Modernity, Identity and Recognition: Malaysia in the Post ...



Modernity, Identity and Recognition: Malaysia in the Post 9/11 World Politics

Syed Imtiaz Ahmed

Assistant Professor

Department of International Relations

University of Dhaka, Bangladesh

Introduction:

The events of 9/11 left a critical imprint on the global politics of identity. Religious, or more particularly, Islamic identity of nations, states or even individuals started to be conceived as a challenge to the hegemony of secularist modernity and hence as a “pre-modern” “barbaric” enemy of civilization. This coercive reassertion of the hegemonic symbols seeks to limit the expression of the alternative modern identities by essentializing the civilizational dimensions of Western modernity. The discourse goes beyond the question of the religion’s (read Islam) compatibility with modernity and depicts an “anti-civilization” image of collective and even individual religious identities primarily by linking it with terrorism and violence. While denouncing “extremism”, their critics voiced the supremacy of Western modernity as the obvious and desirable “end of history” and hence rejected any other alternative claim to modernity. Fukuyama’s reaction to 9/11 clearly upheld this dominant perception in the West: “there does seem to be something about Islam, or at least the fundamentalist versions of Islam that have been dominant in recent years, that makes Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity…We remain at the end of history because there is only one system that will continue to dominate world politics, that of the liberal-democratic west.”[i]

Such evolving discourse of “primitivizing” Islam posed a serious challenge to the identity of Malaysia as a successful modernizer which upholds Islamic values, rather than a replication of Western secularism, as a significant contour of its modernity. The rapid economic development of Malaysia over the last two decades, mainly under the leadership of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), intensified its claim in the narrative of progressive and modern nations. A critical task for Malaysia in the post 9/11 world was to defend its image as a hub of non-Western Modernity with an apparent Islamic character in face of a phenomenal hype against Islamic identity in the Western political discourse. The post 9/11 politics of defamation however does not target Malaysia’s identity individually, rather it slanders the collective space of Islamic identity which Malaysia shares and upholds in projecting its modern image internationally. The challenge for the Malaysian government is thus not only to convince the local audience about its commitment to the identity of an “Islamic Modern” state but also renegotiate the image of that collective space to negate any defamation of its modern identity.

Malaysia’s international position after 9/11 is mainly composed of two interrelated elements. First, it severely denounced Western policies and actions that directly or indirectly associates Islamic identity with terrorism and more broadly, with an “anti-civilization” image and second, it advocated a model of “Islam” that is in tune with the doctrine of progress and modernity, not only for itself but also as a collective identity of the Islamic countries. Even before 9/11, these elements were prevalent in Malaysia’s international policies but their significance has taken a different momentum as a resistance against an international discourse which challenges its image as a modern state by vilifying the collective space of Islamic identity it shares. Thus, the world witnessed an articulated projection of Modern Islam and perhaps the most provocative critic of the West from the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in the post 9/11 period. This paper contends that the struggle of Malaysia’s modern identity in global politics in the post 9/11 period is crucial for understanding its international policies and positions.

The struggle of multiple or alternative modernities within a discursive horizon of global modernity is, however, not new. The struggle, which is particularly prevalent in the late modernizing post-colonial contexts, concerns the recognition of the culturally different ways as being directed towards the same globally shared normative framework of modernity. As Arif Dirlik explains, “The former colonial ‘subjects’ of Euro/American projects of modernity are empowered in a postcolonial world to assert their own projects of modernity. Those who are the most successful in doing so are those who have acquired an indispensable partnership in the world of global capital, and demand recognition of their cultural subjectivities, invented or not, in the making of a global modernity.”[ii]

The unbridled exercise of the US hegemonic power in the post 9/11 world, in effect, has extended the defining capacity of a civilizational discourse which seeks to reassert the superiority of Western modernity as the supreme standard of civilization.[iii] This current system of standardization implicitly confines non-Western modern identities into the peripheries of the civilized world. The assertions of US policy makers along with their actions and programs after 9/11 reinforced this “civilizational program” of Western modernity. This according to Dirlik, “makes a mockery of the supposed recognition of the claims of others to modernity.”[iv]

Modernity in the post-colonial regions often involves a symbolic politics that announces and sustains the modern identity of the nation-state in front of the international audience and hence demands recognition from other members of the international community who are also considered to be “modern” in their own culturally subjective ways. As Eisentadt explains, “A central component in the constitution of modern collective identities was the self-perception of a society and its perception by other societies as “modern,” as the bearer of the distinct modern cultural and political program – and its relations from this point of view to other societies – be it those societies which claim also to be – or are seen as – bearers of this program, and various “others.”[v] The denial of recognition can undermine the national pride and self esteem of the post-colonial states and hence can shape their response to the international conditions responsible for it.

