in Rwanda are also well organised to align the AU objectives, and for the matter of a successful conflict resolution in Africa, Gachacha tribunals do ambiance a clear picture of the AUSC goals. Kagame’s regime have proved self and successful conflict resolution with gachacha proceedings for law violators in conflicts. The following chapter will discuss case studies in African region being attended by the AU to suit the purpose of this study.4.12 Conflict Resolution Mechanism In AfricaGenerally, international peace and security is managed by the UNSC. Whenever conflicts erupt, it is the duty of this peculiar body to resolve or finding a proper solution. The AU under regional arrangement and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, can intervene in managing any kind of conflict in Africa after consultation of UNSC. It is also been referred to AU Constitutive Act that, AUSC can deal with conflict management and resolution in the region by the relevant Commission for Peace. AU also embodied an institution or the important arm for check and balance as per the Philosophers John Montesquieu,Aristotle and Dicey. 4.12.1 Conflict in SudanBriefly in Sudan for some years now, conflict erupted when the two societies in the same state arse on ethnic interests as per there religions and tribes from North Al- Bashir followers and those from South under the late leader John Garang. Again the issue of the area of oil production in Abier were seen to be benefiting the Northern part only and not the Southern part. Following the report submitted in 2006 pursuant to the African Union Peace and Security Council in which the Council endorsed the conclusions of high-level consultation on Darfur, held in Addis Ababa. The Addis Ababa conclusions called for a comprehensive approach to the peace process in Darfur, including re-energizing the political process, strengthening the ceasefire and a three-phased approach to peacekeeping, culminating in an African Union-United Nations hybrid operation.The report proposed a mandate and a structure for the hybrid operation in Darfur in The African Court for Peoples Human Rights ie ACPHR would be a clear destiny to dispense justice in Africa much as people’s human rights are concerned. But again this institution seems to be neglected and or disliked by the member states although numerous events of disobidience of human rights are committed without action taken, records reflects that a very small percent supported its establishment. Among the 53 African member states only 26 members signed the instrument,and only 4 states admitted their individuals to be entertained in this court.Western Sudan and provides details on the various components of the proposed operation and their specific tasks. Additionally, the report described the ongoing efforts of the international community to support the peace process in Darfur and to strengthen the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS).4.12.2 AU in Sudanese ConflictAfrican Union Peace and Security Council expressed its support in principle for a transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation. Such a transition was also endorsed by the United Nations Security Council which called for a joint African Union-United Nations technical assessment mission to the Sudan/Darfur to assess the requirements for strengthening AMIS and the possible transition of AMIS to a United Nations peace operation. On the basis of the recommendations of the joint African Union-United Nations technical assessment mission the Security Council adopted the resolution in which it authorized the expansion of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) into Darfur and invited the consent of the Government for the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peace operation in Darfur. However, the Government of the Sudan did not give its consent.At its meeting, held at the level of Heads of State and Government in New York in September 2006, the Peace and Security Council took note of Security Council resolution, as well as the Government of the Sudan's decision not to consent to the deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Darfur. It requested the African Union Commission, with the support of African Union member States, the United Nations and other partners, to take all necessary measures to enhance AMIS on the basis of the concept of operation approved by the Military Staff Committee of the African Union at its meeting of 2006.Out of deep concern for the difficulties that AMIS and its mandate have been faced with, as well as continued insecurity in Darfur, the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission co-chaired in Addis Ababa a high-level consultation of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the African Union Peace and Security Council members, a number of other African countries, the Government of the Sudan, the European Union and the League of Arab States to identify concrete steps to be taken to improve the situation in Darfur. The meeting recommended on the need to re-energizing the political process, establishing a strengthened ceasefire and defining the way forward for peacekeeping in Darfur. The high-level consultation underlined that the hybrid operation should be capable of contributing to the restoration of security and the protection of civilians in Darfur and should be logistically and financially sustainable, and further noted the need to take into account security along the borders between the Sudan and Chad and the Central African Republic.In Abuja, the African Union Peace and Security Council held a meeting, at which it endorsed the Addis Ababa conclusions and decided with regard to the hybrid operation force that, the size of the force shall be determined by the African Union and the United Nations, taking into account all relevant factors and the situation on the ground, as well as the requirements for it to effectively discharge its mandate. The Security Council issued a presidential statement in which it endorsed the Addis Ababa conclusions. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, President Omar AI-Bashir confirmed that the Addis Ababa conclusions constituted a viable framework for peaceful settlement of the conflict in Darfur and reaffirmed the readiness of the Government of the Sudan to implement the Addis Ababa conclusions. He impasse over deploying a major UN peacekeeping force to Darfur results directly from the international community’s three-year failure to apply effective diplomatic and economic pressure on Sudan’s government and its senior officials. Unless concerted action is taken against the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), Khartoum will continue its military campaign, with deadly consequences for civilians, while paying only lip service to its many promises to disarm its Janjaweed militias and otherwise cooperate. UN Resolution extended to Darfur the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which presently has 10,000 personnel in-country monitoring the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement: it “invited” the consent of the Sudanese government to the deployment of 20,600 UN peacekeepers. This expanded UN force was in effect to take over the African Union’s overstretched African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which although threatened with expulsion in September, has now been extended to the end of December, with its numbers on the ground expected to grow to 11,000.The NCP continues to strongly reject the proposed UN deployment. Its primary motive appears to be a fear that improved security would loosen its grip on the region. Officials responsible for orchestrating the conflict since 2003 also appear to fear that a major body of UN troops in Darfur itself might eventually enforce International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments, although it is not obvious why that risk should be decisively greater for them with an extended UNMIS deployment than it is with the present one.In responding to this rejection, full-scale non-consensual military intervention by the international community is not at this stage a defensible or realistic option. But it may be possible to persuade the NCP to alter its policies and consent to the UN mission in Darfur by moving now to targeted sanctions against regime leaders and their business interests and immediately planning for the establishment and enforcement of a no-fly zone over Darfur that builds on the ineffective ban on offensive military flights the Security Council imposed in 2005.The alternatives to such action radical by contrast with the limp offerings from the Security Council so far would be additional months of trying to entice the NCP into a more forthcoming position, as some leaders are still trying to do, or total concentration on trying to extend and reinforce the existing African Union AMIS mission, as has increasingly been urged by various policymakers. Crisis Group’s concern is that either of these approaches will be too little too late, given the way the security, human rights and humanitarian situation has steadily deteriorated since the DPA was signed.Inter alia, the NCP launched a major offensive in August and offered the UN its own “security plan”, involving sending more than 22,000 government troops to Darfur to secure a military victory. With support from Chad and Eritrea, elements of the rebel groups that did not sign the DPA have regrouped as the National Redemption Front (NRF) and since late June have launched a series of attacks. Violence against women surged, with more than 200 instances of sexual assault in five weeks around Kalma camp in South Darfur alone. The lone rebel signatory, the Sudan Liberation Army faction of Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) increasingly acts as a paramilitary wing of the Sudanese army. It has become clearly apparent that, while a political solution ultimately is the only way to end the war and create the conditions allowing millions of displaced persons to go home, the DPA is all but dead: there is a desperate need for the African Union (AU) and its partners to reconstitute a viable, inclusive peace process that builds on its foundations while addressing its flaws, but there is no sign of that happening.Divisions have now emerged within the international community over whether to drop the UN mission proposal in favour of a strengthened AU-led mission. Unless these divisions are quickly reconciled, the NCP will exploit them to neutralise international pressure. It is an immediate priority to make AMIS as effective as it can be, but that mission, whose credibility in Darfur is decreasing, is not a substitute for the more robust UN force, which would be able to call upon greater physical and financial resources. The situation in Darfur demands the most effective response possible. That can only come through the full UN deployment, and efforts need to be concentrated to bring it about as rapidly as possible.With regard to AUPD request must be made to the NCP to demonstrate progress in national investigations into the policies that drove the crimes and support the inclusion of judicial reforms, lifting of institutionalised immunities and the establishment of credible transitional justice mechanisms as key elements of the Darfur peace process and the study recommends practical measures for transforming the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights into a court able to conduct trials for atrocity crimes on the continent.The recent appointment of Andrew Natsios as US Special Envoy for Sudan and tougher talk out of Washington is welcome, but it is likely that even more could be achieved by implementing and expanding the reach of some of the measures that have already been agreed in the Security Council and elsewhere. Accordingly, the US, UN, African Union and European Union, acting together to the greatest extent possible but as necessary in smaller constellations and even unilaterally, should now:apply targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, to key NCP leaders who have already been identified by UN-sponsored investigations as responsible for atrocities in Darfur and encourage divestment campaigns;authorise through the Security Council a forensic accounting firm or a panel of experts to investigate the offshore accounts of the NCP and NCP-affiliated businesses so as to pave the way for economic sanctions against the regime’s commercial entities, the main conduit for financing NCP-allied militias in Darfur;explore sanctions on aspects of Sudan’s petroleum sector, the NCP’s main source of revenue for waging war in Darfur, to include at least bars on investment and provision of technical equipment and expertise; andbegin immediate planning for enforcing a no-fly zone over Darfur by French and U.S. assets in the region, with additional NATO support; obtaining consent of the Chad government to deploy a rapid-reaction force to that country’s border with Sudan and planning on a contingency basis for a non-consensual deployment to Darfur if political and diplomatic efforts fail to change government policies, and the situation on the ground worsens.Much as the International Criminal Court (ICC) is concerned, arrest warrant against President Bashir for atrocity crimes in Darfur has brought Sudan to a new decision point. The long-ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has defied the court, gained African Union (AU) and Arab League pressure on the Security Council to suspend the case and restricted humanitarian aid in Darfur, putting several million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and others at risk. Darfur rebels have been emboldened, reducing prospects for diplomatic progress. Simultaneously, CPA that ended the North-South civil war is unravelling. As a new U.S. special representative begins to make his mark, the international community may be ready to sacrifice the justice issue for a quick-fix deal that would ensure elections in 2010. But Sudan will have peace only when its impunity system is dismantled. 4.12.3 UN in Sudanese ConflictIn 2005, the Security Council gave the ICC jurisdiction over the situation in Darfur. The prosecutor eventually obtained arrest warrants against one mid-level official and one militia commander and then applied in July 2008 for a warrant against the president. The NCP sought to mobilise African, Arab and Islamic help by charging that the court and its prosecutor in particular, was an instrument of a Western campaign against its Islamic discourse and for regime change. Domestically, it launched the Sudan People’s Initiative (SPI), advertised as a broad-based national consultation to come up with Darfur solutions, but it tightly controlled proceedings and has not carried out its recommendations. Violence intensified in Darfur from September 2008 onwards, with deadly attacks on aid workers and the peacekeepers of the joint UN/AU mission (UNAMID). Inter-tribal clashes and fighting between government and rebel forces continued unabated, creating new civilian displacements. On 4th March 2009, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the arrest of Bashir, upon which the NCP retaliated by expelling thirteen international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) that had been providing vital food and health services. Perceiving Bashir to be weakened by the arrest warrant, opposition and rebel groups hardened their positions and became even more reluctant to engage genuinely with the government. Though the Darfur rebel group JEM signed a “good will” agreement to pursue further talks with the government in February 2009, fighting continued on the ground, and the mediation process set up by Qatar in Doha appears stymied. Attention has turned increasingly to the overarching threat in Sudan: possible collapse of the CPA, which could mean a return to wider civil war. The NCP has held back the key concessions required for the democratic transformation that agreement appeared to promise, including repeal of repressive laws and restoration of basic freedom of association and expression, and it has blocked the actions necessary for a peaceful referendum, such as a credible census, demarcation of the border, fuller wealth-sharing and de-escalation of local conflicts in the transitional areas of Abyei, South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. It appears to have decided to allow neither the secession of South Sudan nor meaningful political reforms in the North. The South’s goal is now to maintain its 2011 self-determination referendum. The plan is already done.The international community, including the Obama administration and its new special envoy, Scott Gration, who shows welcome signs of activism, is right to make saving the CPA a priority. But the temptation is to accept a humanitarian, political and security quick-fix on Darfur in order to preserve chances to hold the 2010 general elections on time and move on to the 2011 referendum. Justice for the crimes committed in Darfur would be in danger of disappearing from that kind of peace process, just as it was dropped from the CPA negotiation itself in 2005 and later from the Eastern Sudan and Darfur Peace Agreements. That would be a mistake. Justice and peace are closely connected in Darfur. Judicial reforms and transitional justice mechanisms leading to reconciliation and a culture of accountability are essential to the success and sustainability of the peace process there. Nor will there be sustainable peace in northern Sudan if the system of impunity is not done away with and genuine change of governance promoted. If the NCP is allowed to relegitimise its rule and close the door to political accommodation with Darfur rebels through a fraudulent electoral process in 2010, northern Sudan will likewise face increased turmoil. That turmoil and the failure to deal with census, border and military redeployment issues will also undermine the conditions for a peaceful referendum in the South on the future of that region.Other issues are to review the security management committee in each Darfur state and allow UNAMID to participate in it, to replace the governors and their deputies by technocrats to administer the three Darfur states until elections, to persuade President Bashir to step down as soon as possible and in any event before the general elections. In future to nominate another presidential candidate and agree with the GNU to postpone the election to 2011, so as to give time for Darfur’s stabilisation and allow fair Darfur participation in the process.Also to suspend application of any court decisions on political and military prisoners in Darfur pending a final peace agreement there, or to establish a Transitional Darfur Task Force (TDTF), a high-level committee comprised of the president, first vice president, special envoy of the UN/AU, chief commander of UNAMID and the justice, interior and humanitarian affairs ministers, to monitor implementation of the above judicial and accountability measures and lastly to accept and implement a comprehensive ceasefire in the three Darfur states through the Doha peace process. And to move all Rebels to participate in the UN/AU/Qatar-supported Doha peace process and accept and implement a comprehensive ceasefire in Darfur, as well as judicial reforms and transitional justice mechanisms, as key components for settlement of the conflict.The UN/AU special envoy in charge of the Darfur peace processes that judicial reforms and transitional justice mechanisms be included as key components of any settlement. Much as UN and AU Special Envoy is concerned, Djibrill Bassolé put judicial reforms and transitional justice mechanisms such as a truth and reconciliation commission and vetting procedures prominently on the Doha agenda. With regard to AUPD request must be made to the NCP to demonstrate progress in national investigations into the policies that drove the crimes and support the inclusion of judicial reforms, lifting of institutionalised immunities and the establishment of credible transitional justice mechanisms as key elements of the Darfur peace process and the study recommends practical measures for transforming the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights into a court able to conduct trials for atrocity crimes on the continent.Much remains to be done to achieve peace in the transitional areas and negotiate a foundation for future North-South relations. Meanwhile, both states also face enormous domestic challenges in the months ahead. In the North, ICC indictee President Omar al-Bashir is facing a growing economic crisis, as well as dissension within his own party the NCP. Southern Sudanese are jubilant, but the South will be born one of the world’s most underdeveloped states. It also faces a significant political challenge in building a genuine multi-party democracy.The current situation in both Sudans, The dispute over Abyei, a territory geographically, ethnically and politically caught between North and South, is one of the most intractable in Sudan. The region was given special status in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and,its own referendum (a choice to join the new South or remain a special administrative territory within the North), but this did not take place in part because of heated disputes over who was eligible to vote. Ngok Dinka constituents are overwhelmingly in favour of joining the South, while Misseriya communities fear annexation could prevent migration and thus threaten their way of life. But the Abyei dispute has also assumed broader political dimensions, and been used as a bargaining chip between North and South. Despite common perceptions, the dispute is not primarily about oil, as the fields currently in Abyei constitute a very small percentage of Sudan’s total production.?Following months of recurring incidents, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in May 2011 took control of Abyei, citing an alleged attack by Southern Sudanese police forces on a UN convoy carrying SAF troops. Tens of thousands have since been displaced, and the UN has reported at least 100 civilian casualties. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) declared the invasion an “act of war”, but has showed significant restraint and vowed to not retaliate. Bashir and South Sudan President Salva Kiir reached an agreement on 12th June that all SAF troops will be withdrawn by 9 July and replaced by the Ethiopian-led UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), approved by the UN Security Council in late June. This will ideally facilitate the return of Abyei’s residents and?result in improved security and civilian protection, but otherwise only maintain an unstable status quo. With no clear path to a resolution of final status, Abyei could remain a flashpoint for the foreseeable future. However, it was a basic agreement on which to build, and commitment from Khartoum was soon withdrawn. With regard to the North-South Border.sections of the 2,100 km., border remain hotly contested.Mounting militarization on both sides makes it highly unstable. As such, the two parties have tentatively resolved to create a 10km demilitarized zone along the border. The new border security agreement also calls for troops to be drawn from UNISFA to provide protection for the monitoring teams in the demilitarized zone.4.12.4 Analysis of Sudanese Conflict ResolutionIn 2011 conflict was resolved by the Referendum by dividing Sudan and another state of Southern Sudan capitalized at Juba. But there after a question of the area famous for oil production bordering the two states remained undetermined although few agreed plans were arrived to secure the conflict resolution. Still the conflict is on board for the right and successful resolution at Addis Ababa to date under the Chair of the former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki. Basically the negotiators are there for the AU mandate of the Regional arrangement to resolve that particular conflict. Much as UN and other international organizations involvement is concerned, issues like human services to include medical, sheltering, food, etc are still delivered together in missions. Futhermore, the undergoing misunderstanding over the very prime area for Sudanese wealth with oil is to be determined impartial by South Sudan and Sudan.Lastly, the interim nature of both the border agreement and the force manning Abyei and the demilitarized zone must be just that, “interim”. These arrangements cannot remain indefinitely particularly if the border remains undefinedlest they simply incubate the disputes and effectively inhibit final resolution and demarcation of the border.?With regard to the North’s problems, situation will change little with Southern independence. Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has not addressed the root causes of Sudan’s chronic conflicts, and is facing multiple securities, political and economic challenges. The party’s hardliners are determined to solve these issues militarily, and has effectively ended debate on Sudan’s diversity, remaining committed to an Arab-Islamic identity for all Sudanese and is ready to sub-divide key states to accommodate political barons. At the same time, NCP rank and file is increasingly discontent with its leadership and its approach to dealing with the current situation.Regarding the South, with independence from the North formalised, focus in the South must now shift to the political agenda at home. A new transitional government will preside over a fixed term from 9th July 2011, during which a broadly consultative review process should yield a permanent constitution. Two factors will shape the coming transition more than any others: the degree to which the ruling SPLM will allow a genuinely multi-party system to take hold, and how much internal democratic reform will be allowed within the SPLM. There are already worrying authoritarian tendencies with the SPLM that threaten to suppress the opposition and undo much of the goodwill created by a political parties conference in 2010. In the coming transition period, a more inclusive process is needed to complete a permanent constitution and regain the confidence of all Southerners. The SPLM must recognise the a genuine multi-party system is not a threat to its power, but a long term investment in stability, in particular as the new state will continue to grapple with internal security issues for some time. The overview of this conflict is generally considering the Sudan’s fragile Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is entering its final phase, and a critical vote on Southern self-determination looms, but foundations for a constructive post-referendum relationship are yet to be laid. In addition to a handful of outstanding CPA items, future arrangements on citizenship and nationality, natural resource management (oil and water), currency, assets and liabilities, security and international treaties must be negotiated, regardless of the referendum’s outcome. Many in Sudan and abroad are focused on ensuring the referendum exercise takes place on 9 January as planned. But simultaneously pursuing agreement on the broader post-referendum agenda is not only critical for a peaceful transition and long-term regional stability, but may also serve the more immediate objective of clearing the path for a mutually accepted referendum. After months with little progress, the African Union (AU) High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and the U.S. jump-started stalled negotiations in recent weeks. But considerable work remains to bridge the gaps between the CPA parties, and time is short. Details of all the post-referendum arrangements cannot, and need not, be negotiated before the vote. Mistrust between the parties remains high, and the still unresolved issue of Abyei complicates the political environment. Given the political brinkmanship that has long characterised Sudan’s North-South politics, it is conceivable that the parties might continue to circle fruitlessly before attempting to strike a grand bargain at the last moment. Such high-stakes gambling risks instability in Sudan and the region, and should be discouraged.Southern Sudan’s right to self-determination is guaranteed by the CPA, and efforts must continue to ensure smooth conduct of the 9th January poll. But progress now toward a series of win-win arrangements could also remove obstacles to the referendum and temper the potential impact of its result.4.13 The 2007 Kenyan Election ConflictKenya was left with deep scars by the violence that erupted in the aftermath of the disputed Presidential election of December 2007. In just a matter of weeks, Kenya was transformed from one of Africa’s most stable democracies into chaos. More than a thousand people died in the post-electoral conflict and over a quarter of a million people were forced to flee their homes due to the unprecedented levels of violence. In February, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, the two main contending presidential candidates, agreed to form a coalition government putting their differences aside. Although much of the violence ceased with this agreement, the country was left wondering: What issues divided Kenyans so badly and how best to achieve the reconciliation and reconstruction of the country? Some insights into these questions can be gained from the two nationally representative surveys that the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) conducted just before and after the 2007 elections. Below there is a summary of the key findings drawn from these surveys. These findings were discussed at a two-day workshop for Members of Parliament, representatives of civil society and academics held in Nairobi, Kenya in 2008. Briefly, two weeks ahead of the elections the CSAE conducted a detailed survey of voter intention, attitudes toward violence and socio-economic characteristics of Kenyans. A second survey, conducted in August 2008, revisited previous respondents to find out about their experiences in the aftermath of the election, their expectations from the new coalition government and whether their views had changed regarding trust among Kenyans, democracy, land conflict, decentralization, among other issues. The election irregularities and a weak Electoral Commission were the main factors that triggered electoral violence. Of course this does not necessarily mean that the perceived election irregularities were the cause of violence, but it was one of the main detonators that fuelled the violence that escalated as a result of deeper issues that divide Kenyans. The post-election survey gives an indication of the deep and long-term consequences that violence will have for Kenya. The outbreaks of violence significantly contributed to the deterioration of trust among Kenyans and of the rule of law. AU have basically perceived the lacuna of the legal system in Kenya as the sent delegation of AU recommended for that rule of law must always prevail to sustain the available relative peace to avoid the future erupt of another conflict.It is a slippery slope and a dangerous situation. Restoring the rule of law and making the necessary legislation to prevent future outbreaks of violence is one of the main challenges that the coalition government faces today. It is important to learn from other international experiences. If you give impunity now it comes back to bite you later. The problem does not go away because you agree to reconcile, but to implement the agreement over the conflict at hand. 4.13.1 AU in Kenyan ConflictPeace process in Kenya was facilitated by initiatives of AU delegates through Jakaya Kikwete, the current President of Tanzania and Chairman of the African Union by then, who nominated the retired President Mkapa to represent Tanzania, to join Graca Machel Mandela (APA) etc, and also when Mkapa arrived in Kenya to assist in the talks, both the opposition parties expressed their continued commitment to the talks. The session discussed also about the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (NARA). The two leaders agreed to form a coalition government, with Odinga set to receive the new position of Prime Minister, in capacity to coordinate and supervise government affairs. In the absence of an opposition due to the formation of the coalition government, more than 70 backbencher MPs supported the creation of a coalition opposition, feeling that it was important to have an opposition for the sake of democratic governance. However, 2008, the Cabinet decided to oppose the creation of such an opposition, saying that it would be unconstitutional and would violate the spirit of the coalition. On the same day, the Cabinet decided to fast-track the commission of inquiry that is intended to investigate the causes of the violence, and to attain successful conflict resolution on the face of legal dimensions. This was a precise a way forward to the AUSC objectives. With regard to Kofi Anan in this conflict, basically the UN sent him for the same purpose to resolve the misunderstandings, something which was already been combated by the AU Delegates and citizens of Kenya with good intention for that nation. What could be evaluated from the same scenario, one would conclude that realization of the losses of lives and properties of the Kenyans themselves reframed the ease or temporary conflict resolution although the act of the ICC by the Chief Prosecutor Moreno O’campo almost disturbed the available relative peace in Kenya. But again still the coming Election is very doubtful following the ICC investigation of which the prosecution ended that among the six accused person only three have to answer the case at The Hague. This adjudication may land the Kenyans in another big conflict if the EWS is not well exercised to tackle the ongoing Presidential campaign with the accused of the ICC like Uhuru Kenyata and Rutto being on board. 4.13.3 UN in Resolving the Kenyan ConflictThe respondents explained and admitted that the UN had played a greater part in resolving the chaos in the country by sending its former secretary general Koffi Annan. The UN considered the Kenyan conflict as power struggle among the politicians. The Organization through Secretary General Ban Ki Moon showed a very central role in addressing the conflict and successfully brought the two sides to the negotiating table. Kibaki and Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement called the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, which established the office of prime minister and created a coalition government. The power-sharing Cabinet, headed by Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, was eventually named after lengthy negotiations over its composition. Literature reveals that, on 7th February 2008 the two sides remained deeply divided in talks, although they agreed that there should not be a recount of votes. Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council called for peaceful resolution of the dispute through negotiations. One of the respondents articulated that, the role of the international community in Kenya is similar to the extent that there have been generous aid contributions towards poverty reduction and socio-economic initiatives at different times over the past few decades. However, while this may have an indirect contribution to peace building, there has been a lack of commitment in Kenya towards any international political engagement at the national or local level in pushing for political reform or supporting peace building initiatives. Odinga and the Cabinet were sworn in on 17th April 2008 at State House. Annan travelled to Kenya again for the occasion; he called on Kenyans to support the new Cabinet and, noting that there was still a long way to go, said that the next task would be to mould the cabinet as a cohesive, effective and productive thing that will help steer this nation right. But again Koffi Annan is expected to revisit Kenya on end of November, 2010 for the same agreement reached to a new Kenyan Constitution and its implementation over the conflict resolution. 4.13.3 Analysis of Kenyan’s Conflict ResolutionConsidering the process of conflict resolution in Kenya, at the stage of negotiation, the ODM did suggest for a government of national unity, it discussed a coalition government with genuine power sharing, which it said would leave less power for Kibaki than would be the case in a national unity government. One of the mediation processes was facilitated by Ghanaian President and African Union Chairman John Kufuor. That negotiation took place in a peaceful atmosphere. Odinga said that he anticipated direct talks involving both himself and Kibaki, with Kufuor's participation. Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju said that by calling off the rallies, Odinga opened the way for negotiation and reconciliation. But there existed doubts that Kibaki really invited Kufuor (as opposed to him having come as a result of international concern for the worsening situation in Kenya). Peace process in Kenya was also facilitated by initiatives of AU through Jakaya Kikwete, the President of Tanzania and Chairman of the African Union by then when he arrived in Kenya to assist in the talks. Also here both the opposition parties expressed their continued commitment to the talks. The session discussed also about the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (NARA). The two leaders agreed to form a coalition government, with Odinga set to receive the new position of Prime Minister, in capacity to coordinate and supervise government affairs. In the absence of an opposition due to the formation of the coalition government, more than 70 backbencher MPs supported the creation of a coalition opposition, feeling that it was important to have an opposition for the sake of democratic governance. However, on 22nd May, 2008, the Cabinet decided to oppose the creation of such an opposition, saying that it would be unconstitutional and would violate the spirit of the coalition. On the same day, the Cabinet decided to fast-track the commission of inquiry that is intended to investigate the causes of the violence. A proposed bill that would allow the backbenchers to create an official opposition, the National Assembly (Parliamentary Opposition) Bill 2008 was published in August 2008 and was passed a few months later. The issue of a possible amnesty for those arrested in connection with the violence also proved to be controversial. Vice-President Musyoka downplayed the tension, saying that campaigning had not interfered in any way with the smooth operations of the coalition.Basically, as much as the Kenyan conflict is concerned, the meeting of foreign ministers from the countries of the East African IGAD was called in Kenya, surprisingly, the ODM held protests for the meeting to go ahead, believing that the meeting would be a means to legitimize Kibaki's government. Annan was critical of this threat, saying that fraud statements outside negotiations were supposed to be avoided. The government subsequently said that the meeting would not officially be considered an IGAD meeting, and the ODM called off the protests on February 6. Much as civil societies are concerned, the conflict atmosphere did not entertain any, until the Peace Accords between PNU and ODM were signed between in 2008. Kenya had suffered many civil wars characterised by state bias towards the interest of the elite, a lack of impunity and rule of law, and poverty and discrimination, particularly against the indigenous population. Although there has been no return to armed violence, the democratisation of society remains incomplete, significant social and economic problems continue, criminal and domestic violence have escalated. After years of relative political stability and prosperity until the 1980s, the consequences of single-party rule and mismanagement of the economy became increasingly felt and there has been a marked increase in violence since the first multi-party elections in 1992. Ethnic clashes, land and water conflicts, cattle rustling and criminality remain prevalent across the country. Generally PCIA may give lessons like country specific approach, conflict analysis focus, project cycle approach, impact assessment to overcome the challenge of balancing peace in a society. There is a possibility of the Kenyan conflict to continue in future especially for the coming Election of which none has been confirmed for the process particularly on the date and candidates. UN has warned that a repeat of the problems could occur after the 2012 presidential election unless Kenya strengthens its institutions and the perpetrators of the 2007 violence are punished. A BBC report in 2009 found that rival groups in Rift Valley Province, such as the Kalenjin and Kikuyu, are purchasing firearms such as AK-47 and G3 rifles, in readiness for anticipated violence at the 2012 poll.President Mwai Kibaki named opposition leader Raila Odinga as the new prime minister, after the pair agreed the deal on Saturday in secret talks. The crisis was sparked by presidential elections in December that triggered violence in which 1,500 people died. The deal overcame a row over how the cabinet posts would be divided.4.14 The 2008 Zimbabwe Elections Conflict Zimbabwe’s March 2008 elections are the latest episode in the country's deepening political and economic crisis. The policies, corruption and repressive governance of President Robert Mugabe in power for 28 years and his ZANU-PF party bear primary responsibility for the severe economic slide, growing public discontent and Zimbabwe's international isolation. Mugabe, with his ZANU party, came to power in 1980 as Africa’s most feted leader, after a UK brokered agreement ended a protracted guerrilla war against the white minority government of Ian Smith. The early 1980s were marked by a five-year brutal repression in Matabeleland and Midlands against the minority Ndebele population that supported rival ZAPU. ZAPU was later forced into a merger, leaving Mugabe head of a de facto one party state, under ZANU-PF, by 1987. State violence escalated since early 2000, when Mugabe lost a constitutional referendum on presidential powers and controversial land reforms, as the people voted in clear protest. The forcible acquisition of mostly white-owned farms by ZANU war veterans beginning in the 1990’s, also spiked after that electoral defeat, Mugabe’s only, crippling the economy and leading to chronic shortages of basic commodities. In the context of spiraling inflation and 80 per cent unemployment, the government launched “Operation Murambatsvina” in 2005 to forcibly clear urban slums, depriving over 18 per cent of the population of their homes or livelihoods. The opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) entered the political scene in 2000, but failed to break Mugabe’s majority in the 2000 parliamentary elections. Elections in 2002 and 2005 were marked by gross manipulation and suppression of dissent. The MDC split in November 2005 over whether to boycott elections for the newly formed senate. After a brutal government crackdown on the opposition in March 2007, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) mandated South African President Mbeki to mediate between the government and the MDC aiming to secure a new constitution and free and fair conditions for elections. Talks stalled in January 2008, when Mugabe called snap polls for March despite the MDC's call for postponement until new constitution adopted. On 29th March 2008, Zimbabwe held combined presidential and parliamentary elections marred by extensive pre-poll manipulation. Only "friendly" countries and institutions were invited to observe the polls and most Western media were barred. Despite the skewed playing field, Zimbabwe's people clearly signaled their rejection of the status quo for the first time, ZANU-PF lost control of parliament to the MDC, which made unprecedented gains in rural areas. ?Yet rather than let democracy run its course, Mugabe and his hard line supporters moved to force victory, withholding the results of the presidential election and launching a countrywide campaign of violence and intimidation. Tsvangirai withdrew from a second round presidential run-off set for 27th June over election violence, leaving Mugabe open to claim his sixth term in office on 29 June. Amid rising international condemnation, talks between ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions began on 24 July under the mediation of South African President Mbeki. After stop start negotiations, a power-sharing deal between Mugabe and Tsvangirai was eventually signed. Yet implementation has quickly stalled and as the humanitarian situation for the majority of Zimbabweans continues to worsen, a new political approach urgently required. Zimbabweans continue to face economic turmoil and corruption, severe food shortages and the collapse of vital services. HIV/AIDS among adults stands at over 20 per cent, while a mounting cholera epidemic has left over 1,500 dead. By January 2009 the annual inflation rate stood at over 200 million per cent, the world’s highest by far making day-to-day life for Zimbabweans increasingly difficult.? The government’s sticking plaster approach including removing ten zeros from the Zimbabwean dollar in August 2008 has done little to stem the economic crisis. Up to a third of the population is thought to have fled over recent years, and remittances from the growing diaspora have become a lifeline for many remaining. The Current Situation in Zimbabwe is deteriorating again under a new wave of political violence organised by Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party that threatens to derail the GPA. Mugabe’s calls for early elections have raised fears about a return to 2008’s violence, and the country faces the prospect of another illegitimate vote unless credible, enforceable reforms can first be implemented. Without stronger international pressure on ZANU-PF, the tenuous current coalition may collapse, triggering further violence and grave consequences for southern Africa.The GPA was signed by the three political parties (ZANU-PF, and the two wings of the former opposition, MDC-T and MDC-M) in September 2008, after Mugabe was “re-elected” in an uncontested run-off following violence that caused Tsvangirai (who led the first round) to withdraw. It was intended to provide a foundation for response to the multiple political and economic crises, but it has become a battleground for control of the country’s future. As in 2008, ZANU-PF’s ability, in partnership with the unreformed security sector leadership (the “securocrats”), to thwart a democratic transfer of power remains intact. The state media is still grotesquely unbalanced, and the criminal justice system continues to be used as a weapon against ZANU-PF opponents, in particular the MDC-T.The centerpiece of GPA reforms is a parliament-led constitution-making process under the direction of the COPAC. That body launched an outreach program in the latter half of 2010, but several civil society organizations and the MDC-T criticize it for falling far short of being inclusive and open and accuse ZANU-PF of having captured and manipulated the process. Both MDC parties argue that COPAC must finish its work before elections are held, but ZANU-PF says elections can proceed with or without a new constitution and links its cooperation on democratic reforms to removal of targeted international sanctions, over which the parties have no control.The lack of political progress has been coupled with an alarming upsurge in political violence organized by ZANU-PF. The March 2008 elections were followed by an unprecedented campaign of violence targeting MDC-T, including at least 300 politically motivated murders that eventually forced the party to withdraw from the June second-round vote. Violence has risen again following the early 2011 visit of the SADC facilitators, including arrest of MDC-T supporters and attacks on party and civil society figures. There are also reports of youth militia deployments across the country ahead of the constitutional referendum, including induction of many of these young people into the police and?army through ZANU-PF’s control of security force recruitment and the civil service. This correlates with allegations about deployment of army officers into rural areas?to coordinate intimidation, though these are vehemently denied by Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa.4.14.1 Role of AU/SADCThe facilitation team recognises that it needs a constant presence in Zimbabwe. Its roadmap should propose an audit of what has and has not been done, what the parties can and cannot achieve. If further power-sharing is inevitable, a pragmatic assessment of the current arrangement’s failure is needed. The guarantors and facilitation team have relied on the JOMIC, set up by the GPA, four members from each of the three signatory parties for evaluations, but it has not fulfilled its mandate, due to inadequate monitoring capacity, no enforcement leverage and problems navigating the distorted balance of power within government. In recognition of its poor performance, the SADC troika recommended strengthening the facilitation team’s monitoring and reporting capacity, so it could work closer with the JOMIC. The annual progress review the Periodic Review Mechanism should provide in consultation with the guarantors has not been done, though the party leaders recently agreed to correct this. The guarantors must ensure a comprehensive review. The crisis group in its briefing recommended that,?Zimbabwe in Engaging the Inclusive Government, first, Donors should pursue a “humanitarian plus” assistance strategy that covers the priority areas in the government’s STERP, including revival of the education, health and water sanitation sectors, as well as a functioning civil service, and reconstruction of basic infrastructure. Zimbabwe should be treated as a post-conflict society in need of some front-loaded aid. Donors might also create a contact group, both to support the political process and to coordinate aid flows. Second, SADC countries, most significantly South Africa, should also provide more direct assistance but require strict compliance with the GPA and avoid in particular direct support to the Reserve Bank, which remains in the control of Mugabe loyalist, Gideon Gono, and could be expected to divert it to ZANU-PF patronage networks. Third, Support is also needed for programs to reform politicised legal institutions, including the judiciary, and strengthen civil society that has been deeply fractured in recent years, including religious, press, labour, academic, women’s and youth groups. SADC and the Commonwealth secretariat might work together to build parliament’s legislative and oversight capacities.Forth, to counter the greatest and very real stability risk an attack against Prime Minister Tsvangirai or a military coup a strategy is needed to retire virtually all members of the security sector senior leadership. Persuading them to go peacefully will not be easy, the generals fear the post-Mugabe era. The government could create leverage with a law that offers immunity to senior generals from domestic prosecution for past political crimes (excluding crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide) in return for retirement. At the same time, it should create a panel tasked to recommend the modalities for setting up transitional justice mechanisms such as a truth commission and vetting processes as part of security sector and other administrative reforms, andFifth, The U.S., EU and others could, in accordance with their laws, sweeten the deal by removing targeted sanctions on those who accept and comply. The new South African president, working with the SADC mediation team, should negotiate with the generals, making clear that those who do not step aside risk prosecution for their crimes domestically or internationally.4.14.2 Role of UN Basically Mugabe had a negative attitude with anyone with a point related to US or UK with regard to the conflict arose and UN being involved in atmosphere especially when all aids stopped from UN member states or from the western race.The 2008-2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations between the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (led by Morgan Tsvangirai), its small splinter group, the Movement for Democratic Change led by Arthur Mutambara, and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front led by Robert Mugabe intended to negotiate an end to the partisan violence and human rights violations in Zimbabwe and create a framework for a power-sharing executive government between the two parties. These negotiations followed the 2008 presidential election, in which Mugabe was controversially re-elected, as well as the 2008 parliamentary election, in which the MDC won a majority in the House of Assembly.Preliminary talks to set up conditions for official negotiations began between leading negotiators from both parties the three party leaders met for the first time in Harare to express their support for a negotiated settlement of disputes arising out of the presidential and parliamentary elections. AU organised negotiations between the parties officially which began on July 25 proceeding with very few details released from the negotiation teams in Pretoria, as coverage by the media was barred from the premises where the negotiations took place. The talks were mediated by the then South African President Thabo Mbeki.4.14.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in ZimbabweA final deal was reached on 11th September, 2008, providing for Mugabe to remain President while Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister. Talks between the parties began in Pretoria on July 10. ZANU-PF and both MDC groupings were present for the talks. ZANU-PF and both groups of the MDC signed a Memorandum of Understanding outlining a framework for talks in Harare. The agreement committed the negotiating parties to an intense program of work to try and finalize negotiations as quickly as interaction. Under the terms of the agreement, the parties agreed to end political violence and work towards a national unity government and a new constitution. Jakaya Kikwete, the President of Tanzania and Chairman of the African Union emphasized Mbeki to be a mediator because of his knowledge, understanding and acumen of the situation during the AU Summit. Much as the 2010 World Economic Forum is concerned, again Jakaya Kikwete convened a miled negotiation at Dar es Salaam between the two Zimbabwe leaders President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsivangirai to sustain a relative peace prevailing in Zimbabwe and to avoid further misunderstanding but to arrive a successful conflict resolution as a goal of the AU and all Pan-Africans. 4.15 The Anjouan Island ConflictBasically in this particular conflict of Comoro, AU successfully attended and timely sent the forces including Tanzanian Army JWTZ, Senegal and Libya Forces to pursue the operation much as unconstitutional governance is concerned in Anjouan Island as against the President Abdalahman Sambi of Comoro. JWTZ and the allied forces invaded successfully the Anjuwan island under the umbrella and the blessings of the AU, for the undemocratic leadership of the military dictator Cornel Mohamed Bakar who extended forcefully his leadership term as against the Comoro Constitution, eventually after the AU military attack, he escaped the islands to Mayotte as a Political asylum AU credited a successful mission of the African conflict resolution and peace management in a right way of which the island is now ruled democratically. At this particular conflict AU has never been interfered by the UN mandate as in other conflict. Why? Study will comment.The invasion of Anjouan in 2008, was an amphibious assault led by the Comoros, backed by African Union (AU) forces, including troops from Sudan, Tanzania, Senegal, along with logistical support from Libya and France. The objective of the invasion was to topple Colonel Mohamed Bacar's leadership in Anjouan, an island part of the Union of Comoros, when he refused to step down after a disputed 2007 election, in defiance of the federal government and the AU. The Comoros archipelago in the Indian Ocean has had a fractious history since independence from France in 1975, experiencing more than 20 coups or attempted coups. The invasion occurred on the early morning of 25th March 2008. The main towns were quickly overrun and the island was declared under the control of the invading forces the same day.Mohamed Bacar managed to escape to Mayotte on March 26 and requested political asylum. He was subsequently held in custody there by the French administration and brought to the island of Réunion. On 15th May, France rejected Bacar's request for asylum but the French refugee office ruled that the ousted leader could not be extradited to the Comoros because of the risk of persecution.The Comorian federal government delayed the holding of an election on Anjouan due to alleged irregularities and intimidation, but Bacar nevertheless printed ballots and held an election in June, claiming a landslide victory of 90 percent. In March 2008, hundreds of Comorian government troops began assembling on Mohéli, which is closer to Anjouan than the larger island, Grande Comore. Sudan and Senegal provided a total of 750 troops, while Libya offered logistical support for the operation. In addition, 500 Tanzanian troops were due to arrive soon after. France, the former colonial power, also assisted the operation by airlifting AU troops to the area. 4.15.1 Role of AU in Comoro Vows of resistance from the self-declared president of Anjouan were met with stern words from the AU envoy, saying "He will be overwhelmed...I am afraid to say that if he tries to do that, it will be the end of him physically, if necessary." In an interview with IRIN, Mohamed Bacar said: "National president Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi does not know anything concerning the military, but if I had to advise him I would say that it's not the solution. The first time in 1997 the army came we kicked them out. The second time May 2007 the army came we kicked them out. That means that if they try to come a third time we will kick them out." Anjouan promised to hold new elections in May 2008, which South African President Thabo Mbeki supported as a way to resolve the crisis. Mbeki once more tried to stop the invasion on 14th March, but the AU disregarded his proposal and the invasion went ahead.On 3rd March, 2008, a fuel ship supplying the Comoros Army caught fire in the port of Comoros' capital, Moroni. The cause of the fire was unknown. On March 11, an armed incursion occurred on the islands where three members of the Anjouan Militia loyal to President Bacar were captured and taken to Mohéli for interrogation. Diplomacy continued with an intervention by South African President Thabo Mbeki who attempted to delay the planned AU invasion to the distinct displeasure of the Comorian government. It is understood that Mbeki spoke to the head of the AU, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, by phone on 14th March to stall the attack, intended to depose Mohamed Bacar. Despite this intervention, a fishing boat with soldiers left Moheli for Anjouan on March 14. There were conflicting statements from both sides, with Comorian and AU military sources reporting that a fishing boat carrying around fifty soldiers from the federal government of Comoros landed in southern Anjouan and attempted to capture a police station. In a later statement Comorian Chief of Staff Salim Mohamed revised the information and said a reconnaissance team of about 10 soldiers landed on March 14 in the south of Anjouan Island and reached the southern town of Domoni. Two soldiers were wounded, a federal source said. "The target of the operation was the Domoni police station in Anjouan so as to free political prisoners," said the source. "Contrary to its republican mission the National Army of Development (Comorian Army) devotes itself to taking innocent citizens as hostages who’s only wrong is to be Anjouanese and not Sambist. In addition to the fishermen kidnapped at Marahare and Mromhouli, a second aggression by the National Army of Development dissident forces supported by the trawler provided by Iran failed. The elements of the [Anjouanese] gendarmerie retaliated in self-defense, wounding two of the gangster attackers including one lethally," 4.15.3 Role of UN/ FranceFrance's role in the crisis was brought into question when, on 19th March, a French police helicopter on an unauthorized, clandestine mission from the French-administered Comoro island of Mayotte crashed in the sea close to the city of Sima on Anjouan. Reports from officials in the Comoros said that no one was hurt in the crash. The helicopter was owned by France's Mayotte-based air and border police force. Critics allege the helicopter was involved in an attempt to bring Bacar into French exile, and that Bacar was only holding out so long because he was protected by the French."We don't know what it was doing. You can imagine the rumors. The government of Comoros did not allow them to come. They were not authorized ... The French said they sent other air and naval assets to pick up the crew." The French military had already transported about 300 Tanzanian troops and 30 tons of freight to Grand Comore between 14th and 16th March. According to reports a French diplomat said that France was ready to transport Senegalese troops as well, but had not yet done so. The diplomatic source said France remains "favorable" to dialogue but on condition that Bacar accepts the presence of African troops at the port and airport of Anjouan. On the morning of March 24, 2008, five boats transporting approximately 1,500 AU soldiers left the port of Fomboni, capital of the island of Mohéli. Bacar and his troops vowed to fight until the last man was left standing, with an Anjouan lieutenant stating, "We will fight until we die.” It was reported that the runway at Ouani Airport close to Mutsamudu was blocked with baggage trolleys and the atmosphere was tense as the island braced itself for the impending assault. Before the telephone lines were cut an Anjouan government spokesperson was quoted as saying: "They have decided to kill but we are not afraid. We are well prepared. Our forces are ready and it's going to work!" About 450 troops landed on the north side of the Anjouan Bay at dawn on 25th March. The BBC reported that the island's capital, airport, seaport and second city were all overrun by dawn, to scenes of jubilation from the local population. By mid-day, the presidential palace was deserted. But other journalists reported that the invaders had "struggled to progress further under the automatic fire of Anjouan forces" and in the afternoon "clashes with heavy artillery continued to shake the town of Ouani." The army was reportedly looking for Bacar's hiding place. After the airport was secured the invasion force apparently split where part of it headed south-west to engage Anjouanais loyalists in the capital, Mutsumudu, and the remainder headed south-east capturing the port of Bambao M'Sanga and the second city of Domoni without resistance. Early reports indicated that the Bacar government had fled to the interior of the island and were in hiding, however later uncorroborated reports from the Comoros government on March 25 stated that Mohamed Bacar had fled the island incognito seeking exile in Mayotte.There was no comment from the Bacar government but the Comoran government spokesperson said that the invasion troops had been told to look for him and were conducting house to house searches. Eventually, Mohamed Bacar managed to escape to Mayotte by speedboat and reports on 26th March confirmed his presence on the island and stated he had requested political asylum in France.The Associated Press reported from Paris that France was considering the request for political asylum but Comoran leaders demanded that France should return Bacar to the Comoros, and there have been anti-French protests calling for the same. France stated that it was treating the asylum request as quickly as possible, but, on March 27, Bacar was moved to the French island of Réunion, where he was charged and investigated for illegally entering French territory while carrying weapons, along with 23 of his followers. The case was rejected for procedural reasons, but Bacar and the 23 other persons remained in custody. By the end of March, several prominent supporters of Bacar had been arrested, 5th April 2008, Bacar was remanded in custody. Comorian President Sambi visited Anjouan in early April, marking his first visit to the island since May 2007. He said that he hoped that separatism in Anjouan would cease with the removal of Bacar from power, and he praised the African leaders who had provided assistance for the invasion. Contrary to previous reports that France was against the invasion, France gave its approval and helped to air-lift the AU troops to the island. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stressed on April 8 that France had not supported Bacar or provided him with any protection, and that it had fully supported African Union intervention. 4.15.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in AnjouanOn April 18, Bacar and with 21 of his close guards were released from prison and returned to house arrest at the Réunion military airbase On 23th April, it was announced that the French Office of Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office fran?ais de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; OFPRA) had granted asylum to two of Bacar's men and refused asylum for six of them; those whose requests were rejected were to be sent to a third country and not returned to the Comoros due to fears of persecution. OFPRA had yet to rule on the cases of Bacar or his other men. Bacar's asylum request was rejected on 15th May, 2008. France's Secretary of State for Overseas, Yves Jégo, said France would support the Comoran government's efforts. "We will continue to act in consultation with the Comoros so that the law can be applied and Col Bacar can be tried." Presidential elections in Anjouan occurred on June 15 and June 29, 2008. The election was won by Moussa Toybou, who defeated Mohamed Djaanfari in the second round. Much as conflict resolution is concerned at this juncture the trials conducted to the wrong doers as against Bacar ended successfully.Basically in Anjouan the conflict based on undemocratic leadership to take over democratic administration. The economic status of the Comoro State is not very much good but indeed it suffies the citizens and the neighbourhood a little bit. In this sense one should not expect to benefit much from this type of economy of the poor state like Comoro. The study shows only the French people who colonized this island just showed cooperation at the end when a rebel Bacar and his followers when they wanted asylum, instead they helped to hand over the culprits before the court of laws. This is a typical example of uninterested area or state to secure economic value to conflict, hence UN never participated in this conflict simply because nothing were to benefit them. 4.16 Libyan Conflict The conflict in Libya basically focused the long leadership of the late Col. Muamar Gadafi which covered over 42 years. Rebels fought to overthrow the regime with the big assistance of the American and the Allies forces in 2011 where by succeeded to kill President Gadafi and the Transitional Council of the Rebels is currently ruling the state. Although Gadafi resisted for some months in the struggle, AUSC highlighted the conflict in a very low ink or nothing was done to secure the resolution of that conflict. This is where AU Commission for Peace and Security Council was to act and show the teeth to bite the conflict. This study only referred the AU effort to send Jacob Zuma the President of RSA and his delegates whose were given by NATO forces very limited time and immediate conditions to leave the state of Libyans at the initial stages of the conflict resolution when Gadafi was still alive and in power to meet the Rebels for end results. It is very unfortunate this study found that AU proved failure to this particular practice and so overpowered by the regional stranger NATO as against the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act too. But again efforts were made by other NGO’S to secure the atmosphere of the innocent lives of civilians in Libya. When the government forces attacked the civilians, violation of human rights were then triggered others to intervene the situation of the conflict. Nevertheless, Libya is signatory to the Banjul Charter and a party to the Protocol establishing the African Court of Human Peoples Rights. However, as Libya has not made a declaration under the Protocol, NGOs and individuals cannot file petitions against Libya. Consequently, NGOs acting in response to the Libyan crisis turned to the African Human Rights Commission. Eventually, on 24th February, 2011, three non-governmental organizations the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (“EIPR”), Human Rights Watch, and INTERIGHTS submitted a joint request for provisional measures to the African Human Rights Commission. EIPR is an Organization active in Egypt, while the latter two are international human rights organizations based in New York and London, respectively. In the request, the applicants asked the Commission to order Libya to undertake a number of actions, including stopping and preventing “the use of unjustified lethal force against protesters, whether by the security forces, mercenaries or other bodies or individuals acting on behalf of the State.” On February 25, 2011, the African Commission made a statement on the human rights situation in North Africa, urging the government of Libya to “immediately end the violence against civilians.” Three days later, the organizations also submitted a joint complaint against Libya to the Commission, urging it to “respond to the grave and urgent situation” in Libya. Both the request for provisional measures and the complaint chronicled the violent repression of civilian protestors from 17th February 2011. Subsequently, on 1st March 2011, the Commission condemned the actions of the Libyan government, and on 3rd March 2011, the Commission instituted proceedings against Libya in the Court for “serious and massive violations of human rights guaranteed under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.” In the application, the Commission specifically referred to the complaints of human rights violations received during its preceding session. Although the African Commission did not request indication of provisional measures, the Court decided to order provisional measures proprio motu. Under the Protocol the Court is allowed to order provisional measures on its own volition in case of “extreme gravity and urgency” and “when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons.” As the Court ascertained the presence of all three criteria in the case of Libya, it ordered Libya to refrain from activities that would result in violation of rights under the Charter or other international instruments. Moreover, the Court ordered Libya to report to it within fifteen days on its progress in implementing the order.The NGOs initially involved in triggering the litigation issued a subsequent press release, hailing the Order by the Court and urging Libya to enforce it. Nevertheless, the Libyan government ignored the Order. As its Order was not complied with, in accordance with the Rules, the Court should report the lack of compliance to the Assembly of the AU and to the Council of Ministers. It will be up to the Council and or the Assembly of the Union, both political bodies, to adopt measures in response to Libya’s non-compliance.4.16.1 Role of AU in LibyaFor the first time in its history, On 25th March, 2011 the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights ordered provisional measures against Libya in the case African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The provisional measures require that Libya immediately refrain from any action that would result in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons, which could be a breach of the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights or of other international human rights instruments to which it is a party.” In addition, the African Human Rights Court ordered Libya to report to the Court within fifteen days on the steps taken in response to the Order. The Libyan government ignored the Order.The African Human Rights Court’s action paralleled that of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). On 26th February, 2011, the United Nations Security Council decided to refer the conflict in Libya to the ICC Prosecutor. A few days later, on 3rd March, 2011, the ICC Prosecutor announced that he would open an investigation. On 16th May, 2011, he requested arrest warrants for Muammar Gadhafi, his son Seif al-Islam, and Abdullah Sanussi for crimes against humanity. On 26th June, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I granted the Prosecutor’s request and issued the arrest warrants for the three persons. This Insight highlights the relationships, dynamics, and cooperation that led to the African Human Rights Court’s Order. In particular, it emphasizes the complex relationship between the African Union, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (African Human Rights Commission), the African Human Rights Court, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).Under the legal points of view, the case suggested a number of preliminary observations. First, evidenced by the language of the Order, the situation of “extreme gravity and urgency” as well as the risk of “irreparable harm to persons” prompted the Court to order provisional measures of its own volition without a request by the Commission. Second, the Court emphasized the consensus formed among international organizations on the gravity of the human rights situation in Libya. For this purpose the Court referenced the acts by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, and the United Nations Security Council. Third, the Court stated that it relied heavily on the evidence of human rights violations gathered and submitted by international NGOs initially to the African Commission. This indicates that in the urgency of armed conflict, which does not allow for extensive periods for collecting evidence, the experience and resources of NGOs in quickly gathering relevant evidence proved being highly important and valuable. Also, it should be noted that the African Charter contains a provision prohibiting forum shopping by states parties. A complaint cannot be submitted to any other procedure of international investigation or settlement. Founding documents of other international human rights bodies, where the individual complaints mentioned in the Commission’s application could potentially end up (for instance, the UN Human Rights Committee) contain the same limitation. It is possible therefore that adjudication of these human rights claims on the international level has been halted until a political outcome is found to the situation through the organs of the AU. The Court’s involvement in the matter cannot bring the desired outcome of halting human rights violations in Libya without adequate backing from the political organs of the AU.4.16.2 Role of UN in Libyan ConflictMuch as the UN Resolution is concerned, the aim was to protect killing of the innocent civilians in Libya apart from the political scrambles with the government. With the same intention NATO forces were sent to Libya to implement the task although with tough challenges with Gadafi’s forces eventually overthrew Gadafi. The degree of effectiveness of the ICC in the prosecution of Libyan leaders (now the sons of Muammar Gadafi and his state subordinates) will provide an indication of the compatibility and conflict between international criminal law and international human rights mechanisms. The influence and positive change that involved the International Criminal Court will certainly bring to the Libyan situation which is subject to further examination and debate. This study will comment on the legal aspect and the position of the UN or Americans and the Allied forces interests.4.16.