Superior Court, State of California



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TROUBLESHOOTING TENTATIVE RULINGS

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|LINE # |CASE # |CASE TITLE |RULING |

|LINE 1 |18CV322719 |Timoteo Guerrero vs Maricela Aguilar |Order of Examination of Defendant Maricela Aguilar dba MGA |

| | | |Drivers---Parties to Appear |

|LINE 2 |18CV322723 |Timoteo Guerrero vs Antonio Aguilar |Order of Examination of Defendant Antonio Aguilar dba MGA |

| | | |Drivers---Parties to Appear |

|LINE 3 |21CV376509 |CloudRay, Inc. vs Motocho, Inc. et al |Click on Line 3 for Ruling |

|LINE 4 |21CV376509 |CloudRay, Inc. vs Motocho, Inc. et al |Click on Line 3 for Ruling |

|LINE 5 |21CV386632 |Idean Pourshams, MD vs Melissa Bearden et |Click on Line 5 for Ruling |

| | |al | |

|LINE 6 |19CV346702 |Taurean Dyer vs Accenture Technology |Off Calendar |

| | |Solutions-US, Inc., a Delaware Corporation | |

| | |et al | |

|LINE 7 |19CV356961 |Sherry Chen vs Lundy Center Association, |Continued to Feb. 24, 2022 at 9 a.m. |

| | |Inc et al | |

|LINE 8 |20CV363552 |John Doe vs East Side Union High School |Click on Line 8 for Ruling |

| | |District et al | |

|LINE 9 |21CV378052 |ALFRED PISANI et al vs KIA MOTORS AMERICA, |Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiffs’ Depositions and Production of |

| | |INC |Documents is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are required to appear for deposition |

| | | |no later than March 4, 2022. The Court is not ruling on any objections |

| | | |to the categories of documents requested, but expects the parties to meet|

| | | |and confer in good faith about any objections in advance of the |

| | | |deposition. The parties are ordered to meet and confer in good faith to |

| | | |schedule the date of the depositions. Moving party is instructed to |

| | | |prepare the Order. |

|LINE 10 |20CV366526 |Vladimir Westbrook vs Hanxu Angela Chen |Defendant’s Motion for Entry of Judgment and for Determination of Costs |

| | | |of Suit and Attorney’s Fees is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Plaintiff |

| | | |filed his Notice of Appeal of the May 21, 2021 Order issued by the Court |

| | | |on June 11, 2021. That Appeal is still pending and pursuant to CCP |

| | | |916(a), the relief sought in the present motion is a matter embraced or |

| | | |affected by the Appeal. The Court will await the Court of Appeal |

| | | |response to the Plaintiff’s appeal before adjudicating the present |

| | | |motion. |

|LINE 11 | | | |

|LINE 12 | | | |

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Case Name: CloudRay, Inc. v. Motocho, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 21CV376509

This is a business dispute between two corporations. The original and still operative Complaint, a form complaint, was filed by Plaintiff CloudRay, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) on January 19, 2021. It states three causes of action against Defendant Motocho, Inc. (“Motocho”) and various Does: (1) Breach of Contract (to perform software development and related services for Motocho entered into on September 25, 2018, which Motocho allegedly breached by failing to pay the amount due); (2) Common Counts (based on the same alleged failure to pay), and; (3) Fraud (based on the allegation that Motocho never intended to pay on the contract).

Motocho filed an Answer to the Complaint and a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff on March 30, 2021.

On July 19, 2021 Plaintiff filed a purported Doe Amendment pursuant to CCP §474, alleging in pertinent part that “Plaintiff has discovered the true names and capacities of some fictitiously named defendant(s),” and naming Mansoor Safi in place of Doe 1 and Semin Valani as Doe 2. The amendment at ¶¶8-12 states in pertinent part that “On or about 2/12/20, Motocho and Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani promised to pay Plaintiff in full . . . On or about 9/8/20 Motocho and Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani again promised to pay Plaintiff in full . . . The failure of Motocho and Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani to pay Plaintiff based on the initial agreement dated 9/25/18, based on the agreement dated 2/12/20 and based on the agreement dated 9/8/20 shows that Motocho and Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani never intended to pay Plaintiff. Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani are the sole officers, directors and owners of Motocho.”

The Doe Amendment admits on its face that Plaintiff knew the identity of Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani for nearly a year before the Complaint was filed.[1]

Currently before the Court is (1) A motion quash service of the Doe Amendment, filed by specially appearing defendant Mansoor Safi on October 18, 2021, opposed by Plaintiff, and; (2) A motion for leave to amend filed by Plaintiff on October 18, 2021, opposed by Defendant Motocho.