This paper argues that the identity functions of the global norms of modernity significantly influences Malaysia’s international positions in the post 9/11 period. The project of building modern identity in Malaysia under Dr. Mahathir vigorously projected Islam as “stabilizing factor” which would ensure “Malaysia’s status as a powerful, disciplined and learned nation that could defend itself and Islam”.[vi] Accordingly, the international identity of Malaysia upheld the importance of Islamic values and hence claimed recognition for its modernity’s essentially religious characteristics. The struggle for such recognition influenced Malaysia’s international policies even before 9/11. But both the terrorist attacks and the consequent discourse on modernity and Islam intensified the challenge for Malaysia to uphold Islam as a central feature of its modern identity.

Modernity, Recognition and Identity in international Politics

The concept and process of modernity itself constitutes a global normative discourse that shapes the identity of states in international politics. As a normative discourse modernity significantly influences state formation, its logic of appropriate behavior and its prestige and status in world politics. The World Society Perspective developed by John Mayer and others has traced modernity as a global cultural and associational process that defines the identity of modern states in international politics. Diffusion of the norms of global modernity thus for them explains the structural isomorphism of nation states all around the world despite enormous differences in resources and traditions.[vii]

The discursive influence of modernity on states, however, does not confirm the existence of a homogenous normative framework, supplying common principles and norms for state behavior and actions. Although the states acquire and practice a number of common normative dimensions, the discourse of global modernity is essentially a contested arena where various culturally different claims to modernity competes and even confronts with a dominant Western interpretation that seeks to homogenize the concept of modernity.

Opening up of modernity as a fragmented and yet global discourse demands new explanations of how modernity shapes state behavior. Modernity’s influence on state behavior is not a one-way process. Rather the non-Western states constantly confronts, contests and negotiates with the totalizing Western interpretations in order to secure international recognition of their emancipated modern “Self”. This complex process of negotiation engages acceptance (re)interpretation and rejection of cultural values that leads to the ultimate construction of their modern identities. This paper mainly focuses on the states’ struggle for international recognition as a vital constitutive component of modern identity and shows how this struggle as a part of identity negotiation explains their international policies.

In his path breaking study on the importance recognition, Axel Honneth stressed its importance for developing a stable identity involving a basic self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem.[viii] Violating or withholding recognition can amount to the rejection of certain identity claims in the form of claims to recognition. As Heidegren observes, “Such a rejection either renders the development of a personal identity impossible or breaks down an already established identity.”[ix] A similar pattern of such politics of recognition can be observed also in international politics where identity of states is dependent on recognition of the “Others”. Wendt categorizes two forms of recognition in international politics i.e. thin and thick. Thin recognition involves having the juridical status of a sovereign person while thick recognition “is about being respected for what makes a person special or unique.”[x] Thus, as Wendt shows, demands for thick recognition in international politics can take numerous forms – “from pursuit of virtue, success, Great Power status, to being God’s chosen people.”[xi] It is within this framework of thick recognition that this paper conceptualizes the normative influence of modernity on state behavior. The desire for recognition of modern identity stimulates a resistance against hegemonic homogenization of the concept of modernity. Resistance here does not include complete rejection of Western modernity but remains as a part of the states’ negotiation with it with the ultimate aim of ensuring recognition of their culturally exclusive modern identities. Specific aspects of Western modernity (like discipline, rationality, technological progress etc.) are generally accepted as core elements of developing a modern identity. But the resistance takes shape when certain cultural values and practices associated with the identity of the non-western States are portrayed as “non” or “anti” modern. Such denial of recognition affects the self-esteem of the latter and thus they venture into the struggle for establishing acceptance of their cultural exclusivities as part of the discourse of global modernity.

