Chapter One: - Covenant University
Chapter One
Introduction
1. Background to the Study
The study examines the Africa role conceptions by Nigeria’s political leadership from 1985 to 2007. The perception that states are like humans who occupy specific roles in a social group is a global one with a long history. By the national role approach which has been popularized by Holsti (1967, 1970, and 1987), Wish (1980), Walker (1990), and Krotz (2001), a state is equated with an individual who cannot live in isolation and has a particular set of roles to perform in the human community: from the family group, to the school, religious organization, peer group, market, workplace, and so forth. Borrowed from Social Psychology, which recognizes the mutuality of “role” and “man” in every social group that provides a platform for the full expression of man’s potentials and social self (Backman and Second, 1968), the behaviouralist approach in the field of Political Science and International Relations contextualizes the world system as an international community or a social group, and states as members or individuals of such community with separate or similar roles either apportioned or self imposed which they identify with the intent of playing. Hence, from the global bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), continental systems such as the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), regional organizations including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to bilateral arrangements, every component in the global system has a set of roles to play, and these distinguish each one of them. Interestingly however, each body may be dysfunctional until the states that make them up play organic roles in the system.
However, political realism, which stresses the primary role of national interest in every role a nation plays or does not play in international politics, argues that national roles are galvanized by well articulated national interests. This perspective holds that identified roles are directly connected to identified interests and that when roles become incompatible with such interests, the state changes the roles. However, it is not always the case for other actors or components of the international system. International organizations to which states belong have specific interests and roles to give life to the interests which its members must play. This does not foreclose the fact that states opt out of organizations that can no longer accommodate their interests rather than play a role not coterminous with their nation’s interests. Spain left the League of Nations in the 1930s, and so did Germany. Despite the place of national interests in identifying national roles, it is the latter that defines the external behaviour or attitude of the state, and makes its reactions or dispositions to world issues predictable (Isaak, 1975). The state would even have a specific image or earn a particular label for itself by which other nations would know it (Eulau, 1963). For instance, the United States and Britain because of their role in global democratization and good governance, and fight to secure the world from terrorism, are referred to as “world policemen”. Thus, the life which the national role approach gives to states more than national interest makes it more attractive and scientific in the study of a state’s foreign policy (Adigbuo, 2007).
The African context of role conception and assumption has not been different. However, it is a relatively new outlook for African foreign policies except for Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia, which from independence, against the backgrounds of their colonial experience and aspirations for the future, assumed some definite roles in the continent and the world. Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah, took the lead in the movement for a radical unification of independent African states in which all the nations would surrender their sovereignty to a supranational authority (King, 1996). Ghana spearheaded this when Nkrumah declared that Ghana was under the authority of the African sovereign, a position that other states in the erstwhile Casablanca group identified with. Ghana’s Pan-Africanist posture and roles allowed for the first conference on the African soil of the movement to be hosted in Accra. Egypt’s anti-colonial behaviour from the era of the nationalization of the Suez Canal under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and its roles in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (a group of states with specific objective to depart from the ideological feud between Soviet Union and the United States during the period referred to as the Cold War, and specific role to reconcile the two divides and judge ideology-related issues based on merits) (Adeyemo, 2002), made Egypt an early comer in global and African politics. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was one of the foremost African leaders to carve a niche for his country as a continental leader with his anti-western but Pan-Africanist rhetorics and advocacy. These activist roles towards African harmony of Ethiopia under him were part of what culminated in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, and earned for Ethiopia from that time to date the headquarters of the continental body.
Role conception and assumption by Nigeria has been a function of the perceptions of the founding fathers from the eve of independence, and a product of certain geographical factors. The nationalists including Nnamdi Azikiwe, Herbert Macaulay, Obafemi Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro, Aminu Kano, Ahmadu Bello, and Tafawa Balewa, to mention a few, viewed Nigeria as a nation naturally created to fill the roles of leadership in Africa and the world. Their foreign policy outlooks which had characterized their basis for independence movement in the first place were premised on the historical factors of the making of Nigeria itself. This factor was the merger of the great nations and empires of the Western Sudan and the Forest Region of the pre-colonial era, including Kanem Bornu, Benin, Oyo, Nupe, Kano, Kororofa, Sakwatto, Itsekiri, and Ijaw (Ikime, 1985). Other factors included the civility, maturity, and political wisdom in struggling for and earning independence. This was considered to have served as a model for other nations under colonial rule. Other factors that informed the role conceptions by the founding fathers included Nigeria’s huge population; its wealth; and its rich cultural heritage. The perceptions of the past have been strengthened by the increasing population making Nigeria the most populous black nation in the world, and its oil fortunes which place it as one of the rich countries of the world in revenue (Onyearu, 2008). The first instinct of Nigeria has therefore been to occupy the centre of African affairs: use its resources, influence, and power to reach great bargains and further its interests, assume leadership positions and become the voice of the continent, and assist needy nations of the entire black world (King, 1996). These three-prong roles have underlined the foreign policy towards Africa and earned for Nigeria the international label of having an Afrocentric attitude.
Against these backgrounds, this study examines African role conceptions and assumption by Nigeria. It attempts to identify the role conceptions, actors in the politics of role conceptions, and how Nigeria performed these roles from 1985 to 2007. The period encompasses five political dispensations (three military regimes and two civilian administrations). However, one of the civilian administrations, the Shonekan Interim National Government (August-November 1993) has been left out because of its very brief tenure, and inactivity in the foreign policy arena.
For Nigeria, national role conceptions vary over time and across borders. Each regime comes up with its own rhetoric of “unique roles” Nigeria would occupy in Africa. This does not foreclose the fact that such regime always seems to end up having role conception or role assumption problems. The seeming vagueness of the conception or vagueness of strategies of realization of Nigeria’s African roles, or the rehash of old conceptions, rather demonstrate any or a combination of these six role conception strands in the development of Nigeria’s African policy: vaguely or unclearly conceived roles; absence of role conceptions; assumption of national roles not conceived; clearly conceived roles that are partially or never filled; lack of a dynamic role conception, and clearly conceived roles that were also effectively occupied. Specifically, the study seeks to identify the lacuna and establish which of the six observable scenarios underlined Nigeria’s African policy from 1985 to 2007. The concept of Nigeria’s African policy can be viewed as a systematic approach to building and preserving a desirable balance between Nigeria’s dispositions and Africa’s conditions (Bukarambe, 1990). a. Since independence in 1960 Nigeria’s efforts have been geared towards engendering an enduring peace, security, unity, brotherhood and brotherliness towards Africa and the entire black race (King, 1996; Oluwaniyi, 2006), and lately good governance, poverty reduction, diseases control and development in the region, with the Africa-centrepiece underlining its foreign policy.
The research interrogates policy makers’ role conceptions, why and how such roles were conceived, how each leadership has implemented their own African policy against the background of their role conceptions, and the specific problems with role conceptions that each has faced. To these ends, the study also examines the politics of conception of national roles in the foreign policy making of Nigeria. The study attempts to underline the utility of National Role Conceptions (NRCs) as a more promising analytical tool in the study of foreign policy (Adigbuo, 2007), than commonly used International Relations (IR) instruments such as Political Realism (including National Interest), Liberal-idealism, Marxism, and lately Constructivism.
1.2. Statement of the Problem
An important area in foreign policy analysis, which, however, seems neglected in Nigeria’s foreign policy (NFP) is national role conception (NRC). In Nigeria, role conception has not been clear in part because it is prone to different interpretations by various governments, political institutions and influential individuals and groups. More critically is that the role conceptions have often been outlandish and vague as far as strategies or instruments of policy were concerned. In terms of the politics of role conceptions and foreign policy making, the Nigerian leadership has exhibited a high degree of dictatorship, making foreign policy a class, clique, and secret thing between the President or Head of State and his chosen small cabinet. Other agents of foreign policymaking, including other ministries, the parliament, judiciary, media, research groups, think-tanks, academic community, and pressure/interest groups are sidelined, while a very small informal or semi-formal political group (the group within the group) conceives external roles of the country, takes decisions, and formulates policies. Thus, foreign policy making is often shrouded in secrecy and clique clannishness. This has impacted on the problem of definition of Nigeria’s African roles in its policy towards Africa. The politicization, secrecy and resultant confusion create a problem of clarity culminating in the unpopularity of role conceptions as a term in Nigerian foreign policy analysis, because it is often difficult for analysts to underline or identify Nigeria’s conceived roles. These have constituted major lacuna in Nigeria’s foreign policy analysis. It is this major gap that this study has attempted to fill: to identify these roles, critique them, and examine how they are conceived and eventually assumed by Nigeria in Africa.
Indeed, Nigeria’s African policy has suffered conceptual problem from independence. Political leaders and elite who make the policies have been more driven by class, group, and personal interests than national concerns in the formulation of policies. They also sometimes lack the intellectual and technical finesse to conceptualize policy and articulate national roles that can help translate rhetoric to action, and subject national roles to their petty perceptions and narrow interpretations (Gambari, 1986). Such have led to a number of deficiencies in role conception- vague, static or non-dynamic, clear but unrealistic (bogus), clear but lacking in will, absence of conception, and clear conception with the will to assume them. By and large, there is a problem with clarity of Nigeria’s African policy, which is rooted at the role conception stage. Universally, NRCs have three basic assumptions namely, that role conceptions are the culmination of the perceptions of leaders, interpretations of the leaders, and the expectations of the general public (local and international) (Adigbuo, 2005; Wish, 1980). However, the politics of role conception in Nigeria is such that the first two assumptions have been strengthened at the expense of the third which emphasizes the crucial place of citizens and other groups which Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann, and Hermann (2001) have referred to as decision units in the policy process (2001). This was particularly so during the post Second Republic period, when the army with its command structure and professional “secret” style of operations, took over the business of foreign affairs. The civilian administration that succeeded it from 1999 was incidentally led by another army General who had retired after serving as a military Head of State in the past. The study thus carefully selected the period of 1985-2007 because it presents a classic reference point in the role conception problem.
The study attempts a fact-value dichotomy, by a scientific inquisition through the interrogation of the many outlandish political statements of the political leaders, and critically evaluating the assertions of the leaders and policymakers and juxtaposing their pronouncements with their actions in Africa, and in the process identifying and documenting Nigeria’s official roles in Africa.
1.3. Research Questions
Against the background of the problem, the study has attempted to answer the following questions:
1. What are the national role conceptions in Nigeria’s African policy?
2. Who conceives national roles and how are they conceived and assumed?
3. Are there differences between the role conceptions and role performance of each administration?
4. What accounts for these differences?
1.4. Research Propositions
The study has made some propositions to act as guide in the course of the research. The degree of probability of the propositions is tested in the course of the research and analysis. These propositions are:
1. National roles are not clearly defined in Nigeria’s African policy from 1985-2007.
2. Foreign policy making process is not controlled by a small and informal group.
3. There is no significant difference between the role conception and role performance of each leadership.
4. Differences that may occur between role conception and assumption are not necessarily informed by domestic factors.
1.4. Objectives of the Study
Against the background of the problematique and research questions, the overall objective of the study is the interrogation of the historical development of Nigeria’s African policy against the background of role conceptions of the policymakers, investigating the underpinnings of politics in the role conceptions and examining how the leadership and diplomacy styles and preferences of four different policy regimes rubbed on policy initiative, making and implementation concerning Africa from 1985-2007. Specifically, the objectives are to:
1. Investigate the national role conceptions in Nigeria’s African policy
2. Identify the political undercurrents in both the conception and assumption of Nigeria’s roles in Africa
3. Comparatively examine the conception of national roles and performance of the roles by the successive leaderships in Nigeria from 1985 to 2007.
4. Account for the differences in the roles of each political regime.
1.6. Scope of the Study
The study covers the period 1985-2007. This was a significant era in Nigeria’s foreign policy. This period included three military regimes (Ibrahim Babangida, 1985-1993; Sani Abacha, 1993-1998; Abdulsalami Abubakar, 1998-1999); and the civilian administration of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007). The administration of Ernest Shonekan is omitted because of its very brief tenure. The period was eventful and critical for Nigeria’s foreign policy in general and its African policy in particular. The period allows for an inquiry into whether Nigeria had clearly defined or identifiable role conceptions in its formulation and implementation of African policy. The study identifies the common thread running through successive regimes’ role conceptions and foreign policy implementation, and establishes the differences in policies.
The period chosen enhances a more critical approach to the understanding of the politics of and variations in foreign policy making in Nigeria because of the governance types it understudies and the understanding of different regime behaviours this offers. The period also allows for a flow in the investigation of any continuity and change in Nigeria’s role conceptions and African policy. These become important because of the variants of leadership and their different agenda as far as foreign and African policy was concerned. For instance, the twilight of the Babangida regime posed a lot of credibility crises for Nigeria in international politics, the Abacha period undermined its leadership in Africa, the Abubakar era sought reintegration of Nigeria in global politics, and Obasanjo’s dispensation saw Nigeria struggling - to outdo South Africa, Egypt and Ghana- and recovering its leadership and respectable position in Africa.
In terms of space (geographical factor), the choice of African policy is informed by the context and focus of Nigeria itself. Nigeria’s foreign policy has been generally described as Africa-centred from independence. This invariably implies that its attitude in the international system is pro-African, encapsulating its West African, Southern African, and general African attitudes. The historical African concerns of Nigeria thus impinge on the choice of African policy, and why it has not opted to study its Middle East, American, European, or Oriental policy.
1.7. Methodology of the Study
The purpose of this section is to discuss the methods utilized by the study, for its data collection and analysis. The following are discussed: research population, sources of data, methods of data collection, techniques adopted for data analysis, and framework for analysis.
1.7.1. Research Population
The research population in this study is underlined by the number of stakeholders or decision units that are present in the process of formulation of foreign policy. These decision units, as Beasley et al (2001) have identified, include all those formal and informal groups that are partakers or influencers of foreign policy decision making such as the branches of government, research institutions, pressure groups, media, academic community, business community, et cetera. To these ends, a purposive sampling is done, culminating in samples taken from foreign policy decision units, and individuals from these units. These include the Executive branch, Legislative branch, research institutes, intellectual, diplomatic and business community. The reason for this cross-section is that the institutions are not only traditional bodies that constitute the foreign policy elite of any nation because of their level of enlightenment, influence, and stakes in public affairs, but that they are also constitutionally recognized as central to policymaking. Interviews were conducted with primary actors in the foreign policy making process, who are an important part of the research population. In other words, the information of a number of key foreign policy decision units and personnel has been sampled to determine leaders’ thinking and preferences when conceiving national roles. By this, the study gained an insight into the politics of role conceptions and foreign policy making.
The objective has been to find out how, why, and when national roles are conceived, and who conceive them, what the roles are as far as the formulation and execution of foreign policy is concerned; and in the case of Nigeria, whether the roles were consistent with prevailing developments at different points between 1985 and 2007. The justification for choosing the only civilian administration is that the era brought a new twist to Nigeria’s foreign policy making with the practical monopolization of foreign policy making powers by the President, and because it was also proactively African. The military-civilian interface in the study helped to underline the differences in the politics of role conception during military and civilian administrations.
1.7.1.1. Number of Samples
Samples from the diplomatic community selected were informed by Nigeria’s age-long and immense roles in and interaction with the countries of the envoys. There were more nations of Africa that Nigeria played active roles in, but the ones sampled out here were the only accessible ones in the course of field work. The number of samples from the diplomatic community is five, namely, the High Commissioners/Ambassadors of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Liberia and Ghana. Samples from the government circles were selected based on their centrality to foreign policymaking. These include the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with four and one personnel interviewed respectively. These embassies or high commissions were specifically picked because of the historic roles Nigeria has played in their affairs either for liberation, political stability, conflict resolution, or foreign assistance. There are several samples from the academic and research community, including eight experts in the foreign policy sphere (four from Nigeria and four from the United States for the purpose of drawing inference and examples). This is pertinent in an analysis of this nature bearing in mind their depth of research and understanding of the workings of public policy. The American intellectual and foreign policy community was extensively interacted with as a pilot study, bearing in mind the similarity between the Nigerian and American diplomatic scenes.
1.7.2. Sources of Data
1.7.2.1. Primary Sources
The primary sources of data for this study include oral interviews. Other primary data are generated from diplomatic notes, correspondences and unprocessed information from government and diplomatic sources. The degree of reliability of primary sources is considered high in social science because of its unprocessed or raw nature (Olorunfemi, 2004). Also the primary source is seen as reliable because the data from primary source are direct information from the participants or key witnesses. The possibility of distortion or exaggeration is however, not unlikely (Alagoa, 1985; Afigbo, 1990).
1.7.2.2. Secondary Sources
Secondary sources of data for this study include books, journals, monographs, newspapers and news magazines, published gazettes, unpublished theses and research projects, and the internet. The secondary sources constitute the greater percentage of data sources of this study. The internet has also been maximized with online resources including journal and book articles that are accessible providing important data.
1.7.3. Methods of Data Collection
Oral data involves the technique of one-on-one interview with persons considered particularly relevant to the foreign policy decision making arena. For this study a smaller number of respondents who are stakeholders in the foreign policy making process have been interviewed. The advantage of the interviews is that it enables respondents to delve into (eye-witness or participant’s) details and fill in the gaps in literature.
Secondary data collection involves intense library search and internet browsing. The implication for the study was that ample library search to collect processed data has been done. Books and journal articles, unpublished theses, government publications, and all other processed data collected have been able to complement, validate, or reject certain claims in primary data and other literature.
1.7.4. Techniques of Data Analysis
The techniques for analyzing data include content analysis, and the descriptive-historical analysis methods.
1.7.4.1. Content Analysis
This approach is bifurcated. It is both qualitative content analysis through extensive literature review, and textual analysis with table illustrations. The textual approach has been adopted to discuss data in human communications such as speeches or public addresses, correspondences, diplomatic notes, letters, and policy statements. It is called the textual analysis, which is a standard in Social Sciences for studying the content of communication. It is defined as “the study of recorded human communications such as books, websites, paintings and laws” (Babbie, 1990). Holsti (I969) defines it as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”. It would thus involve the reading, prognosis, critique, drawing of conclusions from and discussion of every relevant information gathered from the category of sources mentioned. In other words, the approach would have to do with a critical analysis of some primary and secondary data collected. The danger of content analysis however is that decoding human communication might be difficult which may lead to wrong inferences and by extension baseless value judgments in the analysis. Hence cross-examination of evidence or facts from a pool of sources becomes necessary to avoid this pitfall.
1.7.4.2. Historical Method
The historical method is also employed in the study for analysis. This involves a descriptive-analytical and narrative approach. Generally, historical research involves investigation, recording, analysis and interpretation of facts leading to the reconstruction of the past (Gberevbie, 2008; Alagoa, 1985). The study examines four administrations in a chronological order. The historical method also involves interpretation of the records in such a way that conclusions reached would amount to an interpretation or re-interpretation of the past events and consequently reconstruction of Nigerian foreign policy history. The historical method has the following problem- a possible reproduction of distorted facts or dearth of substantial materials covering certain periods. However, the historical method cannot be ignored in a research like this.
1.7.5. Framework for Analysis
“National role” is the framework for analysis. In this case, the role theory has been adapted to national role with the state seen as a person or social being that fills some roles or positions in international politics. In the course of this, the nation’s foreign policy reflects national roles conceived by policy makers that they aspire for the nation to occupy. The fact that the international system is beset with constant changes, and that states also respond to these changes; and the fact that the political group is central in policymaking, make the interactionist understanding of role the framework guiding the analysis in the study. The interactionist approach holds the view that roles are dynamic; while the functionalist view believes that roles are static. In the analysis of a process involving human efforts and cognition where political groups leave the scene for one another, an interactionist approach is a safe methodological approach which this study has adopted. The interactionist model allows for the analysis and understanding of foreign policy and role conceptions as a changing or dynamic thing which are common experiences of human affairs.
1.8. Significance of the Study
Secondary literature have shown that writers and commentators have tended to rely on the policy rhetoric and pronouncements of the political leadership with the tendency to uncritically accept such assertions as the basis for measuring Nigeria’s African policy. Indeed, Nigerian policy makers do make loud statements on Africa-centred roles without keeping to most of them, and these policy statements are often not classified or documented as national role conceptions (NRCs) in most Nigerian foreign policy (NFP) literature, whereas national role conception (NRC) has for some time now become an acceptable prism to examine or evaluate foreign policy actions and behaviour in foreign policy studies.
Indeed, in most analysis of Nigerian foreign policy, NRCs have either not been clearly identified or have not been adequately looked at. This is either because there is vague conception by successive political leaderships about what role Nigeria should occupy in Africa, or the leaders have not been careful enough to differentiate between articulation of national interests and the actualization of national interests, which requires clearly defined means-national roles to occupy to make this happen. Thus, national roles have not been well articulated and outlined by the political leadership. As earlier mentioned, there have been mere fantastic statements made by the Political Executive without taking into cognizance the other decision units and publics’ expectations. Such statements end up being diametrically opposed to action. It is such rhetorics or political statements that foreign policy analysts have worked with. This has influenced the manner of certain methodological and theoretical approaches to the study of Nigerian foreign policy.
The observed problems include the neglect of the ideological and analytical approaches, the two broad approaches (Macridis, 2000) to the study of the foreign policies of some of the administrations; the lack of consideration of role analysis and use of role theory as a framework for analysis of foreign policy making. This study attempts to establish the fact that role analysis would assist more in determining the reliability of policy statements (including declared role preferences), and the psychological environment of the policy makers in measuring policy action. Analysis of foreign policy is complex and involves more than just understanding the institutions, or policy statements. The understanding of the political groups’ orientation and preferences matter more. Contextualizing Nigerian foreign policy from 1985-2007 in this manner, thus enriches the foreign policy literature. Hence, the study addresses the two problems in Nigerian foreign policy literature: subject the role pronouncements of Nigerian political leadership to critical enquiry by examining the performance of the roles, and thereafter identify and document national role conceptions in Nigeria’s African policy. This thus adds to and expands the emerging national role conception knowledge.
Closely related to the above is that “national interest” and “national objective” seem to have preoccupied most literature that are apparently attempting to discuss “national roles”. However, the concepts mean different things. The seeming silence on role in lots of literature suggests a missing link that needs to be filled. A very little portion of literature has referred to role conception or national role as this study has identified. The classic work on Nigeria’s national roles conceptions by Adigbuo (2005) is probably the only major study on the subject area, and yet it covers only Nigeria-Namibia policy from 1975-1990, with emphasis on its roles in the liberation struggles. However, more needs to be done in investigating, identifying and documenting Nigeria’s national role conceptions in its Africa policy during that epochal period of its international relations history.
Also, another methodological approach popular in the study of foreign policy is the focus on institutions in describing the policy process. However, this study attempts to reinforce the perspective that the “political group” (group of influential individuals) is probably more important as a tool for foreign policy analysis. This study thus attempts to underscore the fact that foreign policy analysis can be better handled when subjected to role analysis because that approach unveils: the “political group” influences in the making and implementation of foreign policy (Isaak, 1975), the attitudes and preferences of that group (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1996; Bentley, 1908) and thus would lead to a better understanding of the behaviour of political institutions and the state (Walkhe, Eulau, Buchanan, & Ferguson, 2004). As such, the politics involved in conceiving national roles may be more properly comprehended. In foreign policy analysis, the politics of roles conception may manifest in the disposition, preferences, interpretations and manipulations of policymakers or the political group.
Also, the period under study (1985-2005) was eventful because of the changing nature of Nigeria’s international stature as a result of differentials in foreign policy style and disposition. It encompasses five different political eras, including two civilian dispensations and three military regimes, out of which only four are examined. One civilian administration (August-November, 1993) is left out because it was dismissed as illegitimate and indecisive (Kolawole, 2005) and had a very brief spell with an uneventful foreign policy arena. Examining the politics of role conception and foreign policy making of each military dispensation vis-à-vis the civilian era would provide useful basis for comparison. This period is thus a critical interval in the annals of Nigeria’s foreign policy that cannot be ignored in scholarly study.
1.9. Contributions to Knowledge
The study adds to the growing literature and scientific knowledge of Nigeria’s foreign policy by its post-behavioural approach, and thus also represents another major contribution to foreign policy analysis. The study becomes the third known doctoral thesis on Nigeria’s role conceptions in Africa, the first being Fawole’s “National Role Conceptions and Nigerian African Policy, 1970-1979” in 1990, and Adigbuo’s “Nigeria’s National Role Conceptions and Southern African Policy: The Case of Namibia, 1975-1990” in 2005. The current study is “National Role Conceptions and Nigeria’s African Policy, 1985-2007”, thus bridging the gaps of time and scope as it explores the many new issues underlining Nigeria’s African policy, and thus updating the knowledge base of that new perspective of Nigeria’s foreign policy analysis. Also very important is that the study, by examining two governance types (military and civilian), constitutes a major contribution to the general study of different regime behaviours.
By a careful and critical process of identifying and interrogating the leaders’ pronouncements and statements and thus departing from the norm of uncritically accepting leaders’ policy declarations, the study represents a systematic documentation of Nigeria’s international role conceptions from 1985 to 2007. The work thus adds another perspective to the Nigerian foreign policy literature, and would elicit future scientific study of foreign policies.
1.10. Limitations of the Study
The encumbrances encountered in this study were mainly in the course of primary data gathering. Generally, a disadvantage in interviews is that respondents may not wish to divulge what is considered classified information, or may not be objective in all cases and there may be memory lapse or distortion or exaggeration of facts (Afigbo, 1990). In the course of this research, the one-on-one interview with former political leaders, and Ambassadors and the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations took extra long time to accomplish, and dragged the work. Attempts to book an interview with former Presidents Babangida and Abubakar dragged the field work as both could not be accessed even when the author went to the former leaders’ hilltop estates in Minna (Niger State) in a final bold attempt to get one of them to grant an interview. Also, oral interviews with the concerned Senators which took place in Abuja, were rescheduled several times, and a few were hurriedly conducted. The Senate Committee of Foreign Relations members barely had time, and when they finally squeezed out time for the interviews, they were secretive and evasive as they became parsimonious with certain information for “political and security reasons”, and even objected to cameras and tapes. Generally, it was difficult to get comprehensive information from the informal perspectives to the politics of the foreign policy making process in Nigeria. Even a senior scholar who was with the NIIA but now lecturing in a university refused, legitimately though, to let out crucial information about the informal structure of foreign policy making because he would not want to be quoted. This constituted limitation to the study. However, some of the members of the National Assembly who granted interviews, managed to volunteer some information on this informal structure.
For the secondary sources, the experience was peculiar to general problems with literature or processed data. Secondary data are in some cases distorted or subjective. In fact, subjective opinions often form their conclusions and recommendations. Another major problem of library search is its tediousness and inaccessibility to all or most materials. President Babangida in a telephone call with one of his media aides referred the author to his former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Akinyemi. Professor Akinyemi’s perspectives, insights and accounts were very useful as his experience from the 1960s as an International Relations university scholar, Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), and Minister of Foreign Affairs came to play in filling major gaps, validating or rejecting claims in secondary and other oral sources.
However, the study managed these problems and prevented a negative impact of these gaps on the work. For primary data that could not be got from former Heads of State who were the chief policy makers, some of their former aides were consulted, in some cases with their permission. President Babangida’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, was consulted. Professor Akinyemi transcends generations of policy regimes both as a foreign affairs scholar and a practitioner. His perspectives, insights and accounts were very useful as his experience from the 1960s as an International Relations university scholar, Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), and Minister of Foreign Affairs came to play in filling major gaps, validating or rejecting claims in secondary and other oral sources. Some of the academics consulted have also been in government at certain points in time. In terms of the secondary data, embellishments, distortions and claims are either validated or rejected (while issues are also made clearer) by the writings of some individuals who had served in government as top policy-makers at different times. Generally, the copious literature consulted allows for cross-examination of claims and facts either in literature or oral interviews.
1.11. Organization of the Study
The study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the entire work, identifying the problem and enunciating the objectives. It also identifies the methodology of investigation and report/analysis of findings, and justifies the study and clearly stating its importance/contributions to the knowledge. Chapter two explores two basic things: dissecting the diverse literature on the subject of foreign policy in general and Nigeria’s foreign policy in particular, identifying the relevant concepts, themes, and issues that are central to the study; and the theoretical framework, which it explored to arrive at a model and direction, for the analysis of the study’s findings.
Chapter three throws its searchlights on the philosophical and ideological backgrounds of Nigeria’s African policy; and Chapter four traces the historical backgrounds of Nigeria’s Afrocentric foreign policy.
Chapters five and six constitute the central plank of the study and the main report/analysis. Chapter five examines Nigeria’s roles in Africa during military rule, and Chapter six x-rays Nigeria’s Africa roles under civilian rule. The two chapters provide a platform to examine two governance types and as such understand different regime behaviours. The two chapters complement the earlier chapters in that they allow for the examination of the role types and role challenges Nigeria encountered in the course of the assumption of its conceived Africa roles. Hence, while the other chapters examine the theoretical aspects of role conceptions, the two chapters deal with the practical dimension of national role conceptions.
Chapter seven concludes the thesis. It attempts a summation, and makes recommendations with the benefit of hindsight and field experience. The chapter thereafter makes a number of suggestions for future study.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
This chapter has three basic sections. The first section of the chapter attempts a conceptual discourse of some terms that are central to this thesis. These include national interest, national roles, role conceptions, foreign policy and African policy. The second section explores the secondary literature relevant to the study, discussing their central arguments and weighing the extent of contribution to the theme under focus, with the aim of identifying what gaps the study intends to fill. The section generates critical questions from unanswered ones in the existing literature. Such questions are intended to lay the clear platform on which the study centres its argument. The review covers the following areas: works of scholars on national role conceptions, structure of foreign policy making in Nigeria, and the politics of Nigeria’s African policy. The third section explores the theoretical framework for analysis.
2.1. Conceptual Clarifications
The Concepts of “Nation” and “National”
Can one actually refer to the roles, interests and general issues concerning Nigeria “national”, when technically, only a ”nation” can have such an attribute? Is Nigeria a nation? Traditionally, a nation is a group of people with common heritage and homogenous socio-cultural elements who live in a social space or community. Historical development and experience have changed or broadened the concept of a state, to mean a community of people with or without common heritage or homogenous cultures but who have gone beyond any forms of differences and resolved to live together as a sovereign people in a sovereign state. It is for such group that issues that affect them can be described as ‘national”, and whatever cause of nation-building can be called nationalism. The Unabridged Dictionary of 2006 has defined it more succinctly as” “a large body of people associated with a particular territory conscious of its unity to seek or possess a government.
To this extent and by this broader perspective, Nigeria may thus be referred to as a nation, not however, in the traditional sense of a homogenous group as Nigeria has over 250 ethnic groups or nationalities. Moreover, countries referred to as nations in the traditional sense such as the United States, Russia, and China, are in the technical sense, not nations because they are multi-ethnic or multi-national and multi-faith. But why do we refer to them as nations? They outgrew and reconciled their differences and developed the consciousness to be one identical people. Nation-building and nationhood is indeed an evolutionary process with a long life-span. Nation-building does not end. Nigeria would therefore fit into that newer context of a nation, and its concerns, including role conceptions and interests, can be described “national” as long as it is still evolving.
National Interest
National interest is a generally controversial concept in foreign policy analysis. Scholars do not agree on the fact that national interest has a universally accepted definition, and contend with the view of whether there is anything that can be called “national” in view of the multitude of prevailing personal, class, group, sectional, and public interests in a state. This is because there is no definitive measure or a common plank for the streamlining of all these conflicting interests to a “nation-al” interest. Hence, some view national interests as the interests of the political or ruling class because they may have been constitutionally or traditionally empowered by their leadership position to decide for the rest having been given the general will by the people through popular or dubious election (Rosati, 2006), or by forceful submission in the case of military dictatorship. This is why when a state has taken a particular position on a certain issue, there may not be a public domestic backing of it. National interest may thus be ambiguous and create the smokescreen for the justification of parochial individual, class or group interests by those in government. Henderson (2005) regards national interest as the collective aspiration of a state on a world-wide scale. This denotes the official declaration that a nation’s political leadership has made about what its desires in international politics are. It is generally, a country’s goals and ambitions in global politics whether economic, military, or cultural (Gvosdev, 2004; Byrd, 1996; Church, 1973). The interests are multifaceted: primary, secondary, or long-range. Primary interests are central to a nation’s immediate survival and security, a nation’s wealth, economic growth, preservation of national culture or heritage, and power. The external attitude (foreign policy and national roles) of a nation is therefore expected to be shaped by its national interest.
The pursuit of national interest and the primacy of national power is considered to be in the calculations of nations from the foundation of the realist school of International Relations. From Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Carr, to Morgenthau and Waltz, political realism celebrates national interest and holds that foremost in national role conception are pursuits of national interest and power, negating the moralistic and legalistic fusion into foreign policy by the idealists with the view to creating a utopian and impossible institutional framework on global scale.
It is debatable whether Nigeria has a set of clearly articulated national interests. For a nation that has played many leadership roles in Africa and global politics, a set of national interests should have been documented, from which reference could be made to actions of the government whether they are in the interest of the nation. What is relied on as Nigeria’s national interests are the outline of national leaders which change from time to time, and what the 1999 Constitution sets out as the foreign policy of the country. Both the leaders’ and the constitutional outlines appear more like a set of roles to occupy than what the interests of the nation should be. The weak outlines or lack of documented set of well articulated national interests could have also been responsible for the ambiguous and weak line of role conception. For the bigger countries such as Germany and Britain, national interests are clearly articulated, classified in time and space, and justified. In the case of Nigeria, a set of five or six roles set out in the constitution would not suffice to be national interests, hence the conclusion that Nigeria requires clearer guidelines to its roles in Africa by way of clearly defining its national interests through democratic processes (Pham, 2007).
National Roles
The concept of national role ascribes to the state an organic and social nature, which national interests may not do. National role establishes the basis for the social functionality of states, and provides platform for the comprehension of state behaviour. It allows foreign policy analysis to be more robust when talking about state behaviour or functionality of nations in the international system. National interests as discussed are a set of objectives. These may have been rationalized, articulated and outlined by policy makers. They may remain non-actualized until the state acts (or plays certain roles). The policy makers have more “roles” to play than articulating national objectives. They also may have to conceive roles for the nation. Such roles may be conceived within the frameworks of national interest and objectives. Roles a state wishes to fill or which it has assumed in international politics often represent steps by which it hopes to realize or carry out its national objectives. Thus, national roles can be described as identified positions a state wishes to assume or play, and a set of tasks by which a state realizes its objectives or interest in international politics. It may not be enough for a state to articulate on paper its interests in world politics. It also needs to define its roles so as to effectively carry out its objectives. The interests are theoretical, the roles are practical. All states may have national interests, but not all states may conceive or play any external roles. However, all states require national roles if they want to fulfil their national aspiration (Krotz, 2001: 5-7). National interest is therefore not the same thing as national roles. However, both complement each other and represent stages of national aspiration fulfilment on the international scene. The national role thus helps in a state’s foreign policy formulation and implementation.
Thus, it becomes apparent that national interest defines the national roles to occupy. For instance, if it is the long-range interest of Nigeria to be a global power, it behoves of it to define roles to play to attain that objective or interest. It is America’s interest to give its best ally, Israel a safe haven in the Middle East and have considerable control of the oil-rich region. It has had to play active roles there, like dislodging or fighting real and imagined anti-Zion Islamic extremist leaderships, including Saddam Hussein, Al-Qaeda and Hamas, to attain its national interest. National interest is a potent force. National role is the moving force (Rosenau, 1990).
Consequently therefore, such terms as national interest or national objectives do not explain state behaviour as much as roles states play. Only national roles clearly define state behaviour, just in the same manner that the role of a right-full back, a goal-keeper or striker explains the behaviour or attitude of players in a football match. The objective of a football team may be to win and qualify for the World Cup. But they have to play certain roles on the pitch first before they actualize that interest. Their interest to win cannot take them beyond their wish. Their roles accomplish their interest. So it is in the case of national roles. This understanding is generally lacking in the literature of Nigerian foreign policy so much that it has been difficult to identify and measure role conception in the formulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy and implementation of the Nigeria-Africa policy.
National Role Conception
Simply, national role conception is the identification or articulation of the external or national roles a state would fill in international politics. Flowing from Biddle and other social psychologists’ perspective, down to Holsti and the newly emerging role-influenced foreign policy analysts, national role conception has been described as a function of three basic influencing factors namely, perceptions of the political or ruling class, their interpretations of a nation’s external outlook, and the expectations of the domestic and international publics. States in contemporary international system set out tasks and assume particular roles they seek to undertake. Such tasks are conceived of and articulated in the foreign policy making process by the policy decision makers. As the state occupies or fills its formally conceived roles, this may ascribe to it a distinct image (Eulau, 1963) and make its behaviour predictable (Isaak, 1975). Therefore, national roles can be viewed as positions states attempt to occupy premised on general orientations governments adopt toward the outside world.
Krotz gives a classic definition of national role conception of states. He conceptualizes it as
The internal construction of collective self…what we want and what we do as a result of who we think we are, want to be, and should be; where the “we” represents nation and state as a social collectivity (Krotz, 2001: 1).
The first exponent of NRC, Holsti (1967: 29), captures it as “the domestically shared views and understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international arena”. The views often represent the policy makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions their state should perform on a continuing basis in international politics. These policy makers are in different categories including formal and informal, governmental and nongovernmental bodies- working interdependently- whom Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann (2001) have identified as “decision units” or groups. Such roles create certain obligations and commitment which policy makers will usually attempt to fill. Thus, national role conceptions may refer to the external orientations adopted by government, a set of formally identified tasks a state is likely to assume in international politics which may ascribe to it a distinct image.
Therefore, role conception can be described as the act of identifying international or external roles to fill by a state. In addition, it may refer to the rationalization of strategies and steps to actualizing objectives of a nation in international politics done by foreign policy decision makers (Isaak, 1975; Kaplan, 1957). The process can be complex, secretive and very political (Rosati, 2006).
Foreign Policy
Foreign policy is the rational pursuit of a set of national objectives. The “pursuit” here suggests action, steps, roles, that will delineate the attitude or behaviour of a state in the external context. Foreign policy may be like a wedding ring with which the domestic context of a nation solemnizes its union with the international community. Such political “marriage” is underlined by the ambitions and desires of state; hence foreign policy is a means to an end for states (Goldstein, 2001). For Henderson (2005) foreign policy is a pattern of behaviour that one state adopts in relating with other states, an idea that Waltz (2005) considers as the strategy and tactics employed by the state in its relation with other states in the international system. Idang (1973) regards foreign policy as a plan or programme of actions of a state which determines the sum-total of the state’s objectives in the international system. Holsti (1967) defines foreign policy as the actions of a state toward the external environment and the conditions-usually domestic- under which such actions are formulated. This seems to agree with Kissinger’s (1994) often quoted submission that in foreign policy analysis, the domestic structure is taken as given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends. Simply, foreign policy could mean external attitude of a state. The ultimate goal is to maximize greater advantage for the country. To this end, according to Nwolise (1999), the foreign policy of a developing country like Nigeria, should be geared towards national economic development so as to have a better leverage in international politics.
African Policy
The concept of African policy simply refers to Nigeria’s attitude towards the rest of Africa. This attitude is quantified by its plan or programme towards African countries or on issues concerning the continent. It is a sub-set of the totality of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Within the African policy, there have also been the policies towards individual nations, West African region in which Nigeria is situated, other regions of Africa, and towards international institutions in Africa. In other cases, the African policy encompasses the individual Africans in times of conflict and wars, and the entire black world.
Role Conception and Foreign Policy
National role conception is considered as the moving force of foreign policy (Holsti, 1967, 1970, and 1987; Wish 1980; Krotz, 2001; Bilcik, 2004; Chafez, et al, 1996; Gambari, 1986; Adelusi, 1986; Fawole, 1993, 1999, & 2003; Obadare, 2001); and Adigbuo, 2005 and 2007). For instance, Wish (1980: 532) considers role conceptions as “foreign policy makers’ perceptions of their nations’ positions in the international system.” They include perceptions of the general kinds of decisions, rules, commitments, and long-term functions associated with these international positions.” Wish holds that national role conceptions provide norms, standards and guidelines which affect many aspects of decision making. In agreement with Walker (1978), Wish posits that the variation in foreign policy conduct is a process of “role location”, an idea in tandem with Holsti’s earlier postulation (1967). Holsti also uses the term perception to denote conception. This study disagrees in part with the usage. Perception may refer to a set of ideas or the thinking about role a nation can play. Conception is a stage higher than perception; it can be viewed as clearly identified roles, and strategies defined by a state with which to effectively play its roles in international politics.
Holsti (1967 and 1987) offers two typologies of national role conceptions. In the first typology, nine role conception types are identified while the second has seventeen role types. Holsti attempts to prove that the international system is made up of states filling up roles to fulfil their national interest, and that national power, capacity, wealth, et cetera condition the roles conceived. The context of Holsti was however more suitable for the Cold War era and the accompanying ideological conflict and power politics of the time. It may therefore not be applicable wholesale to this study. However, there is no work on national role conception which can afford to deny the critical influence and contributions of Holsti to the clarity and usefulness of national role conception as a theoretical instrument to study foreign policy.
