Superior Court, State of California
DATE: Thursday, 17 November 2022
TIME: 9:00 A.M.
Please note that for the indefinite future, all hearings will be conducted remotely as the Old Courthouse will be closed. This Department prefers that litigants use Zoom for Law and Motion and for Case Management Calendars. Please use the Zoom link below.
“A person's name is to him or her the sweetest and most important sound in any language.”—Dale Carnegie. All Courts of California celebrate the diversity of the attorneys and the litigants who appear in our Courts. Do not hesitate to correct the Court or Court Staff concerning the pronunciation of any name or how anyone prefers to be addressed. As this Court is fond of saying, “with a name like mine, I try to be careful how I pronounce the names of others.” Please inform the Court how you, or if your client is with you, you and your client prefer to be introduced. The Court encourages the use of diacritical marks, multiple surnames and the like for the names of attorneys, litigants and in court papers. You might also try but that site mispronounces my name.
You may use these links for Case Management Conferences and Trial Setting Conferences without Court permission. Informal Discovery Conferences and appearances on Ex Parte applications will be set on Order by the Court.
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Please Read This Page In Its Entirety As Some Of The Protocols Have Changed. Please Check This Tentative Rulings Page Before Making Any Appearance. Appearing on a matter is a representation that you have read and understood these protocols.
APPEARANCES.
Whether appearing in person or on a virtual platform, the usual custom and practices of decorum and attire apply. (See Jensen v. Superior Court (San Diego) (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 533.). Counsel should use good quality equipment and with sufficient bandwith. Cellphones are very low quality in using a virtual platform. The Court expects to see the faces of the parties appearing on a virtual platform
For new Rules of Court concerning remote hearings and appearances, please review California Rules of Court, rule 3.672.
This Court expects all counsel and litigants to comply with the Tentative Rulings Procedures that are outlined in Local Civil Rule 8(E) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308. If the Court has not directed argument, oral argument must be permitted only if a party notifies all other parties and the Court at (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party's intention to appear. A party must notify all other parties by telephone or in person. A failure to timely notify this Court and/or the opposing parties may result in the tentative ruling being the final order in the matter.
Please notify this Court immediately if the matter will not be heard on the scheduled date. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1304(b). If a party fails to appear at a law and motion hearing without having given notice, this Court may take the matter off calendar, to be reset only upon motion, or may rule on the matter. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1304(d). A party may give notice that he or she will not appear at a law and motion hearing and submit the matter without an appearance unless this Court orders otherwise. This Court will rule on the motion as if the party had appeared. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1304(c). Any uncontested matter or matters to which stipulations have been reached can be processed through the Clerk in the usual manner. Please include a proposed order.
All proposed orders and papers should be submitted to this Department’s e-filing queue. Do not send documents to the Department email unless directed to do so.
While the Court will still allow physical appearances, all litigants are encouraged to use the Zoom platform for Law & Motion appearances and Case Management Conferences. Use of other virtual platform devices will make it difficult for all parties fully to participate in the hearings. Please note the requirement of entering a password (highlighted above.) As for personal appearances, protocols concerning social distancing and facial coverings in compliance with the directives of the Public Health Officer will be enforced. Currently, facemasks are required in all courthouses. If you appear in person, it will be helpful if you wear a disposable paper mask while using the courtroom microphones so that your voice will not be muffled.
Individuals who wish to access the Courthouse are advised to bring a plastic bag within which to place any personal items that are to go through the metal detector located at the doorway to the courthouse.
Sign-ins will begin at about 8:30 AM. Court staff will assist you when you sign in. If you are using the Zoom virtual platform, it will helpful if you “rename” yourself as follows: in the upper right corner of the screen with your name you will see a blue box with three horizontal dots. Click on that and then click on the “rename” feature. You may type your name as: Line #/name/party. If you are a member of the public who wishes to view the Zoom session and remain anonymous, you may simply sign in as “Public.”
COURT REPORTERS.
This session will not be recorded. No electronic recordings, video, still photography or audio capture of this live stream is allowed without the expressed, written permission of the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara. State and Local Court rules prohibit photographing or recording of court proceedings whether in the courtroom or while listening on the Public Access Line or other virtual platform, without a Court Order. See Local General Rule 2(A) and 2(B); California Rules of Court, rule 1.150.
This Court no longer provides for Court Reporters in civil actions except in limited circumstances. If you wish to arrange for a court reporter, please use Local Form #CV-5100. All reporters are encouraged to work from a remote location. Please inform this Court if any reporter wishes to work in the courtroom. This Court will approve all requests to bring a court reporter. Counsel should meet and confer on the use of a court reporter so that only one reporter appears and serves as the official reporter for that hearing.
PROTOCOLS DURING THE HEARINGS.
During the calling of any hearing, this Court has found that the Zoom video platform works very well. But whether using Zoom or any telephone, it is preferable to use a landline if possible. IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS TO SPEAK SLOWLY. Plaintiff should speak first, followed by any other person. All persons should spell their names for the benefit of Court Staff. Please do not use any hands-free mode if at all possible. Headsets or earbuds of good quality will be of great assistance to minimize feedback and distortion.