Global Modernity, Religion, and 9/11:

President George W. Bush’s address to the Joint Session of US Congress in September 2001 reflected the contours of this new global politics of identity in the post 9/11 world where the “modern world” was once again in a struggle to defend the values of modern civilization against “anti-civilization” forces of religious extremism. Declaring the Global War on Terror Bush noted,

“On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, or freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other…This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.”[xii]

The dividing lines were drawn. Observers, analysts and reporters concentrated on analyzing “why do they hate us?” and setting up criteria for differentiating “us” from “them”. However, in the evolving political Western political discourse, there was rarely any direct castigation of Islam as a religion. In fact, the statements of Bush and Tony Blair in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 deliberately sought to avoid the use of religion to distinguish “us” from “them”.[xiii] But the “enemies of civilization” certainly belonged to a particular religious group, all of whose members can be potential supporters/sympathizers of the “backward” and “extremist” interpretations which justifies “uncivilized” acts of terror. Juergensmeyer’s analysis nicely captures this essentialization of Islamic identity:

“Most religious people and their organizations are either firmly supportive of the secular state or quiescently uninterested in it. Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network, like most of the new religious activists, comprise a small group at the extreme end of a hostile subculture that itself is a small minority within the larger world of their religious cultures… Still one cannot deny that the ideals and ideas of activists like bin Laden are authentically and thoroughly religious and could conceivably become popular among their religious compatriots.”[xiv]

In the post 9/11 period, Western policy makers, analysts and media depicted civilization as representing and upholding the core values of Western modernity, which in rhetorical terms, symbolized a grand narrative of freedom, reason and progress. And as Brett Bowden pointed out, “Failing to come out explicitly in support of ‘civilized’ America and its ‘civilized’ allies means risking being classified as an ‘uncivilized’ sympathizer and harborer of ‘barbarous’ terrorists by default.”[xv] This support not only implied diplomatic or military support to the US actions but at a deeper level involved the acceptance of Western values as a universal representation of modern civilization.

Such denial of recognition has been a feature of the global discourse of modernity even before the 9/11. But since then, the intensity of efforts to establish the total hegemony of Western interpretations has increased rapidly. The liberal-democratic space for articulating and defining identities almost completely disappeared, intensifying struggle for recognition of the non-Western modernizing countries.

Malaysia: Modernity, Identity and International Politics

Modernity in Malaysia’s international politics displays a complex pattern of interaction with an international normative discourse which is thwarted by the constant attempts of homogenization under a singular imagery of modernity. Like many other postcolonial states, Malaysia’s response to the global politics of modernity involved both the adoption of the Western values and at the same time rejection of its hegemony by attempting to construct a “a possible and potent hybridised (and local) alternative… holding out the potential for resistance and the formulation of an alternative response and modernity.”[xvi] Construction of this hybridized alternative often ventured the recognition of collective norms and values which was propagated as providing equal, if not better, mechanism to sustain progress and modern development. Thus, collective identity schemes like Asian values or Islam largely defined the contours of modern Malaysia in the international world. Malaysia’s quest for a distinct identity in international politics was mainly manifested during the administration of Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad. The rapid change in economic status of Malaysia under Mahathir propelled a new found confidence in constructing and devising a national identity without the dictates of the hegemonic West. Thus, the expressions of post-colonial resistance became a part of Malaysia’s modern identity where the West has been portrayed as the inseparable “Other discursive space”[xvii] and thus facilitate the construction of a confident and liberated “Self”.

The logic of post-colonial resistance, however, does not involve a wholesale rejection of Western values and ideas; rather, it is essentially designed within a “terrain of attraction and repulsion”.[xviii] In fact, Mahathir Mohamad’s “vision” for Malaysia remained deeply committed to the path of rapid industrialization, scientific and technological progress. Even in the realm of values, the importance of Western examples of orderliness, discipline, social organizations and above all, work-ethic, occupied significant place and hence a part of its modern identity.[xix] The resistance took shape mainly in the discourse of values, ideas and cultural practices which were perceived to be threatened by the hegemonic universalization of Western modernity. Thus, Malaysia’s international policies over the last two decades reflected the project of constructing a post-colonial modernity with a definite element of resistance to negotiate the recognition of its attainments in terms of economic development and modernization as well as its adherence to Islamic values and cultures. In post 9/11 period, importance of such resistance has taken a critical turn due to the discursive practice of identifying Islam with primitivism and violence.