Nevertheless, from the analyses of the forerunners of national role conception (NRC), it can be inferred that states define tasks and assume defined roles in the international system. Such tasks are conceived of and articulated in the foreign policy making process. The roles may ascribe a distinct image to the state and make its behaviour predictable. In this way, the role conception constitutes a nation’s attribute, shapes its attitude in international politics, makes its behaviour predictable, and provides a state with a stable sense of identity.
Role conception is described by Rosenau (1990:220) as the “attitudinal and behavioural expectations that those who relate to an occupant of a role have of the occupant and the expectations that the occupant has of himself in given situations.” Hence, roles are synthesized phenomena, created by the combination of an actor’s subjective understanding of what its behaviour should be (role conception), international community’s demands (role expectations) and the particular context in which the role is being acted out (role performance). Put differently, national role conception is expected to manifest in role performance. Role performance finds expression in decisions, policies and actions (Holsti, 1970:234).
Role conceptions are thus the categories of behaviour that states rely on to simplify and to help guide them through a complex world. The inference from the foregoing is that role conceptions are guiding principles which are then translated into policies. For instance, it is part of the United States’ policy to constantly checkmate what it has designated “Axis of Evil” because it has conceived and assumed the role of the leader of the “Allies for Good”. As states enter the international system characterized by unpredictability, keen competition and anarchy, their national leaders tend to carefully and clearly identify the roles they want to play in it. The roles they seek to play are always sharply informed by their ideology, if they have one, the state’s natural resources, industrial capacity, and so on. Policy makers with an ideological orientation are more likely to often come up with clearly defined national roles. This is because ideology represents a set of principles that are governing sociability and decision making. This means that a state without an ideology could still have its national roles, but they may not be as clearly defined because the policymakers would not have a framework with which to conceive state’s roles (Northedge, 1968). The process of figuring out national roles would be described as the conception, which involves how they are identified and who identifies them. National ideology may thus ennoble conception of national roles as national roles complement national interest accomplishment.
From the analyses of the scholars, it could be deduced that national role conceptions are prompted by any or a combination of the following:
1. National interest- a set of rationally thought out and articulated objectives a state seeks to actualize in the international system. National interest also accommodates expectations of the domestic public.
2. National capabilities- the calculated strengths a state has, which give it an edge over others and favourably position it in a bargaining situation.
3. Attitudes and values- a set of national cultural traits, ethnic and religious values which shape a state’s foreign policy.
4. Personality needs- the subjective perceptions of policy makers of what a national role should be based on, including domestic needs, critical international needs and personal desires of the leaders.
5. Systemic prescriptions and expectations of other governments- the compelling forces from outside a domestic environment, including international law, critical events or trends in the external environment, including nuclear proliferation and conflicts.
The role conception idea as examined in the literature is germane to this study because it shares the same perspective of national role conception with, and attends to the problematic of the study. The submission about state role conception in response to domestic and external demands, expectations and pressures, are in agreement with what the study is attempting to establish. Fawole and Obadare’s direct linkages to Nigeria are particularly relevant to the argument of the study. However, the typologies of Holsti and Wish are tangential to the study because they were specifically experiential of the US, other national contexts, and the world during the Cold War.
Decision Making and Role Conception
Decision making approach is important to both foreign policy and national role analysis. In Easton’s terminology (1953), decisions are regarded as the outputs of the political system as politics itself is viewed as the authoritative allocation of values for a society. The concept of decision making had long been implicit in some of the older approaches to diplomatic history and study of political institutions. Decision making is simply the act of choosing among available alternatives about which uncertainty exists (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997). In foreign policy, decision making may be more delicate because alternatives are not that given in international politics. Decisions may often be more gropingly formulated in the context of a total situation in which disagreements would arise over which estimate of the situation is most valid, what alternatives exist, the consequences likely to flow from various choices, and the values that should serve as criteria for ranking the various alternatives from the most to the least preferred (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, ibid).
The decision making approach or theory directs attention not to the state as metaphysical abstraction or to the government, but instead seeks to highlight the behaviour of the specific human decision makers who actually shape governmental policy. As Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1963: 24) put it:
It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision makers-those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state.
Decision makers may base decisions on images of reality that are shaped by cognition, or how decision makers think about a particular decisional situation. Images can be generally defined as cognitive constructions or mental representations of situations, including perceptions of other actors, as well as the alternative choices that may be available in light of the goals established by decision makers (Gardner, 1985; Simon, 1985).
Conception of national roles is entirely the duty of decision makers. They may collate information here, ideas there, opinions there and incorporate societal expectations, but the output is entirely at their discretion. The decision makers are expected to share roles in the business of national roles conceptions. Roles conception is supposed to be a process related to decision making. It may be a means to an end or an end in itself in decision making. When it is a means to an end, it may be what goes into the process of conceiving roles, that is, the politics of role conception. It includes the sharing of roles among foreign policy decision makers. For instance, at the level of decision making, the national security council, department of state, intelligence agency, foreign relations council, institute of foreign affairs, may share roles in the decision making process which is a major push factor in policymaking (Rosati, 2006). In the case of Nigeria, these decision units (Beasley, et al, 2001) which may be the kitchen cabinet of the head of state which always comprises the National Security Adviser, Minister of Foreign Affairs, calls the shots. As an end in itself, it may refer to the processed roles or output. In other words, it may mean the end process which has culminated in national roles conceived by the policymakers. Foreign policy making and action are matters of decisions and calculations, with the primary objective of maximizing gains or recording minimal losses in international politics (Ogwu and Olukoshi, 2002; Ojo and Sesay, 2001).
The foreign policy of any nation is based on a number of principles, which provide the systematic framework within which policies are conducted. The individuals involved carry out these rational decisions on the conduct of such policies. According to Goldstein (2001) the foreign policy process is a process of decision-making. The decision making process involves: the decision, the decision makers; the policy makers (that is, the group of people saddled with the responsibility of making the decision which is arrived at after a choice has been made from available alternatives) and the decision making process itself, which is the process of selecting the most suitable alternative.
Decision-makers, out of a list of alternatives, calculate the cost and benefits of taking a certain course of action. They reach a decision by choosing the alternatives with the highest benefits and the lowest costs. Using the Arab-Israeli conflict as a case study, Ojo (1994) described the decision making process as crucial for foreign policy making as it involves pulling from a number of intricate alternatives especially during exigencies. The term ‘rationality’ relates to how decision-making entails purposeful, goal–directed behaviour that is exhibited when the individual is responding to an international event using the best information available and chooses from a pool of possible responses that are more likely to maximize his goals (Verba, 1969; Kegley & Wittkopf, 1989). Decision-makers tend to attach probabilities to the possible outcome of an action as a result of the uncertainties in terms of the cost and benefits of taking such action. However it is necessary to note that while some decision-makers accept risks others are prone to averting risks.
Kegley and Wittkopf identify the following sequence of steps in (rational) decision-making:
1. Problem recognition: This marks the beginning of the decision-making process. Decision-makers perceive the existence of a problem, which they must deal with based on the accuracy of the information available. Accuracy here means the information required for dealing with the problem must be readily available; information about the ‘actions, motivations, and capabilities of other actors ’, the international system inclusive.
2. Goal selection: Policy makers determine the rationale for resolving the problem. Hence, all identified goals are arranged in order of preference.
3. Identification of alternatives: A list of alternatives (policy options) is made available with the calculated cost and benefit of choosing each policy option.
4. Choice: Based on the cost-benefit analysis conducted for each policy option, the alternative, that is, the policy option that addresses the problem is selected.
There is however a difference between theory and practice. The process of rational decision making involves accurate and comprehensive information about the problem, clear identification of goals, analysis of options, choosing the most favourable alternative based on a rational decision criteria and an evaluation of the consequences of selecting the policy option followed by measure aimed at correcting errors. In actual practice however, information about the problem is often distorted, individual interests bias national interest, policy options available are limited, selection is done by political bargaining and compromise, superficial evaluation and delayed correction of errors (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1989). The politics involved in decision making may thus erode rationality and proper definition of national roles. Could this have been the case of Nigeria? This study would investigate that next.
2.2. Review of Related Literature
2.2.1. Overview of the National Role Conceptions Debate
The phrase “National Role Conceptions” (NRCs) is popular in American and European literature of foreign policy. It is understood within the context of roles nation-states occupy or play in either regional or global politics. The works of Holsti (1967, 1970 and 1987), Wish (1980) and Chafez, Abramson and Grillot (1996) amply argue that states have roles they fill in international politics. Holsti particularly posits that stronger states either play the role of a usurper, balancer or defender of other states, region or the universe; or fill certain self-imposed or universally expected roles in the international system. Advancing two typologies, Holsti claims that all nations (weaker or stronger) fill some roles in the community of states. Krotz (2001) examines the changing national role conceptions of France and Germany-two political archrivals from 1870- in their quest to outdo each other in Europe. Bilcik (2004) investigates Slovakia’s shifting role conceptions against the background of a changing European system. Both reinforce the perspective that national roles are the national attitude or behaviour of states in the international society.
These works do not limit their analysis to the perspective of “role of states” alone; they also pay attention to the “role of political groups” (policy makers and institutions) within the states that conceive, identify and implement the roles states should play. Without that political group the state, which is just an atomistic element, cannot occupy any roles. Indeed, by the role approach, the state has been given “life’, that is, the state becomes viewed as a social or human entity with specific roles to assume in the comity of nations. The works have made the global debate and literature of national role conception an interesting one. Unfortunately, the approach is not popular yet among Nigerian foreign policy analysts. The popular approach among scholars here is the institutional approach to foreign policy in which the state and the political institutions are the emphases and not the behaviour of actors behind the system. This is one gap that this study attempts to fill, and it does it by a post-behavioural approach, combining behavioural approach with group, institutional, and traditional approaches which the role theory encapsulates.
There are no universal yardsticks for what a nation’s external roles must be. National roles are generally the products of the value judgments of leaders who conceive and implement them, and the normative perception of the policy analyst which may arise from ideological and historical experience, or social backgrounds and ideals of persons conceiving or analyzing. National roles may also be rationalized as what are in the best interest of the nation, and yet, the political leadership and the writers or commentators are still the ones involved here. The national roles of one nation can also not be used as the yardstick for another nation, because national capacity, national needs and external environments differ.
The first problem noticeable in literature therefore, is that roles expected for Nigeria in Africa by individual scholars based on hindsight have often been the yardsticks to determine Nigeria’s commitment to its Africa policy across regimes. However, literature shows that the standard practices in many analyses are the use of the role conceptions of the nation’s founding fathers, the foreign policy objectives as spelt out in the constitution, and laid down principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy as gauges of whether Nigerian leaders are doing it right or wrong. Analysis of Nigerian foreign policy under different political dispensations is thus beclouded by certain pre-judgments based on what has been popularly viewed by individual scholars as Nigeria’s place in African affairs, which tends to endorse the static approach to foreign policy analysis. This static approach celebrates the conventional roles Nigeria plays in Africa, is conservative and has little consideration for adjusting to national inquest and international responses. This study however examines the national role conceptions (NRCs) and African policy of Nigeria from the interactionist perspective, that is, in view of emerging needs and changing external environments.
Basically, the phrase “national role conceptions” is not common in the lexicon and literature of Nigerian foreign policy. The absence of such a crucial term has a fundamental implication for a nation that prides itself as the leader of Africa and that has played so many positive roles in the continent. This suggests lack of ideological and philosophical focus in the articulation of Nigeria’s national interests by successive leaders long after independence. National role conception should thus be a follow-up to national interest. Hence, national roles should be conceived for a nation after the articulation of national interests. This thus implies that national roles need be conceived in as much as national interests are articulated and outlined. The poverty of this conceptualization is the focus of Gambari (1986), who argues that the Nigerian foreign policy landscape suffers this conceptual analysis. Gambari bemoans the simplicity and unscientific approach to foreign policy making by the political class and government of Nigeria. Gambari stresses the need for clear outlining and clarification of concepts and strategies, which is implied the articulation of national roles before a state proceeds to its external environment. In other words, Gambari is suggesting that the Nigerian state should conceive, evaluate, and rank its priorities before acting or assuming roles. Gambari however does not make any reference to ‘national roles”, even if that is what he implies.
The table 1 below shows a summary of the number of times reference or discourse of national role conceptions in Nigeria’s foreign policy analysis has been made in writings, based on the literature accessible in the course of field research, and the findings from oral interviews.
Table 1: Summary of National Role Conceptions in Analysis of Nigeria’s African Policy
| |Number |Nigerian |Foreign |First Time Usage of NRCs, i.e.|Major works |Papers/ |
| | |Analyses |Analyses |during interview | |Articles |
|Writings Sampled |30 |26 |4 |Not Applicable (N.A) |15 |15 |
|Oral Interviews |10 |5 |5 |8 |N.A |N.A |
|Usage of NRCs |7 |5 |1 |- |2 |3 |
|Implied Use of |20 |20 |- |- |10 |10 |
|“NRCs” | | | | | | |
|Analyses |5 |3 |2 |- |2 |3 |
|Identifying the | | | | | | |
|Omission | | | | | | |
|Authors Directly |Adigbuo (2005,2007), Fawole (1990), Owoeye(2001), Gambari (1989), Obadare (2001), Adelusi (1990), King (1996) |
|Using “NRCs’ | |
Source: Author’s Compilation
From the above table 1, it can be deduced that in the writings of scholars and technocrats as the table above shows, only a few commentators and analysts from among thirty specifically screened for reference to NRCs, have done critical analysis of Nigeria’s role intentions and tend to adopt the role approach for a clearer definition of Nigeria’s African policy; and have actually used the term “national role conceptions” or “national roles”. In many other analyses however, the writers and technocrats have simply clarified and engaged in critical analysis of the vague African policy of the leaders. Interestingly however, only five of all the analysts’ writings made reference to “national role conceptions” or “foreign behaviour”, implying that several of them were probably not familiar with the usage of “national roles” in current foreign policy literature to denote international behaviour of states.
It would however be presumptuous in the middle of this study to conclude that the role conceptions of Nigerian political leaders should be secondary or subordinate to those of the inner and outer cores of foreign policy making. In fact, the role conceptions of leaders are indispensable and should be top priority because, like Holsti had said, “they see things better up there”. One can also add that they occupy the driver’s seat of national policy, their conceptions cannot be wished away.
The role conceptions of Nigerian political leaders are the ultimate in any state. However, some foreign policy technocrats who are strong willed, experienced and creative had emerged whose expertise and innovativeness had made the political leaders to allow them ample latitude in the external affairs terrains of the state. Such persons had earned the confidence of their bosses who may either present their thoughts or ideas to the technocrats for fine-tuning and modification, after which the refined perceptions may become the adopted role conceptions of the political leadership; or simply engage such technocrats only at the implementation or role assumption stage where his expertise may become very useful. Such was the lot of Nigeria’s Bolaji Akinyemi and Ike Nwachukwu, two of the three foreign affairs ministers under Babangida. Akinyemi was a realist MFA whose “Concept of Medium Powers”, proposal for Nigeria’s building of its nuclear power (Akinyemi, 2009) and Pax Nigeriana (Akinyemi, 2008) had not only propelled a an awesome image of Nigeria in global power politics, but had also brought Nigeria to the epicentre of global relevance. Nwachukwu’s economic diplomacy had approached realism from a purely altruistic economic platform. His driving of the Babangida economic diplomacy was such that tended to refocus Nigeria’s African policy in such a way that the ultimate object of the policy would be Nigeria’s own economic development. Ambassador Olu Adeniji’s ingenuity in the Obasanjo vision of good governance and economic recovery in Africa through the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) had defied the law of the day that MFAs during the period were lame-duck. In the case of Ibrahim Gambari, his diplomatic finesse has rather ensured that Nigeria’s international roles are felt as Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN (Akinterinwa, 2004). These ministers belong to the category of smart and exceptional foreign affairs ministers who worked out excellent performance of Nigeria’s national roles in Africa and the world
The Nigerian exceptional cases were similar to the daily experience in the US where the Secretary of State (SOS) often wields a lot of influence in external policy. The role conceptions may be the President’s in conjunction with his inner caucus or think-tank. For instance, what is today regarded as the Bush Doctrine is a set of President G.W. Bush’s post 9/11 thoughts and perceptions of the world and the roles America needed to urgently fill in securing the world and its borders against growing terrorism. However, the SOS works out the modalities of how America can fill the international roles conceived by the President’s group. The SOS might work out the performance of the roles even smarter than they were conceived. This was the case with Henry Kissinger, James Baker, Madeleine Albright and Colin Powell respectively. Some SOSs can be so powerful that they could overshadow their President and overact the Presidential mandate on role performance, so that they could even perform such roles in line with their own perceptions. Examples include Edward Shevardnadze of the former Soviet Union and Condoleezza Rice of the US (Rosati, 2006; Clarke, 1987).
Having discussed the role conceptions of the Nigerian political elite and established the fact that conception of role is basically the right of the policy makers, especially the Presidency; and having identified the roles played by each policymaking unit, we can now further break down the workings of the decision or policy making units in the sometimes complex art of roles definition and choosing of foreign policy behaviour of states. Suffice it to say that policy process outcomes denote whose positions among the policy units have counted in the final decision, and indicate the endpoint of the decision-making process. Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann (2001) identify six possible outcomes namely, concurrence, prevalence of one party’s position, mutual compromise/consensus, lopsided compromise, deadlock, and fragmented symbolic action. These suggest the contentions that go on among policy makers like the case of the internal wrangling within the NIIA, or that between the NIIA and the MFA as narrated by Akinterinwa (2004). The MFA may consider itself as the engine room of Nigeria’s foreign policy while the NIIA may see itself as the brain-house from which both the government and the MFA draw ideas in the formulation of foreign policy. A mutual envy and antagonism may thus make or mar the roles performance of the country in view of the fact that the two and other policy centres should work in unison to ensure Nigeria properly fills its roles.
The point being made here is that what goes on in any of the decision units can affect government’s foreign policy behaviour. The unit or group can enhance or decrease its own role and effect in the foreign policy process. Their level of participation is contingent upon the ingenuity of their ideas, creativity, cohesion and quality of their perspectives on foreign policy issues. It is instructive to note that if these qualities are there, those at the helms of decision making-the President, Cabinet, Kitchen Cabinet- would be divided along the lines of superior arguments or articulations or would be forced to take cues from the other units to formulate roles. For instance in analyzing decision making with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO’s) proposed deployment of cruise missiles as advocated by the Reagan administration, it was observed that forces among the foreign policy secondary actors that both favoured and opposed deployment were represented in the cabinets charged with making a decision (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann, 2001: 222).
It is also important to discuss the two types of policy making actors in national role conception and foreign policy decision-making-the closed decision or policy groups and the open groups. The closed group is policy actors that diminish the relevance of external constraints and outside pressures; and the open group is policy actors that amplify external constraints and outside pressures.
The closed group, policy actors group that diminishes external pressures, shapes what the government does more directly. Let us consider the Murtala-Obasanjo government’s quick recognition of the MPLA as the legitimate government in Angola in 1975. This quick response can be traced to the presence of a strong political leader, Murtala Mohammed who was intensely interested in this issue and in building an activist foreign policy for Nigeria as well as improving his country’s power and legitimacy in intra-African affairs. The leadership style of a predominant leader overrode a wide variety of constraints that might have precluded such strong action by a pro-western African regime. Policy decision actors that tend to diminish the effects of outside constraints seem generally more closed to what is going on around them. Their focus of attention is on what is happening inside the decision unit or group-that is what the relatively insensitive leader wants, on maintaining the cohesion of the group for members whose identity resides in the group itself, on solving the problem for members of the single group with loyalty elsewhere but with a majority decision rule, and on winning out over the others for members of the coalition with no rules, and on reaching some modicum of agreement among members of the coalition with rules that allow for majority rule. The members of this group are turned inward and are intent on achieving a particular goal. They are rather oblivious to external forces and outside information intrudes only as it helps to bolster a member’s position (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann, 2001: 224).
Hermann and Hermann (1989) found in another study that the closed decision groups engage in more extreme foreign policy activity than the open decision groups. The closed group often attempt to reject external intrusions on national development like neo-colonialism, interference in political and social situations, et cetera. They may want to also engage in pro-active continental unity and development. The regimes of Murtala-Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari in Nigeria represent examples. The Abacha regime had certain similar characteristics, by its anti-west posture, nonchalant attitude towards the desires of the west regarding Nigeria’s domestic affairs, and in the drive towards West African unity and security; but it did not exhibit the tendencies for understanding foreign policy per se.
The open policy or decision making group, the group that amplifies external constraints and outside pressures before taking foreign policy decision or conceiving roles tends to see things differently. Policy making group that tends to amplify external pressures and constraints tends to be those that are more open to outside influences such as more sensitive predominant leaders, single groups with limited loyalty to the group itself and a unanimity decision rule, and coalitions where unanimity is required for a decision to be acceptable. The open groups or units display more cautious behaviour because of their sensitivity to what the bigger external power would say, thus possessing the tendency to compromise national or regional interests. This was the character of the Tafawa Balewa foreign policy. It went into an Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact, antagonized Ghana’s Nkrumah on radical African unity, and could not convert rhetoric to reality on the roles conceived for Southern Africa. The Shagari administration was also an example. It had good intentions for Nigeria and Africa, but it lacked the will because of its open-ended and pro-western foreign policy.
Thus, the closed foreign policy decision units are more likely to push their positions, to commit their resources, and to be conflictual in the international arena than the open units. The open units are more likely to accommodate opposition (both within the foreign policy making system within a state and from other states); while the closed groups would rather challenge any opposition (Hagan, 1993). In determining who conceives roles for the purpose of a nation’s foreign behaviour, one can predict what the role perceptions and eventual role conceptions of policy makers in both categories examined above would be. The policy makers in the open policy making category would engage in fairly cautious, deliberative behaviour that would not commit many of the resources of the nation and be more cooperative in tone. It reflects more of an interest in maintaining the status quo, being relatively incremental and provisional; in its behaviour (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann, 2001: 224). Balewa and Shagari have been cited as examples. The closed category of policy makers have within them tendencies of being innovative, desiring change and possessing the potentials for deadlock (Beasley et al, 2001: 225). The Murtala-Obasanjo and Buhari-Idiagbon administrations had this character, and some traits of it being exhibited by Abacha.
However, whether the decision unit is likely to amplify or diminish the influence of external constraints appears to depend on the nature of the decision group itself. Secondly, in each of these foreign policy decision groups, information about the domestic and external environments is important to shaping what the policy makers see as feasible alternatives as well as to helping them define the problem they are facing and define roles their countries would undertake externally. The decision making process is structured so that policy makers are interested in seeking information from outside the unit to understand where important constituencies stand and to determine the options they can support. The members of the decision unit perceive a certain responsibility to these external forces and bring them into the decision process.
A corollary to the above discussions is that for every foreign policy decision group or unit taking decisions at any point in time, any of three policy situations is noticeable. These are the situation of the centrality of the predominant leader, single group and coalition. The predominant leader scenario is common under during military rule. The Nigerian experience shows almost all the scenarios except the 1979-1983 have exhibited the single group characteristic. The coalition experience only played out once during the First Republic when Nigeria operated the Parliamentary system with a coalition government for that matter. Thus, role conception and policymaking was jointly done by the ruling Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC); and between the Prime Minister and President Azikiwe. Other administrations had exhibited the single group feature, including the Shagari era in which the ruling political party, inner caucus, and Kitchen Cabinet were dominant and was made up of formal and informal policy making structures. During military rule, the predominant leader phenomenon was not in doubt. However, the military could also exhibit the single group character like during Babangida’s reign; and likewise a civilian leadership can exhibit the predominant leader character like during the reign of Obasanjo (1999-2007).
For the single group, does it mean that because of the presence of other human elements (political party members, cabinet members, policy bureaucrats, foreign policy experts, Senate and House of Representatives members, et cetera) with the chief executive, he has very little or no powers to conceive roles unilaterally, and that makes him lame-duck in the policy process? The critical issue here is the role of the advisers. Are they simply providing advice and information which the leader will take and use in making his own decision or do the advisers wield authority within the group such that they constrain what the leader can do? That is, can they reject what the President wants and have their roles as national roles or their decisions as governmental policy?
The Nigerian experience does not contextualize this question in the affirmative. The adviser in the Federal Cabinet, be it Minister of Foreign Affairs or Special Adviser to the President or Head of State on external relations has tended to be more of a fine-tuner of the weak or strong ideas and perceptions of his employer. The copyright of the processed idea, even if it had been a “thinking” or “conception” contract awarded to the adviser, is exclusively the President’s. In military rule, as it also was during the Obasanjo era from 1999-2007, the adviser’s role is marginal-indeed he exists mainly to fill a political gap or as a reward or compensation for supporting the takeover or electioneering success. Most times, the advisers are not in the position to advice on foreign policy matters because they do not fit into it. In most cases too, the advisers’ contributions are simply harvested to weigh the possible reaction to a decision that is already a fait accompli. (Akinyemi, 2009).
The questions have however generated some debates in literature. For instance, Britain’s decisions during the Munich crisis: Walker (1990) and Walker & Watson (1989) argue that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain operated as the leader of a single group (that is the Kitchen Cabinet) whose members’ primary identity was to the group in this crisis situation. However, Middlemas, (1972), and Colvin (1971) conclude that Chamberlain was a predominant leader who used the inner cabinet to legitimate his personal decisions. However, because the cabinet overruled Chamberlain’s decisions on two out of five occasions showed “a pattern of Cabinet (group) decisions rather than Prime Minister’s Rule” (Walker, 1990: 23). Another scenario is that of G.W. Bush. What constitutes the Bush Doctrine are the President’s positions, emanating from personal anger, regrets, national awakening and strong poise after the ruthless terror attacks on the US in September 2001, which constituted America’s new international roles in the face of global terror. However, a careful study of the political orientation of President Bush would shows that he could never conceive such globalist, imperialist and interventionist roles in his life-time. The sudden transformation from an isolationist to imperial president happened to be the huge influence of the Neo-Cons in Bush’s administration after 9/11. The Bush Doctrine was also passed by the Congress and it became initially popular among Americans. The Neo-Cons are the die-hard American conservative politicians who believe that America is an exceptional nation that should lead the “forces of good” against the “Axis of Evil” and secure the world for democracy. Their role in post- 9/11 Bush foreign policy showed that Bush was not actually a predominant leader, because he had the likes of Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, and John Bolton in the shadows directing the affairs and scripting the Bush Doctrine (Rosati, 2006; Fineman, 2006 and Chait, 2006).
The Nigerian case under General Abacha was however different. Initially, it was a single group development in which Abacha and his junta were working together to gain balance after upstaging the much popular June 12 mandate. This later transformed into a coalition as the Abacha junta mended fences with some astute June 12 mandate apostles such as Vice Presidential Candidate Kingibe, Lateef Jakande, Olu Onagoruwa and Ebenezer Babatope and brought them into an ostensibly government of national reconciliation and unity. However the scenario changed after the political consolidation as a single leader situation emerged. Abacha became a predominant leader who had no respect for any group in foreign policy or general policy making. He had even attempted to assassinate his own deputy and when that did not work, he had roped him in a phantom coup (Kolawole, 2005; Okpokpo, 1999). This was part of his policy to get rid of members of his own group who were either perceived as disloyal or had become encumbrances in his policy regime. In terms of foreign policy making, Abacha had appointed a charlatan as Minister of Foreign Affairs and had used members of his frightened group (junta, political allies, cabinet members, old military friends, et cetera) only to legitimate his decisions (Kolawole, 2005: 874-875).
Policy making is a continuous process in which decisions and non-decisions generate responses that create new opportunities for choice (Axelrod, 1984). In some instances policy makers may recognize that their current decisions will necessitate future on the same problem. Moreover, reconsideration of a previous decision is only the first step as the main step is a review in which it could be detected if a new decision would be necessary or not. In their selection of response to an occasion for decision, the policy actors or decision groups develop expectations about what the action will accomplish. They may believe that it will yield more information, reveal an adversary’s intentions, generate support for their position; or slow, stop, or reverse the effects of the problem. Policy makers’ expectations indicate when they are likely to recognize and interpret new information from the environment that can trigger further consideration of the problem. When decision groups or policy makers initiate a search for information, they expect feedback. Hence anticipation of future reconsideration of the problem is built into the search decision (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann, 2001: 224).
The situation described suggests the busy, complex but interesting structure of the role conception and policy making process. The foreign policy process does not entail roles conceptions alone. It is also is too complex to be monopolized by an individual, president or minister of foreign affairs. It requires concerted efforts. It can only be handled by a group. Like we have identified, the group may be the political group that includes (or be any one of) the leader and his formal cabinet members, inner or informal cabinet members, political party leadership, think-tank; and other groups within the political spectrum that support, checkmate, criticize, and contribute in the foreign policy making process-these include the informal and formal sectors, inner and outer cores of foreign policy, the legislature, press, interest and pressure groups, public opinion and external pressures and influences. At best, the political leader may employ some policy experts to quietly advise him, help him conceive of roles and recommend policy decisions on certain issues, which he would publicly declare as his own role conception. It would be like when political leaders task their speech writers to refine and put their thoughts together in a splendiferous national address, of which the copyright is that of the leader’s.
The few works by Nigerian authors known to have also made reference to and justified the significance of national role conception in Nigerian foreign policy include those of Fawole (1990, 1999 and 2003) and Obadare (2001). Fawole’s work (1990) captures the eventful years of Nigeria’s proactive African foreign policy during which Nigeria clearly identified and effectively filled certain Pan-Africanist roles that brought it to global reckoning. Fawole documents Nigeria’s national roles from the end of the Civil War in 1970, and analyses the Afrocentric peculiarity of its foreign however, with a commitment to redeem its image in the continent after the war.
An update of Fawole’s work on Nigeria’s role conceptions in Africa is his 1999 publication. Fawole (1999) like Holsti (1970 and 1987) emphasizes the centrality of state roles in the understanding of conception of national roles. According to him, states follow their roles in the international system, which makes their position on foreign matters predictable. The work however pays more attention to the structure within the state that is charged or that chares itself with the task of role conception. In another study, Fawole (2003) buttresses the point of the primacy of the political groups and institutions in the conception of national roles in the process of foreign policy making. However, Fawole (1990) addresses the context of the 1970s, which implies a long missing link in the literature and knowledge of Nigerian foreign policy.
However, the nearest study to this is the Adigbuo doctoral thesis, “Nigeria’s National Role Conceptions and its Southern African Policy, 1975-1990: The Case of Namibia”, in which he critically examined Nigeria’s role conceptions towards the southern region of the continent, and its role in the liberation of Namibia from colonial rule (2005). Adigbuo’s study on the liberation movement in Southern Africa generally and Namibia in particular appears to be the only major work in that subject area in recent times. However, its issue-scope of Southern Africa and Namibia and time-frame of 1975-1990, go to validate the need for this study which acts as a major update and bridging of gap in knowledge.
2.2.2. Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy
Attempt would now be made to review literature and discover the extent of study of the politics of national role conceptions in Nigerian foreign policy. The objective of this is to establish the relevance of the works to the study and identify the vacuum to fill. The foreign policy actions of governments are shaped in significant ways by the nature of the political unit or group involved in the decision-making process. Numerous domestic and international factors can, and do, shape foreign policy activity; the influences, Krotz (2001) notes, are channelled through the political structure of a government that identifies, decides, and implements foreign policy. That political structure is constituted by various actors in government working in a concert. Thus, it is only apposite to submit that the observable foreign behaviour of a state may, in actual fact, be the externalization of the behaviour and world-views of a few individuals or institutions in government or those who are working in the policy process: their perceptions of the country’s international roles, reactions and responses to internal and external pressures or occurrences (which has also been described as expectations of the local and international publics about roles the country should occupy), and the interpretations of the conceived and expected roles by policy makers. The political group, dramatis persona, and major institutions that control or share functions or roles in the foreign policy process are identified and discussed.
The foreign policy scene in Nigeria has been dominated by both civilian and military rule. Thus two basic patterns of governance determined the characteristic of the Nigerian foreign policy making process. These were the military patterns in which the set-man, the Head of State with his small political group had absolute control over the political process; and the civilian patterns with loads of actors, political institutions and mechanisms that should constitutionally share foreign policy making tasks with, or that are assigned by the President to carry out foreign policy tasks. The chapter specifically identifies the actors at the roles conceptions stage, classifying them as decision-making groups. These had been called the “political group” (Isaak, 1975) whose influence and roles in foreign policy decision making, or any policymaking process for that matter, are central in the national behaviour of a state. The group influence and other influences are examined in the stage of policy process.
In the Nigerian foreign policy process, the President or Head of State is the main element of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative with foreign nations (Nwosu, 1991). Indeed, foreign policy making is the exclusive responsibility of the government. Other groups may play influential role that would shape the foreign policy; but the political leadership takes the ultimate decision, some of which the citizens may even be ignorant of. The policy process may thus require the concerted efforts of the different organs and branches of government; however the Chief Executive or President with his small group wields ultimate powers, whether in civilian or military rule. In democratic or civilian dispensation, the organs include the executive, legislature and judiciary, and the other agencies of government approved or assigned with the task to execute external relations responsibilities (Akinyemi, 2009; Nwosu, 1991). Indeed, a state’s foreign and domestic policies are in many ways alike, for as Waltz (2005) has identified, political parties and the public, politicians and representative assemblies, Prime Ministers or Presidents -the institutions for making domestic policy- are for the most part the same charged with responsibility for foreign policy.
Foreign policy is part of the public policy of a state. Public policy is an attempt by the government to address a public issue. The government, whether it is the local council, state, or federal, develops public policy in terms of laws, regulations, decisions, and actions. There are three parts to public policy-making: problems, players, and the policy. The problem is the issue that needs to be addressed. The player is the individual or group that is influential in forming a plan to address the problem in question. Policy is the finalized course of action decided upon by the government. In most cases, policies are widely open to interpretation by non-governmental players, including those in the private sector. Public policy is also made by leaders of religious and cultural institutions. The rational model for the public policy-making process can be divided into three parts: agenda-setting, option-formulation, and implementation. Within the agenda-setting stage, the agencies and government officials meet to discuss the problem at hand. In the second stage, option-formulation, alternative solutions are considered and final decisions are made regarding the best policy (Nwosu, 1991:289). Consequently, the decided policy is implemented in the final stage. Implied within this model is the fact that the needs of the society are a priority for the players involved in the policy-making process. Also, it is believed that the government will follow through on all decisions made by the final policy. It is at the point of agenda setting and policy formulation that national roles conceptions come in (Akinyemi, 2009).
Nwosu notes that for the Nigerian foreign policy formulation process, those who design the issue to be addressed by policy exert an enormous amount of influence over the entire process through their personalities, personal interests, political affiliations, perceptions, and so on. The bias is extenuated by the players involved (1991: 174-180). The final outcome of the process, as well as its implementation, may not therefore be as effective as that which could result from a purely rational process. However, Thomas, a former Special Assistant to the Lagos State Governor on Policy and Programs opines that it is also possible for such personality and group traits in the policy process generally, to engender a more effective policy formulation as has been demonstrated by the Obasanjo administration at the federal level and the Tinubu administration at the state level (2001). The factor is considered to be the strong character of such individuals, experience, the manner in which they pull influence among their political group, and their goodwill. Overall, however, public policy continues to be vital in addressing social concerns. In the Nigerian policy process under the military, the military high command called the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) or Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) with the Head of State at the apex of the body controlled and monopolized the decision-making machineries.
In democratic rule, three basic organs were constitutionally mandated to share tasks in the policy process. These included the Executive, Legislative and Judicial organs. In the foreign policy making of Nigeria however, the judiciary played a little role. The important area the judiciary came in was in interpreting and incorporating into the municipal law the World Court judgment and Orange Tree Agreement over Bakassi handover to Cameroon. The universal standards during democratic rule would be discussed first before an examination of the military experience is done.
The Executive Actors
In the Presidential and federal system of Nigeria’s, the head of the foreign policy formulation group is the President. The power of the Executive branch is vested in the President, who also acts as head of state and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The President is responsible for implementing and enforcing the laws written by the Legislature and, to that end, appoints the heads of the federal agencies, including the Cabinet. The Vice President is also part of the Executive, ready to assume the Presidency should the need arise (Nigerian Constitution, 1999).
The Federal Cabinet and independent federal agencies are responsible for the day-to-day enforcement and administration of federal laws. The ministries and agencies have missions and responsibilities that are widely divergent. Including members of the armed forces, the Executive employs million of people for service to the nation. The Nigerian President controls other units responsible for the execution and enforcement of the laws created by the Legislature. He has the power either to sign legislation into law or to veto bills enacted by lawmakers, although they may override a veto with a two-thirds vote of both houses. The Executive branch conducts diplomacy with other nations, and the President has the power to negotiate and sign treaties, which also must be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. The President wields significant constitutional powers permitting him to initiate or propose ideas and programmes that could become policy decisions on the long-run (Nwosu, 1991: 175). In the American system, the President does not depend for his tenure upon a continuing majority support for his programmes in the Congress. However, he looks up to the party support base and relies on lobbyists to have his programmes and policy proposals sail through. In the British system, the Prime Minister requires a huge support of the majority in the House for his programmes to sail through. In both cases however, the overall policy, the direction of change and the meshing of programmes are left to the discretion of the government of the day (Waltz, 2005: 37-38). It can however be noticed that neither Nigerian, nor the British nor the American political leader stays outside the political group to take decisions.
The Nigerian political executive wields much influence because of their universally known sources of power such as electoral votes and constitutional backing. These include national election, party support and constitution. The President, by popular election, has got the people’s mandate-what Rousseau refers to as the “general will”- to take all decisions on their behalf. The Nigerian President is assisted by a retinue of advisers and ministers who occupy key foreign and domestic policy positions. The Vice President, the Ministers and the Special Advisers to the Presidency make up the Cabinet. The Cabinet's role is to advise the President on any subject he may require relating to the duties of each member's respective office. This group occupies the role of helping the leader to fine-tune the policy proposals and ideas of the President. The relevant officers also advise him on foreign relations matters and their discussions on state matters and other issues help mould the President’s opinions or stimulate new foreign policy ideas (Akinyemi, 2009; Ajibola, 2009). They sometimes also suggest or recommend certain policies. The President’s aides on foreign relations matters are particularly of importance in this regard. The ministries and bodies of equal status as ministries assisting in the daily making of foreign policy include: Office of the Vice President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Foreign Service, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Culture and Tourism, Petroleum Resources, Education, Sports, the National Security Adviser and other Advisers to the President. There are other federal agencies as Customs, Immigration Service, State Security Services (SSS), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the National Administration of Food and Drugs Control (NAFDAC). All of these have advisory or implementation roles to play in the Executive in the foreign policy process (Akinyemi, 2009).
The President’s small group of the think-tank is also important in foreign policy decision making. The think-tank is made up of experts and experienced hands in the field of the country’s international affairs, and could be at different times made up of members of the academia, diplomatic community, intelligence community, politicians and a few State Governors, leaders in the National Assembly, and a select-few from the Federal Cabinet, including the Foreign Affairs Minister. The think-tank’s tasks include to advice, recommend, enlighten, and possibly warn the chief executive on external relations policies (Akinyemi, 2009).
Another group that participates actively in the formulation of foreign policies is the President’s Kitchen Cabinet. The Kitchen or inner Cabinet is an informal group but strong enough to influence the President’s thought and position on foreign policy matters. The difference between the group and the think-tank is that it may operate in secrecy and its membership is only known by the President and his very close aides. They may meet at informal times and can be made up of “unofficial people”. The members of the Kitchen Cabinet play a key role in the running of the state and their decisions would probably take pre-eminence over the decisions of the real Cabinet. The members of the President’s Kitchen Cabinet may include his most trusted friends and indispensable aides: Foreign Affairs Minister, directors of the national intelligence and security councils, Vice President, party chieftains, some members of his think-tank, some senior legislators, and even the First Lady (Umar, 2009; Omoruyi, 2004).
The Presidency works closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to set foreign policy agenda, initiate and formulate policies, and implement them. The Ministry is particularly saddled with the responsibility of foreign policy implementation. However, the Minister is the President’s arrowhead as he is most probably even a member of his think-tank and inner caucus or Kitchen Cabinet. Depending on the choice of the executive or the Minister’s pedigree, he could be on the periphery of the inner caucus or not even be a member at all. Yet, the Minister could also be closer and more functional in the policy process than even the Vice President (Akinyemi, 2009; Holsti & Rosenau, 1990).
The Legislature
The legislature is another actor in the formulation of foreign policies of states. The body is the second arm of government. Their primary responsibility is lawmaking. They also act as check to executive powers and minimize executive arbitrariness in the policymaking process. Nigeria operates a bicameral legislative system with an upper and a lower chamber, which has rather been called the “right and left chambers, with the Senate being the right chamber and the House of Reps being the left chamber” (Adelusi, 2009). These are the Senate and the House of Representatives of the National Assembly. The Nigerian Senate has the sole power to confirm President's appointments that require consent, and to ratify treaties. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule: the House must also approve appointments to the Vice Presidency and any treaty that involves foreign trade. The Senate also tries impeachment cases for federal officials referred to it by the House (Aminu, 2009; Akindele, 2005; Akindele, 2004). The National Assembly screens and vets ambassadorial nominees list presented to it by the President, and approves or disapproves of individuals on the basis of merit (Adelusi, 2009; Aminu, 2008).
