9th Infantry Regiment...Manchu "Keep up the Fire"



MANCHU

M/Sgt. Stellins, Operations Sgt.

4th BN – 9 Inf. Regt, 25th Inf Div.

War Zone C – Vietnam

Mar 1969 – Mar 1970

HEADQUARTERS

U.S. ARMY VIETNAM

COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN

NUMBER 6 24 May 1969

DEFENSE OF PATROL BASE FRONTIER CITY

GENERAL

Quick reaction lessons learned published by HQ USARV have emphasized the fact that small units are subject o defeat in detail when they do not make adequate preparations, adhere to basic fundamentals, and fail to be physically and mentally alert. This Combat Lessons Bulletin describes an action of Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. This company prepared itself, applied basic fundamentals of combat, and exhibited a high degree of alertness. The outcome was a highly successful combat action which resulted in the defeat of a larger enemy force.

SYNOPSIS

Patrol Base (PB) Frontier City was one of a series established along the Cambodian border by the 25th Infantry Division. It was situated in flat open terrain, approximately three kilometers from the border, in an area which intelligence revealed to be heavily infiltrated by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. The terrain surrounding the base was generally open, except for small wooded areas southwest of the base. Dense brush lined a stream which ran 450 meters southwest of the base.

A key concept in the planning, and a critical factor in the successful defense of PB Frontier City was the capability to build a fortified company position in one day. In order to accomplish this, two companies, two bulldozers and prepackaged bunker kits were used. Personnel, construction materials and equipment were air-lifted into the site. A Large bulldozer was rafted to a point near the site and then driven overland.

CONSTRUCTION OF PB FRONTIER CITY

Construction began at 0800 hours on the morning of 24 April 1969. The base was to be circular in configuration (see figure 1). The bunker line, 80 meters in diameter, consisted of 24 positions. The positions were constructed by Company c, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, using bunker kits. Each kit consisted of a 15 pound shaped charge, two pieces of steel planking and a bundle of sand-bags. A triple concertina barrier was constructed 75 meters outside of the bunker line by Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry. Between the barrier and the bunker line, 300 claymores were emplaced in two concentric circles. The bulldozers cleared the entire area out to 100 meters beyond the wire. Next they dug ammunition storage pits within the perimeter. Finally they prepared interior berms for the two 105mm howitzers and built up an earth wall between the bunkers. The howitzers, a pre-fabricated 20 foot radar tower, a starlight observation telescope and an AN/PPS-4 radar were lifted in to complete the base. By 1700 hours construction was complete. Company A was extracted by air and Company C assumed the defense of Frontier City.

THE ATTACK

At 1945 hours on 25 April, the radar picked up movement of a company sized unit to the south-west (see figure 2). This target was not immediately engaged. At 2100 hours the starlight scope picked up a platoon sized element 1000 meters from the base. This unit was positioning RPG launchers and ammunition along a rice paddy dike. At 2200 hours the radar picked up heavy movement to the west. Another platoon was sighted in the starlight scope. The battalion S3, who was the senior officer present, directed that the perimeter and enemy position be marked. Railroad flares and smudge-pots marked the perimeter. 81mm mortars fired to illuminate the target. With both the enemy and friendly positions well defined, the S3 called in a flare-ship/gun-ship team, which had earlier been placed on station. At 2230 hours, 8 inch, 155mm and 105mm artillery fired the first of two firecracker TOT’s in the target area. At 2300 hours, a second TOT was fired and a second helicopter team expended. The base’s two howitzers were then directed to fire a 360 degree direct fire mission ranging from 50 to 1000 meters from the wire. By 2330 hours fires had ceased, but radar continued to indicate heavy movement.

At 035 hours the initial rounds of a heavy mortar and rocket preparation began impacting around the base. At 0100 hours the enemy launched a battalion sized attack from the south. The wire was blown in one location by a Bangalore torpedo, and 11 enemy penetrated the barrier. Immediately claymores were blown in the penetrated area. A 90mm recoilless rifle and two M60 machine-guns further blunted the attack. Finally two light fire teams orbiting in the area engaged the enemy and started the rout. The enemy tried to escape under the cover of heavy fires, but artillery and air bombardment continued to devastate the enemy troops and destroy his supporting weapons. By 0330 hours all significant enemy action had ceased. As a result of this battle 214 enemy were killed, six prisoners were taken, and 64 individual weapons and 13 crew served weapons were captured. Large quantities of munitions were captured and destroyed. Only one defender was wounded.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE U.S.. SUCCESS

A LARGERENEMYU FORCE WAS DEFEATED BY AN ALERT, WLL PREPARED US FORCE. Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry was well prepared for anything the enemy had to offer. The result was the virtual destruction of an enemy battalion.

a. ALERTNESS: The defenders of Patrol Base Frontier City exhibited a high degree of alertness. The enemy was located and engaged well outside the defensive perimeter.

b. DETAILED PLANNING: Prior planning provided for the timely arrival of troops, equipment and construction materials.

c. METICULOUS PREPARATION: The US forces were able to defeat a greatly superior force because of superbly prepared defenses.

d. FIRE COORDINATION: Skillful coordination of available fires allowed the defenders to devastate the enemy.

e. COMMUNICATIONS: Using wire and FM equipment organic to a rifle company, the defenders were able to skillfully control their own forces and all supporting fires.

f. INNOVATION: Several imaginative techniques were employed in this operation which permitted unusually effective employment of available equipment and fire support. These included:

(1) The concept of a rapidly constructed hardened PB.

(2) Rafting a bulldozer into position.

(3) Use of a prefabricated radar /observation tower.

(4) Use of bunker kits.

(5) Use of PB artillery as a direct fire defensive weapon.

LESSONS LEARNED

In RVN small units must be constantly prepared against attacks by larger forces. Proper use of the superior mobility, firepower and communications available to US forces will assure their victory. The following lessons can be learned from this action.

a. Units which are continually alert will not be surprised.

b. Detailed planning permits the efficient use of resources in the manner that will best assist the accomplishment of the mission.

c. No effort should be spared to strengthen a defensive position at the earliest feasible time. The enemy frequently attacks US forces shortly after they have occupied a position, hoping to catch them unprepared.

d. Even the smallest US unit can bring devastating fires to bear, provided that supporting fires are properly employed. Competent fire direction personnel and alternate means of communication are indispensable.

e. Under favorable conditions, electronic surveillance can supplement or entirely replace security out-posts.

f. An imaginative approach to any situation will allow standard techniques to be tailored to the specific situation in such a manner as to best accomplish the mission.

CONCLUSION

Through the timely use of intelligence and the skillful and imaginative employment of available resources, elements of the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry were able to decisively engage and defeat a larger force. Commanders at all levels who demand the highest standards of preparation and readiness will save lives and insure similar successes on the battlefield.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE L. MABRY, JR.

Major General, US Army

Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

C, Plus:

USARV G3 DST – 50

COMUSMACV, ATTN: MACJ3-05 – 10

7th AF – 10

COMNAVFORV – 10

III MAF – 10

SA IV CTZ – 10

SF:

CINCUSARPAC, ATTTN: GPOP-DT-5

USCONARC, Ft. Monroe, Va – 5

USACDC, Ft Belvoir, Va – 5

USAARMS, Ft Knox, Ky – 5

USAIS, Ft. Benning, Ga - 5

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