Modernity, Islam and Malaysia in International Politics

It was mainly during Dr. Mahathir’s administration that Islam turned from a symbolic factor in foreign policy to an active element of its international identity. During the entire 1980s Malaysia actively promoted its identity as an Islamic country and concentrated on strengthening ties with other Islamic states both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

There indeed existed precise domestic calculations/compulsions on part of the UMNO led government to promote an “Islamic Face” of Malaysia. Islam remains as one of the most (if not the most) important denominator of Malayan identity. According to the constitutional definition, Malay is a person who habitually speaks Bahasa Melayu (the Malay language), follows Malay Adat (custom) and professes Islam. As Mohamad Abu Bakar pointed out, in context of the multi-ethnic society in Malaysia, Islam became the major basis of Malay unity, a form of ethnic identification.[xx] The new phase of Islamic revivalism in the Malay society in 1970s, particularly the growing popularity of the student-led dakwah movements (particularly Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or ABIM), became a formidable challenge to the authority of the UMNO led government over the Malay Islamic discourse and hence to their long-standing political hegemony. The challenge increased further when Partai Islam se Malaysia (PAS) left the ruling coalition and resumed its role as the Malay Muslim opposition. The possible alliance between PAS and the dakwah movements presented a politically explosive situation for UMNO.

After becoming the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir concentrated on dealing with this challenge of Islamic opposition and to diffuse the situation, he chose to adopt a “mainstreaming” rather than a confrontational approach. Such approach sought to co-opt various Islamic opposition groups and offered UMNO’s own version of dakwah, “one more moderate, tolerant, and suitable to Malaysian society, with its multiple ethnic groups and almost equal proportion of Muslims and non-Muslims.”[xxi] The government adopted series of policies and invested heavily in developing Islamic institutions. The new government sponsored Islamic discourse capitalized on successful modernization in Malaysia under Mahathir and sought to enhance the government’s credibility for relying on a “Right Islam”[xxii] that leads to progress and development, contrary to the ideas and programs of PAS and other Islamic oppositions. Propagation of a moderate and tolerant image of this “Right Islam” also sought to assuage and claim the support non-Muslim communities of Malaysia.

Most authors have explained the influence Islamic identity upon Malaysian international policies as a direct consequence of such domestic political considerations. Shanti Nair argued that like many post-colonial third world countries, Malaysia’s international policies mainly “seeks to affect the internal environment in ways favorable to the building of state and to the maintenance of regime in power” and hence employment of an Islamic identity in its foreign policy serves “the function of domestic political economy.”[xxiii] From a different perspective, Abu Bakar argued that during the first three decades of Malaysia’s independence (1957-87), Islam has hardly occupied a central position in Malaysia’s foreign policy and the country continued to remain loyal to its Western, commonwealth and ASEAN ties. However, in assessing the future trends, he located the possibility of Islam’s growing importance as a broader discourse of identity in global politics, which might substantially affect Malaysia’s international policies.[xxiv]

By solely concentrating on domestic politics, such arguments tend to overlook a rapidly modernizing Malaysia’s changing perception of status and role in international politics. In projecting Islam as a part of its international policies, Malaysia had to make a conscious choice about the critical meanings that it attaches to its overall international identity. Even while developing a domestic politics based explanation, Shanti Nair did acknowledge that there were different meanings and functions of Mahathir’s “modernist” Islam for the domestic and international audience — “On the domestic front, it became a mission to convince the Malays that the programmes and ideas of PAS would ultimately act as an obstacle to their modernization, away from progress. On the international front, the same strategy assumed a more defensive tone concerned with the stereotyping of Islam, recognizing it as a problem of Image.”[xxv] This different function and meaning of “Modern Islam” in Malaysia’s international policies indicates the working of a separate set of interactions between Malaysia’s self and the global discourse on Islam and modernity. By identifying itself with the Islamic world, Malaysia immediately entered a collective space, which has been a subject of increasing suspicion of the liberal modernist discourse, particularly from the angle of a secular interpretation of the modern world. For Malaysia, Islamic identity demonstrated its post-colonial emancipation based on successful modernization. Islam became on one hand, a principal referral point to challenge the discursive hegemony of the West and, on the other, a subject of negotiation with the global norms and principles of modernity. As Mahathir pointed out, “There can be a modern Islamic civilization which is not an attempt to reconstruct life in the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th century nor a slavish copy of a decadent Western system.”[xxvi] It is this very space of “Islamic Civilization” where Malaysia can properly identify itself as a modernized country, liberated from the discursive hegemony of the West.