In order to pass legislation and send it to the President for his signature, both the House and the Senate must pass the same bill by majority vote. If the President vetoes a bill, they may override his veto by passing the bill again in each chamber with at least two-thirds of each body voting in favour. Matters of foreign policy coming from the executive reach the Senate after preliminary debates at the lower House. Thus, the Senate becomes the highest court of appeal for bills or policy proposals emanating from the executive arm of government. There is also the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which takes a scientific look and evaluation at technical matters and make recommendations to the Senate before there is a verdict on and what becomes of a foreign policy bill (Aminu, 2009; Akindele, 2005). The Committee is expected to play a vital role in shaping Nigerian foreign policy. In the US, the Committee is influential: from approving the purchase of Alaska in 1867 to the creation of the United Nations in 1945 to the present day. This committee is responsible for overseeing the foreign policy agencies of the U.S. government, including the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Peace Corps. The Committee reviews and considers all diplomatic nominations and international treaties, as well as legislation relating to U.S. foreign policy (Kerry, 2007).
The Nigerian Senate President is very influential in foreign policy making. His views count, and most times, on matters of national exigency, he encourages his colleagues in the Senate to pass a bill with dispatch. The hallowed chambers of the Senate are considered very considerate and reasonable on issues presented by the President. In Nigeria, the Senate President is the “third in command” after the President and Vice President, unlike in the US where the Senate President is the Vice President of the nation. Although matters would be eventually put to vote when there are party delineations, the Senate President’s influence would facilitate the passage of bills proposed from the Presidency where he belongs (Adelusi 2009; Aminu, 2009). The Nigerian experience in the Fourth Republic as it was in the Second Republic was that the ruling party also produced the Senate President and even the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This has been an advantage for the Presidency who has little brick-walls to realizing his foreign policy ideas. The House of Representatives led by Ghali Umar Na’abah between 1999 and 2003 was however cantankerous towards the executive and acted as active opposition to the Presidency on most occasions on matters having to do with policymaking (Adelusi, 2009).
The House of Representatives also has a Committee on International Relations. This performs the exact functions of the Senate Committee on same matters, but differs in where it reports or to whom it recommends- the House. The House has several sub-committees that bear relevance to foreign policy. These include that on Bakassi, international trade, human trafficking, and so forth with the function of advising the Committee on those other specific technical matters so that the Committee would know the kind of advice to give the House on foreign affairs bills that have been presented by the Executive before it (Aminu, 2008). In the US, the sub-committees looking at key areas of foreign policy concern include that on Iraq, Middle East, North Korea, Africa and Asia (Wilson, 2007).
The Judicial Actors
The judiciary is constitutionally expected to play active foreign policy roles, but in practice, it plays fewer roles in foreign policy making. In the Nigerian context however, the judiciary even plays fewer roles. However, there are judicial influences in foreign policy litigation and judges as Nwosu (1991: 107) and Umar (2009) claim, systematically rule in favour of foreign affairs when confronted with certain domestic challenges. The federal judiciary is prone to support foreign policy interests. For instance, the courts stood by the Federal Government in implementing the Orange Tree Agreement of 2006 in which Nigeria was to engage in a seamless handover of Bakassi to Cameroon. The litigations of individuals and groups challenging government’s plan or attempting to stop the handover were turned in favor of government. The federal and state high courts drew inspiration from the precedents of the National Assembly and Supreme Court which had given sanctimony to the ICJ ruling and the Treaty of Washington (Orange Tree) in the domestic law, to rule in favour of hand over. There are several influences that impinge on the judicial contribution to foreign policy making in Nigeria. One important influence is the ideological preferences of judges. A second important influence involves the national security and defence, the Bakassi experience being an example. A third influence is the national interest. However, the issue of national interest has not been as volatile as ideological orientations of judicial officers. There were however cases where the Supreme Court and other senior federal courts have ruled in the 1990s and 2000s on matters concerning Nigeria’s territorial waters, borders and oil interests (Obadare, 2001), all of which have shaped the country’s foreign policy.
In terms of ideology, judges are guided by their own ideological orientation. The judiciary was divided about the Sharia which had foreign policy implications for Nigeria in terms of its relationship with the Christian west and Islamic world because of the judges’ ideological leanings. Some states introduced the Sharia law in northern Nigeria and when the country was to host the Miss World Beauty Pageant, there was uproar in northern Nigerian cities with the local courts backing the litigations and clamour for a cancellation of the event which was considered as bestiality. The southern courts were opposed to this (Olatunji, 2001). However in the end, the Federal Government was compelled by the agitations and insecurity this would cause to stop the event mid-way into completion. The federal judiciary is thus extremely deferential to governmental authority in the conduct of foreign relations. This is understandable in the sense that the Nigerian judicial head, the Attorney General, is also the Minister of Justice, a prominent member of the Federal Cabinet and probably a political ally of the President. The appointment of judges, including those of the apex Supreme Court, by the ostensibly independent Judicial Service Commission, is also done on the recommendation of the Attorney-General. The allegiance of the judiciary on foreign policy matters to the state, or more appropriately, the President, is therefore not in doubt.
2.2.2.1. Who Conceives What, When and How?
Nigeria has always followed the traditional ways in implementing its foreign policies. These ways have been largely peaceful: establishment of a strong and effective foreign office; establishment of diplomatic, consular and trade missions in foreign countries; conference diplomacy; shuttle diplomacy; and personal diplomacy (Akinyemi, 2009; Ofoegbu, 1998). However, in the entire process and politics of foreign policy-making in Nigeria, the President calls the shots. He is surrounded by policy makers whom he has appointed into his Cabinet, Vice President, Kitchen Cabinet, team of Special Advisers and Assistants relevant in the area of foreign policy, the National Security Adviser, Minster of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Minister of Sports, Minister of Justice, Minister of Education, Military Service Chiefs, and other agencies and offices that have roles to occupy in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Top on his priority list is the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is directly charged with the task of foreign policy-making. The President wields real powers in foreign policy making, but as experience has shown, he can barely take decisions alone without considering the interests of these political stakeholders, which eventually shape his opinions and perceptions. These also include members or leadership of his political party and political godfathers. The political veneration of the President and his co-stakeholders in policy matters seems to have rendered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which should play a central role in policymaking, almost irrelevant most times (Akinyemi, 2009; Fawole, 2003).
The Constitution of Nigeria partly accounts for this situation. The 1999 Constitution empowers the central government led by the President to have unhindered powers to initiate foreign policy. Again, the long years of military traditions in governance have also made the executive to have the overriding policy powers, including that of foreign policy. However, this does not foreclose the fact that the other foreign policy agencies are still useful. The MFA and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) act as think-tank for the executive. The MFA is primarily a clearing house for external relations and point of implementation of foreign policy. It also plays a central role in stimulating foreign policy ideas. Practically, Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Nigeria, have, over the years, acted as chief advisers on external affairs, except in some cases, to a democratically elected President or Military Head of State (Akinyemi, 2009; Akinterinwa, 2004).
The MFA is supposed to be directly responsible for foreign policy formulation and implementation. Because matters are usually left in the hands of the Minister and his officials, foreign policy positions could change radically from one minister to another, depending on the minister's orientation. In addition to the minister's immediate staff, there is a small foreign policy elite comprising other top government officials, interest group leaders, academicians, top military officers, religious leaders, and journalists. These elite exert indirect influence through communiqués and press releases, as well as direct pressure on the government. In 1986 a conference-to which every stratum of these elite was invited-was held to review Nigeria's foreign policy and recommend broad policy frameworks for the 1990s and beyond (Fafowora, 2001).
Among research institutes that directly or indirectly shape the thinking of policy makers at the MFA, are the NIIA, National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) which Ofoegbu has described as the foreign policy inner core (1998: 4); and the Nigerian Societies of International Affairs and Law, and Nigerian universities, which he also calls foreign policy outer core (Ofoegbu, ibid). Nigerian universities have at various times produced top-flight academics as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassadors, including Representatives to the UN. The NIIA is the most relevant. A rationale for NIIA’s formation was succinctly expressed by Sir Balewa at its commissioning, viz:
If Nigeria is to acquit herself honorably and to take her rightful place in resurgent Africa, she requires to be fully informed on the world of today, which is one of the paramount functions of the Institute (cited in Banjo, 1986).
The bodies should serve the following purposes: encourage and facilitate the understanding of international affairs and the circumstances, conditions and attitudes of foreign countries and their peoples; provide and maintain means of information upon international questions and promote the study and investigation of international questions; and establish contacts with other organizations with similar objectives (Akinterinwa, 2004).
By the existence of the International Politics, International Economics, International Law and Organizations, and the Strategic Studies divisions in the Research Department of the Institute, the NIIA is required to promote the scientific study of international policies, economics and jurisprudence and, among other things, provide research findings to the government and the public on international relations issues and provide facilities for the training of Nigerian diplomats and personnel and those of other countries (Akinyemi, 2009; NIIA Act, 1971).
However, the Institute has had perennial internal problems. A problem of the NIIA has been that of supervisory authority of the MFA over the NIIA; and yet another problem is the presence today of several other centres of foreign policy analysis, which seems to have eroded the monopoly of the NIIA in provision of expert knowledge on foreign policy issues. Akinterinwa describes the relationship between the two policy actors this way:
The relationship between the NIIA and MFA can be likened to the relationship between theory and practice, between wishes and reality, but both the MFA and NIIA have always behaved as if they are mutually exclusive of each other and as if they do not constitute two sides of the coin (Akinterinwa, 2004: 81).
Again the supervision of the NIIA was transferred from one authority to another, until it finally came under the Presidency. The Institute’s many challenges, including the intermittent defects in leadership styles and foresight of individual Directors-General as narrated by Akinterinwa (2004: 76-80), may have also thinned out its centrality to government and MFA’s foreign policy decisions for a long time. The internal scuffles and irregularities from the mid 1970s to date may have sent wrong signals to the policy makers that the Institute would have been robbed of focus and informed foreign policy analysis that the executive arm of government would need for policy making.
A supposed vital actor in the policy process in democratic Nigeria is the National Assembly. The National Assembly is a bicameral legislature established under section 4 of the Nigerian Constitution and comprises a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives (Ajibola, 2009). The body, modelled after the Federal Congress of the United States, is supposed to guarantee equal representation of the states irrespective of size in the Senate and proportional representation of population in the House. The National Assembly is located in the federal capital, Abuja. The Senate is chaired by the President of the Nigerian Senate, the first of whom was the Rt. Hon. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who stepped down from the job to become the country's first Head of State, while the House is chaired by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. At any joint session of the Assembly, the President of the Senate presides and in his absence the Speaker of the House presides (Akindele, 2005; Akindele, 2004).
The Assembly has broad oversight functions and is empowered to establish committees of its members to scrutinize bills and the conduct of government officials. Since the restoration of democratic rule in 1999, the Assembly has been said to be a "learning process" that has witnessed the election and removal of several Presidents of the Senate, allegations of corruption, slow passage of private member bills and the creation of ineffective committees to satisfy numerous interests. The Senate also confirms the President's nomination of senior diplomats, members of the federal cabinet, federal judicial appointments and independent federal commissions (Ajibola, 2009).
The Senate has a Committee on Foreign Relations, which acts as the clearing house for all technical matters on foreign affairs, diplomatic appointments and foreign policy bills and proposals. The Committee reports to the Senate and advises on relevant matters. All foreign policy ideas are supposed to come to the Senate for vetting and approval, and the Committee on Foreign Relations has the exclusive task to advise the Senate on them. By its critical approach to bills and issues, and by the advice and recommendations, the Senate Committee thus becomes an important actor in the foreign policy process. As earlier mentioned, the House of Representatives also has its own House Committee. This Committee, like that of the Senate, examines proposals from the executive and advises the House on them before debate. The proposals and bills come to this second House before heading to the first Chamber (Ajibola, 2009).
There is also the Foreign Service, which is today primarily made up of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The Foreign Service and international affairs institutions suffered more neglect under military rule than during democratic era. Except for a few instances, the military institution did not believe in using such agencies, including the MFA as such. A major problem was that the military believed in handling all policy matters with military fiat without due consultation or reliance on democratic and established foreign policy institutions. The nature of military rule did not permit too much of independent thinking or ideas that are different from those of the maximum rulers themselves. Neither were the ministers or advisers given the freedom to function effectively. Military dictators were absolute rulers whose office appropriated so much executive and legislative powers to a single person to run the country at his whim (Fawole, 2003: 20).
According to Fawole (2003: 21), the military had unregulated powers and their actions were not checked by law, and as such, they ran the country the way they willed. Their foreign affairs ministers, who were often military personnel, merely acted the scripts of the head of state. Thus the national role conceptions, foreign policy objectives articulations and policy implementation were the duties of the head of state and his junta, a reflection of their deep or shallow thoughts and perceptions, and an expression of their world-view. The MFA and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) counted very little or not at all during military rule. The National War College, Military Academy, National Institute for Policy and Studies (NIPSS) and Police Academy would however mean more and have been part of the inner core in foreign policy during this rule.
Foreign policy-making under military rule therefore defies all known precepts or traditions. The “political group” may not be as effective as in a democracy. The military elite may be a caricature of the political group, but it may just be the whims and caprices of the maximum ruler that these elite may be chorusing. The ruler may not have to consult the group or seek their opinions. His policies are a fait accompli-he simply presents his thoughts and plan of action before the Supreme Military Council (SMC) or Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) for their knowledge or information and then presented to the nation as the decision of the armed forces ruling cabinet. Also, the policy centres including universities, research institutions, and public opinions are ignored or under-utilized. This is even when known democratic structures for policymaking such as the legislature and judicial systems have either been banned or replaced by military tribunals (Akinyemi, 2009).
It is however pertinent to note that there were certain exceptions to the rule because of personal abilities and dispositions of the military ruler per time. In the history of foreign ministers serving under military rule, foreign ministers (including civilians, academics and military personnel) that have demonstrated better latitude than others, out of about thirteen ministers from 1966-2005 have been Wachukwu, Arikpo, Akinyemi, Gambari, Garba, Nwachukwu, Olisemaka and Adeniji (Abidde, 2008). Gowon needed a sound technocrat like Arikpo to help rebuild Nigeria’s image after a lull in foreign policy during the Civil War. Muhammadu Buhari-Idiagbon were committed to restoring Nigeria’s integrity and place of respect after the moral abyss engendered by the civilian administration before it, and hence needed a prolific diplomat like Professor Ibrahim Gambari to do the job. Babangida needed an Akinyemi to earn the west’s confidence after the saga of the “Dikko crate Affair” had led to diplomatic face-off with Britain.
The foreign policy process in Nigeria thus seemed to have generally suffered the lack of adherence to structured patterns either in civilian or military rule. Every regime has their own policies and every policy process seems to be controlled by the chief executive and his “group”. In civilian rule, the term ‘control’ means there is a smaller group in which there is a single dominant ruler-more likely the President that dictates national and foreign policies. Role conceptions pass through this process as well. Are roles then conceived by just one man who seeks cover in a group for legitimacy? Can a parochial-minded group conceive clear acceptable regional roles for a big nation? What politics goes on in national role conceptions? To these questions we now beam our searchlights for answers.
The various key actors in Nigerian foreign policy making have been x-rayed. The actors referred to as decision units or groups by Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann (2001) are expected to exert pressure and influence on decision-making and policy outputs. However, there are inbuilt constraints in the policy process identified that allow for only a minimal flow of subsidiary agencies and society’s contributions in the decision-making process. This is because of the overwhelming powers and influence of the political leadership who calls the shots. National role conception is a more demanding act, which requires a deeper reflection, a great sense of national history, a sense of mission, and a wider consultation with the inner and outer cores of foreign policy, because the state cannot afford to play docile or servile, or retroactive roles in a world of power politics. Hence, a state’s role in the international system must be unambiguously defined. This is how it should work: political leaders and policy technocrats could have their own perceptions of the roles their state should fill in international politics; but their perceptions should be shaped by the expressions of the public (public opinions, research outputs of informed groups, policy centres' views, citizens and other states) about the roles or position expected of their country probably in view of certain national capabilities or historical symbolisms; which would give them a better interpretation of the national roles. National roles can be viewed as general orientations governments adopt toward the outside world. Such role creates certain obligations and commitment which policy makers will usually attempt to fill.
However, studies have shown that conception of roles is viewed as that technical part of foreign policy making that requires only the policy makers’ special attention. Interestingly, their mind is rather conditioned by their own perceptions and expectations-informed by their orientations-of what they think their country should do, and their own interpretations of the roles they think they should play in seeing to that. Holsti captures this line of argument in his 1970 classic. He describes national role conceptions as the policy makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or subordinate regional systems (Holsti, 1970: 245-246). This view represents a development of the old school of thought, which stresses the importance of distinguishing between the decision maker’s psychological and operational environments. It holds that with respect to policymaking and the content of policy decisions, what matters is how the policy maker imagines the milieu to be and not it actually is (Sprout & Sprout, 1957).
Put differently, this school identifies the elite perceptions of both the external and internal operational environments. The decision makers’ internal psychological environment, including perception of their nation’s military and economic capability, political structure, interest groups, and competing elites shape the external behaviour of their state. The exclusive preoccupation of national leaders with defining national roles is understandable from the prism that they are more stable and consistent as leaders and because “they see all up there” (Krotz, 2001; Wish, 1980; & Holsti, 1970).
The policy makers have been identified. The political leaders have their role conceptions. So do the other foreign policy actors, including legislators, ministry of foreign affairs, research institutes and even the media. In some instances, the national roles suggested by these other policy actors are actually their own role conceptions. So whose own definitions become the role conceptions for the state?
The elite role perception school holds that there should be a ranking for this. Wish (1980) in a study of foreign policy makers’ national roles conceptions, attempts a classification after a content analysis of categories of speeches, articles and interviews indicating national role conceptions. After studying twenty political elites from seventeen nations, he identified three variables that could be used to rank policy makers’ conceptions and determine whose role conceptions take premium. These were role status, motivational orientation, and issue (or substantive problem area). From his analysis, he came up with the submissions that national leaders’ conceptions tended to have a high profile status for their countries, had a more motivated orientation or drive and showed depth of understanding of issue more than other policy or decision makers. Thus, in agreement with old assumptions by Hermann (1976), Spanier (1974), and Holsti (1970), Wish submits that the conceptions of the political leaders are of prime importance (Wish, 1980: 536-550).
2.2.3. Afrocentrism and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
There have also been discourses on the debate of the Afrocentric nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy. There is a popular school of thought in Nigerian foreign policy literature that Nigeria’s foreign policy whether under military or civilian rule has not shifted from the African focus since October 7, 1960 when Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa enunciated the set of national roles conceived for post-independence Nigeria (cited in Adeyemo, 2002). Of more interest to this study is the African policy thrust, which reflects in these conceived roles:
1. The termination or eradication of all forms of colonialism or colonial rule in Africa
2. Eradication of racial/apartheid policy in Southern Africa most especially in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa
3. Commitment to functional co-operation with a view to promoting African unity
4. Promotion of peace in Africa and the world, and
5. Promotion of human dignity especially the dignity of the black man (Adeyemo, 2002; Saliu, 1999).
It is appropriate to ask whether the policymakers of the period 1985-2005 tried to redefine Nigeria’s roles in Africa in view of the irrelevance of the first two (1 and 2) due to the political climate changes in South Africa in 1994. Did the military change anything or were the soldiers in power so carried away by the role conception from independence? Or did they simply ignore preconceived roles and the constitutional stipulations on roles and rather do their own thing the way the military would do it? It must be quickly stressed here that even in the absence of conceived roles; nations can still assume certain roles in international politics. When this happens, it simply means a nation is responding to issues and developments as they unfold in international politics, but does not have guiding principles because of the lack of clearly defined roles. Such state would either be relying against its wish on traditional roles of the country (Northedge, 1968) or simply gamble (Wish, 1980; Rosenau, 1990). Were any of the political leaderships of the time guilty of either or all of these?
The period between 1985 and 2005 represents a watershed in Nigerian political history because it witnessed the succession of five political leaderships (Babangida, Shonekan, Abacha, Abdulsalami and Obasanjo). Two of the administrations were civilian and the rest military. Studies on Nigeria-Africa policy during the period had reflected what each administration set out for itself as an African agenda. The studies explain that the additional burden on Nigeria to assume critical roles in Africa is as a result of the demands of the first and second of the concentric circles in Nigeria’s foreign policy approach (Adeniji, 2000; Akinbobola, 2000; Akinbobola, 1999; Bukarambe, 1990; Fafowora, 2001; Fawole, 2004; Inamate, 2001; Kuna, 2002; King, 1996; Okon, 1998; Olusanya and Akindele, 1989; Saliu, 1999). The first of the concentric circles, the innermost circle represents Nigeria’s good neighbourliness with its immediate neighbours – Benin, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. The second circle revolves around Nigeria’s relations with its other West African neighbours at large. The third circle focuses on the whole continent. The fourth circle revolves around Nigeria’s relations with the world and global organizations. The concentric circle theory reinforces the centrality of Africa in Nigeria’s foreign policy (Akpotor and Nwolise, 1999).
However, some analyses of Nigeria’s foreign policy have rather held on to the view that it is rather the nation’s natural endowments, demographic preponderance, mineral resources, and its dynamic and quality statesmanship that have galvanized its role conception in the continent (Fawole, 1993; Obadare, 2001). They point to certain facts to buttress the argument. These include the fact that Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world (Akinterinwa, 2001; Ayam, 2001; and Aluko, 1981), one of the largest producers of crude oil (Herskovits, 1978), probably has the most civil elite in the developing world (Mazrui, 2006; Saliu, 1996), and that it has a very formidable military (Shaw, 1987; and Thomas, 2001).
The belief that Nigeria would play a crucial leadership role in Africa had predated independence. National and anti-colonial leaders such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who later emerged as the first Nigerian President had contended on July 31, 1959 that “it should be the manifest destiny of Nigeria to join hands with other progressive forces in the world to emancipate not only the people of Africa but also other peoples of African descent from the scourge of colonialism” (Azikiwe, 1961). Balewa had also reacted to Nkrumah of Ghana’s call for a political union in Africa, saying that “Nigeria is big enough and does not need to join others…If others wish to join Nigeria, their position would be made clear” (cited in Phillips, 1964). Analysts have seen this new role as a wake-up call to the continent to accept the nation’s benevolent hegemony (Gambari, 2008; Osuntokun, 2008; Meagher, 2008).
Azikiwe’s perspective could be likened to the story of the rich neighbour whose presence in the midst of the poor is a divine arrangement so that the affluent neighbour can give succour to the needy around it. This line of thought became a strong passion that characterized the thinking of first generation Nigerian policymakers and statesmen. Among the leadership roles conceived were the liberation of the continent from imperialism of all kinds, fighting apartheid and racism in Southern Africa and in the Diaspora, uniting Africans to make their voice loud enough in global politics and using the enormous resources of the country to assist needy African states (Ojiako, 1981, Saliu, 1999). This thus constituted the first roles conception for Nigeria in Africa. The roles conceived at independence were surmised in the Nigerian constitution thus:
The State shall promote African Unity, as well as total political, economic and cultural liberation of Africa (Constitution of the F.R.N., 1979).
However, the nature of roles had to change much later after independence. New developments and new issues evolved in African politics which had to reflect in Nigerian foreign policy. New roles thus had to be conceived. It was not clear whether new roles were conceived by the policymakers or old roles were only re-interpreted and modified. This was because the Africa policy stance remained constant. It remained the old pro-Africa disposition with open-ended and grandiose perceptions of African roles expressed in grandiloquent political leaders’ speeches. This gap would have made it possible for different interpretations and manipulations of conceived roles by successive governments. Did the analysis of Nigerian foreign policy during the period take note of this fundamental gap?
Some studies have discussed the new role demands and expectations emerging for Nigeria in the continent. These demands include regional security (Badmus & Ogunmola, 2003; IPA, 2003), combating increasing poverty, diseases and underdevelopment (Akinbobola, 2000; Nweke, 2000), neo-colonialism (Akindele, 1998), growing indebtedness to the west (Saliu, 1999, Olusanya, 1989), and democratization (Asobie, 2002). There has been a thesis that the fundamental gap of not having clearly defined and updated roles by the political leadership in an evolving world has been rather responsible for the nation’s “role failure” in the continent (Akinyemi, 2005; McAuslan, 1996; & Kirk-Greene, 1991). Shaw (1987) for instance argues that the challenge of Nigerian foreign policy included its “inability to balance capabilities with targets”. This is clearly an indictment in the area of roles conception. The point being made here is not that Nigeria stopped playing its leadership role in Africa. Nigeria still assumed important roles like in the stoppage of civil wars in West Africa, provision of loans for African nations and sending of technical staff to aid West African countries in certain areas. The problem was probably that of wrong prioritization which can only be attributed to poor conception of roles.
However, there is much ado in examining the politics of role conception to determine whether there have been new roles clearly conceived in the business of foreign policy after the generations of Azikiwe-Balewa and Murtala-Obasanjo. The civil war and post-military periods after 1979 are critical and interesting to study. But much more compelling is the period encompassing the second and last phase of military rule and the new civilian era, which is 1985-2005.
Some scholars of foreign policy also hold the view that Nigerian foreign policy has been characterized by inarticulate role location (Akinyemi 1990; Akindele, 1989), or a conceptual problem in defining position for Nigeria (Thomas 2001; Gambari, 1995). The problem is attributed to lack of continuity of government (Aluko 1983; and Shaw, 1983) which results in one administration on assuming power starting a new policy ab initio, thereby undoing old ones. This largely accounts for conceptual problem for national roles. The new regime may not have the patience or capacity to conceptualize roles nor conceive of them, particularly if it is a military regime. Other issues identified include inability of the political elite to promptly identify roles to occupy or play in periods of emergency; and the participation of charlatans in the foreign policy process. Thomas (2001:9) resonates that the Nigerian polity needed to be stable politically to overcome the problem of conceptualizing its position in international politics and having a dynamic foreign policy process.
Some studies have examined the “human factor” or group behaviour in policy. For example, Fawole in a study of the institution, structure, processes and performance of Nigerian foreign policy (2004), establishes the centrality of the human element in foreign policy and explains using the Nigerian experience under civilian rule, how the policy making process is affected by individuals. During the civilian dispensation from 1999-2007 for instance, the foreign policy making process was decimated by the personality and activeness of President Olusegun Obasanjo. This was probably because of political stability for a relatively longer period than previous political experiences. This implies that consistency of political leadership would thus be required to achieve maximum success in the execution of foreign policy. For Nigeria, the peculiarity of frequent changes in government during the era of military rule and instability of civilian leadership characterized by impeachments or threats of removal of key policy actors may have unsettled the foreign policy regime. Nevertheless, a retrospect would show relative stability and continuum in the African policy of Nigeria.
Another issue popularly discussed in Nigerian foreign policy literature during the period under study is its leadership in Africa. A long range foreign policy objective of Nigeria is to assume continental and global power, which like Morgenthau (1973) states, is the objective of most ambitious states in the international system. Nigeria is committed to Africa and it is by this commitment that it has earned a respectable place in global politics. Akinyemi (2005) and Saliu (1999) reflect on this important aspect of Nigeria’s leadership. While they both agree that Nigeria by its economic and cultural diplomacy is a leader in Africa, Akinyemi rather observes that the leadership role is being compromised because of the poor examples emanating from Nigeria in the last two decades. It is also noted that this is caused by the corrupt, decadent, reactionary and ethnically divisive governments. To overcome this role failure, the leadership must be upright, foresighted, flexible and dynamic before assuming the good old roles (Akinyemi, 2005:3-9).
However, Nigeria’s leadership position is considered to be earned because of its natural endowments, and not demanded (Bukarambe, 2000; Saliu, 1999). It thus arrogates to itself the responsibility of catering for the well-being of Africans wherever they may be. Saliu states that it is arguable that the well-being of the African continent is intricately tied to Nigeria’s, justifying it with references to its swift response to the Congo crisis in 1960-61, a few months after independence; its intervention in Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Nigeria had declared that its independence would be incomplete as long as any other African state was under colonialism. It supported revolutionary struggles for independence, fought apartheid to a standstill and was relentless in distributing financial assistance to needy African states. Akinyemi and other scholars including Saliu however contend that going by its pedigree in African politics; much is yet expected of the country today by African states.
Another core issue of Nigeria’s African roles looked at in literature is financial, material and economic assistance to needy African states (Akinbobola, 2000; Akindele, 1998; and Olusanya, 1989). These consider the milestone in Nigerian economic diplomacy, with details of Nigeria’s loans, grants and donations to African states. The studies also look up to the extension of Nigerian resources such as power and natural gas to West African states. In fact, a denominator of Nigeria’s foreign policy making between 1985 and 2005 was oil and energy. These positioned it to render assistance to needy African states. Nigeria made oil and gas to neighbouring African states readily available, while also providing steady electricity to some of them. Soremekun (2003) and Shaw (1987) however believe that the primacy of oil in Nigeria’s foreign policy engineering has given Nigerian foreign policy makers a false ego to engage in messianic pretensions, which has made them to fritter away precious resources meant for purposeful internal development. According to Shaw (1987: 40), Nigeria exaggerated its potentials and overrated its capacity, thus over-doing things in the name of commitment to Africa and relevance in the world. Nigeria was essentially a rentier-state, but metamorphosed into a debtor-state as a result of the huge costs of what Soremekun (2003: 4) calls “messianic pretensions.”
The commitment to Africa lies in the strong pan-African bent of Nigeria’s foreign policy within the period. This strong African appeal is a core premise for discourse and argument in this study. Works that have examined this African sentiment of Nigerian foreign policy include King (2005), Okon (1998), and Shaw (1987). The studies find out that the spirit of Africa in Nigerian foreign policy culminated in the quest for integration, peace and development that berthed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. ECOWAS was to act as an economic and a security platform for West Africans to cooperate so as to gain and enjoy self development and settle disputes in a pacific way.
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The issue of “messianic pretensions” formed part of the weakness of the policy process at the time. For instance, petroleum which should be a source of foreign policy strength and profitable national roles for Nigeria did not just lubricate the foreign policy making. It also corrupted it. It worked this way: The oil boom engendered endemic corruption in high places with government monies meant for projects, financial, technical and humanitarian assistance diverted. Government officials go into collaboration with foreign or multinational companies to embark on jumbo contracts and “white elephant” projects in Nigeria and successive political leaderships undo old agreements to start new bilateral agreements, commence outlandish projects that are wasteful, capital intensive or inflated out of proportions (Meier, 2002; Akinyemi, 1996; Shaw, 1987). The situation thus becomes that of a resource-curse. Shaw (1987: 48-50) observes that the challenges of Nigeria’s foreign policy included its inability to balance capabilities with targets, the degeneration of the economy into a real tailspin, corruption, internal divisiveness that has rather become a source of weakness than strength which from independence have made Nigeria not move beyond “a potential super-state”.
In a study, it was contended that the greatness of Nigeria may not be in doubt (Fasehun & Shaw, 1980) a view earlier expressed by Herskovits (1978) that Nigeria was a black power. Shaw and Fasehun in their 1980 study had however warned that the purposive actor/greatness paradigm would pale into insignificance with the unchecked unbridled corruption, political instability, ethnic and religious crisis. Other problems identified by other scholars include poor governance, mismanagement of aid and Nigeria’s reversal from being a creditor or donor-nation to becoming one of the worst debtor-nations in the continent (Gray and McPherson, 2001; McAuslan, 1996; Kirk-Greene, 1991). It thus becomes for Nigeria, a case of “physician, heal thyself”.
The problems identified above in the literature are very important to this study. They provide useful insight to the politics of role conception, likely causes of role failure, or indefinite role conception or as the case may be, lack of role conception in the policy making process. The identified denominators in the literature of Nigerian foreign policy are also very important to this study. They also shed light on what guides decision makers in their conception, ill-conception or lack of conception of roles. All these would make the analysis to achieve its objective of conceptualizing roles in the analysis of Nigerian foreign policy.
Most of the works reviewed so far provide a historical base for this study. They also constitute a critique of the contending issues in Nigeria’s policy which the current study would benefit from. Aluko, Akindele, Akinyemi, Gambari, Fawole, Saliu, and Olusanya, provide sharp theoretical perspectives for this study. Ogwu, King, Soremekun, Shaw, Ayam and Okon offer much information to understand the objectives, formulation, pursuit and implementation of Nigeria-Africa policy. It is apparent however, that NRC as a concept and instrument of a more proper understanding of Nigeria’s international behaviour in Africa is absent in most of the literature, except for those of Adigbuo (2005), Fawole (1999 and 2003), and Obadare (2001). Adigbuo’s thesis (2005: 1-386) offers so far the most comprehensive and incisive analysis of Nigeria’s national role conceptions. However, the study covers only the period from 1975, when the Murtala-Obasanjo redefined Nigeria’s African roles, to 1990 when Namibia became independent, by the singular resilient leadership roles Nigeria played in the movement. Secondly, the study is limited to Nigeria’s NRCs as far as Namibia and the general liberation struggles in Southern Africa is concerned. The current study would continue from where Adigbuo stopped; it would update and fill up the gaps in Adigbuo’s, including the examination of the wider spectrum of Nigeria’s national roles and roles conceptions concerning Africa from 1985-2005.
Also, very few works have made reference to national roles nor demonstrated a clear identification of roles under the dispensations, particularly under the military where policymaking is unconventional. These few include Gambari (1986), and Akinbobola (2000). This study sets out in search of Nigeria’s national roles in Africa, using NRC as the tool for this search.
Nigeria-Africa policy can also be understood against the background of the growing regional security problem in the past two decades. Africa’s huge security problems were Nigeria’s burden during this period. Nigeria considers African security as germane to its foreign policy pursuits, which prompts Onwuka (2006) to describe security as a “scarce and sensitive commodity.” Indeed, the security demands of states interact, overlap or conflict in international relations. First it is evident that Nigeria is stabilizing democratically and the government has always overcome internal security problems in spite of recurrence. Second all the identified problems facing Africa are well appreciated by successive Nigerian administrations, particularly from the 1970s to date, and these reflect in their foreign policy that has Africa as its centrepiece. In Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy Governance and International Security, Adeniji (2000) highlights Nigeria’s consistency in African security. The areas outlined include: its role in the anti-apartheid movement in Southern Africa, liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, resolution of regional conflicts and disputes, and Nigeria’s politics of harmonization through primary regional integration and security.
Other areas related to security include democracy, good governance, sustainable human development in Africa, disarmament and confidence building among African states and conventional weapons control measures. Adeniji however surmises that a new African agenda is needed in Nigeria’s foreign policy because of the changes in the global system that affects the continent. For him Africa must remain the primary focus of its foreign policy and with the reduction of the strategic and ideological interests of the major powers in the developing countries, regional peace and security issues as well as regional economic and social development will become essentially the task of countries in the region. In an eventual multi-polar world, the role of regional powers will become more vital and Nigeria must seek to remain one of the major powers, if not the major power in Africa (Adeniji, 2000: 21-22).
The charge seems to extol Pax Nigeriana in Africa. Obadare (2001) defines Pax Nigeriana as the establishment of Nigerian hegemony in the African region. It is not very clear whether Nigeria’s impressive role is just to assume leadership position in Africa. Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa had cautioned on this ambitious role conception thus:
If we conduct ourselves well and if we appear well-meaning to the countries of Africa there is no reason why they should not give us our recognized position by virtue of our size and population; but it is not for us to go out to show to those smaller countries that we are big in size and population and therefore, they have to come trailing behind us (cited in Bukarambe, 2000).
A viewpoint about Nigerian foreign policy making process has been that from the Balewa to Obasanjo’s civilian government, the decision-making dynamics mostly reflect the rational-actor model (Inamete, 2006). This was also buttressed with the fact that the shared responsibilities between the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military ruling council or federal cabinet headed by the president (as the case may be) made the policy process effective and successful.
To this extent, Inamete thus attempts to lend credence to the school of thought that advances that in all situations, even if things were bad at home, Nigeria consistently had a focus. For this viewpoint, Nigeria’s shift to economic diplomacy in Africa from the mid 1980s has put the nation’s foreign policy at a vantage point. The Babangida administration thus departed from the normal “political” diplomacy of supporting nation-building and liberation movement, which only take much of Nigeria’s resources. It embraced an economic diplomacy that was meant to benefit Nigeria in economic development (Ogwu and Olukoshi, 2002). The new economic diplomacy is said to have represented a “new focus” of the nation’s foreign policy. This was expected to engender an appraisal of Nigerian roles in Africa. But were new roles conceived in view of this new focus of Nigerian foreign policy?
The domestic and external contexts of the economic diplomacy have been examined (Ogwu and Olukoshi, 2002). The submission is that the immediate domestic context is the deep-seated and seemingly intractable crisis of accumulation, which had bedevilled the Nigerian economy since the 1980s. The crisis was triggered off by the collapse of the world oil market on which the nation depended for over 90% of its annual foreign exchange receipts since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil price revolution of 1973. The sudden collapse in the world market price of oil and the sharp revenue decline galvanized the recourse to emphasis on economic diplomacy. Such economic diplomacy had been characterized by the adoption of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), promoting of foreign investment flows, encouragement of exports, call for debt rescheduling, et cetera. The SAP, Ogwu and Olukoshi observe, weakened the nationalist “radical” strand in Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy orientations and underlined the commitment of the Babangida administration to an emerging international regime characterized by the increasing influence of monetarist economic ideas, the growing power of the IMF, World Bank, London Club, Paris Club and the Group of Seven (now increased to Eight, G-8) countries under the control of the United States (2002:14). Such a landmark in international economics should have a fundamental impact on the role conception of nations seeking to square up to imminent western economic imperialism. Would this impending resurgence of western economic diplomacy not compromise Nigeria’s pro-Africa policy? Also, to what extent however, did this new development influence the role conception of Nigeria?
For nations that cannot square up, they would be susceptible in the face of western economic contraption (Agbaje, 2002). The nations would also naturally evolve a foreign policy orientation that is non-confrontational, heavily pro-West and which accepts with docility the hegemony of the imperialist forces. Asobie (2002), Amale (2002) and Akindele (2002) share the view on this economic diplomacy that seems to depart from Nigeria’s traditional role in Africa and express the fear of possible abandonment of Afrocentrism. However, scholars and career-diplomats such as Fafowora (2001) do not share this view. Outlining the multiple dimensions of Afrocentrism from the 1980s to the present, including Nigeria’s active involvement in the reorganization of the African Union, establishment of NEPAD, pressure on the west for debt reduction and outright cancellation toward Africa, Fafowora upholds the view that Africa remains the centrepiece of Nigerian foreign policy within our period.
Could Fafowora be right? There may have been a consistent pro-Africa policy on paper, but the period characterized by monumental diplomatic blunders did not justify an uninterrupted flow in leadership roles in Africa (See Fawole, 1999 for the blunders in the Abacha years). There were also the Nigeria border disputes with Niger, Chad and the Bakassi peninsula problem with Cameroon, and the Nigeria-South Africa face-off during the Abacha period. Then there were the poor leadership examples in Africa demonstrated by the Babangida inclusion of Nigeria in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the endless transition programme, annulment of the Presidential election of June 12 1993, poor human rights records of the military governments, unbridled corruption and advance fee fraud. These put a question mark on the legendary manifest destiny (divine role) to lead Africa conceived by the nation’s forefathers. Were there no conceived national roles guiding the military leaderships or were the roles overshadowed by lack of focus caused by political instability of the time?
From the writings of some scholars, it could be inferred that the political leadership may have expressed the old wild perceptions about Nigeria’s roles, but may not have reflected it in their role conception in the making of Nigeria-Africa policy or may not have effectively occupied the roles in Africa. Hence, their acts may have been informed only by what was going on in their mind not what they agreed upon as a group to guide their political actions. This pessimism is expressed because the objective of Nigeria’s foreign policy could not be comprehended in its some of actions. The thinking is in agreement with the fact that nations conceiving and assuming roles for others are ultimately doing it for their own sake. The elaborate, grandiose and cerebral African diplomacy of Nigeria makes its real objectives shrouded in mystery. It is therefore argued that whether on the African or global plane, the role of Nigeria should clearly fulfil a national objective of national economic development (Akindele, 1998; Akpotor & Nwolise, 1999). Nigeria-Africa policy, as it were, lacks substance because it is rather too politicized, and thus is based on “charitable, fraudulent and Father Christmas intentions” (Nwolise, 2001).
Nigeria’s African policy may have lacked clear role conception at some points, but could it be factual that it also lacked substance and that the process of foreign policy making has been over politicized? Should nations pursue national interest that benefits other states more than them by taking on moralist roles? According to Akindele (1998), the ultimate goal of foreign policy should be to protect and promote the national interest of the country. Foreign policy may be conceived as embracing the following definitions:
• a set of carefully articulated goals and objectives which a nation-state seeks to realize and actualize in the conduct of its relationships with other states,
• a set of decisions made and actions taken by a state in its interactions with other states,
• a series of demands which a nation-state makes on other states in the international system,
• a series of responses which nation-states offer to the demands which other states put before it, and
• a set of continuously redefined attitudes and dispositions which a state brings to the external environment in which it has to operate (Akindele, 1998:94).
Akindele’s views of foreign policy as a set of decisions and actions taken by a state and a set of continuously redefined attitudes and dispositions which a state brings to the external environment reinforce two perspectives of this study. That is, foreign policy making is a product of the decision making process; and that the process involves the conception and “continuous redefinitions” of national roles (attitudes and dispositions).