I. Motion to Quash Service of the Doe Amendment

Specially appearing Defendant Mansoor Safi argues that the Doe Amendment does not comply with CCP §474 and, given that Defendant Motocho had filed an answer to the Complaint, argues that any amendment requires a noticed motion. Plaintiff, in opposition to the motion to quash, insists that the Doe amendment was proper and that even if it was not, its motion for leave to amend will cure any defect.[2]

A defendant may file a motion to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction under CCP §418.10(a)(1). “[W]here a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.” (Sheard v. Super. Ct. (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211.) “[T]he burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Evangelize China Fellowship, Inc. v. Evangelize China Fellowship, Hong Kong (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 440, 444.) The plaintiff must provide affidavits and other authenticated documents in order to demonstrate competent evidence of specific evidentiary facts permitting a court to form an independent conclusion on the issue of jurisdiction. (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 113.)

The general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed. A recognized exception to the general rule is the substitution under CCP §474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as to whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint. (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 (Woo).)

CCP §474 states in pertinent part that: “When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of the defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, . . . and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly . . .” (Court’s emphasis.)

“Improper service of a defendant under section 474 may be attacked by a motion to quash.” (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 375, citing Optical Surplus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, 782-783 [trial court is required, as matter of law, to grant motion to quash service of summons when party is wrongly served as Doe defendant].) “Section 474 allows a plaintiff who is ignorant of a defendant’s identity to designate the defendant in a complaint by a fictitious name (typically, as a ‘Doe’), and to amend the pleading to state the defendant’s true name when the plaintiff subsequently discovers it. When a defendant is properly named under section 474, the amendment relates back to the filing date of the original complaint. Section 474 provides a method for adding defendants after the statute of limitations has expired, but this procedure is available only when the plaintiff is genuinely ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant. ‘The question is whether [the plaintiff] knew or reasonably should have known that he had a cause of action against [the defendant].’ ‘Ignorance of the facts giving rise to a cause of action is the ‘ignorance’ required by section 474, and the pivotal question is, ‘did plaintiff know facts?’ not ‘did plaintiff know or believe that [he] had a cause of action based on those facts?’’” (Id. at 371-372, emphasis and brackets in original, internal citations omitted but citing Woo among others.)

As the Woo court noted, “[a] further and non-procedural requirement for application of the section 474 relation-back doctrine is that [Plaintiff] must have been genuinely ignorant of [Defendant’s] identity at the time she filed her original complaint. The omission of the defendant’s identity in the original complaint must be real and not merely a subterfuge for avoiding the requirements of section 474. (75 Cal.App.4th at 177, internal citations omitted, brackets added.)

While the California Courts of Appeal have not taken a uniform approach in interpreting and applying CCP §474, the Court finds the approach taken in decisions such as McClatchy and Woo, supra, to be the most persuasive as it gives meaning to the actual ignorance requirement derived from the plain language of the statute: “When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint . . . and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.” (Emphasis added.) CCP §474 is not meant to be used as a tactical tool to attempt to evade the statute of limitations or to make an amendment relate back to the filing of the original pleading.

The motion to quash service of the July 17, 2021 Doe amendment is GRANTED as follows.

Specially appearing Defendant Safi is correct that the July 17, 2021 Doe Amendment admits on its face at ¶¶8-12 that Plaintiff was aware of the identities of Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani and their alleged role in the breach of contract and fraud by no later than February 12, 2020, several months before the original Complaint in this matter was filed. They both therefore could have been identified as named defendants in the original complaint and cannot now be substituted for Doe defendants as Plaintiff cannot satisfy the actual ignorance requirement. “Nothing in [prior cases] suggests a Doe defendant substitution may be based on a later-drawn legal conclusion arising from the discovery of an additional fact when that fact does not add anything to the theory of liability apparent at the time of the original pleading.” (McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at 374, internal citations omitted.)