The Court will prepare the Final Order unless stated otherwise below or at the hearing. Counsel are to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.
TROUBLESHOOTING TENTATIVE RULINGS.
To access a tentative ruling, move your cursor over the line number, hold down the “Control” key and click. If you see last week’s tentative rulings, you have checked prior to the posting of the current week’s tentative rulings. You will need to either “REFRESH” or “QUIT” your browser and reopen it. Another suggestion is to “clean the cache” of your browser. Finally, you may have to switch browsers. If you fail to do any of these, your browser may pull up old information from old cookies even after the tentative rulings have been posted.
This Court's tentative ruling is just that—tentative. Trial courts are not bound by their tentative rulings, which are superseded by the final order. (See Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1374-1375.) The tentative ruling allows a party to focus his or her arguments at a subsequent hearing and to attempt to convince the Court the tentative should or should not become the Court's final order. (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 907, 917.) If you wish to challenge a tentative ruling, please refer to a specific portion of the tentative ruling to which you disagree.
|LINE # |CASE # |CASE TITLE |TENTATIVE RULING |
|LINE 1 |21CV391680 |Vincent McPhillip v. Pi Community Co.; Nicolas |Demurrer of Defendants to Plaintiff’s Complaint. |
| | |Kokkalis; Chengdao Fan. |The demurrer to the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is OVERRULED. |
| | | |The demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ |
| | | |LEAVE TO AMEND based on the business judgment rule. |
| | | |The demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ |
| | | |LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim |
| | | |The motion to strike the second cause of action is MOOT. |
| | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 2 |21CV391680 |Vincent McPhillip v. Pi Community Co.; Nicolas |Motion of Defendants to Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint. |
| | |Kokkalis; Chengdao Fan. |SEE LINE #1. |
|LINE 3 |21CV391680 |Vincent McPhillip v. Pi Community Co.; Nicolas |Case Management Conference. |
| | |Kokkalis; Chengdao Fan. |Apart from compliance with the orders in the matters discussed in Line|
| | | |#1, all matters will be STAYED until 13 December 2022 at 9:00 AM |
| | | |pending a ruling on the motion of defendants to compel nonresident |
| | | |plaintiff to furnish a bond under California Corporations Code, § 800 |
| | | |and/or and undertaken pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, § 1030. |
| | | |SEE LINE #1. |
|LINE 4 |20CV372692 |Adeline Martinez v. Borba, Inc.; Blanca Ruelas |Motion of Defendant to Compel Plaintiff to Provide Responses to |
| | | |Defendants’ Supplemental Interrogatory and Demand for Production of |
| | | |Documents. |
| | | |Pursuant to the Order of this Court vacating the trial date in this |
| | | |matter, all pending motions are CONTINUED to 17 January 2023 at 9:00 |
| | | |AM in Department 20. |
| | | |This Court will appreciate knowing in advance if the matter has become|
| | | |moot. |
| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 5 |20CV372692 |Adeline Martinez v. Borba, Inc.; Blanca Ruelas |Motion of Defendant to Compel Plaintiff’s Response and/or Compliance |
| | | |with the Demand Of Defendants for an Independent Medical Examination |
| | | |and for Sanctions. |
| | | |Pursuant to the Order of this Court vacating the trial date in this |
| | | |matter, all pending motions are CONTINUED to 17 January 2023 at 9:00 |
| | | |AM in Department 20. |
| | | |This Court will appreciate knowing in advance if the matter has become|
| | | |moot. |
| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 6 |21CV392872 |Brian Quinn v. Patricia Novak |Motion of Plaintiff to Compel Defendant to Provide Further Answers to |
| | | |Form and Special Interrogatories. |
| | | |NO TENTATIVE RULING. The parties should use the Tentative Ruling |
| | | |Protocol to advise the Court if they wish to submit on the papers |
| | | |presented or appear and argue the matter on the merits. |
|LINE 7 |19CV356536 |Chad Garton v. Optimum Solutions Group, Inc.; Joshua |Motion of Plaintiff for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. |
| | |J. Wolfe; Debra Gould a.k.a. Debra Aragon. |Good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that the hearing on this matter be|
| | | |continued to 22 November 2022 at 9:00 AM to be heard in connection |
| | | |with the motion of defendants for Judgment on the Pleadings. |
| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 8 |21CV392238 |City of San José v. District Attorney for the County |OFF CALENDAR. |
| | |of Santa Clara | |
|LINE 9 |21CV392238 |City of San José v. District Attorney for the County |OFF CALENDAR. |
| | |of Santa Clara | |
|LINE 10 |21CV392871 |Stoer Construction, Inc. v. LD Milpitas Property, |Petition of Defendant to Compel Arbitration And Stay Action. |
| | |LLC., Et al. |No party has filed opposition to this petition. |
| | |And related cross-complaints. |The construction contract addresses dispute resolution and requires |
| | | |mediation as a condition precedent to binding dispute resolution. |
| | | |(Article 15 0f the A201 Contract.) A mediation took place but did not |