2.2.4. Nigerian Leadership and Foreign Policy Making
Generally, when discussing leadership and policymaking, particularly in the context of behaviouralism which this study has adopted through its role conception approach, an understanding of the social backgrounds of the leaders matters. While this study has not done a social biography of any of the political leaders, it however subscribes to Plato’s thesis that the social and ideological backgrounds of each leader impinge on their world-view, political outlook, decisions and actions as political leaders. Idang (1973) shares this view, situating the context to Nigeria. For instance, the conservative backgrounds of Balewa influenced his casual disposition to radical changes to African situations. Gowon’s pacifist and anti-war fence-mending disposition even during the Civil War was because he was raised in a clergyman’s home. Flowing from this, questions about why Babangida was so steeped in deception and subterfuge, why Abacha was like a delicate still-water in leadership, Abdusalami’s persuasive politics and decision-making, and Obasanjo’s native wisdom and uncanny bravado in policy matters: would find answers in an analysis of the social environments in which the leaders grew or emerged.
Having made this general observation, at this juncture, it is pertinent to flip through the extent of literature on the foreign policy making of the five political dispensations. But first, it is important to restate that foreign policy formulation is primarily the responsibility of governmental structures such as the legislative (Parliament/Congress/National Assembly) and the executive organs. These include relevant departments and ministries, parastatals and intelligence agencies (Adeyemo, 2002; Fawole, 2000 & 2004). The mass media and organized pressure/interest groups may also shape the formulation of foreign policy. The Constitution spells out the role of each institution. However, where the military is in place (as it did for the greater part of 1985-2005) in which most of these institutions and structures are absent, what happens to foreign policy making?
The Babangida administration inherited the foreign policy regime of General Muhammadu Buhari which was toppled in a coup in August 1985. The Babangida administration may have been a typical example of the problem of lack of continuity in political leadership and foreign policy making in Nigeria because most of Buhari’s policies were undone. A number of studies on Nigerian foreign policy, Africa policy and foreign policy making have encompassed the Babangida era (Gambari, 1986; Nwachukwu, 1988; Olusanya & Akindele, 1989; Oyelakin, 1989; Otubanjo, 1989; Obiozor, 1992; Mrinho, 1992; Sesay & Owoeye, 1993; Saliu, 1995, 1999 & 2006; Adeyemo, 2002; Fawole, 2003; Oyovbare & Olagunju, (Not Dated).
There seems to be a consensus among the scholars that the Babangida administration witnessed a dynamic foreign policy. The works praise the administration for a strong African policy that culminated in technical assistance to needy West African states, pacific settlement of old boundary disputes with immediate neighbours, commitment to peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the region and a modest economic diplomacy in Africa and the world. These landmarks may suggest a clear role conception guiding the regime; but it could also have been that the administration was simply following a traditional role conception or role expectations of the continent without the political elite even having its own ideological foundation of roles.
However, the Babangida era has been lampooned for the serious image problem by the domestic crisis generated by unbridled corruption, drug scandals, international fraud (Adeyemo, 2002) and the annulment of the 1993 Presidential elections that had negative effects on its role in African and global politics (Saliu, 1999 & 2006). The era was particularly faulted for adding nothing new to Nigeria-Africa role conceptions, thus recycling the old national roles, what has been described as putting old wine in a new bottle (Saliu, 2006). Could that have been the case?
Literature on the Shonekan era appears non-existent probably because it was short-lived. The Interim National Government (ING) led by Shonekan was supposed to be the puppet government of the exiting Babangida junta by which the latter was expected to offer as a stopgap and to placate the international community and Nigerians following massive protests against the annulment of the 1993 election. The ING had barely settled down for any national policy making when numerous litigations questioned its legitimacy. Shonekan’s U.S. and Cyprus trips in September and October were a huge failure as efforts to earn acceptability were rebuffed. His address to the African Ambassadors to the UN in September while in New York also yielded insignificant result (Adeyemo, 2002). All this ended in a military coup led by General Sani Abacha that ousted the lame-duck ING three months after assumption of office.
Scholars have described the Sani Abacha era as probably the second most interesting and challenging for Nigerian foreign policy (Akinterinwa, 1997; Fawole, 1999a; Fawole 1999b; Fawole, 2003; Akinyemi, 2005; Onoja, 1996; Hoffmann, 1996; Osuntokun, 1997; Mbu, 1997; and Saliu, 2006). The most difficult time would have been the civil war period. Nigerian foreign policy initiation, formulation and implementation were faced with the usual problem associated with the military. This had to do with unilateralism, lack of constitutionalism, discontinuity, and abandonment of regular agencies in foreign policy making.
The causes of the Abacha regime’s foreign policy problems were identified as basically the unresolved June 12 election, incarceration of political leaders and state sponsored violence, the lack of a clear transition program calendar, the human rights abuses which peaked by the hanging of the nine Ogoni ethnic leaders, and general hostile disposition to the international community. The problem at home would not have been a big foreign policy issue if well managed by the policy makers. But there was a very poor handling of the nine Ogoni leaders episode (Fawole, 1999). The handling was so poor not only because there was a communication gap between the military rulers and their foreign spokesmen (Fawole, 199b); but also because there was a very poor understanding and reading of international events and the foreign policy henchmen, Tom Ikimi and Hassan Kpaki never agreed on issues (Osuntokun, 1997 and Saliu, 2006).
The military regime of Abacha had an inexperienced Minister of Foreign Affairs at a most trying time for Nigeria. Like Britain needed a warlord as Prime Minister such as Churchill during the march to war in 1939, so did Nigeria need an astute diplomat during the Abacha (Ogoni and June 12) crises. No wonder, Nigeria lost a great measure of its goodwill in the west and Africa, suffered economic and military sanctions, got suspended from the Commonwealth and was isolated by many nations. It now began to look towards Libya (Africa) and Asia for allies (Saliu, 2006).
The multifaceted problem of the era could suggest that Nigerian foreign policy may have suffered instability, poor or lack of role conception and zero tolerance to innovation. The poor conception might have caused the problems for the nation at the time; it was also possible that the appointment of foreign policy misfits to occupy policymaking roles could have led to poor or lack of roles conception.
Despite its image problem, the Abacha regime has been described as proactive in Nigeria’s peacekeeping and conflict resolution traditional roles (Ciroma, 1995; Ofonagoro, 1996; Mbu, 1997). It boosted peacekeeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, attempted to restore the government of President Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and made Nigeria’s relevance in regional politics uncompromised.
Could the pass mark above given the Abacha regime render ineffective the earlier hypothesis of poor role conception? Or could the regime just have been playing to the gallery so as not to lose all in regional and global politics? Or was it the case of assumption of roles not conceived? These are questions to which this study seeks answer.
Despite the fact that General Abubakar’s emergence as new ruler was circumstantial as he was expected to fill up the vacuum left by the sudden demise of General Abacha; his regime marked a clean break from the Abacha foreign policy regime (Adeyemo, 2002; Badmus & Ogunmola, 2003). His first task was to tackle the image problem and restore the confidence of the international community in the Nigerian government. Hence, he was faced with the multiple tasks of reconciliation at home, release of political prisoners, improvement of the human rights situation, plea to political exiles to return, and a strong promise to return the nation to democratic rule.
There seems to be scanty literature on the administration’s Africa policy not because it lasted only 11 months, but as a result of the fact that there were more issues to settle within and with the international community in general so as to reintegrate Nigeria in the international system. Nigeria however remained active in the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflict resolution efforts (Fawole, 1999b; Fawole, 2003; Adeyemo, 2002; Ojo & Azeez, 2002). This commitment to conflict resolution just have been another case of consciously or unconsciously allowing old roles and same objectives on the continental plane, which is what probably reinforces Bukarambe’s convictions (2000) that all Nigerian leaderships have pursued the same foreign policy, had same guiding principles and implemented it same way. This view cannot be sacrosanct in all the cases. Besides, the past four decades reviewed have even shown that there can be marked differences in approach, understanding and formulation of foreign policy. It has also shown that national role conception may not have been an issue for consideration in the second phase of military rule in Nigeria (1984-1999) because of the peculiarity of military rule and its defiance to professional diplomatic advice and “use and dump” approach of bureaucrats in the policy process.
Though recent, some studies have been carried out on Nigeria-Africa policy during Obasanjo’s era. Among the studies are Fawole (2000), Fawole (2004), Anifowose & Seteolu (2003), Olokun-Aluko (2005), Osuntokun (2005), Akinterinwa (2005), Adagbo (2005), Adeyemo (20020 and Saliu (2006a and 2006b).
Of relevance to this study are Fawole (2004) who provides insights on policy making during the Obasanjo era as he x-rays the policy making process from 1999; and works of Akinterinwa (2005); Olokun-Aluko (2005); and Osuntokun (2005) who assess Nigeria’s active roles in the reorganization of the African Union (AU), formation of New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and good governance in Africa within the first four-year term of Obasanjo. The studies of Saliu (2006a & 2006b) and Adeyemo attempt a stock-taking of the earlier period of the new civilian era with Saliu (2006a) identifying the multiple appointments into the foreign service as a major drawback for foreign policy making. The presence of many players, including several Ministers of Foreign Affairs in policy making process with the actual decision taken by Mr. President was seemingly unnecessary.
Obasanjo’s era seemed to have been one of the most eventful and controversial. Like Balewa in the First Republic, President Obasanjo doubled as the de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs despite the appointment of Sule Lamido as the person in charge of the Ministry (MFA). Like Abacha also, Obasanjo settled many regional conflicts while the home-front was in turmoil.
2.2.5. Summary of Identified Gaps in Literature
The literature on NRCs in NFP studies is not comprehensive, as the term is even uncommon. Second, there seems to be uncritical acceptance by writers of political statements by policymakers as the basis of measuring & analyzing Nigeria’s African policy. Third, there appears to be more emphasis on institutions than the political actors, without whom the institutions are mere atoms.
Also, conceptual problems are created by the attempt at the seamless use of “interest”, “goals”, “objectives” and “roles” denoting similar meaning. (Interest is stated goals that a state may never carry out; role is action taken to actualize national interest. Hence, it is important to distinguish interest and role (where interest ends, role begins) and the latter-role- is more likely what brings a nation into cooperation or confrontation with others in the international community, not just the stated interest. Interest indicates what the FP behaviour may or should look like; role could tell and predict the FP behaviour).
Moreover, the few works on Nigeria’s NRCs are mostly in journal articles, with as journal articles look at a particular issue per time, implying that they are incomprehensive as far a holistic study is concerned. The only significant works on NRCs are Fawole’s “National Role Conceptions and Nigerian African Policy, 1970-1979”, and Adigbuo’s doctoral thesis in which he examined “Nigeria’s National Role Conceptions and its Southern African Policy: The Case of Namibia (1975-1990)”. These efforts need to be followed up because of their time-scope (1975-1990), and its limit to Nigeria’s Southern African (Namibian) policy alone.
Therefore in spite of the avalanche of literature, the gaps are significant, which this study has attempted to fill.
2.3. Theoretical Framework
Theoretical perspectives in foreign policy analysis abound. The national interest theory (Morgenthau, 1973; Kissinger, 1994), national power theory (Thompson, 1960; Morgenthau, 1973), game theory (Snidal, 1985), communication theory (Deutsch, 1963), bargaining theory (Schelling, 1951), group theory (Bentley, 1908; Hagan, 1958), systems theory and functional analysis (Kaplan, 1957; Merton, 1957; Hempel, 1959), decision making theory (Easton, 1965); and role theory, are quite prominent in the study of foreign policy. This study adopts the national role theory as its analytical framework, because it ascribes a personality or human or organic quality to the state, emphasizes the dynamism of state behaviour in the face of the complex realities of global system, and validates the group or class influence in politics, which the study has premised its argument earlier. Also, is the fact the topic of the thesis naturally requires the choice of the role theory.
2.3.1. Role Theory: Meaning and Relevance
The role theory is derived from the concept of role as used first by psychologists and anthropologists in distinguishing individual or group role perceptions and actual performance in any social gathering. This could be family, peer group, religious group, workplace, community, market, and in this case, the political group. Among social psychologists that pioneered the role theory include Cooley, Linton (1936), Parsons (1937), Newcomb (1950), Sarbin (1966), Ackerman (1958), and Biddle (1979). Originally, the role theory is a perspective in social psychology that considers most of everyday activity to be living up to the roles, or expectations, of others. It posits the following propositions about social behaviour:
1. People spend much of their lives in groups.
2. Within these groups, people often take distinct positions.
3. Each of these positions can be called a role, with a whole set of functions that are molded by the expectations of others.
4. Formalized expectations become norms when enough people feel comfortable in providing punishments and rewards for the expected behaviour.
5. Individuals are generally conformists, and in so far as that is true, they conform to group roles.
6. The anticipation of rewards and punishments inspire this conformity.
The generalizations on role above attempt to underscore the fact that social role is the universe of rights and duties of a group in a given situation. The social role is connected to expectations, norms and behaviour a group has to face. However, while these assumptions seem correct, could it be in all cases that individuals or groups occupy distinct positions or roles as contained in the second submission? Do some groups occupy any roles at all? What if there are- and there always are- cases of duplicity of roles by two or more groups or individuals? The analysis is central to the study as it bolsters the perspective that the group is indispensable in all actions particularly political and that assumption of role presupposes the interface between the political group and the political environment (that is, group preferences, interpretations and outsider’s expectations of roles to fill). However, it also raises the question of whether in some cases, roles are defined or filled by a group (political leadership or nation) as it is the case in this study.
Different categories of social roles have also been identified (Blatner, 2006; Rowen, 1990; Jackson, 1972; Bertrand, 1977). These are:
• cultural roles- that is roles given by culture, e.g. a chief priest
• social differentiation- that is roles given by profession, e.g. teacher, taxi driver
• situation-specific roles- that is roles given by witnessing a development, e.g. eye witness
• bio-sociological roles- roles given by physiological composition e.g. a blonde woman, a pregnant mother
• gender roles- roles given by sex, e.g. a male chauvinist, a feminist.
The categorization above suggests that in life, people have to face different social roles, sometimes they have to face different roles at the same time in different social situations. There is also an evolution of social roles: some disappear and some new ones develop as members of different social groups with accompanying roles (Blatner, 2006 and 2000; Thomas, Feldman and Ramin, 1967; Shaw and Costanzia, 1970, Courtney, 1987). Role behaviour thus changes and it may be influenced by the following aspects:
a) The norms, which determine a social situation
b) Internal and external expectations
c) Social sanctions and rewards
These three aspects are used to evaluate the behaviour of the group and that of other people. For a political group that is tasked with foreign policy decision making, are these three conditions applicable? They are applicable but their application is often accompanied by complications, whose resolution ends up in political action or what is called ‘politics”, that is, a kind of power sharing, power play or arrogation of powers. What about in the case of a nation as it occupies certain roles defined for it by the policy makers? Do accepted values or norms determine the context of roles conception and policy making; are intra-group or public/external expectations considered; and are there compelling factors like the legislature, constitution, public outcry or international organizations that shape the context of roles and policymaking? The answer is definitely in the affirmative because there are more compelling “political” forces in the international arena that would precipitate domestic political action.
Social (and political) roles can be defined as norms of behaviour a group has to follow. Norms have been defined as a set of behaviour that is usually used by the group members. In case of deviance, negative sanctions follow (Rowen, 1990; Popitz, 1972; Dahrendorf 1973).
Role theorists have identified that the many role expectations at different levels may cause the filling of multiple roles at the same time (Blatner, 2000; Biddle, 1966 & 1979; Davis, 1984; Horowitz, 1988). The situation that may arise from this has been described as social differentiation. Social differentiation got a lot of attention due to the development of different job roles. For example, a foreman has to develop his own social role facing the expectations of his team members and his supervisor – this is an intrapersonal role conflict. He also has to arrange his different social roles as father, husband, club member – this is an interpersonal role conflict. A distinction has also been made of must-expectations, with sanctions; shall-expectations, with sanctions and rewards and can-expectations, with rewards. Put differently, the theory posits that human behaviour is guided by expectations held both by the individual and by other people.
The expectations correspond to different roles individuals perform or enact in their daily lives, such as secretary, father, or friend. For instance, most people hold pre-conceived notions of the role expectations of a secretary, which might include: answering phones, making and managing appointments, filing paperwork, and typing memos. These role expectations would not be same for a professional soccer player. Groups and individuals generally have and manage many roles. Roles consist of a set of rules or norms that function as plans or blueprints to guide behaviour. Roles specify what goals should be pursued, what tasks must be accomplished, and what performances are required in a given scenario or situation. Role theory holds that a substantial proportion of observable, day-to-day social behaviour is simply persons carrying out their roles, much as actors carry out their roles on the stage or ballplayers theirs on the field. Role theory is, in fact, predictive. It implies that if we have information about the role expectations for a specified position (e.g., sister, fireman, and trader), a significant portion of the behaviour of the persons occupying that position can be predicted (Potash, 1990; Heiss, 1976, Bates, 1968; Getzels & Guba, 1954; Rommetveit, 1954).
The analysis above has elicited a number of fundamental questions this study seeks to address. Can a nation assume and manage many roles at the same time in a continent or global system without losing focus? Constitutionally, decision makers play several roles at the same time: legislative, executive, judicial, and representative. Would this allow for clearly identified roles to assume as far as foreign policy making is concerned or would it cause roles confusion and conflict? The other submission by role theorists that roles specify goals also addresses a central question of this study. This is the fact that the conception of national roles makes the task of national objectives and interest articulation complemented.
Role theory also holds that behaviour may only be changed if roles are changed (Potash, 1990; Davis, 1984; Jackson, 1972; Biddle & Thomas, 1966; Bates, 1968; Moreno, 1946). This is because roles correspond to behaviours and vice versa. In addition to heavily influencing behaviour, roles influence beliefs and attitudes; individuals will change their beliefs and attitudes to correspond with their roles. For instance, people over-looked for a promotion to a managerial position in a company may change their beliefs about the benefits of management by convincing themselves that they did not want the additional responsibility that would have accompanied the position. Role theorists see role theory as one of the most compelling instruments bridging individual behaviour and social structure. Roles, which are in part dictated by social structure and in part by social interactions, guide the behaviour of the group or individual. The group, in turn, influences the norms, expectations, and behaviours associated with roles. The understanding is reciprocal and didactic.
There seems to be an agreement between functionalists and role theorists on the concept and function of roles. For instance, Morris (1971) and Biddle (1979) reached a consensus: the functionalist approach sees a role as the set of expectations that society places on a group or an individual. By unspoken consensus, certain behaviours are deemed appropriate and others inappropriate because the society (societal norm) places the expectations.
In the functionalist conception, role is one of the important ways by which group or individual activity is socially regulated: roles create regular patterns of behaviour and thus a measure of predictability, which not only allows individuals to function effectively because they know what to expect of others, but also makes it possible for the sociologist to make generalizations about society. Collectively, a group of interlocking roles creates a social institution: the institution of law, for example, can be seen as the combination of many roles, including: that of police officer, judge, criminal, and victim.
Roles, in the functionalist perspective, are relatively inflexible and are more-or-less universally agreed upon. Although it is recognized that different roles interact (teacher and student), and that roles are usually defined in relation to other roles (doctor and patient or mother and child), the functionalist approach has great difficulty in accounting for variability and flexibility of roles and finds it difficult to account for the vast differences in the way that individuals conceive different roles. Taken to extremes, the functionalist approach results in role becoming a set of static, semi-global expectations laid down by a unified, amorphous society. The distinction between role and norm (or culture) thus becomes sterile.
The functionalist approach has been criticized for its static placement of roles. Interestingly, this conception has crossed over from academic discourse into popular use. It has become commonplace to speak of particular roles as if they were indeed fixed, agreed upon by all, and uncontroversial. This everyday usage nearly always employs role in a normative way, to imply that this is the proper behaviour for a teacher or a parent, or even for an entire institution.
The functionalist approach because of its inflexibility may not also be too applicable in national role analysis. This is because it does not encourage viewing the world as a changing one that requires dynamism or shifts in roles conception and foreign policy making to meet the changing needs. The interactionist definition of role is more fluid and subtle than the functionalist perspective. A role, in the interactionist conception, is not fixed or prescribed but something that is constantly negotiated between individuals or groups. The interactionist approach would therefore be the analytical framework for this study as far as role conception and foreign policy analysis is concerned.
One of the central focuses of the role theory analysis is the attempt to distinguish “role” and ‘self”. There have always been controversies over the ‘self’ and the “role”. It is argued in some quarters that the expression of the “self” is impeded when following expected roles. Raffel (1999), sharing the same view with Merton (1969) argues that both the expression of the self and fulfilment of expected roles are contradictory and that there will be role conflict when the self emerges against the role. This argument is further reinforced by Dahrendorf (1973) who resonates that the role followers or those who believe in keeping faith with roles expected of them rob themselves of the self. However, this does not totally rule out the self. What this suggests is that the self (personality) is instrumental in the role occupied, but that the role should overwhelm tendencies toward self(ish) considerations. It is against this backdrop that Goffman (1959) put forward that there should be a balancing act in self-role relations.
It may not be entirely easy to create a self-role dichotomy because humans are emotional and unatomistic. However, it is expected that the personality needs a high level of psychological discipline before they are trusted with delicate tasks of role assumption. In the context of this study, a question is elicited: should policymakers bury the self and consider only the local and international expectations before conceiving of roles for the nation in the continent? Was that the situation in Nigeria between 1985 and 2005? States may appear atomistic and could hence be expected to remove the self from role in international politics; but it is pertinent to note that the state is driven by the political leadership entirely made up of humans.
The group importance of the role theory has also been reinforced by Howard, Ehrlich, Rinehart and Howell (1962 85 – 97). However Turner (1978) differed from the traditional position of the role theory. He toyed with the idea of putting the individual ahead in role analysis. According to Turner, some roles are put on and taken off like clothing without lasting effect. Other roles are difficult to put aside when a situation is changed and continues to colour the way in which many roles are played or compel a quit or continuation of it. But role embracement (Goffman, 1961:166) can coexist with strict role compartmentalization. A nation can give itself unreservedly to a role and take great pride in producing a convincing portrayal of the part but return to being a very different kind of person when the play is over. It is against the danger discovered in the attempt to separate the role from the original attitude of the group that Turner concludes by advancing the merger of the role with the group.
Various derivatives and additional concepts in role theory have developed over the years. This is probably because of its clarity and success in analysis. These include:
Role Confusion- This is a situation where a group or an individual has trouble determining which role they should assume at a particular time. For example, if a graduate student were to attend a department party at a professor's home, the student may find it difficult to determine if he/she should act as a student toward the professors, exhibiting deference or respect, or as a friend or associate, showing collegiality and familiarity. In policy making, it may be confusing for a Chief Justice of the nation, who is also a policy maker what role to assume in the final conclusion by the Federal Government that Bakassi would be handed over to Cameroonian authorities following the Green Tree Agreement of 2006. Should he support his employer the Executive that wanted Bakassi handed over; or should he just latch on to his judicial roots and follow constitutional stipulations that any international treaty of adjudication could only be validated by the National Assembly? In the case of the nation, should Nigeria act to its “good neighbourliness’ and “allegiance to international law” scripts and hand over Bakassi without any recourse; or should it assume the role of the unwilling power that wants to keep its over one million people and oil-rich territory?
Role Conflict- This results when a group or an individual encounters tensions as a result of incompatible roles. For instance, a mother who is employed full-time may experience role conflict because of the norms that are associated with the two roles she has. She may be expected to spend a great deal of time taking care of her children while simultaneously trying to advance her career. For policymaking and national role conception, when the political leadership of Nigeria took the decision to join OIC in 1985/6, there would have been the Ambassador of Nigeria to Italy and the Vatican that would still have had to convince the host country that Nigeria needed to be in the OIC. Also in regard to national roles, Nigeria as the “giant of Africa” which had adopted the policy of “good neighbourliness” found itself in constant conflict with its “good” neighbours, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.
Role Strain- This refers to the felt difficulty in fulfilling role obligations. In contrast to role conflict, where tension is felt between two competing roles, the tension in role strain comes from just one role. Returning to the example of a mother, if she were to find that she is unable to fulfil her obligations as defined by, say, an overly demanding spouse (or religion, or child), she would experience role strain. The role expectations may be beyond what she is able to achieve or may push her to the limits of her abilities. In foreign policy making, role strain may result from too much of demands and pressures from the public on what government should and should not do in international politics. Some believe Nigeria’s magnanimity in Africa is overstretched and should therefore be limited; while some think Nigeria has not done for Africa as much as what is exaggerated on paper and in speeches. Policy makers may face a role strain here. Again, expectations from African of what Nigeria should offer may overstretch the country.
Role Distance- This refers to the effectively expressed pointed separateness between the group and its putative role. The group is not denying the role but the virtual self that is implied in the role for all accepting performers. The concept of role distance provides a sociological means of dealing with one type of divergence between obligation and actual performance. For policy analysis, this may refer to the lack of keeping faith with much that is hyped. Nigeria’s foreign policy history is characterized more by grand speeches of the political leadership of the power and capacity of the nation to assume leadership role in Africa than physical manifestation of it. This is a distance from the role conceived.
Role Embracement- Role embracement refers to the complete adoption of a role. When a role is truly embraced, the self disappears completely into the role. Three things seem to be involved in the earnestness with which people assume roles or the degree to which they embrace a role:
• an admitted or expressed attachment to the role
• a demonstration of qualifications and capacities for performing it
• an active engagement or spontaneous involvement in the role activity at hand, that is, a visible investment of attention and muscular effort
The important question here is that, in foreign policy making and conception of national roles, can the self disappear completely into the role? Also, can nations abandon their national interest and face the task of helping others? In power politics (political realism) which constitutes the rule of international politics (Carr, 1958; Morgenthau, 1973), national roles are fulfilled thus: the role you play to help others is with the ultimate aim of helping yourself.
Also, social psychologists and sociologists (Blatner, 2006 & 2000; Edgley, 1990; Bonney & Scott, 1983; Batesman, 1965; Goffman, 1959) have used the dramaturgical analogy between social life and a stage play to talk about subtle, indirect forms of social influence. In doing so, these scholars typically emphasize three concepts: social roles, social norms, and reference groups. Within the dramaturgical analogy, social roles are the parts to be played, social norms the script of the play, and reference groups the audience. In that context, social roles could be viewed as behaviour patterns that are characteristic, and expected, of a group which occupies some position in a social structure. Less formally, they are the parts to be played in the social drama. Of course, playing roles in society is considerably more complex than playing a part in a play. Each of us is called on to play a number of different social roles at once. Some are very specific and well defined; others are general and ambiguous. For example, as an actress, Nollywood’s Chioma Chukwuka might be called on to play simultaneously the roles of premedical student, daughter, sister, apartment-mate, Catholic, part-time beautician, fiancée, and woman. Each of these roles has its own more or less explicit script. The policy maker could be a political party man, member of a professional group, member of the kitchen cabinet, a church leader, father at home, son to somebody and a man who has to act different scripts at different or same time as he assumes the roles accompanying each position. The nation assumes roles of res populi (the affairs of its people), a neighbour, a member of the African Union, a member of The Commonwealth, a member of the United Nations, the “giant of Africa”, etc (some compatible, some incompatible, thus leading to role confusion, role conflict and role strain).
The role theory seems a fruitful approach to understanding humans, decision making and society. The successes of the role theory in psycho-human analysis and in understanding of human and group behaviour/relations has probably been responsible for its adaptation to the analysis of group politics and behaviour of states in international politics.
Indeed, it is pertinent to note that “decision making”, “group”, “system” and “communication” are components of role analysis. Hence, an attempt would be made to demonstrate the interdependence with group, system, decision making and communication analyses. The significance of the role theory lies in its identification of the importance of assumption of roles at two levels of foreign policy making: first at the level of the decision making where a political group or class formulates foreign policy for a nation; and second, at the level where roles conceived for the nation by the political class is being occupied (played or performed) by the nation in the international system. The theory also recognizes that there are certain variables considered in the formulation of policy and conception of national roles. These are expectations of the society, perceptions and expectations by the roles occupants themselves and interpretations of the occupants. In filling national roles, the state also considers expectations of the international system, its own perceptions and expectations of roles to assume, and its interpretations of its expected roles. The study however seeks to consider whether the political elite considered these three variables, whether there was lopsidedness in the process of policymaking; and whether there was any clearly conceived roles or any role conception at all in the filling of roles in Africa by Nigeria within a period of twenty years that witnessed five political leaderships.
2.3.2. Justification of Use of Role Theory
The study has deliberately chosen the Role Theory (which it has adapted to the National Role theory), not only because of the thesis’ topic which naturally requires leaves no other choice; but also because of the political relevance of role theory in policy decision making and in international politics. First policy makers have constitutional and expected roles to play in the policy process, which have various serious implications on the quality of governance. Examining the underlying politics of policymaking is thus central for the study. Second, nations are considered as parts or components of a system with specific roles (negative, positive; passive, active) which they play, without which the international system would have problems with states’ cohabitation. Hence, the foreign policies of states are underlined by national or international roles which require a critical understanding. Third, the roles nations conceive for themselves or assume in international politics are in a state of flux, in response to changing circumstances. The changing or dynamic roles; or the static roles (as the case may be) require a careful study and documentation. The final analysis is that the role theory is a behavioural and scientific approach to understanding foreign policy behaviour. More specifically, the role theory ascribes behavioural and human qualities to states as players in international politics, aiding in identifying the behaviour of states, predicting states’ attitudes, and according a distinct image to states.
The earlier manifestations of the role theory in political analysis were in the works of Merton (1957), Gross, et al (1958), Whalke, Eulau & Buchanan (1962), Eulau (1963), and Biddle & Thomas (1966). Recent adaptation of the role theory to analyze foreign policy has been done by Holsti (1987), Wish (1980), Adigbuo (2005), Fawole (2003) and Obadare (2001). The meaning, origin and character of the role theory have been critically examined in the literature review. An attempt would be made here to establish the relevance of the role theory and its adapted version to this study.
2.3.3. Basic Assumptions of Role Theory
The concept of national role flows from the old perception which suggests that political behaviour always manifests in the performance of a political role (Eulau, 1963). The role theory validates the psychological model in Political Science which suggests that political behaviour is the result of the demands and expectations of the roles which a political actor (institution, group, or nation) occupies (Isaak, 1975).
The theory also endorses and stresses the group approach to politics. It rather considers that each individual’s personality and attitude in a decision making process is contingent upon the attitude, expectations and demands of other members in a group. Hence decisions can be made only when individuals (President, Senator, Cabinet members) fill a set of roles. This is at the level of domestic politics. For international politics, the role theory when updated to “national role” theory will be looking at conception of certain national roles as first a product of group consensus and second a product of considered expectations and demands of the international system. These expectations from the system matter in the conception of national roles because the group conceiving the roles leads a nation which is itself a subsystem or one of the components of the international system. We shall come to that shortly.
The role theory has a number of features that aid political analysis. First is that group action is important in decision making. Thus, the theory endorses the group approach to the study of politics. In politics, the group is the ultimate (Bentley, 1908); and it exists when men with shared interests organize, interact and seek goals through the political process. This is in agreement with the role approach. What bridges gap in the group as policymaking is done is communication flow. Deutsch (1963) stresses that the communications approach enhances the understanding of political action as it does with the ability of political actors or group to transmit messages and react to them. This is a major attribute of actors filling roles.
Secondly, the theory attempts to place political activity in a social context. The theory has conceptual framework that views the individual as someone who depends on and reacts to the behaviour of others.
Thirdly, the theory has the ability to describe institutions behaviourally (Whalke et al, 1962). Put differently, the role theory emphasizes the institutional aspects of an actor (or individual’s) behaviour. The institution is represented as a number of interrelated roles.
Fourth, the role theory thus bridges the gap between individual and group approaches to politics. Individual behaviour is viewed in terms of roles expected of a group or institution.
Role Expectation, Role Perception and Role Interpretation
In national role theory analysis, there are two levels of roles-roles of the policy makers in policymaking; and national roles or roles of the state. There are three sources of roles in either level. The first one is expectations of outsiders (society or international public) about roles of role occupants, or about roles a state should play internationally. The second is the perceptions of insiders (i.e. those filling the role) of their roles, or roles their states should occupy internationally. The third is interpretations of the roles by the occupants.
At the first level of roles, the first source or influence on roles has to do with the expectations of the society or people about the roles of political actors. This stresses the peculiarities of an official or an institution as far as their traditional roles are concerned. In the same way, it also has to do with the expectations of roles the voter or citizen will fill. For instance, the citizen is expected to carry out their constitutional obligations. The President is expected to provide the leadership. The people or society have certain notions about what the President should or should not do, and such preconceived notions become the source of the behaviour of the President as he tries to, as a member of a political group, fill a role. By society it is meant a broad spectrum of cultural norms, public opinion and legislative statutes, that find expressions through governmental officials, groups and private individuals. These bodies and their mechanisms represent legal restrictions to the power of the President. This validates the position of the role theory of the centrality and efficacy of the political group rather than individualism in studying political action or phenomenon. The expectations may thus constitute the roles (Isaak, 1975). At the second level of roles, that is, national roles, policy makers may be influenced by the demands, pressures and expectations of the citizens about the roles their country should occupy at given situations in international politics. The international community too, may have a set of roles it expects a nation to occupy in international affairs.
The second influence on roles to be filled is the perceptions and expectations of the insiders. The insiders include the role occupant. This has to do with the way the occupants (President, Legislator, Minister, Cabinet Members, etc) perceive of roles to occupy. At the second level of roles, that is national roles, this also refers to the role-occupants or policy makers’ own belief and feeling about the roles they wish to see their country occupy in international politics.
The third influence is how the group of role occupants interprets their own roles. This will include their own ideas about what roles to play, what they should or should not do, and how they should do it. These ideas reflect personal attitudes and ideology of what each occupant has that influence what they should do. Again at the level of national roles, these would include their interpretations of their country’s national roles at the stage of foreign policy implementation.
Missing in the literature of influence on roles however is what the insiders expect of one another, which is absolutely important. It is this fourth influence of roles that synthesizes role theory and system, communication and group models in political analysis. The idea of roles suggests the existence of a political system in which different parts or components fill different roles. But the parts are so mutually interdependent that their efforts are intertwined to keep the political system going. A political system may manifest at different levels. It could be a political group (political party, government or cabinet, legislature, kitchen cabinet) with specific or overlapping roles, or a state or nation with government and the governed filling roles. It could yet be states occupying different roles separately or collectively in an international grouping. In whichever case, there is symmetry of relationship within the group through a communication flow that allows for absence of duplicity or conflict of role or what have been referred to as role conflict and role strain (Biddle and Thomas, 1966).
Communication keeps the group going and minimizes conflict in the group. This is because it does with the constant transmission of information among members along with a constant reminder of specific roles of the members. This results in efficient and effective decision making process. It is through communications that inputs are received and acted upon and outputs are generated by a system. It is important to point out once again that the inputs represent part of the role expectations and the outputs are fallout of the functionality of different roles occupied and performed by a group in the political system. The communications approach helps underline the role theory thrust that the survival and behaviour of a political system is predicated upon group politics.
A communication flow also reduces conflict in what is referred to as role network (Eulau, 1963). Role network suggests the different roles a particular actor fills at different levels or times. For instance, the President fills the role as Chief Executive of the state. He fills another as party member or politician, and yet he fills another as Cabinet member. This brings about an intricate structure of relations in which one role is implicated in several other roles. Role conflict is thus inevitable in this situation because the same actor will be performing sub-roles and widespread roles that will make role occupation unwieldy. However an understanding of the political system and environment by the many texts or information through political communication will make the political actor know when and how to change or adapt roles in given circumstances.
Communication is thus central in occupation and performance of role. This is because the political system depends on information about its environment for the making of decisions and then adjusting its decisions based on the feedback information it receives. The political actor considering the outsiders’ expectations of roles to fill gets the information of the societal expectations by political texts. It is also by such text (information; communication of it) that the role occupants (insiders) realize the role expectations of the members of their political group.
Aside what had been earlier elaborated, the role theory will aid analysis in the following ways:
a) Enhancing explanation and prediction of political behaviour. Because of the knowledge of role expectations (societal expectations, insiders’ perceptions and occupants’ interpretations), it will be easier to predict the behaviour of occupant of a role with a degree of confidence
b) Dealing with complex social issues and placing political matters in a social context
c) Role conflict as a concept in role theory is useful in explicating the sometimes erratic behaviour of political actors
d) Provision of framework for analyzing institutions in behavioural terms
e) Suggesting an approach to the study of political recruitment. Role expectations make it clearer requirements for the occupation of certain roles.
2.3.4. Role Theory and Foreign Policy Decision Making
Role theory has been useful in foreign policy analysis. First, it has been helpful in understanding the group behaviour in the decision making, interest articulation and foreign policy planning and implementation. Second, it helps reduce the state to a member of a bigger political system (the international system) with the role expectations of other members of the system counting in its behaviour and action in no smaller measure to its own perceptions and interpretations of roles to assume in the system. But is this always so? In inter-state politics the last two tend to count more (Carr, 1958; Morgenthau, 1973; Nwolise, 1999).
It can however be understood that occupants of roles in a foreign policy institution may come with three mindsets namely, the expectations of the society or people (internal or national and external or international) about what roles they should play, their own perceptions about what roles they should play, and their interpretations of the roles. More importantly, the occupants are more conditioned by their own perceptions of their role expectations. These are informed by their ideas, personal experience, personal beliefs and dispositions towards certain foreign policy issues. Such behaviour becomes the institutional behaviour and conception of national roles can be predetermined more by such interpretations of role expectations.
As African leaders expect Nigeria to play a role for instance, their Nigerian counterpart may have another idea of the role to play. This may go against the expectations of the Africans or the Nigerians. Naturally, another dimension of role conflict may result from this. The political leadership made up of the Presidency, Federal Executive Cabinet, Legislature, foreign policy advisers, Ministers, etc, may have their own ideas about what roles to fill and how to fill them. Interestingly, this political group will be the one to formulate and implement policies toward Africa. Even within that group, there is always a subgroup controlled by the Chief Executive. This is the think-tank (modestly called, but in actual fact a caucus of trusted and loyal cronies, the Kitchen Cabinet) that interprets and re-interprets the role expectations and represents the major actors in foreign policy making. As a matter of fact, such cabinet may determine the roles a nation fills, making the role expectations rather a fait accompli and the interpretations of other members of the group or the outsiders’ expectations a mere formality.
In Nigeria, the most powerful group in the politics of roles conception (or lack of it) and foreign policy making is the President’s Kitchen Cabinet. Under military rule, the group is usually made up of the Head of State, the Chief of Staff or Vice President, Defence Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, some or all of the Service Chiefs, National Security Adviser, and some “very close” friends in the Supreme Military Council, and the First Lady (King, 1996; Adeyemo, 2002; and Saliu, 2006a). Under civilian rule, the key actors in the kitchen cabinet may include, the National Security Adviser (NSA), Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the President himself. In some cases, the party leader may also be a prominent member. The narrower political group decides on the most delicate matters, takes a position before presenting this to the floor of the formal Cabinet meeting, Legislative Assembly or any other platform constitutionally recognized in national decision making. This is part of the politics of national role conception that the study seeks to examine.
This situation allows for the preferences and perceptions of the President and his group to be central in the conception of national roles and foreign policy making. Even more central is the executive group. What this means is that insiders’ mutual thought or perceptions about mutual roles in policymaking is tangential. It also means that the traditional outsiders’ expectations stressed by the role theory become secondary. The insiders’ perceptions, expectations and interpretations count more. The study seeks to investigate the Nigerian peculiarity: what the outsiders’ and insiders’ expectations are of roles Nigeria should fill in Africa, what the insiders’ perceptions and interpretations of the expectations are, how national roles are conceived by this all important political group; and what roles are shared by the political group; and whether any national roles have been clearly defined and applied in Nigeria-Africa relations.
2.3.5. Influences on Role Conception in Foreign Policy Making
The influences on roles conceptions are not different from the basic assumptions of role theory as already enumerated; however, there are a few peculiarities in the field of politics as this section would demonstrate. In other words, a political contextualization of role theory is being attempted here. Basically, the three influences on conceptions of national roles are perceptions, expectations and interpretations.
Perceptions
These are the world-views and presumptions of Nigerian political leaders of what position or roles their nations should play in a given international system-regional (ECOWAS), continental (AU), global (UNO); security (ECOMOG/UNAMSIL), religious (Organization of Islamic Conference-OIC), economic (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries-OPEC) systems, and so forth. Perceptions are informed by the past, upbringing, orientation, experience, knowledge base, wisdom, ideology, or mood of the leadership. Every leader, it is assumed, have their own feelings and desires of what roles they want to play as leaders at home and in the international community. The role perception guides their policymaking and reflects in the national behaviour of the country as it also shows in the state’s foreign behaviour. Holsti (1967: 156) confirms this:
One way to account for specific foreign policy objectives is to emphasize the perceptions, images, attitudes, values, and beliefs of those responsible for formulating policy objectives.