The allegations in the Doe Amendment to the Complaint at ¶¶8-12 are judicial admissions binding upon Plaintiff. “A judicial admission is a party’s unequivocal concession of the truth of a matter, and removes the matter as an issue in the case. Judicial admissions may be made in a pleading…. Facts established by pleadings as judicial admissions are conclusive concessions of the truth of those matters, are effectively removed as issues from the litigation, and may not be contradicted, by the party whose pleadings are used against him or her. A pleader cannot blow hot and cold as to the facts positively stated.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 456.) “Not every document filed by a party constitutes a pleading from which a judicial admission may be extracted. Code of Civil Procedure section 420 explains that pleadings serve the function of setting forth the formal allegations by the parties of their respective claims and defenses, for the judgment of the Court. The pleadings allowed in civil actions are complaints, demurrers, answers, and cross-complaints. When these pleadings contain allegations of fact in support of a claim or defense, the opposing party may rely on the factual statements as judicial admissions.” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 746 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added].)

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend

Plaintiff’s Motion for leave to amend is made “on the ground that Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the Complaint to add two ‘DOE’ Defendants (Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani), and the allegations, as set forth in the already-filed ‘Amendment to Complaint to Substitute True Names of ‘Doe’ Defendants (C.C.P. §474)’ that was filed on 7/19/21.” (Notice of Motion at p. 2:15-19.)

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED. As explained above Plaintiff’s own judicial admissions in the July 19, 2021 Doe Amendment establish that Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani cannot be added as Doe Defendants because Plaintiff was aware of their identities and their alleged role in the breach of contract and fraud by no later than February 12, 2020, several months before the original Complaint filed, and Plaintiff therefore cannot satisfy the actual ignorance requirement necessary for such amendments.

Furthermore, as Defendant Motocho’s opposition to this motion points out, Plaintiff has failed to comply with Cal. Rule of Court 3.1324. A party moving to amend a pleading must include a copy of the proposed amended pleading with the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a)(1).) The party must also state in the motion what allegations are proposed to be added to, or deleted from, the previous pleading, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations or deletions are located. (Id., rule 3.1324(a)(2) & (a)(3).) A supporting declaration must also be filed specifying: (1) the effect of the amendment, (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper, (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (Id., rule 3.1324 (b).) No copy of a proposed amended pleading (which would be a first amended complaint) has been provided, instead only copies of the Complaint and the Doe Amendment are attached as exhibits D and E.

The accompanying declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel Stephen Opperwall claims (at ¶15) that “[s]ince the time of filing the Complaint, Plaintiff’s Counsel has learned more about the facts and circumstances, and those facts and circumstances support the filing of the ‘DOE’ Amendment, for the reasons set forth in the ‘DOE’ Amendment.” This is insufficient and the Doe Amendment, rather than supporting an amendment under CCP §474, in fact undercuts it as it establishes that Plaintiff was aware of the identities of Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani and their alleged role in Defendant Motocho’s alleged breach of contract and fraud by no later than February 12, 2020, several months before the original Complaint in this matter was filed.

This ruling denying the motion for leave to amend is without prejudice to Plaintiff seeking leave to amend through a noticed motion on some other basis other than adding Safi and Valani as Doe Defendants (the sole basis for the present motion). That said Plaintiff is reminded that the general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed. The exception to this rule provided by CCP §474 is not available to Plaintiff as regarding Mansoor Safi and Semin Valani given Plaintiff’s admissions in the July 19, 2021 “amendment.”

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Case Name: Idean Pourshams, M.D. v. Melissa Bearden, et al.

Case No.: 21CV386632

This is an action for General Negligence and Defamation brought by Plaintiff Idean Pourshams, MD, a self-represented litigant, against Defendants Melissa Bearden (“Bearden”) and Yoga Source Partners, LLC (“YSP”). The original and still operative Complaint in this action is a form complaint (with a typed attachment) filed on September 13, 2021, stating claims for Negligence and Defamation against both Defendants. The action is based on alleged statements by Defendant Bearden who is allegedly employed by Defendant YSP.

As noted Plaintiff is self-represented, which is sometimes referred to a proceeding in propria persona. “[W]hen a litigant is appearing in propria persona, he is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. Further, the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.” (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267, internal citations omitted).)

Currently before the Court is Defendant YSP’s demurrer to both causes of action alleged in the Complaint, which is opposed by Plaintiff.

Demurrer to the Complaint

The Court in ruling on a demurrer treats it “as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Piccinini v. Cal. Emergency Management Agency (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 685, 688, citing Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. It admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint; the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214.)

The Court in ruling on a demurrer considers only the pleading under attack, any attached exhibits (part of the “face of the pleading”) and any facts or documents for which judicial notice is properly requested and granted. The Court cannot consider any extrinsic evidence in ruling on a demurrer.

Defendant YSP demurrers to both causes of action as alleged against it on the ground that they both fail to state sufficient facts to support a claim. (See YSP’s Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer at pp. 1:26-2:7.)