| | | |result in settlement or resolution of the disputes and, therefore, the|
| | | |General Conditions require arbitration. |
| | | |On 14 July 2022, petitioner LDMP sent a written request for |
| | | |arbitration to plaintiff. Plaintiff has not responded nor stipulated |
| | | |to arbitration and thus petitioner brought this petition. |
| | | |The petition is GRANTED pursuant to the A201 Contract as well as by |
| | | |Code of Civil Procedure, § 1281.2. Counsel for petitioner may submit a|
| | | |formal order through the Clerk’s e-filing queue for execution by this |
| | | |Department. |
|LINE 11 |22CV397039 |Trinh Nguyen v. Hanh Trinh Duc Tin; Australian Travel |Motion of Defendants for Change of Venue. |
| | |& Immigration LLC. |The motion of defendants for a change of venue to Orange County is |
| | | |DENIED. |
| | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 12 |22CV401209 |Syed Ali v. Synaptics Inc. |Motion of Defendant to Declare Plaintiff to Be a Vexatious Litigant, |
| | | |to Furnish Bond, and to Obtain a Prefiling Order. |
| | | |The motion of defendant to declare plaintiff to be a vexatious |
| | | |litigant, to furnish bond, and to obtain a prefiling order before |
| | | |filing any new litigation without leave of court is GRANTED. This |
| | | |Court bases its rulings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, § 391 et |
| | | |seq. in general and specifically pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, |
| | | |§ 391(b)(1-3). Bond is set in the amount of $50,000.00. |
| | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 13 |17CV318339 |First National Bank of Omaha v. Savacion Makil |Hearing on Claim of Exemption. |
| | | |A writ of execution has attached $13,477.99 which is held by the |
| | | |Office of the Sheriff, County of Los Angeles. |
| | | |Judgment debtor claims that his Money Market Saving-6773 derives from |
| | | |Social Security Benefits (42 U.S.C. §407) and County Employee Benefits|
| | | |(Code of Civil Procedure, § 704.110). |
| | | |Judgment creditor states that the judgment debtor fails to provide any|
| | | |documentation that the funds held in the money market savings account |
| | | |held by the levying officer are exempt. |
| | | |Social Security payments are exempt when in a direct deposit account |
| | | |up to $1,750.00 where one depositor is the designated payee. (See Code|
| | | |of Civil Procedure, § 704.080.) Employee benefits are only barred |
| | | |from levy or taxation if not paid. Once paid out, and deposited into a|
| | | |savings account, they are subject to levy. (Code of Civil Procedure, §|
| | | |110.) |
| | | |The funds are not direct deposited Social Security funds. Judgment |
| | | |debtor’s income exceeds his income and the funds saved are properly |
| | | |levied funds to pay the debt judgment debtor owes to judgment |
| | | |creditor. |
| | | |The claim of exemption is DENIED. |
| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 14 |21CV392872 |Brian Quinn v. Patricia Novak |Case Management Conference. |
| | | |SEE LINE #6. |
|LINE 15 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 16 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 17 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 18 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 19 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 20 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 21 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 22 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 23 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 24 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 25 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 26 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 27 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 28 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 29 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
|LINE 30 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |
---oooOooo---
Calendar Line 1
| | |
|SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |
|COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |
| | |
|DEPARTMENT 20 | |
| | |
|161 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 | |
|408.882.2320 · 408.882.2296 (fax) | |
|smanoukian@ | |
| |(For Clerk's Use Only) |
|CASE NO.: |21CV391680 |Vincent McPhillip v. Dr. Nicolas Kokkalis, et al. |
|DATE: 17 November 2022 |TIME: 9:00 am |LINE NUMBERS: 1-2 |
|This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 20 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. |
|Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 20 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM on 16 November 2022. Please specify|
|the issue to be contested when calling the Court and Counsel. |
|---oooOooo--- |
|Orders on Demurrer and Motion to Strike to the Complaint |
|by Defendants Dr. Nicolas Kokkalis and Dr. Chengdiao Fan |
|and Nominal Defendant PI Community Company. |
I. Statement of Facts.
This is a shareholder derivative action regarding sabotage of an innovative blockchain start-up.
According to the complaint, plaintiff Vincent McPhillip (“Plaintiff”) met defendants Dr. Nicolas Kokkalis (“Kokkalis”) and Dr. Chengdiao Fan (“Fan”) (collectively, “Defendants”), a married couple, at Stanford University in 2018. (Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 15.) They all shared a common goal of enabling the mass adoption of digital currency. (Ibid.)