Holsti views this stage as a defining moment for national roles. According to him, it is at this point that all those internal and external factors shaping foreign policy resonate in the minds of the political leaders. These include important events abroad, domestic political needs, social values, ideological imperatives, state of public opinion, availability of capabilities, degree of threat or opportunity perceived in a situation, predicted consequences and costs of proposed courses of action, and the time element or requirement of a situation (1967: 157)
It is pertinent to note that other policy makers (otherwise referred to as actors or decision units/groups) also have their perceptions of the roles they want their country to play and their foreign policy idea of particular international issues. They may belong to the group that amplifies external pressures and whose perceptions are also influenced by systemic or foreign situations or constraints. In contrary, they may belong to the category of policy makers who diminish or disregard external pressures and outside constraints. However, their perceptions are also important because these inform the quality and content of advice they render the leader or the content and quality of policy decisions they reach if they take premium in the policymaking of that country. The leader cannot make policy alone, even if he has the ultimate power to do so. He relies on these support groups and it would take only his discretion to bring in persons with similar role perceptions into his formal and informal cabinets. However, the leader gets the blame or credit for any outcome of policy.
By the term perception, it means that the national roles of a state are not yet intelligible. Perceptions are merely faint ideas of what the future will look like and could be fantasies that may just end up in vague conceptions and bogus rhetoric, if not well processed. Holsti has said that at this defining moment, policy makers “define little” as they “seldom draw up careful lists assessing the relative weight of each component of the definition of the situation” (1967: 157) How are they processed? This is where expectations and interpretations come in.
However, perceptions of political leaders are very important as it constitutes the first potent influence on roles and foreign policy conceptions and rationalization.
Interpretations
Expectations have been deliberately left out even though it is the second influence on role conception. This is because it would be discussed full-blown in the last section of this chapter. However, interpretations are the understanding and projections of policy makers after attempting a scientific analysis of perceptions and expectations. The political leader or his foreign affairs minister does this in readiness for or in the process of implementation of policy and performance of roles. Interpretation, properly put, is the roles conceived. Roles conceived, ceteris paribus, should have harmonized other perceptions, views, national interest, national objectives, national history, national constitution, security and defence matters, expected results, et cetera.
However, because in politics other things are not always equal, subjectivity should be expected at the interpretations stage. Each leader has their own understanding of international situations and national response to them. Each administration sees things differently from another. Indeed, just as judges and lawyers interpret the law differently in any given situation to free or sentence the prosecuted, so do leaders and policy makers interpret conceived national roles differently to suit their interest (personal, group, political, ideological, and national). As a matter of fact, the political helmsman may even interpret roles differently from his group that conceived them. The role performance may be sharply different from what his political or military group conceived to define their leadership position at home or abroad. Consider this statement by Babangida on his boss and Head of State he had just deposed in a military coup in August 1985:
Where some of us thought it appropriate to give more time, anticipating a conducive atmosphere that would develop, in which affairs of state could be attended to with greater sense of responsibility, it became clear that such expectations could not be fulfilled. General Buhari was too rigid and uncompromising in his attitudes to issues of national significance. Efforts to make him understand only served to aggravate these attitudes. To prevent a complete erosion of the given mandate therefore, we had to act so that hope may be rebuilt (Babangida, 1985:2).
Interpretations may actually turn out to be the leader or policy maker’s refined or glorified perceptions or images. He may not interpret the roles the way it is scientifically processed. His images may just come to play once again and as such conception and performance may just become another version of the leader’s own thought as crudely or vaguely defined initially. Images are defined as “an individual’s perceptions of an object, fact, or condition, his evaluation of it in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or hostility, or value and the meaning ascribed to, or deduced from it” (Holsti, 1967: 158).
The discrepancy between image and reality is partly a result of physical impediments to the flow of information due to lack of time, faulty communications, censorship, or lack of competent advisers or intelligence sources. It is also a problem of the distortion of reality caused by attitudes, values, beliefs, or faulty expectations (Vertzeberger, 1990). Any individual is bombarded constantly by messages about the environment, but he may select and interpret only a fraction of what he sees because only a part of it may be relevant to a particular situation. At times, he sees only information which conforms to his values, beliefs, or expectations.
Two factors can distort the information on which images of reality of policy makers are based. These are physical and psychological factors. If a policy maker relies on faulty information, misinterprets cues, twists the meanings of messages to fit his own preferences, or disregards information which contradicts his values and preferences, his psychological environment upon which he would act, is quite different from the physical environment in which his policies have to be executed. For instance, Alhaji Shehu Shagari has been much criticized for not filling the many laudable roles his administration conceived for Nigeria in Africa. But it was a little role he personally played in this lack of fulfilment of his own leadership conceptions (or the psychological platform); the political atmosphere of the time characterized by harsh economic conditions, high level corruption, ruling party’s undue influence on governance, inter-party violence, aggression of immediate neighbours, among others constituted the physical environment (field bottlenecks, which also made the country labelled as morally lacking the basis) to occupy any meaningful leadership or interventionist roles in the continent. Therefore, the distinction between the definition of the situation (psychological environment) and reality (physical environment) is essential in the analysis of national role conceptions and state behaviour in the external system.
At this juncture, the central conditioning factors in the Nigerian role conception process would be broken down. These are the group factor and the political influences.
The Group Factor
Isaak has argued that all political actions take place within the group (1975). Politics is a group thing and policy making is a “political concert”, the only means by which governance is possible. It is this fact that gives credence to the popular phrases and terms such as “organs of government”, “separation of powers”, “checks and balances”, “fusion of powers”, et cetera. These terms suggest that governance and policymaking requires teamwork with clearly spelt out functions for each decision unit or group. By this, there is independence of judgment, but interdependence of idea and action. Political decisions and implementation cannot be monopolized by one man-civilian, monarchy or military. This is why in civilian rule, there are countless constitutionally allowed groups including inner core units like political parties, governmental cabinets, team of policy advisers, ministries bureaucrats, civil and public services, national assemblies, research institutions; and peripheral policy units such as labour and pressure groups, interest groups, the media, and so forth. There are also informal unconstitutional but potent bodies such as the leaders’ friends, confidants, fellow presidents, families, wives and even concubines. These apply to military leadership as well, but in military rule, there are copious unconstitutional groups like the Command ruling council, military ministers, military governors, advisers, and tribunals. In monarchy, the apparatuses in civilian rule also applies, but it has its own other informal sectors such as the King’s praise singers, harem and diviners like in traditional African and Asian political systems (Fage and Oliver, 1957).
In conception of roles, the Nigerian leader’s perceived roles are tabled before whichever decision units he deems fit. However, Wish (1980) and Obadare (2001) suggest that most leaders prefer their inner caucus meetings as the first theatre to discuss this high-profile policy matter. The Nigerian experience has been such that the leader could call his formal Cabinet to discuss what he considers as the nation’s international roles and foreign policy behaviour in a particular circumstance. He listens to objections, additions, subtractions, modifications, approvals and the meeting either rises up with set roles conceived and sealed, or rises with the option to present their consensus to the national assembly depending on the nature of the role. If it is in view of a national emergency like a Cameroonian attack which requires war role and huge capital to prosecute, the President presents this to the National Assembly. However, because of the magnitude of national attention the situation deserves and the national sentiments in favour of it, or because of the urgency, the legislature may return the proposal void of any or significant objections, or may give it express approval. The Obasanjo administration had such opportunities in the cases of the Sao Tome and Principe crisis in 2003, intervention in the Rwanda-Congo disputes in 2004, Togo crisis in 2005 and on some national security issues such as the Odi (1999), Zaki-Biam (2003) and Plateau crises. The perceptions of the President have thus got group sanction and they become both the nation’s role conceptions and assumptions.
It is worse in military rule. The Head of State, if magnanimous, calls his ruling Command and presents his set of perceived national roles at such points of emergency to the members. He could present it after action has already been taken. They approve in line with military tradition of respecting the military hierarchical structure by not challenging the superiors. If not magnanimous, the junta leader simply addresses the press telling them that “the army” or “ruling Command” has decided to undertake a number of tasks in the international system. Some of the members of the Command may just be hearing about “their decision” for the first time on radio, television or in newspapers (Taiwo, 2000; Oluleye, 1985). Some cases in point were the Babangida junta’s decision to collect the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, and the unpopular taking of Nigeria into the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) both in the mid-1980s which were however stiffly opposed by civil-society; Abacha’s sanction to implement the judgment of the Ogoni Nine by hanging them in 1995, pullout of Nigeria from the Cup of African Nations in 1996, and the deployment of troops to the Niger Delta to complete a mop-up exercise of the so-called restive ethnic organizations.
Some leaders may simply give their advisers and foreign ministers, policy makers, or even law makers certain terms of reference in respect of role conception, and expect them to put up an excellent role agenda. Such leaders thereafter declare and attempt to make their countries fill these clearly defined and peer-reviewed roles. These were the cases of Arikpo as MFA under Gowon, Garba under Murtala-Obasanjo, Gambari under Buhari, Akinyemi under Babangida, and in recent times though outside our period, Maduekwe under Yar’adua. In other cases, the leaders task the other policy decision units to conceive international roles for the country; they may however end up performing what they had conceived on their own. In both instances, Nigeria during the rule of President Babangida comes into the picture. He had commissioned a presidential historical group of international relations and foreign policy experts from policy research centres and universities to put up a chronological analysis of Nigeria’ s external relations since independence, with the view of formulating policy and conceiving new roles. He applied some of the recommendations, and in some cases, did what he conceived of in mind (Akinyemi, 2009; Taiwo, 2000: 122). Whatever he did subsequently would not matter any longer. He had brought the “group” into the picture but not to the mainstream.
The group thus legitimates individual perceptions and in some cases selfish interest in foreign policy making. The group factor therefore validates the scholarly argument that politics takes place only within a group.
Political Influences
Political influences flow from the group analysis above. However, what occurs at this stage are the “politics” itself, namely the “authoritative allocation of values in the society” (Easton, 1981) and the “determination of who gets what, when and how” (Laswell, 1958). It also refers to the political traditions of a state and the need to maintain or depart from such traditions depending on prevailing national and international circumstances. These are looked at in the following sub-themes.
Party or Military Class Affiliation
The political class in Nigeria is principally made up of party chiefs, party “laity”, statesmen and elderstatesmen, godfathers (or god-mothers, sons, political mafia, et cetera), civil society and in the case of military rule, the military class. The military class, particularly the retired military is potent even during democratic rule.
The political party is extremely influential in governance and foreign policy making. The party helps in the victory of its candidates into leadership positions and protects their tenure. The party secures it against impeachment or any disciplinary measures and helps again in re-election. The party thus becomes the life-wire of the government of the day. The exploits of the party for the government may be the diligence and craftsmanship of just one or a few members who constitute a class of its own. The party elite may thus transform into party mafia, godfathers, and wield enormous powers and influence. For instance, the election and re-election of Shehu Shagari in 1973 and 1983 were the handiwork of Umaru Dikko and the National Party of Nigeria Chairman, Meredith Adisa Akinloye (Wright, 1998; Graf, 1985).
In the Second Republic, both Dikko and Akinloye, and a number of other prominent National Party of Nigeria (NPN) stalwarts had become the most powerful elite, occupying exalted positions and securing big contracts for themselves and for their cronies. As party Chairman, Adisa was entitled to slots in ministerial and ambassadorial appointments to ‘take care’ of his ‘boys’ who gave much support to the party at the polls, and had influence in the foreign policy making process as a prominent member of the Kitchen Cabinet that decides everything. Dikko became the Minister of Transport as compensation for party loyalty and became so prominent in the Kitchen Cabinet and got the choice contract of importing rice into the nation and in some cases building and construction materials for the building of the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja (Taiwo, 2000: 75; countrystudies.us/nigeria). In terms of governance, they virtually dictated the pace in the government’s politically expedient but uneconomic projects such as the establishing of federal university in every state and commissioning of the iron and steel plants in Ajaokuta that remained unfinished. They also influenced the appointment and posting of foreign envoys for Nigeria. Maitama Sule who had stepped down for Shagari in the 1978 Presidential primaries at the very last minute also became a prominent Kitchen Cabinet member and the party’s nominee for the plum job of Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN (Ekwueme, 2009). According to the party, Maitama Sule was too intelligent and gifted in oratory skills that he should be confined to local politics (ibid, 2009: 2). At the UN, he was appointed Chairman of the Apartheid Committee, thus fitting right into a core area in Nigeria’s role conceptions at the time. The influence of the political group was pivotal here. Their perceptions of Nigeria’s foreign roles thus became sacrosanct for the Presidency and National Assembly which they ably controlled. The National Assembly was a predominantly NPN assemblage, with the Senate President, Josef Wayas being unpretentiously biased for all the political executive’s policy bills and proposals. Indeed, Wayas was a prominent and loyal member of the President’s Kitchen Cabinet (Graf, 1985). The decisions of the political elite must have also counted in Nigeria’s xenophobia of the early 1980s. Nigeria took the most un-African decision of expelling aliens whom the political class had suggested were responsible for the domestic and cross-border crimes in the region at the time. This led to hostility with West African neighbours and a reprisal with some neighbours retaliating by expelling Nigerians in their countries (Adeyemo, 2002; Meier, 2002; Otubanjo, 1989).This was against the Nigerian principle of good neighbourliness and role of securing and maintaining unity in the neighbourhood that Nigeria had conceived and vowed to uphold from independence and even during the era of Shagari (King, 1996).
In terms of the military class affiliation, military rulers always tend to defend and uphold their traditions. They also conceive of national roles in a military way, using decrees, fiats and dispatch to implement policy. Again, the military focuses attention on national and international security as primary national roles. This explains the many cases of military interventions in national politics; and internationally, the copious sponsoring of Nigerian Contingents in peacekeeping and conflict resolution missions in Africa and the world during military rule (1966-79; 1984-98).
In another instance, military class affiliation has emerged in a situation where the retired soldier returns to political life by seeking elective office or remaining in the background as a gadfly. The military-turned civilian ruler is not out of touch with his military orientations and traditions. Roles are conceived and performed with the same military fiat, foreign policy is run by decrees and the military (retired and serving) is engaged in national and international security missions. The Obasanjo civilian administration (1999-2007) has been severally described as a behaving like a military one in terms of national governance, policy making, conception of international roles, foreign policy behaviour and implementation (Fawole, 2004; Fawole, 2000). Again, the presence of the retired military who are playing underground active role in politics, influences foreign policy making, appointment of envoys, postings and general attitude in the international system. This is explicable by the awe they inspire naturally as potentially dangerous elite in the polity that can remove any government, and the direct role they play in advising and recommending (Abegunrin, 2003; Adams, 1994).
Political Precedents and Antecedents
These refer to political traditions of a state, government or political group (party or elite). All of these variants are applicable in the context of role conceptions and performance. As earlier mentioned in this study while citing Eulau (1963), roles ascribe a distinct identity to a state. A nation’s traditional role may have cumulative effects on the perceptions and attitudes of both policy makers and the domestic public in general. If they conceive their nation as a “free-world leader”, “apostle of democracy” or as an “honest mediator and umpire” in the face of a east-west ideological rivalry like Nigeria was as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), certain beliefs and attitudes toward international affairs are likely to become an established part of their definition of any situation, and will reflect in their responses to developing situations abroad. Because of certain regular patterns of a state’s international roles, it earns a reputation and image that every other state would know. This makes its behaviour predictable. Hence, policy makers or governments want to keep to these traditional roles. They become conservative about effecting changes in the international roles, or change the roles within the context of known behaviour.
The devotion to precedence or strong historical roots of national roles is a characteristic of Nigerian foreign policy making. The Nigerian foreign policy makers are guided by a strong sense of historical traditions in their national role conceptions. These traditions include the principle of exceptionalism and the belief that Nigeria’s exceptional qualities including the largest black nation in the world, the eight largest producer of crude oil, its other natural resources and great military are natural endowments positioning the country in a leadership position in Africa. Nigeria thus considers itself somewhat in the same way America does as a good force naturally positioned to act as guardian, liberator and protector of all-Africa interest. These principles most times explain the tendency towards what has been termed Pax Nigeriana in some circles and what has explained Nigeria’s moralist behaviour in Africa, intervening at all cost in conflict and humanitarian matters from independence to date. In the case of America, this belief has been blamed for its arrogant foreign policy behaviour in certain global matters (Johnson, 2006).
Every regime always vows to keep the African-centrepiece behaviour as conceived by the founding fathers of Nigeria. The foreign policy and general speeches of Nigerian Heads of State and Ministers of Foreign Policy have always been laced with role conceptions keeping to this old tradition for which Nigeria is known and respected internationally. The question of whether the role conceptions inherent in the speeches were new or depicting dynamism in the context of changing global circumstances is not to be answered here. Chapter four has addressed the question partly by the overview on the foreign policy of Nigeria from 1966-1984. The other part would be answered in chapters six and seven.
Expectations of the Society
There are two levels of expectations in the politics of role conceptions. The first is the expectations of the domestic environment about the part policy makers should play in the business of policy making and the roles they wish and anticipate that the policy makers would conceive for their country to occupy in the international system. Such expectations may come from the citizens, policy support centres, media practitioners, pressure and interest groups, private sector, et cetera. Such groups which are the passive and outer core policy decision units express their wishes through formal and formal means. Their expectations may exert influence on the policy making process. The role they anticipate for their country may be considered by the political leadership and occupied. For instance, the student body in Nigeria led an organized movement in 1960 against the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact during the Balewa era. They condemned that as antithetical to Nigeria’s role conceptions to eradicate and discourage any for of imperialism from independent Africa. They expressed wish to see Nigeria occupy a role that would be in alignment with its foreign policy objective to lead Africa to total liberty. The Balewa administration quickly revoked this pact in line with the pressure from civil-society (King, 1996: 62). An instance from abroad is the constant pressure from the American public that America was losing its reputation because of the negative imperialistic roles it was filling around the world, with their expectations that the US should take on its old progressive roles had informed the new President to yield to this role expectation declaring that “America would lead again” through peace and cooperation even with traditional enemies (Obama, 2009: 2), a feat that has earned him a Nobel Peace Prize within such short a time.
The second level of expectations is that coming from the international “society”. Nigeria is constantly conscious of the expectations of them by other African states and policy makers of other countries. Countries of West Africa have had to express anticipation during the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflicts of the 1990s that Nigeria would use its leadership position to intervene and stop the crisis. Indeed, President Tejan Kabah of Sierra Leone had at a time called for Nigeria’s intervention in the country. The expectations that Nigeria would always play leadership role in peacekeeping and conflict management in Africa has influenced the thinking of policy makers to conceive roles that would meet these expectations. Nigerian policy makers have expressed at different times that ‘Nigeria cannot let Africa down” (See for instance, Akinyemi, 2005). Again some scholars have recommended the need for Nigeria to stabilize itself, minimize the social-political decadence so as to reposition itself in re-occupying its Africa leadership role so as not to concede it to South Africa, warning that African countries are seemingly expecting the latter to take the centre stage and are therefore already looking the other way (Mazrui, 2006; Ayam, 2004).
Expectations are created when a state is a member of certain organizations or groupings. For example, as a regional power, South Africa is expected to engage in a more effective mop-up of the Southern African region such as the Zimbabwean crisis. South Africa under Thabo Mbeki thus led the Southern Africa Development Commission (SADC) the way Nigeria has led the ECOWAS to champion regional peace, security and economic cooperation to engender national development. Also the foreign role of a government within an alliance will normally display characteristics compatible with the purposes of and expectations of the alliance partners (Holsti, 1967: 172). Another instance is that of the Mexican drugs war. Mexico-albeit America’s backyard and age-long regional rival- has anticipated that the US would forget its hegemonic tussle for once and help its domestic fight against the growing drug cartel in Mexico. Its open expression of this expectation influenced the US government to join in the Mexican anti- hard drugs war with the ultimate aim of checking its regional and international backlash (). Thus, the expectations of other states become an important component of a definition of the situation and help sustain a state’s international roles.
Having examined the two levels of expectations, it is pertinent to beam searchlights on the three main areas by which local expectations are more directly discernible. These include public opinion, pressure and interest groups and class interests.
Public Opinion
Public opinions constitute a crucial aspect of channelling national role expectations of ordinary citizens. The mass media particularly play a critical role in the development of public opinion on foreign affairs, and in the link between public opinion and foreign policymaking. The level of media effects on public opinion, determines, more or less, the levels of public support for a political decision. This is something the Nigerian government and political elite are aware and wary of, and which barely influence, to a large extent, their decisions. Military rule and civilian experience between 1985 and 2007 fell short of universal standards in this regard. Nigeria’s domestic decision regarded public opinion, let alone foreign policy decision-making. Ordinarily however, in the field of foreign policymaking, the scope of domestic factor influence is the result of the nature of a democratic polity. Since the era of secretive diplomacy constitutes a distant past, in most democratic states it is already admitted that a political leader, an executive centre, cannot act in the foreign policy arena without the consent of his people. The democratization of International Relations and Political Systems, through which the structures of citizen’s participation in the political procedures have been broadened, as well as the renewed citizen’s interest in foreign affairs, reinforced the degree of sensitivity on behalf of the leadership. As a result, the influence mechanism has been transformed from a one-way relationship (top-down approach) to a two-way relationship (executive centre- public opinion and vice versa) (Varvaroussis, 1999).
Unequivocally, an executive centre receives messages and is influenced by the attitudes of public opinion in national affairs, as those are derived by the media, the various public opinion polls, the pressure groups and political parties. However, it has the ability to seek new ways of wider acceptance and recognition of its policy, in the framework of public information concerning its policy, and more specifically through the influence of the public opinion. This is exactly what magnifies the critical role of the media as an amplifier of such an interaction, since the media not only influence executive decision-making and public opinion attitudes but also represent a channel of communication and mobilization between the executives and public opinion. The political leader’s attempt to ensure wider acceptance and recognition of his policy depends largely on two factors: i) his level of dependence on the dominant attitudes of public opinion and ii) the character (systematic or not) of his effort for influence and guidance of public opinion (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976).
In the event of foreign policy making, especially when it is about issues of vital interest such as pushing back an external threat, it is rationally demanded that the citizens must be fully informed about the policy aims, so that the public’s response is positive and massive. The leadership’s main goal of information is that the public opinion is adapted to the already-taken decisions. In the event, however, that mere information becomes a grim manipulation of the will, then the public opinion itself is utilized as a tool of foreign policy with negative ramifications for a country’s politics. It is this subtle distinction between information and manipulation that manifests in the actions of the political leader- whether he is interested in satisfying audiences or realizing national interests, and whether he adapts his policy planning to ephemeral/tactical goals (popularity, re-election) or to strategic foreign policy goals (legitimating of action, securing resources and building coalitions). In addition, this distinction is also important for another reason, the emergence of the media’s dominant role as information providers for foreign affairs (Maos, 2003). According to the ‘media dependency theory’, individuals will be more dependent on the media for issues for which they do not have their own sources of information or for issues for which personal experience is unlikely to ensure adequately useful information; Foreign affairs represent the best example of such issues. This fact, reasonably, multiplies the prospects for media effects on public opinion, since it ‘endows’, more or less, the media with the monopoly of role to set agenda for policymaking. Hence, if the foreign policy making mechanism responds to changes in public opinion and if public opinion responds to media content, the study of the nature and the degree of media influence is critical to the understanding of the public opinion-foreign policy relationship. After all ‘‘…it would be premature to celebrate the triumph of democracy before knowing how and by whom the public is itself influenced” (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987).
In another study however, Page and Jacobs (2007) interrogate the contending views about whether policy makers should consider public opinion in role conception. According to them, many observers and commentators have disagreed with the position that policy makers should risk the opinions of foreign policy ‘charlatans”, that is, the ordinary citizens’ wants and opinions. Classical realists, in particular, have argued that policymakers should exercise discretion independent of the public’s preferences, because of the dire stakes involved, the need for secrecy and dispatch, and the necessity for specialized skills, knowledge, and experience (Morgenthau, 1973; Lippmann, 1955).
For example, Morgenthau has submitted that “unavoidable gap” exists between the kinds of thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy and the kind used by the mass public, which he says, embraces “simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil” and erratically changes its views due to shifting “moods” and a hunger for “quick results” that “sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit.”(Morgenthau, 1973: 35). Similarly, Lippmann warns that the “public opinion of the masses cannot be counted upon to apprehend regularly and promptly the reality of things.” The public, he asserts, simply does not have the “kind of knowledge, let alone an experience and seasoned judgment, which cannot be had by glancing (at media reports).” Lippmann concludes that public opinion had “shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions when the stakes are life and death” and is “deadly to the very survival of the state as a free society.” (Lippmann, 1955: 35). George Kennan agreed that “public opinion… can be easily led astray into areas of emotionalism and subjectivity which make it a poor and inadequate guide for national action.” He concludes that “a good deal of our trouble seems to have stemmed from the extent to which the executive has felt itself beholden to… the erratic and subjective nature of public reaction to foreign policy questions” (Kennan, 1951).
However, there is a second school that argues that public opinions are a sin qua non for both role conception and policymaking. According to Page and Jacobs (2007: 5), to allow officials simply to ignore what the public wants would risk ignoring values that the public holds dear and would be undemocratic. To assume that the officials always know best, despite plentiful historical examples of Nigerian officials’ errors and miscalculations, such as in the case of Nigeria from the intervention in Equatorial Guinea to the handing over of Bakassi without budging in the face of public outcry, for instance, would be more dangerous than listening to the public. Again, the scholars argue that lack of public support for official foreign policy can send bad signals to international adversaries, constrain policy choices, upset policy continuity, and destabilize political leadership. Thus most skeptics about public opinion argue that it is important to “educate” the public to come into harmony with official policy Page & Jacobs, 2007: 6-8).
By and large a key point is inevasible: those foreign policy decision makers and the general public should not disagree with each other, at least not often, deeply, and persistently. In the long run, at least, policymakers and the public should come into substantial agreement, either because the policymakers respond to what citizens want or because they persuade citizens to agree with the policymakers’ judgments.
As a corollary to and in confirmation of the above, James Madison had observed that “public opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free one.” In modern times, Presidents have frequently found it in their interest to appeal directly to the public for support on issues. In the Nigerian context, public opinion is not a popular source or shaper of role conception and foreign policy making. Military rule and public opinions do not have any relationship. For civilian rule, a public rejection of public opinion is not usually done; the politicians simply shy away from expressed public opinions in newspapers, magazines and the electronic media. Policy makers tend to ignore a sophisticated democratic culture where leaders directly use opinion polls and news analysis of the wishes of the general public to generate ideas, sift policy feedback and formulate policies.
Pressure and Interest Groups
In international, like in domestic politics, group activity has become influential. Organizational and propaganda techniques have enabled these groups to claim an enlarged role in the decisions both of foreign offices and of intergovernmental organizations (Domhoff, 2005; Blaisdell, 1958). Pressure and interest groups are probably the most dynamic users of the media, which they use to express their opinions/views and channel their national role desires for policy formulation. They attract attention through vigorous expression of public opinion and make use of lobbyists in the national assembly to have desired bills passed. When attention through the media fails, these outer groups in the policy process resort to the legislature, and may even sponsor some of their own persons for elective posts.
The two groups are very similar, but only differ in that pressure groups encompass several other similar organizations, while an interest group takes care of the interest of its small number of members. Examples of pressure groups in Nigeria include religious bodies such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), The Pentecostal Fellowships of Nigeria (PFN), and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ). Instances of interest groups are the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE), Nigerian Guild of Actors (NGA), and the Association of Movie Producers of Nigeria (AMPN). Pressure and interest groups have stakes in the Nigerian foreign policy as they directly deal with the international public and as such have their own ideas about what should be done to further their interest such as sales of Nollywood movies abroad, embarking on holy pilgrimage to Jerusalem or Mecca; and ideas too about roles their country should occupy in international affairs.
An interest group is a group of persons working on behalf of or strongly supporting a particular cause, such as an item of legislation, an industry, or a special segment of society. Organizations seeking to advance a particular sectional interest or cause, while not seeking to form a government or part of a government. Interest groups may occasionally contest elections as a tactic to influence political parties, but they usually rely on a variety of campaigning and lobbying methods to influence government policy. Put differently, an interest group is any association of individuals or organizations, usually formally organized, that, on the basis of one or more shared concerns, attempts to influence public policy in its favour (Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia, 2009). All interest groups share a desire to affect government policy to benefit themselves or their cause. It could be a policy that exclusively benefits group members or one segment of society.
The experience in Nigeria is that the foreign policy makers tend to placate the pressure groups by meeting some of their demands, and welcoming their suggestions to the policymaking process. They may, on the other hand, not incorporate these suggestions in the role conception. In the case of Nigeria, sometimes the governments simply offer political appointments to some of the members of interest/ pressure groups as a means of tapping from their experience. Quite a number of top-flight Nigerian academics in the ASUU have been appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director-General of the NIIA, and ambassadors in Foreign Missions (Akinterinwa, 2004; Fafowora, 2001), including Bolaji Akinyemi, Ibrahim Gambari, Tunde Adeniran, Joy Ogwu, George Obiozor, to mention a few.
Class Interests
The foreign policy elite or class is of two types: the local and the foreign. But first, the class is any group that can earn government and the state respect by their power, influence, wealth, support base and level of social status. They can be people of any social persuasion, including intellectuals, opinion makers, chiefs and monarchs, senior jurisprudents, business moguls, high profile journalists, politicians, the military, clerics, etc. Apart from possessing the capacity to swagger, sway and compel, they practically control governmental policy. Some do this by persuasion and pressure, while others do it by compulsion (subtle threat and blackmail) wanting government to do their bidding. In the event that government insists on being fair in the policy process, they may resort to use of threat of withdrawing political support, instigating demonstrations and orchestrating impeachments of the political leaders to get what they want (Ogbonmwan, 2005; Ibrahim, 2003).
The elite or class interest is a fundamental consideration in policymaking. Foreign policy is not an exemption. In the area of international commerce for instance, the elite in business may influence government’s policy on importation or influencing it to lift ban on certain goods and services they benefit from. They could make government open borders or close them; or to rescind its decision on a number of foreign economic or social policies. For instance, the Obasanjo administration had to reverse its ban on importation of fairly used cars from neighbouring countries after the initial outlawing, because of the pressure from the leaders and dealers in the second-hand automobile industry within and outside Nigeria. In fact, Ota town where the President mostly resides outside Abuja became the hub and “port of entry” for eight years, of vehicles smuggled into Nigeria from Benin and Togo Republics (Rauful, 2002).
The foreign elite are even as powerful, or lot more. Their business interest is the ultimate concern and they use their friends in government to promote or protect it. Government itself is disposed to them because they believe their business activities or foreign investment would advance the cause of the local economy. In some cases, such external elite in the foreign and domestic policy corridors of their host countries have sponsored or instigated a change of government (Ouldmey, 1994; Chomsky, 1992). Such international class may include business moguls, the multinational companies, and members of the foreign diplomatic community. In Nigeria, the oil multinationals and the construction giants, Julius Berger, have been typical examples of class interest that government would protect and consider in national role conception and foreign policy making. Other members of this international class are the pay-television group, Multichoice, telecoms companies MTN and Zain.
2.4.5. Shortcomings of the Role Theory
The emphasis of the role theory on the political group as the most important unit of analysis in policy studies tends to underestimate the potency of individual action that may overwhelm any group efforts or political act. For instance, the German policy of “reclamation” of old glory in Europe from the 1930’s could not have been the architect of any political group but the sole initiative and execution of Adolf Hitler. Odumegwu Ojukwu went against the counsel and protest of the prominent Igbo soldiers of his cabinet to declare a war on Nigeria in 1967. The “manifest destiny” thesis that Nigeria was naturally positioned to lead the continent, which re-echoed in Sir Tafawa Balewa’s speeches and foreign policy declaration, and which has always reflected in Nigeria-Africa policy since 1960 was the conception of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The illustrations above show the limit of the role theory which regards the ‘group” as all in all in political decision-making
The theory tends to overlook the possible manipulations individuals hiding in the political group could wreak in the policy making process. The role influences include preferences of insiders and their interpretations. Hence there is the tendency towards analyzing policymaking process without minding the neglect or re-interpretation of the supposed core role influences of expectations of the outsiders, for example, the society or governed in the case of policymaking or a continent in the case of national role assumption.
Though extolled for its enhancement of clarity of thought and analysis, the theory may sometimes create conceptual fix. There seems to be some connection with terms such as functions, objectives, duties, and position, which analyses tend-with much struggling- to substitute for role.
Again its basic theoretical metaphor was applied only loosely and its earliest proponents (Simmel, Mead, Linton and Jacob Moreno) differed in the ways the role terms were used. Unfortunately, these differences persist in current literature. For instance whereas some scholars use the term “role” to refer to characteristic behaviours (Biddle, 1979; Burt, 1982), others use it to designate social parts to be played (Winship and Mandel, 1983). Yet others offer definitions that focus on scripts for social conducts (Bates and Harvey, 1975; Zurcher, 1983). Although these differences appear substantial, the problem is more technical than substantive. Arguments persist among role theorists that the basic concern of the orientation are the characteristic behaviours, part to play, and scripts for behaviour.
Despite its weaknesses, the role theory is relatively more applicable, clearer and more robust enough in understanding foreign policy making that it is adopted to be the framework for analysis of this study. The limitations are tangential, but its usefulness is overwhelming to the study.
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Chapter Three
Philosophical and Ideological Underpinnings of Nigeria’s African Policy
This chapter attempts to examine the ideological and philosophical underpinnings of Nigeria’s foreign policy which may have been responsible for a strong African appeal and which may have guided Nigeria’s conception of roles to assume in Africa since independence. The philosophical and ideological underpinnings are rooted in the historical experience of the country. To this end, the chapter explores into the backgrounds of Nigerian foreign policy making to establish the thread that runs through national role conceptions (NRCs), with the view of identifying the variants, similarities and lacuna in the conception and assumption of roles in Africa.
3.1. Foundations of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
Nigeria has an interesting foreign policy transition because of the changing nature of its statehood. As a colonial territory, its immediate affinity was with Britain and with much less ties to African countries. However, there was a natural closeness to Anglophone African countries which was inevitably so because the British organized their colonies in a web of socio-economic and political ties with little or no choice for the Africans. At independence, with a common unsavoury colonial experience alongside other African countries, and with strong historical traditions on its side, Nigeria opted to take on the gauntlet of an Africa “redeemer” in the face of the vestiges of foreign domination. From civilian to military dispensations, Nigeria remained committed to its belief. It is important to examine the historical factors that shaped the conception of roles by Nigeria and the foundations of the strong pro-African sentiment.
3.1.1. Colonial Heritage
Colonialism had a strong influence in the conduct of foreign relations of modern states, including Nigeria. From the fifteenth century, European conquests and expansion radically altered the institutions and systems of nearly all the world creating a homogenous socio-political culture. Britain was a key player in European colonialism. For Nigeria, it carried on through the British Colonial Office in London its external relations from the time Nigeria acquired a legal personality in 1914. This was done principally to promote the national interest of the British colonialists and not Nigeria. The country did not have the capacity to enter into and conduct independent foreign policy because of its colonial status (Adeniran, 1985). As the British government decolonized, it created a loose association between itself and all its former colonies called the Commonwealth to perpetuate the old colonial ties. The Commonwealth originally started with the British colonies in North America. In an attempt to prevent Canada from declaring independence like the United States had done in 1776, and to avert a possible American encroachment in Canada, Britain granted Canada a dominion status with power over the control of its internal affairs within the framework of the British Empire. Thus, the British North American Act of 1867 facilitated the emergence of the Commonwealth of Nations. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Irish Free State along with Britain constituted the original members of the Commonwealth. As early as 1897, they began informally consulting on matters of common interest. In 1921, the Imperial Conference described the Dominions as autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Imperial Conference of 1930 approved a report on how to formalize this new status. The statute of Westminster of 1931 gave full legal recognition to it and the British Commonwealth properly replaced the British Empire (King, 1996; Harris, 1975).
The old Commonwealth therefore symbolized the triumph of British imperialism. According to Harris (1975: 34-48), the colonial origins of the organization indicate that it was not meant to serve the indigenous peoples, but symbolized instead, a defeat of their interests. Also security and strategic concerns rather dominated in its formation than development priorities. No wonder therefore the Commonwealth states (settler and conquest colonies) because of relative consensus on matters concerning the former colonial masters involuntarily existing, would support it. For instance, when Britain declared war on Germany in 1939, members of the Commonwealth joined and fought on British side. The membership of India at independence in 1947 altered the composition and transformation of the Commonwealth from a white homogenous group of five nations to a new multiracial experiment in international cooperation (King, 1996: 72). Three principal features of the group were discernible at this rate namely: the common colonial experience of members, the stranger factor because of racial and cultural diversity for which the head of Commonwealth, Britain had to give cohesion, and multiple economic and social opportunities arising from such diversity.
The colonial heritage and the arrangement described above have played a fundamental role in Nigeria’s behaviour toward other nations since it joined the comity of independent nations. When it joined the Commonwealth, Nigeria associated itself with the challenge of developing new cooperative relationships among nations. Its choice of participation in the Commonwealth has been driven more by the fact that it is considered as a viable vehicle for pursuing selected foreign policy concerns. As a result of its historical importance in the continent, Nigeria is considered a strategic partner in the Commonwealth and the country too sees the organization as a potential avenue to realize its national objective of economic post-colonial transformation and becoming a major voice in the global system, which have been attained over the years (King, 1996: 72-73).
Apart from the colonial heritage of the Commonwealth, the colonial system itself helped in shaping Nigeria’s foreign policy and conception of roles to occupy in Africa. Colonialism was generally harsh, exploitative and discriminatory in nature. The common cruel experiences of colonialism united the Africans and broke geographical and ideological borders in the continent as platforms emerged from all corners to fight the common enemy of external domination. British colonial system was particularly divisive. Although the British created a platform for which administrative convenience and economic exploitation could be facilitated, they rather instituted a system which would break any meaningful bond across the boundaries that could spark off a common challenge from the continent (Ikime, 1985). The evil nature of colonialism and its negative effect on African unity and progress thus constituted another major influence on the international behaviour of Nigeria and its disposition towards Africa at independence. Nigeria after independence took up the task to purge Africa of all forms of colonialism, because of the legacies of division, disunity and conflict, which negate the principle of brotherhood, unity and collective progress that the founding fathers of Nigeria wished for the continent.
An examination of the colonial heritage in the foreign policy and role conception of Nigeria would be incomplete without identifying the expansion of British influence from the southwest to the central and northern Nigeria in the second half of the nineteenth century. That spread has constituted a landmark geographical factor shaping Nigeria’s external relations. The need to protect British traders and missionaries in West Africa led to the appointment of John Beecroft as the British Consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra in 1849. In 1851, Lagos was attacked over the issue of slave trade by the British imperial forces, which led to the signing of the unequal treaties in 1852 between the British government representatives and King Akintoye for the safety of British interests and putting a stop to the slave trade. In 1861, Lagos was invaded and annexed by Britain with the King, Dosunmu dethroned. This forceful annexation was immediately followed by the conquest of the hinterland and the formation of the Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria, which were amalgamated in 1914 (Adeyemo, 2002).
The significance of this historical fact is that foreign policy making powers were by the delegation of such roles concentrated in the hands of the Governor of Nigeria beginning from the 1914 merger. The Secretary for Colonies delegated such powers to the Governor, who through the 1922 Clifford Constitution to the 1946 Richards Constitution had absolute powers to conduct external relations for Nigeria without consultation with the people. Even when there was power sharing between Federal and Regional Governments from 1951 to independence in 1960, the executive still had absolute power in foreign policy making (Frankel, 1973; Idang, 1973). Hence, a foundation by colonial experience had been laid for the Chief Executive and political leaders to have ultimate answer to the questions of role perception, conception, assumption and performance as far as Nigerian foreign policy is concerned. From independence to 2000s, policy decisions and policy failures or successes were attributed to political leaders and their groups, with the categorization of such policy regimes after the regime in power, for instance “Gowon foreign policy” or the “foreign policy of the Shagari administration”, or “Obasanjo’s diplomacy.”
Colonial heritage still plays a significant role in Nigeria’s foreign policy today, particularly in its foreign policy towards Africa. Nigeria saw and offered itself as the protector of African post-independence sovereignty. It was not clear what the role conception was during or at the twilight of colonialism. The task of foreign policy was exclusive for the Colonial Governor; and the nationalists, no thanks to the divide and rule system, was sectionally and ethnically divided but bound and loyal to British overlords. The roles conceived in Nigeria at the time were British roles in consolidating their colonial rule in Africa (Ade-Ajayi, 1980). However, it later became clear from speeches by nationalists that succeeded the British authorities that Nigeria would wish to occupy roles of leadership and spokesmanship for the continent. Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa had challenged Ghana’s claim to leadership in Africa when he openly opposed Nkrumah’s radical approach to African union, declaring that Nigeria was too big to follow the course of Ghana or any other nation in the continent for that matter, Balewa had also contended that Nigeria had a more pragmatic approach to post-independence unity in Africa that Ghana should rather identify with (Balewa, 1963). Nnamdi Azikiwe had made the famous declaration that Nigeria had the “manifest destiny” to lead the African continent in view of its vast human, material and natural resources, a combination that no other nation in the continent possessed (Azikiwe, 1961). This role mentality resonated in the foreign policies of Gowon, Mohammed/Obasanjo, Shagari, and Buhari, Babangida, Obasanjo and even Abacha as would be examined in the next chapters.