In constructing an Islamic Identity, Malaysia’s policy on one hand, sought to locate the Islamic countries within a broader terrain, dominated, exploited and denigrated by the “West’ and hence engaged in a constant struggle to earn their “rightful place” in the modern world. On the other, it sought to “rediscover” Islam in the modern time and space, particularly highlighting its peaceful nature and conformity to the doctrine of progress and modernity. Mahathir’s 1996 publication, Islam: The Misunderstood Religion, elaborated such critical dimensions of Islamic identity project in contemporary world politics. Here, first he criticized the incorrect association of “fundamental Islam” with violence and terrorism: “if the teachings of Islam are studied, it would be clear that the best Muslims are fundamentalists. The fundamentals of Islam are based on peace…The people who are usually described as fundamentalist are far from following the fundamentals of Islamic religion…In calling these deviationists Muslim fundamentalists, the West has displayed his lack of understanding of Islam.”[xxvii] Second, Mahathir was particular in identifying the dangers of “misinterpretations” of Islam for the Muslims. It is the interpretations, according to Mahathir, that can undermine the true spirit of the Quran. Such “misinterpretantions” however, thrive and flourish in an international environment where Muslims are subject to constant “injustice” and their identity is essentialized: “when non-believers condemn all Muslims as terrorists and plain bad people, they certainly are not being helpful. They are simply pushing the good Muslims into the arms of deviationists.”[xxviii] The statement not only reflects Mahathir’s position against essentialization of Muslim identity but also a plea for recognition of the “good” (or right) Muslims, who are different from the bad (or deviationist) ones. This dichotomy between “good” and “bad” Muslims also prevails in what Mahmood Mamdani describes as Western “culture talk” about Islam and Islamic countries, particularly after the 9/11.[xxix] However, Mahathir’s dichotomization rejects the division between “good (moderate) Islam” and “bad (fundamentalist) Islam”, implicitly presupposed in the Western discourse. His criticism of the Islamic “Self” focuses on the follower Muslims not the religion Islam. Thus, Malaysia, according to Mahathir, remains as a “fundamentalist” Islamic state rather than a moderate one, as described by the Western media and policy-makers. In a personal interview with the author Mahathir Mohamad explained, “It is they (the Westerners) who say that Malaysia is a Moderate Islamic country. We are not a moderate Islamic country. We are actually fundamentally Islamic. In other words, we stick to the basic fundamental teachings of Islam as found in the Quran and the verified ahadith (teachings of Prophet Muhammad).”[xxx] And those teachings, for Mahathir, can provide the basis for a peaceful, tolerant and civilized identity. As he argued in the interview:

There is no moderation in Islam because Islam itself is already a moderate religion. If you follow the fundamental teachings of Islam you will be promoting peace because Islam is about peace, there should be no conflict between you and fellow Muslims, there should not be any conflict between you and non-Muslims. Islam already says that there are people with other beliefs who pray in their own way and their religion is theirs and our religion is ours. So tolerance of other religions is embedded in the fundamental teachings of Islam. So we are not moderate Muslims, we are Muslim fundamentalists. [xxxi]

The modern Islamic face of Malaysia thus doesn’t merely reflect acceptance of Western hegemony over defining and dividing Islamic identity. Rather it upholds an autonomous attempt to claim Islam’s place within the discourse of modernity.

Malaysia, Islam, Modernity and the Post 9/11 World Politics

Soon after the incidents of 9/11 Malaysia joined with most of the nations of the world to condemn the brutal violence. Dr. Mahathir stressed the importance of global unity and expressed Malaysia’s intentions to cooperate with the US in fighting against terrorism.[xxxii] George W. Bush’s personal phone call to Dr. Mahathir in October 2001, the Bush-Mahathir meeting before the APEC summit and finally Mahathir’s visit to White House in 2002, all indicated the prospects of a strong and cordial tie between Malaysia and the US on a common ground of “War against Terrorism”.[xxxiii] However, Malaysia’s concerns about the nature of US actions became apparent even during the early period of enthusiasm. As early as on September 22, 2001 Mahathir Mohamad pointed out that while Malaysia supported efforts to curb terrorism, it felt that it was timely for the world community to give attention to solving problems which caused people to resort to terrorism. These included the violence in Palestine, Iraq and Chechnya.[xxxiv] One of the immediate concerns of Malaysia in the post 9/11 period was to dissociate itself from any possible connections with the international terrorist network and at the same time uphold its autonomy in decision making in face of growing unilateralism in US actions and policies. A challenging situation for Malaysia occurred when the news was circulated that in January 2000 the top leaders of Al-Qaeda met in Kula Lumpur to plan the entire 9/11 bombing.[xxxv] Jane’s Defense Weekly and also Singapore’s Berita Harian alleged that if Malaysia would have arrested Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaz Al-Hazmi, both accused for the 9/11 bombing, during their stay in Kula Lumpur then the terrorist attack could have been averted. The news indeed complicated Malaysian project of upholding Islam as a contour of its modern identity as it now was under the risk of getting associated with an Islam that is “primitive” and “violent”.