First Cause of Action (General Negligence)

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917; see also CACI No. 400.) The existence and scope of an alleged duty of care are questions of law to be determined by the Court on a case-by-case basis. (Liaco v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 649, 659.) “The issue of whether a legal duty exists is an issue of law, not an issue of fact for the jury.” (Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.) “A complaint which lacks allegations of fact to show that a legal duty of care was owed is fatally defective” and subject to demurrer. (Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1111.)

The basis for this cause of action as brought against Defendant YSP is the Complaint’s allegation that YSP is “negligent in creating and allowing a culture of bullying and misconduct at its establish despite advertising and writing on its doors that it is a place of acceptance for all.” (Attachment to Complaint at p. 2:2-3.) The attachment further alleges that YSP “was negligent in allowing this behavior by their employee,” (Attachment at p. 2:28) referring to Defendant Bearden’s allegedly defamatory statements. While not part of the Complaint, in the opposition to the demurrer Plaintiff opines that, based on its advertising, YSP somehow “owed a legal duty not to create emotional distress for its customers.” (Opp. at pp. 8:28-9:1.)

Defendant YSP’s demurrer to the first cause of action on the ground that it fails to state sufficient facts is SUSTAINED.

The Complaint fails to describe a duty of care owed by YSP to Plaintiff, or to sufficient allege that any breach of a duty of care owed by YSP proximately caused Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.

YSP did not have any general duty to prevent Defendant Bearden’s alleged actions. “Although ‘as a general principle, a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous’ [citation], it also is well established that, as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 234-235.)

There are limited exceptions to the no-duty-to-protect rule, were a business may owe a duty to business invitees to protect them from physical harm or property damage caused by physical conditions of the property (premises liability) or from physical harm or property damage caused by third party criminal conduct under certain conditions, but neither of these exceptions apply to the facts alleged in the Complaint.

As this is the first pleading challenge in this case and it is not apparent to the Court that leave to amend would be futile, Plaintiff is GRANTED 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND the first cause of action.

Plaintiff is reminded that when a demurrer is sustained with leave to amend, the leave must be construed as permission to the pleader to amend the causes of action to which the demurrer has been sustained, not add entirely new causes of action. (Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1015.) To raise claims entirely unrelated to those originally alleged requires either a new lawsuit or a noticed motion for leave to amend. Absent prior leave of court an amended complaint raising entirely new and different causes of action may be subject to a motion to strike. (See Harris v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023 [“Following an order sustaining a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court's order. The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.”])

Second Cause of Action (Defamation)

“Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) “The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.) There are two types of defamation, libel and slander. (Civ. Code §44.) Libel (Civ. Code §45) is defamation through writing while slander (Civ. Code §46) is defamation orally uttered.

YSP’s demurrer to the second cause of action on the ground that it fails to state sufficient facts is SUSTAINED.

The sole basis for the claim as alleged against YSP is that it “is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee,” Defendant Bearden “because the offence took place on the premises of its business.” (Attachment to Complaint at pp. 1:28-2:1.) There is no allegation that YSP itself defamed Plaintiff. The claim as alleged against YSP fails as a matter of law because it cannot be vicariously liable for Defendant Bearden’s alleged statements or actions.

“The scope of vicarious liability is not boundless. An employer will not be held vicariously liable for an employee's malicious or tortious conduct if the employee substantially deviates from the employment duties for personal purposes. Thus, if the employee inflicts an injury out of personal malice, not engendered by the employment, or acts out of personal malice unconnected with the employment, or if the misconduct is not an outgrowth of the employment, the employee is not acting within the scope of employment. If an employee's tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the place of employment and attendance to occupational duties prior or subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of action against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In such cases, the losses do not foreseeably result from the conduct of the employer's enterprise and so are not fairly attributable to the employer as a cost of doing business.” (Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 812-813, internal citations and quotations omitted.)

“Although the question of whether a tort was committed within the scope of employment is ordinarily one of fact, it becomes one of law where the undisputed facts would not support an inference that the employee was acting within the scope of employment.” (Perry v. County of Fresno (2013) 215 Cal App.4th 94, 101 [county corrections office writing racially inflammatory letters to inmates was acting outside the scope of his employment].) The alleged actions of Defendant Bearden can only be reasonably construed as alleged acts of personal malice towards Plaintiff, and cannot be reasonably interpreted as acts falling within the scope of her employment, even if some of the acts are alleged to have taken place at YSL’s business location.

