The Cold War: The 4 Policemen, Roll-back, Spheres of ...



Ideational Competition brokered by Material/International forces

Or: How are ideational debates brokered by the material environment

US Grand Strategy during the Cold War: The “Four Policemen,” “Roll-back,” Balancing/Spheres of influence or Superiority?

Benjamin Miller

University of Haifa

Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Millennium Conference, LSE, London 2012

ABSTRACT

The International System as the Broker of Competing Ideas on National Security:

the Case of US Grand Strategy in the early Cold War

Which type of factors shape the grand strategy of the state: ideational/cultural or material/rationalist? While addressing the material-ideational debate in IR, this paper argues that the material environment selects which idea—out of autonomous competing ideas- is going to dominate the state’s grand strategy.

The material-ideational debate is an important theoretical and empirical debate in the Social Sciences, notably among the key theories in IR. While realists highlight the effects of material factors, constructivists focus on ideational factors, and liberals are divided between some who advance material factors and others who subscribe to ideational explanations.

The present study addresses this major debate through a three-step process: First, in contrast to purely materialist/rationalist approaches, which minimize the role and importance of ideas, I suggest that competing ideas are autonomous of material factors and there is a vigorous debate in the “marketplace of ideas” on which idea should guide the state’s grand strategy. I distinguish among four key ideas, which competed for dominating US grand strategy with the end of WWII and the beginning of the Cold War: the “four policemen,” ”roll-back,” balance of power/spheres of influence, and preventive war. Secondly, in order to deepen the theoretical sources and our understanding of these competing ideas and to link them to IR theory, I will relate them to a recently developed distinction among four ideational approaches in IR: offensive realism (OR), defensive realism (DR), offensive liberalism (OL) and defensive liberalism (DL). More specifically, the “four policemen” is a defensive liberal idea, “roll-back”—an offensive liberal idea, balance of power (BOP)—a defensive realist idea and preventive war— an offensive realist idea, while offensive realism also advances the general idea of material/military superiority as the key to national security.

The third step is the key one: under which conditions each one of these ideas is going to dominate the state’s grand strategy? I argue that the international system serves as the broker of which idea is selected as the grand strategy, more specifically, two key variables associated with the international system serve as the brokers: the distribution of capabilities in the international system and the level of threat facing the state. Indeed, the grand strategy, which was selected, did not fully fit with any one of these ideas advocated by leading spokesmen in the domestic debate on foreign policy.

In the case of the US grand strategy, the combined effect of the systemic factors at the height of the Cold War—bipolarity and high threat—brought about the rejection of these four ideas and instead the combined effect of these two systemic factors led to the dominance of a milder version of Offensive Realism—the search for US superiority expressed in a major military build-up— not to balance Soviet power, but rather to surpass it in a major way— and the related steps of forming world-wide alliances and global forward deployment of US forces.

Outline:

I. The Puzzle: why did US Policy toward the Soviet Union (SU) change twice in the Five Years following the end of WWII?

II. The argument

III. Lit. Review—Alternative explanations: Mearsheimer, Ikenberry, Dueck, Layne

VI. Problems with the lit.:

A. regarding which grand strategy (GS) the US followed

B. regarding the explanation of the selected GS

V. Typology of Potential DVs: The 4 Competing Ideas and their relations with the types of Grand Strategies

A. DL—the 4 Policemen

B. DR--- BOP/spheres of influence (Kennan-containment)

C. OL—Roll-back/liberation/ Regime Change

D. OR—superiority (NSC-68), preventive war

IVI. DV: the Evolution of the GS:

E. 1945-6-- DL

F. 1947-50-- DR

G. 1950-62—OR

H. Challenges by OL along the way

The evolution of US GS in the early years of the CW did not result from a clearly defined national security doctrine. “Only in a piecemeal and staggered manner did the Truman administration decide upon the major elements of the American response to the Soviet Union.” [1]

VII. Explanation of the two Policy Changes-- Why did a certain GS become dominant: the rise of bipolarity and the increasing level of threat-manifested by a more threatening behavior and growing capability to implement the threats;

The study presents two major propositions for explaining the GS changes:

1. The greater the level of threat posed by the SU (as measured by its aggressive behavior) >

The greater the shift in US strategy from Defensive to offensive

2. The more powerful the SU becomes (measured by its growing military capability), the more US strategy moves from Liberal to Realist

From DL to DR:

A. Iran—1946

B. Turkey/Greece 46-7 >Truman Doctrine (DR)

C. E. Europe/Polish elections

D. Czech Coup—48+

E. Berlin –48-9 > NATO (DR)

From DR to OR:

F. Korea >OR (NSC-68)- superiority

VIII. Conclusions

I. The Puzzle: why did America’s Soviet policy change twice in the five years following WWII?

Within 5 years from the end of WWII, the US changed its grand strategy twice. While starting with a cooperative strategy in relation to the SU (what I call “defensive liberalism”), the US moved about two years since the end of the war to a more hard-line policy, though still relatively moderate with a focus on diplomatic and economic means of containment (“defensive realism”). However, 3 years later, the US shifted gears again to a much more hawkish policy of reaching superiority and embarking on world-wide commitments and deployment (“offensive realism”).

What is the best explanation of such important and significant changes in GS?

The Ideational Competition: its links with a Typology of Grand Strategies

US officials and commentators raised a great variety of ideas with regard to the most effective and desirable US GS following the end of WWII in order to maximize US security and also to construct a more peaceful world order. Each one of these ideas was in accordance with the logic of one of the GS discussed here, respectively: OL, DL, OR and DR. More specifically, the Competition in the Market Place of post-WWII Ideas on US GS took place among the following ideas: The 4 Policemen was related to DL (mostly associated with FDR), Roll-back associated with OL (the key representative being John Foster DULLES), Balance of power/Spheres of influence derived from DR (the leading intellectual force was Kennan) or Superiority based on OR (the key advocate was Paul Nitze).

Let us briefly distinguish among the 4 approaches to security by introducing a general typology of Grand Strategies:

Whereas the distinction between offensive and defensive realism is a familiar one,[2] students of International Relations theory have tended to overlook the fact that a parallel distinction can be drawn within an ideology-promotion perspective. Most notably, it is possible to distinguish within the liberal perspective between offensive and defensive variants or branches of liberalism. Both liberal approaches focus on the benign influence of democracy on the external behavior of states and on international security and thus call to promote democracy, but they differ with respect to the means of democracy promotion. While defensive liberalism favors the promotion of democracy by peaceful means, the offensive approach advocates democracy promotion by the use of force if necessary.

The various combinations of these two dimensions produce four ideal types of great power approaches to security (see Figure 2): offensive realism, defensive realism, defensive ideology promotion and offensive ideology promotion. A combination of maximal use of force in a unilateral manner aimed at affecting the capabilities of the adversary produces an offensive realist strategy; defensive realism refers to a minimal use of force in a multilateral manner for affecting the balance of capabilities; defensive ideology promotion emphasizes the spread of ideology multilaterally by peaceful means; while offensive ideology promotion focuses on effecting regime change unilaterally and by the use of force.

If ideology promotion is done by a liberal power, such as the US, then defensive liberalism focuses on the use of “soft power” in a multilateral manner for promoting democracy, free-market economies and international institutions and thus affecting the rival’s ideological character;[3] In contrast, offensive liberals are willing to use massive force in a unilateral manner in order to promote democracy and affect the rival’s ideology.[4]

Even though some of these ideas became components of the post-war GS, many of them were not endorsed, esp. in the most important arena—the relations with the only other SP—the SU. However, some of them were implemented in relation to US allies in accordance with the conditions specified by the theoretical model presented here (the combined effects of the BOP and the balance of threat).

There has been a Gradual transition between the approaches;

1. From WWII--- to 1947—DL—BOTH FDR and also Truman continues his strategy

2. 1947--1950: from DL to DR—Kennan and the Truman Doctrine,

NATO in response to Berlin and the Czeck coup

3. 1950—l962—OR (NSC-68) in response to Korea

4. OL—some related ideas are accepted, but not the core idea of liberation of E. Europe

The Changes are in response to key external-material events selecting which one of the ideas will be translated into the GS.

Rejection of alternative ideas: The US didn’t opt for BOP (DR), let alone the more extreme version of DL—disengagement, but opted for military superiority (OR) in the peak of the CW. It also mostly turned down roll-back/open door (OL) in the Soviet sphere or cooperative multilateralism with the SU such as in the form of “the four policemen” (DL).

The key argument--The explanation: Soviet (SU) power eliminated OL; SU threat brought down BOP and multilateralism of the 4 policemen. The combined effect of power and threat brought about OR.

My novel argument in relation to other analyses: the US GS was based on the logic of OR-- superiority as the GS (as opposed to Mearsheimer and also the liberal analyses), while the explanation for the dominance of this strategy was derived from the Soviet threat (as opposed to Layne).

I. Lit. Review—Alternative explanations: Mearsheimer, Ikenberry, Dueck, Layne

Review of Mearsheimer, Ikenberry, Layne and Dueck re US Cold War strategy

Mearsheimer describes American behavior vis-à-vis Europe as offshore balancing for the period 1900-1990. The argument is that the US maintains the European balance of power by actively preventing a single great power from taking over Europe, followed by passivity as long as there is no further attempt to take over. The establishment of NATO and the long term commitment that followed was due to the fact that the Soviets controlled Eastern Europe and no European power could face them.[5] This is a defensive realist approach, as Layne has noted.

Layne argues that the US strategy during the first decade after WWII was to secure American hegemony “by removing the Soviet Union as a peer competitor.”[6] He argues that the US could have reestablished Germany and Japan as poles to prevent their possible fall (and their strategically rich environment) to Soviet hands, but the fact that this did not happen hints to a much more ambitious plan.[7] However, Layne might be wrong in describing the formation of America’s commitment to Europe. Unlike his account, the US did not “[enter] into the negotiations that culminated in 1949 in the North Atlantic Treaty,” but was dragged in by Europe. The Truman Doctrine did not just pop up. It was a result of several processes, of which one very significant was Great Britain’s statement in 1946 that it could no longer maintain Greece.[8] Layne argues that the US insisted that Eastern Europe should be open (i.e. not a Soviet sphere) mainly as part of its goal to ignite regime change in Moscow.[9]

Dueck argues that the US could have returned to strategic non-entanglement, engage in rollback, or divide the world to spheres of influence. All were pushed aside for containment.[10] He states that containment was ideological, and instead of BOP, it was seeking preponderance.[11] Dueck uses neoclassical realism to say that not only structural pressures determined US grand strategy, but also processes of agenda-setting, coalition building, and cultural factors - American liberal norms and ideas.[12] The spheres of influence approach was quite influential in Washington, but the US demanded that any such sphere would be open, that is not oppressive.[13] Containment, Dueck argues, was liberal, since it fostered “the strength of an international order characterized by free trade, national self determination and liberal democracy.”[14]

Ikenberry argues that WWII ended in two interrelated settlements: the Cold War and the Western arrangements.[15] The “containment order” included balance of power, nuclear deterrence, and political and ideological competition. The Western arrangement was a set of institutions among the Western countries and Japan. It was based on economic openness, political reciprocity and multilateral management of an American-led liberal political order.[16]

Ikenberry identifies six grand designs that competed: global governance; an open trading system that would govern itself; Atlantic union; geopolitical interests based system that would provide access to resources and markets for the US; creating a multipolar system by assisting Europe to become a “third force”; containment. [17]

II. Differences of Opinion in the lit. (see also below):

III. A. regarding what GS the US followed

B. regarding the explanation of the selected GS

|Theorist US GS |Explanation of US GS |

|Mearsheimer Def. Realism |Rise of a potential hegemon in Eurasia without a local |

| |balancer-def. realism |

|Layne Off. Lib. |Open door-off. liberalism |

|Dueck Def. Lib./realist |Liberalism on the cheap-def. Liberalism with some systemic |

| |effects |

|Ikenberry Def. Lib |Institutional leadership-def. liberalism |

|Miller From Def. Lib. |Changes according to power and threat, while liberalism is |

|To DR to OR |mediating |

Key Competing theories which explain US GS in the CW

| |Objectives |Means |School |Regional focus |Problems |

| | | | |in the CW | |

|Dueck |Spread liberalism |--Cheap (defensive) |Defensive liberalism|Europe |--illiberal behavior |

| | |--Realism explains why roll-back and |(with some IR | |tacit shperes |

| | |isolationism were not selected, |systemic influence) | |--not cheap (due to BP& threats |

| | |--liberalism explains why | | |Spheres-of-influcne: Stalin |

| | |spheres-of-influence not selected | | |Behavior prevented it |

| | |-- containment—the only GS that matched IR| | |Threatened |

| | |and liberalism | | |It-signal |

| | | | | |of threat |

|Layne |Open Door (economic |Extra-regional hegemony |Off. Liberalism |Europe |--hegemony imposed on a reluctant US by the IR |

| |Liberalism) | | | |system (European weakness, GB decline and SU |

| | | | | |threat), not due to open door |

| | | | | |-- security threats are the IVs |

|Mearsheimer |Affect the distribution of |--Regional Hegemony (in the W. Hemisphere)|Off. Realism in the |Europe |US seeks hegemony, not balance in Europe and |

| |capabilities |--Off-shore balancing re. Europe/Asia |Americas; | |world-wide due to high security threats |

| |(for | |Defensive Realism in| |And the BP |

| |Material security) | |Europe | |structure— |

| | | | | |US responsibility |

|Ikenberry |Promote (liberal) |US Multilateral leadership of |Defensive Liberalism|Europe |--multilateralism re. the West, not outside |

| |international order |International Institutions | | |--unilateral vs. the SU |

| | | | | |--material/security factors are the Ivs which |

| | | | | |lead to the multilateral leadership |

|Miller |US preponderance |Unilateral-exclusionary vs. the SU (the |1st wave Off. |World -wide |BP & SU threat explain US GS—BP--system |

| | |Marshall Plan, NATO); multilateral vs. |Realism | |compells US to intervene—no other to pass her |

| | |Western allies | | |buck-GB decline |

| | | | | |--SU high threat leads to quest for |

| | | | | |preponderance |

| | | | | |-- liberalism—intervening, not IV |

|US GS |Explanation of US GS |

|Mearsheimer Def. Realism |Rise of a potential hegemon in Eurasia without a local |

| |balancer-def. realism |

|Layne Off. Lib. |Open door-off. liberalism |

|Dueck Def. Lib./realist |Liberalism on the cheap-def. liberalism |

|Ikenberry Def. Lib |Institutional leadership-def. liberalism |

|Miller From Def. Lib. |Changes according to power and threat, while liberalism is |

|To DR to OR |mediating |

| |Was it possible to reach an accommodation with Stalin? |

|Mearsheimer |NO—SU powerful, aspirant for hegemony in Eurasia with no local |

| |balancer; The US was the only power which could balance it |

|Layne |YES—it was possible to set up Germany as an independent power, |

| |thereby reestablishing Multipolar BOP in Eurasia and allowing |

| |the US to disengage; Stalin was only dissuaded by the Marshall |

| |Plan; |

| |US interested in dominating NATO allies and maintaining Open |

| |Door |

|Dueck |Yes—explicit spheres-of-influence agreement could be accepted |

| |by SU but rejected by the US due to liberal opposition to SU |

| |domination of E. Europe |

|Ikenberry |The focus was on constructing a liberal order in the West |

|Miller |NO--SU powerful in the middle of Europe in l945 and |

| |expansionist/threatening behavior since 1946 which could be |

| |deterred and contained by a superior and resolute power, though|

| |OR by US escalated the Cold War, but US also conducted DR re. |

| |SU sphere of influence |

2. Rejection/Falsification of Alternative explanations:

Levels of Analysis[18]

This section will show the limitations to explanations based on the individual and domestic/ideological levels of analysis—due to the discrepancy between the expectations deduced from their logic and the selected grand strategy, though it will also indicate the shortcomings to a pure systemic/polarity account.