The concern thus soon extended to include the collective autonomy problems of the Islamic countries. On one hand, Malaysia reassert its image as a modern state and on the other, it found itself in difficulties to accommodate with the coercive policies and actions of the US that defamed and threatened the image and sovereignty of the Muslim countries. Attack on Afghanistan and Iraq, policies for monitoring and regulating Muslim states and individuals gradually distanced Malaysia from a so called global campaign against terrorism. Mahathir’s speech at the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) conference in 2003 contained serious criticism of Western actions and their alliance with Israel and attracted world-wide attention.

Malaysian position on the Islam, terrorism and Western actions after the 9/11 has to be understood within the broader framework of essentialization of Islamic identity which ultimately undermines the notion of Islamic modernity. While Malaysia cannot move away from Islam to Western to secularism for domestic political and cultural compulsions, it also cannot compromise its modern image, which symbolizes its post colonial emancipation in front of the international community. Moreover, that very sense of emancipation further necessitates Malaysia’s emphasis on Islam in international positions and policies. Malaysia thus entered into a “recognition game” in which it sought to negotiate its own identity with Western modernity’s increased attempts to primitivize Islam. It is the successful modernization in Malaysia that generated both the capacity and the inclination to resist the hegemony of the Western discourse. Of course, domestic political calculations play an important role behind articulation of Malaysia’s point of resistance i.e. Islam. But the Modern Islam it projects in its international identity is indeed constructed on basis of its interactions with the Western hegemonic modernity as the essential “other”. For successful realization of Modern Malaysia, it requires recognition of both modernity as defined in terms of progress, development and civilized practices and modernity as defined in terms of emancipation and freedom in practicing autonomy in identity construction.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to develop a structuralist explanation of international policies and positions of Malaysia, particularly in the post 9/11 world. The analytical focus has been on the structure of global modernity and how identity politics is played out in relation to that structure. The paper conceptualized global modernity as an essentially fragmented discourse where alternative religious, cultural and national claims to modernity are often in engaged in competition with the hegemonic Western notions. The essence of such competition concerns a struggle for recognition of the non-Western modernities. The recognition does not simply imply Western acceptance of a non-Western country as modern, rather it involves challenging the Western hegemony over the very concept of modernity. In this struggle for recognition, non-Western countries thus not simply embrace Western notions of modernity but also assert their autonomy in identity construction on basis of increased agency and sense of emancipation generated by successful modernization. The trend is particularly prevalent among the post-colonial countries where such autonomy occupies a central position in the discourse of national pride and self-esteem. Non-recognition in this regard can lead to increased assertion of autonomous identity and attempts to locate it within a discourse of modernity that is not an exclusively Western domain. From this perspective, the so called anti-Western rhetoric of Malaysia and its adoption of a modern Islamic identity receive a new meaning. Rather than looking at the material interests or domestic politics, this paper argues that it is the successful modernization in post-colonial Malaysia that has prompted it to promote a doctrine of Modern Islam in its international policies. The post 9/11 international political scenario has intensified Malaysia’s struggle for recognition of its modernity. Thus, its international policies have increasingly emphasized on articulating a doctrine of Modern Islam and at the same time take a critical position against Western hegemonic concepts and policies.

Acknowledgements: I would first and foremost like to thank the Asian Scholarship Foundation for providing the nine-month research scholarship which enabled me to do this study in Malaysia. Particularly, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Lourdes Salvador, Director, and Ms. Somakamol Yongkrittaya, Program Officer, Asian Scholarship Foundation, Bangkok. My special thanks to my host institution, Institute of Malay World and Civilization, University Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), particularly to the institute’s Director, Professor Shamsul AB for his constant inspiration and guidance. My special thanks also to Mr. Johanes Herlijanto (University of Indonesia), Professor Alexander Wendt (Ohio State University, US), Professor Daniel Chirot (University of Washington, US) and Professor SN Eisentadt (Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem) for their inspirations and suggestions.

End Notes

-----------------------

[i] Fukuyama, Francis. “The West has Won”, The Guardian, October 11, 2001, London, UK.