The team of three first started experimenting with different digital currency concepts under Social Chain, Inc. (“Social”), which was incorporated in September 2018. (Complaint at ¶ 16.) In November 2018, the team began experimenting with a new digital currency, “Pi,” through which everyday people could mine and earn currency from their phones.[1] (Ibid.) Since launching the Pi Network mobile application in March 2019, the Pi Network has grown to over 20 million engaged members, millions of whom visit the app daily. (Ibid.) Plaintiff was employed by Social as its CEO and served as CEO of Pi. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Kokkalis and Fan were likewise employed by Social as its Chief Technology Officer and President and Chief Product Officer, respectively. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff and Defendants agreed to split the ownership equity equally. (Complaint at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff and Defendants each purchased thirty-three million, three hundred thirty-three thousand, three hundred thirty-two (33,333,332) shares for three hundred thirty-three dollars and thirty-two cents ($333.32) from Pi (the “Shares”), as well as a promissory note of $70,000 for each founder’s contribution of intellectual property to the project. (Ibid.) The purchase of the Shares and the sale of their intellectual property to the company gave Plaintiff and each defendant a 1/3 ownership interest in Pi. (Ibid.)
At one point, Defendants began suffering from marital issues and their conduct posed a threat to the existence of Pi and Social. (Complaint at ¶ 23.) Defendants were unable to prioritize Pi’s needs over their marital discord, which was detracting from their duties at the company. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Despite Plaintiff’s efforts, yelling matches, physical aggression, and marital power struggles continued to disrupt the company’s operations. (Ibid.)
On 26 April 2020, following more aggressions directed at him by Defendants, Plaintiff determined he needed to step away from the hostile environment. (Complaint at ¶ 28.) While Plaintiff was on medical leave and under doctor’s instructions to have no contact with Defendants, they fired him as CEO of Pi and Social, leaving the company without management and expertise in key areas, including generating demand for Pi. (Ibid.)
In the midst of their marital conflict, Defendants mismanaged vital relationships for the company. (Complaint at ¶ 29.) For example, Defendants failed to pay third party vendors responsible for Pi’s marketing and design – critical ingredients to the success of a start-up and further eroding trust in the company and its management. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Defendants also squandered a relationship with Ms. Christine Birch, a high-powered partner that had a track record of generating demand (i.e., billions in ticket sales for major Hollywood movie studios). (Id. at ¶ 31.) As a consequence, Pi lost a valuable partner and continues to suffer from the distrust, wrongful, and deceptive business practices Defendants employed with vendors and other partners of Pi that were critical for the company to grow and flourish. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
On 21 May 2020, defendant Kokkalis sent an email to Plaintiff regarding potential new investments. (Complaint at ¶ 33.) The email contained an implied threat that Defendants would dilute Plaintiff’s equity to enhance their equity interests. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Defendants implicitly indicated they would offer shares only to the founders, at a particularly attractive price, with full knowledge that as a result of the ongoing legal conflict, Plaintiff could not be expected to contribute. (Ibid.) Plaintiff ultimately made the decision not to purchase more shares along with the Defendants, as he saw any participation in the sale as self-dealing behavior, deviating from founding team principles and betraying Pi employees, investors, and the Pi community as a whole. (Id. at ¶ 38.)
In July 2020, Defendants followed through on their threat and purchased 500,000,000 shares of Pi at a mere $0.00005 per share. (Complaint at ¶ 39.) Defendants unilaterally used their majority on the company’s board to issue themselves 1 billion shares, on top of Pi’s 100 million previously issued shares, without informing existing investors or with any attempt to determine the company’s fair market value. (Ibid.) The transaction increased their stake from 66% of the company to 97% of the company for a mere $50,000. (Ibid.)
This insider self-dealing transaction cost the company millions and jeopardized the company’s relationships with existing and future investors. (Complaint at ¶ 40.) By selling themselves shares well below market value, Defendants defrauded the company of millions of dollars it could have otherwise raised if it sold its equity at market value. (Ibid.) Also, by failing to notify existing investors of the transaction, Defendants betrayed trust in an act of double dealing, selling shares to themselves at a mere fraction of what they had charged existing investors just months later. (Id. at ¶ 41.)
Defendants’ actions have brought serious harm to the company to the tune of millions of dollars, impeding the project’s development and thus damaging the trusted reputation of the project. (Complaint at ¶ 47.) Defendants’ actions have also undermined the project’s ability to attract developer talent and thus create a demand for Pi. (Ibid.) Further, the company’s resulting lack of capital means it cannot offer financial incentives needed to attract the world’s best developers. (Id. at ¶ 48.)
On 23 November 2021, Plaintiff filed the operative complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and appointment of a receiver.[2] Plaintiff brings these claims derivatively in the right and for the benefit of Pi to redress Defendants’ wrongful actions and damages caused to Pi. (Complaint at ¶ 50.) Plaintiff has not made any demand on Pi to institute this action against Defendants because a demand would be futile as Defendants are controlling members of the company. (Id. at ¶ 53.) Demand is also excused as Defendants’ misconduct does not constitute an exercise of good faith business judgment. (Id. at ¶ 54.)
On 30 August 2022, Defendants and nominal defendant Pi Community Company (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) filed the motions presently before the court, a demurrer and motion to strike to the complaint. Plaintiff filed written oppositions.
A further case management conference is also scheduled for 17 November 2022.
II. Demurrers in General.
A complaint must contain substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising the defendant of the issues to be addressed. (See Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is properly sustained where the complaint or an individual cause of action fails to “state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.10, subdivision (e).) “[C]onclusionary allegations . . . without facts to support them” are insufficient on demurrer. (Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 531, 537.) “It is fundamental that a demurrer is an attack against the complaint on its face, it should not be sustained unless the complaint shows that the action may not be pursued.” (Yolo County Dept. of Social Services v. Municipal Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 842, 846-847.)