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Libya Much as conflict resolution in Libya is concerned, the UN resolution with regard to NATO forces and the AU delegation in Libya were completely having opposite goals. The President Muamar Gadafi was killed by the NATO forces and the rebels were given leadership to administer the transition government of the Libyan state before election. The situation in Libya remained with questionable relative peace of which civil war is still going on as the rebels and the former government forces are still fighting. AU in this conflict was completely put aside by the NATO forces whereby the delegates led by President Jacob Zuma of South Africa were given very few moments to mediate the rebels and the late Gadafi administration. Practically AU did nothing and was given orders to quit the state of Libya of which NATO forces continued to resolve the conflict by killing the civilians when tried to overrule the sovereign of Libya instead of protecting civilians from unnecessary killings.At this juncture civilians in Libya are still killing by themselves, and NATO with their own arrangements is there with purpose to monopolize fuel business in Libya. With the same reflection AU can not do anything unless obeys the UN resolution and the order of the big nations (USA). Here AU showed a toothless organization which has shown uselessness or ineffectiveness in the regional conflict arrangement. 4.17 Chad Conflict (2005–2010)History tells that, since Chad independence in 1960, the former French colony of Chad has been swamped by the civil war between the Arab-Muslims of the north and the African-Christians of the south. The civil war in Chad began in December 2005 As a result, leadership and presidency in Chad drifted back and forth between the Christian southerners and Muslim northerners. When one side was in power, the other side usually started a revolutionary war to counter it. France, the former colonial power and the neighboring Libya have both become involved at various times throughout the civil war. By the mid-1990s the civil war had somewhat stabilized, and in 1996 Idriss Déby, a northerner, was confirmed president in Chad's first democratic election. In 1998 an armed rebellion began in the north, led by President Déby's former defence chief, Youssouf Togoimi. However, a Libyan peace deal in 2002 failed to put an end to the fighting. In 2003, conflict in the neighbouring Darfur region in Sudan leaked across the border into Chad. Refugees from Sudan were joined by Chad civilians who were trying to escape rebel violence and eventually filled the camps. It was clear that Chad's rebels received weapons and assistance from the government of Sudan. At the same time, Sudan's rebels got help from Chad's government. In February 2008, three rebel groups joined forces and launched an attack on Chad's capital, N'Djamena. France sent in troops to clear up the government. Many of the rebels were former allies of President Idriss Déby. They accused him of corruption towards members of his own tribe.The battle at the start of December 2005 in the Chadian capital N'djamena came as no surprise. For the years prior to the eruption, the Sudanese government was trying to overthrow the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, using Chadian rebels as middle men. The three armed groups involved in one of the most recent attacks in 2008 were all extensively armed by Sudanese security forces, which had the clear intent of cutting off the support that Déby was giving to the rebels in Darfur, especially the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which had been on the offensive in Darfur. The current war in Chad is a result of four distinct forces. For one, the war appeared to be a continuation of the conflicts of Darfur and Chad, which include the competition for power and land. Secondly, there was an internal Chadian conflict. Déby reverted to a one-man military rule after a hopeful broadening of the base of his regime in the late 1990s which was coupled by the growth of civil politics in N'djamena. Déby relied heavily on a close knit group of kinsmen and on claiming the alloted government finances for his own agenda, distributing aid in return for civilian loyalty. Third is Khartoum's (capital of Sudan) strategy for managing security within its border, which includes treating the weak surrounding states as merely extensions of its internal limits. The Sudan security helped bring Déby to power in 1990 as part of their responsibility that also saw it engage militarily in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic over the military decade. In the same way that Khartoum used a combination of extortion and retribution to control its provincial elites in Darfur, it uses the same tools to influence its trans-border limits. Furthermore, the regional competition for dominance through an immense area of central Africa has rarely been governed by state authority. This boondock includes Chad, CAR, and northern DRC, as well as the areas of Tripoli, Sudan, Kinshasa, Kigali, Kampala, and even Asmara are competing for influence across this area, as well as Khartoum.4.17.1 Role of AU in ChadMuch as AU is concerned a number of efforts were tried to be deployed in the conflict but failed to attain the resolution. The implementation of the reforms promised in an August 2007 agreement with opposition parties was slow and uneven. Throughout the country, government forces continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain civilians and suspected rebels, often on the basis of ethnicity, and subject them to cruel and unusual punishment. Chad's prison conditions are among the harshest on the African continent. Weak institutions of justice contributed to a culture of exemption. The government has not investigated or prosecuted serious abuses against civilians, such as killings and rapes by government security forces and rebels following clashes at Am Dam in May 2009. More than 250,000 Sudanese refugees and 168,000 Chadian displaced people live in camps and elsewhere in eastern Chad. In April, approximately 5,000 new Sudanese refugees arrived from West Darfur, following renewed fighting there between the Sudanese rebel group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudanese government forces. The conflict involved Chadian government forces and several Chadian rebel groups included the United Front for Democratic Change, United Forces for Development and Democracy, Gathering of Forces for Change and the National Accord of Chad. The conflict has also involved the Janjaweed, while Sudan allegedly supported the rebels, while Libya mediated in the conflict, as well as diplomats from other countries.4.17.2 Role of the UN in ChadDuring the Peace process, in January 2009, the government of Chad requested that the United Nations begin the process of withdrawing the peacekeeping mission in eastern Chad. The Chad government criticized the UN mission's slow deployment, uneven record of success, and improvements in the security situation as reasons for its decision. In May 2009, the UN revised the mission's mandate and authorized its gradual drawdown and closure by the end of the year, and effectively shifted full responsibility for the protection of civilians, including displaced populations and refugees from Darfur, to the Chadian security forces. Harmony between Chad and Sudan can only be considered as per the Agreement for restoration between them.An agreement for the restoration of harmony between Chad and Sudan, signed 15th January, 2010, marked the end of a five-year war. The fix in relations led to the Chadian rebels from Sudan returning home, the opening of the border between the two countries after seven years of closure, and the deployment of a joint force to secure the border. President Idriss Déby visited Khartoum, in February for the first time in six years; and in July, Chad, a state party to the International Criminal Court (ICC), hosted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, earning the doubtful claim of being the first ICC member state to harbor a suspect from the court.Peacekeepers from the MINURCAT have been in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic since mid-2008 with a mandate to protect refugees and displaced populations, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and promote human rights. Following the UN decision to draw down the mission by the end of 2010, representatives of UN agencies formed a working group with the Chadian government to improve security for humanitarian groups in eastern Chad. The plan includes consolidation of the Chadian Integrated Security Detachment (DIS), a component of MINURCAT consisting of Chadian police forces trained by the UN, which provide security in and around the refugee camps. However, the plans do not clearly address the security concerns of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), or the local population.Bilateral relations and Humanitarian aid were all worked as one in this particular conflict. Bilateral relations between Canada and Chad are limited Canada supports efforts to re-establish peace, security and political dialogue in the region. The conflicts between the government and rebel groups, the humanitarian crisis at the border between Chad and Sudan (Darfur region) as well as the tensions between the two countries contribute to the instability of the region. Canada encourages Chad and Sudan to continue to normalize their relations. Canadian aid in Chad is mainly of a humanitarian nature and is dispensed through multilateral and international organizations channels such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nation World Food Program (WFP) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provides training grants to Chad through the Canadian Francophone Grants Program. Canada also finances local projects through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, which is managed by the Canadian High Commission in Yaoundé, Cameroon. 4.17.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Chad Although the civil war in Chad ended with the signing of the peace treaty, it is clear that the country is, and still will be, in distress for a very long time. Regarding the security situation in Chad, since the clash between Government and opposition forces earlier in 2009, the powerful government’s strength had been greatly diminished and many had retreated into Sudan. However, a large number of demobilized soldiers and weapons were now loose in Chad, which encouraged criminal activity. Organized gangs tried to make a living by attacking humanitarian actors, and two kidnappings had taken place in the past two months. Indeed, urgent action is needed to prevent a further deterioration of the region. With such a high level of criminal activity, when criminals do not respect the country, and were attack anyone and anything, humanitarian aid will be all the more difficult. Without a large presence of army personnel to ensure law and order, there would never be any possibility of helping internally displaced persons and refugees as necessary.Undoubtedly, the civilians are going to be in dire need for aid for years to come. Looking ahead, a combination of challenges must be tackled, including spreading criminality, malnutrition, food security, and the election of the next successor. However, feeding and sheltering people will not be enough to give them a decent life. Although there is 82% coverage, to have just 3% on health and 2% on education meant that the international community was not fulfilling its mission. While it is sometimes difficult to rehabilitate refugees for life outside the camps, incentives could be provided to the displaced population, such as programmes of economic assistance for agriculture and livestock, microcredit, and help in dealing with land-rights issues.4.18 Ivory Coast Conflict Conflict in Ivory Coast emerged on the eve of the second round of the presidential election, tension between supporters of President Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara increased to extreme. Clashes on 19 and 22 November 2010 between the two camps left several injured. These incidents are symptomatic of the deterioration in C?te d’Ivoire’s political climate since the first round results were announced. Together with the brutality of some of the campaign discourse, they raise the spectre of a disastrous election. The hour of self-satisfaction and polite exhortations passed.Although most of the fighting ended in 2004, Ivory Coast remained tense and divided. French and UN peacekeepers patrolled the buffer zone which separated the north, held by rebels known as the New Forces, and the government-controlled south. After repeated delays, elections aimed at ending the conflict were finally held in October 2010. But the vote ushered in more unrest when the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to concede victory to the internationally recognized winner, Alassane Ouattara.The resulting four months stand-off was only ended when Mr Ouattara's forces overran the south of the country, finally capturing Mr Gbagbo and declaring him deposed. In November 2011, Mr Gbagbo was transferred to The Hague to stand trial at the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity. The international community and the UN then sent a clear message to political and military actors that, they must accept the results of the 28 November vote. Anyone sabotaging the run-off through fraud, intimidation or violence runs the risk of new UN sanctions.During the coming days, Ivorian political leaders must work hard to lower the temperature and build on the gains of an exemplary first round, which disproved the most pessimistic forecasts. After a relatively peaceful campaign, there were no significant incidents during polling on 31st October. International and national observers expressed their satisfaction. Moreover, there was a record turnout of close to 84 per cent, proof of the willingness of citizens to put a tumultuous decade behind them. The laudable attitude of voters contrasted, however, with a poll marked by technical flaws albeit too few to call into question the overall results. Election officials were absent from many polling stations. The tallying and verification of results revealed the weakness of the Independent Electoral Commission (Commission électorale indépendante, CEI), which neglected to keep the public informed of progress for almost 48 hours, creating the conditions for a dangerous period in which rumours were rife. If it does not address these problems during the run-off, they could undercut the poll’s credibility and give either side grounds on which to contest the result. Security was erratic. The CCI responsible for this crucial task, mobilized significant numbers, estimated at 6,500 of the planned 8,000. However, with members drafted on an emergency basis on the eve of the election, the CCI lacked communications equipment and resources. Absent from many polling stations, it was incapable of coordinating deployment with the impartial forces of UNOCI and the French force, Licorne. This was a serious problem because, in the event of unrest, UNOCI can only intervene at the specific request of the CCI. To compensate for the CCI’s inadequacies, President Gbagbo decided on 14th November to deploy about 1,500 loyalist army soldiers in the north of the country, still controlled by the former rebels. Nothing suggests that these troops will remain impartial. 4.18.1 Role of AU in Ivory CoastBasically AU mainly used ECOWAS as aliason office in the conflict with few delegates involved to resolve the conflict and actual participation inelectoral process.The second round is a confrontation between the two most antagonistic candidates in the Ivorian political landscape: the current president, Gbagbo, who won 38.3 per cent of first-round votes, against the former prime minister, Ouattara, who received 32.08 per cent. Their main challenge was to win the support of those who voted in the first round for the former head of state, Henri Konan Bédié, who came third with 25.24 per cent. There were fears that both sides will subject members of the Baoulé ethnic group, the traditional support base of Bédié’s party, to strong pressure, including intimidation and violence.ECOWAS reviewed the situation on the ground, each side had the capacity for violence, albeit asymmetrically. Both had an extremist minority that could be tempted, in the event of defeating again in contest results in the street. In October 2000, after Gbagbo’s election to the presidency, there were violent clashes between his supporters and members of Ouattara’s Rassemblement des républicains (RDR). The means of escaping a repetition of this scenario were however, well-known. Above all, the organization of the second round must be improved so as to reduce as much as possible the scope for protest against the results and thus reduce the risk of violence. The international community continued its support in the second round, but also pressurised Ivorian political leaders to operate calmly. On the eve of the presidential run-off, the U.S. president, Barack Obama, who is very popular in C?te d’Ivoire, repeated the call for calm that he made ahead of the first round. The international community also reminded candidates and their respective camps, especially those responsible for security and the mobilisation of youth wings, that they will be held personally responsible for any conflict escalation by their supporters. Members of the UN Security Council communicated to Ivorian political leaders with their intention to follow the electoral process closely. Ivorian political and military leaders kept in mind that the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council remains in force and that new names may be added to the current list. 4.18.2 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Ivory CoastAfrican leaders were to learn through this conflict and avoid selfishness in leadership. The winner in democratic election must be supported by all people.Although most of the fighting in Ivory Coast ended in 2004, but the state remained tense and divided in groups. French and UN peacekeepers patrolled the buffer zone which separated the north, held by rebels known as the New Forces, and the government-controlled south. After repeated delays, elections aimed at ending the conflict were finally held in October 2010. But the vote ushered in more unrest when the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to concede victory to the internationally recognized winner, Alassane Ouattara.In November 2011, Mr Gbagbo being arrested was transferred to The Hague to stand trial at the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union should publicly appeal to African candidates for restraint. Messages should be consistent with that of the UN Security Council regarding possible sanctions in the event of organized violence.4.19 Egypt ConflictThe marches and civil disobedience taking place in Egypt right now may or may not succeed in replacing the former president, Hosni Mubarak, but if the protests do succeed, the likelihood of conflict increasing is greater than the likelihood of conflict decreasing. That’s right, replacing the dictator will make the conflict worse, not better. Three major conflicts that have been raging between various sets of political forces and that have defined the contours of the political map since Mubarak's ouster reached explosive levels in the 10 days later. These major conflicts are the battle between the ruling military council and the Muslim Brotherhood over who will author the constitution; the conflict between liberal forces and Islamics over the civil-religious balance in the state; and finally, the struggle between non-religious pro-revolution forces and the SCAF over the duration of the generals' tenure on top of the political scene.Moreover, three new developments on the scene have complicated the picture and accentuated the velocity of the head-on confrontations now taking place: the recent decline in the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood since January, which makes it more vulnerable to pressures from both friends and foes; the apparent return of the National Democratic Party (NDP) apparatus as a player on the scene via the candidacy of Shafiq; and the coalescence of sizeable revolutionary forces around Hamdeen Sabahi's candidacy as an alternative to both the Brotherhood and the old order.In recent months, SCAF has used the relative decline of the Brotherhood's support in the public since it assumed the mantle of parliament in January to isolate the Brotherhood and weaken its ability to challenge the army generals. Meanwhile, whole sections of liberal forces, which detest what they perceive as the Brotherhood's attempts to monopolize the writing of the constitution, have in recent weeks lined up behind SCAF in its conflict with the Brotherhood.Sabahi forces have managed to pull anti-NDP people who reject the Brotherhood alternative behind their "third way" project. In this context, SCAF has decided to mount an all-out attack on the beleaguered Brotherhood to reign in the 84-year-old powerful group, in order to enforce its agenda.As the Brotherhood faces attacks by Shafiq, who badgered them as "power hungry," and as Sabahi besieges Morsi with demands of a presidential council to run the country after SCAF leaves, as an implicit condition for calling for a vote for Morsi against Shafiq, SCAF moved in to issue an ultimatum on June 5 to the Brotherhood to accept a Constituent Assembly without a clear Brotherhood majority.Two major issues have remained hotly contested all week as SCAF waits to assess how far they might be able to push the Brotherhood to concede: the future of the Islamist-led parliament and the prospects for proceeding with the presidential elections runoffs on June 16 and 17. Advisory reports submitted from the State Commissioners Authority to the Supreme Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the procedures adopted by the government in parliamentary and presidential elections (disadvantages to independents in the parliamentary elections law and failure of the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission to implement the Disenfranchisement law against Ahmed Shafiq) promise to lead to the dissolution of parliament and/or repeating presidential elections a new.4.19.1 Role of AU in EgyptAU was remotely involved in the conflict in Egypt much as resolution is concerned.Initially, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) issued two strong statements in support of the 'legitimate aspirations' for democracy of the people of Egypt and Libya, and condemned violence and violation of international humanitarian law against civilians in Libya. In the situation, the opposition parties united with groups of common citizens to obtain the common objective of replacing the current president. If that objective is achieved, the commonality that holds the disparate groups together will be removed and the likelihood of conflict will increase as the groups jockey for control of the country and its governing institutions. This same phenomena was seen in the United States after the 9/11 attacks. When the attacks occurred, liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans came together in a united opposition to a common enemy who had attacked us. As the danger of further imminent attack has receded, the factions returned to their opposition of each other and the amount of political conflict increased to previous levels.Unity created by fighting a common enemy allowed George W. Bush to get congress to authorize the invasion of Iraq. Once the perceived danger of the common enemy (Iraq) decreased, some of the legislators who supported the invasion changed their minds and turned to opposing it. This is the danger of perceived unity created by opposition to a common enemy. Another reason that the conflict in Egypt is likely to get worse is if the president is removed and the groups are united by what they don’t want, instead of what they do want. Once this common glue is removed, there is great danger of increased conflict.For the long term good of the country, now is the time for the opposition to unite and decide what they do want, not just what they don’t want. If they don’t do this now, there is serious danger that Egypt will face years of unrest as the factions contend with each other for power.The Brotherhood, under tremendous pressure to win the presidency and to save its parliament (hoping to strengthen its position in its long-term conflicts with SCAF) had shown readiness to make concessions to the generals on the issue of the Constituent Assembly to lower the temperature on the battlefield, thus averting any premature all-out war scenario that it might not be ready to face at this stage. The Brotherhood might be allowed by its adversaries to stay strong in parliament for the time being; thus, bigger confrontations between the group and SCAF could be deferred to the not too distant future. Meanwhile, street protests by a rejuvenated pro-revolution constituency, pressures from the Hamdeen camp, as well as threats from liberal forces to line up with SCAF against the Brotherhood could continue to pressure Egypt's largest Islamist political power to shift and adjust course, though in as yet undetermined directions. So far nothing visible can be narrated in public on the involvement of the AU for the on going situation in Egypt. News have tried to publish the unrest days of the citizens of Egypt even for the coming democratic election of June 2012 which the Military Council is handling the process.4.19.2 Role of UN/Arab League in Egypt Basically the Arab League is working more closely with the Military Transitional Council to revive peace in Egypt although remotely with the assistance of the UN and other international humanitarian organization like Human Right Watch, EIHR, ICRC, etc. An unexpected wave of popular protests broke on Africa's northern shores in 2011, starting with the political demise of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents, leading to more deadly conflict in Libya. These events particularly those in Libya have divided the African Union, and shaken the organisation's fragile new foundations of democracy promotion and conflict prevention.After the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervened in Libya, however, the older norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states was reasserted in Africans . Protesters at Tahrir Square in Egypt, February 2011 was to the extreme to shock the authorities.4.19.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Egypt In this dramatic context, the AU has reached its tenth anniversary as a reformed and reinvigorated institution, which replaced the Organisation of African Unity in 2002. It is an apt time to reflect on whether the AU's response to events taking place in North Africa over the past year is an exception to the organisation’s track record of greater engagement in conflict resolution and political peer pressure among African leaders, or a sign that the old rules of the "dictators' club" of the 1970s and 80s still prevail?There are three explanations for the reform of the OAU, which are important to understanding whether and to what extent the new principles adopted by the AU have been consolidated since 2002: an overall increase in the number of African democracies; an active role played by "norm entrepreneurs" within the OAU secretariat and the AU commission; and?strong leadership by key member states. At this juncture, it seemed that the ruling military council's roadmap to a civilian handover on June 30 was on track. However, the legally untenable cocktail of innocent and guilty verdicts that the Cairo criminal court issued on the morning of June 2 in the year-long trial of Hosni Mubarak sent pro-revolution sectors of the populace back to Tahrir and the iconic squares of other cities with gusto. The ousted president and his interior minister, Habib El-Adly, were given life sentences for their role in the murder of protesters, but six top police chiefs were acquitted, and Mubarak and his sons were cleared of all wrongdoing in financial corruption cases.The Brotherhood, under tremendous pressure to win the presidency and to save its parliament (hoping to strengthen its position in its long-term conflicts with SCAF) had shown readiness to make concessions to the generals on the issue of the Constituent Assembly to lower the temperature on the battlefield, thus averting any premature all-out war scenario that it might not be ready to face at this stage.4.20 Liberia ConflictThe First Liberian Civil War was an internal conflict in Liberia running from 1989 until 1996. The conflict killed over 200,000 people and eventually led to the involvement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and of the United Nations. The peace did not last long, and in 1999 the Second Liberian Civil War broke out. Samuel Doe had led a coup d'état that overthrew the elected government in 1980, and in 1985 held elections that were widely considered fraudulent.There had been one unsuccessful coup by a former military leader. In December 1989, former government minister Charles Taylor moved into the country from neighboring Ivory Coast to start an uprising meant to topple the Doe government. During the civil war, factions formed around Taylor and those who supported his former soldier with the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, Prince Johnson. Johnson took the capital Monrovia in 1990 and executed Doe, while Taylor's forces, the Armed Forces of Liberia, and Johnson's forces battled for control of Monrovia.Peace negotiations and foreign involvement led to a ceasefire in 1995 that was broken the next year before a final peace agreement and new national elections were held in 1997. Taylor was elected President of Liberia in July 1997.Samuel Doe had taken power in a popular coup in 1980 against William R. Tolbert, becoming the first Liberian President of non Americo-Liberian descent. Doe established a military regime called the People's Redemption Council and enjoyed early support from a large number of indigenous Liberian tribes who had been excluded from power since the founding of the country in 1847 by freed American slaves. Any hope that Doe would improve the way Liberia was run was put aside as he quickly clamped down on opposition, fueled by his paranoia of a counter-coup attempt against him.Doe promised a return to civilian rule, but the 1985 election that saw a narrow victory for Doe was widely condemned as fraudulent by international monitors. Thomas Quiwonkpa, the former Commanding General of the Armed Forces of Liberia who Doe had demoted and forced to flee the country, attempted to overthrow Doe's regime from neighboring Sierra Leone. The coup-attempt failed though and Quiwonkpa was killed. Large scale crackdowns followed in Nimba County in the north of the country against the Gio and Mano tribes where the majority of the coup plotters came from. The mistreatment of the Gio and Mano tribes fueled ethnic tensions in Liberia, which had already been rising due to Doe's preferential treatment of his own group, the Krahn.Charles Taylor, who had left Doe's government after being accused of embezzlement, assembled a group of rebels in C?te d'Ivoire (mostly ethnic Gios and Manos who felt persecuted by Doe) who later became known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). They invaded Nimba County on 24 December 1989. The Liberian Army retaliated against the whole population of the region, attacking unarmed civilians and burning villages. Many left as refugees for Guinea and C?te d’Ivoire, but opposition to Doe was inflamed. Prince Johnson, an NPFL fighter, split to form his own guerrilla force soon after crossing the border, based on the Gio tribe and named Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).By the middle of 1990, a civil war was raging. Taylor's NPFL soon controlled much of the country, while Johnson began advancing into the capital, Monrovia. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) attempted to persuade Doe to resign and go into exile, but despite his weak position besieged in his mansion?he refused. While making a brief trip out of the Executive Mansion to ECOMOG Headquarters, Doe was captured by Johnson on September 9, 1990, and tortured before being killed. The spectacle was videotaped and seen on news reports around the world. Peace was still far off as both Taylor and Johnson claimed power. ECOMOG declared an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) with Amos Sawyer as their president, with the broad support of Johnson. Taylor attacked Monrovia in 1992, but ECOMOG reinforced the city and negotiated the Cotonou Agreement, a treaty between the NPFL, IGNU and Doe’s remaining supporters (known as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy or ULIMO). A coalition government was formed in August 1993. In September 1994, the Akosombo Agreement attempted to replace the coalition with moves towards a democratic government, but IGNU rejected this. The Abuja Accord of August 1995 finally achieved this, but in April 1996 the NPFL and ULIMO again began fighting in Monrovia, leading to the evacuation of most international Non-governmental organizations and the destruction of much of the city.Charles Taylor organized and trained some indigenous northerners in Cote d'Ivoire. During Doe's regime Taylor had served in the Liberian Government's General Services Agency, acting 'as its de facto director'. However, he fled to the United States in 1983 amid what Stephan Ellis describes as the 'increasingly menacing atmosphere in Monrovia' shortly before Thomas Quiwonkpa, Doe's chief lieutenant, fled into exile himself. Doe requested Taylor's extradition for embezzling $900,000 of Liberian government funds. Taylor was thus arrested in the United States and after sixteen months broke out of a Massachusetts jail in circumstances that are still unclear.On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor and a small group of Libyan-trained rebels calling themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) entered Nimba County from neighboring C?te d'Ivoire, attacking the village of Butuo. The raid, mounted by a small group of men, managed to capture some weapons, and then the raiders withdrew to the jungle. The NPFL initially encountered plenty of support within Nimba County, which had endured the majority of Samuel Doe’s wrath after the 1985 attempted coup. When Taylor and his force of 100 rebels reentered Liberia in 1989, on Christmas Eve, thousands of Gio and Mano joined them. While these formed the core of his rebel army, there were many Liberians of other ethnic backgrounds who joined as well.Doe responded by sending two AFL battalions, including the 1st Infantry Battalion, to Nimba in December 1989-January 1990, apparently under then-Colonel Hezekiah Bowen. The AFL acted in a very brutal and scorched-earth fashion which quickly alienated the local people.Tribal affiliations played a key role in the split between the Krahn, to which Doe and most of his adherents belonged, and the Gio and Mano people, who formed the bulk of the rebel forces. The rebel invasion soon pitted ethnic Krahn sympathetic to the Doe regime against those victimized by it, the Gio and the Mano. Thousands of civilians were massacred on both sides. Hundreds of thousands fled their homes.4.20.1 Role of AU in Conflict By May 1990 the AFL had been forced back to Gbarnga, still under the control of Bowen's troops, but they lost the town to a NPFL assault on 28th May. By June 1990, Taylor's forces were laying siege to Monrovia. In July 1990, Prince Yormie Johnson split from Taylor and formed the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL). The INPFL and NPFL continued their siege on Monrovia, which the AFL defended. Johnson quickly took control of parts of Monrovia prompting evacuation of foreign nationals and diplomats by the US Navy in August.In August 1990, the 16-member ECOWAS agreed to deploy a joint military intervention force, the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and place it under Nigerian leadership. The mission later included troops from non-ECOWAS countries, including Uganda and Tanzania. ECOMOG’s objectives were to impose a cease-fire; help Liberians establish an interim government until elections could be held; stop the killing of innocent civilians; and ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. ECOMOG also sought to prevent the conflict from spreading into neighboring states, which share a complex history of state, economic, and ethno-linguistic social relations with Liberia.On 9 September 1990, Doe visited the barely established, newly arrived ECOMOG headquarters in the Free Port of Monrovia. Stephen Ellis says, his motive was to lay a complaint that the ECOMOG commander had not paid a courtesy call to Doe, the Head of State, however, the exact circumstances that led to Doe’s visit to the Free Port are still unclear. Doe had been under pressure to accept exile outside of Liberia. However, after Doe arrived, a large rebel force led by Prince Johnson’s INPFL arrived at the headquarters and then attacked Doe's party. Doe was captured and taken to the INPFL’s Caldwell base. He was tortured, and then killed, and his torture and execution was videotaped by his captors.Johnson’s INPFL and Taylor’s NPFL continued to struggle for control of Monrovia in the months that followed. With military discipline absent and bloodshed throughout the capital region, members of ECOWAS created the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to restore order. The force comprised some 4,000 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, the Gambia andGuinea. ECOMOG succeeded in bringing Taylor and Johnson to agree to its intervention, but Taylor's forces engaged it in the port area of Monrovia.In November 1990, ECOWAS invited the principal Liberian players to meet in Banjul, Gambia to form a government of national unity. The negotiated settlement established the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), led by Dr. Amos Sawyer, leader of the LPP. Bishop Ronald Diggs of the Liberian Council of Churches became vice president. However, Taylor's NPFL refused to attend the conference.Within days, hostilities resumed. ECOMOG was reinforced in order to protect the interim government. Sawyer was able to establish his authority over most of Monrovia, but the rest of Liberia was in the hands of various factions of the NPFL or of local gangs.The United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) was formed in June 1991 by supporters of the late President Samuel Doe and former Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) fighters who had taken refuge in Guinea and Sierra Leone. It was led by Raleigh Seekie, a deputy Minister of Finance in the Doe government. After fighting alongside the Sierra Leonean army against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), ULIMO forces entered western Liberia in September 1991. The group scored significant gains in areas held by another rebel group the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), notably around the diamond mining areas of Lofa and Bomi counties. From its outset, ULIMO was beset with internal divisions and the group effectively broke into two separate militias in 1994: ULIMO-J, an ethnic Krahn faction led by General Roosevelt Johnson and ULIMO-K, a Mandingo-based faction led by Alhaji G.V. Kromah.The group was alleged to have committed serious violations of human rights, both before and after its breakup.4.20.2 Role of UN LiberiaIn 1993, ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin. Following this, on September 22, 1993, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), to support ECOMOG in implementing this Cotonou peace agreement. UNOMIL in early 1994 deployed 368 military observers and associated civilian personnel to monitor implementation of the abortive Cotonou Peace Agreement, prior to elections originally planned for February/March 1994. Renewed armed hostilities, however, broke out in May 1994 and continued, becoming especially intense in July and August. ECOMOG, and later UNOMIL, members were captured and held hostage by some factions. By mid-1994, the humanitarian situation had become disastrous, with 1.8 million Liberians in need of humanitarian assistance. Conditions continued to deteriorate, but humanitarian agencies were unable to reach many in need due to hostilities and general insecurity. Factional leaders agreed in September 1994 to the Akosombo Agreement, a supplement to the Cotonou agreement, named after the Ghanaian town where it was signed, but the security situation in Liberia remained poor. In October 1994, in the face of ECOMOG funding shortfalls and a lack of will by the Liberian combatants to honor agreements to end the war, the Security Council reduced to about 90 the number of UNOMIL observers. It extended UNOMIL’s mandate, however, and subsequently extended it several times until September 1997. In December 1994, the factions and other parties signed the Accra Agreement, a supplement to the Akosombo Agreement, but disagreements ensued and fighting continued.In August 1995, the main factions signed an agreement largely brokered by Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings. At a conference sponsored by ECOWAS, the United Nations and the United States, the European Union, and the Organization of African Unity, Charles Taylor agreed to a cease-fire and a timetable to demobilize and disarm his troops. At the beginning of September 1995, Liberia’s three principal warlords Taylor, George Boley and Alhaji Kromah?