[ii] Dirlik, A, 2003, Global Modernity? Modernity in an Age of Global Capitalism: European Journal of Social Theory, Vol.6 No.3, p. 286.

For a comprehensive analysis of the hegemony of Western Modernity in defining the “standards of civilization” see, Bowden, B, 2004, In the Name of Progress and Peace: The “Standard of Civilization” and the Universalizing Project: Alternatives: Global, Local Political, Vol.29 No.1, January/February, pp. 43-68.

[iii] Dirlik, Ibid. p.288.

[iv] S Eisentadt, S.N. The Protestant Ethic and Modernity – Comparative Analysis with and beyond Weber, Lecture given at the Congress of German Sociological Society, Germany: University of Munchen, November 2004.

[v] Nair, Shanti. Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy. London and NY: Routledge, 2002, p. 92.

[vi] See for details, Mayer, J. W. et al., 1997, World Society and the Nation State: American Journal of Sociology, Vol.103 No.1, July, pp. 144-81.

[vii] See for details, Honneth, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press, 1995.

[viii] Heidegren, C, 2002, Anthropology, Social Theory, and Politics: Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition: Inquiry, Vol. 45 No.4, December, p. 436.

[ix] Wendt, A, 2003, Why a World State is Inevitable: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No.4, p. 511.

[x] Ibid. p. 512

[xi] George W, Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and American People”, September 20, 2001. (20 December, 2004)

[xii] Leudar, I & Victoria Marsland, 2004, On Membership Categorization: ‘Us’, ‘Them’ and ‘Doing Violence’ in Political Discourse: Discourse and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2-3, p. 257.

[xiii] Juergensmeyer, Mark, Religion in the New Global Order, Paper presented at the Conference on Study of Religion and Terrorism, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University: US, November 20-22, 2002, p. 3.

[xiv] Bowden, B, 2002, Reinventing Imperialism in the Wake of September 11: Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Affairs, Vol.1 No.2, Summer, p.29.

[xv] Loong Wong, “Mahathir, Malaysia and Globalisation: Challenging Orthodoxy” Globalization, Vol.4 Issue.2 October 2004. < >

[xvi] Souchou, Y, 2001, Modernity and Mahathir’s Rage: Theorizing State Discourse of Mass Media in Southeast Asia, in Y Souchou ed. House of Glass: Culture, Modernity and the State in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 56.

[xvii], Ibid. p.49.

[xviii] See for example, Mohamad, Mahathir. The Challenge. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1986, pp. 44-47 and Mohamad, Mahathir. Reflections on Asia. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 2002, p. 93.

[xix] See for details, Abu Bakar, M, 2001, Islam, Civil Society, and Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, in, N Mitsuo, S Siddique, and O F Bajunid (eds.) Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 57-75

[xx] AB, Shamsul, 2005, The Making of Moderate Islam: The Malaysian Experience, Personal Communication.

[xxi] Shanti Nair used the term to describe the “modernist image” of Islam in Malaysia propagated by the UMNO. See for details, Nair, Shanti. Ibid. pp. 91-120.

[xxii] Ibid. p. 7 & 11.

[xxiii] Abu Bakar, Mohamad, 2004, Islam in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: The First Three Decades (1957-87) in, Baginda, AR ed. Malaysia and the Islamic World, London: ASEAN Academic Press Limited, 2004, pp.17-30.

[xxiv] Nair, Shanti. Ibid. p. 99.

[xxv] Makaruddin, Hashim ed. Islam and the Muslim Ummah: Selected Speeches by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 2000, p. 156.

[xxvi] Mohamad, Mahathir, 1996, Islam: The Misunderstood Religion: IKIM Journal (Malaysia), Vol.4 No.2 July-December, p 9.

[xxvii] Ibid.

[xxviii] Mamdani, M, 2002, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism: American Anthropologist, Vol.104 No.3, September, pp. 766-775.

[xxix] Personal Interview with Dato Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Kula Lumpur Malaysia, August 18, 2005.

[xxx] Ibid.

[xxxi] “New Straits Times”, September 15, 2001.

[xxxii] See for details, AB, Shamsul, 2002, Malaysia’s International Role Post September 11: IDSS Commentaries Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

[xxxiii] “New Straits Times”, September 22, 2001

[xxxiv] See for details, Wikipedia (Online Free Encyclopedia) < > (20 January 2006)

................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download