Individual/world view— according to this level of analysis, we should expect

1) decisive effects of Truman’s personality and world view on policy outcomes;

(2) We should also see continuity in policy of the same president even despite important events and changes in the external world which disconfirm US policies.

In the case of the two major changes in the Truman administration, it is important to note that they were in contrast to Truman’s initial preferences and thus show the limitations to the individual level:

--Truman continues the GS of FDR until the material/external environment refutes this strategy:[19] Iran, Turkey/Greece, E. Europe, Berlin, Czech Coup (see below on the transition from DL to DR) and then makes another change following Korea (from DR to OR)

Alternative ideational/individual-level explanations would expect the following documents or statements to exercise influence:

■ Kennan’s Long Telegram of 2/46:

■ Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech

■ NSC-68

The background to the great influence of the Long Telegram, (2/22/1946): it provided an answer to “a question flummoxing Washington: why was the US unable to find a policy toward the SU that worked?”[20]

Kennan’s response: SU hostility was not a function of US policy but of Russian history and psychology reinforced by communism and the Stalinist police state: Irrespective of US behavior, the SU would try to undermine the US.[21]

Yet, ideational influences are criticized, for example, by a leading researcher of this period. The influence of the first two is criticized (Miscamble 1992, pp. 27-8 and 2007, p. 308); The Long Telegram in no sense put an end to the floundering in US FP (Miscamble 1992, p. 27-8; see also Larson 1985, p. 301—with the same point)_

NSC-68: was not endorsed by Truman until the Korean invasion-- (Gaddis 2005, p. 107, top--111).

Domestic: In accordance with the logic of this level of analysis, we should see here important influences of US public and ideology in favor of the liberal approaches (either DL or OL).[22]

-- On the DL side, the public was in favor of demobilization in the aftermath of WWII

and also willingness to see SU (and Stalin) positively. There were also great hopes attached to the UN. Also, until Korea, Congress was unwilling to fund NSC-68 (Gaddis 2005, p. 107, top).

-- On the OL side, there was a sympathy among the public for the Liberation of E. Europe.

The grand strategies during that period of the peak of he Cold War were, however, not liberal but realist—initially defensive and later offensive.

Ideological: The selection of DR and later OR—despite the opposition to BOP/realism etc. by FDR and others.

--Global engagement (alliances, forward deployment)—despite opposition to entangling alliances

---No Rollback – despite support for and appeal of liberation ideas

Systemic: changes within the same structure can’t be explained by bipolarity as such

V. Typology of Potential DVs: The 4 Competing Ideas during the beginning of the Cold War

I’ll start with presenting what kind of empirical evidence could meet the expectations of each one of the 4 approaches and thus the presence of this evidence, if it dominated US policy, would show that the GS which the US pursued was guided by this approach.

Then I’ll move to a discussion of the various alternative ideas raised in the US elites about the desirable US GS in accordance with the different approaches. These ideas included democracy-promotion (or “roll-back”) informed by OL, multilateralism (or “the four policemen”) related to DL, and balancing (including in the form of a division into sphere-of-influence), informed by DR.

Next, I’ll show that even if parts of these ideas became important components of US GS, the idea which became dominant in relation to the key rivalry with the SU was the quest for superiority related to OR. The most powerful explanation for the selection of this option is derived from the international system even if domestic politics and decision makers’ perceptions also played significant roles as intervening variables.

How will each Grand Strategy look like:

■ OL: imposed democracy/open door, unilateralism

■ DL: multilateralism: GP concert or collective security; international institutions; economic cooperation/international trade; peaceful gradual promotion of the pre-requisites for democracy

■ DR: cautious balancing; cautious in use of force, interventions, and deployment;

Spheres-of-influence—explicit and more likely—among ideological rivals—tacit; no intervention for democracy-promotion; arms control for strategic and crisis stability

-- OR: massive build-up, armament toward superiority (allies and arms), global deployment and alliances, unilateralism, regime change toward non-democracy,

The Autonomy of Ideas and Ideational Approaches to Security-

The Debate on Alternative Ideas to maximize US security and for the postwar order (promoting peace and preventing the dominance of a single power over the resources of Eurasia)

Each idea is organized according to the GS objectives and its means:

1. Def. Lib: Multilateral cooperation--Collective Security in the form of a Concert of GPs--The Four Policemen[23]

FDR’ s grand design for the postwar order was premised on the collective enforcement of peace by the great powers.[24]

The four-policemen concept is based on GP cooperation derived from shared interests in maintaining world peace; the Great powers (the US, GB, SU and China).

should enjoy special managerial privileges in exchange for maintaining their collective responsibilities to enforce the peace. FDR believed that the US, GB, China and Russia should jointly manage the peace after WWII.[25] FDR preferred collective decision-making to unilateral action (George l980). The Four Policemen would not limit their cooperation to managing immediate threats to peace, but would devise a peace settlement for the war’s aftermath, and then continue to consult about the maintenance of peace in the postwar era.

Collective Security or BOP: FDR believed that peace would be preserved by a system of collective security maintained by the wartime allies acting in concert and sustained by mutual goodwill and vigilance.[26] The victorious allies would supervise the disarming and portioning of Germany and subject various other countries to their control. One of his ideas was that the Big Four would remove from the hands of other nations, friendly as well as hostile, all weapons more dangerous than rifles[27]. More precisely, FDR’s 4 Policemen was a compromise between Churchill’s BOP and the unconstrained Wilsonianism of his advisers such as Sec. of State—Cordell Hull, who opposed power politics, spheres-of-influence, alliances, BOP, and territorial change by force.[28]

Yet, in fact it was more Collective Security than BOP: FDR was informed by the concept of collective security, modified by the idea of the 4 Policemen as the enforcers of Collective security, instead of the traditional BOP. To FDR, the purpose of the war was to remove Hitler as the obstacle to a cooperative international order based on harmony, not on BOP.[29] He wanted to destroy the BOP and didn’t fear the implications of BOP logic, notably SU expansion to the vacuum created in the middle of Europe or the collapse of the alliance in the aftermath of victory. FDR didn’t favor to preserve BOP (including against the SU) following the war, but to pursue a state of universal peace; thus, the US should disengage its military forces following the war and not station them in Europe (HK 396, 410)—in his view the US public wouldn’t accept this; he also rejected US responsibility for the economic reconstruction of Europe.

Domestic and Individual-Level sources for the Defensive Liberal Approach

Domestic politics and the ideational Approach: The integration of the 4-policemen concept in a collective security framework is at least partly due to the domestic power of defensive liberalism in the US. Internationalist groups in US domestic politics advocated the defensive liberal approach. In response to their pressures, FDR agreed to a new IO—if the four GPs continued to be in charge of enforcing the peace.[30] Thus, FDR later incorporated his “Four Policemen” concept into a collective security framework acceptable to Wilsonian idealists even though he continued to insist on the centrality of power.[31]

Belief system and the ideational approach: FDR firmly believed that the SU could be persuaded to assume the burdens and responsibilities of a great power for maintaining world order.[32] FDR’s preference for an explicit sphere of influence agreement, but expected public opposition to internal interference in European states, while competitive BOP will be unstable and might lead to war (Larson l985, pp. 74-75).

As a whole, the bureaucracy (State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and public shared FDR’s optimism about the postwar order. 11/1944: public opinion poll—44% believed that Russia could be trusted to cooperate with the US; 35%-- no; 11% didn’t know. The Joint Chiefs did not even consider locating permanent bases in Europe.

4/1945—when Truman replaces FDR, he believes he should continue FDR’s policies.

Support of FDR and much of the public in collective security.[33]

A universalist vision of Collective security was the official policy of the US since the middle of WWII (Gaddis 2005, p. 55).

2. OL: Roll-back (“Liberation”):[34]

The objective of rollback was the Liberation of Eastern Europe from the coercive rule of the SU. The logic of the strategy was based on the advocates’ argument that containment is too defensive and didn’t challenge the SU. Such a defensive posture would only generate further retreats by the US and its allies. So long as the communist regime stayed in place, the SU would continue to constitute a threat to the US and the West. Thus, roll-back supporters prescribed regime change, including a strategy of military intervention to help anti-communist revolts in E. Europe and potentially to attack the SU itself.[35]

Key advocates and supporters of OL included a variety of individuals, groups and organizations: The call for liberation of Eastern Europe culminated during the 1952 Presidential campaign. The most important advocate was John Foster Dulles, the chief foreign policy adviser to the Republican platform committee.[36] He helped to shape the platform’s pledge to “revive the contagious, liberating influences…[which] will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue in their monstrous ways and mark the beginning of the end.” (cited in Krebs p. 17).

In an article in Life in May 1952, entitled “A Policy of Boldness” he called on the US to make “it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur” (cited in Krebs, p. 18). Only rarely did he point out concrete steps to advance liberation such as an intensification of VOA broadcasts to stir up resistance, then air supplies to the freedom fighters, and eventually accept the liberates states into the free world as the Soviets disengage.

Both Kennan (the major representative of DR as discussed below) and Dulles saw opportunities for undermining SU rule in E. Europe. While Kennan wanted to do it by taking advantage of latent differences within the international communist movement, Dulles was more interested in overthrowing communism in E. Europe (Gaddis 2005, p. 154).

A key OL advocate was James Burnham[37], who called for the “liberation” of E. Europe from SU influence via direct backing of anti-communist revolts—the position approved by the GOP 1952 convention. Not only did he call for liberation from SU rule, but advocated the establishment of full-blown liberal democracies (Krebs 14, top), though in practice he suggested carrying out mostly propaganda and symbolic acts. The popular criticism of Truman/Acheson as too soft on Communism and of containment as too defensive (fed by Communist triumphs in 1948-50)[38] was manipulated by the Republicans for political reasons and culminated in the 1952 Presidential campaign—appeals to liberate the satellites had deep resonance (Krebs 13).

A moderate OL advocate was Republican Senator Taft: despite his concerns about US overextension, he believed in the possibility of encouraging love for freedom the in the Soviet bloc by spending relatively small amounts of money. Though universal democracy was desirable, the US could not impose it and spend a lot of resources on it. [39]

In the bureaucracy there were two prominent groups of rollback advocates:

--State Dept. officials (Leffler 1992, p. 372): not satisfied from only deploying abroad components of atomic weapons, authorized by Truman on July 28 at an NSC meeting. They insist that military capabilities provide the shield to protect the West, while the US enacts a positive program to project US influence into the Soviet world, roll back SU power, and promote internal changes within the SU itself.

-- the CIA special operations—clandestine/covert in E. Europe (see also below)

As Mitrovich uncovers (2000), the practical means suggested by supporters of rollback inside the Truman administration focused on psychological warfare, including propaganda and covert actions (see below in the discussion of actual policies). The reasons, which the advocates of this policy suggested for adopting such rollback policies, were its successful application in WWII and that it would mitigate the danger of war with SU.[40]

Realism and US Grand Strategy: Internal Divisions

Realists have not always been united over the issue of how much

intervention was enough.[41] Neither are they so united even now over the

issue of restraint in the early period of the Cold War. As Patricia

Roberts points out in a capsule history of the development of

the realist school, realism began as a philosophy of intervention.

Before World War I, nascent realists like Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred

Thayer Mahan, and the young Walter Lippmann believed that American

security depended on a balance of power in Europe and keeping a large

portion of the continent in hands friendly to the United States. A

balance of power was important because a united Europe in unfriendly

hands was the one entity capable of invading or otherwise threatening

the United States. Thus, Lippmann believed that the United States had to

intervene in World War I on behalf of Great Britain. Subsequently,

during and after World War II, he joined other academic realists like

Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Reinhold Niebuhr in urging the

United States not to repeat the mistake it made after World War I by

retreating into isolationism. All of these realists urged the United

States to remain involved in Western Europe and to help it rebuild so

that it would not fall into the hands of Communists who might invite

Soviet influence into the Western sphere. It was only later in the Cold

War that these realists, whom we call here Defensive Realists, began to drop away from the consensus urging greater U.S. intervention to limit the Soviet sphere - Lippmann in his famous dissent from Kennan's Mr. X article, Kennan from what he

considered the misinterpretation of his containment doctrine, and

Morgenthau even later. Meanwhile, other realists—whom we’ll see as Offensive Realists-- like Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze believed that they were following Walter Lippmann's realist principle of balancing goals with the power available by expanding

American and European military power to achieve the necessary goal of

preventing Communist expansion into the rest of the world. For many

years, then, the realist school was divided between "hard realists" (or Offensive Realists) like Acheson and Nitze, who advocated increasing Western military power to achieve their desired goals, and "soft" or "restrained" (or Defensive) realists who

advised the United States to reduce its goals to match its available power.[42]

3.Def. Realism: preservation/restoration of the BOP, including by spheres of influence (cautious balancing)

The realists viewed the Cold War as a great power struggle for hegemony. [43] The threat was posed by the Red Army at the heart of Europe and it was derived from Russian imperialism, not communist ideology and world revolution.

The Grand Strategy’s Objectives: Thus, the US should focus on the restoration of the balance of power, which was distorted by the defeat of Germany and Japan and the expansion of the SU. Indeed, the concept of the balance of power is the key idea in the defensive realist policy analysis and prescription. This concept is viewed as the most appropriate way of reconciling national aspirations with the national interest.[44] The Realists, esp. DR, are against making the world in the image of the US, but rather to preserve its diversity against attempts to remake it in the image of others (Gaddis, p. 55).

Instead of a universalist vision of collective security, George Kennan, as a leading DR, prescribed a strategy of preserving global equilibrium, namely BOP, esp. in Europe and Asia within the existing international order rather than trying to reach a “one world”. The key goal was to prevent SU domination of areas of great potential power in Eurasia, which would enable SU superiority and pose a major threat to the US (Gaddis 56). If balance of power is restored in Europe, there is a chance for conflict reduction, although not a comprehensive settlement so long as the current regime/ideology of the SU persists.

The conception of interests, threats and intervention is seen in the context of the BOP:

■ Interests must be finite because capabilities are also finite (p. 31)

■ Distinction has to be made between what is vital and what is not

■ Threats have to be determined against this criteria of interests

■ To be serious, threats had to combine hostility with capability, namely, industrial war-making potential; thus communist regimes in the non-industrialized Asian mainland is not a serious threat which requires preventive action

■ Considerations for intervention: a combination of interests and costs-- the importance of interests and the ease (costs) which they could be defended (p. 59).

■ There are five vital power centers: US, GB, Germany/Central Europe, Japan, USSR

■ The key threat to the BOP: the possibility for the USSR to control two of these world power centers (p. 32)— Thus, the BOP is unthinkable so long as Germany and Japan remain power vacuums (bottom of p. 37)

■ Focus on the defense of the power centers--“strongpoint defense” rather than “perimeter defense” (p. 57). The key point: the BOP can be maintained by denying the key centers of military-industrial power from SU hands

The Conception of Soviet intentions

In Kennan’s Long Telegram, (2/1946), fear and insecurity are the key Soviet motivations: “The sources of SU conduct could be best understood in term of psychopathology…the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity” (cited in Talbott, The Master of the Game l988, p. 43). In this view, diplomacy is the best instrument to deal with the SU paranoiacs.