– made theatrical entrances into Monrovia. A ruling council of six members under civilian Wilton G. S. Sankawulo and with the three factional heads Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah and George Boley, took control of the country preparatory to elections that were originally scheduled for 1996.Heavy fighting broke out again in April 1996. In August 1996, these battles were ended by the Abuja Accord in Nigeria, agreeing to disarmament and demobilization by 1997 and elections in July of that year. 3 September 1996, Sankawulo is followed by Ruth Perry as chairwoman of the ruling council, who served until 2 August 1997.Simultaneous elections for the presidency and national assembly were finally held in July 1997. In a climate hardly conducive to free movement and security of persons, Taylor and his National Patriotic Party won an overwhelming victory against 12 other candidates. Assisted by widespread intimidation, Taylor took 75 per cent of the presidential poll (no other candidate won more than 10 per cent) while the NPP won a similar proportion of seats in both parliamentary chambers. 2 August 1997, Ruth Perry handed power to elected president Charles Taylor. Thereafter, Liberians had voted for Taylor in the hope that he would end the bloodshed. The bloodshed did slow considerably, but it did not end. Violent events flared up regularly after the putative end of the war. Taylor, furthermore, was accused of backing guerrillas in neighboring countries and funneling diamond monies into arms purchases for the rebel armies he supported, and into luxuries for himself. After Taylor's victory, the country was peaceful enough so that refugees began to return. But other leaders were forced to leave the country, and some ULIMO forces reformed as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). LURD began fighting in Lofa County with the aim of destabilizing the government and gaining control of the local diamond fields, leading to the Second Liberian Civil War.In 1997, the Liberian people elected Charles Taylor as the President after he entered the capital city, Monrovia, by force. The implicit unrest manifested during the late 1990s is emblematic in the sharp national economic decline and the prevalent sale of diamonds and timber in exchange for small arms.The 1989-1996 Liberian civil war, which was one of Africa's bloodiest, claimed the lives of more than 200,000 Liberians and further displaced a million others into refugee camps in neighboring countries. Entire villages were emptied as people fled. Child soldiers committed atrocities, raping and murdering people of all ages. Liberia's civil war claimed the lives of one out of every 17 people in the country, uprooted most of the rest, and destroyed a once-viable economic infrastructure. The strife also spread to Liberia's neighbors, contributing to a slowing of the democratization that was progressing steadily through West Africa at the beginning of the 1990s and destabilizing a region that already was one of the world's most marginal.4.20.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in LiberiaIn 1997, the Liberian people elected Charles Taylor as the President after he entered the capital city, Monrovia, by force. The implicit unrest manifested during the late 1990s is emblematic in the sharp national economic decline and the prevalent sale of diamonds and timber in exchange for small arms.The 1989-1996 Liberian civil war, which was one of Africa's bloodiest, claimed the lives of more than 200,000 Liberians and further displaced a million others into refugee camps in neighboring countries. Entire villages were emptied as people fled. Child soldiers committed atrocities, raping and murdering people of all ages. Liberia's civil war claimed the lives of one out of every 17 people in the country, uprooted most of the rest, and destroyed a once-viable economic infrastructure. The strife also spread to Liberia's neighbors, contributing to a slowing of the democratization that was progressing steadily through West Africa at the beginning of the 1990s and destabilizing a region that already was one of the world's most marginal.The Second Liberian Civil War began in 1999 and ended in October 2003, when UN and US military intervened to stop the rebel siege on Monrovia and exiled Charles Taylor to Nigeria until he was arrested in 2006 and taken to The Hague for his trial. By the conclusion of the final war, more than 250,000 people had been killed and nearly 1 million displaced. Half that number remain to be repatriated in 2005, at the election of Liberia's first democratic President since the initial 1980 coup d'état of Samuel Doe.The incumbent Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who initially was a strong supporter of Charles Taylor, was inaugurated in January 2006 and the National Transitional Government of Liberia terminated its power. After fourteen years of war, Liberians may be ready for development of basic services on peaceful terms, particularly electric current and primary infrastructure.4.21 Madagascar ConflictMuch as the conflict in Madagascar is concerned, as an isolated piece of land of Africa bordering southern eastern of the continent in the Indian Ocean, SADC have played a very big role to conflict resolution regarding political leadership. The political situation in Madagascar has been marked by struggle for control. Since Madagascar gained independence from France in 1960, the island's political transitions have been marked by numerous popular protests, several disputed elections, an impeachment, two military coups and one assassination. The island's recurrent political crises are often prolonged, with detrimental effects on the local economy, international relations and Malagasy living standards. The eight-month standoff between incumbent Ratsiraka and challenger Marc Ravalomanana, following the 2001 presidential elections, cost Madagascar millions of dollars in lost tourism and trade revenue as well as damage to infrastructure, such as bombed bridges and buildings damaged by arson. A series of protests led by Andry Rajoelina against Ravalomanana in early 2009 became violent, with more than 170 people killed. The installation of Rajoelina's transitional regime has, since March 2009, caused many bilateral donors and intergovernmental organizations to freeze aid and suspend regular diplomatic relations with Madagascar, causing economic development to stagnate and reversing many of the gains achieved under the previous administration. In addition, modern politics in Madagascar are colored by the history of Merina subjugation of coastal communities under their rule in the 19th century. The consequent tension between the highland and coastal populations has periodically flared up into isolated events of violence. 4.21.1 AU in Madagasca ConflictHistory tells that this state is among the founder member of OAU and later AU during 2002. Nevertheless, Madagascar was not permitted to attend the first African Union summit because of a dispute over the results of the election in December 2001, but rejoined the African Union in July 2003 after a 14 month hiatus triggered by the 2002 political crisis. However, Madagascar was suspended again by the African Union in March 2009 because of ongoing political crisis. While Rajoelina's attempt to wrest power from a democratically elected government has been condemned by African Union, Western diplomats, under the auspices of the United Nations, are pushing for dialogue and a focus on addressing the grievances expressed in the demonstrations. "We call on the authorities, political parties and civil society to find a solution to this crisis through dialogue, with respect of the constitution, and to follow the reforms necessary to respond to calls for more social justice and democracy, and for the good management of public affairs," said a statement released by the European Union on 6 February. Others have more immediate concerns: "It is easy to forget that it is still the cyclone season here. This is the most difficult time of year for people, and now, in addition to a global economic crisis that is expected to affect Africa severely in 2009, we have a political crisis here in Madagascar," said Ramiarison. 4.21.2 Role of UN in MadagascarThe UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Haile Menkerios, told Madagascan president Marc Ravalomanana when they met that UN Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon is very concerned about the current situation in the Indian Ocean island country. Menkerios, who arrived in the island, urged the president to sit down and talk with the opposition led by former Antananarivo mayor Andry Rajoelina, who has proclaimed himself as president of the country to replace Ravalomanana. Rajoelina was from mayor of the capital city and replaced by a special team appointed by Ravalomanana. At the meeting with Ravalomanana, Menkerios said that the United Nations is ready to help the country find a peaceful and democratic solution to get out of the political crisis, which began in December. The presidential website quoted Menkerios as calling the Madagascan authorities to identify those who behind the killings of anti-government demonstrators on day of tragedy, saying that responsibility lied on both sides. Menkeiros conveyed a message from UN chief Ban Ki-moon to president Ravalomanana who has accepted the role of the UN secretary general as facilitator of a dialogue between the two rivals. The UN chief "deplores the violence and lack of restraint on all sides that led to this tragedy", in which dozens of people were shot dead and hundreds of others injured. The secretary-general described the bloody violence in the capital city as "tragic events," and extended his "deep condolences to the Madagascan people." "The secretary-general urges the Madagascan authorities to urgently initiate a fair process by which those responsible will be brought to justice," the message said. Menkerios, who plans to leave the Indian Ocean island country on Tuesday, also met opposition leader Andry Rajoelina following his meeting with Ravalomanana. This is the latest effort by the international community to try to find a peaceful solution to the on-going confrontation between president Ravalomanana and opposition leader Rajoelina. Rajoelina said again on Monday that he would continue the general strike on Tuesday until the government led by Ravalomanana resigns.Antananarivo, 11 February 2009 (IRIN) - As emotions continue to run high in Madagascar's capital, Antananarivo, many people are asking who is to blame for the political turmoil in which over 100 people have died in anti-government protests organised by opposition leader and former mayor of the capital, Andry Rajoelina. What was once a peaceful democracy movement has become part of a political struggle which reached a new law when security forces shot dead 28 people outside the presidential offices on 7th February? "We want change," Henri, a teacher told IRIN at an anti-government demonstration in Antananarivo. "I am here because I believe the government has made mistakes. But change should be democratic, Rajoelina should find another way to show his opinion."The 7th February tragedy have left many questioning the motives behind leading a crowd of protesters to march on a presidential building guarded by armed soldiers. "There was only ever going to be two outcomes," said Solofo, an eyewitness of the day's events. "Bloodshed or storming the palace." "There was a time when I supported the democracy movement," Solo, a basketball coach, told IRIN. "But now it has become too extreme." 4.21.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in MadagascarPromises broken since his election as mayor of Antananarivo in December 2007, Rajoelina has set himself up as a vocal opponent of President Marc Ravalomanana, attracting the support of many who had become disillusioned with a government that they feel has failed to address the needs of Madagascar's poorest. Analysts said Rajoelina's election in itself was a signal to the president that he was becoming increasingly distant from the people who once voted him into power. While tiny elite in Madagascar has benefited from his liberalisation of the economy, the conditions of the poor have worsened, despite macro-economic growth. Ravalomanana's economic reforms have attracted foreign investors - after years of economic stagnation and isolation - tempted by the country's oil and mineral wealth. Mining giants such as Rio Tinto have invested billions of dollars in local projects. Canada's Sherritt International Corporation, a natural resource company, is investing $3.4 billion in developing one of the world's biggest nickel mines just east of Antananarivo. "The economy has shown positive results since 2004. There has been huge increase in foreign investment, especially in the mining sector, and the economy has been showing signs of recovery," Herinjatovo Ramiarison, economics professor at the University of Antananarivo, told IRIN. "But the negative side of this free market is that it has increased the gap between rich and poor, and I think that is the main cause behind this crisis. Everywhere inequality is a source of political and social frustration and trouble, and it is very easy for people to be led to strike and protest," he commented. "The government succeeded in implementing economic policy, but failed to implement social policies to counteract the inequality between the poor and rich." The president himself has benefited enormously from Madagascar's economic growth. His success as an entrepreneur in dairy products helped him win the respect of his supporters during his campaign for the presidency in 2001, but people have reportedly become suspicious of overlapping public and private interests, and it has taken little to provoke people to take to the streets of Antananarivo in protest.Many people also believe there are other, more powerful forces at work behind the opposition leaders. "The violence that we are seeing has the hallmarks of past struggles here," a political analyst and resident of Antananarivo, told IRIN. "There are political people from the past here what we call dinosaurs and maybe some of them are involved in some way. It is difficult to say, but there is a lot of money involved in this anti-government movement, and it is not clear where that money is coming from." The damage caused when the protests escalated into violence could be long-term. In just a few shorts weeks the work of many years to re-position Madagascar as a safe investment has been set back - by some estimates it could take between six and ten years for the economy to fully recover."I am worried that we won't be able to avoid a food crisis if they don't find a solution to this situation soon." It will be hard for Ravalomanana to recover from the bloody events of what the local media have called "Red Saturday", but there is little political alternative to the 59-year-old tycoon. At the age of 34, Rajoelina is viewed by many as too young to be president. "I am not pro-Ravalomanana," said Solofo, "but he was elected president and we have to let him finish his mandate. The current protests are a warning, but he can change, and if not, he is out in the next elections." 4.22 Conflict in DRCThe current situation in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu is horrible so that a plan to resolve the conflict is their by emphasising a military solution which is failing to date. Two years after the rapprochement between Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame, government soldiers are still battling militias for control of land and mines. Neither side has the strength to win, but both have the resources to prolong the fighting indefinitely. Meanwhile, civilians suffer extreme violence, and the humanitarian situation is deteriorating. Ethnic tensions have worsened in anticipation of the repatriation of tens of thousands of Congolese refugees who fled to Rwanda during the 1990s.4.22.1 Background of the Conflict in DRCIn 2008, Presidents Kabila and Kagame found themselves under intense domestic and international pressure to put an end to the latest violent chapter in the Kivus after fighting again flared between the Congolese armed forces (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo – FARDC) and the Congolese armed group known as the National People’s Congress (Congrès national du peuple – CNDP). On 5 December 2008, the two presidents jointly announced the launch of ‘Umoja Wetu’ (‘Our Unity’), a combined military operation against the Rwandan rebel Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR – Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), and the opening of direct negotiations between the CNDP and the Kinshasa government. The Rwandan army entered Congo in early 2009 and, in collaboration with the FARDC, neutralised elements of the CNDP opposed to integrating into the Congolese army and arrested CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda. Nkunda was replaced by Bosco Ntaganda, a senior CNDP leader and, since 2006, International Criminal Court (ICC) indictee.Cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC signalled a political shift that raised hopes for regional stabilisation and laid the formal foundation for a new bilateral relationship. However, this rapprochement was only made possible by a secret political deal under which the two heads of state agreed on the possibility of neutralising their respective enemies, Laurent Nkunda and the FDLR. The integration of the combatants of the former Congolese armed groups into the FARDC did not provide for establishing state authority over Eastern Congo, as the CNDP maintained a parallel administration and a military chain of command in large parts of North Kivu. Military activity against the FDLR did have some limited success, including increasing the disarmament rate of FDLR combatants. In Europe, pressure increased on the FDLR leadership: on 17 November 2009 German police arrested two top FDLR political leaders, Ignace Murwanashyaka and Deputy Straton Musoni; both were part of an international FDLR support network that continues to operate. This was followed by the October 2010 arrest of Callixte Mbarushimana, a top FDLR leader, in France. He was extradited to The Hague on 25 January 2011, to stand trial at the ICC.On 1 January 2010, FARDC launched a third military operation, ‘Amani Leo’, aiming to eradicate FDLR rebels within 3 months. MONUC support for the operation is contingent upon respect for human rights by FARDC forces; abuses by FARDC soldiers have meant that many recent operations have been carried out without MONUC support. Reports of mass rapes and sporadic killings, carried out by both rebel groups and FARDC forces, continued throughout 2010. On 19 January 2011, accusations surfaced that Lt. Col. Kibibi Mutware, a senior commander in South Kivu, had led the mass rape of at least 50 women. Amani Leo is ongoing, as FDLR command and control has not yet been disrupted. Inter-community tension in North Kivu has been further fuelled by claims related to the return of Congolese refugees from Rwanda and Uganda. Following a meeting held on 15 - 17 February 2010 between Rwandan and Congolese authorities and UNHCR, preparations for the return of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda have been underway with the aim to begin repatriation of up to 200,000 Tutsi refugees before the end of 2010, a move opposed by traditional, religious and military leaders of the Hunde and Nande communities. A massive and rapid repatriation of refugees, as envisaged by the CNDP, would consolidate the control of Tutsi and Hutu communities over land under the aegis of units of the FARDC led by former CNDP officers. Furthermore, from October to November 2009, violence in Equateur province between the Enyele and Munzaya tribes led to the flight of up to 120,000 people to the Republic of Congo and the internal displacement of up to 40,000.4.12.2 Role of UN in DRCOn 18 November, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that more than 100 civilians had been killed during the clashes. From late November to December 2009, Enyele rebels fought Congolese security forces and moved towards the city of Gemena, nearly 250km south of their initial position, before being stopped by Belgian-trained Congolese forces. On 31 December 2009, the FARDC claimed to have taken total control of the town of Nyele, the rebels’ stronghold. MONUC reported that 157 insurgents and one Congolese soldier had been killed during the capture of the town. On 4 and 5 March 2010, Enyele rebels stormed Mbandaka, the capital of Equateur province, inflicting at least 21 casualties, including three MONUC staff. The FARDC and MONUC had to fight to recapture the city’s airport and take control of the situation. After the attack, the situation remained volatile, with continued clashes reported throughout April. On 22 April, local human rights NGO alleged that 49 civilians had been summarily executed by the Congolese army during the fighting in Mbandaka. In May, 11 rebels were sentenced to death for the attack on Mbandaka; a further 21 were given prison terms. Several armed groups are operating in Province Orientale, the most violent of which has been the Uganda-based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Founded in 1987 by Joseph Kony, the LRA has been active in Province Orientale since at least 2005, originally operating from the Garamba National Park. On 14 December 2008, the Ugandan army launched operation Lightning Thunder, designed to end the LRA insurgency in a matter of weeks. This failed and the LRA splintered into small groups, some going to South Sudan and the Central African Republic, others remaining in the Haut- and Bas-Uélé districts. These groups continue to terrorise the Congolese population and have probably massacred more than 1,000 people since the end of 2008. Facing this threat, the local population organised self-defence groups and in March 2009, with logistical support from MONUC, the Congolese army launched Operation Rudia II. The Ugandan army also retains some units in the region, despite its official withdrawal. On 3 November 2009, an operation against a 150-strong LRA group near Faradje ended successfully with the surrender of Lt. Col. Charles Arop, a senior LRA commander. However, poor exchange of information between Ugandan and Congolese forces and MONUC is hindering coordinated protection of civilians and tracking of LRA fighters. In addition, there are reports that Congolese soldiers are abusing civilians and misusing the logistical support provided by MONUC. For several years, the US has supported the Ugandan military effort against the LRA. On 24th May 2010, President Obama signed into law the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, which requires the US to develop and implement a strategy to end LRA violence in Uganda and surrounding states. On 24th November 2010, Obama announced his strategy, which involves increasing funding and logistical support to regional efforts to disband the LRA and capture Joseph Kony and his senior commanders. During the 2006 presidential campaign, President Kabila promised reconstruction of infrastructure and consolidation of democracy; since then very little progress has been made, whilst the socio-economic situation has deteriorated in most of the country. Political pluralism has shrunk, with the opposition virtually excluded from governorships despite a strong performance in 2006 elections. Police instigated a brutal crackdown on the political-cultural movement Bundu dia Kongo in Bas-Congo in 2007. Free expression has been jeopardised by intimidation and a string of arbitrary arrests. On 2 June 2010, Floribert Chebeya, an eminent human rights defender and the director of Voix des Sans Voix, was found dead in Kinshasa, a day after having been summoned to a meeting with General Numbi, head of the national police force. 8 police officers were charged with the killing, and are currently standing trial.The Congolese Constitution requires the implementation of major steps towards decentralisation before May 2010, as well as the holding of local elections before end of 2011 and first-round presidential elections three months before Kabila’s current mandate ends on 6th December 2011. These institutional reforms and electoral preparations have been largely delayed, and major concerns remain about the wider democratisation process. A number of revisions to the Constitution, proposed on 3rd January 2011, were passed by an extraordinary session of the Parliament on 15 January. These changes introduce a one-round electoral system for the Presidency, in place of the previous two-round system, and increase the powers of the executive. On 4th March 2010, President Kabila demanded that MONUC begin its drawdown by 30th June 2010 (the 50th anniversary of the independence of the DRC) and complete the withdrawal before summer 2011. In a 7th April report to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), UNSG Ban Ki-moon recommended the withdrawal of 2,000 troops by June 2010, and presented a three-year disengagement plan, with benchmarks related to progress on security in the east, SSR and institution building. On 28th May 2010, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1925, renaming MONUC the “United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (MONUSCO) to reflect a shift from peacekeeping toward stabilisation. The new 12-month mandate further concentrates the military force of the UN mission in the eastern provinces of the country. The UNSC expects to condition further withdrawal of blue helmets on a set of benchmarks and to conduct regular reviews of the situation with the Congolese authorities.Regarding international partners and MONUSCO Crisis Group made the few recommendations to include, or suspend offensive military operations in the Kivu pending deployment of internationally-trained battalions, including units trained by the U.S., China, Belgium, South Africa and Angola, and then to deploy the trained Congolese battalions first in Masisi and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu to provide security for the population while the 23rd March 2009 agreement between Kinshasa and the Congolese armed groups is being fully implemented; and apply targeted military pressure on the FDLR in North and South Kivu, while international partners monitor and support these battalions in the field.b) focus MONUSCO forces on immediately increasing protection of the population from gross human rights violations, including by maintaining an airborne rapid support and deployment capacity, defensive deployments and joint protection teams; help the national army hold territories left by the FDLR; and regain Congolese trust by ensuring that the rules of engagement are actively implemented and pursuing the arrest of Bosco; andc) start a revised program combined with a new disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program under international responsibility to process all soldiers who have joined the national army since January 2008, including ex-CNDP and Congolese rebels now associated with the FDLR; and begin to reduce the 60,000 troops in the Kivu to the target number of 21,000 in the government’s January 2010 army reform plan.4.22.4 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in DRCMuch as CNDP and the government is concerned, parties were to Implement fully the 23 March agreement by renewing the mandate of the National Steering Committee (CNS) that expired in May 2010, so that international partners could support and monitor the CNS by reporting regularly on implementation of each side’s commitments; and reopening discussions on the ranks of the officers of other Congolese armed groups who have been integrated into the national army.Also appointing CNDP figures to the North Kivu provincial institutions in exchange for verifiable dismantlement of CNDP parallel administrative and tax structures, subject to MONUSCO monitoring and reporting to the CNS; and arresting Bosco,but again handing over responsibility for security of the Masisi and Rutshuru territories to national army battalions trained by foreign partners and MONUSCO.However it would be very important to commit troops who have participated in the “Amani Leo” operation to join the new DDR program, so that all ex-CNDP fighters are either completely integrated into the national army or police or reinserted into civilian life, and also committing not to engage in any political or military activities with foreign dissidents, including those of the Rwandan general, Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa.Due to increasing number of refugees in the conflicting area, it was advised by the crisis groups that.the states involved in the conflict should oversee and ensure a secure environment for refugee return in the Kivu, taking into consideration of conducting a census of the undocumented refugees who returned to the Kivu since summer 2009 in partnership with UNHCR, starting a nationality verification process and issuing voter cards to eligible persons before elections, and reviving the joint Congo-Rwanda-Uganda verification mechanism to deter illegal immigration into the Kivu, but also starting repatriation of refugees from Rwanda and Uganda under UNHCR conditions, including voluntary return and security of the zones of return; the permanent local conciliation committees (CLPC) should decide if security conditions allow return based on clear benchmarks, and areas determined by MONUSCO to be under parallel administration should not be considered open for return.With regard to right implementation, it would be necessary to?build the institutions and the capacities to foster inter-communal reconciliation and dispute management. This reflects on developing expertise to manage land conflicts, including a land commission to review titles; reinforcing STAREC, the Congolese government organisation in charge of stabilisation programs, as a permanent conflict resolution mechanism; implementing the 2008 Goma conference resolutions on peace and security; and dedicating adequate resources and additional staff taken on through a transparent recruitment process. This also involves empowering provincial institutions with resources and authority to respond to local needs, and creating the legal and administrative framework to address issues of ethnic minorities’ political representation and inconsistencies between customary and modern law.Much as peace process is concerned, practical implimentation of holding a roundtable with local communities, provincial authorities and national representatives to set clear guidelines for allocating posts in the provincial administration; map out a consensual process for distancing local communities from armed groups; and adopt a code of conduct for political activities in the Kivu. This would short circuit the conflicting network at the area.Among other recommendations of the crisis group was to the relevant authorities to organise a special summit of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), so that could open political discussions at head-of-state level and chaired by the African Development Bank (ADB) to agree on economic, land and population movement issues, with the aim of forming a mutually beneficial vision for the future of the Great Lakes region. But again to analyse jointly the region’s traumatic history, so as to foster reconciliation between Congolese and Rwandans, and also to commit not to interfere in legitimate efforts at consolidation of the state in eastern Congo. Issues like rebel M. 23 to govern the nothern party of DRC at Goma area are also reconsidered as part of foreign interest. 4.23 Somalia ConflictSomalia is among the states in Africa suffered in ethnic conflict for quit long time now. In the year 2005, the current conflict report has not undergone review accorded to official World Bank publications. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data involved in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on the map do not imply any judgment on part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Somalia’s history of conflict reveals an intriguing paradox namely, many of the factors that drive armed conflict have also played a role in managing, ending, or preventing war. For instance, clannism and clan cleavages are a source of conflict used to divide Somalis, fuel endemic clashes over resources and power, used to mobilize militia, and make broad-based reconciliation very difficult to achieve. Most of Somalia’s armed clashes since 1991 have been fought in the name of clan, often as a result of political leaders manipulating clannism for their own purposes. Yet traditional clan elders are a primary source of conflict mediation, clan-based customary law serves as the basis for negotiated settlements, and clan-based blood-payment groups serve as a deterrent to armed violence. Likewise, the central state is conventionally viewed as a potential source of rule of law and peaceful allocation of resources, but, at times in Somalia’s past, it was a source of violence and predation.Economic interests, too, have had an ambiguous relationship with conflict in Somalia. In some places, war economies have emerged that perpetuate violence and lawlessness, while in other instances business interests have been a driving force for peace, stability, and rule of law. Understanding under what circumstances these and other variables serve as escalators or de-escalators of violence or both is the subtle challenge conflict analysis faces in the Somali context. A brief review of conflict trends in Somalia underscores the point.In the context of the cold war, the regime, led by Siyad Barre, recast the coup as a socialist revolution and with funds from international partners built up one of the largest standing armies in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1977 and 1991, the country endured three major armed conflicts. The first was the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977–78, in which Somali forces intervened in support of Somali rebel fighters in a bid to liberate the Somali-inhabited region of the Ogaden. Somalia lost the war and suffered around 25,000 casualties. Those losses sowed the seeds of future internal conflict, prompting the rise of several Somali liberation movements’ intent on overthrowing the military regime of Siyad Barre, whom they held accountable for the debacle. After more than a decade without an active program in Somalia, the World Bank reengaged in 2003 in partnership with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and with the collaboration of other development partners engaged in the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) mechanism. A joint World Bank/UNDP Country Reengagement Note (CRN) under the Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) initiative devised a strategy for Somalia that would contribute to the provision of basic public goods, accelerate socioeconomic recovery, and create an enabling environment for long-term institutional and policy change.The first of these movements was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), established in 1978 by Abdullahi Yusuf. This mainly Majerten clan movement engaged the regime in periodic skirmishes in the northeast of the country and was met with harsh repression.The second major armed conflict was the war between the Somali military and the Somali National Movement (SNM) for control over northwest Somalia. The SNM was formed in 1981 by some members of the Isaaq clan following the Ogaden War. Isaaq grievances deepened over the course of the 1980s, when the Barre regime placed the northwest under military control and used the military administration to crack down on the Isaaq and dispossess them of their businesses. The civil war mounted by the SNM began in May 1988 and produced catastrophe. Government forces committed atrocities against civilians (an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Somalis died, mostly members of the Isaaq clan, which was the core support for the SNM); aerial bombardments leveled the city of Hargeysa; and 400,000 Somalis were forced to flee across the Ethiopian border as refugees, while another 400,000 were internally displaced. These atrocities fueled Isaaq demands for secession in what became the self-declared state of Somaliland in 1991.The third armed conflict before 1991 pitted embattled government forces against a growing number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. The strongest of these movements included the United Somali Congress, USC (Hawiye clan), the Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni clan), and the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (Majerten clan).This multifront war presaged the predatory looting and banditry that characterized the warfare in 1991–92. In addition to these wars, many other legacies of the Barre period fuel conflict in contemporary Somalia. As the Cold War waned in the late 1980s, Somalia’s strategic importance to the West diminished, enabling donors to place human rights conditions on aid to Somalia. Western donors froze aid to Somalia in response to the war with the SNM in the north. Stripped of its principal source of revenue, the Somali state shrank and eventually collapsed. An initiative by a group of eminent Somalis known as the “Manifesto Group” to broker reconciliation and establish a provisional post-Barre government was met with arrests by the Barre regime in April 1990.The principal victims of this violence were weak agricultural communities and coastal minority groups caught in the middle of the fighting. Looted of all their belongings, they faced a massive famine in late 1991 and early 1992, prompting large international relief operations. The food aid quickly became part of the war economy, a commodity over which militias fought and that warlords diverted to fund the wars. Illiterate gunmen saw war, plunder, and extortion as their only livelihood. Some businessmen were enriched by war-related criminal activities such as weapons sales, diversion of food aid, drug production, and exportation of scrap metal. And whole clans found them in possession of valuable urban and riverine real estate won by conquest, which they stood to lose in a peace settlement.In Somaliland, interclan clashes did occur, including two serious wars in 1994 and 1996. But for a variety of reasons more robust authority of traditional clan elders, greater political cohesion among the clans, more support from businessmen to support peace and subsidize demobilization, and more effective political leadership, to name a few the fighting never devolved into anarchy and generalized violence. In the northeast, chronic interclan tensions were contained by traditional elders as well. In both regions, a modest economic recovery fueled by import-export activities through their seaports helped to divert energies toward commerce and away from warfare.4.23.1 Role of UN in Somalia (UNOSOM), 1993–94U.N. intervention in Somalia was initially prompted by a desire on the part of the international community to protect food relief and end the famine ravaging southern Somalia. It was initially a U.S.