“It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s conduct. A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213.) “It ‘admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint . . .; the question of plaintiff's ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 213-214; see Cook v. De La Guerra (1864) 24 Cal. 237, 239 [“[I]t is not the office of a demurrer to state facts, but to raise an issue of law upon the facts stated in the pleading demurred to.”].)
III. Analysis.
Moving Defendants argue the complaint is subject to demurrer on the following grounds: (1) the court lacks jurisdiction over each cause of action; (2) the first cause of action is protected by the business judgment rule and fails to state a valid claim; and (3) the second cause of action fails to state a valid claim. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.10, subdivisions. (a), (e).)
A. Lack of Jurisdiction.
“ ‘Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The adequacy of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction must be addressed whenever that issue comes to the court’s attention.’ [Citation.]” (Totten v. Hill (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 40, 46.)
“ ‘ “Lack of jurisdiction” is a term used to describe situations in which a court is without authority to act.’ [Citations.] ‘Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by constitutional or statutory law. [Citations.] The California Supreme Court has defined subject matter jurisdiction thusly: “Subject matter jurisdiction … is the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” [Citations.] By contrast, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are described as acts in “excess of jurisdiction.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Cummings v. Stanley (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 493, 503.)
“A challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of a court is properly brought by demurrer to the complaint [citations]. It may also be raised by a motion to strike [citation]; motion for judgment on the pleadings [citation]; motion for summary judgment [citations]; or in an answer [citation].”[3] (Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028, 1036.)
A demurrer is properly sustained where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. (Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 433, 438; Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.10, subdivision (a).)
Here, Moving Defendants argue Pi Community Company is a “Cayman Islands entity” and the complaint fails to explain how a California court may affect the affairs of a Cayman Islands entity. Plaintiff however alleges that jurisdiction is proper in Santa Clara County under Code of Civil Procedure sections 410.10 and 410.40. (See Complaint at ¶ 8.) Moving Defendants do not support their position with any citation to legal authority and thus this argument is not sustainable on demurrer. (See Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Bellflower Unified School Dist. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 927, 939 [“The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.”]; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [court may disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he or she wants us to adopt].)
Accordingly, the demurrer to the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is OVERRULED.
B. First Cause of Action: Breach of Fiduciary Duty.
Fiduciary and confidential have been used synonymously to describe any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is in duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. (Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 257, 271 (Richelle L.).) Such a relation arises where a confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another, and in such a relation the party in whom the confidence is reposed, if he or she voluntarily accepts or assumes to accept the confidence, can take no advantage from his or her acts relating to the interest of the other party without the latter’s knowledge or consent. (Ibid.) The essence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship is the parties do not deal on equal terms, because the person in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is in a superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent party. (Ibid.)
California recognizes that one standing in a confidential or fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation. (Richelle L., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 273.)
“ ‘In order to plead a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, there must be shown the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach. The absence of any one of these elements is fatal to the cause of action.’ [Citation.]” (Brown v. Cal. Pension Adm’rs & Consultants (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 333, 347-348.)
Moving Defendants argue the breach of fiduciary duty claim fails to state a cause of action because: (1) Defendants’ conduct is protected by the business judgment rule; and (2) Plaintiff cannot establish harm to the company or its shareholders.
1. Business Judgment Rule.
“It is a fundamental principle of corporate governance that the role of managing the business of the corporation is vested in its board of directors, not in its shareholders. This responsibility includes the prosecution, defense, and control of corporate litigation. Judicial deference is accorded to directors under the ‘business judgment rule,’ which recognizes that where decisions are without fraud or breach of trust, ‘management of the corporation is best left to those to whom it has been entrusted, not to the courts. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] As codified in [Corporations Code] section 309, the business judgment rule obligates a director to perform his or her duties ‘in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances’ (§ 309, subdivision (a)); and it insulates a director from liability when he or she performs those obligations in the manner provided in the statute (§ 309, subdivision (c)).” (Bader v. Anderson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 775, 787-788.)
“The business judgment rule has been justified primarily on two grounds. First, that directors should be given wide latitude in their handling of corporate affairs because the hindsight of the judicial process is an imperfect device for evaluating business decisions. Second, ‘[t]he rule recognizes that shareholders to a very real degree voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment; investors need not buy stock, for investment markets offer an array of opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by corporate officers.’ [Citation.]” (Frances T. v. Village Green Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 507, fn. 14.)
Thus, “[t]he [business judgment] rule establishes a presumption that directors’ decisions are based on sound business judgment, and it prohibits courts from interfering in business decisions made by the directors in good faith and in the absence of a conflict of interest.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1045 (Berg & Berg Enterprises).)