■ SU ideology is not a guide to action as a justification for action already decided upon; therefore the objective of containment should be to limit SU expansionism, and communism posed a threat only to the extent that it was an instrument of that expansion (p. 33)

■ Fear of SU expansion by psychological means due to a demoralization in W. Europe and Japan (p. 34)

Means of the GS

The restoration of the BOP will be done by reassuring the states, which are under the Soviet threat:

1. For DR, however, the key means for doing it should be economic and technological means such as the Marshall Plan to Europe in l947-9: economic rehabilitation as a key means/priority of containment even if that meant deferring military preparedness based on an estimation that the SU is unlikely to resort to war in the near future (due to US atomic monopoly and SU control of E. Europe without war).

2. Yet, military force is important for the BOP (p. 38), thus some military deterrence is necessary (p. 61-bottom), though Kennan was against excessive reliance on the military (39).

■ 3. Selective engagement in the industrial centers (W. Europe and Japan) and selected non-industrial regions around them (Turkey and Greece and the ME because of its oil), but not beyond that wherever communism expands – like in mainland Asia—China (p. 40).

■ 4. Acceptance of spheres-of-influence in terms of the balance of interests

and in contrast to OL: avoiding direct military intervention to prevent communist takeovers and avoid calling for the overthrow of communist governments in E. Europe—because the SU would be willing to go to war for maintaining their sphere of influence in E. Europe (p. 44).

Churchill (who can be seen as an indirect participant in the US ideational debate) called for a traditional BOP system. Such a system should include rebuilding GB, restoring France to GP status, even inclusion of a defeated Germany. German inclusion would mean resisting its dismemberment so that along with the US, it will counter-balance the SU, while reducing the latter’s excessive demands for reparations.[45]

A BOP system would also include a spheres of influence agreement—the percentage attempt with Stalin (HK 413, bottom; Larson l985, pp. 107-112).

There was also support in the US for such an arrangement of an explicit spheres-of- influence agreement —Kennan, Bohlen, Lippmann (in Dueck p. 87-88).

5. Against a universalist strategy: The assistance to Greece/Turkey was part of US assumption of GB’s former responsibility to contain Soviet encroachment into the Mediterranean and preserving the European BOP. But due to domestic considerations the administration misrepresented it as a moral universalist struggle between good and evil – a dangerous, unworkable policy (Kennan in Gaddis 2005, p. 51).

6. A multipolar world: not a division into US and SU spheres of influence, but the emergence of independent centers of power: Japan and W. Europe and the emergence of BOP among all of them (bottom of p. 40)

7. Use of nationalism: Taking advantage of tensions between SU and the communist movement due to SU intolerance, thus reducing SU ability to expand (p. 41-3). For the moment, encourage Titoism—cooperate with E. European communist governments independent of the SU for containing the SU (p. 45). Nationalism would help to contain communism (46).

8.NOT OR: Against a preventive war with the SU (47)

-- An extreme version of def. Realism called for disengagement (Dueck 2006, pp. 84-5): Avoiding new strategic commitments on the Eurasian continent—this position appealed to many Americans because of classical liberal concerns (see A. Friedberg 2000) and was supported by both conservative Republicans like Hoover and Taft and progressives such as Henry Wallace.

Offensive Realism: Superiority

OR argues that state security can be maximized only by being the materially superior power. Maintaining the balance of power is not sufficient. The OR strategy includes ideas of preventive war. Thus, Mark Trachtenberg demonstrates the prevalence of preventive-war thinking within the upper echelons of the administration.[46] There were quite a few proposals to destroy the SU atomic plants before bombs could be produced or even after that. For example, the Navy in 1948 (P. 104) and even State Dept. moderates (Bohlen l949 and Kennan 1950) thought in terms of a war with the SU before it had NW; Churchill, (p. 105). A major source of preventive war thinking was, the Air Force— thee was a widespread support among high-ranking officers for a preventive war via strategic airpower (p. 106). Both the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force called for an air strike on emerging Soviet NW capabilities (citations in Dueck, ft. 11, p. 190).[47]

The key document which prescribed an offensive realist approach at the beginning of the Cold War was NSC-68, whose leading author was Paul Nitze. It advanced a range of positions which differed considerably from the DR strategy led by Kennan:[48]

I. The division of opinion regarding the conception of SU objectives: intentions vs. capabilities

According to Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson, SU aims to weaken, if not destroy, the US and to reach world domination by all possible means, including by demonstrating that force and the will to use it are on their side (Trachtenberg 1991, p. 198; Gaddis 2005, p. 90). In contrast, Kennan argued that SU was already overextended; Titoism offered opportunities to the US to exploit tensions within the East Bloc.

NSC-68 was more pessimistic and suggested that SU expansion produced strength. Kennan focused on the evaluation of SU intentions. He estimated that the SU was cautious and will not take advantage of its superior conventional power as there was little to gain from it. NSC-68, for its part, focused on SU capabilities: when the SU becomes superior and expects to win, it will go to war in the form of a surprise attack; in other words, capabilities shape intentions; until then, there is a danger of war by proxy (Gaddis 2005, pp. 94-95).

II. Are Interests Divisible? Expansion vs. Minimal

Kennan: YES- Since not all of its interests were equally vital, the US has a lot of freedom of action whether and how to respond to a proxy war authorized by the SU (Gaddis 2005, p. 95).

NSC-68: NO-Interests are indivisible. Thus, it is imperative to respond to any challenge even in the periphery—otherwise the US would eventually sacrifice vital interests.

In Kennan’s view, in order to maintain BOP (and thus to safeguard diversity), it is only necessary to deny centers of industrial-military capability from the SU, while it is necessary only to defend selected strongpoints (Gaddis 2005, p. 89).

In contrast, NSC-68 called for the expansion of interests, while taking into account also considerations of prestige and credibility, and as a result leading to an increase of defense spending:

1) Perimeter defense—all points along it are considered of equal importance,

blurring the distinction between vital and non-vital interests.

(2) Changes in the BOP could occur not only as a result of military or economic actions, but from intimidation, humiliation or even loss of credibility

In other words, the BOP depends on perceptions, including of the public and issues like prestige and credibility (p. 90).

(3) Increase in defense spending against the Administration’s position. According to NSC-68, the US can afford the higher defense spending by governmental “management “ of the economy via application of Keynesian techniques, namely, higher growth rates by governmental stimulation of the economy (pp. 90--92).

(4) The threat defines the interests: Expansion of interests according to the Soviet threat. US interests couldn’t be defined apart from the SU threat to them—“frustrating the SU design” became an end in itself, not a means to a larger end (p. 93).

III. Can advantages/superiority in military capabilities be translated into military and political advantages—does it have strategic utility?[49]

Kennan: NO-- the US should respond asymmetrically: strengthen itself and its allies, but no need to duplicate SU capabilities.

NSC-68, which called for military superiority[50]: YES: Even without war the SU could use its excessive military to challenge the US/its allies’ position (p. 95 bottom).

Summary: The Differences between Kennan (DR) and NSC-68 (OR)[51]

|The Item |Kennan—DR |NSC-68—OR |

| |Minimal deterrence and balancing |Peace through strength |

|Are interests divisible? |YES—distinction between vital and |NO—even peripheral can |

| |non-vital |challenge/undermine reputation, |

| | |credibility, thus eventually eroding |

| | |vital interests |

| | | |

| | |High |

|the importance of credibility/reputation|Low | |

|Likelihood of war initiated by SU |Low—SU has cautious intentions |High—SU has superior capabilities, which|

| |War-Only by miscalculation |will lead it to initiate war |

|Political Utility of superior military |NO--US can respond asymmetrically |YES—translated into strategic |

|capabilities> | |advantages; |

|Balance of Resolve??? |Resolve derived from the importance of| |

| |interests |An indicator of resolve/willingness—thus|

| | |a need for military build-up also to |

| | |show political will[52] |

|The relations among capabilities, |The level of vital Interests |Military capabilities are a signal of |

|interests and resolve |determines resolve |resolve |

|Intentions vs. capabilities |Intentions are important[53] |Only capabilities matter; intentions are|

| | |unknown—then worst-case analysis re. |

| | |Soviet intentions (including resort to |

| | |nuclear weapons-Talbott 58, top); even |

| | |if intentions could be estimated, |

| | |theycould change overnight; thus it is |

| | |essential to have the capacity to use |

| | |force that could be measured and treated|

| | |as constant (Talbot 57) |

| | | |

|The nature of Interests |Objectively determined irreducible |Determined by the perception of the |

| |interests |Soviet threat: |

| | |Any interest threatened by the SU |

| | |becomes vital—interests are a function |

| | |of threats> great expansion of interests|

|Military means/defense spending |limited |unlimited |

|Type of means to contain the SU |A great variety: political |Military superiority |

| |psychological, economic, nationalism |Big expansion of the defense budget[54] |

| |and military | |

|Use of force—“Flexible Response”[55] |“horizontal”—limited military, but |“vertical” from deterrence to nuclear |

| |greater use of economic, diplomatic |weapons |

| |and psychological means | |

|Is the Response Symmetrical? |NO—acting only when interests are |YES—responding whenever the SU |

| |vital, conditions favorable, and means|challenges interests |

| |accessible | |

|Commitments and Resources |To limit commitments according to |To mobilize resources to meet |

| |resources |commitments |

|To exploit fragmentation within the |YES—it is the SU, not international |Assumes continuous SU control over |

|Communist bloc by cooperating with |communism, which threatens US |communism; |

|independent communists to contain the |security, thus cooperating with |Any communist victory appears as a US |

|SU? |communists independent of the SU, to |loss, at least in the short-run |

| |contain the SU | |

|Negotiated settlement with SU |possible |Impossible without a change in the |

| | |nature of the SU system (Gaddis 102) |

| | |Negotiate only from a position of |

| | |strength (top 103), but the US is in |

| | |relative decline (103) and SU has |

| | |inherent advantages in negotiations |

| | |without taking into account SU |

| | |disadvantages (p. 103) |

|Roots of SU conduct |Defensive—SU paranoid; |Offensive |

|Talbott (l988), p. 55 ( |The challenge: Long-term and political|The danger: immediate and military |

| |( p. 56) |(1954—“the year of maximum danger”-SU |

|See below on the image of the opponent | |will have major power-projection to the |

| | |US by their bombers—Talbott, p. 56,) |

|The direction of the military BOP |SU is the weaker party (Talbott 56) |The West is disarming, while SU fully |

| | |armed (threat –or capability-inflation, |

| | |Talbott, p. 56—a tendency to exaggerate |

| | |the opponent’s capabilities and |

| | |intentions) |

|Intervening Variable | | |

|Cognitive explanation: |Status-quo?? |Offensive, Very aggressive, revisionist,|

|Image of the opponent |Defensive motivations |willing to use force, including nuclear |

| |Possibility of reaching political |weapons, |

| |agreement |Settlement impossible |

NSC-68 is explicitly against preventive war (Gaddis 98)-- NSC-68 saw preventive war as a negative option—both unfeasible and morally repugnant—only preemptive strike.[56] Still, it can be defined as an offensive realist document (see below and Snyder 1991) also because some of the report’s key points echoed the conventional preventive war arguments, esp,. that the US is moving to a period of high danger (Trachtenberg 1991, p. 108).

While NSC-68 was against relying too heavily on NW, it approved of the H-bomb (Gaddis 99).In contrast to Kennan, the document opposed “no first use”; and supported what would be later called “flexible response.”

DR’s critique of NSC-68[57]:

--expanded unnecessarily both defense spending and interests

■ not taking advantage of fragmentation inside the communist movement/world

■ no effective combination of objectives and capabilities

■ rhetoric of a universalist approach of democracy-promotion

NSC-68 is essentially OR though it has some rhetorical elements of OL. Thus, Nitze suggested that while the goal is not to democratize everyone, in order to mobilize domestic support, there is a need to make the case that the objective is not only repelling an invasion, but “creating a better world” (Gaddis 2005, p. 106). NSC-68 and its primary author Paul Nitze (though others were not sure) approved of rollback—to replace communist governments with anti-Soviet, democratic ones.[58]

Still, the practical priority was to increase the military budget and to reach military superiority.

VI. The Dependent Variable: the Selected Grand Strategy—

1945-1950s[59]

Stages:

I. From WWII until the End of 1946—DL: The “4 policemen” and the Accommodative Approach-- FDR continued by Truman

Toward the end of WWII and in its immediate aftermath, having in mind the postwar world order, the US followed a cooperative approach toward its wartime partner. Both FDR[60] and continued by Truman,[61] at least initially, led a cautious and an accommodative policy toward the SU based on willingness to accept legitimate Soviet security interests.[62]

FDR sought to maintain the Grand Alliance as a great power concert in the aftermath of the end of WWII, which meant mainly preserving friendly peacetime relations of mutual respect with Stalin (Gaddis 2005, pp. 11-12).

This accommodative policy had a number of foundations:

1. FDR planned to demobilize the army rapidly and bring it home (HK 1994, p. 410).

While the US did not favor spheres of influence due to domestic and liberal considerations, it was aiming initially at a more extreme version of def. realism/liberalism—military disengagement:

In Yalta FDR promised the withdrawal of US forces from Europe within 2 years of Germany’s surrender.[63] At the Teheran conference (12/1943) FDR admitted to Stalin that Congress might not approve the deployment of US troops in postwar Europe; FDR wanted only a limited US postwar occupation zone.[64]

Similarly, Truman didn’t respond favorably to Churchill’s request that US forces stay longer than that date. Truman continued a dual approach: trying to convince the SU that a comprehensive European settlement is preferable to spheres of influence, while starting to prepare such a division in order to deflect SU inclinations in that direction.[65] The US was not inclined in the early postwar months to challenge directly the reality of SU hegemony in E. Europe; rather there was a willingness to recognize SU interests in E. Europe if they avoid interference in domestic affairs.

2. The view of Stalin as a pragmatist (Gaddis 2005, p. 10)-- Stalin as “uncle Joe,” that is, the misperception of Stalin as a moderate (HK 1994, p. 412); FDR didn’t distrust Stalin almost until his death (Gaddis l997, pp. 20-21). FDR’s postwar plans was based on the assumption that the SU would be willing to collaborate with the West in preserving world peace (Larson 1985, p. 70).[66]

3.A fundamental basis of the accommodative view was the US acceptance of SU security interests—US was willing to be cooperative so long as the SU was seen as a security-seeker. A key distinction with regard to the SU policy toward E. Europe was whether it was interested only in influencing E. European foreign policies (a security-seeker) or in extending the totalitarian coercive Soviet system with secret police (an expansionist/greedy/non-security power).[67]

At this stage the dominant US view was that the Soviet Union was a security seeker. Thus, FDR and Truman in the first few months subscribed to the explanation of Soviet behavior as a security-seeker, defensively motivated by insecurity, which can be overcome by reassurance (Gaddis l987, p. 38).[68] This policy includes gestures of good will and restraint toward the SU during and immediately after the war (Gaddis l987, ft. 82, p. 254). Thus, Harriman began his tenure as ambassador to Moscow in l943 as a firm advocate of FDR’s policy of US-SU cooperation. US policymakers attached great importance to cultivating a lasting cooperative relationship with the Soviets.[69] FDR enacted soft-line toward Stalin to overcome his lack of trust in the West and to show that collaboration was in their best interest.[70] In the Teheran summit (11-12, 1943) FDR did his best to accommodate SU security requirements.[71] During WWII the Soviet projection of power into Europe was seen as for defensive purposes.[72] This soft-line continued as the war neared its end and in its aftermath.