-led, U.N.-sanctioned multilateral intervention involving nearly 30,000 troops. In May 1993, the operation was formally handed over to the United Nations. The U.N. mandate was much more expansive – to assist Somalis in promoting national reconciliation, rebuilding the central government, and reviving the economy. The intervention initially succeeded in freezing armed conflicts in the country. U.S. commanders decided not to embark on a campaign of disarmament, for fear of arousing armed resistance leading to U.S. casualties. The cessation of hostilities provided an opportunity for the main 15 Somali factions to meet and negotiate the framework for atransitional national government and the terms of a national reconciliation, the Addis Ababa Declaration of March 1993. But the ambitious UNOSOM mandate of rebuilding a Somali government via locally-selected district councils directly threatened the interests of a number of militia leaders and their clans, who controlled valuable riverine and urban real estate through conquest, and who viewed UNOSOM’s program as a move to disenfranchise them.A confrontation was inevitable. In June 1993, only one month after the United Nations assumed control of the operation, the militia of General Aideed (representing the Haber Gedir/Hawiye clan) attacked U.N.forces, killing 24 peacekeepers and precipitating a fourmonth battle between the United Nations and Aideed’s militia. The subsequent failure of U.S. and U.N. forces to capture Aideed, the paralysis that the fighting imposed on U.N. nation-building efforts, and the disastrous losses sustained in the October 3 “Black Hawk Down” incident sealed the fate of the U.N. operation, which departed in March 1995, leaving Somalia still in a state of violence and anarchy.The post-UNOSOM period is marked by several key developments. First, it began a failed pattern of externally funded national reconciliation conferences. More than a dozen such conferences have been convened, of which only one the 2000 Arta Peace Conference came close to bearing fruit. The conferences have tended to provoke conflict inside the country, divert energies of the political elite from governing areas they claim to control to jockeying for positions in a proposed state, and elevate the status of factional and militia leaders, whom some argue are part of the problem, not the solution. Second, UNOSOM’s civil and political work helped to empower a small but growing civil society in Somalia, which has since been an important force for peace-building in the country. Third, UNOSOM’s enormous presence transformed the Somali economy in ways that helped to undermine the war economy and reshape interests in greater levels of security and rule of law. Their shifting interests helped to contain armed conflict and lawlessness in the post intervention period. Armed conflict continues to plague much of Somalia, but since 1995 the nature, duration, and intensity of warfare have changed significantly. With few exceptions, armed conflicts today are more local in nature, pitting subclans against one another in an increasingly fragmented political environment.This devolution of clan warfare means that armed clashes tend to be much shorter and less lethal, in part because of limited support from lineage members for such internal squabbles, in part because clan elders are in a better position to intervene, and in part because some clans have successfully consolidated their occupation and control over territory and for the moment meet little resistance. Money and ammunition are scarcer as well, limiting the duration of conflict. Armed clashes in Somalia now are increasingly difficult to distinguish from armed criminality many of the worst clashes in recent years began as acts of robbery or murder that produced a counterattack, leading to a cycle of violence between two clans. While armed conflict has changed significantly since the mid-1990s, Somalia remains without a functional central government. But even its systems of governance have evolved in interesting ways in the past decade. Local polities, generally comprised of Sharia courts or municipalities, have sprung up in towns and neighborhoods across much of southern Somalia, providing sporadic and variable levels of law and order. Even modest levels of law and order tend to reduce armed conflicts by minimizing retaliation and revenge killings as a source of justice. The most ambitious attempt to revive formal government in southern Somalia was the Transitional National Government (TNG) (2000–03) formed at the conclusion of the 2000 Arta Peace Conference. Despite initial promise, the TNG faced considerable opposition from both internal factions and neighboring countries. The Arta process was not a comprehensive peace key actors, including Puntland, Somaliland, and a number of militia leaders in the Mogadishu area were not brought into the talks, ensuring a large collection of rejectionists at the outset. Making matters worse, the TNG leadership devoted most its attention to securing foreign aid and external recognition, rather than engaging in the arduous process of rebuilding a central government. Funds it did secure mainly from Gulf were lost to corruption, further reducing public and international confidence in the TNG. As a result, the TNG was never able to extend its authority beyond parts of the capital Mogadishu and eventually became largely irrelevant.4.23.2 Role of AU in SomaliaSomalia is a member of African Union and the League of Arab (LAS). As part of Africa, it is automatically a member of African Union, while its long standing historic ties based on common cultural and religious affinity give it membership in the LAS. It is argued that this dual membership makes it captive to the divergent interests of both African and Arab States, which have their own interests in the political arrangement of Somalia.Regional states under the AU have intermittently engaged in proxy wars in Somalia and have the potential to both create and worsen tensions and violence inside Somalia in pursuit of their own goals. These states have also shown the capacity to support peace-building efforts. The latest attempt to broker a peace and revive a central government in Somalia began in October 2002 and was undertaken by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with the Kenyan government hosting the effort and external partners such as the EU providing support. The framers of this round of talks came up with several innovations, including an initial phase, which pledged parties to a cessation of hostilities, and a second phase devoted to reconciliation, which required the participants to address key conflict issues. The second phase was to provide a blueprint for whatever government emerged from the talks. Over the ensuing two years, the peace process encountered numerous obstacles and lengthy delays. Long-standing disputes over the size and composition of representation in the talks, and disagreement over who controlled the selection of members of parliament, created crises that prompted walkouts and boycotts by some key political leaders.The third phase of the talks centered on power-sharing negotiations. It encountered predictable problems initially disputes over allocation of seats by subclans, control of the nomination process, and selection of individual members of parliament leading to delays in the inauguration of a 275-member parliament for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Issues included clan identities, governance, economic performance, natural and productive resources, militarization, conflicts among regions in Somalia, and international influences. This section highlights common patterns as well as common drivers of conflict escalation and de-escalation and discusses key differences among the regions.Nearly all armed conflicts in contemporary Somalia break out along clan lines. Clan identities are malleable and can be shaped by leaders to pursue control of resources and power. Clan identities are not the basis for conflict; rather, their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions. Clan groups can serve as destructive or constructive forces as well as traditional conflict moderators. In lineage-based Somalia where clans define relationships, clan identity is not static and fixed but is shaped and manipulated according to changing situations. This does not suggest that clans are inherently conflictual but that rather clan identities can be manipulated purposefully to acquire control over resources and power. Warlords and divisive leaders emphasize differences among clans and formulate demands that play on those differences. Warlords are instrumental in invoking loyalty to raise or lower the level of identity from clan to subclan and sub-subclan and back again depending on what is most convenient.4.23.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in SomaliaClan is integral in Somali society and influences all aspects of Somali life. The Somali experience demonstrates that clan is a double-edged sword it closely links Somalis and tears them apart. Thus, clans need to be constructively encouraged to serve as facilitators of cooperation and mutual assistance.?Manipulation of clan identities. Clan and subclan identities are used to underscore differences and sharpen cleavages for specific objectives. Such differentiation in identities may be based on real or constructed differences and may change depending on the goals being sought. Clan elders use traditional laws to settle disputes in non-confrontational ways. In fact, in the absence of state authority or when official channels of mediation do not work, clan elders use customary laws to bring about negotiated settlements and prevent conflict escalation.?Cross-clan partnerships: In recent years, CSOs, businesses, and local initiatives have formed on cross-clan lines to work toward development and peace, helping to build trust and overcome suspicions among clans.Unfortunately, the south-central region has met with a much worse fate. The TNG, established at the 2000 Arta Peace Conference, proved impotent and had limited authority beyond some parts of Mogadishu. In the absence of an accountable central state, the region has witnessed periods of anarchy and ferocious armed conflict. It appears that, in recent years, faction leaders’ attempts to claim control of the region and forge alliances were made mainly to increase their bargaining power in the reconciliation process rather than to advance common interests. This political vacuum has forced residents to depend on the Sharia courts, local authorities, and CSOs to provide some degree of governance.It appears that Somaliland will make a decision on its future depending on the governing structure determined in the peace process. The fourth possible outcome is failure of the peace process, leading the three regions to adopt different government structures. Localized clan politics may lead to the “clanustization” of the south-central region with local structures ranging from fiefdoms to local government authorities. Puntland may focus on building its administration; and Somaliland will renew its efforts to receive international recognition.Given the sharply different paths followed by the three regions of the Republic of Somalia after the collapse of the state, it is helpful to examine each region independently to better understand current trends and potential future obstacles and opportunities. The only administration that was considered to have legitimacy is the TNG established at the 2000 Arta Peace Conference, Djibouti, with the backing of the Arab states. The TNG, however, had limited power outside of parts of Mogadishu and was plagued by internal wrangling and corruption. Regional actors support clan groups in Somalia that may extend their influence. In fact, incompatible regional interests have been critical in delaying national reconciliation and a political resolution to Somalia’s problems. Interference by external states is further complicated by cross-boundary clan relations. The borders of Somalia were imposed externally without much consideration for clan configurations, thus dividing kindred clans across boundaries. This situation has led to armed conflict and diplomacy among states being shaped as much by interactions between governments as by cross-border relationships among clans. Ties between South-central Somalia and the Gulf states have strengthened since the end of the Barre regime. Nearly US$800 million of Somalia’s trade exchange has shifted from Europe to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and large numbers of Somalis have escaped the civil war to seek refuge and employment in the Arab states. In the absence of social services in South-central Somalia, Arab states have also provided social assistance through Islamic charities. Ethiopia’s positive stance toward Somaliland ensures that both a potentially expansionist pan-Somali nationalism and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism are kept at bay. It appears that the Somaliland regional administration has made a concerted effort to prevent Islamic fundamentalists from increasing their power and, by following the principle of separation of state and religion, has excluded religious fundamentalists from the regional administration.Landlocked Ethiopia has increased trade with Somaliland. After the 2000 war with Eritrea and its inability to rely on Assab port, Ethiopia increasingly channels exports and imports through the port in Berbera. It also cooperates with Somaliland on shared issues of concern, such as security. Ethiopian Airlines flies regularly to Somaliland, and Ethiopia has opened a liaison office in Hargeysa. Somaliland’s relations with its other neighbor, Djibouti, have been uneven, particularly given Djibouti’s perceived support of the TNG and its stance in defense of reconstituting a unified Somali state. Djibouti is also likely to view Somaliland as a potential rival because its Berbera port could be an alternative seaport for the region.5.13.4 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Somalia Politics in Somalia conflict was conducted to guide reconstruction and development assistance to the country. It attempts to provide a picture of conflict related factors and structures that are specifically relevant for effective and sensitive reconstruction and development assistance. Given this focus, the report does not provide advice on issues such as political arrangements or configurations, including the ongoing peace process. The conflict in Somalia arised when societal groups pursued incompatible objectives. It is a dynamic process that leads to both positive and negative changes. The manifestations of conflict vary according to the means employed.A conflict is predominantly violent when the use of violence outweighs the use of political or other means. Violent conflicts differ in intensity and scope and range from violence that affects small parts of the population to full war, hence in Somalia more than 1,000 combat deaths is estimated in a year. The World Bank follows the United Nations in adhering to the principle of territorial integrity of Somalia as sanctioned by member countries, and it therefore considers Somalia a single entity.Despite the existence of minority groups, Somali society is relatively homogenous linguistically (Somali) and religiously (Islam). Lineage underpins Somali society, with divisions defined along clan and subclan lines. Traditionally, the main clan families of Darod, Dir, Issaq, Hawiye and Rahanweyn, along with minority clans, constituted Somali society. In the peace processes (both in Arta and Mbagathi), however, the four major clanfamilies of Darood, Hawiye, Digil-Rahanweyn, and Dir (within which the Issaq is included as the largest clan), along with minorities (Bantu, Barawans, and Bajuni), are considered to represent Somalia. Within each of these clans, there are many subclans and sub-subclans. The population consists largely of pastoral or nomadic groups and agricultural communities, with a significant number engaged in trade, businesses, and fisheries (coastal areas). These stronger marauding clans have grabbed rich plantations and real estate owned by agricultural clans and indigenous groups, often leading to their displacement, or worse still, their enslavement. The displaced are forced to move out of traditional lands into new areas, thus changing demographic constitutions. African states and organizations have played pivotal roles in the peace process. The peace talks were led by IGAD and successfully executed by Kenya. The African Union is expected to play a key role in providing support to peacekeeping in Somalia, and several regional states, both African and Arab, appear committed to shoulder the reconstruction of Somalia.Outside the region, Western donors, particularly the European Community, have supported the Somali leaders to negotiate a peace. They have also provided much economic support and assistance to the peace process. The international community now has to readjust its own support mechanisms/coordination modalities to support the new Transitional Federal Government and manage the transition phase. In the context of the war against terror, the United States has showed renewed willingness to engage. External Actors/states as drivers of Conflict escalation and de-escalation in a positive and negative attitude continue to influence the evolution of the Somali state. They take sides in Somali conflicts by allying with clans who are sympathetic to their aspirations and strategic interests. The opposing interests of these states negatively impact Somalia. On the positive side, IGAD, African Union and several African states are playing a crucial role in the peace process. The EU, Arab states, and other countries and organizations are also providing development assistance to Somalia.Conflict sensitive assistance would mean that reconstruction and development policies, programs, and projects consider their potential impact on the conflict environment to ensure that interventions do not contribute to conflict escalation but instead, if possible, contribute to conflict de-escalation. Rarely are the links between aid interventions and conflict simple or static, and rarely do they translate into direct cause-effect relationships. Indirect linkages are an important part of the picture, and the linkages are often mediated by complex social structures. Hence, the way aid interventions impact de-escalation of conflict would be through structures and processes that strengthen the society’s ability to manage conflict in nonviolent ways. Although aid may have positive impact on peace and conflict, it is a rather blunt peace-building tool best suited to complement, not replace, more direct domestic and international peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building efforts.Society structure also holds true. An education project may fail to produce students able to pass statewide exams but may succeed in reducing tensions among particular social groups by creating and institutionalizing an environment that increases constructive contact among groups and decreases misunderstanding by dispelling stereotypes and misconceptions. The best use of the conflict analysis is one in which teams themselves carefully consider the potential impact of specific planned interventions on the conflict environment and weigh alternative designs on basis of the findings and pointers given here and in the three regional reports. A recent framework for joint needs assessments also promotes the systematic consideration of conflict factors.4.24 Central Africa-Eritrea ConflictThe Djiboutian–Eritrean border conflict between the forces of Djibouti and Eritrea occurred between June 10 and June 13, 2008. It was triggered by tension which began on April 16, 2008 when Djibouti reported that Eritrean armed forces had penetrated into Djiboutian territory and dug trenches on both sides of the border. The crisis deepened when armed clashes broke out between the two armed forces in the border area on June 10, 2008. The currently in force 1900 boundary agreement specifies that the international boundary starts at Cape Doumeira (Ras Doumeira) at the Red Sea and runs for 1.5?km along the watershed divide of the peninsula. Furthermore, the 1900 protocol specified that Ile Doumeira (Doumeira Island) immediately offshore and its adjacent smaller islets would not be assigned sovereignty and would remain demilitarized. Djibouti and Eritrea had twice previously clashed over the border area. In January 1935, Italy and France signed the Franco-Italian Agreement wherein parts of French Somaliland (Djibouti) were given to Italy (Eritrea). However, the question of ratification has brought this agreement and its provision of substantial parts of Djibouti to Eritrea into question. In April 1996 they almost went to war after a Djibouti official accused Eritrea of shelling Ras Doumeira.4.24.1 Background of Eritrea ConflictIn January Eritrea reportedly requested to cross the border in order to get sand for a road, but instead occupied a hilltop in the region. On April 16, Eritrea is reported by Djibouti to have set up fortifications and dug trenches on both sides of the Djiboutian border near Ras Doumeira. Djibouti, in a letter to the UN calling for intervention, claimed new maps put out by Eritrea showed Ras Doumeira as Eritrean territory. Eritrea denied it had any problems with Djibouti. Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said on May 15 that the row was a "threat to the peace and security of the whole Horn of Africa" and said Ethiopia would secure their trade corridor through Djibouti in the event of a conflict. Ethiopia has relied on Djibouti for access to the Red Sea since Eritrea's independence. Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki denied sending troops into the area and added they do not have any problem with Djibouti. On June 10, according to Djibouti several Eritrean troops deserted their positions fleeing to the Djiboutian side. Djiboutian forces then came under fire from Eritrean forces demanding the return of the deserters. Djibouti called up soldiers and police who had retired since 2004 in response to the fighting. Eritrea dismissed accounts from Djibouti as "anti-Eritrean". A statement from Eritrea's Foreign Ministry said it would not "get involved in an invitation of squabbles and acts of hostility" and claimed Djibouti was trying to drag Eritrea into its "concocted animosity." According to French Colonel Ducret, French soldiers in Djibouti provided logistical and medical assistance to the Djibouti army as well as providing them with intelligence. Clashes between the two forces reportedly continued for several days before Djibouti's military announced on June 13 that fighting had subsided, but on the same day, President Guelleh, was quoted by the BBC as saying that his country was at war with Eritrea. Djiboutian soldiers were killed and 55 wounded during the fighting. According to Djiboutian estimates, 100 Eritrean soldiers were killed, 100 captured, and 21 defected. Djiboutian President Guelleh declared: "We've always had good relations. But they aggressively occupied part of our country. This is an aggression we are resisting."The League of Arab States held an emergency session in response to the fighting and called for Eritrea to withdraw from the border region.The French foreign ministry said it was highly concerned about the fighting. The French defense ministry announced they were increasing their military presence in Djibouti and increasing their support for Djibouti's army following the border clashes. The announcement also said France was "preparing to deploy a forward logistics base and a land force near the zone where the clashes took place", adding that "its military has stepped up air surveillance over the border to monitor the activities of Eritrean forces." Reports also indicate that additional naval forces are being moved to the region as well as an additional team of military surgeons.4.24.2 Role of AU in Eritrea The Peace and Security Council of the African Union urged Eritrea and Djibouti to exercise the utmost restraint and to resolve the dispute through dialogue including fully cooperating with an AU mission sent to the area. However, Eritrea, unlike Djibouti, had not yet accepted the mission. Bereket Simon, special adviser to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia told Reuters "Ethiopia firmly believes that such unwarranted action should be stopped immediately and peaceful and diplomatic solution must be sought for the problem. On June 24, 2008, the United Nations Security Council held a meeting at their headquarters in New York to hear a briefing of the situation, as well as statements from the Prime Minister of Djibouti Mohamed Dileita and the ambassador of Eritrea., further meeting in September referred to the signing of a peace and reconciliation Agreement (the Djibouti Agreement) between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in Djibouti on 19 August 2008 and took note of a request for an international stabilization force to be deployed to the region. 4.24.3 Role of UN in Eritrea Conflict A UN fact-finding mission was sent to the region and issued a report saying the standoff between Djibouti and Eritrea could "have a major negative impact on the entire region and the wider international community" noting while Djibouti has pulled out of the disputed area Eritrea has not. The fact-finding mission was not allowed into Eritrea by the Eritrean government. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution, urging dialogue between the two countries to solve the issue peacefully. The council welcomed Djibouti's withdrawal to positions before June 10, 2008, and demanded Eritrea make a similar withdrawal within five weeks of the resolution. In early June 2010, Djibouti and Eritrea agreed to refer the matter to Qatar for mediation, a move that was praised by the African Union. A critical review made by this study in a letter to the UN calling for intervention, claimed new maps put out by Eritrea showed Ras Doumeira as Eritrean territory. Eritrea denied it had any problems with Djibouti. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution, urging dialogue between the two countries to solve the issue peacefully. Basically, in these two countries there is a minimal economic interest much as big nations are conerned. Hence no special interest at the area, then neglecting principle of the big nations is hereby shown vividly as more used to areas like Uganda, Zimbabwe and so forth. UN always works for the big nations interests. 4.24.4 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in EritreaWith regard to French Defense Minister Hervé Morin discussions with Djibouti's Defense Minister Ougoureh Kifleh Ahmed, the promise to strengthen the French military presence in the country in case there is "an escalation in the current border row." Also to reaffirm the "very great concern of France" over the recent border incidents, Morin, has "reassured his counterpart of the full support" of his government, at the same time calling for a "diplomatic" settlement of the issue. The two nations have a mutual defense agreement. But also the United Nations Security Council called on both sides to exercise maximum restraint and re-establish dialogue.The United States State Department issued a press release condemning Eritrea's "military aggression" saying it represented "an additional threat to peace and security in the already volatile Horn of Africa" and calling for Eritrea to accept third party mediation on the border dispute. Eritrea responded to the statement accusing the U.S. of instigating conflict in the region. The American embassy in Djibouti advised citizens against traveling to the northern Djibouti where Ras Doumeira is located for safety reasons. The overview in conflict resolution basically reflects unstable relative peace in Eritrea.4.25 Mali ConflictBasically there are a couple of big issues that have led to the recent Mali conflict. The people who live in the northern segment, one of the ethnic groups there are the Tuaregs. They had been fighting against the central government, which is where the capitalists were in the south, in Bamako. And, of course, like practically all African countries, you've got many different ethnic groups. So the Tuaregs, who are a desert people, light-skinned, they have been pushing to initially, to autonomy, going all the way back. Now, Mali was a colony of the French, and they got independence in 1960. In 1958, before independence, the Tuaregs had been lobbying the French, saying that they did not want to live under a government of the darker peoples in the south. Ever since then they have been pushing and fighting sporadically. It has flared into wars maybe three or four times. And then last January fast forward to three months ago, 17th January the Tuaregs started their most serious war. And this time they said they weren't going for autonomy, they wanted independence. And they started fighting greatly against the government in the south. Now, one of the most interesting reasons why this time the fight is so intense and has been harder to contend for the government is that Bamako, the Mali borders Algeria, but right after the Algeria border is the border with Libya. And every analyst says that the Tuaregs had gone into Libya, fought for Gaddafi. When Gaddafi fell, about 2,000 of them trooped back into Mali hardened fighters with big sophisticated weapons. And so what happened was that they were winning the war in northern Mali, and then the other big event that happened was that the soldiers of the national government in Mali were very unhappy with their president, a president called Amadou Toumani Touré, who had a good reputation because he had pushed democracy, but his soldiers were very unhappy because they said, he wasn't fighting the war effectively. So last month, March 22, they overthrew him because they said he was weak. They wanted the war prosecuted more effectively, basically because in the face-to-face confrontation, the army, the Malian army, lost to the Tuaregs. In several battles they lost a few small settlements and towns. But also the word got back that the Malian soldiers, who were complaining that they didn't have equipment and apparently a number of them were captured and their throats were slit. So it became a big issue in the capital, in Bamako. Many women marched, saying that the president was allowing their husbands to be killed defenselessly. So there was animosity in the general populace. But I'll emphasize again that my own opinion of the president is pretty good. And this was in March. Now, he had scheduled elections for this month. It would have been April 29 when there will be elections. And he was not standing, because being a good democratic president, he was not standing; he was handing over. But these soldiers, junior soldiers, overthrew him. And here is the worst part from my point of view. Within ten days of overthrowing him, the Tuaregs won the entire north. Now, so people who are saying that they didn't the war was being fought badly and they wanted to take over and fight the war better, they actually lost very quickly. And therefore the Tuaregs actually declared the north of Mali as an independent state. They call it Azawad. So now Mali has been split. Again AQIM and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, who actually likely came from Algeria. But the two countries share their border, and this is the middle of the desert, so it's not clear where the border is. Since they took over and on April 6 declared their new state of Azawad, it's clear that they are not in control. The few journalists who have made it there and Al Jazeera has been one of them, and they have had people talking on camera it turns out that you have got the Tuareg group who declared Azawad, sort of the political leadership, and their group is called the MNLA. But in addition you've got a jihadist group, they have shown up. And, in fact, that is America's great concern. So they are worried about those. But now another group broke out from the Islamic group, and they said, rather than attacking the West, what they want to do is impose sharia in the north. 