“An exception to the presumption afforded by the business judgment rule accordingly exists in ‘circumstances which inherently raise an inference of conflict of interest’ and the rule ‘does not shield actions taken without reasonable inquiry, with improper motives, or as a result of a conflict of interest.’ [Citations.] But a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to establish these exceptions. To do so, more is needed than ‘conclusory allegations of improper motives and conflict of interest. Neither is it sufficient to generally allege the failure to conduct an active investigation, in the absence of (1) allegations of facts which would reasonably call for such an investigation, or (2) allegations of facts which would have been discovered by a reasonable investigation and would have been material to the questioned exercise of business judgment.’ [Citation.] In most cases, ‘the presumption created by the business judgment rule can be rebutted only by affirmative allegations of facts which, if proven, would establish fraud, bad faith, overreaching or an unreasonable failure to investigate material facts. [Citation.] Interference with the discretion of directors is not warranted in doubtful cases.’ [Citation.]” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1045-1046.)
“[T]he failure to sufficiently plead facts to rebut the business judgment rule or establish its exceptions may be raised on demurrer, as whether sufficient facts have been so pleaded is a question of law.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1046; see Lee v. Interinsurance Exchange (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 694, 711-717 [judgment of dismissal following sustaining of demurrer affirmed on appeal for complaint’s failure to have pleaded facts establishing exception to business judgment rule]; see also Barnes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 365, 378-379 [judgment of dismissal after sustaining of demurrer affirmed in part due to failure to allege facts rebutting business judgment rule].)
Moving Defendants contend that conduct set forth in support of the breach of fiduciary duty claim falls under the business judgment rule and Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing an exception to the rule.
The alleged breaches are contained in paragraphs 57-59 as follows:
¶ 57: Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Pi by selling shares of Pi to themselves below the fair value of the shares. Plaintiff did not consent to the conduct of the Defendants.
¶ 58: Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Defendants allowed their marital and personal discord to disrupt and threaten the existence of Pi and Social Chain, which was in breach of their fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith and fair dealing to Pi.
¶ 59: The success of a blockchain network like Social Chain depends on the belief, based on trust and confidence, that the system will operate as expected. Thus, the Defendants’ deceptive conduct, such as their dilution of shares, jeopardized users’ trust in the network. As a result, demand for the currency is inadequate and the ultimate success and viability of the company is at risk.
Here, Plaintiff alleges defendants’ misconduct could not have been an exercise of good faith business judgment. (Complaint at ¶ 54.) This allegation however is a conclusion that cannot overcome application of the business judgment rule on demurrer. In opposition, Plaintiff argues defendants’ actions constitute a conflict of interest and they failed to engage in any reasonable inquiry to value Pi and its shares prior to executing the June 2020 share sale to themselves. (See OPP at p. 5:10-28; Complaint at ¶¶ 57-59.) But, these contentions are not supported by specific facts in the complaint to satisfy an exception under the business judgment rule. Therefore, the argument based on the business judgment rule is sustainable on demurrer. Should the court sustain the demurrer, Plaintiff has requested leave to amend which will be granted. (See OPP at p. 9:1-13; see also City of Stockton v. Super. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747) [if the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the pleading in response to a motion challenging the sufficiency of the allegations, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the pleading shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment].)
Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action based on the business judgment rule is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.
2. Harm to the Company and Shareholders.
Moving Defendants also argue Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating harm to the company or its shareholders. The court declines to consider this argument as the demurrer is sustained for reasons stated above.
C. Second Cause of Action: Appointment of a Receiver Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, § 564(b)(5).
Code of Civil Procedure section 564 authorizes a court to appoint a receiver under various circumstances outlined by statute. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 564, subdivision (a).) Under the second cause of action, Plaintiff seeks appointment of a receiver where a corporation has been dissolved. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 564, subdivision (b)(5).)
“The requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 564 are jurisdictional, and without a showing bringing the receiver within one of the subdivisions of that section the court’s order appointing a receiver is void.” (Turner v. Super. Ct. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 804, 811.) “Receivership is an extraordinary remedy, to be applied with caution and only in cases of apparent necessity, and where other remedies would be inadequate.” (Rogers v. Smith (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 16, 21.)
Based on defendants’ conduct in this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks the appointment of a receiver to protect the assets of Pi for the duration of this litigation. (Complaint at ¶¶ 62-65.)
Moving Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to allege any potential or imminent harm to the company or its shareholders that would require appointment of a receiver. In opposition, Plaintiff contends defendants’ argument is misplaced as the second cause of action is actually based on Code of Civil Procedure section 564, subdivision (b)(9) which allows for a receiver “[i]n all other cases where necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party.” Plaintiff asserts the court previously, in an order dated 3 May 2022, also acknowledged the complaint was seeking relief for a receiver under section 564, subdivision (b)(9). (See OPP at p. 8:3-10.)
As a preliminary matter, the appointment of a receiver is a remedy and thus the proper procedural vehicle for challenging an improper remedy is motion to strike, not demurrer. (See Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 385 [“The appropriate procedural device for challenging a portion of a cause of action seeking an improper remedy is a motion to strike.”].) That said, Plaintiff concedes in opposition that the second cause of action has not been labeled correctly as he seeks relief under section 564, subdivision (b)(9), not (b)(4). As stated above, the court has granted Plaintiff leave to amend as to the first cause of action. Plaintiff will also be afforded leave to amend the second cause of action to properly allege facts to support appointment of a receiver under section 564, subdivision (b)(9).