Accordingly, the US accepted initially the security demands to have a sphere of influence in E. Europe for foreign policy purposes—a policy of reassurance as was expressed by Ambassador Harriman (April 1945) and Sec. of State. James Byrnes (October 1945).[73] In other words, the US did not object to regional arrangements for legitimate security interests, only to intervention in internal affairs by the dominant state. Thus the SU had a right to “friendly” neighboring states.

Until late 1946 Truman continued the FDR’s road of belief in GP cooperation. Only slowly and in a rather disorganized way did the US object to SU policies that it deemed threatening to its interests. From late 1945 to the end of 1946 the Truman administration awkwardly moved away from the FDR’s policy of some accommodation toward a more hard-line strategy vis-à-vis the SU; from a perception of SU as a tough ally to a potential opponent.[74]

The public also had a kind of an informal DL orientation. In the eyes of the public, the Cold War came as a surprise to most Americans. There were expectations that issues will be addressed within the UN.[75]

2.1947-9:From DL to DR (Kennan’s Containment-- Restoration of the Balance Of Power)

As a recent major study shows (Miscamble 2007), what is striking is not that Truman abandoned FDR’s policy, but that he sought to maintain it for so long in the face of such unpromising Soviet behavior.[76] Although at several points Truman lost his patience with Stalin, he soon regained it and continued his quest for agreements and understandings, a policy he abandoned only in 1947. However, Truman’s progression from conciliation to containment was not direct and unidirectional. Instead, Miscamble adds weight to the argument previously made by Deborah Larson that at least until early 1947 Truman vacillated, sometimes offering concessions and at other times refusing to yield. Over time, the policy drifted toward the latter, but the progression was not smooth.

The DL approach was already in trouble during 1946,[77] even though its final collapse came about only at the beginning of 1947: “Beginning in 1947, the Americans finally recognized with some clarity that the “hoped-for-new order” of FDR’s and Cordell Hull’s soothing, wartime assurance was “”an illusion.” [78]

The components of the new GS included:

■ 1. Containment: The Truman Doctrine—early 1947—replacing GB as the dominant sea power in the Mediterranean and intervening in European political affairs.[79]

Truman proposed assisting Greece and Turkey so that they could fight Communists. He stated: “I believe that it must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” (cited in Ernest May 1993, p. 2).

■ 2. Later in 1947, the Marshal Plan (Gaddis l987, pp. 56-7)--

US commitment to fund European economic recovery (May 1993, p. 2)

■ One of the motives is to detach the E. Europeans from SU control by offering to them the Marshall Plan aid,[80] though the SU& E. Europeans refuse to take part. Thus, the Plan aids only non-communist and becomes part of the CW.[81]

■ 3. The Berlin crisis and US response to it: when the SU closed the border between the 2 parts of Germany (mid-July 1948), the US responded by a round-the-clock airlift to West Berlin.

■ 4. The establishment of NATO in 1949.

■ 5. Atomic monopoly

■ 6. Serious consideration of preventive air strike against the SU, although not selected eventually and rejected by the Administration (Dueck 2006, p. 86, references in ft. 11, p. 190, also Trachtenberg in Sec. Stu. 2008; Krebs 11).

The Grand Strategy’s Logic:

I. The Truman administration implemented the first stage of the Kennan’s strategy—restoration of the BOP[82] based on a distinction between vital and less vital interests (the 5 centers of power and that apart from the SU itself none other center should be allowed to fall into SU hands)

II. A conception of threats as combining hostility with capability (Gaddis 2005, pp. 58-9):

■ no universalism

■ Selective engagement: strongpoint defense/building up positions of strength

■ the administration shares this view of non-intervention in the mainland of Asia-from Afghanistan to Korea (p. 59).

Means used by the Grand Strategy:

Based on Kennan’s DR advice,1947-9: the focus is on economic means—rehabilitation of Europe, while deterrence and covert actions are secondary (Gaddis 2005, pp. 60-62).

-- economic & technological means employed selectively to reinforce power centers not under SU control

--economic rehabilitation as a key means/priority of containment was accepted by the Administration[83]— even if that meant deferring military preparedness based on an estimation that the SU are unlikely to resort to war in the near future (due to US atomic monopoly and SU control of E. Europe without war)

--—some use of non-economic instruments (Gaddis 2005, pp. 61-bottom—62):

—military deterrence

—covert action

--Multipolarity— the rise of independent centers of power (Europe, Japan) will serve US interests rather than spheres of influence (p. 62), toleration of diversity, though not communism. Thus, the US policy was not control, but denial—non-intervention in internal affairs.[84]

--BOP was ultimately a psychological phenomenon

III. Stage II in Kennan’s strategy: to bring about fragmentation within the international communist movement: DR (Titoism) with some OR tendencies—

1. Marshall aid offered to SU&E. Europe[85]

2. l948: rapprochement with Tito despite the internal character of the regime—due to his breakup with Stalin[86]

3. 1949—encouraging further dissidence in E. Europe: Voice Of America, economic pressures and covert action

4. Tendencies toward OR: NSC 58/2—eliminate SU power from E. Europe even if that meant cooperation with communist regimes as long as they were not subservient to the USSR; even more so in China with Mao.[87]

5. a strategy of using Titoism to roll-back SU influence in the communist world—to encourage movements within world communism which tend to weaken the Kremlin control within the communist world—the US should align with the forces of nationalism to weaken SU imperialism (the same logic as supporting independent centers of power in Europe and Japan).[88]

6. But Kennan was Against OL or OR—cautious strategy: avoiding direct military intervention to prevent communist takeovers and avoid calling for the overthrow of communist governments in E. Europe—because the SU would be willing to go to war for maintaining their sphere of influence in E. Europe (p. 44) Not OL—willingness to work with communist regimes so long as not subordinated to the Soviet Union.

.

III. Stage III in Kennan’s strategy:

Behavior modification of SU policy so that they will learn to live with a diverse world rather than remaking it in their own image; to behave according to the UN charter

A gradual/partial Shift toward a more assertive DR: There were, however, several major actions between 1948-50 toward a more assertive DR opposed by Kennan, who was more moderate than the administration: the establishment of NATO, independent W. German state, US forces in post-occupation Japan and the H-Bomb. Kennan viewed these steps as enhancing the security dilemma by encircling the SU with military alliances These moves were designed to build “situations of strength” (Acheson)—strength came to be viewed as an end in itself, not as a means for a larger end.[89]

3. The Selected Grand Strategy--1950: NSC-68 and Korea—From DR to OR[90]

The transition from DR to OR in the second half of l950 is manifested by the quest for achieving US military superiority. Historians agree that preponderance of power became national policy following the onset of the Korean War.[91] It was a vision that called for ever more armaments. US leaders believed that both the industrial core of Eurasia and the raw-material-producing periphery had to be included in the US sphere for the SU not to win the Cold War. This was a costly strategy.[92] Secretary of State Acheson believed that “through military superiority the US would wrest the initiative from the Kremlin and multiply its options for waging the cold war.” [93]

A key expression of the quest to reach superiority is the enormous jump in the defense budget for 1951 in comparison to previous years.Truman asks for more money for defense for 1951—from $ 13.5 billion to $48.2 – a 257 percent increase (Gaddis 2005, p. 111, top).

Although US officials talked about “restoring the BOP in Europe and Asia (Marshall cited in Gaddis l987, p. 57), in contrast Dueck (2006, p. 83) suggests: under containment U.S. officials did not seek BOP with the SU, but US predominance: big defense spendings & commitments (pp. 88-9); Containment was much beyond BOP—it was not a strategy of balance, but of preponderance (p. 93).

In Preponderance of Power, Leffler highlights the US quest for superiority.[94]

Particularly, two strategic considerations influenced the development of a comprehensive overseas base system:

1. the need for defense in depth—the US must encircle the W. Hemisphere with a defensive ring of outlying bases

2. the need to project US power quickly and effectively against any potential adversary (Leffler in Ikenberry 2005, pp. 85-6)

Both Acheson and Nitze supported a major military build-up: America’s own risk-taking had to be supported with an ever larger array of military capabilities (Leffler l992, p. 372).

The new OR Grand Strategy—the search for superiority-- was guided by the logic of NSC-68, which was accepted by the administration in 9/1950. NSC-68 was essentially an OR document, even though it included also some OL elements, which , however, were less integrated into the actual GS. NSC-68 called for “a build-up of military strength by the United States and its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be superior…, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites.”[95]

What was new about NSC-58 was that it called for more, more and more money to implement the program and to achieve the goals already set out (Leffler l992, p. 356).

■ The US as a revisionist: NSC-68 was not a defensive/status-quo document– but rather the US objective was to retract SU power—to force the SU to recede by creating situations of strength.[96]

The offensive character of NSC-68: was manifested in its divergence from NSC 20/4 (11/1948):

--the projection of military strength to combat the SU threat

--a recommendation for a massive military build-up.[97]

Before Korea, Truman rejects this prescription and tries to reduce military expenditures (Barass 2009, p. 64). The balance on the eve of Korea was of US atomic superiority, but of conventional inferiority—a total of only 7 active divisions, the nearest of them to Korea was in Japan (Barass 2009, p. 68).

But following the N. Korean invasion the Truman Administration initiated a major build-up of US military superiority (Barass 2009, pp. 71-72). This huge military build-up was intended for reaching superiority over the Soviets in reaction to Soviet/sponsored Communist aggression, notably the N. Korean invasion of June 1950: By 1953 US military production was 7 times that of 1950.[98] This is in contrast to Layne’s argument (2006) that the US aspired for hegemony already before the Cold War and irrespective of the Soviet threat.

The Manifestations of Offensive Realism

Two dimensions: A. Strengthen the US

B. Weaken the Opponent—the SU

A. Policies to strengthen the US:

1. The defense budget soon tripled to nearly $50 billion a year (according to Leffler 1992, pp. 372-3—national security obligation would total about $69.5 billion in fiscal year l951, level off to about $ 56 billion for fiscal years 1952-4, and decrease to about $45 billion in l955. Most of the funding would be earmarked to the military establishment.

Both Nitze and Acheson called for more defense spending.[99]

2. Rapid expansion of armed forces from 1.5 million to 3.6 million men (SU expanded its own to 5 millions—great expansion in each of the 3 services: the creation of 17 Army divisions—compared to 10 authorized in June 1950; 322 combatant ships—compared to 238 authorized in June 1950; 70 air wings compared to 48 in June 1950.[100]

3. Uranium and plutonium production increased sharply leading to an increase in the output of atomic weapons.

4. Push for a full war-fighting force by 1954 (Stalin fears attack by 1954).

5. More powerful atomic bombs (7 times than Hiroshima); total of 800 bombs- -- could destroy the SU in 2 hours (by late 1952—SU had 70 bombs and a small no. of slow-moving planes that could reach targets around the SU periphery)

Truman approved another huge escalation of nuclear weapons (Leffler 1992, p. 373, bottom).

6. Major strengthening of NATO (Barass, p, 71, mid-page); including by major military deployment in Europe.

7. 5-1955: W. German rearmament

8. Establishment of world-wide anti-Soviet alliances, which surround/encircle the SU with US bases

9. Stepping-up military help to France in Vietnam

10. Expansion of War Aims: Korea

B. Policies to weaken the SU:

11. OR is augmented by some components of Regime Change(?) (“Liberation”)—including elements of OL in the strategy[101]

Critics of containment argued that is too defensive and didn’t challenge the SU. Such a defensive posture would allegedly only generate further retreats by the US and its allies.

In Undermining the Kremlin Gregory Mitrovich argues that following the Allied victory in World War II, the United States turned its efforts to preventing the spread of Communism beyond Eastern Europe. Gregory Mitrovich argues, however, that the policy of containment was only the first step in a clandestine campaign to destroy Soviet power. Drawing on recently declassified U.S. documents, Mitrovich reveals a range of previously unknown covert actions launched during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Through the aggressive use of psychological warfare, officials sought to provoke political crisis among key Soviet leaders, to incite nationalist tensions within the USSR, and to foment unrest across Eastern Europe. Mitrovich demonstrates that inspiration for these efforts did not originate within the intelligence community, but with individuals at the highest levels of policymaking in the U.S. government starting as early as 1947.

Both books, esp. Grose, highlight the US propaganda and political warfare of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and a variety of cultural and intellectual front organizations and also subversion by agents parachuted behind enemy lines.

Mitrovich focuses on attempts to exploit vulnerabilities in the SU: programs to disrupt Kremlin decision making (Operation Overload), to encourage SU officials to defect (Operation Engross), and to take advantage of SU disorientation after Stalin’s death (Operation Cancellation).

NSC 20/4, approved by Truman in 6/48 called for planting disinformation and supporting armed resistance groups. The main strategy was to take advantage of the “paranoid nature” of the Soviet power structure in order to encourage conflict within the leadership and between the party and the military and the security services and the army (Mitrovich 2000, p. 9).

Specific Policies to Weaken the Opponent:

A. Propaganda: Radio Free Europe established in 1950 (Krebs 12)

B. Psychological warfare: The Eisenhower-Dulles used a roll-back rhetoric as part of “psychological warfare” against the Eat bloc (Gaddis 2005, p. 152-3),

Early 1953—the administration’s abortive proposal for a Congressional “captive nations” resolution—off the record justified by Dulles as a psychological weapon (Gaddis 2005, p. 153).[102]

C. D. Jackson, the president’s special assistant for CW operations was eager to use psychological warfare and covet actions to roll back SU power (Leffler 2007, p. 101 (and the related references)

C. Subversion/ Covert operations in the Eastern bloc[103]

■ Kerbs 2001, p. 9, bottom-10: NSC-7 (3/1948): preservation of US atomic superiority and support for underground movements in the Communist bloc—emphasis on aggressive measures to roll-back the Iron Curtain, but NSC-7 was never formally considered (p. 10 top)

■ Shortly afterward approval of NSC 10/2, which empowered the CIA to conduct covert operations through the OSP (Office of Special Projects later renamed OPC—Office of policy Coordination ) which deals with “subversion against hostile states,, and support for indigenous anti-communist elements…” (Krebs 10).

■ NSC 20/4, approved in revised form by the president in 11/48: a high priority to generate resistance behind the Iron Curtain and to exploit the disparity between Soviet and national communist interests (Krebs 11).

■ NSC-68 – continuation of offensive-minded strategy (Krebs 11-12).

■ CIA support (l948-52) for resistance movements in Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states and Albania, (Krebs 12; Tim Weiner, The CIA—see below)

The general policy objective: to stimulate further Titoism

1949—1952: The operation which went beyond that: to dislodge the Communist regime headed by Enver Hoxha in Albania—parachuted some Albanians into their homeland, but they were captured. It shows how difficult it was to overthrow regimes in police states; it proved impossible to transform the passive resistance of the population into an open rebellion.[104]

The CIA established front organizations for underground political groups and potential subversion, guerrilla activity in E. Europe (Tim Weiner, The CIA…, pp. 32-33);

NSC 10/2 on June 18, 1948 called for covert operations to attack the SU around the world. The Pentagon wanted “guerrilla movements… underground armies.. sabotage and assassination.”