4.25.1 Role of AU in Mali ConflictThe deteriorating security situation in northern Mali has prompted regional leaders to ask for approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for urgent military intervention. But how realistic is military intervention in a complex situation where political stability still prevails in the capital Bamako? Is there a chance for a negotiated end to this crisis? The UNSC on Monday 18 June finally declared its readiness to consider backing such a West African military intervention in Mali under the AU, where militant rebel groups, mainly the Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and the Islamist Ansare Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have taken control of the northern regions. The UNSC made this decision after repeatedly expressing its reservations about the intervention plan of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).ECOWAS’ request for UNSC approval of a military option came after the visit to Paris of the current African Union (AU) chair Thomas Yayi Boni and Niger’s President Mahamadou Issifou. Both leaders sought to draw attention to the deteriorating situation in Mali. Military intervention as a conflict resolution mechanism is always controversial and could complicate the situation further. Alone, it might not provide a definite response to the challenges facing Mali. In addition, the terrain in northern Mali might be something to consider, as most West African soldiers are not familiar with what is now termed ‘desert combat’. Any military engagement without proper information gathering, planning, effective logistical support and a clear exit strategy might transform the region into a permanent war zone like Somalia. Meanwhile, it is essential to stress that within ECOWAS’ normative framework, a military option is always seen as an option of last resort. It might also be possible that ECOWAS leaders do not share the same views on the issue and that could be detrimental to the authority of the regional body.From the point of view, the good thing is that no country internationally likes this declaration of independence. Nobody has recognized not the U.S., not the Security Council, not the Europeans, and certainly not the Africans. So the African Union, which is the continental body, as well as ECOWAS, a regional body in West Africa, they pushed back very hard against both the Tuaregs declaring a new state and against the junior soldiers in Bamako who are taking over. They are led by a captain called Captain Amadou Sanogo. So the Tuaregs who took over, it's clear they are not in full control. They've made alliances with Ansar Dine, the group that wants to impose sharia. But there also the jihadists who basically just want to fight the West and fight the United States. So what they have done, even though they've declared a country, you've got it's not clear who is in control. There is no real control. And it's a huge area, and it is desert.4.25.2 Role of UN in MaliBasically UN later backed AU effort to support Mali to restore peace in Northern part been overruled by the rebels known as AQIM suported with Al qaeda group.The other thing is that three, four years ago, the U.S. had made Mali a major partner. AFRICOM, the United States Africa Command, they had targeted Mali, and they had actually made Mali a very close partner, so because of the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, to help them fight. And so one of the most interesting things is that when the Tuaregs started attacking Mali again in January, AFRICOM sat on its hands. And this was very intriguing and very disturbing that they sort of turned their backs on the government in Bamako. And the other criticism that people have thrown out is that, you know, the U.S. got involved in Libya. Everybody knew that weapons were flowing everywhere. And the fact that thousands of fighters from Libya got all the way into Mali, and the U.S. would not see them, it raises questions. And when you add to the fact the soldiers who took over were trained in the U.S. and that some State Department officials have been saying, well, they have grievances all of which makes it extremely suspicious when you look at it. At the end of the day, it's not even in U.S. interests that the Tuaregs have taken over, because, as we said, the Islamic groups who are anti-American and make no bones about it, they are now showing their faces. We can see them clearly, and they have taken over. They are showing their flags. And some of them are telling women to put on a hijab and headscarves and all the kinds of sharia and Islamic law things. So what has happened in Mali is so dangerous for Mali itself. The UNSC’s resistance to authorise a military operation could be explained by three key factors. Firstly, it needs to be understood in the context of UNSC Resolutions on Libya and on C?te d’Ivoire, and the subsequent controversies they brought about. As such, both permanent and non-permanent members might want to consider carefully a new military venture before endorsing it. Secondly, the UNSC has indicated that there is a need for more clarity on the mandate, resources and capacity of the force to be deployed in Mali. Both permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC have clear concerns about the strength of the force. Thirdly, the UNSC members insist on the sequencing of the options available to resolve the crisis, including political and diplomatic efforts. Yet the mediation process is highly complex. Indeed, the negotiations would need two sets of parameters to be successful. The first is related to the coherence of the political transition in Bamako. The second is what is to be negotiated given the fact that the groups present in northern Mali do not all have the same claims. Recent clashes between elements of Ansar Dine and MNLA combatants highlight this complexity.There is, however, a good chance that negotiations could prove helpful in resolving some of the political issues. It is also likely that, weakened by its failed attempts at forging an alliance with Ansar Dine, the MNLA might finally accept the idea of a negotiated settlement. Indications from various separate meetings between ECOWAS mediator President Blaise Compaore, the MNLA and Ansar Dine do point to the possibility of talks. The aim of the dual mediation processes engaged in by Compaore is to define with both groups some modalities for the negotiation process.From ECOWAS’ perspective, Mali’s territorial integrity and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable. While the MNLA might be convinced to accept the idea of ‘One Mali’ with the possibility of ‘increased autonomy’ in the northern regions, it is highly unlikely that one can expect the same outcome with members of AQIM or Ansar Dine. The key challenge here stems from the competing agendas of the various groups controlling the north. Ansar Dine does not share the MNLA’s quest for independence, while the MNLA resents the Islamist stance of Ansar Dine. Another point of disagreement is the link between Ansar Dine and AQIM. 4.25.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Mali ConflictThe preconditions requested by the mediators before negotiations are for Ansar Dine to drop its claim to impose sharia law on Mali and break away from AQIM. However, the symbiotic relationship between Ansar Dine and AQIM makes these pre-requisites difficult to satisfy. And even if the ECOWAS mediator succeeds in his efforts to bring the MNLA ‘back to the Republic’, it will be challenging to hold talks with AQIM, the strength behind Ansar Dine. Therefore, ECOWAS’ decision to deploy troops should be seen as a complement to the political and diplomatic efforts. It should also be seen as a means to facilitate the protection of state institutions that have become vulnerable since the military coup of 22 March 2012. The earlier mob attack on interim president Dioncounda Traore, who is still in Paris for medical treatment, could serve as a reminder of state fragility and lack of respect for state authority in Mali. Importantly, an ECOWAS/AU/UN mission could help deliver humanitarian assistance to those trapped in the conflict zones and who are subjected to inhumane treatment on the part of the rebel groups, mainly those professing Islamic fundamentalism.As the UNSC considers whether or not a military operation is necessary, some regional actors also have to be involved in the overall strategy to restore peace in Mali. The role of Algeria and Mauritania would be essential and regional leaders need to motivate both countries to be part of the regional response mechanism. When you say it's very suspicious, the study mean, it sounds like suggesting that in terms of establishing AFRICOM in Mali, the U.S. kind of wanted to get rid of this president and may be didn't mind if the north was taken over, at least for a while, in order to create a situation of that nature, where the military and what takes control. Apart from suspicion, now, the interesting things about the scenario are two things. Number one, the rebel overthrower was trained by the United States. Since 2004, he had been to the U.S. for four cycles of training. And one of the things that dismay me is that if you look at the State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, over and over he has made statements that seem to say that, well, we understand the soldiers, and they had grievances. And this study is very confused, because the U.S. is always advocating the language of democracy. The Africans and the West Africans have all said that the era of coups is over, no soldier should take over. If a soldier is unhappy with his president, he can complain through channels, and if the worst comes to the worst, he can run for office. So the two junior soldiers who have taken over and therefore lost the north of the country are totally against democratic principles. Does this reflect any light of successful conflict resolution! 4.26 Conflict in BurundiThe detonator for Burundi’s crisis was the 1993 assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye. Ndadaye had been leader of FRODEBU (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi) the main non-armed party associated with the Hutu ethnic group, and Burundi’s first democratically elected President. But the wave of inter-ethnic massacres following his assassination built on ground already poisoned by decades of colonial divide-and-rule, ethnicized violence around independence in 1962, and a failed insurrection in 1972. The origins and nature of Hutu and Tutsi as identity categories remain controversial, but it is uncontroversial to say that manipulation of ethnicity has remained at the base of Burundi’s violence, compounded by wide vertical disparities in wealth and opportunity, and the persistence of feudal land relations. After Ndadaye’s assassination, a tense period followed in which his successor, President Cyprien Ntaryamira, strove to shore up the FRODEBU government against the threat represented by the solidly Tutsi army, the FAB (Forces Armées Burundaises).Burundi provides a very interesting case study in terms of conflict resolution and peace building in Africa. Currently Burundi is having a transition period which has followed the protracted peace negotiations and the signing of the peace accord in Arusha on 28th August, 2000. What makes the case of Burundi interesting is the fact that Burundi is one of countries in Africa with along history of ethnic conflicts and protracted conflict resolution process followed by a transition period. Africa has much to learn from the experience of Burundi. Violent conflicts in Burundi have been periodic events since when Burundi achieved independence in July 1962. Within the context of the long post-independence period the conflicts can be traced into three phases. 4.26.1 Background of Burundi Conflict The first phase was the period between 1962 and 1966. During this period conflicts were mainly due to political competition for power based on ethnic lines between the Tutsi and the Hutu. At independence it was the UPRONA party which formed the government because it won the 1961 elections. At the time UPRONA was a non-ethnic national party, incorporating all ethnic groups. However, the assassination of its national leader, Prince Rwegasore, in 1961 had deprived the party of a uniting leader. Thus between 1962 and 1996 UPRONA degenerated into an ethnic party dominated by the Tutsi. This was a result of violent struggles between the Tutsi and Hutu politicians such that two Hutu prime ministers got assassinated, speakers and deputy speakers of parliament, ministers and military leaders got executed and other politicians got killed (Ndarubagiye, 1995). The situation culminated into the overthrow of King Mwambutsa IV who was the head of state, and thus a republic was declared.Multipartism was also abolished in 1996 and a one party system under UPRONA was also declared. Thus conflicts during this period resulted into changes from national politics into ethnised politics. The second phase constitutes the period between 1966 and 1993. Periodic conflicts during this period were due to ethnised politics in which the minority Tutsi who monopolized state power and controlled the army and oppressed the majority Hutu and minority Twa. The state itself was a military state arising out of military coups of 1966, 1976 and 1987. The Hutu and the minority Twa ethnic groups found themselves not only dominated and oppressed politically but also excluded, segregated and marginalized in terms of socio-economic relations (Ndarubagiye, ibid). Violent conflicts during this phase were, therefore, a product of such relations. Wherever the Hutu resisted and reacted in form of riots and so on, they were faced with violent repression from state organs. This resulted into mass killings and massacres. Thus the violent conflicts of 1969, 1972/73 and 1988 were of such nature. The most serious was the 1972/73 massacres during which nearly 300,000 people lost their lives (Mpangala, 2000).The third phase constitutes the period from 1993 to the present. This has been a period of protracted civil war for ten years now. The civil war erupted in October 1993 after the assassination of a democratically elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye (Reyntjens, 1993). With the introduction of a multiparty system in 1992 the first elections were held in June (Parliamentary) and July (Presidential), 1993. FRODEBU, a Hutu based political party won the elections with a Hutu President. These political changes threatened the Tutsi who had been monopolizing state power for nearly 30 years. Thus soon after the elections unsuccessful coup attempts were made culminating into the assassination of the President. This instigated some Hutu groups to begin fighting the government of Burundi which again came to be dominated by the Tutsi particularly after the military coup of 1996 which brought President Buyoya once more into power. Due to the civil war upto now more than 300,000 people have been killed.4.26.2 Role of OAU/ AUBurundi’s success is thus the outcome of a sustained process in which domestic, regional and international/multilateral actors were called upon to interact in complex and complementary ways. Based on enlightened self-interest, pressure from the Organisation of African Unity by then, now African Union (AU) and its membership, and particularly South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda, encouraged Burundian actors to stay the course. Pressure and donor support from the EU and its member states, from Canada and from the US also played a critical role. The most important aspect of conflict resolution in the Burundi conflict was the Burundi Peace Negotiations. The first phase of the negotiations was carried out in two sessions in Mwanza, Tanzania in 1996, and the second phase was the negotiations in Arusha from June 1998 to August 2000. In the interest of our discussion in this paper we shall make a discussion of four important aspects which include the initiative for the peace negotiations, the facilitation process, negotiating parties and the signing of the peace agreement. The initiative to begin the process of peace negotiations for Burundi was mainly made by Governments and Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region. In other words it was a Regional Initiative. The initiative was propelled by a widely shared concern by the international community on the deteriorating law and order and internal security situation in Burundi. The international concern was associated with fear that the genocide of Rwanda in 1994 could also take place in Burundi. However, the Regional Initiative was greatly supported by the OAU and the UN.In terms of facilitation, through the Regional Initiative, the OAU and the international community, the Late Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere was requested to mediate in the Burundi peace negotiations in 1995. After studying the situation in Burundi Mwalimu accepted the responsibility as mediator and began work in 1996 in Mwanza. Mwalimu was chosen because he had long experience on the affairs of Burundi as a nationalist leader and President of the United Republic of Tanzania. As a retired President he was a respected national and international figure with enough knowledge and wisdom to enable him play the role as mediator for Burundi. He was also accepted by the Burundi negotiating parties in Mwanza and later on in Arusha. Mwalimu preferred to use the methodology of facilitation rather than mediation. Facilitation created a special relationship between the Facilitator and the negotiating parties such that it provided greater freedom, openings and space for the negotiating parties to make decisions and arrive at oncesus. Given the nature of conflicts in Burundi the facilitation approach was viewed by Mwalimu as the best option compared to the mediation approach. Mwalimu carried out the task as the Facilitator during the Mwanza two sessions in 1996 and during the negotiations in Arusha from June 1998 to 1999. After is death Nelson Mandela the former President of South Africa succeeded him until August 2000. In Mwanza in 1996 there were only three negotiating parties that is the government, the UPRONA Party and the FRODEBU party. This means that many parties to the conflict were excluded. After the second session the negotiations broke down due to disagreements on basic principles of the negotiations and the coup d'etat on the 25th June, 1996. When the negotiations resumed in Arusha in 1998 the number of negotiating parties was greatly expanded to include the Government, the National Assembly and seventeen political parties. Altogether there were nineteen negotiating parties. One obvious feature of the political parties was their ethnic character with ten of them Tutsi based and seven Hutu based parties. The issues negotiated were based on four themes that is the nature of conflict, democracy and good governance, peace and security and social and economic reconstruction and development. Four committees were established each to deal with one theme. Towards the end of the negotiations a fifth committee to deal with issues of implementation of the peace agreement guarantees was established. In each committee all the 19 negotiating parties were represented. Periodically committees presented their work to plenary sessions for overall discussions. Negotiations took place for two years and three months. They were protracted and difficult. In some situations consensus was reached, in others it was difficult to arrive at consensus. The large number of negotiating parties and the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic dichotomy often made things difficult. In order to consolidate certain positions groupings such as the G7, the G8 and the G3 emerged. The final document of the peace agreement known as the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi bore many aspects with concesus and many without concesus. Among issues without concesus there were two important issues that needed to be settled before the signing of the agreement. These were the question of ceasefire and secession of hostilities and leadership of the transition period. The issues called for serious negotiations as the signing process was nearing. At last it was decided that the signing ceremony on the 28th August 2000 should take place as planned so that the issues could be resolved later.4.26.3. Role of UN in Burundi The UN in Burundi have played part in a transition period of implementing the Peace Agreement signed in Arusha. To a large extent it is therefore part of the conflict resolution process. However, in the context of this thesis we do also characterise this period as a period of peace building. This is so because all the steps and measures of implementing the agreement constitute a new long march towards building peace in the country. It is during this period that principles of democracy and good governance are established, a new constitution is made, armies are integrated and new national army and security forces are created, and social and economic reconstruction processes are carried out.The implementation process during the transition period is carried out through various institutions. The most important institution is the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC). Composition of the IMC comprises of representatives of all the negotiating parties, six Burundians designated for their moral integrity, and three non-Burundians each representing the UN, the OAU (now the AU) and the Regional Peace Initiative. The IMC is chaired by a representative of the UN. The role and responsibility of IMC is to follow up, supervise, and coordinate implementation of the Agreement. It has to ensure that the timetable of implementation is followed and that the agreement is interpreted correctly. Other transitional institutions include the Judiciary, the Defence and Security Forces, the National Assembly, the Senate and the Executive.The establishment of the transitional Executive became complicated because of the delay to resolve the issue of transitional leadership. Finally it was decided that the three years transitional period should be divided into two phases of 18 months each. During the first phase the transitional President should be a Tutsi and during the second phase it should be a Hutu. The transition period in Burundi has experienced achievements and problems. Among the achievements include the establishment of the transition period itself which will end in October 2004. So far many aspects of implementation have been carried out such as creation of the Executive the National Assembly, the Senate the IMC and the Judiciary and Repatriation and resettlement of refugees and IDPs are going on. 4.26.4 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in BurundiManaging the political posture of a multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operation is a highly complex balancing act. It involves careful attention to the recognized partners in a peace process (as recognized in prevailing peace agreements) while preserving an open channel to those not signed on to the process. It requires the provision of technical advice to governments of transition while remaining alert to the risks inherent in betting too much of the UN’s political and other capital on such ephemeral administrations. And in a world of proliferating mediators (multilateral, bilateral, national and, increasingly, non-governmental) it requires striking an effective modus vivendi with others, which builds on their successes and reinforces them rather than appearing to supplant them. All the while, of course, this calculus must be made in function of the directly operational demands of peacekeeping across multiple sectors.4.27 Rwandese ConflictThe Rwandan Genocide was the 1994 mass murder of an estimated 800,000 people in the small East African nation of Rwanda. Over the course of approximately 100 days (from the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira on April 6) through mid-July, over 500,000 people were killed, according to a Human Rights Watch estimate. Estimates of the death toll have ranged from 500,000–1,000,000, or as much as 20% of the country's total population. It was the culmination of longstanding ethnic competition and tensions between the minority Tutsi, who had controlled power for centuries, and the majority Hutu peoples, who had come to power in the rebellion of 1959–62. In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a rebel group composed mostly of Tutsi refugees, invaded northern Rwanda from Uganda in an attempt to defeat the Hutu-led government. They began the Rwandan Civil War, fought between the Hutu regime, with support from Francophone Africa and France, and the RPF, with support from Uganda. This exacerbated ethnic tensions in the country. In response, many Hutu gravitated toward the Hutu Power ideology, with the prompting of state-controlled and independent Rwandan media.As an ideology, Hutu Power asserted that the Tutsi intended to enslave the Hutu and must be resisted at all costs. Continuing ethnic strife resulted in the rebels' displacing large numbers of Hutu in the north, plus periodic localized Hutu killings of Tutsi in the south. International pressure on the Hutu-led government of Juvénal Habyarimana resulted in a cease-fire in 1993. He began to implement the Arusha Accords.The assassination of Habyarimana in April 1994 set off a violent reaction, during which Hutu groups conducted mass killings of Tutsis (and also pro-peace Hutus, who were portrayed as "traitors" and "collaborators"). This genocide had been planned by members of the Hutu power group known as the Akazu, many of whom occupied positions at top levels of the national government; the genocide was supported and coordinated by the national government as well as by local military and civil officials and mass media. Alongside the military, primary responsibility for the killings themselves rests with two Hutu militias that had been organized for this purpose by political parties: the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, although once the genocide was underway a great number of Hutu civilians took part in the murders. It was the end of the peace agreement. The Tutsi RPF restarted their offensive, defeating the army and seizing control of the country.It is vital that the Rwandan conflict should not be regarded as ever lasting, in spite of the massive destruction it has caused and the huge difficulties linked to its effective resolution. The existence of a conflict reflects the presence of antagonisms, which, by and large, originate from a difference of interests between two or among several parties. For the conflict to outbreak, the parties should not only have or pursue incompatible interests, but they should also more importantly become aware of that situation. Consequently, the building process of sustainable peace in Rwanda should consider as vital the knowledge of the conflict, its nature and its causes - direct or indirect - and the challenges and opportunities for the Rwandan society. This study is obviously in line with that imperative.4.27.1 Role of AU in Rwanda Conflict Much as AU is concerned in this old remarkable scene in Africa, the Rwandan conflict has been defined in different ways. Those differences in definition have generally been the result of how people have understood the Rwandan society and its components. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa communities have been given different definitions according to writers and periods. They have been qualified as being races, tribes, social states or social classes. Both Rwandans and foreigners have produced extensive literature about that issue since the colonial era till now. Deep analysis shows clearly that those identities do not, in reality, correspond to any of those categories, to which they have been confined for a long time. Hence OAU now AU have been approaching the conflict so remotely with a view of internal affair.The reverse phenomenon, "Hutufication", a kind of social deterioration, was also true for the Tutsis who could find themselves deprived of their herds. Those facts show clearly that, at that period, "Tutsiness" and "Hutuness" did not have in the concerned persons' mind; "a genetic dimension" contrarily to clan belongingness for instance. Then, at what level, is the cause of conflicts situated and how has it functioned? From the general point of view and at cultural level, those “euro-centric" views have resulted in emptying the Rwandan society of some of its intrinsic values and altering some others. That situation has had an impact on the "cultural reservoirs" of social cohesion and of conflict resolution in such a way that, in the face of the development of the factors of division and conflicts, the Rwandan people have not been capable of "becoming immune” against contamination and of producing "antibiotics" to fight the disease imposed on them by those factors. Conflicts in Africa of the Great Lakes, in particular the conflict of Rwanda, are a good illustration of that phenomenon. At first, there is a perfect entity, the sedentary Bantu "Hutuness" (it matters little if " Twaness" was anterior to it), then arises a disturbing element, the Nilo-Hamitic invading "Tutsiness", and in the third phase, in order to restore the primitive state, which is to be perfect by definition; it is up to the Hutuness in jeopardy to mobilize the whole group in order to destroy the threat of that "deadly" otherness, in such a case, the "Tutsiness" and finally to get free from it. All the conflict situations in Rwanda from the 1959 revolution to the 1994 genocide, places emphasis on that three-phase dynamics. It is not rational but that does not prevent it from being functional in society. Identity crises are the result of long-lasting phenomena. Three elements should be combined for the sense of identity to take form: the socio-economic crisis, the state crisis and the internal or proximity heterogeneity. Countries forming the African continent are very different by their history, culture and geography, by their internal policies and international relations. The sources of the conflicts which are devastating them reflect that diversity and complexity. Some are the result of internal factors, others depend on the dynamics of a region, and others comprise even significant international dimensions. In spite of their diversity, the sources of conflict in Rwanda and in Africa of the Great Lakes in general, can be classified into three categories: colonial heritage, chronic bad governance and inadequate and conflict-generating political systems. The Hutus and Tutsis learned that they belonged respectively to the Bantu and Nilotic-Hamitic family, that they were definitely strangers to one another. At the same time, they learned that the first is an inferior race and the second a superior race, which was enough to arouse resentment of frustration on the one hand and conceit on the other hand. Through continual consciousness-raising of the victimization of the first by the second and the eternal domination of the second over the first, the foundations of ancestral enmity were finally laid up. In line with those ideologies, two complementary processes of identity-based restructuration, one "de-structuring " and the other "structuring", have been put into place: on the one hand, the progressive destruction of identity references common to the Hutus and Tutsis and on the other, the crystallization of the exclusive otherness which has become genetically hereditary in the eyes of the colonizer.As the Rwandan society was organized into racial hierarchies, the Tutsis, the superior group by definition, became the "natural candidates" for assisting colonizers. Considered as inferior, the Hutus were condemned to be "naturally dominated". The indirect colonial rule system, like a company director who recruits employees for his/her company branch, had no other option but to select the intermediaries among the elements who were "genetically the best". A typical example of segregation based on racial thinking was the exclusion of all the Hutu chiefs from the traditional political structures in Rwanda and Burundi in the 30's by the colonial administration (Morthehan Law) and with the agreement of missionaries and they were the replaced by the Tutsis. 4.27.2 Role of UN RwandaApart from AU efforts and inability to handle the conflict, UN through ICTR established in Arusha ,Tanzania made to arrive a post conflict resolution. But also in Rwanda, the other factor of instrumentalization was segregation in schools in the very rare secondary schools built in colonies. However, the problem of Rwanda and Africa in general is not only attributable to the colonial era or to the colonizers alone. The destructuring factors have been set up even after independence. All these factors are been reconsidered to dispense justice by the ICTR under the UN.According to the pre-colonial African conception, states and kingdoms were separated by social environments. Frontiers therefore meant the places where those social environments met. Colonization has put Africa of the Great Lakes at the crossroads of three zones of interests and influences: the zones of German, Belgian and British influence. That situation has created territorial appetites and mutual incomprehension among powers. To overcome that situation, they had to conclude agreements or bilateral and international arrangements. But those agreements signed at several kilometres far away from the field did not take the realities in the colonies into account. Even if in its internal conflict situation the colonial frontiers do not play a part as a causal factor, Rwanda was the most affected by those colonial tractions and its borders were the subject of several conventions and arrangements.Rwanda definitely lost the province of Bufumbira in favour of present Uganda. In the East, the accord called ORTS-MILSNER of 30th May 1909, as modified by the Treaty of London and approved by the League of Nations (LN) on 6th September 1936 now UN, had set up the present bordering line between Rwanda and Tanzania. With the Belgo-German convention of 14th May 1910, Rwanda recovered its present West provinces (to east of Lake Kivu) but it definitively lost the Western part of Lake Kivu. All those tractations related to the modifications of borders did not displace inhabitants. As a result, Rwandan populations at that time were massively distributed in other "states-territories" newly created by colonization. And today, Rwanda is the only country in the sub-region, whose citizens of times gone by are confronted with nationality-related problems in countries inherited from that period. Those Rwandan populations turned into Congolese or Ugandan has become today the core of insurrection anytime their nationality is put into question. In Uganda, the crises of 70's and 80's went back to their roots from " Rwandophobia" and populations, who were, wrongly or rightly, related to Rwandan identity, became potential targets of violence in that country for various reasons. The situation is also likely to become explosive in Tanzania if nothing is done. As some political personalities were, rightly or wrongly, associated with Rwandan identity, they lost their legitimate citizenship and, in the Western part of the country, Tanzanian populations speaking Kinyarwanda were subjected to threats and rejection. As a result, the ethnic problem, engendered and exacerbated by the colonial power then cashed in on national leading classes, has tremendously confronted social relations, to such an extent that, the creation of real nations in some African countries remains a problem whose solution is still fragile or non-existent. Injustice and unequal distribution of national resource, poor management and unequal distribution of national resources are the epidemics that have been devastating Africa since independence, particularly in DRC. UN oversaw the action in bracket. The democratization of African countries has been a permanent demand from both African people and foreigners. And the continent has been attempting to start up the democratic process without success. Most of African countries have constantly adopted a model of democracy imported from the west and incompatible with their socio-cultural and political particularities. And partisan cleavages have permanently focused on identity. In such circumstances, ethnocracy has become the synonym of democracy and the former was preached as being the latter. 4.27.