Leave to amend the second cause of action is DENIED as the defect in the claim as alleged against YSP, the fact that as a matter of law vicarious liability/respondeat superior liability does not extend to an employee’s acts of personal malice (such as the alleged actions of Defendant Bearden) cannot be cured by amendment without contradicting the basis of the claim as alleged against Defendant YSP. “While inconsistent theories of recovery are permitted, a pleader cannot blow hot and cold as to the facts positively stated.” (Manti v. Gunari (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 442, 449, internal citation omitted.)

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Defendant East Side Union High School District (“Defendant”) brings the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses to the District’s Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Document Requests and for an Award of Sanctions against Plaintiff John Doe (“Plaintiff”). Specifically, the motion seeks further responses to the following discovery requests: (1) Form Interrogatories 9.1 and 9.2; (2) Special Interrogatories 1,36,37,38,45,46,47,57,58,59,61,62; and (3) Request for Production of Documents, Set One. The Motion also seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $3510. According to the moving papers, the discovery requests were originally propounded in May of 2020 and there have been ongoing discussions amongst counsel (including a prior motion that was deemed moot in light of Plaintiff’s supplemental responses prior to the hearing date) to resolve the disputes, but despite supplemental responses in March, April and August of 2021, the parties have been unable to reach agreement as to the adequacy of the responses.

The Court has now reviewed the voluminous record in this matter including the pleadings, separate statements, declarations and exhibits submitted in connection with the instant motion. After a full review and consideration of the positions of the parties as set forth in their papers, the Court issues the following order.

1. Form Interrogatories: Defendant’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories 9.1 and 9.2 is GRANTED. These are standard judicial council interrogatories that seek factual information about the incident(s) that give rise to the claims set forth in the Complaint. While Plaintiffs may need to supplement their responses once experts have been retained, they are obligated to provide all information available to them at the present time regarding the information sought in the interrogatories. If Plaintiff does not have any further responsive information at the present time, they should state so in a code-compliant response.

2. Special Interrogatory 1: The Motion to Compel a Further Response to Special Interrogatory 1 is GRANTED. While Plaintiff did identify specific individuals in a supplemental response, Plaintiff must provide a brief summary of what that individual knows about the claims at issue in the lawsuit. If Plaintiff does not know or have any information about what the person knows, they should state so in a code-compliant response.

3. Special Interrogatories 36,37,38,45,46,47,57,58 and 59 all appear to be contention interrogatories that seek factual information supporting specific contentions set forth in the Plaintiff’s Complaint and also seek the identity of specific individuals who have knowledge of those facts as well as any documents that contain information supporting or refuting the facts and contentions. Defendant seeks further responses contending that Plaintiff has provided “boilerplate responses” which provide little, in any, factual information which actually supports the contentions in the specific paragraphs of the Complaint reference in the interrogatories. Defendant contends that the boilerplate response is evasive, non-responsive and provides no actual factual information as requested in the interrogatories. The Motion to Compel Further Responses to these Special Interrogatories is GRANTED. Defendant is entitled to know what facts support the contentions in the Complaint and if Plaintiff does not have any additional facts other than what is provided in the response, they should state so in a code-compliant response. To be clear, the Court is not instructing the Plaintiff on how to answer the interrogatories, but is requiring that the Plaintiff provide all facts that they are aware of to support these contentions beyond what appears to be a very general summary of the claims. If Plaintiff has no additional facts, they simply need to state that in a code-compliant response.

4. Special Interrogatories 61 and 62: It appears from the record that Plaintiff has indicated that they do not have any addition information beyond what is provided in their response and accordingly, the Court will DENY to the motion as to these two interrogatories. Defendant will have the opportunity to further explore Plaintiff’s responses when the Plaintiff is deposed.

5. Request for Production of Documents, Set One: The Motion to Compel Production of Documents is GRANTED. All responsive documents together with written responses are order to be produced within 30 days of the date of this Order.

In sum, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to further responses as set forth above. Supplemental Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents are to be provided within 30 days of the date of this Order. Monetary Sanctions are awarded in the sum of $1350 to be paid in 30 days.

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[1] The Court on its own motion takes judicial notice of the Complaint, Motocho’s Answer, and the Doe Amendment pursuant to Evidence Code §452(d) (court records).

[2] Safi’s “request” for judicial notice, stated in his moving papers, is denied for failure to comply with Rule of Court 3.1113(l). Plaintiff’s “request” in the opposition is denied for the same reason.

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