3.1.2. Ideological Foundations
Ideology engenders political unity and minimizes potential social incohesion. This because it constructs a psychological and social bond that would make a nation unshakeable in the face of external threat or divisive influences. Such a state would have a behavioural pattern which would make its actions or reactions predictable; and as a guide or prism which the group uses to determine its world of reality, the state knows what to approve or disapprove (Northedge, 1976), and by extension what to conceive as national roles and what not to conceive as national roles. King (1996: 33) views ideology rather as “a major instrument for coping with the stranger element within and among nations.” By inference, ideology, a prevailing political orthodoxy or political traditions of a state (Northedge, 1976: 46) closes up social distance and minimizes conflict between groups and nations. Conversely, competing ideologies would create social incohesion, which would make the state vulnerable to external influences and manipulations. With a high degree of heterogeneity, Nigeria succumbed to competing ideological influences, each playing a part in the posture that Nigeria has taken in world affairs. However, these ideologies have combined to provide a guide to foreign policy or national role conception (King, 1996:33-51). The Nigerian foreign policy had been guided largely by a number of ideological orientations, which included capitalist democracy shortly after independence, and Pan-Africanism, which have informed its western bent and Africa-centred policies respectively. Incidentally, Nigeria probably for obvious multi-ethnic, multi-faith, and even multi-class cleavages, has not been able to evolve a distinct ideology.
Nigerian foreign policy makers have often on paper resisted ideological labels, contending that no political leader should impose any singular colonial, religious, ethnic or party ideology. Instead a collective commitment to a set of integrated ideas, values, beliefs and ideals has been advocated. However, Nigerian foreign policy making has always been characterized by ideological and cultural orientations of policy makers or the political group(s) in power. This eclectic approach to the place of ideology in national life recognizes the importance of several ideologies that have influenced the Nigerian people and politics. It emphasizes the functional value of ideology. The strains of political thought that have influenced Nigeria’s foreign policy makers since independence have been nationalism, pan-Africanism (Apter & Coleman, 1962) Marxism (Zartman, 1983), or rather “radicalism”, and capitalism (Schatz, 1977).
Nationalism
Nationalism is the most prevalent ideology in Nigerian foreign relations. Nationalism is the ideology of freedom from oppression (Apter & Coleman, 1962: 89; Sithole, 1959) which seeks to create and maintain the nation-state as the ideal political forum (Chatterjee, 1986). The nation-state is regarded as the political unit that enhances the integration of the masses of different peoples into a common political entity, guarantee individual equal rights and political freedoms and provide for the general welfare of the people. Thus the appeal of nationalism has always been that of securing Nigeria’s neighbourhood for the purpose of its own corporate existence, and the liberation of African states from colonialism, apartheid and internal conflicts (Kohn, 1995), such as in the case of Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sao Tome and Principe.
The nationalist fervour of Nigeria’s foreign policy was manifest at independence, when the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa declared that,
In formulating its policy for the conduct of foreign affairs the Federal Government recognizes that its primary duty is to safeguard and promote the interests of the Federation and its citizens (Balewa, 1964: 23).
The problem with nationalist sentiments is that the heightened awareness it evokes may focus the people’s attention on differences that could divide as well as similarities and aspirations that can unite. The stranger factor may be enhanced or undermined by nationalism. This dual possibility makes it both a particularistic and universalistic force (Idang, 1973: 21-25). The range of diversity in Nigeria since amalgamation makes it susceptible to the stranger element that may be magnified by nationalism. For instance, the emphasis on a shared ethnicity or ethnic nationalism among the Igbo aided the attempted secession of Biafra in 1967. This had also resulted in many inter-ethnic conflicts and communal clashes, such as the 1987-90 Dzango-Katarf crisis in Katsina, Ife-Modakeke clashes of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, the Andoni- Ogoni conflict of the mid-1990s, the Ijaw-Urhobo-Itsekiri conflicts of all time, and the Tiv-Jukun (Zaki-Biam) violence of 2003, among others. This particularistic sub-nationalism threatened a fundamental objective of foreign policy which is the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state. However, the universalistic nationalism was more evident in the early years of Nigeria’s independence, which was central in national role conceptions in its Africa policy. This externalization of its nationalism had found expression in its belief and tacit support for the pan-African union called the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the drawing of the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action which was proactively nationalistic. It is pertinent to note that while the sub-nationalist phenomenon ravaged the home-front and nearly negated the first rule of foreign policy-preservation of the state-successive governments in the 1990s and 2000s did not allow this to reflect in Nigeria’s international behaviour, as it vigorously assumed roles of mediator, arbitrator, conciliator and peacekeeper during this period, with the aim of sustaining the fragile African statehood. The efforts have included the peacekeeping and peace-enforcement initiative through the ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and its active participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, Congo, and Cote d’ Ivoire between 1990 and 2006. It also resulted in unilateral settlement of disputes in Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and the restoration of democratic rule in Sao Tome and Principe.
The specific targets of universalistic nationalism in Nigeria that have shaped its conception of roles to occupy in Africa since independence are colonialism, racism and imperialism (Smith, 1979). The political and economic strangulation of Africans by the colonial powers were also characterized by the practice of cruel racial discrimination. DuBois (1965) had described the phenomenon thus:
There was no Nazi atrocity-concentration camps, wholesale maiming of and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of childhood-which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been practicing against coloured folks in all parts of the world (DuBois, 1965:23).
Opposition to such multifaceted oppression constituted a basic element of African nationalism. African nationalism is also directed at maintaining political independence and engendering economic development, all of which resonated in Nigeria-Africa policy at independence. Balewa had declared in a speech:
We are seeking not only political but economic independence. It is not our intention to be at the mercy of more powerful states because we need their financial support; so we must have a healthy economy (Balewa, 1964: 33).
By colonial creation, most African states have within their boundaries peoples from a variety of cultural backgrounds. The intrinsic value of nationalism in Africa, unlike in Europe, was therefore to unite diverse groups with ancient socio-cultural barriers. In the continent it functions both as an instrument of intrastate and interstate unity. (King, 1996: 36). A member of the First Republic Nigerian House of Representatives once observed that,
The nationalism of Nigeria is in fact, internationalism in the sense that, within our borders, Nigeria is a kind of nation of nations, who, if they were confined within their borders, would make larger nations than at least eight of the European countries. In trying to weld all these peoples together into one nation, we are trying in Nigeria to do what on the African level; we would like to do continentally (Apter and Coleman, 1962: 72).
A common thread in almost all the foreign policies of Nigerian political leaderships from independence to 2007 has been the similarity in a universalistic conception of nationalism. Murtala Mohammed had said that the independence of Zimbabwe was tantamount to the independence of Nigeria, and that any African nation still suffering colonization or racism in form of apartheid was a “slap” on Nigeria’s face as the greatest black nation on earth (Mohammed, 1975). Also, General Obasanjo had amplified this perspective when he declared that Nigeria considered the racial and social prejudices in the southern African society as an affront and a challenge to Nigeria’s position as a liberator of the continent from all external oppression (Obasanjo, 1976). Also, the Buhari, Babangida and Obasanjo (civilian) administrations also stressed a universalistic nationalism. Gambari, Buhari’s foreign affairs minister had disclosed that Africa was to constitute the area of primary concern to us. A pattern of concentric circles may be discernible in our attitude and response to foreign policy issues within the African continent and the world at large (Gambari, 1986).
In spite of the changes in the African situation from apartheid and colonialism, Nigeria’s nationalistic foreign policy still resonated in new challenges of drought, hunger, diseases, and cooperation. For instance, Babangida’s universalistic nationalism was clearly Africa-cantered:
African problems and their solutions shall constitute the premise of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Self sufficiency and constructive cooperation in Africa shall be Nigeria’s primary concern (cited in Adeyemo, 2002: 125).
Despite Nigeria’s many international problems during the reign of General Abacha, the regime still continued Nigeria’s universalist nationalism in at least the West African region. While addressing the Nigerian diplomatic community in 1994, Abacha had underlined a strong African nationalism by simply stating: “The problems of Africa are Nigeria’ problems” (Abacha, 1994); a declaration President Obasanjo reiterated when he declared that ‘we thank God for giving us the capacity to fight for the cause of Africa, and its freedoms from bad domestic leadership (Obasanjo, 2001). This disposition must have informed the very eventful Nigerian diplomatic terrains in Africa at the time, which culminated in the co-founding of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and the African Union (AU).
Nigeria’s consistency in a universalistic nationalist tradition is significant. It is therefore pertinent to conclude that the commonalities of colonial hardship, racial discrimination, imperialism, and the new challenges of ethnic and sectarian conflicts, drought, poverty, diseases, and democracy, among others have compelled policy makers in Nigeria to accord priority to the African cause in definition of roles to assume in Africa from independence to date.
Pan Africanism
The second major ideological influence on Nigeria’s foreign policy is Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism has a lot of semblance with nationalism (Apter & Coleman, 1962: 89-90). In this case, it is related to universalistic nationalism that has been discussed. The galvanizing factors in pan-Africanism include racism, colonization, racial slavery, and apartheid. Pan-Africanism seeks unity among African peoples at home and in the Diaspora and their advancement (Padmore, 1971).
Unlike nationalism, pan-Africanism originated outside of Africa. W.E.B. DuBois, an early exponent of pan-Africanism from the West Indies, succinctly puts the idea of the ideology across viz:
The idea of one Africa to unite the thought and ideas of all the native peoples of the Dark Continent belongs to the twentieth century and stems naturally from the West Indies and the USA. Here various groups of Africans, quite separate in origin became so united in experience and so exposed to the impact of new cultures that they began to think of Africa as one idea and one hand (DuBois, 1965: 71) .
A caveat to the realization of the objectives of pan-Africanism lies in its operationalization: if it must work, then Africans in Africa had a greater role to play than those in the Diaspora. Hence, African nationalist leaders assumed the dominant roles in the early years of the movement. It became the popular instrument of struggle for national independence (Padmore, 1976: 128). In Nigeria, leaders like Nnamdi Azikiwe led the movement. Using his West African Pilot newspaper, he popularized the ideals of the pan-Africanist movement around the continent. At the instance of Azikiwe, a group of West African newspaper editors published the Atlantic Charter and Africa in which they called for self-determination by Africans. They called on the US President F.R.D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to apply clause 3 of the Atlantic Charter to Africa. This clause provided for the right of all peoples to choose their own governments (Padmore, 1971: 131).
Pan-Africanism is itself both an ideology and a foreign policy of state. This is because it is universalistic and when operationalized, involves the engagement of the international public by a state. However, it has also been adapted to consolidate internal unity and development. Some African politicians during and after colonialism localized pan-Africanism to have a masses appeal for political legitimating and control. They used the universal ideas of self-government, freedom and independence from colonial rule as a catalyst for organizing political movements and building political parties with national outreach. Nkrumah’s Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in Ghana and Kenyatta’s Kenya African Union (KAU) are a few examples. In the case of Nigeria, the National council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
(NCNC) led by Azikiwe was formed (King, 1996: 38). Azikiwe later became the first President of Nigeria in a Westminster Abbey type of government that succeeded the colonial regime. No wonder then that when Nigeria differed from Ghana in the pan-African deal to create a United States of Africa in the 1960s, it was the Nigeria-Africa policy idea of Azikiwe proposing a peaceful or evolutionary approach to African unity that prevailed as the policy decision in Nigeria over Ghana’s radical and militant proposition.
Pan-Africanism, like nationalism, rubbed much on Nigeria’s foreign policy from Balewa (1960-1966) to Obasanjo (1999-2007). The manifestations were not significantly different from what has been identified as the ramifications of a universalistic nationalism. This has however been contextualized in the African platform. Nigeria’s posture in Africa and role in engendering peace, progress, unity and development up to the 2000s have been a Pan-Africanist foreign policy. The 2000s have been particularly evident in the Obasanjo economic diplomacy in Africa, and the NEPAD and APRM initiative.
Marxism
Zartman (1983) had posited that Marxism was one of the ideological undercurrents of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Citing the Murtala-Obasanjo example, he argues that although the regime may not have a Marxist orientation by virtue of the fact that the military in colonial and post-colonial African state does not exhibit such ideology, its corrective and reformist tendencies after African independence showed some form of extremism that was Marxian in nature (1983: 56). Marxism is alien to a political system designed by the burghers of the British colonial system. However, as Zartman asserts, Marxism played a prominent role in the young foreign policy of Nigeria from independence. This recalls the point earlier made about the fact that several ideological leanings characterized Nigerian foreign policy. Marxism is an attractive ideological system for peoples in developing countries. Its analysis of human oppression and theory of social change culminating in liberation of the masses from poverty, ignorance, class oppression; relief from exploitation and an equitable share of national resources were reassuring to the groups that were laidback. Marx’s view of history is that economic determinism and resultant dialectic materialism characterize human societies, which inevitably leads to class consciousness and conflict (Feurer, 1959: 6). He however offers hope when he concludes that such era ‘ended either in a revolutionary reconstruction of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes” (1959: 7)
The Marxist perspective of history stresses the temporary nature of oppression and the ability of the oppressed to change their condition. This is attractive to the nationalists and Pan-Africanists as it endorses anti-colonial struggles of all kinds, including neo-colonialism. Also the ideology recognizes the need to upturn the status quo in the state and ownership of production means. When the oppressed take control of both apparatuses, the state would cease to be the “product of the irreconcilabilities of class antagonisms” (Lenin, 1963). The vitriolic opposition of Marxism to European imperialism was apparently a wake-up call in Africa to take over power from the colonial oppressors and the local or petit-bourgeoisie.
As earlier said, it will not be appropriate to say that Nigeria’s foreign policy has ever been Marxist, even if some scholars allude the radicalism of some of the regimes in matters of Africa’s interest to Marxism. There had not been any particular leadership that had a leftist or Marxist bent. There have been however, liberal and socialist elements in the opposition parties in democracy or certain military quarters whose agenda had been to establish socialism. These included the Awolowo political group in the First and Second Republics, and the Gideon Orkar military group that attempted to topple Babangida’s capitalist regime in a bloody coup in 1990 (Williams, 1990). However, the radical approach and support for liberation struggles in the socialist states of Angola and Mozambique by the Murtala-Obasanjo regime in the 1970s, and probably the anti-western posture of the Abacha administration in the mid-1990s, may have accorded Nigerian foreign policy at some time a Marxist label. The so-called Marxist fervour which took the form of radicalism resonated in Nigeria’s African foreign policy at some points. According to some scholars, the policy makers had sought the radical Marxist ideals in tackling local and African problems. For instance, its policy of support in the liberation struggles of ‘Marxist’ states as Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and armed struggle in Southern Africa had such Marxist extremism. Military rule also sometimes adorned radical postures that smacked of Marxian revolutionary movement, with an antagonistic disposition to any external interference to African or regional issues. The Murtala-Obasanjo and Abacha regimes demonstrated this tendency. The idea from late 1970s to nationalize foreign companies which government took over, and the indigenization policy meant to give government some control over productive forces that affect general welfare, were Marxist-oriented (Akinsanya, 1983). While this has been described as Marxian, government itself had claimed that the act was in tandem with its mixed economy policy. Again the adoption of certain Marxian-like principles is also borne out of the fact that government or public ownership of the economy’s key sectors is the only nationalist alternative to foreign control since local capitalists do not have substantial capital to withstand their external competitors.
Capitalism
Capitalism has also been identified to have underlined Nigerian external behaviour. The entrenchment of market forces in Nigeria during colonialism was to have a long-standing impact on Nigeria’s foreign policy. Britain was a great capitalist nation with the mission to invest excess capital abroad, seek new markets to export surplus goods and acquire sufficient raw materials outside Europe to cater for the huge demands of industrialization from the eighteenth century (Hobson, 1967). Indeed, capitalism had fired up the tempo of imperial policy and colonization, which gave Lenin the impetus to posit that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism (1970). In the event of these industrial and colonial policies, the Tubman Goldie-led Royal Niger Company (which became the first example of multinational company in West Africa) was formed in Nigeria. a strong capitalist foundation had thus been laid.
In colonial Africa, foreign capitalists rode on the backs of their home-governments to eliminate local competitors, to establish monopolies, and thrived on a system of slave and forced labour (Gutkind and Wallerstein, 1976). Capitalism thus manifested the exploitative and greedy nature of colonialism. Although capitalism was cruel, its principles of individual freedom, and non-interference by government which were contradictory to its cruel manifestations were utilized by Africans to oppose colonialism. Pre-colonial and colonial Nigerian societies had thrived on private enterprise. This was supposed to be in tandem with capitalist principles that hold sacrosanct the value of self-interest. The colonial policy to engage government in control was thus a double-standard measure.
At independence, the government of Nigeria did not hesitate to build the fabrics of its economy on native and modern capitalism, namely private enterprise. More importantly, the influence of capitalism is evident in the foreign policy of the country. Some of the manifestations of a capitalist foreign policy have been the indigenization policy and industrial policy encouraging collaboration of local and foreign investors, abolition of excess taxes, allowance of duty-free raw materials for production of export goods, and a reduction of the corporate income tax (Federal Ministry of Industries, 1990).
Capitalism has been more evident in Nigeria-Africa policy from the 1990s. Successive administrations have placed more emphasis on encouraging African states to explore opportunities for greater economic collaboration with the bigger capitalist states for the purpose of meaningful strides in economic development. This idea is premised on the fact that it is only when African economies become viable enough that they can keep any appearances of imperialism at an arm’s length. The tricks or strategies to reach that height of economic independence lie in what would be learnt by such collaboration.
The capitalist orientation was enormous and largely became the prism by which Nigeria conducted relations with the extra-African community. This statement of fact should elicit some deep reflection. Apparently, Nigeria has a pool of ideological orientations from which it could pick up the appropriate instrument to deal with a particular issue, nation or continent. Nationalism offered a galvanizing force to create a great Nigerian nation on whose broad shoulders African states can lean on. Pan-Africanism has been the platform on which it creates a bridge with the Diaspora and attempts to forge a cross-continental unity. Marxism compels compassion to “set the captives” of the ex-metroples free; and here is capitalism with which the country can reach out to the developed market economies in an attempt to attain economic greatness in Africa.
3.1.3. Social and Cultural Foundations
Socio-cultural orientations of Nigeria have greatly influenced its foreign policy and conception of roles to fill in Africa. The social and cultural roots of Nigerian foreign policy lie in the ethnic composition of the polity, huge cultural and religious diversity and the influence of the nationals from immediate neighbouring countries (Saliu, 2006). Nigeria is made up of about 250 ethnic groups and has a very rich cultural heritage. Also, it is a multi-faith society (Marshall, 2009; Olupona, 1992). The multiplicity of ethnic groups since the 1914 amalgamation gives Nigeria a distinct image in the black world as the most culturally diverse and yet most nationally cohesive. Among the groups are also many elements from neighbouring countries of Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. By this, Nigeria’s disposition to its neighbours is characterized by caution, friendship, good neighbourliness and limited geographical barricades (Ate & Akinterinwa, 1992). This factor played a role in the neighbouring states’ attitude towards Nigeria during the Civil War of 1967-70, when they supported its continued corporate existence and did not betray the country by aligning with Biafra or their former colonial master that wanted Nigeria’s disintegration, France (Stremlau, 1977). The social and cultural affinities coupled with the good gestures of its immediate neighbours have informed its according them top priority in its foreign policy “concentric circles” (Saliu, 2005).
Also Nigeria is strengthened by this cultural diversity and infallibility in spite of many national troubles, to intervene in African states threatened by ethnic and civil strifes. This multinational and cultural strength has also inspired the country to take the lead in bringing African nations and the black world together for international cultural festivals such as the Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977.
Nigeria is the most populous black country in the world. Consistently from the 1960s, Nigeria has maintained a lead in population. In the 1962 Census, its population was put at about 55 million. The Census of 1991 figured out over 100 million people, and the 2006 Census puts Nigeria at over 140 million in population (NPC, 2009). The population size of Nigeria is considered by policy makers to have naturally placed Nigeria in the position of a leader in the black world. This self-belief is tenable because demography is considered as a typology of source or another dimension of power. In proper terms, the size of population and the quality of population are now considered a measure of another kind of power: demographical power or put differently, the power of number (Goldstein, 2001). Some war analysts consider size or number important in war. The size of an army for instance facilitates remobilization and reconnaissance, and inspires fear in the enemy camp (Madiebo, 1980; Waltz, 1959). The size of Nigeria has been instrumental in its role conception and foreign policy from independence. Policy makers draw inspiration from the overwhelming population size because they view Nigeria as so endowed to naturally become the major voice for Africa and the entire black world (Akinyemi, 2005).
3.1.4. Economic Foundations
The economic power or potentials of a state have always given it a leverage in the comity of nations, which in Henderson’s view (2005), could ennoble the image of the state, make it awe-inspiring, increase its voice, enhance its bargaining power or even earn for it enviable role in the international system. The power of oil in the Middle East for instance, has strengthened the foreign policies of the states and given them not just a loud voice, but also a big stature so much that major powers cannot afford not to pay special attention to them. The United States (US) for instance redefined its policy in the Persian Gulf because of the enormity of oil resources that have two symbolisms for the US: its major source of energy and the threat or potential of the Gulf countries to convert oil wealth (power) to unbearable military power (Rosati, 2006). This has been the case with Iran which seemed to be patronized by the US which was expected to have banned the Iranian President from the UN General Assembly in New York in 2008 and President Barack Obama’s declaration of willingness to sit down for talks without preconditions with Iran’s Ahmedinajad (Chossudovsky, 2009). The American Far-Right and some other sections of the society had expected the ban in view of President’s Ahmedinajad’s defiance of international condemnation to stop the acquisition and development of nuclear arms. In respect of Nigeria, it is the economic powerhouse in West Africa and the second in Africa, only behind South Africa. With a GDP of over $170 billion, it contributes 50% of the GDP of the West African region. The GDP per head amounts approximately $692. Nigeria is the twelfth largest producer of petroleum in the world and the eight largest exporters. Nigeria has the tenth largest reserves of petroleum and as of April 2006 became the first African country to fully pay off its debt, estimated at approximately $30 billion, owed to the Paris Club (Onyearu, 2008).
These developments make Nigeria, in many respects, one of the most attractive business environments in the world, a fact demonstrated by its substantial trade relationships with the US, UK, China, Russia, France, Japan, and the Middle East, these being the major economies in the world. With a booming industry in telecommunications with more than 30 million mobile phone subscribers, it has the fastest growing market in the world, having overtaken South Africa (Onyearu, 2008: 2). Nigeria is also endowed in two other economic ways namely, its agricultural prosperity and its size that makes it a viable international market. These three factors have made the country strategically positioned in the external community and have been central in the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria. However, there are several aspects of Nigeria’s mineral resources that greatly undermine their value as sources of economic strength and autonomous foreign policy. Firstly, the exploitation of these minerals, especially petroleum and natural gas, has been entirely in the hands of Western multinational companies, putting Nigeria in a weak position. Secondly, the country depends entirely on petroleum for growth and development. The petroleum sector accounts for 90 percent of foreign exchange. As the production of oil increases, that of the other minerals decline and no substantial effort has been made to reduce the imbalance. Thirdly, since a substantial quantity of the minerals is unexplored and unexploited, there is no way of assessing their actual and potential amount and worth for planning purposes. Consequently, although Africa has been the cornerstone and centerpiece of its foreign policy, Nigeria’s external trade record shows clearly that there has been very little trade and economic interaction between it and other African countries. For instance, Nigeria’s trade relations with other African countries from 1974 to 1983 were quite small in comparison to the value of its global trade (Adigbuo, 2005).
Pre-colonial Nigerian economy was self-sufficient for states’ survival. The self-reliant Nigerian pre-colonial economy was disorganized by the advent of British imperialism. The impact of the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution on Europe and the resulting British imperial interests in Africa caused a shift from the slave trade to the establishment of a “legitimate” market for its industrial goods and a quest for raw materials (Shaw, 1983). The imperial economic demand in Nigeria led to a shift from food production to cash crops needed to feed British industrial concerns. This led to the transportation of Nigerian cash crops like cocoa, palm oil, rubber and groundnuts, to mention but a few, to Britain. To facilitate the trade, the British currency was introduced into the Nigerian market. The immediate outcome of these measures was the conscious integration of the Nigerian economy into the world capitalist system. To further strengthen the imperial stronghold in Nigeria, the Limited Liability Act of 1862 was introduced to encourage the influx of British firms. By 1920, the Nigerian market was already dominated by British trading companies like the United African Company (UAC), United Trading Company (UTC), Paterson Zachonis (PZ) and John Holt. The formation by these foreign firms of a trade organization called West African Merchants reinforced their dominance in the import–export market and virtually eliminated the indigenous traders. Long before Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the country had been reduced to a cash crop-producing estate in which the British Colonial Office determined what should be produced, their prices and their export. This made Nigeria a British economic appendage divorced of any industrial development, technologically deficient and without capital accumulation in the country. The situation remained the same with the discovery of oil. There has even been a severe dependence on oil and associated dependence on Western corporations, investments, technology and skills (Adigbuo, 2005: 135).
On the economic foundation of colonies, what Hatch (1970) terms the economic undercurrents of British imperialism, the author asserts that certain new economic features appeared in the African colonies, but the basic fact of economic dependence had not altered. In some ways, indeed, it was strengthened. As colonial governments were commanded by the metropolitan powers to pay their own administrative expenses, thereby encouraging the production of cash crops to provide export revenues, so not only “commercial profits but government revenues themselves came to depend on prices determined outside the continent”. Moreover, he emphasizes, as political power involved control in economic legislation and regulation, colonial governments often under orders from their masters in European capitals could subordinate the “interests of their subjects to those of the merchants, manufacturers and financiers of Europe. It was no objective of colonial rule to undermine the foreign dependence of colonial economies or to replace them by independent, self-propelling economies” (Hatch, 1970: 203).
Hatch (1970: 204) further emphasizes that, when the British government first used its diplomatic and military weapons to establish political control over Nigeria, a number of economic factors shaped the decision. With the attainment of independence, this economic dependence substantially constrained Nigeria’s range of foreign policy choices and subsequently affected its performance in Africa. Nigeria as a peripheral appendage became subservient to and dependent on Britain and other advanced capitalist states for its economic survival. This dependency syndrome eventually killed innovation, reshaped consumption in tune with what obtains in the advanced capitalist societies and predisposed the discrimination against home-produced goods by Nigerians. All inherited colonial ideas, social structures and political institutions have tended to reinforce and therefore perpetuate this economic way of life. The dominance of Nigeria’s external trade by Britain and member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) from the early 1960s is obvious. Even by the mid-1960s 70 percent of Nigerian imports came from Western countries, while 90 percent of the nation’s exports went to the West. The Soviet Union’s share of the trade was merely 4 percent of imports and 1 percent of exports. The rest of the world accounted for 25 percent of imports and less than 10 percent of exports (FOS, 1961 & 1962; Akindele, 1986). The Western stranglehold on Nigeria’s foreign trade was made possible and reinforced by Western domination of external investments in the country.
While the post-colonial economic wealth, abundance of mineral resources, huge market potentials and rich agricultural environment have brought their own blessings for a comfortable leadership role in Africa, the colonial economic foundation rather had negative consequences for Nigeria’s foreign relations. An inevitable consequence was the heavy dependence of Nigeria’s economy on the fortunes of the West. The Nigerian leadership believed that the most effective means of achieving national economic and social development objectives was to develop the economy along Western lines (Adigbuo, 2005: 136). It can be argued that Nigeria’s contribution to the liberation efforts in Africa would have been more far-reaching had Nigeria not been situated in the same ideological camp as forces and nations responsible for the territory’s economic and political subjugation and had it not been helplessly tied to the aprons of the former colonial masters as the African countries it wanted to lead.
Also economic interdependence always constitutes a setback towards effective role assumption, as it erodes independent decisions of states. For Nigeria, the problem of Nigeria’s economic dependence on the western nations continues to affect the country’s policy in Africa. For instance, the Nigerian government was in a terrible dilemma in contemplating economic sanctions against the West on some cases like the Southern African liberation struggles, since according to them it would be against the Nigerian national interest to do so (Nnoli, 1976; Adigbuo, 2005: 138). Nigeria was wary of initiating policies that were likely to trigger sanctions from its Western friends who definitely discountenanced certain lines of action against South Africa. Nigeria from the 1980s to 2006 had taken the face-off with Cameroon over Bakassi with a diplomatic disposition and have been cautious not to appear as an imperialist in West Africa, probably more because of France’s likely reaction.
The implication of all the above is the crossroads these would spell for policy makers in conceiving national roles to play and polices to formulate at such dicey and delicate moments, in spite of the ennoblement of its enormous economic wealth. However, the economic capacity of Nigeria still inspires the kind of foreign policy made. Indeed, aside the diplomatic ingenuity behind the historic leadership roles played which have accorded honour to Nigeria in the African continent, the wealth of the country has also been a factor for the aggressive and capital intensive roles in West Africa and the entire continent in the 1990s and 2000s. Nigeria under Babangida, Abacha and Obasanjo pursued peacekeeping and conflict resolution missions that cost Nigeria over tens of billions of dollars. The country also could afford to give loans to other African states including Ghana, and giving of grants to Seychelles by the Obasanjo administration between 2001 and 2005 (Akinbola, 2006).
3.1.5. Objectives of Nigerian Foreign Policy
Foreign policy objectives have been defined as “the state of affairs that a state feels is most in its national interest in a particular situation” (Said, Lerche, & Lerche, 1995). Holsti views foreign policy objectives as an image of a future desirable condition that governments aspire to bring about by wielding influence abroad (1987). There are traditionalist and non-traditionalist views of foreign policy objectives. The traditional foreign policy objectives conform most of the time to the realist typology namely, security, autonomy, wealth, status and prestige. The non-traditionalist view is related to a state’s foreign policy orientations and specifically its national roles. These normally include promoting value-based objectives, such as social justice, human rights, majority rule and support for military actions for independence or any other positive end. Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives took into account both the traditionalist realist view and the non-traditionalist liberal model, conforming more to Holsti’s three-level analysis of short-, medium- and long-term foreign policy objectives (1987: 233).
The Nigerian foreign policy objectives are derived from Chapters 2, Section 19, and Sub-sections A-E of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999: 13). And they clearly stated as follows:
i. promotion and protection of the national interest
ii. promotion of African integration and support for African unity
iii. promotion of international co-operation for the consideration of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all manifestations
iv. respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and
v. promotion of a just world economic order.
The first objective is as nebulous as it is controversial. First it must be recognized that Nigeria has not yet a body of principles and values called “national interest”. There is no document in which such national interests are contained. The United States has its national interests clearly stated in several public documents, including the documents of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 2006) National interest begins with a democratic process of bringing together representatives from a cross-section of society, including the elected representatives, civil and public servants, legal professionals, university and higher institution scholars, businessmen, military, artisans, market women, and all other stake holders, to a roundtable to articulate national interest. National interest should not be the duty of government alone, or a group of political party loyalists, or military dictators. The task of the congregants would be to look at issue from their own perspectives, as the sum-total would be aggregated to come up with what is all-encompassing and “national’ in outlook. Such articulated interests would be documented, and would include interests that would be both domestically and internationally pursued. Indeed, whether domestic or foreign interests, all the nation would do in its foreign policy would be to put up an external attitude, relationship, and policies that would work towards the realization of the national interest. For now, Nigeria is far from this, and this may have explained bungled diplomacies, and non-strategic role conceptions in some cases.
The second objective has a dual role which is to promote any cause for the integration of African nations and to be actively involved in the unity of the continent. The African cause coming just after the objective of ambiguous protection of Nigeria’s national interest shows the place of importance Africa occupies in the Nigerian world-view. It is instructive to note that the concentric circle approach to foreign relations is vividly discernible in the five major objectives of Nigerian foreign policy. The first objective shows the commitment to Nigeria, the second objective encapsulates the second and third concentric circles committing Nigeria to West Africa and the continent respectively, and the third, fourth and fifth objective underlines Nigeria’s fourth concentric circle, which is a commitment to the world.
The objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy were earlier outlined in the addresses of political leaders and the country’s constitutions. At independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives declared by the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa were properly speaking, African policy. The declaration was full of innuendos of responsible national role conceptions. The goals included:
• The termination or eradication of all forms of colonialism or colonial rule in Africa.
• Eradication of racial/apartheid policy in Southern Africa, most especially Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.
• Commitment to functional cooperation with a view to promoting African unity.
• Promotion of peace in Africa and the world.
• Promotion of human dignity, especially the dignity of the black man.
• Promotion of economic development and redressing the existing disequilibrium in the international political and economic system.
It is pertinent to mention here that the second goal depicting the concern for and the subsequent practical steps to create an apartheid-free Southern Africa was the defining moment for national role conceptions in Nigeria-Africa relations after independence. Nigeria, for the first time, identified, clearly defined and effectively occupied significant roles in the Southern Africa regional struggles.
Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives have since been reinforced by the recommendations of the military-appointed Adedeji Committee on the Review of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy. These objectives not only served Nigeria’s national interest, but were also a guideline which Nigerian functionaries conformed to, and regarded as their national role conceptions or principles. It is uncertain whether Nigeria appreciates the limits of its power in its conscious effort to be an effective leader of Africa. Aluko (1981) cautioned against two particular errors based on economic and psychological misperceptions, namely:
To cast for Nigeria a role in world affairs that is clearly beyond our means [and] the psychological error made by most Nigerians in and outside government that because of the size, population, and the agricultural and mineral resources in the country we are destined to lead Africa (Aluko, 1981: 56).
Aluko may be right on the thesis of error of judgment. Nevertheless, Nigerians in and outside government pride themselves as “giant” because of these fortunes of nature, and remain essentially boosted by these factors as they articulate national interests and conceive foreign roles in Africa.
3.1.6. Basic Principles of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
The objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy are informed by a national creed or principles that Nigeria firmly upholds as a sovereign nation. Such principles, like King (1996: 45) posits, are consistent with the ideological framework which informs its policy. The conception of national roles, formulation of policies, and conduct of external relations are thus inextricably controlled by these basic principles or fundamentals. The principles have been declared, discussed or analyzed at various times (Balewa, 1964:56-58; Obasanjo, 1976; Garba, 1977; King, 1996:45-51; and Adeyemo, 2002: 94-95). The fundamental principles are geared towards protecting and advancing Nigeria’s national interest. The principles include:
• Respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of nation-states
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states
• Promotion of African unity through functional cooperation
• Elimination of colonialism and racism and the promotion of world peace, and
• Non-alignment in the Cold War struggle between superpowers and their allies
The first principle, respect for territorial integrity of sovereign states is informed by the idea that Nigeria’s ability to defend its own sovereignty is strengthened when states respect each other’s territorial integrity. Respect for territorial integrity assumes added importance in Africa where arbitrary and artificial boundaries created are subject to dispute, to engender continental and national stability. Balewa had opined that such boundaries
should be respected and, in the interest of peace, must remain the recognized boundaries until such time as the people concerned decide of their free will to merge into one larger unit. We shall discourage any attempts to influence such communities by force…since such interference could only result in unrest and…harm to the future of this great continent (Balewa, 1964:56).
Nigerian borders cut across ethnic groups, or put differently, ethnic groups in Nigeria are by colonial design cut into other geographical entities. For example, the Yoruba of the southwest are divided between Benin Republic and Nigeria. The Efik-Ibibio, Ejagham and Ogoja peoples also straddle the borders along Nigeria and Cameroon; just as the Hausa-Fulani, Shuwa Arabs and Kanuri in the north also straddle the borders along Nigeria-Niger and Nigeria-Chad. Using ethnicity therefore as basis for self-governance would spell doom, and a s such Nigeria has since the OAU Cairo Resolution of 1964, remained committed to “respect the borders existing on their (states’) achievement of national independence” (Zdenek, 1977). This respect has earned for Nigeria the trust of smaller neighbours that it has no expansionist intentions (King, 1996), with the exception of Cameroon, which from the 1980s to the 2000s had strongly insinuated Nigeria’s planned military and political expansion. This suspicion was increased by the diplomatic and military row with Equatorial Guinea, the controversy over ownership of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula, and the surreptitious and underground French incitement against Nigeria’s restless attitude in its neighbourhood.
The second principle, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states complements the first. Non-interference is not the same as non-intervention. Interference itself literally means an unwelcome involvement of an external or a second party in the national affairs of a sovereign state. Intervention however, is an acceptable development in international politics to help a state restore peace or to save a nation from an internal crisis that is becoming externalized or a huge humanitarian concern (Pogoson, 2006). The global community and African Union’s presence in Sudan is, for instance, the case of intervention which the United Nations tacitly sanctions (UN Charter, 1945). The case of interference however, has been the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 with the purported mandate to “Free Iraq and establish a democratic government of the people” (Rosati, 2006).
The principle of non-interference is one that Nigeria has not been able to fully enforce in the face of the overriding interest of the major powers, especially when African states cheaply seek help from the powers in tackling domestic issues. For instance the Kano Accord of 1979 establishing a Transitional Government of National Unity in Chad in the face of national crisis was deflated by Hissene Habre when he quit the peace arrangement to pursue a cause of toppling the entire regime. Habre sought and got the aid of the US, Egypt, Sudan and France to topple the transitional government of Weddeye in 1982. Weddeye courted and got Libya’s Gaddafi to oust. Habre to restore himself in 1983, and thereafter, there started a wild goose chase between the two as one party overthrew the other with the help of foreign nations (King, 1996: 47). Chad had thus become a client state. Nigeria became concerned because Chad, by its clientele disposition to major powers, posed a serious security risk to its Nigerian neighbour. The same goes for Benin, Cameroon and Niger, who had France’s military presence and looked up to that colonial power over every little domestic problem. However, Nigeria upholds this principle of non-interference as it relates to its African counterparts. It has not had a case of undue interference in the affairs of other African states. But it has intervened at critical moments on many occasions. Among such instances were the unilateral and subsequent multilateral intervention in the Liberian crisis from 1990 to the restoration of democratic rule in 2005, the engagement of the Sierra Leone warlords from 1994 to the eventual stabilization of the hitherto fragile democracy in that country in 1999. Other cases of Nigeria’s legitimate intervention was the resolution of the political crisis in The Gambia by the Obasanjo administration, containment of the military attempt to dislodge the democratic government of Sao Tome and Principe, and the diplomatic resolution of the Togo and Congo crises in the early 2000s.
The third principle, African unity, like the first and the second stems from the nationalist and pan-Africanist ideological orientation of its foreign policy. Promotion of African unity as a cardinal principle of Nigerian foreign policy is a cause to be approached commitedly but pragmatically- for, as Balewa put it-an understanding of one another by Africans is the first practical step to be taken before political union (Balewa, 1964: 159). It was this cautious disposition to African unity that characterized Nigeria’s own contribution to the creation of the OAU in 1963.
Nigeria’s African unity principle was tested when the Civil War that erupted over the secession of Igboland or “Biafra” in 1967 nearly tore it apart. The government of the day fought resiliently with the firm resolve to keep Nigeria together as an indivisible entity. After the war, Nigeria played a central role in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. This symbolized the fact that Nigeria believes in continental unity through functional cooperation. Nigeria also stood firmly behind Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in their liberation struggles and to wrest them from the Western chessboard used to perpetuate division in Africa. The support is borne out of the fact that the nation realizes that an unstable and a hostile international environment has to be confronted head-long if the agenda to build unity is to be realizable. The statement made by Balewa in the 1960s about Nigeria’s own agenda for African unity which other nations, including Ghana should identify with seemed prophetic, as the Obasanjo administration from 1999 charted a new course and led the new vanguard for African unity. The efforts manifested in the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 1999, which replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The repositioning of the African organization was considered important to meet the many new challenges of the continent, including war and conflict, hunger, poverty, diseases, global warming, neo-colonialism, democracy, globalization, and more (Obasanjo, 2001).
The fourth principle, elimination of all appearances of colonialism and racism is again premised on its ideological background of nationalism and pan-Africanism. One of the manifestations of racial hatred and discrimination was the evil of colonialism. Both pose a serious threat to African and black progress and unity. Nigeria thus considers itself burdened by the role to, like Balewa said “do anything towards the liberation of African countries” (1964:161) and with the responsibility to, according to Shagari (1979) “bring about the…rapid emancipation and development of all of the countries of Africa” and “ensure that all the oppressed peoples of Africa regain their freedom and dignity.” The last phrase “oppressed peoples regain their freedom and dignity” suggests that Africa would face “colonialism after colonialism” or like most Third World scholars have often put it, “neo-colonialism” which is meant to perpetuate and accomplish the long-range objective of colonialism which is political and economic servitude (Ake, 1983; Rodney, 1972). The successive political leaderships in Nigeria continued the crusade to end or at least discourage re-encroachment of colonialism through new strategies such as foreign aid, and cultural and ideological instruments. The Abacha regime was particularly anti-west, and carried out sweeping reforms in the main sectors of the domestic economy; while the Obasanjo administration attempted to promote a level-playing field with western economies through equal partnerships and foreign direct investment (Saliu, 2006b). On the African platform, the Babangida, Abacha and Obasanjo administrations led the debt reduction crusade to deflate neo-imperialism that is crystallized by the debt overhang (Saliu, 2006b: 124). All these efforts did not however mean that there were no other contradictions that still kept Africa in the economic and political gridlock of the developed nations. African states still had foreign partners with whom there was economic understanding and from whom they still got grants and loans. Some other African states were still tied ideologically, militarily and economically to their former colonial masters. Even Nigeria that was championing the course of total emancipation from neo-colonialism was still guilty of taking facilities from the Breton Woods and subjecting itself to the conditionality from the financial cartels (Akinyemi, 2008).