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Rwanda Factors of identity based conflicts, harsh living conditions, deep violations of human needs, scapegoat ideology, the syndrome "Us versus Them" and leniency from inactive onlookers. Girard R. has also worked on those phenomena, with the mimetic theory and the scapegoat theory. All those factors are responsible for explosions of violence in Africa, notably within the electoral perspective which is related to the question to know who is going to control who, who has the right to what, and who has access to which advantages or who is going to face the risk of being marginalized. Extreme poverty and scarcity of resources, population increase and unemployment have constantly made living conditions particularly difficult for the population and catalysed crises and identity-based conflicts in Rwanda. Above all there is also the syndrome "us-them". It is for us-natives" against "them-non natives" that "People of Katanga origin" slaughtered the "Balubakats early in 90's. During the same decade, around "us, the autochthones" against" them the foreigners", different ethnic groups in both Kivu indulged in killing Rwandophone populations. In Uganda, the syndrome us - them" inflamed the conflicts, by resorting to regional, religious, political and ethnic identity-based differences, as mentioned earlier. In 1994, 800,000 Rwandan people were hacked and burned to death in 100 days. When the Head of Human Rights Watch in the US called the State Department to ask why the US government wasn’t doing more, she was told: “You have to make more noise. But the inactive bystander whose leniency has more negative effects is the international community, in such a case U.N and the Security Council (especially its 5 permanent members: USA, France, United Kingdom, China and Russia). Its failure to act, its omissions and its lack of firmness with regard to violence in DRC since 1991, to massacres in Burundi since 1993, but especially during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda supported the crimininal attitudes in those countries. Poor management of Rwandan refugee camps in Kivu and Ngara (Tanzania) by the international community and its leniency towards genocidal forces who were controlling the camps, between 1994 and 1996, intensified and regionalized the conflicts. In addition to those 5 factors mentioned by Staub, the conflicts in that region have been intensified by the structural hegemony, the rhetorical element, the dehumanization and the demonization of the opponent. There are hegemony structures before and after the conflicts in that region for two major reasons: unequal distribution of the public wealth (and especially the power) and existential fear. What is terrifying, in case of Africa and in particular in Africa of the Great Lakes, is the way those identities express their demands. It is their over-determination over any other dimension. It is nature and their affinity with explosive violence. It is their capacity to take hostage any dynamics of inclusive assimilation and formation of "state-nations". It is the prejudices and ideological clichés, which boom their general rapid development and the extreme rejection of the other until he is left with just one option: exile or extermination. The efficient resolution of the Rwanda conflict faces a number of challenges that can be categorized into the weight of genocide and recidivism of deadly identities, intensifying factors of conflicts that are not settled yet, regional environment is characterized by the increasing "Rwandophobia", the internationalization of the conflict and the external judgment, also there are active alliances between negative operating in neighbouring countries and some actors and foreign governments. The international systems, particularly UN and EU systems, have not taken any concrete measures against Rwandan genocidal forces. Some external actors are maintaining conflict-generating perceptions on the Rwandan society. There is external resistance to change dynamics and peace building mechanisms thought out by the Rwandan society and the failure of the international solidarity during the post-genocide period: lack of will to cancel the external debt even the one which is "illegitimate and criminal" is the greatest indication of the sad reality. Building sustainable peace in Rwanda requires the establishment of strategies responding to two types of factors: on the one hand those that have impeded peace to exist or have constantly weakened it. The strategies should be based on conflict resolution and emergence of citizenship, responsible and democratic governance and sustainable socio-economic development.After the 1994 genocide, which stood out in whole Africa, Rwanda showed ingenuity in conflict management and resolution thanks to the policy of National Reconciliation as well as participatory and innovative justice known as Gacaca. Rwanda gave honour and pride to Africa when it was declared World Number One of good governance for the year 2002, out of nearly half of the number of UN member countries. The same year, the international leadership prize was awarded to Rwanda President and, through him, to the Rwandan leadership. Finally, there is the contribution of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) to national security and stability as well as to the process of the national transformation for sustainable peace. RDF is meant to be a really Reconciliation Commission national army. Various reintegration actions of former ex-FAR soldiers are eloquent examples. RDF is also meant to be a professional, strong and friendly towards the population, which has good reasons to constantly rely on it. Moreover, Rwanda has also established a number of numerous mechanisms and tools for conflict resolution and peace building. It is worth mentioning, within the framework of this study, three of them in particular: Vision 2020, the New Constitution and the National Unity and The Vision 2020.4.28 Conflict in NigeriaBasically conflict in Nigeria is fractured along ethnic, religious and class lines, encompassing more than 158 million people and 450 ethno linguistic groups. The majority of those in northern Nigeria adhere to some form of Sunni Islam, while Christianity, in the guise of various Protestant denominations and Roman Catholicism, dominate in southern Nigeria. There are also significant adherents to traditional religious beliefs. Cultural concepts of political legitimacy, the rule of law and rights to land, differ markedly, resulting in a pluralistic state with few shared values. The British colonial policy of “indirect rule” through tribal chiefs and Muslim Emirs fostered ethnic fragmentation, in which “strangers” had only restricted land rights. Christian missionaries brought Western education to the south, but were excluded by the British from Muslim areas. Christians were thereby advantaged over their northern counterparts in the post-colonial competition for employment within the bureaucracy and Western economic sector.With time terror was increasingly used as a form of political action and posed a serious threat to international peace and security. Saying the war against terrorism must be won, President Jonathan noted the recent upsurge in terrorist attacks in Nigeria over the last few months. Noting that the United Nations building in Abuja was the target of an attack that left several people dead, Nigerian President conveyed condolences to the victims’ families, as well as to the entire United Nations family, for that barbaric and heinous attack. He stressed that such acts only strengthened Nigeria’s resolve to develop appropriate national strategies and to collaborate more closely with the international community in fighting that menace. In June, the Nigerian Government enacted a terrorism prevention bill and an anti-money laundering amendment act. It was also working with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate and other relevant international bodies and friendly countries to sharpen its response mechanisms. It would launch its first project with the Task Force in November, aimed at promoting conflict prevention and countering the appeal of terrorism to youth. Boasting that Nigeria’s April general elections had been judged credible and transparent, he said the Government was on course to implement its strategic plan to ready the country for the future. In that context, there was a new sense of activity and self-belief in the ability to create a new Nigeria, founded on the principles of personal freedoms, democracy, good governance and rule of law.Underlining the importance of using preventive diplomacy in resolving armed conflicts around the world, he said the international community had focused too little attention on mediation and preventive diplomacy in favour of the military aspects of peace and security. Cultivating peace and fulfilling the aims of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter required early identification and appropriate intervention. The goal should always be to present the peaceful alternative as a less costly and effective way of achieving political and social objectives.Among other issues, he voiced support for the Secretary-General’s proposal to deploy an assessment mission to study the situation in the Gulf of Guinea, where increasing piracy and other maritime crimes were damaging security, trade and other economic activities, in order to explore possible options for United Nations support and action. Nigeria also supported the newly created UN Women and strongly emphasized women’s political participation in its national action plan on gender equality and women’s empowerment. It had recently ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and acceded to four other international human rights instruments, while domestically enacting national human rights legislation. The international community must provide robust assistance to C?te d’Ivoire as it embarked on post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. Nigeria looked forward to membership in a revamped Security Council.Northern Muslims' resentment at perceived discrimination and disadvantage has led to repeated clashes in the fifty years following independence, especially in northern cities such as Kano and Kaduna, with their large Christian populations. There have also been sectarian Muslim vs Muslim conflicts, often sparked by local charismatic religious leaders. The religious and ethnic became the main vehicles for political mobilisation in the post-colonial era, threatening to tear the nation apart. In 1966, a coup sparked riots across the north, the massacre of thousands of non-Muslim Igbo and, ultimately, secession of Igbo-dominated Biafra and the Nigerian civil war.4.28.1 AU in Nigeria Conflict"A reminder that leaders must listen to their people that all of us must do more," Ban Ki-Moon said though trade and investment were crucial for development, Africa's future also depended on investments in civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. He identified one form of discrimination which he said had been ignored or even sanctioned by many states for too long as discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. AU shall highlight on the point.Ping on his part regretted that over the past months, the continent has witnessed a resurgence of terrorism, particularly in Nigeria."I take this opportunity to reiterate the strong condemnation by the AU of the criminal attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, and to reiterate our support for the efforts of the government of Nigeria," he said. He said although considerable progress had been made in the areas of creating an atmosphere of peace in the continent, there was still a long way to go in order to fully live up to the commitments made. He said the violence and contestations which often mark elections in Africa remind the people of the continent this fact, sometimes in a tragic manner.The Nigerian presidency reacted promptly Monday to reports that President Goodluck Jonathan was defeated by President of Benin Republic Boni Yayi to become chairman of the African Union (AU), taking over from Equatorial Guinea's President Teodoro Obiang Nguema. Before then, some agency reports had it that President Jonathan entered the contest as a last minute attempt to become the chairman but that his effort was stoutly opposed by Ghana leading several West African nations.The Presidency, through Reuben Abati, Jonathan's Special Adviser on Media and Publicity, not only debunked the reports that the president was "defeated" by Yayi Boni but also that he did not even contest in the first place as he was not a candidate. The presidential spokesman however conceded that previous week, there were feelings that President Jonathan may be adopted by ECOWAS Heads of State and governments since it was the turn of ECOWAS to produce the next AU chairman, adding that Jonathan was indeed approached by leaders within and outside the West African sub-region to take up the post which he rejected in favour of focusing on domestic issues, being already ECOWAS chairman.While appreciating this explanation, analysts are of the view that the seeming mix-up would have been averted had the presidency's information machinery taken a prompt proactive measure by clarifying before hand, that the president was indeed approached on this but resolved to focus on domestic affairs. The silence, analysts believe, casts a lot of shadow on Abati's response, especially when news went round before the AU summit that the Foreign Affairs Ministry advised the president against such ambition.Besides, observers of international affairs feel that the entire scenario is a manifestation of the president's style. It probably has to do with the personality of the president. If you mention Obasanjo, he is a very forceful character. President Jonathan is more laid back. But if you are talking in terms of personality, Obasanjo is a more forceful character", Dr. Aderemi Oyewumi, an international affairs analyst said. Forcefulness has its uses. At times like this, what sort of style does Nigeria need, the forceful style or the drawn back one? With the bashing Nigeria's image has received in recent times, diplomatic experts feel that Nigeria cannot afford a draw back posture at the moment.There is no free launch anywhere so we can't continue acting like Father Christmas any more. For instance, we shouldn't be sending our planes to other African leaders to attend meetings, let them find their own ways. We've been so nice to them, so they feel they can take us for a ride. Generally, our foreign policy has been more or less consistent since independence. We have our vital interests which never really change. It's just the personalities that change. What Nigeria should keep doing is to continue to champion the cause of Africa. In the past couple of years we've seen one or two things that didn't go down well with some, take the issue of Libya for instance, where South Africa took the lead in challenging the Western stance towards Libya", said a diplomatic source who asked not to be named. Experts also say the emergence of AU chairmen should take a more pragmatic perspective by determining certain criteria for selection instead of automatic emergence through rotation. They argue that with the wave of democratization in Africa in the past two decades, the AU should get tougher on Africa's sit-tight index."Its seems as if it's just automatic, whether you are a dictator or not, you can become chairman of the AU, it’s not proper. It's something the AU should look at. Take the former chairman, Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea for instance, he's been in power for more than 30 years, and he's arranged for a change in the constitution which guarantees that he hangs in there for God knows how long."I become chairman, they should serve as role models. Look at Abdoulahi Wade in Senegal, he is insisting on third term, Gambia's Yaya Jammeh just as well, is another one", noted Dr Oyewumi.These characters never want to leave office. They are just using democracy as a cover. What you have there is what I call elective dictatorship. They keep getting elected by manipulating the electoral system. Remember ECOWAS did something unprecedented by refusing to send election observers to Gambia. It wasn't given wide publicity but it was significant because they said they couldn't guarantee a free and fair election. Elections are generally not rigged on the day, they are rigged long before the people cast their ballots. So I think the AU should look at this issue of chairmanship, it should not be automatic. You have NEPAD, you haveAPRM, why is it that all these things cannot be applied to chairmanship of the AU, he added.On the criteria for selection, he said, "If you want to lead the AU for instance, you are supposed to be the kind of leader Africans should be proud of, you are supposed to serve as a role model, not just some character who's been in power for ever and has refused to leave office. So in spite of the march of democracy on the continent, we are still saddled with all sorts of characters who are never going to leave power unless forcibly removed. For instance you may insist, one provision that would have to be insisted upon is that all these countries must have term limits which they stick to. But you've a situation whereby even where they have term limits, some leaders change the constitution to allow them go on and on and they say they are democrats.In fact the longer a leader stays in power the easier it is for him to manipulate the electoral process. So you must insist on term limits, that no matter how good you are, after two or three terms depending on what the consensus says but not more than three terms, you leave office. No room for changing the constitution because as long as that is allowed, there will be no end to it. Here in Nigeria, thank God, one brazen attempt at going for a third term was defeated. So it will never happen again, or I hope it doesn't happen again.4.28.2 Role of UN in Nigeria ConflictNigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan 21 September 2011 proposed to the UNGA the creation of a conflict mediation commission within the office of the United Nations Secretary-General to develop strategies for the resolution of disputes across the world. Such a commission would be tasked with collating information on conflicts, identifying the parties to them and developing rules of engagement, including the sanctions that would apply to those who obstruct efforts to resolve disputes peacefully, Mr. Jonathan told the Assembly’s annual general debate in New York. “For the world to move from a culture of response after conflict to that of a culture of prevention, the international community must muster the political will to promote preventive diplomacy, in particular through mediation,” said Mr. Jonathan. He said conflicts were also linked to the proliferation of small arms and pledged that Nigeria remains committed to the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty that addresses the problem of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Mr. Jonathan also voiced concern over the increasing incidence of piracy and maritime crime in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea and expressed his support for the Secretary-General’s proposal to send a UN assessment mission to the region to study the situation and explore possible options for UN support and action.He pointed that Nigeria had in the recent past faced an upsurge in incidents of terrorism, including the suicide bomb attack on UN House in the capital, Abuja, on 26 August that claimed the lives of 23 people, including 11 UN staff, and said his country will continue to work with the world body and other partners to combat the scourge. He announced that the UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) will launch its first project in Abuja in November intended to prevent conflict and counter the appeal of terrorism to youth through education and dialogue.4.28.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in Nigerian The oil boom has brought mixed fortunes to Nigeria. The military sought to diffuse ethnic tensions by creating 12 states, each with a share in the newly discovered oil bonanza, but this only fuelled minority demands for the creation of even more states. Today there are 36 states and 774 local government areas based on ethnicity and religion. Revenues from oil production were divided among the states, ostensibly to enable the resource-poor to maintain social services. But successive military strongmen, politicians, corrupt bureaucrats and businessmen swindled much of the money. The people of the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta, who bore the brunt of ecological degradation by the oil industry and human-rights abuses of the military, eventually took up arms.When the military eventually handed over power to a newly-elected civilian government in 1999 there was a general feeling of hope and renewal, often couched in terms of a romanticised history of the tribal-ethnic society. Kano is divided along religious lines. EPA/Stringer Twelve northern states introduced various forms of Sharia law between 1999 and 2002, with Muslim politicians extolling a “return” to traditional values. The non-Muslim minority feared loss of human rights and civil liberties. But in non-Muslim areas, ethnicity and religion played no less a role in defining “community”, exclusion of “outsiders”, and notions of rights and morality. One of the first acts of the new civilian government was to grant the oil-producing areas first call on 13% of locally-derived oil revenue, in addition to their share of revenue. While a long-overdue compensation for decades of neglect, this further enraged the poor and unemployed in other parts of Nigeria, especially in the Islamic North.The 2011 elections were marked by violence, with more than a thousand killed. But despite widespread electoral fraud, these elections were more creditable than the preceding three. Some 72 of the 109 incumbent senators lost their seats, while only 100 of the 360 members of the House held their seats. President Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian, held on but violence escalated. President Goodluck Jonathan is struggling to keep violence under control. EPA/George Esiri .Jonathan is being urged by colleagues and the media alike to take control of the rapidly-deteriorating situation in Nigeria. The president, meanwhile, has vowed to focus on the economy.But sadly, unless Nigeria’s political leaders are prepared to address problems of inequality, corruption, and a more socially equitable redistribution of oil revenue (worth US$59 billion in 2010), Nigeria faces a grim future. Nigeria called for support for the international community in the implementation of the AU framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development. Foreign Affairs Minister Olugbenga Ashiru, who made the call at a two day ECOWAS regional seminar on "Responsibility to Protect R2P" in Abuja, said the framework would prevent re-occurrence of conflicts in the continent. Under the framework, the AU Peer Review Mechanism is an essential component of conflict prevention and best practices in good governance as well as the R2P concept.Under the R2P Concept, nations are expected to observe three-pillar strategy, which includes the responsibility of a state to protect its population from atrocities.The framework also enables the international community to assist states in fulfilling their obligations and the decisions of the UN Security Council to protect populations under threat. Ashiru, who spoke against the backdrop of the R2P implementation, explained that the Nigerian domestic situation was different and would not require such intervention. Similarly, the UN Representative on Genocide Prevention, Dr. Francis Deng, commended ECOWAS role in conflict resolution in the sub-region, saying the bloc had constantly applied the second and third R2P pillars in addressing issues. Deng was represented by Mrs Grace Ongile, the UN Representative in Nigeria. Nigeria, West Africa Abuja, United Nations (UN) and the African Union Commission (AU) have resolved to support President Goodluck Jonathan in his bid to put an end to the violence being unleashed on the country, especially in the North, by members of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram. First to declare his support was UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon; followed by the AUC chairperson, Dr. Jean Ping, who gave Jonathan the bodies' backing during their separate remarks at the opening of the 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ki-Moon reiterated that the UN was working closely with AU to address what he called transnational challenges in West Africa including terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.He said: "With respect to Nigeria, I am deeply troubled by the indiscriminate and unacceptable violent attacks. No cause justifies terror. "We stand in solidarity with the authorities and the people of Nigeria for democratic and accountable governance." The UN scribe urges African leaders to adopt a preventive approach to human rights, saying the Arab Spring took many by surprise with traditional indicators showing that the countries were stable or doing well". He said below the surface of the indicators, there were deprivation, exclusion and abuse among others. Events have proved that repression is a dead-end. Police power is no match for people power seeking dignity and justice. The women and men protesting in streets and public squares across the region are both an inspiration and a reminder.4.29 Conflict in UgandaThe last 50 years since Independence Uganda has witnessed the reign of a succession of tyrannical rulers and conflicts affected and caused by events in neighbouring countries in The Great Lakes region. In addition, conflict surrounding resources and influence from international actors has exacerbated the divides between different national, religious and ethnic groups. Idi Amin was one of Uganda’s most notorious rulers, expelling the Indian population and being held accountable for up to 800,000 deaths. Currently, the Lord’s Resistance Army and other militia groups continue to cause terror in unstable areas in Uganda, which has led to the displacement of 1.6 million people. The LRA have been accused of the abduction of around 30,000 children, many of whom are forced into becoming child soldiers. A working peace agreement still remains elusive in Uganda, and its peace process has an important role to play in the realisation of peace and security in the region.The LRA began its insurgency in northern Uganda in 1986, claiming that it was fighting for a political system based on the Bible’s Ten Commandments. In practice, its brutal methods have been directed largely against the region’s civilian population. Its fighters have pillaged and burned entire villages, carried out massacres, mutilated people and, most notoriously, abducted children. In 1994, the Ugandan authorities, acting through mediators, sought negotiations with the LRA, but with little effect. In 2000, the parliament approved an offer of full amnesty to all rebels, provided that they gave up armed activities and handed in their weapons. Some 15,000 former fighters, many from the LRA, have taken advantage of the amnesty, which encouraged many children originally kidnapped by the LRA to escape and return home. 4.29.1 AU in Uganda ConflictAfrica is an arena of intensifying great power rivalry. And, critically, Africa remains the major epicenter for mass atrocities as well as a potential source of transcontinental health pandemics. Consequently, stabilizing the continent should be a core AU policy goal.The African Union (AU) has great potential as a US partner in Africa. Unfortunately, the AU's practical capabilities in the field of conflict management suffer from a persistent capabilitiesexpectations gap, falling well short of the ambitious vision and rhetoric contained in its founding documents. The AU's shortcomings are not fatal, however; the US government can bolster AU conflict management capacity in the near and long terms.With the return of peace and security to Northern Uganda, the Government has developed the Peace Recovery and Development Program (PRDP). This programme has three major objectives: to strengthen coordination of recovery interventions in the North and North-Eastern regions; to enhance monitoring of recovery programs and to undertake resource mobilization. Government has budgeted for a total of US $ 606 million for a three-year period for this programme. Of this budget, Government shall contribute 30% while 70% is to be contributed by development partners. Uganda appreciates the humanitarian assistance Japan Government has contributed to Northern Uganda over the years.As Uganda Government begins to implement the PRDP, we look forward to further support from Japan Government in the areas of economic recovery and development. Uganda and Japan share mutual concerns on the situation in Somalia. As a result of the anarchy and piracy, coupled with recurring droughts and floods, there are an estimated 3 million people in Somalia in desperate need of humanitarian aid. Uganda supports the strengthening of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and is closely following the political situation on the ground. We are also actively participating in the debate in the UN Security Council regarding the possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. Uganda appreciates Japan’s intervention to conduct maritime security operations off the coast of Somalia. It is however important to note that piracy in Somalia, is only a manifestation of more fundamental underlying problems caused by the anarchy and complete collapse of state institutions in Somalia. We therefore call upon the international community to support the region in addressing these problems. Uganda will continue cooperating closely with Japan on international matters, particularly now that our two countries are non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for the period 2009-2010.4.29.2 Role of UN in Ugandan ConflictA Retired UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the conflict in Uganda will also be taken into the hands of the ICC. Issue of the Arrest Warrants to the culprits “should send a powerful signal around the world that those responsible for such crimes will be held accountable for their actions.” Speaking before the UN General Assembly on 8 November, Judge Philippe Kirsch, president of the ICC, said that the court offers an opportunity “to ensure that the perpetrators of the worst atrocities no longer benefit from impunity, to deter future perpetrators and to build a culture of accountability.” Noting that the court does not have a police force of its own, he urged all countries to cooperate in ensuring the arrest of the indicted LRA commanders so that the first trials could begin in 2006. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that 25,000 children have been kidnapped by the LRA since the conflict began, nearly half of them since 2002. Abducted boys and girls have been forced to fight and serve as porters, while many girls have also been pressed into sexual slavery. The war has displaced an estimated 1.6 million people in northern Uganda, obliging them to seek refuge in 135 overcrowded and unsanitary camps. At the outset, the government of Uganda sought to end the insurgency primarily through military means. But the LRA was able to operate from bases in war-torn southern Sudan, beyond the Ugandan army’s immediate reach. In recent months, some LRA forces have also moved into eastern DRC. In order to build confidence and understanding between NRM/UPDF and LRA/M, KM, the OAU, the UN, IGGAD, other organisations and individuals and groups of individuals concerned with conflict resolution in northern Uganda, should help the to two parties come to a talking understanding each other, so that they can co-ordinate their actions to rationally pursue goals, and attain the gratification of not their needs alone but their needs encupsuled in the people’s needs. While the above mentioned entities are doing this, the two warring parties should enter into a cease fire and operate with restraint and avoid using abusive and demeaning language at each other or other people. The proposals for the removal of some of the obstacles to peace are categorised as follows: Individual action, community action and institutional action.4.29.3 Analysis of Conflict Resolution in UgandaFollowing the alternatives resolution to the action of the rebels, when the top LRA leadership rejecting all offers to end the conflict through Amnesty International, the Ugandan government asked the ICC prosecutor in December 2003 to open an investigation. The evidence he uncovered has now led to the charging of Joseph Kony, the top LRA leader, with 33 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, sexual enslavement, pillaging, ordering attacks against civilians and forcibly conscripting children. Four of his commanders were also charged: Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya and Dominic Ongwen (the last has since been killed in battle). The indictments were originally drafted in June. But Ugandan mediators were openly skeptical of the ICC’s moves to prosecute, warning that indictments could hamper their peace initiatives. So the indictments were kept sealed for several months to give more time to the ongoing amnesty and reconciliation efforts. After the indictments were unsealed, Ms. Betty Bigombe, a key mediator, argued that there was “now no hope” of convincing the LRA leaders to surrender. Justice Peter Onega, chairman of the Amnesty Commission, worried that the ranks of the LRA might also fear prosecution. He said that his commission would now shift gears, to “sensitize” the LRA fighters “that the warrant is only for a few people and the rest are free to come back home.” ICC officials have pledged to work with local community leaders and the Ugandan government to ensure that the judicial process does not undercut the amnesty programme. Overall, said Uganda’s UN Ambassador Francis Butagira in November, “It is of utmost importance to the people of northern Uganda, as well as the healing of the whole nation, that the leadership of the LRA be tried by the ICC.” Recent developments in Uganda, the region and the world are auguring well for a possible peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda. These signs include: the rejection of continued war by the majority of Acoli and the awaking of Acoli consciousness; the rise of many new peace organisations and initiatives, such as the Human Rights Focus, based in Gulu, Kacoke Madit (KM), Bedo Piny (BP), etc.; the escalation of the war in Western Uganda; the sudden outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; the exchange of prisoners of war between the Sudan and Uganda, the international publicity of the heinous events taking place in Northern Uganda; and the dismal performance of UPDF.KM is spearheading the search for peace and development in Acoli. They and all other local and international organisations and associations struggling to restore peace and sanity into our mother land deserve all our unqualified support and commendation for the good work so far done. These organisations and institutions are effective means of intervention into the autopoetic nature of the conflict.For a long time the challenge of restoring peace in Acoli was left to the government, but this has not been successful. The single-shot ?table at the top", the high table for leaders approach to peace making should be avoided. Individuals and various groups should be allowed to generate a flow of peace ideas. Proposals may be contradictory, but peace also varies from place to place. All attempts should be made to tap these diversities and marginalising nobody. This is because making peace itself is a model of structural peace.In conflict management and resolution, the very first expressed intention of a peaceful resolution of the conflict is a positive step in the right direction, and peace makers shouldn’t lose sight of this. This should be commended. LRA should pursue this challenge further and throw another challenge to the Government, and in so doing, they open up the first step of familiarising with each other and thereafter they create a culture of bargaining, which is essentially the first basic step to peaceful resolution of conflicts.In conclusion, it is important to note that there are now positive signs for possible peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda, and consequently, no opportunity should be lost in taking advantage of the present circumstance to press for an immediate negotiated peace in the north and the rest of Uganda. Institutions like KM and the Church to take the lead using a multi-prong approach to bring the warring parties to the table and save the lives of those innocent brothers and sisters caught in this conflict.The evolution of peace is a slow process of social learning. Since for a long time the people in Acoli have been living under conditions which bred in them hate and the love to fight, there is need to establish special programmes to teach the people and particularly the children peaceful human relations. Undoing cultural violence is even more difficult, this is because structural violence is hidden in the sub-conscious. When dealing with peace, attempts should be made to disintegrate the sub-conscious in the following ways: national interests, Acoli interests, individual interests; the individual sub-conscious and the collective sub-conscious.If the NRM and LRA top dogs still insist on war, they should know that there are other forms of equally challenging national issue fights, which can produce the same results as war but which avoid the horrors of war. For example fighting natural forces. I propose that they should draft all the young men of Uganda to go out and fight against the natural forces that man must overcome in order to increase his standard of living and his general happiness.The task of creative, positive conflict transformation is not only to avoid violence, to abstain from the irreversible, but to increase the entropy by coming out of the phase of the conflict with more mature selves and more mature social transformations around. When acting to attain peace, it is always important to remember that conflict transformation can also be negative, leaving enormous irreversibility in all spheres including the soul. In the case of the soul: it can generate hatred, craving for revenge, restitution, building one’s future life around intense wishes to exchange one irreversibility for the other. In this situation therefore, a spirit of forgiveness (not forgetting) on top of complex and creative conflict transformation could be helpful. There are some living examples of such practices from Gandhi, Nelson Mandela .Acoli at the NRM high table should convince their colleagues that Northern Uganda needs a coherent, consistent and pro-people policy, to enable immediate peaceful resolution of the conflict. The cost of war is too high to continue this way. Government should now for once open its hears and listen to the wish of the people in need, other than always trying to justify its failures. Irresponsible statements are very easy to utter, but in the final analyse, they are very costly.4.30 ConclusionThe role, or potential role of the African Union, should not be belittled. In its present revitalized form, the AU has begun to project a stronger image, and its stamp of approval for the activities of regional organizations is likely to be needed more and more. Neither should it be believed that SADC or IGAD or ECOWAS member states make the best mediators or the ideal sources of peace- keeping troops in their respective regions. The use of troops from neighbouring countries could, in some cases, be unwise. Utilizing a Malian official to handle a crisis in East Africa and, using troops mainly from Southern Africa could be more appropriate for instance. Such a responsibility would best be taken by the African Union. At this point, note should be made of initiatives involving the whole continent, such as NEPAD, and another covering the northern half of Africa namely CENSAD. NEPAD is described as the development program for Africa; or the framework for progress through which African countries, and the African Union, are measured. Its principles of good governance, including the peer review mechanism, can play an important role in the prevention of internal conflict in African states. Among the measures put in place to stabilize the African continent, the study should also mention the Ouagadougou 2000 Decision of African Heads of State to suspend any government of a Member State of the African Union that carries out removal of a democratically elected government by unconstitutional means. It is in implementation of this that Mauritania, Guinea Conakry and Madagascar have been suspended from the AU until the constitutional order has been restored.In Comoros, after several months of sanctions and mediation made no progress, African troops supported the Comorian armed forces to remove self-styled ‘President’ Mohammed Bacar from power in Anjouan in March 2008. The African Union did so at the request of Abdallah Sambi, the President of the Union of Comoros. Other examples include Liberia where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) played a pivotal role in stabilizing the country that had been ravaged by a fratricidal war. Even in Zimbabwe, a negotiated solution was recently signed with the lead role of African Statesmen including former South African President Thabo Mbeki. In light of the above panoramic view of conflicts in Africa, it is clear that Africans are doing more for and by themselves. In all these cases, solutions have been found because of the leadership roles that African countries are playing in addressing some of the most intractable conflicts and the support that has been given by the international community. No doubt, African engagement has served as a catalyst for international support and the return of UN peacekeepers to Africa (MONUC in Congo, UNMIS in Southern Sudan, UNAMID in Darfur) after the tragedies of Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s. Today, Africa is the continent with the largest UN commitment on peacekeeping with eight of the seventeen active UN peace missions in the world. Although non-African countries fund these missions, all have a significant contribution of African troops and police, as burden sharing has come to characterize the search for peace and security.This study calls Africans, down to the grassroots from where we have come, we should carry out self examination and reflection on our role in the conflict. Each and every one of us should ask what have I done or not done, to aid and abet the conflict. Do I have any feelings for others to live in this world a comfortable life? Or if I am not living a comfortable life, should others also suffer because of my personal interests? Is war the only way of fulfilling my egoistic interests or are there other non-violent ways.CHAPTER FIVE5.0 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS5.1 Overall ViewIt is the main contention of this thesis that the broad parameters