The CIA mission: Roll-back the SU to Russia’s old boundaries and free Europe from communist control (p. 36)

plan to recruit legions of exiles for armed resistance groups to penetrate the iron curtain, though found only a few (37).

In WWII, the US made common cause with communists to fight fascists (44). In the CW, the CIA used fascists to combat communists.—p. 46--the Ukrainian Lebed against SU

By 1949, the US was ready to work with almost any son of a bitch against Stalin. Lebed fit that bill.” (p. 47).

CIA use of former Nazis because they convinced then that they could run missions aimed at the heart of SU power (48-9).

Several recent works showed that, contrary to what had

been believed, the Anglo-American attempts to weaken or overthrow the

Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union were

serious, conducted on a large scale, and central to the strategy for

waging the Cold War.[105] “They also revealed the father of many of these

efforts to have been George Kennan, something that did not fit well with

the picture of him as the mastermind of containment or with his later

critiques of belligerent American policies.”[106] “It is too simple to see this period as

characterized by containment, even if we view this approach as being

quite capacious. From the start, holding the line against further Soviet

expansion vied with the strategy of forcing a retraction of communist

power, and after the split with Yugoslavia, of encouraging other Titos

which meant accepting (at least temporarily) communist governments as

long as they were not subservient to the USSR.”

The new evidence on OL shows Rollback- related policies as early as 1947. This data on US covert actions highlights the offensive component in US GS, but it does not prove the dominance of the OL in the GS. While it aims also at regime change, for practical purposes, it is political/psychological warfare to undermine/weaken the opponent—thus fits nicely with OR.

As Robert Legvold argues, Mitrovich’s characterization that “rollback” was “the be-all of US policy” was “overdrawn.” (FA, May/June 2000, pp. 158-159). Similarly, Garthoff suggests (PSQ 116 (1), 2001, pp. 160-162): Apart from identifying the existence of these operations, Mitrovich has not been able to learn whether they actually led to any active efforts, much less any identifiable results.[107]

The Explanation

The Stages of the evolution of US GS are based on the combined effect of the 2 propositions introduced at the beginning of the paper:

1. 1945-6; Defensive Liberal Grand Strategy due to SU as not threatening (WWII ally) and relatively weak (as a result of the war devastation)

2. 1947: Transition to Defensive Realist due to a bipolar (BP) system (British decline and SU powerful in Europe)—Truman doctrine

3. 1948: growing SU threat> augmented by some components of Offensive Liberal (Mitrovich 2000)

4. 1950: growing Soviet threat (Korea)> from Defensive Realist to Offensive Realist—NSC-68 augmented by some components of Offensive Liberal (psychological warfare)

5. 1955: growing SU capabilities > abandonment of OL (Mitrovich 2000)

6. The GS: Offensive Realist—the quest for and the maintenance of US superiority

The International System as the Broker of the Market Place of Ideas: Explaining by material/international factors

This is demonstrated by causal links between changes in the IR environment (growing SU threat according to its actions and changes in the BOP—GB withdrawal and decline; loss of atomic monopoly, communist successes in Europe and Asia)

and changes in US GS shown, for example, by consecutive time links between the changes in the environment and changes in US GS

Criterion for the systemic influences:

■ The greater the variation/difference/change from decision-makers’ original ideas/views[108]

■ Timing: This change can be reasonably traced to systemic inputs, esp. if the change in views follows the systemic stimulus

■ If views popular at home are turned down following systemic developments

■ Offensive approaches: the greater the gulf between initial willingness to cooperate (joint policemen or cautious balancing/spheres of influence) and eventual conflictual approaches

■ Defensive: the opposite

■ Realist: if initial liberal ideas (multilateralism or promotion of democracy-self-determination) are sidelined

■ Liberal: the opposite

Facing other powerful states that limit their freedom of action, the great powers are compelled to resort to realist strategies. The threatening nature of the system provides incentives to pursue offensive strategies in order to cope with the high threats. An empirical example is the US grand strategy at the height of the Cold War. Thus, while at the end of the Second World War President Franklyn Roosevelt aimed to pursue a defensive liberal strategy (as demonstrated in his idea of the multilateral “Four Policemen” concert of great powers)[109], the US had to change its initial post-war inclination due to systemic pressures, irrespective of the worldview of the person in the White House.[110] Thus, facing a powerful Soviet Union with major offensive capabilities in Europe and perceived aggressive intentions demonstrated in a range of international crises in 1946-1950, namely, a highly threatening environment, the US in the late 1940s and the l950s adopted an offensive realist grand strategy. As Dueck suggests, this strategy “was not a strategy of balance, but of preponderance.”[111] Layne similarly argues that “when World War II ended, the Soviet Union was the only obstacle to U.S. global hegemony, and in the first postwar decade Washington’s principal grand strategic goal was to secure that hegemony by removing the Soviet Union as a peer competitor”.[112] Thus, in the early 1950’s the U.S embarked on a massive program of military buildup and adopted the doctrine of Massive Retaliation. As one historian defines it, “in what was technically peacetime,” the US “embarked on military preparations comparable to those undertaken during the Second World War”.[113] Still, due to the Soviet countervailing power the US was unable to pursue an offensive liberal strategy of “rollback” (that is, regime change in Eastern Europe), even if there was some domestic ideological support for this policy, and had to be content with the offensive realist approach of surpassing Soviet capabilities.

The Explanation for the DL approach in 1945-6: Low SU threat and US superiority

With the end of WWII, the administration was not convinced that the SU posed the most likely threat to the postwar BOP. Rather, FDR believed in cooperation with Russia and Truman continued his policy as late as fall of l945;[114] In fact, the Truman administration proved just as eager as its predecessor to teach Churchill that the days of BOP diplomacy were over. Interestingly, US officials (in the FDR and Truman administrations) were suspicious and critical of Churchill and favorable toward Stalin.[115] Indeed, at the time of FDR’s death, the SU was not seen as an enemy and the US was not frightened by SU military power. The SU was seen as a devastated country: compared to the US, the SU was weak.[116] The military estimated toward the end of WWII that there was a low SU threat. Thus, in 1944 Intelligence estimates downplayed the likelihood of SU hostility even as they acknowledged the probability of SU hegemony (Gaddis l987, p. 27). In 1944-1945 a cautious US military was concerned to prevent/reduce SU fears, although it was determined to prevent SU dominance of Eurasia due to the implications for the balance of power; at any rate, there was a relatively benign view of SU intentions until the end of 1945 (Leffler in Ikenberry 2005, pp. 90-96).

From DL (the 4 policemen) to DR (Kennan’s containment by economic means and nuclear deterrence and hope to build MP world)

The Effects of Changes in the two key IVs on the changing GS:

IV1: SU Power—the rise of bipolar balance: Soviet and American power—

The shift in the BOP leads to a transition from liberal to realist approaches

The BOP at the end of WWII (Leffler 1992, p. 3, bottom--p.4): The transition to a bipolar BOP – the key factor leading to the dominance of realist approaches (defensive or offensive depends on the level of threat)

SU—overwhelming power on the Eurasian land mass (+territorial gains); Germany and Japan-defeated and occupied; France—humiliated; GB-weakened; China engulfed in civil war.

The rising power of the SU and its allies:

■ Dominance of E. Central Europe

■ Massive Conventional/mobile capabilities at the heart of Europe

■ 8/49: acquisition of the atomic bomb

■ 1949—the Chinese Revolution (allied with Stalin)

■ SU power precluded roll-back (Dueck 94-5)

■ US power in a bipolar system:

Leading to Change I—from Dl to DR--The structural transition from a MP to BP world—in contrast to individual/ideological-level explanations

At the end of WWII, as indicated above, the US impulse was to bring the troops home and disband the military as it did following WWI. In 1945-6 Truman and Byrnes didn’t think in structural terms of the new post-WWII world BOP (Miscsamble 2007, p. 263). Truman thought in Wilsonian terms—the UN settles disputes; Byrnes: his own negotiating skills would secure peace.

Both didn’t think that the US would have to decide/select among GSs framed in light of Great Britain’s decline; still thinking in FDR’s terms of GP cooperation; some Americans even thought in terms of US mediating between GB and SU.

Yet, there was a growing recognition by top US decision-makers that the emergence of a BP world eliminated the chances for “the hoped-for new order” envisioned by FDR and Cordell Hull and made it an illusion (Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 726 cited also in Miscamble 2007, p. 309).

A key development in the emergence of a BP world was the British disengagement, esp. from the Eastern Mediterranean. Following the high costs of its key role in WWII, GB became too weak to play its stabilizing role (Miscamble 2007, p. 309). [117] The power vacuum in the Middle East/Eastern Mediterranean—due to the British weakness-- led to the Truman Doctrine and Containment.[118] The British withdrawal from the Greek crisis showed that only the US could carry the burden. In a BP world there is no other power which can contain the SU (Christensen 1996). In this sense, the US commitment was imposed by the international system reinforced by the following post-WWII international developments[119] (

■ No real Bop emerged from the war-- this encourages SU expansion beyond the ideological rivalry:

--SU dominant on the continent following US withdraw—Central European power vacuum encourages SU expansion

-- GB weakness and retraction also induces SU expansion

■ The weakness of Europe and Japan, thus the need for US protection.

■ The weakness of Iran, Turkey and Saudis, who asked for US protection. The initiative came from them, NOT the US. The US responded (notably,Truman to Greece and Turkey in the Truman Doctrine of 3/1947) because allies are important in East-West even if the allies are also concerned about regional threats and even if there was the bias of the domino doctrine (Dueck 106).

■ 10/49: the changing BOP in E. Asia with the communist victory in China.[120]

Kissinger argues that FDR’s “4 policemen” manifested a mismatch between an ideational approach and the logic of the BOP.[121] If the concept were to work, the US would have to be willing to intervene wherever peace was threatened. But, according to FDR, the US was unwilling to maintain the BOP in Europe (US troops would stay only 2 years in Europe) and since GB was unable to do it alone (and also its unilateral actions—like in Greece—were not supported by FDR, but seen as imperialist), that would mean SU dominance in Europe (and Asia);

FDR overestimated the GB capabilities—so that it could handle the defense and the reconstruction of Europe; but eventually, the logic of BOP won and the US was drawn back into Europe, and Japan and Germany were restored.

The transition to bipolarity leads to the collapse of the DL because of the need for each of the superpowers to focus on balancing the capabilities of the other and to contain its potential expansion.

As Waltz points out (2009, p. 29 in Zartman), in bipolarity, as opposed to multipolarity, there was none else to contain the SU. The culture of US FP didn’t suddenly change. The structural change forced the US to embark on the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, NATO, Korean intervention and the subsequent deployment of two divisions to Europe—all within 6 years.

■ This is related to my argument that liberal approaches (both DL/Collective Security and also OL) are more likely to work under liberal hegemony.

While strong domestic sources for DL, a lack of material support in the IR system.

IV2: The growing threat leads to the change from Defensive approaches to an Offensive one[122]

With the end of WWII, the great imponderable was whether the Kremlin wanted more than just security (Leffler 1992, p. 3). Was the SU greedy/revisionist vs. security –seeking/status-quo?[123] The change in US position followed a more greedy/aggressive/non-security unilateral SU behavior (see Jervis’ deterrence model, l976, ch 3).

With the end of WWII, the international conditions were ripe for the emergence of a high SU threat: a victorious large Red Army in the middle of Europe and socio-economic-political instability in the continent. The SU was a revisionist power: both capable and willing to inflict harm on vital US interests. The more threatening SU behavior became, the greater was the willingness of the US to invest in a defense build –up of armament and alliances.

Leading to Change No. 1—from DL to DR:

■ The change in the BOP is reinforced by IV2—the Balance Of Threat.

FDR and Truman initially tried to have a cooperative world.

By the end of 1946 many US officials had, however, reached the conclusion that the Soviet adversarial conduct threatened US security and they wanted to meet the Soviet threat.[124]

■ Stalin presided over SU expansion for creating a wide security belt so long it will not lead to war (Kissinger, Diplomacy 1994, 398). The rise in the Soviet threat is based on Stalin’s failure to keep his word as given at Yalta and as understood by the US—to hold free elections and the establishment of democratic governments in E. Europe (HK, 415).

On top of the ideological gulf, the lack of responsiveness by Stalin to FDR’s and Truman’s accommodative approach (Gaddis 2005, pp. 14, 18) reinforced the sense of the Soviet threat.[125]

The critical difference between post-WWI isolationism and post-WWII global involvement was the severity, clarity and the focus of the threat. The SU by 1947 had become the most plausible source of threat. The US empire arose primarily not from internal causes, as had the SU empire, but from a perceived external danger powerful enough to overcome American isolationism, (Gaddis l997, p. 38, citing Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 10-24 and also Pollard, Economic Security, pp. 246-7).

The willingness component of the SU threat, on top of Soviet capabilities, was based on an aggressive SU behavior. This was manifested, first of all, by the Sovietization of E. Europe (imposing a hostile/threatening ideology which poses a threat to key US values), and also Iran/Turkey

East Europe became the chief indicator, a litmus test of the behavior that could be expected of the SU in the wake of WWII (Krebs 2001, p. 7 citing Leffler 1992).

Why the Soivetization of E. Europe led to fear that SU would seek an expansion elsewhere:[126]

A. Combined with their aggression in other places (see below)

B. SU unilateralism: SU unilateral actions re. the Sovietization of E. Europe even though the US accepted the SU new borders and its sphere of influence in E. Europe.[127]

This acceptance didn’t prevent rising cases of SU unilateralism.

C. Association of domestic oppression with external aggression; the “Sovietization” of E. Europe—SU expansion— was seen by the US both as breaching the right of self-determination (liberalism) AND as a harbinger of more aggressive goals (Miller l995, p. 117)

D. SU was seen as breaking their promises. In contrast to the promises made in Yalta, not only sphere of influence for security/foreign policy purposes, but also domestic oppression in E. Europe. As the military situation turned more in his favor, Stalin progressively raised his terms: in 1941—his key concern was frontiers; in l945—regime change

SU domination of E. Europe—determining the domestic regimes in their sphere of influence—leads to a more hard line in Congress and the public (Gaddis l987, p. 53).

The other cases of unilateral SU behavior which increased the perception of the Soviet threat:

1. IRAN—SU failure to remove their troops by the agreed-upon deadline and its establishment of a puppet regime in Northern Iran. The US forced a Soviet retreat.

2. Soviet demands for bases on the Turkish Straits,

3. The outbreak of civil war in Greece. [128]

Even if one could argue that SU domination of E. Europe shouldn’t have generated security fears because it could be seen as a key Soviet security interest (preventing German invasion), this was not the case with the other cases of Soviet unilateralism and aggression.

SU encroachments on Greece, Turkey and Iran couldn’t be justified by security concerns and thus they led to change in US policy (Gaddis 1997, pp. 31-2?))

In other words, the perception of threat is determined by the behavior of the adversary—whether it is guided by security or expansionist motives.

4.The use of Communist parties, which were loyal to the SU, to take over not only E. Europe (Tony Judt, Post-War), but also the growing power of Communist parties in W. Europe (Leffler 1992, p.7), E. Mediterranean and China.