Non-alignment is the fifth major principle guiding Nigeria’s foreign policy. Fresh from independence, this was the primary norm guiding the foreign policy. Non-alignment as a principle is the idea by a group of states not to take sides during the Cold War, with either of the feuding ideological powers. It is distinct from neutrality in that it implies an active participation in international affairs, but such participation would not go beyond mediation and reconciliation levels in the face of East-West conflict. The judgment of issues would be based on their merits rather than from predetermined positions. For Nigeria, the “power-show” and ideological rivalry between the US and Soviet Union was considered irrelevant to the advancement of its national interest (Aluko, 1973).
Nigeria favours the principle of non-alignment because it makes it more assertive and boosts its foreign policy objective of being a regional power. The principle discourages dependency in foreign policy by asserting the right to define and exercise options in international affairs free of ideological impediments, and helps in the shattering of unhealthy colonial ties and orients the country to develop new relations toward developing countries with whom Nigeria would likely share a wider scope of common concerns. However, several scholars perceived that Nigeria was not as non-aligned as it claimed on paper. The Balewa administration was considered to be pro-West and anti-East policies. These pro-West images were possibly a result of Nigeria’s colonial experience, during which educated Nigerians were socialized into Western values (Philips, 1964). In addition, Nigerians were nurtured in all aspects of Western life, albeit primarily of the British variety, during the colonial period. The policy actions commonly cited to substantiate the claim that Balewa was pro-West were summarized by Anglin (1964) as “delaying the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; imposing restrictions on the size of the Soviet mission in Lagos, on travel to Soviet bloc countries (especially for study), and on the importation of communist literature; discouraging Soviet bloc aid and trade; proposing a ‘two-China’ policy and supporting India in its dispute with China.” The other reasons he outlined were Balewa’s conclusion of a defence pact with Britain, permitting the establishment of “secret NATO radio station” in the country, refusing to attend the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, adopting a policy of silence on Cuba and Berlin and the resumption of US nuclear tests. The other policies were collaborating with the neo-colonialists in the Congo and opposing the creation of a union of African states (Anglin, 1964: 248).
Though the Balewa administration later reversed some of these policies, the initial anticommunist policies created doubts as to its sincerity in the espousal of a non-aligned policy on East-West issues. The amended policies included lifting the bans on travel to the USSR and on Soviet literature. The defence pact with Britain was abrogated following a series of domestic protests. Trade and cultural links with East European countries were marginally opened. Following the Nigerian Civil War, it is reasoned that the state learnt a lesson about the danger of relying on one power bloc or on the same group of countries. The Nigerian government quickly discovered that the traditional suppliers of arms, the UK and its allies, were not reliable: the US absolutely refused to sell arms to the Nigerian government during the war (Ogunbadejo, 1976). The “Biafrans” had succeeded in manipulating the west by an effective propaganda instrument that Nigeria was carrying out acts of genocide on them. Also, Britain and its allies had their own interests: for these two reasons, they were not in a position to respond positively to all of Nigeria’s military support requests. Hence, Nigeria had to turn to the Soviet bloc for assistance, which came immediately. With the backing of Soviet Union, the concepts of dependence and non-alignment took on new significance for Nigerian leaders. The West was unreliable and the East was helpful (Adigbuo, 2007; Aluko, 1971). The two scenarios created here demonstrate the weakness of the non-alignment principle in Nigeria’s foreign policy and the risk of inconsistencies this portended in national role conception.
The principle of non-alignment formally characterized the foreign policies of the regimes up to 1993. In practice, it was rather the opposite. For instance, the Murtala-Obasanjo regime, despite the non-aligned posture, identified more with socialist states and openly confronted the capitalist world. The Shagari and Babangida administrations embraced western states and the latter even put up an economic diplomacy that would engage western investments in the domestic economy. The Abacha regime effectively ended the era of alignment with the west, as it began to show a bias for the isolated nations of the Middle East and socialist bloc from 1995 (Saliu, 2006b; Fawole, 2004). However, Obasanjo’s administration identified with the cause of non-alignment, but by this time, there had been a momentous questioning surrounding the continued relevance of non-alignment in the face of a globalization orchestrated by the west, and more controversial was whether the nations had ever been truly non-aligned. The nature of capitalist economic development from the 1990s to date of some of the founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), such as Indonesia and Egypt; and the socialist economic development of Yugoslavia and Tanzania further raised the need for a refocusing of the NAM (Goldstein, 2006; Ojo and Sesay, 2001).
3.1.7. Character of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
Nigeria’s foreign policy has always been characterized by three basic elements namely: secure neighbourhood-good neighbourliness, the Africa centre-piece perception and power politics popularly referred to as the “giant of Africa” perception. These three show an intrinsic paradox in Nigeria’s role perception. Promoting good neighbourliness and secure neighbourhood may be central in accomplishing the national objective of engendering regional peace and thus creating an auspicious business and economic environment for national development. The Africa giant perception would also enhance the conception and assumption of national roles in the region that would increase the approval ratings of Nigeria and possibly make it indispensable in the continent. Hence the first and third features tend to promote national interest. However, the perception of Africa as corner stone of its foreign policy would-and indeed has-engender the conception of national roles that may not be in agreement with its national interest. For instance, the many financial, material and economic aid to other African states in the midst of domestic economic depression is, to say the least, conceiving and assuming national roles that would harm its national interest. A quick discussion of these three features and perceptions would follow.
3.1.7.1. Secure Neighbourhood and Good Neighbourliness
Five basic policies that a state may adopt towards its immediate neighbours have been identified (Blake & Barck, 1960). These are: neutrality, alliances, annexation, expansion, and good neighbourliness. Nigeria has the option to adopt the expansionist policy, but chose the good neighbourliness policy in relating with countries around it. Nigeria’s neighbourhood geography shows that Cameroon borders it to the east, Benin to the west, Niger to the north, Chad to the northeast and Equatorial Guinea separated by Atlantic Ocean lines to the south. Although not sharing borders with them, Togo, Ghana and Burkina Faso can also be viewed as immediate neighbours because of geographical propinquity. However, ninety percent of the neighbours are former French colonies. France is not regarded as a trusted friend of Nigeria. A former British colony with huge economic and military potentials and ambitious Africa-centred policy, Nigeria is seen to pose a threat to France’s neo-colonial ambitions in Africa.
Moreover, the French neighbours are smaller and poorer states with weak economies and low military strength, two factors that make them largely dependent on the extra-African aid. By so doing, they render themselves as client states. Being distinct from Nigeria in colonial heritage and ideological orientations, and owing allegiance to their former masters, the immediate neighbours could compromise Nigeria’s security. A peculiar example is the unique neighbourliness Cameroon offers. There is a historical link between Nigeria and Cameroon. By the defeat of Germany in the First World War, its colonies, including Cameroon (Cameroon) were handed over to other colonial powers. By an international agreement, Cameroon was divided into the British Cameroon in the west and French Cameroon in the east. At independence, a controversy over the placement of British and French Cameroonians resulted in a UN plebiscite in 1961. The wish by northern British Cameroon to remain in Nigeria was granted, making Nigeria to integrate a good number of Cameroonians as Nigerians (Aluko, 1981: 281). However, Nigeria- Cameroon relations have not been the best as the relics of British- French colonial and ideological feud still remains. This has manifested in the protracted and fierce oil-rich Bakassi peninsula conflict.
Against this background, Nigeria believes that being good to and maintaining a cordial relationship with its neighbours is the surest way to earn their trust, confidence and ensure its security. Nigeria’s national security is thus premised on good neighbourliness (Fulani, 1989). The good neighbourliness perception of Nigeria is further reinforced by the Civil War experience, when none of its immediate neighbours allowed the use of their territories for anti- Nigerian or pro-Biafran activities. Of particular interest was Cameroon which could have encouraged the secessionist Biafra to use its territory. It rather allowed the Nigerian military to use its territory to sandwich the Biafran forces (Ogunsanwo, 1986).
Also Nigeria believes that a safe neighbourhood would ensure a safe statehood (Bulama, 1997; Arikpo, 1975). As such, Nigeria has been committed to securing the West African neighbourhood. It has been contributing to regional peace and security, occupying crucial roles in helping among others, Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Niger and Chad to stabilize their democracies or engage in conflict management.
One last footnote about good neighbourliness and secure neighbourhood: Nigeria and these immediate neighbours share socio-cultural links and historical experience in some cases. The example of Cameroon has been discussed. For instance, Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana have the Kwa-speaking group which include Fon, Yoruba, Adja, Bariba, Asante, Fante, Twi, Ewe, to mention a few. The entire region is also characterized by similar traditional religion, Christianity and Islam. The ethnic, linguistic and religious factors are natural unifying forces that have been instrumental in a peaceful neighbourhood. Nigeria’s good neighbour policy is based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of neighbours and commits the country to respect the sovereign equality, independence and territorial integrity of neighbouring states. The policy calls for cooperation among the neighbours on economic, political and security problems of common concern. Every regime has been committed to this policy since independence (King, 1996: 105).
It is pertinent to state that this good neighbourliness character is central to the subject-matter of this study. The character has informed the role conception of policy makers and the role assumption of Nigeria in Africa.
3.1.7.2. The African Centrepiece
The African philosophical saying that a wise elder cannot oversee the derailing of a growing child seems to be etched in the foreign policy thinking of Nigerian policy makers. Nigeria is considered as a mature nation blessed with political, economic, military, human and material resources, and as such should have no excuse in helping needy African nations (Obiozor, 1996). Yakubu Gowon had declared that Nigeria,
Is fortunate in having the resources potential in men, material and money to lay a solid foundation for a socio-economic revolution in black Africa. The uncompromising objective of a rising economic prosperity in Nigeria is the economic independence of the nation and the defeat of neocolonialist forces in Africa (Gowon, 1970: 67).
There is a consensus of opinion that Nigeria’s foreign policy is Africa-centered. Africa as centre-piece simply means the wellbeing of the continent occupies an important place in the foreign relations of Nigeria. This welfare ranges from liberation, to unity, security, conflict management, democracy, good economy, healthcare and good governance.
The Africa as cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy is the major focus of this study. It is the reason why the study is carried out in the first place. It is interested in knowing the extent to which Nigerian foreign policy makers bore this in mind before conceiving roles to fill in Africa and the extent of pursuit of Africa policy. There is a manifest curiosity to see how the rhetoric of the Africa cornerstone played out. The Africa-centered focus is informed by a policy orientation that assumes that Nigeria’s security can be subverted by extra-African powers acting with the cooperation of fellow African states. It also assumes that functional cooperation and unity among African states can curtail or neutralize interference in the internal affairs of African states and promote the achievement of common security and development goals. The foreign policy orientation also assumes that an unstable Africa is inimical to Nigeria’s ability to foster progressive economic, political, and social development (King, 1996: 139).
The general conceptions of roles in Africa thus boldly demonstrate the Africa-centeredness of Nigeria’s foreign policy. These roles are embossed in the foreign policy objectives (behaviour) namely: to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of African states torn by civil crisis, oppose big power entanglements in crises within or among African states, support the UN and African Union (AU) (formerly OAU) peacekeeping forces in Africa with the aim of conflict resolution, and to provide moral, material and political support for African liberation struggles against colonial or neo-colonial regimes (Idang, 1973: 45). The methods of and commitment to occupying these roles and realizing the objectives have varied with different administrations. However, the question is have there been changes to the roles and objectives to suit the changing and prevailing circumstances at each period?
Have there been new role conceptions, particularly from 1985-2005 in view of the evident new manifestations in international relations in Africa- ethnic nationalism and religious schisms culminating in civil wars, democratic dictatorship, internal colonialism, intra-African slave trade, child and girl trafficking, child-soldering, corruption, drug-peddling, et cetera? Have the role conception in Africa policy been dynamic (interactional with emerging scenarios)? Or have they been static with merely new approaches (old conceptions expressed in “dynamic” rhetorics) to fit into the newer contexts of African international relations but that cannot fix the new problems? Put differently, this study would be interested in finding out whether new roles were conceived or clearly identified and defined by policy makers, whether Nigeria filled the old roles within that period, and whether the policy makers played around old roles but rather occupied roles that they did not even conceive.
3.1.7.3. “Giant of Africa” Perception and Disposition
The second feature of Nigerian foreign policy, that is the Africa-centrepiece, demonstrates the consistent sentiments in the country’s external relations. It contrasts sharply from the first-good neighbourliness- which is prompted more by national security and interest ends. It thus means that Nigerian foreign policy is unique in Africa and the world because it actively accommodates and reflects political realism and liberal idealism, or power politics and sentiments. The political end constitutes the third feature of Nigerian foreign policy, the “giant of Africa” perception and disposition. Some scholars have expressed that Nigeria’s overwhelming financial, human and material resources commitment to Africa is a manifestation of political realism, that is, its ambition to become recognized as a regional power (Hoffman, 1996). Other scholars (Obiozor, 1996; Moyosore, 1990) have not been this cynical about the country’s proactive roles in Africa, contending that its natural and historical endowments coupled with the intense contributions and sacrifices for Africa’s progress since independence have naturally earned Nigeria honour and its leadership position in the continent. Yet, a few writers (Akinyemi, 2005; Meier, 2002; Soyinka, 1997) share the sentiment that the “giant of Africa” mentality is obsolete because the period Nigeria deserved the appellation may have been over. Now, it is contended, the name “giant of Africa” is self-imposed, undeserved and laughable because the glory has faded with the plethora of domestic problems and downslide in the economy. Such sentiment also harbours the fear that the aspiration by policy makers to earn that appellation at all cost has probably been responsible for the stretching of the economy to its elastic limits which has done more harm than good to national interest. Nigeria should thus, rather face the home-front, revitalize the economy, pursue a citizen-based diplomacy in Africa and naturally re-earn its place of pride (Onyearu, 2008; Ajayi, 2006).
Whatever sentiment is expressed, or whatever the controversy in literature, Nigeria’s foreign policy in Africa demonstrated the three features discussed, including good neighbourliness, Africa centrepiece and giant of Africa disposition. The three represent a blend of realism and idealism which distinguishes Nigeria from other ambitious nations in contemporary international system.
3.2. Determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
There are the internal or domestic and external or international environments within which Nigerian foreign policy operates. These are regarded as the determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Every state has these factors conditioning its foreign policy from perception, to conception, making and implementation.
The domestic factors in Nigerian foreign policy include geography, economy, political parties, leadership, ruling elite’s perception and attitude, public opinion, ideology, pressure and interest groups, Nigerian Constitution and the Nigerian Civil War. The external determinants include colonialism, racism-apartheid, pan- Africanism, Cold War and non-alignment, international law and world opinion, and the intentions of other states.
3.2.1. Domestic Factors
1. Geography:
The geographical factors influencing Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation include location, size, population, climatic conditions, soil, topography, natural resources and national boundaries. Nigeria is bordered by Benin to the west, Cameroon to the east, Niger and Chad to the north, Equatorial Guinea to the south. Such geographical propinquity naturally engenders external relations that closely affect its immediate neighbours. These could be characterized by aid, cooperation, conflict, hostility, fear, suspicion, intimidation, or even outright expansionism.
Nigeria’s population size has changed upwardly since 1963, reaching 100 million as of 1991-93 and over 120 million by 2006 (NPC, 2007). This makes it the most populous black state in the world. As the most populous African state, Nigerian foreign policy makers have been consistently passive and cautious about African political unity partly because many African states may not be willing to surrender their hard-won sovereignty and partly because Nigeria as the “giant” in size and population would not want to get all these lost in a political union.
Climate has imposed restrictions on the types of crops that can be grown in particular areas and their impact on international trade and national economy. Cocoa, rubber and palm produce in the south and groundnuts, millet and cotton in the north have acted as sources of foreign currency revenue for Nigeria, which has been used to pursue an ambitious foreign policy.
Availability and distribution of natural resources including oil have determined Nigeria’s confidence and freedom to manoeuvre in global politics (Adeyemo, 2002: 59) and to become Africa’s leading spokesman in the world.
2. Economy
Oil is the major driving force of Nigeria’s foreign policy today; oil is an important factor in the foreign policies of many states-with or without oil- in the international system today (Soremekun, 2003). States that have oil have earned an enviable image because of the universal importance of petroleum. States without oil still need oil and so cannot do without the oil producers, which has accorded the former with a lot of bargaining power and leverage to influence political decisions. Nigeria belongs to this group. Coupled with its agricultural richness and its huge market potentials for the world, Nigeria possesses the economic power to run an ambitious foreign policy.
Hitherto however, the agricultural viability of the country with about 70 percent of its total national revenue coming from agriculture and 75 percent of its people into farming, Nigeria was a major supplier of food, cocoa, rubber, palm produce, timber, groundnuts, hides and skin, and cotton. These were the sources of wealth in the colonial and post-colonial days with which Nigeria made impact in Africa and the world. The discovery of oil however changed the situation. Nigeria lost its agricultural culture and became a major buyer of food from Asia, Europe, US and West Africa (Mhinro, 1988).
Economic decline owing to pandemic corruption, mismanagement, political instability and poor economic policies rendered Nigeria poor and dependent on foreign aid and investment for any major reconstruction or development project. The country thus became hugely indebted and emerged as a rentier-state which western states particularly Britain took advantage and exploited the situation to their advantage. Its roles to oversee an independent, strong and indivisible Africa were thus impeded by its metamorphosis to a rentier-state (Ake, 1983).
3. Politics
The factors here include political parties, federal structure, political instability and military rule. Until 1999, political parties in Nigeria were formed along ethnic or sectional lines (Madiebo, 1980). The ethnic factor has remained a formidable domestic factor in the policy process in Nigeria. The ethnic diversity manifesting in political disunity made institutions vulnerable as there was lack of consensus on issues in the home-front that created foreign policy instability. Nigeria found it difficult to speak with one voice on foreign policy issues. Adeyemo (2002: 64) gives an account of the 1961 incident when the Eastern Nigeria Premier, Michael Okpara declared in New Delhi, India that that Nigeria would favour the formation of a third power bloc of Afro-Asian nations at a time when the Federal Government was clearly opposed to any form of power bloc. In 1965, the Hausa-Fulani Northern People’s Congress (NPC) led government of Balewa refused to recognize Israel-a state recognized as far back as 1947 by the UN- when the Israeli already had an embassy in Lagos and when the other political parties from the Christian south accorded Israel full respect. These inconsistencies created confusion about Nigeria’s stand on certain international issues. Also, it gave the country the reputation of speaking with too many voices on external issues. Another problem was the different ideological orientations of the political party. During the First Republic, the ruling NPC was capitalist, Action Group (AG) was welfarist, and the NCNC and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) were socialist. Hence, both the East and West led by the AG and NCNC respectively looked towards the socialist bloc, while the North and the Central Government governed by NPC were pro-west.
Like the scenario above, the loose federal structure had influence on Nigerian foreign policy. There were four regions and later sections in Nigeria with enormous powers. These included the East, West, North and Mid-West. The Constitution empowered them to enter into treaties or nullify those even those already entered by the Federal Government. The regions were also empowered to have their own foreign exclusive relations. But for the adjustment on and customization of Nigerian federalism by the military government, the state system that succeeded regionalism would have had certain powers to embark on foreign relations exclusively. The new federal structure from the 1970s created a cohesive foreign policy machinery and outlook (Ogwu, 1986).
Military rule and political instability have same thing in common. There is an interface between the two that could destroy the policy process. First African military coups are characterized by the removal of existing political structures, institutions and traditions. Then there is a rule by decrees and soon after there would be another coup that would follow the same process. The implications are legion. A charade of political instability follows, which rubs significantly on foreign policy process. One treaty entered into by a previous regime is discarded or disregarded by a new military junta. There are many instances, but of interest was the case of General Yakubu Gowon who, away to represent Nigeria at the OAU Summit in Kampala-Uganda in 1975, heard the news of his own overthrow in a military takeover (Oluleye, 1985). That marked the end of Gowon’s foreign policy, policy statements made or agreements reached on behalf of Nigeria at that summit. In military rule, decisions or polices could also be made by the military command without any resort to public opinion or parliament for proper policy making process. The military did whatever it considered right with national interest defined from a parochial perspective. The good aspect of military rule and foreign policy in Nigeria was that its foreign policy was Afrocentric as it seemed to understand the Africa centrepiece, more than democratic government. Its arbitrariness was also a blessing in disguise. Because of the absence of democratic encumbrances and its dispatch about decisions, military regimes acted swiftly without any challenge or delays. No wonder, Nigerian foreign policy during military rule-despite some flops-was on the overall success story (Fawole, 2003).
4. Leadership
The foregoing discourse points to leadership as a deciding factor in all cases of foreign policy making and implementation, success or failure. The leadership style, orientation, ideological leaning, experience and will are the basic factors. All of these also have an overall impact on the quality of political leadership. The 1960s and 1970s have been described as the best years of Nigeria’s external relations. This can be attributed to the quality of leadership of the time. The lowest times of Nigeria’s international relations were the period 1993-1998. That can also be attributed to leadership. The conception of roles to play in Africa or the lack of it depends on the political leadership. The main thrust of this study is to examine the place of leadership in roles conception in the foreign policy process.
5. Ruling Elites Ideology
This is also related to leadership and politics discussed above. The ruling elite in Africa-Nigeria inclusive- wield enormous influence and power over the foreign relations of their countries. Indeed, the personal or group interest of those individuals translates to the national interest of those states (Aluko, 1981: 10). It is even believed that the field of foreign relations is the exclusive preserve of the President or Head of State. Whenever there is a change of government therefore, it is assumed that there has been a change in the external behaviour of the state (Aluko, ibid). Therefore, the ideology of such leaders would influence their foreign policies. For example, where rulers are militant, one can expect a radical foreign policy stance from their states. Murtala Mohammed of Nigeria is a typical example. But where the rulers are conservative with aristocratic background like Balewa, a moderate and cautious foreign policy can be expected (Adeyemo, 2002: 69).
6. Pressure and Interest Groups
In the introductory discussion of this study, one of the three basic assumptions of role theory mentioned was role expectations of the public/society: about what roles policy makers should play in the policy process and role expectations of Nigeria in Africa. Pressure and interest groups belong in this category. They are organized associations that operate to obtain favourable policies from the government. Any pressure group should have numerical strength, financial resources, knowledge (Opene, 1983), people in government, or posses disruptive instruments as strike action, riot, et cetera to get government to its side. Pressure groups and public opinion share a lot in common. Pressure groups hold and voice out opinions in most cases to make themselves heard. The groups could be professional organizations, labour unions, media, student bodies, and so forth. The groups exert influence on government and affect foreign policy formulation in Nigeria (Ojo, 1999). For instance, the demonstration by the student body in Lagos against the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact in 1960 resulted in a quick revocation of the pact (Ajibola, 1978). The pressure mounted on the Babangida regime by the Christian community to stop the contemplation to take Nigeria into the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) compelled the regime not to make the attempt. Also the enormous pressure on the Abacha regime by pro-democracy activists, National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), oil workers, academic staff and labour union, among others, affected both the domestic and external environments of Nigeria’s foreign policy and its international relations at the time. Abacha started “transition to civil rule program”, sought new allies in the face of western hostility towards his poor human rights records exposed by the pressure groups, and was consequently isolated. Pressure was mounted on the Obasanjo administration by business moguls and the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria to liberalize the economy and place more power on local entrepreneurs to create an atmosphere for them to favourably compete with the foreign investors in the oil, manufacturing and telecoms sectors (Business Day, 2008)
7. Nigerian Constitution
The most credible source of foreign policy objectives and by extension the greatest influence and guide to the foreign policy of a state-at least during civilian rule-is its constitution. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states in clear terms what the roles or foreign policy behaviour should be. The Constitution also states the roles each policy maker should occupy in the business of the state.
8. Military Might
The most important determinant of foreign policy is military might or power. It is pertinent to militarily weak nations pursue weak foreign policies. They quickly compromise of what should be their national interest in the face of a stronger power, may concede more easily in bargains because of fear of the consequence of recalcitrance, and could open up their territory for stronger nations to establish military bases in the thin hope that they would either be protected, or benefit by way of training and weapons acquisition, thus mortgaging their sovereignty. Conversely, stronger nations pursue ambitious foreign policies. The United States, Russia, Germany, Britain, and China have always pursued very ambitious foreign policies in view of their military capabilities. Nigeria’s foreign policy has been ambitious regionally; but its military might is dwarfed in the global context by the level of technological and economic advancement that now go along with military innovations.
9. Level of Technology
The global system today is driven by technology, and nations with technological advancement control the world. The technological innovations vary, from transportation devices, communication, telecommunication, construction, to warfare devices, technologically advanced nations effortlessly rule the world and have better bargaining power and leverage in global politics. The traditional technological powers have been USA, Russia, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and China; however India, Malaysia, and the Asian Tigers are beginning to come up strongly because of their technology advancement. Also, some nations deliberately pursue high-power calibrated weapons in order to command some awe and respect in the global system. Nigeria is a low-level technology country with technology playing a rather diminishing role in its foreign policy.
3.3.2. External Factors
1. Colonial Heritage/Legacy
Colonial heritage has been exhaustively discussed. Colonial heritage has bequeathed to Nigeria its set of allies, its policy orientation, political ideology and where its post-colonial external loyalty would lie. Its natural allies would be the countries that have the same lingua franca of English language and similar colonial experience. Hence members of the Commonwealth would be its immediate economic and social partners.
2. Cold War and Non-Alignment
First it must be understood that the Cold War era is gone and plays no more role in the foreign policy of most nations of the world, including Nigeria. However, the Non-Aligned Movement still exists as a body, and while it also has little or no role in the contemporary foreign policy of Nigeria, it was influential in the 1970s. As a principle of foreign policy of states, members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) believed in a policy of independence based on peaceful co-existence, non-participation in military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact), support for liberation movements and refusal to the Great Powers of facilities for the establishment of military bases on the soil of the NAM (Idang, 1973: 231). These principles were exhibited in Nigerian foreign policy behaviour or roles during the Cold War. However, like it was also identified earlier, the principles were ignored at some points. For instance, the Balewa government was not true to its word about non-patronage of either bloc when it banned all socialist literature and was hostile to Soviet Union but maintained a close relationship with the western powers even to the point of signing the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact (Aluko, 1981: 173). The many contradictions in the NAM principles from the 1970s to the 2000s by member-states, including Nigeria, and the controversies raising the need for a refocusing have been discussed.
3. Intentions of Other States or Principle of Reciprocity
The realistic assessment of the intentions of other states with which Nigeria interacts constitutes an important variable conditioning Nigeria’s foreign policy and external relations. Generally, this principle of reciprocity requires that a nation would treat other states on the basis of how they treat its own citizens. The problem with this principle is that Nigeria could go to war or be in conflict with another state if it lacks the capacity to identify that state’s intentions. Conversely, the country may trust a wrong nation because it fails to know its intentions. However, if a nation can identify the intentions of other states, which would definitely, determine its policy towards them. This new proposition christened ‘citizen-centred’ foreign diplomacy by Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ojo Maduekwe in 2007, is an example of foreign policy based on the intentions of other states. The principle holds that Nigeria would relate to any nation exactly the way the country relates to it, and that it would treat foreign nations the way they treat its own citizens (Onyearu, 2008: 2). Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Yaradua may thus be departing from the traditional Africa-centred economically sacrificial and expensive policy to a citizen-centred foreign policy to suit the prevailing circumstances. This should elicit scholarly debates and studies in the near future.
Other external determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy include international law and world opinion, international organizations such as the UN and AU (OAU), policies of the superpowers, and global and regional problems. These external factors are systemic in nature for, they are international issues, events or actions that precipitate a reaction from Nigeria.
3.3. Machinery for the Implementation of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
This section discusses the machinery for foreign policy formulation in Nigeria. While it examines the formulation process generally, there is more emphasis on the period between 1960 and 1984, for two reasons. First, the machinery of the 1960 to mid 1980s has since been modified and is different from the period of study (1985-2007). Second and as a corollary to the first, the new machinery would be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. It is also worthy of note that there had been changes in nomenclature of portfolios, such as Ministry or Minister of External Affairs (MEA) to Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Permanent Secretary to Director-General, and so on. However, this study would maintain the reference to or use of the “MFA” in all cases.
In military rule, all democratic institutions meant to formulate and implement foreign policy are absent. The constitution is suspended, the structures are sacked and the institutions dissolved or weakened. Foreign policy making and implementation become the exclusive tasks of the military head of state and the high command. This is particularly so because of the hierarchical nature or stratification of the military with a top-down flow of power. The head of state may engage whomsoever he wishes for implementation of the policies. There is therefore the fusion of roles in foreign policy making. The perception, conception and infusion of roles at the foreign policy formulation stage, and the performance of roles and execution of foreign policies become the tasks of the military ruler and his cabinet. Most times, the foreign policy behaviour (roles) of Nigeria is actually the extension of the individual attitude and disposition of the head of state. The group factor which the role theory stresses also comes to play because the head of the military junta thinks and acts in line with his group (military) background and his actions are in fulfilment of his military traditions and objectives (Fawole, 2003; Jemibewon, 1978).
It is pertinent to note that the military principally follows the institutional structure of external relations (except the legislative bodies) and engages the civilians and foreign policy institutions in the art of foreign policy making and implementation. Policy and research centres such as the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Development Policy Centre (DPC), Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), universities, civil service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and non-governmental institutions constitute a pool from which military governments get their personnel, ideas and strategies for external relations.
In democratic dispensation, the formulation and implementation of foreign policy are shared responsibilities. But the constitutional head of a foreign policy process is the President. In reality however, the President is constrained by the group factor: his cabinet (particularly his kitchen cabinet), his political party, the legislature and the electorate. The three basic characteristics of the “role” thesis namely, perception of policy leaders of the roles they occupy in policymaking, expectations of the society/public about the roles the policy makers should occupy, and interpretation of the roles occupied by the policy makers, come to active play. This is at the local level or domestic environment of foreign policy. At the external level, the three features- perception of leaders about roles Nigeria should occupy in Africa, expectations of the citizens and the international public about roles a big country like Nigeria should play, and the interpretations of the roles Nigeria occupies in Africa by the leaders- also come to play.
The next stage of foreign policy after formulation is implementation. This is vested in the Executive organ of the government. The first stage in foreign policy implementation is what has been referred to as persuasive explanation (Olusanya & Akindele, 1990; Gambari, 1989). This is a crucial stage and this stage is also crucial to this study because that is when national roles already identified at the formulation stage are defined or vaguely conceptualized, updated or recycled. Very clear explanation is required at this level because of the sensitive tasks, including the pursuit of national interest (a role set) and carrying out of policy objectives (that is the national behaviour, a more delicate role set) (Adigbuo, 2005: 34). The consequences of a poor communication at this definition and policy explanation stage may be dire. Another task at this stage is to identify and explain the instruments of policy from among inducements or rewards, deprivations, threat, force, diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and the use of good offices. Others include exchange of visits by heads of state and top government functionaries, foreign and technical aid.
In the implementation of foreign policy, the MFA is the most important apart from the Presidency. The Ministry started as the Nigerian Foreign Service in 1957, with a division of it created in the Prime Minister’s Office for the purpose of dealing with matters relating to Commonwealth and Foreign Relations. Following the attainment of independence, the Balewa administration created the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations to handle Nigeria’s foreign affairs (Adeyemo, 2002: 95). Balewa combined the duties of external affairs with his official duties until the appointment as minister of Jaja Wachukwu in 1962 (2002: 96).
Table 2 below shows the structure of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) by 1966. Note that the bureaucracy was strictly occupied by career diplomats and civil wants. From 1966 however, the military brought in the political; appointee, the Commissioner for External Affairs, to head the ministry.
[pic]
Source: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, 2009.
There is, as shown in table 2 above, a foreign policy bureaucracy headed by the Minister ably assisted by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry. The ministry is made up of basically trained or career diplomats from whom the MFA, ambassadors or envoys and Special Advisers are sometimes appointed. In the organizational structure of the ministry as of 1960-72, closely following the Permanent Secretary is the Head Administration (Overseas Communication Services) and the next is the Head Africa coming ahead of other heads, which underscores the priority given to Africa matters in Nigerian foreign policy (Olusanya & Akindele, 1990: 56). The Nigerian Foreign policy bureaucracy has served (and continues to serve) as an important mechanism for the implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy goals and objectives. During the First Republic, it was difficult to ascertain with any precision the role played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the degree of influence exerted by the Foreign Minister. The Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, took personal interest in the in the formulation and execution of policy. Aluko observes that for the first ten months of independence, the Prime Minister remained his own Foreign Minister. In addition, the Prime Minister preferred policy papers on foreign relations from the Cabinet Office to those emanating from the External Affairs Ministry (1981). This style was similar to what obtained in the most of the years of the Obasanjo era from 1999 to 2007, even though he had several foreign affairs ministers, including junior ministers and a long list of personnel in his foreign policy bureaucracy.
Under the military regime, however, activism and dynamism in foreign policy created a more visible role for the Ministry. The Minister (then referred to as Commissioner) of External Affairs (See figure 1) became integrated with the policy making authority. Okoi Arikpo, Joseph Garba (both External Affairs Commissioners) enjoyed pre-eminence in foreign policy making and execution. This was also true of Nwachukwu (1988-1993) and Tom Ikimi (1995-1998), both of them Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Adeyemo, 2002: 96).
Incidentally, the 1979 constitution excluded the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the constitution’s list of membership of the Defence Council. This omission underscores his role as the President’s principal assistant for the formulation of foreign policy and conduct of diplomacy. In practice, however, Professor Ishaya Audu, -the Minister of External Affairs – assumed a central role in Nigeria’s foreign policy and international affairs. He made public pronouncements on crucial international problems affecting Nigeria and he worked closely with his Ministry. The Presidential system of government practice between October 1979 and December 31, 1983 points to an enhanced role not only for the Ministry of External Affairs, but also for other Ministries and agencies like the Defence Ministry and Information Ministry, Also, under the 1979 Constitution, the Senate was empowered to give its advice and consent to nominee for Ambassadorial appointment.
Table 3 below shows the restructuring in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showing the major departments and ranks in the Ministry from 1972 to 1979, when the military quit the political stage.
[pic]
Source: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is primarily charged with the duty of managing Nigeria’s foreign relations with the outside world through carefully thought-out, formulated and well-coordinated foreign policy. The duties have been classified into four broad categories, including political, economic, consular and administrative (Adeyemo, 2002:98; Harr, 1969: 40). These duties cover representation, protection of Nigeria’s nationals abroad and the pursuit of trade and investment interests (MFA, 2007). The ministry also serves as clearing house for negotiations and conclusions of various bilateral and multilateral economic agreements and protocols. Even where it relinquishes certain duties to other relevant arms or bodies of government due to the technical nature of the issue, it remains responsible for the background information, political advice and follow-up actions (Adeyemo, 2002: 99). Speaking of advice, the MFA also serves as an advisory body to the President or Head of State on external affairs matters.
Table 4 below shows a more broadened Ministry showing major restructuring and the expansion of the offices of political appointees, including Junior Minister or Minister of State.
[pic]
Source: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.
The major ranks in the MFA involved in the implementation of policy objectives were the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs (HMFA), Director-General (DG); Deputy Director-General (DDG), International Economic Cooperation Department (IECD); Assistant Director-General (ADG), Bilateral Economic Cooperation Department (BECD); ADG, Multilateral Economic Cooperation Department (MECD); ADG, Trade and Investment Department (TID); and two Deputy Assistant Directors-General (DADGs) for each department (MFA, 2005).
The Nigerian Foreign Service has witnessed a rapid growth over the years. For example, in 1960 there were very few Nigerian Diplomatic Missions, but the Nigerian Civil War (1967-January 1970), many Missions were opened in order to disseminate war propaganda. In 1979, there were 79 Nigerian Missions abroad. Under the Presidential System of government or during the Shagari administration (October 1979- December 31, 1983), the Nigerian Missions abroad were increased from 79 to 92 (in 1982) for political reasons or patronage. However, several of the Missions were closed down during the Buhari/Idiagbon regime due to worsening economic situation in Nigeria. By 1984, four Missions were closed by the Babangida administration due to economic considerations. The Babangida administration from 1985 brought its own innovations into the Nigerian Foreign Service and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, creating more departments and units to cater for Nigeria’s ambitious power politics and economic diplomacy (Akinyemi, 2005). Twists and turns in the Ministry, the need for capacity to meet prevailing challenges, and political considerations of the groups in power were compelling factors in the several cases of organizational restructuring of the Ministry. The military exit of 1999 also prompted certain overhauling. The Obasanjo administration carried out reforms in the Nigerian international scene as he restructured the entire Foreign Service. What was noticeable as from 2001 was a bloated foreign policy bureaucracy, which was deemed necessary because of the dire straits in Nigeria’s external relations which needed to be straightened then (Lamido, 2002).
The Table 5 below shows the very recent changes in the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This shows a bloated foreign policy bureaucracy, which is a legacy of President Olusegun Obasanjo.
Table 5 Additions to the Structure of the MFA as at 2007
|Current Positions |
|Minister of Foreign Affairs |
|Permanent Secretary - Foreign Affairs |
|Junior Minister of Foreign Affairs (1) |
|Junior Minister of Foreign Affairs (2) |
|Director of Budget |
Source: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.
The table above shows few but very significant changes in the structure of the MFA. The MFA is now being assisted by two junior ministers or Ministers of State. Also very significant is that the junior ministers, unlike before the civilian dispensation, would now be subordinate to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, who should originally be the head of the organization.
The changes over the years in the structure of the Ministry were not just routine. The major aim has been to make the Foreign Service more effective in the formulation, articulation (in the absence of the National Assembly, especially the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Armed Forces Committee), and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives (Aminu, 2008). Although the Ministry is the official machinery for implementing Nigeria’s foreign policy matters, some relevant Home Ministries such as the Federal Ministries of Education, Finance, Information, Defence, Internal Affairs, Trade and Industries, Sports, Agriculture, Culture and Tourism, among others, are also involved in the process of formulating and implementing Nigeria’s foreign policy decision.
The next chapter amplifies the discourse here as it examines the politics of role conceptions in foreign policy making process in detail.
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Chapter Four
The Evolution of Role Conception and Nigeria’s African Policy
Nigeria’s colonial experience, population, physical size, vast natural resources and enviable military capacity have given it a towering stature that have placed a lot of burden squarely on its shoulders (Ajayi, 2006: 114; Akinyemi, 2005; Shaw, 1987: 42). The country’s leaders too have imposed on the country a huge burden of leadership roles to fill in the continent. These give practical expression to the basic assumptions of the role theory namely, perception of policy leaders, expectations of the international public and interpretations of the policy leaders of the roles a state occupies in the international system. Shortly before independence, Prime Minister Balewa had captured what would be the foreign policy behaviour or roles of Nigeria in Africa years to come. On August 20, 1960 at the Federal House of Assembly, Balewa had declared that Nigeria was,
Adopting clear and practical policies with regard to Africa; it would be our aim to assist any country to find solution to its problem (Al-Hassan, 2009: 2).
The declaration by the Prime Minster was a declaration or conception of national roles and a foreign policy behaviour that was Afrocentric, or Africa-centred. This chapter takes a careful look at the historical development of role conception in Nigeria-Africa policy. It examines the types of roles conceived from the beginning of nationhood by the founding fathers, the long-term impact of these role typologies on the formulation and implementation of Nigeria’s policy towards Africa, and attempt to establish if the roles and Africa policy were static or dynamic as each regime came on board.
4.1. Role Conception in Nigeria’s African Policy
The idea of national role conception in Nigerian foreign policy appears not to be a popular one because very sparing reference is made to it in literature. This is probably because roles are not understood to be the “foreign policy behaviour” of a state. However, some scholars have applied this line of thought to examine Nigeria’s external relations. These include Fawole, who did a doctoral thesis titled ‘National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy: Nigerian African Diplomacy under Military Rule, 1970-1979”, (1990); and Adigbuo (2005) whose doctoral thesis specifically focuses on “Nigeria’s National Role Conceptions and its Southern African Policy: The Case of Namibia”. Both Fawole and Adigbuo specifically adapted Holsti’s role conception analyses (1967, 1970 & 1987). Obadare (2001) and Gambari (1986) in some other works have also examined Nigeria’s foreign policy within the context of national role conception. The thought that the foreign policy of every sovereign state would probably always be underlined by role conception was originally Holsti’s. Therefore, to have a clear understanding of national role conceptions or foreign policy behaviour, a grasp of Holsti’s role conception analysis has always been necessary as the other writers have demonstrated. Indeed the history of national role conception in foreign policy is incomplete without Holsti. His inquiry was into how foreign policy makers perceive their states and the roles they should play in the international system. To arrive at a typology of national role conceptions, he reviewed a large number of speeches, parliamentary debates, radio broadcasts, official communiqués and press conferences of 71 governments, found in 972 different sources. These sources provided evidence of 17 role conceptions. Holsti’s thesis is characterized by four main assumptions:
1. Foreign policy makers have national role conceptions
2. Role perceptions by political leaders are more influential than the role
Expectations or prescriptions of the external environment in the conception
of external roles or shaping of foreign policy behaviour;
3. The sources of national role conceptions are a complex mixture of location,
capabilities, socio-economic characteristics, system structure and the personalities of leaders; and
4. The consequences of national role conceptions include both a constraining effect upon foreign policy behaviour for a particular nation as well as a type of input that affects stability and change in the international system (Holsti, 1967; 1987).