embark on African conflict resolution as to the legal aspect much as clear legal dimension reflects dermacation of AUSC against UNSC and other international organizations. Obviously it is to picture out that AU is unable to influence a durable successful management and resolution of conflicts in Africa, although few events were revealed positive in my study above in any meaningful way.5.2 FindingsThis study researched about 19 African states among the 53 with regard to overview of the compass within the continent.This included North zone, West Africa, Central zone with Horn of Africa and South Africa zone. Although the choise was done randomly but with intention to review the AU effectiveness in catering Africans demand to peace and security developments Briefly AU relies on member states contributions, cooperation, financially and materially responsibilities ie., annual fee contribution and moral support by themselves and at the high percentage. The continent currently lacks devoted Pan-Africanist like Kwame Nkuruma, Patrice Lumumba, the late Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere, and now the only hero who remained as per this study for prosperities of the AU born in Sirte Declaration was killed in LIBYA, 2011, Colonel Muamar Gadafi. These patriots dreamed for the future United States of Africa, these could stand firm to protect, preach and fight for future free and Independent African continent. Hence the AU looses integrity and power of organising itself from the structural and functional point of view in all aspects, therefore it remains as a rubber stamp of UN and other super power institutions or nations. This is because when member states in conflicts elects to invite foreign powers to mitigate their conflict or to back up their rival claims like the conflict in Somali and Cote d’Voire, Kenya, or the ongoing conflict of Libyans, these foreigners injects their interests in process. Once the system of the regional control collapse also the Africans fails to reorganize their own life hence neo-colonialism .In other words, in various ways African states are tired to the apron string of the states of America and Europe. There is hardly any state that can be said to enjoy a truly power to decide on independent existence. As the result of this dependence, the decisions and actions of African States, concerning both domestic and external affairs including conflict resolutions, are determined and shared by extra-African powers ie.,UN, IMF, WB, USA, EU, etc of which the study found that, Africans depend on foreigners both to survival and their development. Hence AU must change direction of these waves. AU must build the real common Africanness of the states in the region in order to promote cooperation and interdependence among member states, to coordinate their policies and actions in all aspects agreed particularly in continental developments and manage to resolve conflict among them while maintaining their full independence and sovereign identities. Introduction of the international duties that Africa is noted for in the post-Cold War World, participation in peacekeeping is included. Africa is one of the major troop contributors in the numerous efforts to restore peace and order to various conflict areas, particularly those on the African continent. The bulk of African conflicts were either inherited, in the context of the post-colonial crisis that be devilled the continent, or came during the process of adjustment, consequent to the recession of Cold War politics.The conflict-inducing potential of the simultaneous pursuit of economic reforms, in the form of structural adjustment programmes and democratisation has also been noted. In addition, elections have proven to be a contentious issue, as the continent’s entrenched leadership confront the reality of the periodic renewal of their mandate with the electorate.The proliferation of peacekeeping missions is indicative of the international mandate of the United Nations, in its attempt to provide the enabling environment necessary for the reconstruction of societies. However, while there is a willingness to provide troops by Africa and other Third World states in what appears to be the emerging international division of labour in peacekeeping, the provision of finance and conflict trends emerges. Thus logistics to accomplish the task is the role assumed by the developed world, and this is suffering from the donor fatigue apparent in post-cold war relations. Indeed, while there is a conscious attempt by each continental organisation to learn to manage its own affairs without interference from another power external to the continent, Africa is lagging behind in this regard, in spite of the reformed African Union especially under legal dimensions and mandate to act. This study has closely examined inter-alia the Libyans and the Darfur conflicts resolution process as a demonstration of the incapacity or failure of the continent to manage its own affairs. Darfur is the confluence of all that is wrong in Africa. Conflicts persist because the political will, troops and logistics necessary for their resolution are lacking. Africa within the Contemporary World Conflict Profile, What position does Africa occupy on the world’s conflict map? How is the continent ranked in terms of its capacity to contain conflicts? This study values Africa as first and last in ranking continental conflicts, consecutively. Unfortunately, the continent is known to lead on all indexes used to describe crises. But Sudan will have peace only when its impunity system is dismantled.Although it is the most resource-endowed, Africa is also the most poverty-stricken continent.Conflicts in Ivory Cost, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Chad, the DRC and Uganda often makes headlines. Reports on conflicts in Somalia and Sudan have remained in the media for years, and their resolution is presenting the AU capability and, to a lesser extent, the international community with a profound problem.In the case of Somalia, most African states are unwilling to send troops to support the peacekeeping efforts underway, because of the country’s volatility. In Sudan, the transformation of the AU force to the AU/UN hybrid force (UNAMID), and the expectation to have 26 000 troops on the ground, did not materialise. Currently, troops on the ground number less than 10 000, and are over extended.The reality of the crises in most African countries following the end of the Cold War can be appreciated in the context of failed and failing states, and the interconnectedness of conflicts. The most endemic conflict areas on the continent are part of the states classified in the first category such as Libya, Zimbabwe, Somalia, the DRC, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. This study found that, end of the Cold War marked the end of stability for most of these countries. Somalia disintegrated in 1991 when General Siad Barre fled into exile, leaving a country in ruin. The inability of the government to continue holding the fragile state together was also related to the abrupt end of all aid, after a history of receiving significant aid. The country’s strategic position on the continent made it an attractive point for Cold War rivals. Clan and kinship ties became the basis of identity in Somalia, and hundreds of identity groups re-emerged. These clans formed factions and continuously proliferated, making it impossible to comprehend the nature of alliances. Consequently, the character of politics became fluid and unpredictable.The 1993 attempt by the US to provide relief ended in a fiasco, and this set the precedent for all future international interventions. Somalia is no longer on the international community’s immediate agenda, and there is a noted lack of interest in the country. Many conflicts in African countries have one thing in common: they are connected and not exclusive.Neighbouring states are not disinterested observers, as noted in Rwanda’s support for Laurent Nkunda in eastern Congo, Ethiopia and Kenya’s interest in Somalia,Chad’s backing of the forces in Darfur; the attempt by the Khartoum government in Sudan to overthrow the regime in N’djamena, Chad; Uganda and Sudan’s involvement over insurgents within their countries, and the interplay of forces in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. These examples of the spill over and connectedness of conflicts in Africa indicates the difficulties associated with resolving them.There are also those conflicts associated with democratisation and economic reforms. Almost all the countries in Africa that transitioned from either a single party or military dictatorship to a multiparty political system are largely under pressure from donor communities, these have experienced conflict associated with elections. The latest occurrences as the study revealed have been in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The purported stability associated with Kenya was shattered following the polls conducted in December 2007. A government of national unity was put in place to pacify the parties involved, while ordinary Kenyans are still picking up the pieces of their shattered lives. The same scenario occurred in C?ted’Ivoire as Laurent Bagbo refused to hand over the mandate to the winner Outtara in the recent Presidential election, with similarly devastating results. Attempts of resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe is underway, with the international community divided, following a failed bid to censor Zimbabwe’s leadership at the UN Security Council. Election-related conflict is a residual effect of the entrenched leadership problem associated with governance in Africa. Elections especially the quest for votes and the appeal to primordial divisive sentiments by politicians, have the potential to ignite conflict in Africa, as demonstrated in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. It is a phenomenon that continues to threaten the fragile stability of most African states.The many conflicts in African countries have one thing in common, they are connected and not exclusive conflict trends. 5.30 ConclusionThis study concludes by viewing legal dimension challenges in Darfur. Since the creation of the UN in 1945, peacekeeping has become a dominant feature of conflict resolution.UN peacekeeping history shows a total of 59 missions from the first mission in 1948 to 2004. Currently, in Africa alone, there are missions in Darfur, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad and the DRC. There have also been attempts to regionalise peacekeeping efforts, as exemplified by the Economic Community of West Africa Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) initiative.The emergence of regional peacekeeping was predicated on the US application of the doctrine of burden-sharing and collaboration. Initially, this took place through the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) an initiative that followed the US experience in Somalia, and the lack of international action during the genocide in Rwanda and events in Burundi. The ACRF sought to build an African force that would intervene in African conflicts, thus reducing the demand for outside, interventions by the members of the UN Security Council. This approach has also been adopted by a number of other donor countries, notably France and Britain in recent years. Associated with this is the colonial alignment of effort to resolve conflicts in their former colonies as France did in Ivory Cost to arrest Laurent Bagbo after the refusal to hand over mandate to the winner.Thus, Britain can be found in Sierra Leone, France in Chad, there is US support for ECOMOG in Liberia, and the Belgians are visible in the DRC. Over time, the obvious intent of the ACRF gave way to a more nuanced approach, now termed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), within which the US trains selected African military elements for participation in peacekeeping operations. In spite of these efforts, peacekeeping in Africa has been challenged, due to the continent’s lack of economic and political resources to drive the process to its logical conclusion. The case of Darfur, and the politics that have dogged the peacekeeping operation since inception, is indicative of the crisis within. Darfur is entirely reliant on the goodwill of the international community for survival. Since the reconstitution of the peacekeeping force into an AU/UN hybrid force in January 2008, supposedly for maximum efficiency, it has been unable to raise the required manpower necessary for deployment in troubled region.There was an implied understanding by those involved that Africa and most Third World states would meet the manpower requirements, while the West would provide the necessary logistical support. On both counts, neither manpower nor logistics have been fully provided for the force.Basically the troops which were already in place including the old AU force and two new battalions, did lack essential equipment, such as sufficient armoured personnel carriers, Helicopters, to carry out even the most rudimentary of peacekeeping tasks. So poorly provisioned were they that, some personnel even had to buy their own paint to turn their green AU helmets into the UN blue. A combination of bureaucratic delays, stonewalling by Sudan’s government and reluctance from troop and material contributing countries to redeem their pledges and send peacekeeping forces into the area rendered the force vulnerable to attacks. The recent indictment and call to issue a warrant for the arrest of General Omar el-Bashir has added another drawback to the resolution of the Darfur crisis.The development has polarised the international community in particular, the League of Arab States and the AU. These seeming differences in position play into the intransigence of the regime in Khartoum over the resolution of the Darfur crisis. This study signifies these conflicting interests of the AU member states being the same UN member states.The Darfur initiative is representative of the continent in the post-Cold War and post-11 September 2001 world. In the first place, the AU is merely responding to initiatives emanating from outside its borders and, as such, has little or no say in the way they are managed. Peacekeeping initiatives to date have been at the mandate of the UN or former colonial powers, as the AU’s limitations are manifested in restricted human and material resources and, above all, in the debilitating lack of political will. The manner in which the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the AU did not overcome the weaknesses inherent in the old organisation, and has not provided the kind of leadership envisaged. Somalia, Chad and Sudan are constant reminders of the organisation’s challenges in managing its own affairs.The continent has not been able to fulfil its role as troop provider for peacekeeping endeavours in Africa. There is a seeming willingness to provide troops outside the continent, while pledges made for those on the continent remained unfulfilled. Unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, the commitment of the developed world does not include sending personnel. Even regional peacekeeping efforts, such as ECOMOG, have had to rely on international support to fulfil their responsibilities. ECOMOG was not only ad hoc, but also Election related violence, as experienced in Kenya in early 2008, is a residual effect of the leadership and governance challenges in Africa.With regard to Nigeria for funds and troops, this study found that, it caused much suspicion among neighbouring countries about Nigeria’s motives and intentions within the subregion. Relatively, the Darfur conflict points the reality of international politics, where each continent looks after its own. It is similar to the reality of deployment of investment, where geography and location remain the key determinants of foreign direct investment. Thus, business enterprises in North America are more likely to rate Mexico and Latin America as markets of critical importance in their investment planning, Europeans expect the United Kingdom, France and the emerging economies of eastern Europe to feature more prominently in their calculations and Asian firms expect China, India and the rest of Asia to be of greater importance for their investment. A similar rationale applies when it comes to conflict resolution. Africa is conspicuously absent in this calculation, and this explains the problem confronting all peacekeeping efforts on the continent. Somalia is an extremely dangerous proposition for the West and, above all, unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no strategic importance to warrant direct intervention.The responsibility, therefore, remains a continental one. Without intentional changes, Africa will continue to rely on the occasional goodwill of the developed world and a UN system. Neither South Africa nor Nigeria, the most economically powerful states, they are supposed to resource, endowed states on the continent be ready to assume a more significant role. Both states have their own internal problems, South Africa is smarting from the recent xenophobic attacks on Africans, which revealed the gap in unfulfilled promises to its citizens since the first democratic election in 1994. Nigeria is not only confronted with the common problem of a lack of economic opportunities, but also poor governance, corruption and collapsed infrastructures. South Africa’s role in Zimbabwe conflict, did not please the West, whose agenda for regime change differs from what the continental and regional organisations Peacekeepers from the Economic Community of West Africa Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) initiative, which represents attempts to regionalise peacekeeping efforts in Africa. These differences in perspectives, opinions and strategies for intervening will continue to be in African’s disadvantage as long as it continues to rely overwhelmingly on outside intervention for the management of its own affairs. In conclusion, this study seeks to stimulate and focus public awareness of the existence and respect of the human rights violation by the UN actors in particular conflicts in Africa, that inequality before the laws must be defended and respect for human rights must be as universal as the rights themselves. Africa must have a legal stand to exercise her needs to her member states whenever conflict arises in the region. Many challenges remain, of course. It would be wrong to assume that Africa is able to engage substantively on its own with conflicts such as those in Darfur, Somalia, the Great Lakes Region or between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Many of the challenges, relating to African-led peace processes, have been implied in this presentation. For now, we examine challenges relating to African peace support operations where agreements have been signed. Whereas the African Union and the regional organizations have been compelled to deploy peace support operations, they continue to experience difficulties in financing them. In Somalia, the African Union deployed the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mission, which is supported by international partners, requires more support to effectively carry out its mandate. In Darfur, the UN/AU joint mission, UNAMID, requires more air support and ground transport equipment, including helicopters. The issue here is finding a dependable and assured mechanism to finance African peace support operations. Negotiations are continuing with the UN Security Council for this financing to come from UN Assessed contributions, since Africa would be acting on behalf of the UN Security Council, the body responsible for international peace and security according to the UN Charter. In the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, we established the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is intended for rapid deployment for a multiplicity of peace support operations that may include preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace-building, post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, re-integration and humanitarian assistance. The forces shall be within the national armies but on standby for AU calling as and when need arises. The challenge is that the ASF is still in its infancy of establishment. Whereas the partners are supporting the initial stages of establishment, there is no assurance that the required future massive funding shall be met.To hammer the last nail on the coffin much as conclusion is conerned, the innocent people of Africa deserve a settled life to fully exploit their potential. In fact, it is a human right that they live in dignity. This aspiration is one of the considerations enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU, to promote peace, security and stability on the continent. Africa is endowed with a wealth of resources, both human and natural. Without peace, these resources cannot be fully and optimally harnessed to ensure the much needed development on the continent. Conclusively, AU must have total legal power to rule and manage Africa independently without foreign interference in the continent. Basically Conflict Resolution System in Africa is very undetermined much as the AU is concerned. It is queit well expressed in the AU Constitutive Act as per the arrangement of the mechanism itself, the legal system, the Commission for Peace and the Security Counsel as to how the conflict can be tackled in a proper way to the resolution, but still there are basics to be highlighted to achive the AU goals over this institution. We have seen above there is democracy, good governance ideas, established regional African Court, capacity building focus by development partiners, G8 or EU and UN efforts for the same goals but still achievements are seen to be minor. On July 1, 2008, the AU adopted a protocol to the African Charter merging the African Human Rights Court with the Court of Justice of the African Union into one Court, “The African Court of Justice and Human Rights.” The change will become effective when fifteen states deposit their instruments of ratification.For years now African leaders and people of Africa in general are not aware that are to play a major role in the prevention, management and resolution of continental conflicts. These factors stem from knowledge but are not limited to ideological and structural inadequacies within continental intergovernmental organisations, financial constraints, lack of will and political commitment on the part of states as well as external dependence ,especially in terms of financial and logistical resources. Therefore for a shift, as far as Africa is concerned, from a conflict reaction approach towards a conflict prevention and resolution system, Africans must change there mind set for that purpose.On the basis of the study observation and engagements over the years, there is no doubt that there is a desire and commitment, on the part of Africa and the international community, to resolve conflicts on the continent. This desire and commitment are well expressed in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and in the current collaborative efforts with the international community. Ultimately, Africa is primarily responsible for shaping its destiny, though with the support of the international community. Examination of regional efforts towards long lasting peace in Africa reveals that they have been partially successful where they have occurred. Where the conflicts have persisted, the problem has been lack of implementation of agreed positions because of various reasons, including external interference, and our own internal constraints. It is therefore, that Africa continues to be inspired by past experiences where solutions to African conflicts have been possible, because of active involvement of all the African parties’ concerned and African ownership and drive of the peace processes. This study will high light the deficiencies in the Conflict Resolution System and recommend for the way foward to a successful conflict resolutions in Africa much as the legal aspect and lacunas are concerned. 5.4 Recommendation This paper recommends the following with intentions to pool resources, ideas and information to international alert, views of scholars, experience of activists with the reality of those affected by violence and oppressions in their own communities in Africa;AU must find and focus the possible initiatives which will lead to successful peace to danger areas and potential conflicts, and recommend resolution of conflicts in Africa under the formal and legal dimension, to seek and propose constitutional provision which protects and respect ethnic,religious,linguistic or other minorities . AU should further project programmes to educate state leaders who are the sources of conflict, these include mismanagement of resources and economic corruption, misappropriation and embezzlement of the state funds which are compounded by lack of accountability and transparency in the management of state resources, also actions on political injustice, manipulation of elections, ethnic politics, disruption of the rule of law, ie the courts, police, the military, etc and without forgetting over centralization of state powers and state resources to the total neglect of the vast majority of the population (mass poverty).According to the principle of pacta sunta servanda the two organizations UN and AU make the member states to adhere to it and not otherwise. Therefore the law must put a dermacation much as this principle is concerned as a leeway of regional capacity to manage her peace and conflict resolutions. This means that whenever conflict arises in Africa, the law should uphold AU to proceed with conflict management and resolution without consulting the UNSC as it is now being implemented. A number of events of conflict areas in Africa have shown either delay or less interest to the UN actors with VETO to intervene or assist particular conflicts, good example conflict in Rwanda and Congo,Ivory Coast or Libya, the responce or interest differed as per their gaining interests.The study recommends that, delays due to convenience and interests of the members of the UNSC, to that particular conflict may cause bigger economic, cultural and or political damage to the results of violence in the event and later no even positive response. Therefore, the AU mandate to proceed with conflict management and resolution without consulting UN is of utmost need legally dimension to accomodate the negativities. This study recommends from the point of view that AU, UN, or ICC like other International Organization are subjected to International Laws and hence must abide to Conventions and Treaties acted upon. AU as the sole African International organization must be operative to cater the needs of the Africans peace and security. Emphasis must be put more to the Laws governing this AU vis-à-vis UN and its operations especially on the question of conflict resolutions in Africa. AU at this juncture must have stipulated Laws or Regulations to free decisions of the African Conflict Resolutions, power to decide all matters related to its member state and not as it is now! Africa must now stand independent under the law, there must be legal limits over matters with African interests as against the big fishes like USA, FRANCE, NATO,EU,etc Practically all these could work if and only if the AU member states commitment be done to its organization which would be well analysed legally under the multilateral agreement. Under the same principle all the nations signed the Treaty in question must obey the agreement no matter how big it is, provided it signed as a member state to that Protocol and its Convention. International Law Commission must link the framework to the need of the Africans and figure out exactly what to be adopted by the AU member’s states with regard to objectives regarding Conflict Resolutions and their standard or status in the UN organization structure. Africans now needs their own continental forces, Civil and Criminal courts able to conduct culprit trials for atrocity crimes in the continent.,impose sanction to all wrong doers in Africa to conflicts resolutions. This study recommends AU to have African International Criminal Court which can also issue Arrest Warrant to invaders in the African continent like NATO in Libya who acted against UN Resolution and no futher action is taken against them to date.Africa must stop depending on the segregative ICC at The Hague, failure to that more confusions will be propagated to Africans live in suspense until when UN or US interests be turned upside down. African Conflicts in the continent imposes great hardship to the Africans whom the joy of living is impaired by the suspicion, fear and shame that are generated by the armed conflicts or civil wars in or between states been sponsored by US and his allies. Eg Rebels in Libya conflict were offered 25 million US Dollars by US after being passed by Congress, 2011. (All World Media did air the News).AU/UN must intentionally promote human rights and review development of groups and individuals within national borders and internationally. This must be done by emphasizing and strengthening the links between development and traditional human rights or domestic laws, to extend the work of civil societies, NGOs in the process of peace and social change.Finally, Article 52 of the UN Charter, 1945 be reconstructed precisely on the emphasis of Article 33 (Pacific Settlement) of the free and constant mandate of the regional arrangements on conflict resolutions without favourism of regions in particular interests of the parties concerned vis-as-vis UN. Enhancing management capacity through the process of systematic conflict analysis to facilitate the development of sound peace building objectives, strategies and monitoring processes through PCIA. 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Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to Conflict Resolution. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Reports A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan , Africa Report N°130, 26 July 2007Comoran president gets a hero’s welcome in Anjouan", African Press Agency, April 5, 2008.[dead link] Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, Africa Report N°151, 9 July 2009Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri, Africa Report N°140, 13 May 2008Congo: No Stability in Kivu despite Rapprochement with Rwanda, Africa Report N°165, 16 November 2010? Congo: Staying Engaged after the Elections, Africa Briefing N°44, 9 January 2007Edgerton, Robert B, Africa's armies: from honor to infamy: a history from 1791 to the present (2002) Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda." Human Rights Watch. Report (Updated April 1, 2003) London: Pluto anisation of African Unity (OAU) Resolving Conflict in Africa: Proposals for Action (Addis Ababa; OAU Press and Information series 1, 1992) p.3Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution, A course produced by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations,2000, P.11Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan , Africa Report N°172, 4 Apr 2011Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 13, arts. 13, 14. Africa Report N°174, 4 May 2011Samset, I., "UN Peacekeeping in the Congo: When is the Job Done?", Noref Police Brief No. 9 (June 2010)Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the Prospect of Southern Independence , Africa Report N?159, 6 May 2010Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis, Africa Briefing N°50, 13 March 2008 Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur? , Africa Report N°145, 21 October 2008 Newspapers HYPERLINK "" Two Sudans: Managing the World’s Newest Border Demands Careful Planning", Zach Vertin, Reuters AlertNet, 8 July 2011 HYPERLINK "" Abyei Is Burning: Immediate SAF Withdrawal Critical", Zach Vertin, On the African Peacebuilding Agenda, 13 June 2011Lucas, B., & Rachel, O., (2008). "End of turmoil in sight as AU boss jets in", Daily Nation. Nairobi, KenyaNyerere, J. K., (1997). In the Daily News Tanzania of June 9,1997. HYPERLINK "" Sudan: Preparing for a peaceful southern secession",?comment by Francois Grignon in Reuters The Great Debate, 17 December 2009 Kagoro, J., (2008), Beyond the Juba Peace Talks”, Peace Newsletter, Vol. 6, p.5Sudan: Divisions in the Ruling Party, EJ Hogendoorn (Horn of Africa Project Director), 4 May 2011.The Referendum in Sudan, Fouad Hikmat (African Union and Sudan Special Advisor), 13 January 2011.Shivji, Issa G., (2009). Pan Africanism a way towards infrastructer of peace in Africa. The Guardian (Tanzania) April 27. UN chief helped Rwanda killers arm themselves," The Guardian, 3rd September 2000."UN Must Stop Backing Congo's Disastrous Operation against Marauding Rebel Militias", Donald Steinberg, The East African. 30 Nov 2009 Journals"After MONUC, Should MONUSCO Continue to Support Congolese Military Campaigns?", Thierry Vircoulon, On the African Peacebuilding Agenda. 19 July 2010"Congo Crimes Should Be on the Agenda of the UN Security Council", Fabienne Hara, The Huffington Post. 14 October 2010Charles Hartung, 'Peacekeeping in Liberia: ECOMOG and the Struggle for Order,' Liberian Studies Journal, Volume XXX, No.2, 2005 DR Congo: "Conflict and interests", Neil Campbell in Public Service Review. 12 December 2008 "DR Congo: Why is there still a Kivu problem?", Thierry Vircoulon, The Africa Report. 23 November 2010"Maintain the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic Of Congo",?Mark L. Schneider (Crisis Group) with?Raymond C. Offenheiser, The Christian Science Monitor. 23 April 2007"The Congo Re-erupts", Francois Grignon and Fabienne Hara, The Wall Street Journal Europe. 4 November 2008"Time to pull out UN troops in Congo? Not so fast", Fabienne Hara, The Christian Science Monitor. 14 May 2010 WebsitesAlan C, (2008). "Zimbabwe rivals sign agreement", International Herald Tribune.Available at , Retrieved on 28th November, 2010.Armon, Jeremy; Andy Carl (1996). "Liberia: Chronology". Conciliation Resources. . Retrieved 2007-02-26.? ,Wars involving Liberia - Peace process during Civil War Int’l Crim. Ct., Pre-Trial Chamber I Issues Three Warrants of Arrest for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdualla Al-Senussi (June 27, 2011), available at F5DAF8370218.htm.Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 2, available at [hereinafter Protocol to the African Charter]. Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights rule 3, available at [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000 (adopted July 11, 2011), available at (March 12, 2008). "Comoros troops capture fighters on rebel island". .za. Archived from the original on 13 March 2008. . Retrieved 12 March 2008.? AFP (March 15, 2008). "Comoran forces and Anjouan followers clash". France 24. . Retrieved 16 March 2008.? Fabricius, Peter; Carter, Chiara (March 16, 2008). "Mbeki intervenes to halt AU invasion". Independent Online (Independent News & Media). Archived from the original on 27th March 2008 ? set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=vn20080316090807474C517053. Retrieved March 25, 2008.? Amir, Ahmed Ali (March 19, 2008). "Comoros says French helicopter crashes on Anjouan". Reuters Africa (Reuters Group PLC). Archived from the original on 13 April 2008. . Retrieved March 25, 2008.? AFP (March 25, 2008). "African forces invade rebel Comoros island". ReliefWeb. . Retrieved October 1, 2008.? Goujon, Emmanuel (March 25, 2008). "Bacar's troops in Anjouan not to give up until last man standing". ReliefWeb. . SAR-7D3M92?OpenDocument. Retrieved 27 March 2008.? France 24. March 26, 2008. Archived from the original on 15 April 2008. . Retrieved 25 March 2008.? AFP (March 27, 2008). "Bacar has asked for asylum in France". France 24. . Retrieved October 1, 2008.? Amir, Ahmed Ali (March 27, 2008). "Comoros rebel leader flees to French-run island". Mail & Guardian. . Retrieved March 2, 2011.? The International Herald Tribune. March 27, 2008. ISSN?0294-8052. . Retrieved July 31, 2008.? France flies rebel out of Comoros". BBC News. March 28, 2008. Archived from the original on 2 April 2008. . Retrieved 28 March 2008.? Comoran rebel remanded in custody". BBC News. April 5, 2008. Archived from the original on January 17, 2010. . Retrieved April 5, 2008.? Comoran rebel asylum plea refused. BBC News. May 15, 2008. . Retrieved October 1, 2008.? Comoros-Anjouan-intervention". African Press Agency. March 17, 2008. . Retrieved March 25, 2008.? APPENDIXQUESTIONNAIRE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND STAFF IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, MINISTRY OF EAST AFRICAN, ETC.This is an academic research about “Legal Dimensions of the Role of the AU/UN in Conflict Resolution in Africa”. The researcher intends to investigate the AU effectiveness and legal capacity in African Conflict Resolution, to analyse current legal challenges facing AU with regard to member states obligations with other organizations in African and International Community. To see conflict of interest and the range of implementation of the AU objectives vis-as-vis UN mandate (Article 33 & 52 of the UN Charter, 1945), also to evaluate contribution of AU member states to reach their goals as per the AU Constitutive Act of 2002 in the regional arrangements over international peace and security. It is in the hope of the researcher that you will avail your cooperation to facilitate the intended academic goals. Being the case therefore, the right to confidentiality is reserved. Do you know the AU? What are the objectives of the AU?How does AU assist conflict (any conflict you know) Resolution in Africa? Does UN work for the African conflict Resolution?Is the AU effective for the Africa Affairs or conflicts Resolutons as a Regional Organization?To what extent do you think AU is capable to perform?How does UN/AU operate in Conflict Resolution in Africa in a case where conflict of interests collide in a conflict like Sudan. Do you think AU can work over UN on conflict Resolution in African Region?Does the law give mandate the AU to perform positively?Is it right for UN to decide for conflicts in Africa than AU?In the conflict of Libya, was it fair under the Law for NATO to invade a sovereign like Libya to resolve their conflict? How have NATO performed with regard to UN resolution 1973?- - - ................
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