5. Underlying Systemic Sources of Threat--Uncertainty Under Anarchy: The more fundamental problem here was the instability and uncertainty and even chaos which prevailed in the aftermath of WWII in certain regions—under international anarchy-- and could be taken advantage of by the USSR through the local communist parties.

According to this systemic logic, neither Truman nor Stalin wanted a cold war; it came about because conditions in the IR system created risks that Truman and Stalin could not accept and opportunities they could not resist. The threat for the US was derived from chaos/socio-economic collapse and instability and thus the rise of Communism in Europe, which was seen as a tool of the Kremlin;[129] Thus, the Marshall Plan was seen as an appropriate response (Leffler 2007, p. 62).

There was also a concern about instability in the Third World—fear that Stalin would capitalize on these conditions (Leffler 1992, 102).[130]

A systemic account—focusing on the security dilemma, mutual fear and action-reaction dynamics— highlights that the source of US GS was not the evil character of Stalin and his regime, but because the USSR could take advantage of the turmoil in Europe (and de-colonization in the 3rd world), which afforded him opportunities to expand his power, esp. the greatest threat—Germany joining the SU.[131] The US feared that the economic resources of Europe would fall under SU control which would pose a threat to US free economy and provide opportunities for SU to expand in 3rd world (Leffler, 2007, p. 69, 2nd para).

As a result, the US offensive—The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the re-building of W. Germany—was a response to IR anarchy, upon which the SU could capitalize. On the other hand, Stalin’s view of the Marshall plan as a threat, which would isolate the SU, leads to the tightening of control of E. Europe and increase defense expenditures. [132]

Certain post-WWII structural elements encouraged a mutual security dilemma:[133]

Vacuums of power in Central Europe and N.E. Asia after the defeat of Germany and Japan. Japan and Germany: concerns about revival of nationalism or independent neutrality might lead t their alliance with the SU (Leffler 1992, p. 8). (The prescription, bottom of p. 8-9: they could remain independent of the SU only if viable trade within the free world)

■ The effects of de-colonization on the world BOP

Domestic politics as an intervening variable:[134]

Truman acted in the IR arena because he feared Stalin would exploit conditions to aggrandize SU power, not because he felt a groundswell of public opinion demanding new foreign policy initiatives. Yet, the threat is posed in ideological terms to secure congressional support, thus generating an unintended ideological crusade (top of. 72)

The threat in the eyes of the public was ideological: Stalin’s regime was ruthless and was imposing “godless” communist regimes on E. European countries from where many Americans came (p. 72).

p. 72, 2nd para: the threat to US interests—what is at stake—“if Western Europe goes beyond the Iran Curtain… consequences for the US: economic, infringements on domestic freedoms

A Comprehensive study concluded that the SU acted unilaterally and that it was unwilling to cooperate in maintaining the BOP. Still, Truman responded cautiously to SU unilateralism. The US was willing to give to the SU the benefit of the doubt for many months.[135]

There was an accumulation, however, of indisputable evidence of SU unilateral expansionism.[136]

Still, a few competing theories explaining SU unilateralism emerged:

1. Regime--totalitarian; Gaddis 1987, 35-36: —common US belief—and of Truman (like Wilson and FDR, bottom of 36)-- that totalitarian regimes are aggressive in FP

2.ideological—communism (Gaddis 1987, p. 37) -- Most Americans were concerned about SU Communism and the vanguard of world revolution—post-WWII indicators

5. Insecurity—can be overcome by Western reassurance

:

One may argue that it was an idea-- Kennan’s long telegram on 2/46 (Gaddis 2005, p. 19; see also Gaddis l987, p. 39), which brought about the change in US GS. In the long telegram he argued that reassurance by the US will not affect the SU: autocracy+ ideology> treats the world as hostile;

The telegram reinforced the growing tendency in the US to see SU behavior with suspicion—thus no practical difference between defensive and offensive motives.[137]

However, the key to the change in GS seems to be empirical: it became increasingly clear that SU unilateral behavior was not responsive to West’s gestures of restraint and goodwill during and immediately after the war[138]

The US feared of a Germany under SU control (the SU turned down US proposal to keep Germany united and disarmed and not under control of any of the GPs) served to make the idea of a divided Europe and Germany more acceptable for the US (Gaddis l987, pp. 54-5).

Military aspect of containment is needed: 1/48-- Ernst Bevin alerts the US to SU expansion and the need for the West to defend against it—reinforced by:

4. The 2/48 coup in Czechoslovakia > Marshall Plan is not enough—a need for an explicit military guarantee (Gaddis l987, p. 62).

The key point is that the policy change was a reaction to external events and not the result of a certain idea: Truman and Acheson gave the SU the benefit of the doubt well into the early postwar era…: Truman and other US officials updated and adjusted their beliefs in response to the facts, as any good scientists would. Truman’s shifting positions were not determined by ideology—liberalism or capitalism.[139]

Miscamble 2007, “Truman never self-consciously decided to transform the foreign policy content and approach he inherited from FDR. Instead, external circumstances drove the creation of the Truman’s administration foreign policy” (Miscamble 2007, p. 308). The Truman doctrine was not born as a result of ideas such as those of Kennan, but rather as a result of the obstinacy and adventurism of Stalin and Molotov—such as the Prague Coup and the Berlin Blockade—leading eventually to NATO in 1949.[140]

Gaddis 2005, p. 56: fear that SU could become superior if take over the big industrial centers in Europe and Asia—either by armed aggression or by political and subversive means—would make the SU superior which would then threaten the US security and core values

1946: The System as a broker of ideas--Dueck, p. 99: “By 2/46, SU behavior seemed to confirm that the hard-liners were right. The USSR seemed to be acting in an aggressive and heavy-handed manner, not only in E. Europe but also in Turkey and Iran…”

-- Advocates of cooperation were marginalized (Benny: due to Su aggressive behavior)

Truman was genuinely alarmed by the threat of SU expansion.—he endorsed a hard-line approach early in l946 (references in fts. 85, 86, pp. 195-6)

■ Despite US preference for limited liability (Dueck 2006) international pressures of SU threat and weakness of Japan and Europe (Bipolarity) compelled the US to take care of European and Japanese security (Dueck 100-5), esp. GB decline—the transition to BP—no buck-passing (Christensen 1996, pp. 34-6).

■ 1947: rigged elections in Hungary and Poland

■ 2/1948: coup in Czechoslavakia > 1. most W. Europeans seek military alliance with the U > NATO (Dueck 2006, p. 102) > makes possible European integration

a. Truman pushes for passage of the legislation supporting the Marshall Plan (Leffler 2007, p. 68)

b. Berlin crisis 1948-9-- the airlift

Ernest May (1993), p. 3: W. European fear of the SU threat/military power in Europe> 1949—US joins NATO

1949—the SU atomic test> Truman gives money to increase atomic production + the H-bomb (May 1993, top pf p. 4)

■ 6/1948-5/49: the Berlin Blockade

■ SU mobile tank division in Germany: : 175 divisions—5 times as many as the US, GB and France combined> Europeans felt threatened by this huge force > NATO (E. May, NSC-68, p. 3 (bottom).

■

■ Iran/Turkey encroachments

■ 1949: the loss of atomic monopoly—Gaddis 2005, p. 80: Truman sees it as the US becomes inferior since the Us relied more heavily on NW for the BOP>>thus a need to build the H-bomb/super bomb

■ Barass (2009): 10/49: changing BOP in E. Asia with the communist victory in China

Gaddis 2005, p. 81: gradual/partial Shift toward OR: Thee moves (NATO…) build “situations of strength” (Acheson)—strength came to be viewed as an end in itself, not as a means for a larger end

The reasons for this gradual shift:,

Gaddis, pp. 81 (bottom)-83: Changes in capabilities:

1. The “loss” of China> the rest of Asia more vulnerable;

2. The loss of atomic monopoly> US deterrence is less credible to counter SU conventional force superiority

p. 83: a shift in the perception of power relations

pp. 83 (bottom)-84: rising SU threat: the Czech coup, Berlin blockade, purges in E. Europe…

p. 84: domestic constraints on negotiations with the Russians

negotiations would challenge the credibility of the US commitment to contain SU aggression.

III. From DR to OR—military superiority

The Shift due to external-material input

■ The key: 1950: N. Korean invasion—military aggression through international boundaries, supported by SU/China > the implementation of NSC-68

Before Korea: While

1949—the CW seemed to thaw

Truman—the Fair Deal—focus on domestic spending rather than defense spending.

Proposed for defense—14.3 billion for fiscal year l950; 13.5 for 1951[141]

Gaddis 210, bottom—

4/1950—Even after reading NSC-68, Truman was still committed to lower the defense budget—Korea changed all of that—“providing the shock necessary to shift the budgetary arguments of NSC-68 from the realm of theory to that of practical necessity.”

NSC-68’s advocates did not have to work as hard as anticipated to win support for it thanks to unexpected help from SU—Stalin authorized the N. Korean invasion—this event ensured the implementation of NSC-68.

Truman had not formally endorsed NSC-68 at the time the war erupted in Korea and Congress was reluctant to fund it; the invasion caused both things to happen.[142]

■ NSC-68 – accepted by the administration in 9/1950 --ONLY after the N. Korean invasion, which also made possible Congress funding it (Gaddis 2005, p. 107), NSC-68 implemented in the following months and years—much less likely in the absence of the events of June 1950_- Korean War as the start of global containment? (Gaddis 1974 argues so—cited in Larson l985, p. 4, n. 1).

■ Gaddis 2005, pp. 106-115

p. 106, bottom—NSC-68’s advocates did not have to work as hard as anticipated to win support for it thanks to unexpected help from SU—Stalin authorized the N. Korean invasion—this event ensured the implementation of NSC-68.

Truman had not formally endorsed NSC-68 at the time the war erupted in Korea and Congress was reluctant to fund it;

The invasion caused both things to happen (p. 107).

The Korean war seemed to validate a number of NSC-68’s key conclusions:[143]

■ all interests had become equally vital

■ any shift in the BOP could undermine the entire international structure

■ The attack on Korea made it vital, even if it was peripherial before, in order to maintain US credibility

■ The SU might resort to war by proxy, even in the face of US superiority (this assumption shared by Kennan)

■ P. 108:

■ Present US capabilities were insufficient: nuclear weapons do not deter lower-level aggression; absence of conventional means necessary to cover all contingencies; questioning in Europe of US credibility—much less available capabilities there than near Korea

■ US strategy in Korea was consistent with NSC-68

■ P. 109: But contradictions in NSC-68:

Escalation avoidance (limited war) vs. credibility/resolve:

The 38th parallel—to cross it—escalation; not to—lack of resolve

Still, Truman administration in Korea-according to NSC-68: both resist proxy aggression and avoid escalation

Korea increased the willingness to spend money on defense—Gaddis 210, bottom—

4/1950—Even after reading NSC-68, Truman was still committed to lower the defense budget—Korea changed all of that—“providing the shock necessary to shift the budgetary arguments of NSC-68 from the realm of theory to that of practical necessity.”

p. 111, top: Truman asks for more money for defense:

for 1951—from $ 13.5 billion to $48.2 – a 257 percent increase

Leffler, p. 18: The Korean War accelerated changes in US tactics

The Threat prevented neo-isolationism (Dueck 94)

The invasion > fear in Europe of SU invasion to W. Europe> demand for US deployment > ground US deployment in l951 (Dueck 103)

Barrass (2009) p. 64: While Truman rejected initially NSC-68 recommendation of preponderance, “as it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union was not a status-quo power, but a global competitor, it was difficult for Truman to sustain his restrained approach.”

p. 67, bottom, mid of p. 68: SU approval and aid to the N. Korean invasion of the South

The combined effect of East Bloc’s moves produces a high-level threat:

■ The Prague coup

■ The Berlin Blockade

■ the communist takeover of China

■ June 25, 1950: invasion of S. Korea

V. Intervening Variables – magnify the threat and the domestic willingness to sacrifice/ invest to reach superiority

--Domestic character/ideology: anti-communism:

opposition to spheres-of-influence agreement with SU (Dueck 2006, pp. 83, 88; Gaddis;1987, p. 51: US aversion to a sphere of influence agreement in Europe due to the fear of a resurgent isolationism in the US in case of such an arrangement, but in contrast to Dueck it was more of anti-communism than liberalism—thus, the anti-democratic behavior in Iran…

■ Use of emotional symbols--Because of Domestic politics, Truman had to justify his request for aid to Turkey and Greece in terms of “freedom” against “totalitarianism” rather than in terms of the BOP for public consumption (Larson l985, p. 329)—Domestic influenced Truman’s presentation of the containment policy, but were not sufficient to cause the US to enter a Cold War against the SU

Larson 330: But domestic politics didn’t cause the shift to CW policies

The democratic coalition preferred continuous US-SU cooperation

■ Larson, p. 331: DMs perceptions-- Truman/US CW belief system—the domino theory (bandwagoning) aggravated the Cold War

■ Ernest May (l993), pp. 8, bottom--9: domestic pressures toward anti-communism, culminating with McCarthyism.

VI. Failure of competing theoretical explanations:

These theories are Euro-centric, overlooking 3rd world: illiberal preponderance

My argument for the CW period—OR is more relevant than in any of these theories explained by certain factors of the IR system (BOP and high threat) and accordingly also more relevant in the CW than in later periods—according to changes in the systemic factors

The Cold War: Competing Explanations of US GS

Sources for geopolitical interpretation of containment:

--Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 25-71

■ Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire, pp. 418-85

■ Christensen, Useful adversaries, pp. 32-76

Title: IR Theory and US GS in the CW: DR, DL, OL or OR? Balancing, Hegemonic or liberal?

Introduction

Which GS did the US follow at the height of the CW? Some of the most sophisticated answers were presented in the last few years by leading IR theorists who introduce both an innovative theoretical model and rich empirical data to support their claims. While accepting that they make major contributions to both theory and empirical research of US national security, they overlook the approach which can best (even if not perfectly) describe US GS in that period as well as the combined effect of the 2 systemic/material factors which best explain the dominance of this approach: the BOP and the BOT.

■ Competing Theoretical Models: Their theories see the US GS as OL (Layne—the hard lifting is done by 2nd image—open door) ) DR (Mearshiemer—as Layne defines him re. the US) or DL (Dueck or Ikenberry)

Failure of competing theoretical explanations:

■ These theories are Euro-centric, overlooking 3rd world: illiberal preponderance

■ Dueck: to remake the world in the liberal self-image of the US, but to do it on the cheap—without the allocation of appropriate resources (“limited liability”—a desire to limit costs of international commitments far more than most realist theories would predict).

Intervening variables: elite belief systems

In the US case: belief in spreading democracy and open markets as a way to make the US more secure

Dueck—for the CW:

1. Isolationism – rejected due to SU threat and US systemic responsibility

2. rollback—rejected due to SU power

3. spheres of influence—rejected due to liberalism (I argue due to systemic imperatives—on the difficulty to cooperate with Stalin—Gaddis 2005, pp. 16-18, bottom of 19-23; SU threat and in fact there was a tacit agreement)

4. containment due to international pressures (and ok for liberalism)

My critique of Dueck—DL—“containment was influenced by liberal assumptions” (p. 89).

My critique: illiberal behavior—Iran..