Therefore, the demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim.
IV. Motions to Strike in General.
A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter asserted in a pleading. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 436, subdivision (a).) A court may also strike out all or any part of a pleading not filed in conformity with the laws of the State of California. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 436, subdivision (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 437, subdivision. (a).)
Irrelevant matter includes “immaterial allegations.” (Code of Civil Procedure, § 431.10, subdivision (c).) “An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: (1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; (2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; (3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code of Civil Procedure, § 431.10, subdivision (b).)
“As with demurrers, the grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matter which the court may judicially notice.” (Weil & Brown, et al., California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 7:168, p. 7(l)-76 citing Code of Civil Procedure, § 437.) “Thus, for example, defendant cannot base a motion to strike the complaint on affidavits or declarations containing extrinsic evidence showing that the allegations are ‘false’ or ‘sham.’ Such challenges lie only if these defects appear on the face of the complaint, or from matters judicially noticeable.” (Id. at ¶ 7:169, p. 7(l)-76.)
“In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to the motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.)
V. Analysis.
Moving Defendants seek to strike the second cause of action for the same reasons stated on demurrer. As the demurrer to the second cause of action has been sustained with leave to amend, the motion to strike is MOOT.
VI. Conclusion and Order.
The demurrer to the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is OVERRULED.
The demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND based on the business judgment rule.
The demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim
The motion to strike the second cause of action is MOOT.
|___________________________ |______________________________________________ |
|DATED: |HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN |
| |Judge of the Superior Court |
| |County of Santa Clara |
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|SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |
|COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |
| | |
|DEPARTMENT 20 | |
| | |
|161 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 | |
|408.882.2320 · 408.882.2296 (fax) | |
|department20@ | |
| | |
| |(For Clerk’s Use Only) |
|CASE NO.: |22CV397039 |Trinh Hoa Nguyen v. Hanh Trinh Duc Tin a.k.a. My-Linh Nguyen, et al. |
|DATE: 17 November 2022 |TIME: 9:00 am |LINE NUMBER: 11 |
|This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 20 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. |
|Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 20 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM on 16 November 2022. Please specify|
|the issue to be contested when calling the Court and Counsel. |
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|Order on Motion of Defendants for Change of Venue. |
I. Statement of Facts.
Plaintiff filed this complaint on 12 April 2022.[4]
Plaintiff alleges that he deposited $6,000.00 with the defendants, a travel agent and agency, to purchase a travel package to Dubai for the New Year. While plaintiff received the airline tickets, he did not receive the rest of the travel package that would include E tickets, the list of hotels, luggage information and other items which were promised to be sent two weeks before departure.
Despite several phone calls and text messages and emails, the rest of the package arrived two days before departure. In an attempt to confirm the bona fides of the travel package, plaintiff found out that no such booking existed with the hotel or tour guide. Plaintiff and his family decided not to go on the tour.
II. Motion For Change of Venue.
Defendant, My-Linh Nguyen (erroneously also sued as Australian Travel & Immigration, LLC) seeks to have this case transferred to Orange County Superior Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 395 and 397 based on the allegations in ¶¶ 2, 10 and 11 of the Complaint.
III. Analysis.
Code of Civil Procedure, § 395(a) states: “Except as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action. . . . . Subject to subdivision (b), if a defendant has contracted to perform an obligation in a particular county, the superior court in the county where the obligation is to be performed, where the contract in fact was entered into, or where the defendant or any defendant resides at the commencement of the action is a proper court for the trial of an action founded on that obligation, and the county where the obligation is incurred is the county where it is to be performed, unless there is a special contract in writing to the contrary.”
“A corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.” (Code of Civil Procedure, § 395.5.)
“In Turner v. Simpson, 91 Cal.App.2d 590, 591, the court said: ". . . [Where] it appears that the contract was entered into in the county in which the action was filed plaintiff is entitled to have the action upon it tried there despite defendant's residence in another county.” (Stanning v. White (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 547, 549.)
The county where the contract was entered into is the county where the acceptance occurred, e.g., where it was mailed or where words of acceptance were spoken. (See Wilson v. Scannavino (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 369, 370-371.) In cases against corporations alleging breach of the obligation to make payments, the county where the payments were to be made is considered the place of performance and is a proper venue. (See Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Cal.2d 458, 466.) Clearly, defendant was obligated to make payments in this county. Accordingly, this county was the place of performance and is a proper venue for this action.
On a motion to transfer venue, “[t]he plaintiff’s choice of venue is presumed correct.” (Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1075.) Thus, “the party attempting to change venue . . . bears the burden of establishing that [the chosen venue] is not a proper venue under any applicable statute.” (Id.) The burden is on the moving defendant to establish whatever facts are needed to justify transfer and to negate the propriety of venue on all possible grounds. (See Karson Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 7, 8-9.) Normally, this requires affidavits or declarations containing admissible evidence. (Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 929.)
