Center for Defense Information: Lessons from History, U



Center for Defense Information: Lessons from History, U.S. Afghan Policy 1978-2001

U.S Covert Operations in the Afghanistan War

With the 1979 invasion of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the war between anti-communist rebel forces and the Soviet-backed Afghan government was well underway. The number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan reached 100,000 by early 1980. Anti-communist guerrilla forces, jointly called the mujahidin (Islamic warriors), actively fought both the Soviet troops and the pro-Soviet Afghan government led by President Babrak Karmal.

From the Soviet invasion onward, the United States sought ways to back the anti-Soviet forces. By 1983, the CIA was purchasing assault rifles, grenade launchers, mines, and SA-7 light antiaircraft weapons, totaling 10,000 tons, mainly from China. The Reagan administration had them shipped to Pakistan, a country that at the time was working closely with Washington.

Then, in a move that marked a turning point in the relentless war, in 1985, President Ronald Reagan made a secret decision to escalate covert support to the mujahidin. Soon after, the CIA began to supply an extensive array of intelligence, military expertise and advanced weapons to the Muslim rebel forces. They included satellite reconnaissance data of Soviet targets in Afghanistan; Soviet plans for military operations based on satellite intelligence and intercepts of Soviet communications; covert communication technology for the rebels; detonating devices for tons of C-4 explosives for urban targets; long-range sniper rifles; a targeting system linked to a U.S. Navy satellite; and wire-guided anti-tank missiles.1   Furthermore, amidst intensifying debate within the CIA over the extent of U.S. involvement in the war, Reagan made the decision to equip the mujahidin with sophisticated U.S.-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles. American-trained Pakistani officers were sent to Afghanistan to set up a secret mujahidin Stinger training facility, which was complete with a U.S.-made electronic simulator. By 1987, the CIA was sending a steady supply of 65,000 tons of arms to the mujahidin.

While it funneled equipment, intelligence and money to the mujahidin, Washington maintained its armchair supervisory role in the war by entrusting Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) to handle direct contact, operations with, and training of the mujahidin. In all, the United States provided over $2 billion in weapons and money to seven Islamic mujahidin factions in the 1980s, making this last Cold War battle the largest covert action program since World War II.2  

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988. With the Soviets out of the picture, however, the victorious mujahidin focused next on fighting the Afghan "puppet government" now headed by Mohammad Najibullah, who had replaced Karmal in 1986. Najibullah fell from power when the mujahidin finally captured Kabul in the spring of 1992. But the guerrilla factions proved unable to unite, and began another arduous power struggle amongst themselves. Afghanistan thus became a fragmented country of several independent zones, each ruled by different warlords. These political divisions exacerbated the schism already present between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and between the many tribal and ethnic groups that reside in the country.

  
Backfiring of U.S. Policy

Then emerged the Taliban. They came together in Pakistan in late 1994 as a militia of Pashtun Islamic fundamentalist students. These students had received training in Pakistan's religious schools attended by refugee men who had formerly fought as the CIA-backed mujahidin. Indeed, a man who played a significant role in the advent and growth of the Taliban movement was Mullah Mohammed Omar, the current chief of the Taliban and former fighter under a CIA-trained commander. Garnering power and support during a peak of political fractiousness, the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, declaring themselves the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

They appealed to many Afghans with their promises of peaceful rule. As a result, some of the people trained under CIA command in the 1980s turned into loyal fighters for the Taliban. Armed and inflamed by religious zeal, the Taliban spread throughout Afghanistan declaring to end the civil war, corruption and lawlessness. As they rose in popularity among other Pashtun Afghans, they also intensified in violence that displayed their Islamic extremism. The training grounds that the CIA maintained and operated during the anti-Soviet war soon became camps and safe havens for militant terrorists, among whom was Osama bin Laden. Indeed, when the U.S. launched cruise missile attacks at a camp near Khost in 1998, it was discovered that the training camps were being occupied by Pakistani military intelligence to train the Harakat-ul-Ansar, an Islamic guerrilla organization identified as a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department.

By the time the world recognized the oppressive nature of the Taliban, both the United States and the United Nations had long ceased taking interest in Afghanistan. U.S. economic and military assistance to Afghanistan decreased dramatically after 1989, and no provisions were made for rebuilding the nation, demobilizing fighters or organizing relief aid. When the mujahidin took over Kabul in 1992, the UN Development Program (UNDP) in Afghanistan relocated to Pakistan, annulling what minimal rehabilitation assistance the agency had planned. The leadership vacuum facilitated the growth of the Taliban, who continued to recruit men from both its own ideological circles and from mujahidin factions throughout the late 1990s.3   Today, they rule more than 90 percent of the country, imposing on the Afghan people their rigid Islamic laws, edicts that are regarded internationally as blatant violations of human rights.

And, ultimately, the destructive persistence of the Taliban, the group's link with bin Laden, and the consequences of its extremist rule became part of American history on Sept. 11.



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