Dueck: my argument that the GS was realist, not liberal

Why not a liberal GS: anti-democratic regimes,

not coming to aid of democratic revolutions,

supporting authoritarian regimes,

not pursuing multilateralism (Concert, Collective Security) with the SU (Dueck pp. 90-91), Gaddis’ explanation: lack of responsiveness by Stalin (2005, p. 18).

realist-material threats and power are the cause of support for democracies in Europe

Illiberal behavior in Third World

Dueck: US could reach a spheres-of-influence agreement with SU, but didn’t due to liberal domestic constraints and beliefs of DMs—

1. it reached a tacit arrangement due to systemic pressures

2. at any rate the arrangement could apply only to Europe

3. the Sovietization of E. Europe was a signal of aggressive intentions on the part of Stalin and a high threat, which made it difficult to reach agreements with him beyond the question of liberal ideology even if this fact made it more difficult to reach an agreement

Dueck’s limited liability: in pp. 100-4 he admits that despite of US desire for it, international pressures compelled the US to much greater commitments such as NATO 1(949) and ground deployments in Europe (l951)

■ Ikenberry: to maintain IR order through US multilateral leadership of Inter. Institutions

. My critique of Ikenberry: true vs. W. Europe, not SU (Dueck 2006, pp. 90-91), and the Third World

Ikenberry (and Dueck?): variants of Defensive liberalism

valid vis-a-vis the West but not the SU, including illiberal, non-democratic policies (regime change toward non-democracy)

Liberal toward to West (Marshall plan, etc.) made possible by material factors re. to the Cold War (Leffler 1992, p. 17, 3rd para; Dueck 103)

■ Mearsheimr: to secure the US by regional hegemony in the Americas and off-shore balancing vis-à-vis Europe and Asia. Due to the “stopping power of water” it is impossible to reach global hegemony and the Us can’t dominate Eurasia (2001, p. 41). The best outcome for the US is regional hegemony in the Western Hemsphere and to prevent the rise of a hegemon in Europe and Asia through offshore balancing— military deployment and alliances in these regions only when there is a danger of a rising hegemon which the regional great powers are unable to balance. Thus, the US intervened in WWI, WWII and the Cold War when there was a serious danger to the European BOP and the local powers were unable to maintain the balance.

Mearsheimer’s Critique of Layne: Accordingly, following the defeat of aspirant hegemon in Europe- Germany—the US quickly demobilized and by 1950 only about 80, 000 US troops were left in Europe (2001, p. 256).

But as the Cold War intensified (Benny: a need to define/specify more clearly the IVs), the US formed NATO (l949) and reluctantly increased considerably its forces on the continent—upto 427, 000 in l953 and no less than 300, 000 during the CW and also deployed NW during the 1950s and early 1960s.

The explanation (in contrast to Layne): SU control of E. Europe and its ability to occupy the rest of Europe (power and threat)

Offshore balancing also toward Asia (pp. 257-261)—no deployment so long no real threat of a rising hegemon without the ability to balance it.

p. 260: Deployment only as the threat of Japan becoming the hegemon becomes real in Fall l941 and esp. in response to Pearl-Harbor.

And then during the CW (pp. 260-61): the rise of SU as a potential hegemon with no local GP to contain it > forces the US to contain it in Asia

■

Layne’s critique of Mearsheimer re. the US as an offshore balancer (2005, pp. 23-38):

■ pp. 25, 26: in the 1990s rather than disengaging, the US aims to maintain extra-regional hegemony, discourages the rise of independent centers of power such as the EU:

The alliance with Europe/Japan aimed at reaching global US preponderance (p. 55, citing Leffler l992, pp. 17, 498). The US didn’t want them to endorse independent FP (p. 56 citing Leffler).

■ -- since the early 1940s the US aspired to reach international hegemony (Layne 2006, Chs. 2-5)

■ As an offshore the US should have withdrawn a long time ago since The SU threat disappeared already in the mid-1950s and Europe could defend itself since the l960s

■ US plays an hegemonic role as peacetime regional “pacifier” in Europe, Asia and the Gulf—critical for US economy

■ Prevented Germany &Japan to become a GP

■ Pacified French-German relations (For Mearsheimer it was a by-product of containment of the SU)

My critique of Mearseimer--The problem of Mearseimer: search for hegemony, no off-shore

DR (Mearsheimer ): -- the US pursued hegemony, not off-shore balancing

Not spheres-of-influence

his theory is defensive realism for the US -- off-shore balancing

But: the US aspired for superiority (Leffler 1992, pp. 15-19) and conducted a larger global containment strategy with extensive peacetime military commitments to other nations and a highly interventionist global military policy (Art 2003, p. 178)

■ Layne: “Open Door” through US “extra-regional hegemony”: demand that other states open their economies, adopt US ideas and institutions and comply with US hegemony—economic Open Door (maintaining an open international economic system) and Political Open Door (spreading democracy and liberalism abroad) (2006, pp. 30-31).

■ In the CW: maintain economic access by the US and dominate he European allies (Layne 57); containment of the SU—a secondary/minor objective.

Layne’s IVs: The system makes it possible (a permissive factor); the motivations come from Open Door economic and ideological expansion--economic interests and ideological fears of US dominant elites

Economic and ideological concerns drove the extra-regional hegemonic expansion

Layne’s account of the CW (2006, pp. 51-70):

p. 56—The SU threat: The perceived threat was not SU power but political instability, social dislocation and nationalism following the War and de-colonization which can also be taken advantage by SU, but could exist also in the absence of the SU

Thus, the post-l946 changing assessments of the SU threat were based on US intentions and not on the SU’s – US disregarded signs of SU weakness, and moderation (Leffler cited in p. 56, n. 32)

Mearsheomer’s Critique of Layne: Accordingly, following the defeat of aspirant hegemon in Europe- Germany—the US quickly demobilized and by 1950 only about 80, 000 US troops were left in Europe (2001, p. 256).

But as the Cold War intensified (Benny: a need o define/specify more clearly the IVs), the US formed NATO (l949) and reluctantly increased considerably its forces on the continent—upto 427, 000 in l953 and no less than 300, 000 during the CW and also deployed NW during the 1950s and early 1960s.

The explanation (in contrast to Layne): SU control of E. Europe and its ability to occupy the rest of Europe (power and threat)

Offshore balancing also toward Asia (pp. 257-261)—no deployment so long no real threat of a rising hegemon without the ability to balance it.

p. 260: Deployment only as the threat of Japan becoming the hegemon becomes real in Fall l941 and esp. in response to Pearl-Harbor.

And then during the CW (pp. 260-61): the rise of SU as a potential hegemon with no local GP to contain it > forces the US to contain it in Asia

My critique of Layne: hegemony but not due to 2nd image/Open Door, but response to security threats

OL: in occupied important countries (Germany and Japan), but not beyond

Layne: his theory is OL for the US (at least in Europe?)--the quest for superiority (the arms build-up, alliances, interventions, commitments) was a reaction to Soviet threat/ behavior/Cold War, not planned in advance, even if magnified by US ideology

Leffler (l992, pp. 15-6: Initially containment meant preponderance only in a defensive sense -- “At the end of the war, US officials certainly had no desire to retain substantial military forces overseas…” The US conducted rapid demobilization

■ the Europeans wanted US hegemony and NATO, including free-market and democracy (Dueck 2006, p. 100); it was the US Congress which was reluctant to fund ongoing troop deployments overseas

■ GB withdrawal leads to the Truman Doctrine

■ Gaddis, p. 23: US demobilization/defense cuts continue in l947

■ Dueck 100-102: US didn’t want extensive involvement in Europe but was forced/dragged/compelled by systemic pressure—W. Europeans fears (from SU and Germany) and pressure for an alliance and after Korea—for a forward deployment

■ Based on Leffler, Layne (p. 56) underestimates the SU threat—see Trachtenberg, cited in Layne, p. 224, n. 27; Gaddis 2005, pp. 55-56

■ Gaddis 2005, p. 62-63: The US preferred independent centers of power overseas—both in Europe and Japan, though not controlled by Communist parties—in contrast to Layne’s argument about the desire to dominate them

Gaddis: the US interest was not to dominate other power centers, but to deny their control by others

Gaddis l987, p. 58 (bottom): US was interested in a MP world—in contrast to Layne

Gaddis, p. 59: the US is in favor of non-intervention in domestic affairs of its allies, including cooperation with Socialists in W. Europe

The US was invited by the Europeans; the US didn’t have to impose its will

APPENDIX

The Revisionist School of historians, summarized in Larson l985, pp. 10-12:

Open Door policy—creating an “informal empire” based on free trade explained by US leaders’ drive for access and control over foreign markets and raw materials—influenced by leaders’ world view

Critiques, pp. 13-4: overlooking evidence that US leaders were influenced by security/BOP concerns; no GS guiding policy-makers

Summary of Gaddis’ view of the origins of the CW in Larson l985, p. 15

My critique of the other models: Don’t explain variations/changes in US GS

■ My theory: 1st wave Off. Realism: quest for global preponderance for security in response to BOP and threats

Key Competing theories which explain US GS in the CW

| |Objectives |Means |School |Regional focus |Problems |

| | | | |in the CW | |

|Dueck |Spread liberalism |--Cheap (defensive) |Defensive liberalism|Europe |--illiberal behavior |

| | |--Realism explains why roll-back and | | |tacit shperes |

| | |isolationism were not selected, | | |--not cheap (due to BP& threats |

| | |--liberalism explains why | | |Spheres-of-influcne: Stalin |

| | |spheres-of-influence not selected | | |Behavior prevented it |

| | |-- containment—the only GS that matched IR| | |Threatened |

| | |and liberalism | | |It-signal |

| | | | | |of threat |

|Layne |Open Door (economic |Extra-regional hegemony |Off. Liberalism |Europe |--hegemony imposed on a reluctant US by the IR |

| |Liberalism) | | | |system (European weakness, GB decline and SU |

| | | | | |threat), not due to open door |

| | | | | |-- security threats are the IVs |

|Mearsheimer |Affect the distribution of |--Regional Hegemony (in the W. Hemisphere)|Off. Realism in the |Europe |US seeks hegemony, not balance in Europe and |

| |capabilities |--Off-shore balancing re. Europe/Asia |Americas; | |world-wide due to high security threats |

| |(for | |Defensive Realism in| |And the BP |

| |Material security) | |Europe | |structure— |

| | | | | |US responsibility |

|Ikenberry |Promote (liberal) |US Multilateral leadership of |Defensive Liberalism|Europe |--multilateralism re. the West, not outside |

| |international order |International Institutions | | |--unilateral vs. the SU |

| | | | | |--material/security factors are the Ivs which |

| | | | | |lead to the multilateral leadership |

|Miller |US preponderance/ |Unilateral-exclusionary vs. the SU (the |1st wave off. |World -wide |BP & SU threat explain US GS—BP--system |

| |1st wave off. realism |Marshall Plan, NATO); multilateral vs. |realism | |compells US to intervene—no other to pass her |

| | |Western allies | | |buck-GB decline |

| | | | | |--SU high threat leads to quest for |

| | | | | |preponderance |

| | | | | |-- liberalism—intervening, not IV |

Potential/available GS to the US (see above according to the various authors):

Layne:

1. Isolationism – the BOP in Eurasia is irrelevant to US security

2. offshore balancing—prevent the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon

But both call, in practice, for no US military presence in Eurasia (no military alliances, no deployment) so long as there is no rising hegemon

3. selective engagement—seeks to maintain a MP distribution.

See Art (2003), pp. 121, 160-1.

4. hegemony—seeks to maintain an imbalance of power in Eurasia in America’s favor

But both 3 and 4 call, in fact, for an ongoing forward US deployment in Eurasia—more than maintain BOP and to promote Open Door (????), though selective engagement – is only for selective presence

Mearsheimer: Hegemony – in the GP’s region (and potentially in adjacent regions); or offshore—in overseas regions

■ My model: 1st wave OR (Zacharia, Gilpin)—esp. GS vis-à-vis the SU and also the sources of support, alliance and multilateralism with Europe

My argument: more OR—vis-à-vis the peer competitor-- than in the leading new theories, and more OR than in the other periods, although some variations related to the other GSs:

■ OL: hegemony, occupation, high threat: Germany, Japan

■ DL: vis-a-vis the West, liberalism aggravates the conflict (but not up to OL—roll-back and not in the Third World)

■ DL: non-intervention in E. Europe revolutions

Indicators: --balancing or superiority?

--Patterns of democracy promotion/regime change: rejection of roll-back, anti-democratic coups, non-intervention in favor of democrats

--Unilateral vs. multilateral vis-a-vis the SU?

Sources for realist interpretation: Dueck 2006, ft. 32, p. 192

-----------------------

[1] Miscamble (l993), p. xiv, citing also Larson (l985).

[2] For useful overviews and citations, see Jeffery Taliaferro, “Security-Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000/01): 128-161, and Layne, The Peace of Illusions.

[3] On soft power and multilateralism, see Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[4] On the philosophical roots of this enduring debate within liberalism regarding the use of force to spread democracy, see Thomas C. Walker, “Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of Intervention,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 449-468.

[5] Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 252-257, esp. 256-257.

[6] Layne, 2006, p. 51.

[7] Ibid, p. 55.

[8] See ibid, p. 57.

[9] Ibid, p. 61.

[10] Dueck, 2006, p. 82.

[11] Ibid, pp. 82-83.

[12] Ibid, p. 83.

[13] Ibid, p. 88.

[14] Ibid, p. 89.

[15] Ikenberry, 2001, p. 163.

[16] Ibid, p. 170.

[17] Ibid, pp. 175-184.

[18] On the Level of analysis—and the Cold War, see Larson (l985, pp. 18-23).

[19] For an individual-level explanation of Truman, see HK

[20] See “The Hawk and the Dove,” p. 59.

[21] On the Long Telegram, see Miscamble (1992, pp. 25-28).

[22] Gaddis l972, pp. 24-31; l987, pp. 23-4; 2005, pp. 10, 12); Larson , pp. 71-76; A. George, “Domestic constraints on regime change in US foreign policy,” pp. 233-59; Ikenberry 2005, p. 119; HK, Diplomacy—index-- Four Policeman concept, including sub-titles—failure of—pp. 420-22… Truman and—pp. 426-7…); An important new source: Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (Cambridge, 2008, Paperback).

[23] Larson, p. 3.

[24] Larson, pp. 3, 71-6.

[25] H. Kissinger (Diplomacy, 1994), p. 395

[26] Gaddis 1972, pp. 3, 24-25

[27] (HK bottom 400-top 401

[28] A major mistake in the eyes of HK, 405 bottom-408: a negotiated spheres-of-influence agreement could have prevented the emergence of satellite orbit in E. Europe and could have led to Finlandization of E. Europe.

[29] Larson 73

[30] Gaddis l987, pp. 23-4

[31] Larson, p. 3.

[32] Gaddis l987, p. 51.

[33] Leffler (1992, pp. 372-80, passim, 448, 561, 491, 517; 2007, pp. 99-101, 145); Gaddis 2005, pp. 153-4; Dueck (2006, p.p. 85-6):

[34] Leffler 2007, pp. 99-100 (ft. 43, p. 483): Dulles: The Cold War would be lost if the US did not go on the offensive—seeking to “roll back” communism (Dulles, War Or peace, p. 163, 74-78; Immerman, Dulles, pp. 1-34).

[35] See Krebs, pp. 16-18.

[36] Critics of containment are summarized in Kovrig (The Myth of Liberation, pp. 99-111).