The county where the contract was entered into is the county where the acceptance occurred, e.g., where it was mailed or where words of acceptance were spoken. (See Wilson v. Scannavino (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 369, 370-371.) In cases against corporations alleging breach of the obligation to make payments, the county where the payments were to be made is considered the place of performance and is a proper venue. (See Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Cal.2d 458, 466.) Clearly, defendant was obligated to make payments in this county. Accordingly, this county was the place of performance and is a proper venue for this action.
In this matter, plaintiff has chosen to file the section in the County of Santa Clara. Defendant has presented no evidence in the form of declarations negating grounds for local venue in Santa Clara County or why the case should be transferred to Orange County.
The motion of defendants for a change of venue to Orange County is DENIED.
IV. Tentative Ruling.
The Tentative Ruling was duly posted.
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V. Case Management.
The matter is set for a further case management conference on 28 March 2023 at 10:00 AM in Department 20. The parties should commence discovery and discuss resolution by alternate dispute resolution prior to that time and place.
VI. Conclusion and Order.
The motion of defendants for a change of venue to Orange County is DENIED.
|____________________________________ |_________________________________________________________ |
|DATED: |HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN |
| |Judge of the Superior Court |
| |County of Santa Clara |
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|SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |
|COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |
| | |
|DEPARTMENT 20 | |
| | |
|161 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 | |
|408.882.2320 · 408.882.2296 (fax) | |
|department20@ | |
| | |
| |(For Clerk’s Use Only) |
|CASE NO.: |22CV401209 |Syed Ali v. Synaptics, Inc. |
|DATE: 17 November 2022 |TIME: 9:00 am |LINE NUMBER: 12 |
|This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 20 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. |
|Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 20 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM on 16 November 2022. Please specify|
|the issue to be contested when calling the Court and Counsel. |
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|Order On Motion of Defendant to Declare Plaintiff |
|to Be a Vexatious Litigant and to Furnish Bond. |
Plaintiff filed this complaint on 18 July 2022. He contends that defendant acted wrongfully in considering his case for application for employment under a wrongful failure to hire theory.
The defendant has filed this motion for an order declaring plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant, to furnish a bond, and to obtain a prefiling order pursuant to the Vexatious Litigant Statutes (Code of Civil Procedure, § 391 et seq.)
Defendant has opposed the motion.
This Court take judicial notice of orders declaring plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant in the following matters:
1. Ali v. Apple Inc. (Case No. 22CV395734) (Santa Clara County Superior Court);
2. Ali v. Delta Dental Ins., et al. (Case No. CGC-22-598262) (San Francisco County Superior Court); and
3. Ali v. Facebook Inc. (Case No. 22CV397522) (Santa Clara County Superior Court).
This Court has knowledge that he has commenced over 10 lawsuits since 2017 that have been determined adversely to him.
Defendant requests that this Court issue formal rulings certain evidentiary objections.
This Court notes that Defendant’s reply papers include a list of objections to plaintiff’s evidence. This Court notes and considers the objections but there is no requirement that this Court prepare formal rulings on such a motion. It is undisputed that parties to litigation are required to make their evidentiary objections at the hearing otherwise they run the risk of having the objections deemed waived. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 437c(b)(5) and (d).)
However, there is no authority to suggest that the trial court must rule on these objections outside of summary judgment or anti-SLAPP motions. In fact, in Reid v. Google, Inc., the California Supreme Court held that if a trial court fails to rule on evidentiary objections with regard to a summary judgment hearing, those objections are also preserved on appeal. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532; (See generally People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 188 [providing that a motion in limine is a motion brought before the trial court for the purpose of excluding evidence].)
On the merits of the motion, the motion of defendant to declare plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant, to furnish bond, and to obtain a prefiling order before filing any new litigation without leave of court is GRANTED. This Court bases its rulings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, § 391 et seq. in general and specifically pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, § 391(b)(1-3). Bond is set in the amount of $50,000.00.
Counsel for defendant is to compare a formal order and provide a completed VL-100 form for execution by this Court. These papers are to be delivered via the Clerk’s e-filing queue.
|____________________________________ |_________________________________________________________ |
|DATED: |HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN |
| |Judge of the Superior Court |
| |County of Santa Clara |
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[1] “Pi” and “company” are used interchangeably.
[2] This Department intends to comply with the time requirements of the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Government Code, §§ 68600–68620). The California Rules of Court state that the goal of each trial court should be to manage limited and unlimited civil cases from filing so that 100 percent are disposed of within 24 months. (Ca. St. Civil Rules of Court, Rule 3.714(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2)(C).
[3] By contrast, a motion to quash is the proper procedural vehicle for challenging personal jurisdiction. (See Parsons v. Super. Ct. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 7 [“A motion to quash challenges service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.”].)
[4] This Department intends to comply with the time requirements of the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Government Code, §§ 68600–68620). The California Rules of Court state that the goal of each trial court should be to manage limited and unlimited civil cases from filing so that 100 percent are disposed of within 24 months. (Ca. St. Civil Rules of Court, Rule 3.714(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2)(C).
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