[37] See Krebs (14-15) who also cites Tafts’ book A Foreign Policy for Americans, pp. 103-13). Senator Taft was a more moderate OL supporter rather than the roll-backer as noted in Krebs (2001) and Dueck 2006).

[38] See also R. Garathoff in PSQ (see below in the Selected GS).

[39] This paragraph is based on H. Diplo/ISFF book review, Dec. 10, 2010.

[40] That ambiguity over how much intervention

was enough is in part the product of a second ambiguity that permeates

the view of many realists and especially that of GBS: Whether realism is

descriptive or prescriptive.

[41] such as notably Walter Lippmann, The Cold War (l947)-- summarized in Larson (l985, p. 7, 2nd paragraph). The Realist views summarized in Larson, pp. 7-8 (citations of all their works--, p. 9, ft. 8; For example, Halle, based on his book—Cold War as History-- L. Halle, The Cold War as History (l967), pp. 102-6: the postwar need to develop a realist policy:

1. States should not be divided between inherently “aggressors” (Germany and Japan) vs. “peace-loving” (Russia)

2. The need to re-establish a BOP by filling the remaining power vacuums and thereby limiting the further expansion of the Russian empire

3. Churchill (March 5, 1946): Iron Curtain between a Russian sphere and the free West

4. Churchill: The Russians respect most military strength

pp. 106-8: Kennan’s containment

[42] This analysis is largely based on the Assumptions of George Kennan, according to Gaddis (2005, pp. 24-52). See also Miscamble (l992); Stephanson..

[43] Kissinger (1994, p. 395, 414—bottom of the page).

[44] Trachtenberg (History and Strategy, 103-12, esp. 103-7; Sec. Studies 1-3/2007). See also Dueck 2006, p. 86; (for another citation, see Krebs, p. 127, ft. 22—an article by Hamel in Diplomatic History, summer 1990).

[45] The distinction between roll-back (OL) and preventive war (off. Realism): Regime/intentions vs. capabilities.

[46] This analysis is largely based on Gaddis (2005, pp. 89-95).

[47] See Miller (1995, 106-7): Related to the tension between balancing vs. bandwagoning as the dominant image of international politics

[48] Mitrovich (2000, p. 12, last para): NSC-68 as a policy to achieve nuclear superiority.

[49] Gaddis, pp. 95-103

[50] Talbott (1988, p. 57 top).

[51] (Talbott 57)

[52] (Gaddis 2005, p. 97-8).

[53] Gaddis 2005, p. 99.

[54] Although the preventive war option was “advocated with much more vigor” than two of four alternatives discussed in the report (Trachtenberg 1991, p. 108, ft. 25).

[55] Gaddis 2005, p. 104,

[56] (Krebs bottom of p. 11 and p. 127, 2nd half of ft. 22 and ft. 23)

On NSC-68, see Ernest R. May, American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68.

[57] Brief overview in Nye, The making of America’s Soviet Policy, pp. 67-72

[58] Gaddis (2005, pp. 10-15)

[59] Gaddis (2005, p. 16).The argument about Truman’s continuation of FDR’s conciliatory policy until the end of 1946 is documented most comprehensively in the recent study of Miscamble (2007; his ch. 7 is on the period from late 1945 to late 1946).

[60] Although with Byrnes as Truman’s foreign minister, the policy moved to a greater reliance on bargaining and horse-trading. Leffler (2007, Bottom of p. 4), for his part, argues that during l946 Truman and Stalin wavered between toughness and conciliation.

[61] Gaddis (l987), ch. 3 on spheres of influence, p. 50, 5th paragraph

[62] Larson l985, p. 74

[63] Gaddis (l987, pp. 52-3).

[64] Leffler (2007), p. 42-4: Truman’s willingness/interest to collaborate with Stalin at the end of the war: “Stalin, Truman thought, was someone you could deal with. He would respect American power. Agreement was still possible.” Leffler 2007, p. 56 (2nd full para): Truman did not seek a showdown with the SU/ sever the wartime coalition… continued the de-mobilization of US forces…

p. 57: also the new secretary of state—George Marshall—did not want confrontation

[65] Krebs 2001, p. 8.

[66] Wallace tried to revive it in spring/summer 1946 (Gaddis l987, p. 39, top).

[67] (Larson l985, pp. 69-70).

[68] On FDR belief in reassurance, see Larson (l985, 75-6).

[69] Larson, pp. 75-8.

[70] Gaddis l987, p. 51.

[71] Krebs (2001, p. 8). See also on Byrnes’ visit to Moscow at the end of 1945 (Miscamble 2007, 270-4.

[72] Miscamble 2007, pp. 262-4.

[73] Ernest May (1993), p. 2.

[74] This paragraph relies heavily on Jervis’ review of Miscamble (2007) in H-Diplo.

[75] (HK 1994, 433; Gaddis l987, p. 53; Larson l985, p. 301: Miscamble 1992, p. 27): Even before 1947—troubling signs- HK 1994: p. 433: The collapse of the 4-policemn at the Postdam Conference

In 1946 Move toward the “get tough” approach (Miscamble 1992, p. 27)

--Gaddis l987, p. 53 (end of full 2nd para): early in l946 an emerging consensus in favor of tougher methods in relation to SU.

Still, 1946 ended with Truman’s renewed, but wary, commitment to SU-US cooperation.

(Larson 1985, p. 301), though By the end of 1946 many US officials had reached the conclusion that the Soviet adversarial conduct threatened US security (Miscamble 1992, p. 3, citing Gaddis 1987, pp. 20-47).

[76] Acheson, Present at the Creation, cited in Miscamble 2007, p. 309. Leffler 2007, p. 68: By the fall of l947—US feels they didn’t have the time to try cooperation with the SU.

[77] On the Truman Doctrine, see Larson (l985, p. 4-top; Leffler (1992), pp. 121-27, 142-47, 503, 513.

[78] Gaddis (1987, p. 60).

[79] E. May (1993, p. 2).

[80] Gaddis 2005, 56 on the acceptance of Kennan’s strategy.

[81] Gaddis 2005, p. 60-61.

[82] Gaddis ,top of p. 63

[83] Gaddis, p. 65.

[84] Gaddis, p.66

[85] pp.67-8

[86] pp. 68-9

[87]On the reasons for this gradual shift, see Gaddis, pp. 81 (bottom)-82.

[88] Gaddis 2005, pp. 106-115.

[89] Barrass, The Great Cold War( 2009, p. 63-64, 71) (based on Leffler (l992), pp. 355-60; Ernest R. May (ed.), American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68 (l993), pp. 23-81); See below how and why the Korean War influenced the transition from DR to OR.

[90] Leffler 1992, p. 488.

[91] Leffler l992, pp. 488-9; ft. 179, p. 636 introduces citations on the emphasis on preponderance.

[92]Leffler l992, pp. 15-19, esp. bottom of p. 18—top of p. 19).

[93] Ernest May (l993), Introduction, p. 9. Barrass, 63-4: NSC-68 prescribes preponderance of power—both conventional and nuclear

[94] Krebs 2001, pp. 11-12, ft. 22 citing Trachtenberg.

[95]Although Krebs argues that there was also a continuation of NSC 20/4: emphasis on an offensive-minded strategy that characterized US thinking in the late 1940s.

[96]Saul in Cox, p. 78, citing additional sources; see also on the build-up: Leffler (1992), pp. 485-493, esp. pp. 488-9: the hydrogen bomb, p. 489: strategic/escalation dominance.

[97] Leffler 373.

[98] detailed in Leffler 1992, p. 373

[99] See Mitrovich and Grose—both in 2000.

[100] The proposal died because Republicans wanted it to repudiate Yalta, while Democrats didn’t like its implied criticisms of FDR and Truman (Gaddis 2005, p. 153).

[101] sources are cited in ft. 26 in Krebs, p. 12; Mitrovich 2000; Grose 2000; and also Tim Weiner, The CIA, 2007); and Sarah-Jane Corke. U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945-53. 256 pp. (London: Routledge, 2007. ISBN: 978-0-415-42077-8)—discussion in Diplo Roundtable Review—6-2010, intro. By Jervis (e-file):

[102]Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950, pp. 207-209.

[103] The following books are cited in Jervis’ review (H-Diplo, 6/2010): Scott Lucas, Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union; Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961; Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain; and Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956.

[104]From “Anti-Soviet covert-subversive operations”: Review by Jervis of Sarah-Jane Corke. U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945-53. 256 pp. London: Routledge, 2007 In H-Diplo Roundtable Review (~diplo/roundtables

Volume XI, No. 29 (2010), 10 June 2010).

[105]Rollback or Finlandization: A. Ronald Krebs, Dueling Visions: U.S. Strategy toward Eastern Europe under Eisenhower (Foreign Relations and the Presidency):The presidential election of 1952, unlike most others before and since, was dominated by foreign policy. Krebs argues that two very different images of Eastern Europe's ultimate status competed to guide American policy during this period: Finlandization and rollback. Rollback, championed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency, was synonymous with liberation as the public understood it - detaching Eastern Europe from all aspects of Soviet control. Surprisingly, the figure most often linked to liberation - Secretary of State John Foster Dulles - came to advocate a more subtle and measured policy that neither accepted the status quo nor pursued rollback. This American vision for the region held up the model of Finland, imagining a tier of states that would enjoy domestic autonomy and perhaps even democracy but whose foreign policy would toe the Soviet line Krebs’ case studies of the American response to Stalin's death and to the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement reveal the eventual triumph of Finlandization both as vision and as policy.))))

[106] According to Gaddis 1997--Explanation of SU behavior--pp. 20-21: Personality vs. Situational explanation of the origins of he CW: the test—if there was a change in attitudes with situations/circumstances.

US& GB reach the conclusion, somewhat reluctantly: inability to cooperate/compromise with Stalin due his character

FDR—reacted according to situations, pp. 21-2: but not Stalin toward democracies whom he deeply distrusted continuously (in general he didn’t trust anyone)

In contrast, FDR didn’t distrust Stalin almost until his death, while Churchill alternated.

[107] See Larson (l985, pp. 71-76).

[108]On the adaptability of US GS, see, for example, Leffler (l992, p. 18): As circumstances changed and threats mounted, US tactics shifted, though the overall goal remained the same: As allied policies faltered, the US decided to deploy mobile forces for intervention in the Third World.

[109] Dueck (2006, p. 93; see also the citations on p. 192, fn. 32).

[110] See Layne (2006a, p. 51; see also 2002-3, p. 134). For other sources that interpret US Cold War policy in accordance with offensive realism as defined here, see Leffler (1992, pp. 15-19); Copeland (2000); Mearsheimer (2001); Jervis (2004, p. 8 and citations in ft. 20).

[111] Bell (2001, pp 105,113); see also Zubok and Pleshakov (1996, p. 69).

[112] Gaddis l987, p. 25-6.

[113] HK 1994, pp. 429-32.

[114] Leffler (1992, pp. 5). On US economic/military/power projection advantages, see p. 6.

[115]Mead (2002), pp. 81-7: 1914-1947: US had to decide whether to reinforce GB, disengage or replace it for maintaining world order (cited in Miscamble 2007, p. 263).

[116]Gaddis l987, p. 56, start of 1st full paragraph; Gaddis 2005, pp. 22-3, 40, 51, 58, 64-65, 284, 38n, 61); Dueck 2006, p. 105-6; Leffler 2007, pp. 61-2—citation of Truman.

[117] See Miscamble 2007, p. 308: on the causes of the the collapse of FDR’s DL vision):

[118] Barass (2009).

[119]HK (l994), pp. 420-22.

[120] As Kissinger frames it, the puzzle was how did the SU become from an ally to the “international public enemy number one?” (Kissinger 1994, chs. 16, 17 cited in Kennedy-Pipe 2007, p. 28). In Diplomacy, p.397 bottom, HK presents the causes of the failure of the 4 policemen (in contrast to the Concert of Europe).

[121]See the theoretical works by Charlie Glaser (1997, 2010).

[122] Gaddis, Strategies…, p. 16: Truman believed in accommodation with the SU—a quid pro quo strategy—failed due to domestic constraints but mainly due to a lack of SU responsiveness (p. 18)

Miscamble 1992, p. 3, citing Gaddis l987, pp. 20-47. However, Leffler (1992, p. 100) argues that such an assessment took place even earlier: “In early 1946, US officials defined the SU as the enemy.” On Bevin’s concerns in 1946 about SU expansion, see Miscamble (2007, p. 277).

[123] Some leading researchers of the Cold War highlught Stalin’s lack of responsiveness following the post-Cold War opening of Soviet documents. Gaddis 1997, p. 25: the key role of Stalin’s distrust (see also Leffler 2007, p. 75) in leading to the CW—such a distrust was not the prevailing attitude in the West in 1945. See also pp. 292-3: So long as Stalin was running the SU—the CW was unavoidable. He and authoritarianism are responsible for the CW.

Gaddis l997, p. 31, 2nd para: Stalin’s pattern: advance which stops after provoking a strong US response; thus, if the West bears responsibility to the CW- it is that it didn’t try containment earlier.

Leffler, however, has a more mixed position: Leffler 2007, p. 51: “Stalin’s ideological preconceptions and personal paranoia made him suspect enemies everywhere.”—this is also argued by Barass (2009),pp. 73-4—thus the CW was inevitable Leffler (2007)p. 52: real threats to Stalin/SU

p. 53: the incoherent Stalin’s FP: (2nd para): hard-line but also moderate steps on the part of Stalin; he didn’t want a rift with the West

p. 55: Stalin wanted: a communist takeover in East Central Europe by peaceful means, while preserving cooperation with the West as well.

[124]Jervis (review of Miscamble in H-Diplo 2007, pp. 21-22); Gaddis l987, bottom of p. 29-31; HK 413.

[125] Gaddis l997 (Now We Know): p. 16: US&GB accept SU sphere

p. 17: Asymmetries in Spheres of influence > origins of CW

p. 18 (3rd paragraph): US&GB hopes about Stalin—that he didn’t desire to extend his own system, but Stalin – unilateral approach to security

p. 19: The fears Stalin created in the West by his suppression of Poland—raised doubts about cooperation with him

[126] Gaddis l987, p. 32.

[127] Leffler 2007, pp. 57-59. See figures in Leffler 1992, p. 7, also pp. 101-103. See also the related Kennan’s concerns about conquest by psychological means due to demoralization in Europe and Japan—Gaddis 2005, p. 34.

[128] (Gaddis p. 61: this was the CIA threat assessment) >> p. 63, 2nd para; the sources of the threat—the SU was eager to capitalize on them)

[129]Leffler 2007, p. 63, 3 para-p. 64.

[130]Leffler 2007, p. 65.

[131]Leffler, p. 69.

[132] Leffler 2007, pp. 70-72.

[133] Gaddis 1987, p. 33-34.

[134] Gaddis, p. 38-top.

[135] Gaddis, p. 39.

[136] Gaddis l987, pp. 38, bottom and 39, top, esp. ft. 82, p. 254.

.

[137]Gaddis 2007, p. 32 , also citing Larson (l985), pp. 325-6.

128 Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman (Cambridge, 2007):

Final chapter: “Transformation: Truman’s Foreign policy”

[138] Ernest May (l993)-NSC-68, pp. 3, 10.

[139] Gaddis 2005, pp. 106-7.

[140] Gaddis 2005, p. 107.

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