Holsti’s work can be reduced for analytical purposes to three specific fields: Cold War-oriented role conceptions, role conceptions with non-aligned orientations; and regionally oriented role conceptions. Six of the national role conceptions outlined by Holsti are typical of Cold War orientations. They are faithful ally, anti-imperialist agent, and defender of the faith, bastion of the revolution, regional protector and protectee. There are several role conceptions that reveal non-aligned orientations in the Cold War. These are independent, active independent, mediator-integrator, bridge and isolate. Lastly, there are other role conceptions identified by Holsti that can be classified as regionally directed: liberation supporter, regional subsystem collaborator, developer, internal development and example (Holsti, 1967; 1980).
These classifications of the orientations (Cold War role conceptions, non-aligned role conceptions and regionally oriented role conceptions) reinforce the earlier discourse on the ideological and historical backgrounds from which roles and foreign policies are formed. The classifications are of particular relevance for the present study as they provide theoretical thrusts and understanding for the measurement of the role types conceivable by Nigerian policy makers at certain points in its history, and to determine whether there was a vague or no conception, or whether the policy makers simply danced around old rhetorics and occupied roles that were not conceived. It is also instructive to note that Holsti’s postulations were a product of study of 71 governments, including developing and newly emergent states in the 1960s. This period also coincided with the era of an aggressive pro-African foreign policy by Nigeria. His works were therefore not stereotypes of the American system but a comparative study of national roles.
Nigeria’s roles in the 1960s suggested Cold War orientation of regional protector. That was why Nigeria joined in the protection of Africa and the newly independent countries from ideological infiltrations that may erode its hard-won self rule or jeopardize its unity. This was closely related to the non-aligned role orientations as well in which Nigeria seemed to have conceived mediator-integrator roles. For instance, Nigeria was a member of the ad hoc commission of the OAU set up to resolve the border conflicts between Morocco and Algeria and between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya during 1963-1964. In 1965, when the Assembly of States set up the 21-member Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, a Nigerian jurist in the person of Mr. Justice M.A. Odesanya was appointed Chairman. An outstanding feature of Nigeria’s policy of mediation was the growing reluctance to refer African issues to the UN, where external influences could complicate them (Aluko, 1973). Nigeria also served as mediator in the conflict between Zaire and Angola over the Shaba crisis, in the disagreements between Uganda and Tanzania in the 1970s, and in the effort to influence the release of French and Swiss nationals held by rebels in Chad in the early 1980s (Delancy, 1983).
Since the 1970s, Nigeria’s national roles have had the appearances of Holsti’s regionally oriented roles which include liberation supporter, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer. These have manifested in the anti-apartheid and liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe (Adigbuo, 2005). Other ways these have played out included the establishment of ECOWAS as a facilitator of functional cooperation; and the recent creation of the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) with the objective of regional socio-economic development.
4.2. Role Conception by Founding Fathers
The phrase “founding fathers” of Nigeria refers to the architects of Nigeria’s independence and makers of modern Nigeria through their active contributions in colonial parliament, civil service, educational institutions, independent press, and trade unionism. The colonial experience was both unpalatable and eye-opening. The brutish and exploitative nature of colonial rule had increased the tempo of decolonization and set the tone for a post-colonial way of life: a life of freedom for Nigeria and all states around it. This was premised on the fact that there was no alternative to liberty if a people must grow, and also that freedom for all would guarantee its own freedom as well.
The eye-opening impact was a manifestation of the contradictory nature of colonialism itself. Colonial authorities encouraged western education and religion, from which literature about equality, democracy, liberation revolution, et cetera led to the emergence of second generation nationalists and opened the eyes of first generation nationalists. Also, the world wars between 1914 and 1945 with an interval of 1918-1939 were fought for freedom. These had far-reaching effects on nationalism in Nigeria. The wars showed the lack of any moral basis for Europe to keep other peoples in bondage, and they shattered the myth of white superiority and invincibility as Nigerians now realized that, like others, the white man could also nurse fear or die.
Foremost nationalists in Nigeria included Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Anthony Enahoro, Pa Imoudu, Obafemi Awolowo, Aminu Kano, Ladipo Solanke, and Ahmadu Bello. They used every means within their reach, including rallies, newspapers, strike actions, books, organized protests, parliament, political organizations, constitutional conferences, and so forth to fight colonialism. Through their speeches, addresses and writings, they articulated their idea and thought about Nigeria and Africa. From their perceptions, Nigeria’s might, array of enlightened nationalists and a bloated group of educated elite had placed Nigeria at the centre of some unavoidable roles to play in a post-independence Africa. Their thoughts and ideas, particularly when some of them took over the reins of power at independence, laid the foundation for national role conceptions in Nigeria’s foreign relations. Nnamdi Azikiwe had appealed to nationalist sentiment thus:
Britain (and the west) cannot be fighting a war of liberation and yet keep (us) in political bondage… (African) soldiers are now shedding their blood. In the deserts of the Middle East, in the jungles of Burma, in the wilds of North Africa, in the mountains of East Africa, they are sacrificing in order to make the world safe for democracy. They fight and die so that…the rest of the world may have life and enjoy political freedom…Will their sacrifice be in vain? (Azikiwe, 1943: 60).
Also, Obafemi Awolowo added voice to the clarion call:
It is not infrequently the case that Africans demand that something should be done for them simply because it is being done for the Europeans…There is a burning desire to demonstrate that the Africans too can do what Europeans can do. This is natural and legitimate (Awolowo, 1966: 112).
National roles conceived for Nigeria shortly before and at independence were Africa-centred. One could therefore say that Nigeria’s African policy is as old as the Nigerian state itself. The notion that Nigeria was destined to lead the African continent and champion the cause of blacks all over the world actually predates its attainment of independence in 1960. This conviction has remained strong almost forty years after independence. More ironically, in the past, its most strident articulations have remarkably coincided with periods of social and political stress when national morale was expected to touch its lowest ebb. Perhaps the explanation for this tenacity is to be found in the national role conception which most Nigerians, including the political elite, have about the country. The sources of this conception are obvious enough and relate to the country’s often-repeated demographic preponderance, its economic and natural endowments, and its staggering human resources (Obadare, 2001).
Addressing a public gathering in London on July 31, 1959, two months before the country’s independence, Nnamdi Azikiwe, soon to become its first President, contended that
It should be the manifest destiny of Nigeria to join hands with other progressive forces in the world in order to emancipate not only the people of Africa but also other peoples of African descent from the scourge of colonialism (Azikiwe, 1961: 64).
On the perception of Nigeria as a natural leader, which has also been evident in the role occupied at independence, the arrogant reaction to Nkrumah’s perspective of Africa’s political union by Tafawa Balewa is a typical example:
Nigeria is big enough and does not need to join others… if others wish to join Nigeria, their position would be made clear to them in such a union” (cited in Phillips, 1964: 90).
Role conception by the founding fathers of independent Nigeria was therefore very clear and devoid of any ambiguity. The declared roles were occupied in Africa and these were evident in Nigeria’s African policy from 1960.
4.3. Concept of Nigeria’s African Policy
The concept of Nigeria’s African policy denotes a set of principles guiding Nigeria’s foreign policy that lays a strong emphasis on the wellbeing of the African continent. It goes beyond just a set of policies towards Africa (Saliu, 1999: 93). According to Saliu, Nigeria’s foreign policy concentric circles approach, ranking Nigeria’s policy objectives, including maintenance of world peace, defence and protection of the territorial integrity of Nigeria, promotion of the economic wellbeing of Nigerians and Africans, and eradication of all forms of colonialism and racism from the continent, showed that the country’s foreign policy was more pro-African than pro-world (Saliu, ibid).
Adigbuo (2005: 101-103) has the same perception of Nigeria’s African policy. According to him, the principles were strongly Afrocentric. He summed them up as:
1. Support for the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
2. An anti-apartheid/anti-colonial preoccupation
3. Intra-African economic cooperation
4. Commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts.
It is appropriate to provide a brief insight into these strands of Nigeria’s African policy.
A) Support for the OAU, Intra-African Cooperation and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes:
The idea of African unity was institutionalized in May 1963 as the Organization of African Unity. Nigeria played a prominent role in bringing this continental body into existence and has helped to ensure its continued functioning (Elias, 1965). Indeed, successive Nigerian governments have fervently supported the OAU with the conviction that Nigeria has a special responsibility to the OAU, a belief heavily influenced by its self-perception as a major leader in Africa. Nigeria’s interest in and support for the OAU were intensely focused. A premise consistently held by successive Nigerian administrations has been that peace and unity among African states and stability on the African continent are vital to global peace and in particular to Nigeria’s security. On the issue of the unity and security of the continent, Nigeria has since independence advocated that inter-Africa relations should be dictated principally by an acceptance of the colonially derived territorial demarcations on the continent. On the inherited boundaries, Balewa insisted that “however artificial these boundaries were at first, the countries they have created have come to regard themselves as units independent of one another” (Balewa, 1966: 6). Consistent with this premise, Nigeria believed that the OAU would provide machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. To this effect, Nigeria was guided by the following:
a. the inviolability of boundaries
b. the legal equality of states
c. non-interference in the affairs of other states
d. peaceful settlement of all African disputes by negotiation, mediation or
arbitration, and
e. promotion of functional unity and understanding among African states
through practical steps of economic, educational, cultural, scientific and
technical cooperation, as well as the expansion of diplomatic representation
in Africa.
B) Anti-Apartheid/Anti-Colonial Preoccupation:
Nigeria found the OAU useful for various functions relevant to its foreign policy objectives. In the political realm the OAU provided a platform for the projection and implementation of its commitment to the liberation struggle in Africa. Since the creation of the African Liberation Committee in 1963, the liberation of the African territories under colonial rule has been an issue area in which Nigeria has demonstrated distinct leadership. Indeed, the commitment of Nigeria to armed struggle became a crucial element of its Southern African policy (Adigbuo, 2005: 103; Arikpo, 1975). In 1971, Nigeria initiated and spearheaded the campaign at the OAU against the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals, which Okoi Arikpo, Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, described as an exercise that tended to sacrifice the interests of five million Zimbabwean Africans to those of 250 000 minority white settlers (Arikpo, ibid). Nigerian leaders after independence understood racial discrimination and apartheid in particular as an insult to the integrity of the African wherever he might be. When that perception is matched with South Africa’s role during the Nigerian Civil War, the minority regime in Pretoria was taken as a security threat. On the tenth anniversary that marked the end of Nigeria’s Civil War, Shagari proclaimed at the OAU Summit in Freetown, in July 1980:
We must not relent in our struggle against the forces of apartheid… We must strive for the total elimination of the apartheid regime and the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of South Africa as a whole (Shagari, 1980: 210).
C) Intra-African Cooperation:
The identification by the Nigerian government of the OAU as a problem-solving mechanism and unifying African force did not wane. The country went ahead to be part of the formation of the ECOWAS, a functional cooperation mechanism among West African nations, in 1975
D) Commitment to Dispute Settlement:
Regional issues and conflicts, such as the disputes over Western Sahara, Chad and the Horn of Africa, were presented to the OAU at Nigerian insistence. Nigeria ardently believed that Africans themselves should solve African problems – a stance taken to dissuade or minimize foreign intervention in African conflicts (Adigbuo, 2005: 103; Ogwu, 1986: 83).
The subsequent sections now take a specific look at the conception of national roles in the making and implementation of Nigeria-Africa policy and how Nigeria occupied each in Africa under subsequent administrations from 1960 to the first half of 1985.
4.4. The Balewa Administration
The role conceptions of the Balewa administration were clear, but there were no bold policy initiatives to implement its Africa policy or overcome the colonial legacy in the continent (King, 1996: 19). The reason, some scholars have averred, was because the administration itself was characterized by moderate, conservative and pro-British, pro-west stance (Idang, 1973: 55), with a reluctant disposition to some delicate African issues like political union. This posture was also probably as a result of the fact that independence was just newly won with insufficient sentimental and ideological detachment from the west. However, the undeniable fact also was that Balewa himself was of an aristocratic background with a conservative attitude, which suited the British in the continent for future ties (Ikime, 1985). For instance, Balewa demonstrated his knack for compromising the Africanist principle of Nigeria’s foreign policy in 1960 when he entered into the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact permitting the British to establish a military base in Nigeria, contrary to the Nigerian foreign policy principle of non-alignment and “Africa’s freedom from all forms of colonialism” (King, 1996: 19, Idang, 1973: 51), and by regarding all radicalism and militancy as immoral (Idang, 1973: 52).
The opposition to “militancy” and “radicalism” was what prompted his view that the stance of Kwame Nkrumah on militant opposition to neo-colonialism and radical approach to African unity as “immoral”, asking for caution and moderation (Idang, 1973: 52-53). This created a tense atmosphere in Nigeria-Ghana relations, which negated the role conceptions of the Nigerian leadership to engage African states in good neighbourliness and to work towards the eradication of all forms of colonialism. A moderate, conservative and cautious approach like that of Balewa’s could not have led to “eradication”. Eradication is an exercise that requires revolution or radicalism like Ghana proposed. Nkrumah had opined:
African unity is above all a political kingdom which can be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only in the political kingdom (Nkrumah, 1963: 34)
Balewa had reacted thus:
We shall do everything within our power to foster cooperation among the countries of Africa…it would be pre-mature to think in terms of a common market for Africa…particular attention would be devoted to adopting clear and practical policies as regards Africa. (Balewa, 1964: 56-58, 62-70, 71-75).
“Clear and practical policies” demonstrated the vintage “pragmatism” that has been said to have characterized Balewa’s foreign policy. On Nkrumah’s African political union, Balewa had arrogantly dismissed any possibility of Nigeria’s belief in it, bluffing that “Nigeria is big enough and does not need to join others… if others wish to join Nigeria, their position would be made clear to them in such a union” (Phillips, 1964: 60). This declaration however exhibited a filling of one of Nigeria’s conceived roles at independence, namely the “manifest destiny” to lead Africa to the promise land. He cautioned that there should not be undue interference in the internal affairs of others in the name of an ambiguous political union, maintaining that the colonial artificial boundaries should be the post-independence measure of statehood for the mean time pending when Africans later become mature enough to indicate their freewill to change the boundaries or merge into a single unit (Adeyemo, 2002: 111).
The position taken above was not surprising, although it also represented the filling of another national role conceived by the Balewa administration that is a practical, gradual and responsible approach to the unity of the continent. That position however, was reminiscent of the Northern disposition towards decolonization in 1950, when the Ahmadu Bello-Balewa camp at the Constitutional Conference had vetoed Nigerian independence in 1953, voting to rather have it “as soon as practicable” (Ikime, 1985: 14; Madiebo, 1985: 45).
The first major test of the Balewa administration’s conceived roles in Nigeria-Africa policy was the during the Congo crisis of 1960. Balewa declared that Nigeria’s active support for the UN Peacekeeping Operation in the Congo, providing troops and materials, was to “see that there is law and order that is all our interest’ (Balewa, 1964: 101). The ideological undercurrents in the Congo crisis as a result of groups divided along French and Belgian lines clashing with the ultimate target being the African Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba were thus ignored by Nigeria. The UN was rather not supportive of the African Prime Minister, thus protecting colonial or neo-colonial interests (Ohaegbulam, 1982). Therefore, that Balewa ignored the basic problem of neo-colonialism in the Congo only to support the UN in maintaining the colonial status quo for the sake of “law and order” was a total negation of his administration’s role conception to emancipate African countries from all appearances of western colonialism.
The second test was on Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia). Balewa took a conservative stance in the harsh apartheid rule and unilateral declaration of independence of Ian Smith. Nigeria did not honour the OAU decision that member-sates should break diplomatic relations with Britain for tacitly supporting Smith. Balewa rather preferred to seat OAU and Britain down and settle the rift (Adigbuo, 2005: 173-75). This again was a negation of role commitment to consider African wellbeing paramount.
The Balewa administration however, occupied its conceived roles in some instances. He was among African leaders who sought continental unity. By this effort the OAU was formed in 1963, May 25. The OAU incidentally, reflected Nigeria’s perception of a more pragmatic approach to African unity. Secondly, he spearheaded the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth and Olympic Games to increase pressure on the apartheid regime to make reforms in its policy. When France tested atomic bomb in Western Sahara, Nigeria immediately severed diplomatic ties with it to protest this inhumanity to Africa (Phillips, 1964: 63-70; Adeyemo, 2002: 112).
Generally, the Balewa policy concern was primarily on decolonization of Africa and this brought him to terms with several liberation struggles; one of the focal roles of Nigeria being the support for any movement towards the total liberation of the continent. However, his approach was consistently cautious and legalistic, appealing for regard for international law in matters that required revolutionary approach. He seemed unwilling to hurt or provoke western powers and appeared to be a great patron of Britain. Indeed, he was anti-communist and several of his policies in this regard were far way off from the non-aligned principle of Nigerian foreign policy. Balewa’s foreign policy has not been regarded as dynamic, innovative or satisfactorily Africanist.
In the early part of this work and chapter, six role conceptions strands in the development of Nigeria-Africa policy were suggested-vaguely or unclearly conceived roles, absence of role conceptions, occupation of non-conceived national roles, and clearly conceived roles that were partially or never filled, lack of dynamism in role conception, and clearly conceived roles that were effectively filled by Nigeria. The sixth strand is not a lacunae but a plus for role conception, namely, clearly conceived roles that were effectively occupied. The study of Balewa’s Africa policy suggests the following: clearly conceived roles that were partially or never filled and lack of dynamism in foreign policy behaviour or role performance. The Balewa policy regime belongs here and this would represent the fourth suggestive guide in our searchlights at national role conceptions in Nigeria-Africa policy.
4.5. The Ironsi Regime
The Ironsi regime was deposed on July 29th, 1966, six months after it assumed power after the revolution of the junior and mid-ranking officers led by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu of January 15th. Hence, there is a sparing account of his foreign policy in Africa or the world. Ironsi had been actively involved in the Balewa regime. As the Supremo - that is, the highest ranking military officer in the land-his duty was to bring the armed forces to their ultimate levels of loyalty to the state and head of state. He was like the state’s de facto chief security officer of the country and hence, a major advisor and stakeholder in matters of national security and defence polices, and international security (Oluleye, 1985; Ademoyega, 1981). General Ironsi had led the Nigerian Contingent to the Congo peace mission, and had been elected the overall Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Forces to the Congo. The foreign policy outlook of Ironsi had thus been shaped by the engagement in national security and defence issues as the Supreme Commander and the head of peace mission to the Congo.
No wonder the Ironsi foreign policy did not depart from that of Balewa, his predecessor’s. He declared the continuation of the country’s belief in cordial relationship with other states, non-interference and caution in intervention in African crisis. Ironsi assured the country’s allies both in Africa and the world that his foreign policy would retain the principles of non-alignment and good neighbourliness (Adeyemo, 2002: 114). The domestic problems, including the backlash of the unification decree which was feared to be establishing Igbo hegemony in a unitary state, made Ironsi’s administration to have very little time to carry out any Africa policy or occupy any roles it defined. It is pertinent to say that even the Ironsi era was only different in the area of the fact that it was military, but it attempted to sustain Balewa’s foreign policy regime. Role conception in this era was as such static and not interactionist or dynamic.
4.6. The Gowon Regime
General Yakubu Gowon came to power through what has been described as a “counter-coup” of July 29, 1966, which ousted an Igbo man, General Ironsi. The Hausa-Igbo conflict and the Northern Nigeria pogroms (a kind of genocide) that targeted Igbos that followed from September 1966 to April 1967, made Eastern Nigeria secession inevitable. Gowon’s era thus witnessed an eventful foreign and Africa policy. Even the domestic crisis of secession and Civil War played a major role in its external relations. The era witnessed a war-diplomacy and with the secession, Nigeria became divided into two, relating with each other by war. This put Gowon in Nigeria’s worst foreign policy dilemma ever, divided in foreign policy and not knowing how to view its Eastern secessionists, whether as part of Nigeria or a separate nation. The two had distinct foreign policies and related by war-diplomacy. Indeed, at this time Nigeria rather became a source of concern for African states and the world (Stremlau, 1977). First was the implication of the Biafran war propaganda projecting the Nigerian onslaught as genocide which made the west, Nigeria’s traditional allies, to withdraw its support and war-time supplies to Nigeria. Second, Africa was divided into two camps- those that wanted an indivisible Nigeria and the group that wished to see a demystification of the Nigerian power by a successful secession of the oil-rich east (St. Jorre, 1972, chapter 8).
The war confronted Nigeria with the impact of the colonial legacy on its foreign policy. Naturally, Rhodesia under Smith and apartheid South Africa supported the separatist movement because of British prompting for Nigeria’s hard-line policy against its aiding of apartheid. But Tanzania, and Francophone countries of Gabon and Cote d’ Ivoire recognized and supported Biafra because of France’s prompting. For France, its desire was to see a dismembered Nigeria to make it less capable of challenging its West African interest and attempt at having a stranglehold on its former African colonies. However, there was overwhelming African support for Nigeria and refusal to recognize Biafra, which was a factor in the west’s inability to recognize the secessionist state. The extensive African support was reciprocity for Nigeria’s leading role in African post-independence liberation and unity. The reluctance of neighbouring West African nations to compromise and support Biafra or their former colonial master, France’s quest facilitated the victory of Nigeria in the war for unity (St. Jorre, 1972, chapter 9).
By these developments, Nigeria’s Africa roles became underlined. The Gowon administration reinforced the Africa roles conceived by the founding fathers and Balewa. However, the West African neighbours’ refusal to support Biafra engendered an updating of Nigeria’s roles in Africa. It was the Civil War experience that led to the clearer conception of good neighbourliness (King, 1996: 21). The nations bordering Nigeria were regarded as of greater security importance to Nigeria than others, and hence remaining their friends was quite pertinent. For instance, road network agreements were made between Nigeria and Benin Republic, Niger and Cameroon.
Moreover, Nigeria established joint River Basins Authority with its immediate neighbours as well as joint economic ventures. It was in line with this economic cooperation needs for permanent friendship sustenance that instigated the Gowon administration to collaborate with Eyadema of Togo to form the ECOWAS in 1975. ECOWAS was to facilitate better regional integration by the initiated protocols on the free movement of persons and goods. Nigeria was the major financier of the organization (Saliu, 1995).
Also, Gowon placed more emphasis on the centrality of Africa to Nigeria’s foreign policy. The old role conception to support all liberation movements in Africa was radically occupied by Nigeria. Gowon increased diplomatic support for nationalist movements and with the surging oil fortunes of the 1970s, increased financial contributions to the OAU Liberation Committee (Ogunsanwo, 1986). In addition to assisting the liberation movements, the regime supported the OAU’s decision to break diplomatic relations with Israel for fighting an African nation, Egypt (Olusanya & Akindele, 1989).
Also, Nigeria under Gowon conceived another role hitherto absent. This was the granting of financial and material aid to African states in critical economic situations. This was in pursuit of the role of clearing any tendencies to encourage neo-colonialism in the event of nations seeking help from the west. For instance, the strike of drought in Mali and some other countries in the early 1970s saw Nigeria lending helping hand to the Sahelian Republic (Saliu, 2006: 96; Ate & Akinterinwa, 1992; Olaniyan, 1988).
However, Gowon’s endless political transition created internal dissensions in the country which eroded his political legitimacy. This soon reflected outside the country as it flawed the moral basis of Nigeria’s Africa security and order role agenda, as the country itself suffered at home similar problems it was tackling outside. Be that as it may, national role conceptions under Gowon were defined by the prevailing domestic and international circumstances, and were effectively occupied. Gowon’s role conceptions represent our sixth of the six strands namely, clearly conceived and effectively occupied national roles in Africa. The roles were also dynamic or interactionist because they were updated to fit current situations.
4.7. The Murtala-Obasanjo Regime
This era is often referred to as Murtala-Obasanjo period because General Olusegun Obasanjo, who was General Mohammed’s deputy, also took over from the later after his assassination in a military coup six months into his reign. Obasanjo continued the foreign policy posture of his boss and predecessor. General Murtala Mohammed had the following perception of Africa in his time:
Africa has come of age. It is no longer in the orbit of any Continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes are in our hands to make or mar (Mohammed, 1976: 3).
It was this historic clarion call that set the tone for a very clear conception of roles and Africa-centred policy the military administration of the times. The 1976 Adedeji Foreign Policy Panel Review clearly set out a new policy behavior or roles as follows:
i. defence of Nigeria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
ii. creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa that would facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of all African states while fostering national self-reliance and rapid economic development.
iii. promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the world.
iv. promotion and defence of justice and respect for the human dignity of the black man, and
v. defence and promotion of world peace (Adeyemo, 1988).
These role conceptions undeniably suggest the Africa-centrepiece in Nigerian foreign policy. Otubanjo says of it:
The Murtala-Obasanjo regime pursued a foreign policy which was aggressively African in its purpose. It was a policy which brought Africa to the forefront of African politics. Running through its foreign policy was the desire not only for the total liberation of Africa from the colonial and racist yoke but equally important, the genuine independent and economic solvency of all African states (Otubanjo, 1989).
One of the high points of this proactive Africa policy of the era was the diplomatic recognition and support, in spite of strong western sentiments against it, for the Angolan government led by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The regime insisted that Africans were capable of defining their own interests, and rejected US President Ford’s attempt to pressure African countries into supporting western Cold War policies with regard to Angola, planning a public burning of the letter from Ford (Adeyemo, 2002: 116).
Towards realizing its Africa policy, Nigeria played influential roles at the regional and continental levels. It provided strong support for ECOWAS, OAU and the Liberation Committee of the latter. The African nationalist liberation movements were given enormous support in the struggle to end white minority rule in Southern Africa. The Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe was accorded recognition and distanced itself from the elections that undercut black electorate in that country. Nigeria also allowed the liberation organizations such as the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), the African National Congress (ANC), and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) to open offices in Lagos, Nigeria’s capital. By this proactive stance towards the liberation of Southern Africa including Angola, Nigeria was made a member of the Frontline States, being the only non-Southern African member of the group. Again Nigeria’s historic leading role in Africa also earned its leadership the membership and chairmanship of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (Fawole, 2003).
Nigeria also used its influence to bring pressure on western governments, including the US and Britain, to lend support to the movement for decolonization of Southern Africa, and facilitated the process that brought Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF to power in 1980 (Izah, 1991).
Nigeria had a very big universal image in 1970s because of the focused and effective Africa policy, and its loud voice matched by actions in the world. Some scholars have averred that it was Nigeria’s sudden boom in oil wealth that aided the capacity to “talk and be heard in the big club of nations.” The Murtala-Obasanjo Africa policies was multifarious and quite dynamic in role conceptions, thus negating the fifth lacunae and strand of explanation identified in this study namely, the lack of dynamism. It also falls within the sixth strand namely, national roles were very clearly defined and effectively occupied like in the Gowon regime.
4.8. The Shagari Administration
Accounts of the foreign policy of Nigeria in the era of Shagari attempt to show a meltdown in role conception (Adebo, 1988; Otubanjo, 1989; Adeyemo, 2002), but a closer look at his period shows it was not always so. The Shagari era (1979-1983) represented a civilian come-back in the foreign policy business since the exit of Balewa in 1966. This meant that the military had been at the centre of policymaking for thirteen years. The Shagari administration reiterated the Africa-centeredness of Nigeria’s foreign policy (Tijjani & Williams, 1981). Shagari declared his administration’s willingness to sustain the Frontline States’ role played by his predecessor. He pledged:
Nigeria will no longer tolerate provocations by South Africa or the dilatory tactics of her allies in the western bloc with regard to self-determination and majority rule in Namibia (Tijjani and Williams, 1981: 92).
Also the Shagari administration promised to continue to back the armed struggle in South Africa. According to President Shagari,
Sanctions alone will not destroy apartheid and racism in South Africa. They can, however, be used to support the armed struggle…We shall continue to assist, encourage and support that struggle with all our might and resources (Tijjani and Williams, 1981: 53).
Shortly after assumption of power, Shagari hosted the OAU Economic Summit, which adopted the Lagos Plan of Action. The Plan aimed to increase economic self-reliance and ensure the emergence of an African Common Market by the year 2000. The administration also provided troops for the OAU Peacekeeping Force in Chad. It was Shagari’s administration that initiated reparations from the west to Africa and the black world as a role or foreign policy behaviour of Nigeria. Shagari had brought the issue of reparation to the floor of the UN General Assembly, declaring:
Africa bears the scars of a long history of spoliation and deprivation, of the ravages of the slave trade and foreign aggression, of both political and economic injustices… I believe the time has come for the international community to address itself to the issue of reparations and restitution for Africa (Tijjani & Williams, 1981: 90-91).
This was revolutionary in the foreign policy of any black nation, in Africa or the Diaspora. This brought the issue of reparations to the front burners of international debates and became a matter of foreign policy of many other nations in the black world. The Shagari administration, as critical as it was in keeping faith to its Africa role promises, had scored a first in the Africa-centrepiece foreign policy of Nigeria and in national role conception.
However, the period was characterized by the Nigerian economic meltdown of the 1980s and the firm economic ties with the ex-metropoles. The dependent nature of the economy limited the capacity for pursuit of Africanist roles. Nigeria’s oil-dominant economy was dependent on western markets, especially the US. Oil production fluctuated and oil prices declined. Since about 95 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings came from this source, it became more difficult to use economic power as an instrument of foreign policy. The diminished economic resources meant that Nigeria was less able to back up role conceptions with performance.
The oil shocks weakened and destabilized Nigeria’s foreign and Africa policy (Ihonvbere & Shaw, 1988). There were also a general domestic crisis, precipitated by post- 1979 election controversy, intense divisions among the political elite after the 1983 polls, crass materialism in government culminating in corruption throughout the period, and severe austerity measures created a wide gulf between continental role promises and role action or performance. The challenges called for focus of attention more to the home-front than external plane, because the domestic contexts of its foreign policy had hamstrung the international contexts. The Shagari administration thus had some semblance with the Balewa administration, conceiving bogus roles but having no will or auspicious environment to occupy the roles.
There were more problems for the Shagari administration. The corruption, internal dissensions and inability to carry out its many promises led to a credibility loss in Africa. Smaller neighbours disrespected Nigeria, using its borders for illegal smuggling and bunkering along with Nigerian partners, violated its territorial integrity and disregarded any threat or warning from the Nigerian authorities. The height of these was the Cameroon and Ghana menace, which even led to the expulsion of Ghanaians and other African “illegal” aliens from Nigeria and the beginning of the hostilities with Cameroon over border and territorial claims in Cross River and Gongola (now Adamawa) states (Ate & Akinterinwa, 1992). Ghana swiftly reacted by expelling Nigerians too and a diplomatic face-off -first of its kind with Africans whose interest it vowed to protect-had thus commenced. These were a sharp departure from the good neighbourliness and big brother roles Nigeria was hitherto known for. This also generated bad blood in ECOWAS. At the continental level, Nigeria even failed to take a position on the recognition controversy over the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. This was when Nigeria’s leadership and opinion were desired most (Otubanjo, 1989: 104). Shagari’s role performance was far below the role conceptions and role expectations by Africans. Nigeria’s foreign policy remained at the level of routine observance of existing relations and obligations. In no area of foreign policy was there innovation nor a more urgent approach than had previously existed. Even in the matter of the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 which emphasized the need to focus on the economic problems of Africa, the Shagari regime was not able to provide initiative or leadership (Otubanjo, 1989: 105).. The years of his regime were, therefore, a period of recess for Nigeria’s foreign policy. It was characterized by the slowing down of the tempo and the substantial dismantling of the role expectation which the previous regime had instituted.
4.9. The Buhari-Idiagbon Regime
The regime of General Muhammadu Buhari has always been referred to as Buhari-Idiagbon regime indicating the significance of the deputy (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters), General Tunde Idiagbon in that dispensation. The leadership itself wanted to be so called, as on assumption of power on December 31, 1983, the Buhari had clearly stated that their administration was an off-shoot of the Murtala-Obasanjo regime, and that they would pursue the great cause of that dispensation (Adeyemo, 2002: 122). Their foreign policy was thus similar.
Buhari strove to give clearer form to the country’s foreign policy orientation. Africa was to constitute the area of primary concern to the country. It was also emphasized that Nigeria’s national security and economic wellbeing would constitute the axis around which revolves its foreign policy. The Buhari administration believed that the old conception of Africa being the policy centerpiece would be properly defined (Gambari, 1986: 74). According to Buhari,
A pattern of concentric circles may be discernible in our attitude and response to foreign policy issues within the continent and world at large. At the epicentre of these circles are the national economic and security interest of Nigeria, which are inextricably tied up with the security, stability and economic and social wellbeing of our immediate neighbours. One of our principal priorities is put on a more constructive footing in relations with our neighbours with whom we share identical goals of regional stability and peace (cited in Gambari, 1986: 75).
The above showcased an Africa policy with greater emphasis on actualizing national interest, while national role expectations would remain intact. The point had been made previously that national roles occupied in Africa were most times at the expense of national interest because of the many sacrifices of human, material, financial and technical resources expended. Nigeria was sometimes committed to Africa at its own economic expense, and while the home-front was in disarray, the country would still keep faith to its declared roles in Africa. However, the Buhari-Idiagbon administration sought a redefinition of this, preferring to play roles that would be beneficial to both Africa and Nigeria. This Buhari-Idiagbon approach has semblance with the new foreign policy thrust proposed by the Yar’Adua administration that stresses “citizen-centred diplomacy” (Maduekwe, 2008).
The position of the Buhari-Idiagbon was understandable from the standpoint that the basic rationale for the coup itself was to arrest Nigeria’s rapidly deteriorating economic situation, eliminate corruption, and improve the wellbeing of the generality of Nigerians. In pursuance of these reforms, the Buhari regime closed Nigeria’s land borders and expelled illegal aliens. This was expected to check widespread smuggling, but it also undermined the good neighbourliness policy to the West African countries since most of the expelled aliens were West Africans. Even so, the regime pursued an Africa-centred policy. Nigeria concluded the quadripartite agreements with neighbouring countries that provided for cooperation in security, immigration, customs, and police matters (Gambari, 1989).
Nigeria continued the mediation process in the Chadian crisis, honoured the country’s financial commitment to the OAU and helped the organization in solving the problem of famine in Africa. Nigeria’s active involvement in the Southern Africa crisis was maintained and remained a force among the Frontline States. Nigeria extended diplomatic recognition to the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), over which the Shagari administration was indecisive. The regime even facilitated the admission of SADR to the OAU. It rejected the infiltration of Africa by the two global ideological divides, and also rejected the US demand that the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military personnel from Angola as condition for Namibian independence (Alkali, 1996).
The Buhari-Idiagbon regime’s Africa policy was active, dynamic and piously pursued. The national roles were performed in accordance with the conception. Put differently, there was a balance between role conception and role performance as far as Africa was concerned, and yet the country’s national interest was not mortgaged. The period found Nigeria’s respect in the comity of African nations restored. Probably in recognition of its proactive Africa policy, Buhari was elected ECOWAS Chairman in July 1985. Buhari’s ouster in August 1985 was therefore unpopular among African states. Nigerians however hailed it because of what they considered its “highhandedness” and militarization of the state in the execution of its war on indiscipline. But the west welcomed it as they had considered the Buhari-Idiagbon regime too uncompromising. It had rejected the International Monetary Fund (IMF’s) conditionality as collateral for loan borrowing or debt rescheduling in the heat of rehabilitation of the economic situation at home. The western creditor-nations, including Britain, thus supported the overthrow of the regime on grounds advanced by the Babangida regime that it was high-handed, using the War Against Indiscipline to witch-hunt political opponents, and imposing austere economic measures that were escalating the cost of living (Forrest, 1993: 38-39; Olusanya, Ate & Olukoshi, 1988; Olusanya, Akindele & Ate, 1988).
4.10. Overview of Nigeria’s African Role Conceptions (1960-1984)
The table 6 below shows Nigeria’s role conceptions from 1960-1984. The table, which is the author’s compilation from a number of speeches sampled, and policy actions of political leaders as chronicled in literature, shows the ideological and prevailing domestic and external factors promoting a strong Pan-Africanist roles, and inhibitions at certain points. The analysis shows the differences in the degree of Afrocentrism by each political leadership from Balewa to Buhari.
Table 6: Nigeria’s National Role Conceptions, 1960-1984
|Political Leadership | Balewa 1960-1966 |Ironsi |Gowon 1966-1975 |Murtala-Obj |Shagari 1979-1983 |Buhari1983-1985|
| | |1966-1966 | |1975-1979 | | |
|No. of NRCs Speeches Sampled |3 |1 |3 |5 |3 |3 |
|Clarity of NRCs |Good |Poor |Fair |Very Good |Fair |Good |
|Perception of Nigeria (Role |Continental Leader |Vague |Regional Power |Continental Power/ |Continental Power |Continental |
|Profile Status) | | | |Liberator | |Power |
|Motivational Orientation(s) |Nigeria as |Vague |Nigeria as |Nigeria as Liberator|Nigeria as |Nigeria as |
| |Protector | |Regional Leader | |Liberator |Hegemon |
|Substantive Problem Area(s) |South Africa/ Congo|Southern Africa |South Africa/ |Southern Africa |South Africa |S.Africa/ |
| | | |ECOWAS | | |Domestic |
| | | | | | |Restructuring |
|Roadmap for Actualization |Vague |None |Regional |Frontline Role in |Vague |Vague |
| | | |Functional |Southern Africa | | |
| | | |Cooperation | | | |
|Role Performance |Insignificant |Insignificant |Significant |Very Significant |Insignificant |Very |
| | | | | | |Significant |
|Constraints To Influence |Conservative/ |Domestic Crisis |Domestic Crisis |Domestic Crisis |Western Influence/|Domestic Crisis|
| |British Influence | | | |Economic Crisis | |
Source: Author’s compilation
The above table complements the foregoing analysis in the chapter about the general orientations of each leadership including motivational and ideological orientations, the blueprint and strategies for actualization, drawbacks of the policy process, and local and international factors that shaped the role conceptions and performance. The table shows a number of denominators in Nigeria’s self perception which underlined its role conceptions and performance in Africa. These include the fact that all the leaderships viewed Nigeria as a strong and influential nation which should naturally play the role of a protector of the continent or region, or liberate it and engender frameworks that would lead to a functional relationship among African states with Nigeria as focal political point. Unfortunately, the regime of Ironsi offers little data because of its brief tenure and domestic crisis that inhibited Nigeria from the visibility of international politics. The commitment of the Murtala-Obasanjo regime to a Pan-Africanist foreign policy, which surpassed that of every other regime can also be noticed. The Gown administration was inhibited from the outset by the Civil War while by the time the regime picked up to show commitment to regionalism, the Murtala-Obasanjo intervention had cut it short.
The Balewa era had clear conceptions of roles to assume in post-independence Africa, but had vague or faint idea of how, and the strong political will to actualize them. They were bogus roles that lacked strategic thinking; and assuming them were marred by caution, conservatism, and colonial attachment to Britain which the Balewa administration exhibited. The Shagari administration exhibited these same traits. Ironsi and Gowon’s foreign policies were shaped or limited by tragic internal crises, although the Gowon administration still had clear role conceptions that were partially assumed, such as in the Southern African liberation movements and the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Buhari administration was unpopular in western circles, but its role conceptions which were reminiscent of the Murtala-Obasanjo era made that regime’s foreign policy appealing to African nations. However, the Murtala-Obasanjo and the Obasanjo civilian administrations’ foreign policy regimes recorded the high points of Nigeria’s international relations and African policy. These two regimes witnessed the peak of Nigerian Pan-Africanism, radical African nationalism, continental leadership and power, and laid a strong foundation for the giant of Africa aspirations of Nigeria.
Nigeria’s foreign policy under military rule from 1966-1979 was more dynamic and decisively Afrocentric. Roles Nigeria would play in Africa were conceived, and they were clearly defined. A number of factors could have been responsible for this. Military rule has no regard for constitutional delays or legislative slow-downs and the foreign policy decisions and role conceptions were oftimes directly done by the all-powerful Head of State. Hence each regime had little or no objection in occupying the roles it conceived for itself. Second, the dynamism and regular updating of the roles could have been engendered by the fact that each regime that comes to power redefines national roles based on what it considers prevailing continental (or domestic) situations. Third, the 1970s was the era of the Nigerian oil-boom. The oil-wealth was thus available to sufficiently “oil“ the wheels of foreign policy or occupy very ambitious roles in Africa. The fact that the military rulers at the time were also nationalist leaders in uniform was also not in doubt going by their hard-line thoughts and dispositions to colonialism and neo-colonialism. This can better be understood from the context that the army of any nation is an institution meant to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This dual role could have been the mission exported to the African context.
The civilian dispensation had problems with their foreign policy implementation. Both Balewa and Shagari had fine thoughts and role conceptions as far Africa was concerned. However, role performance or implementation of the Africa policy was a major problem. There were peculiar prevailing obstacles for each of them, but both were democratic governments with basic democratic institutions and structures that had inbuilt slow-down or impeding mechanisms. So, the role conceived by the President or Prime Minister might also undergo review by the “political group” at all levels, Cabinet, Legislature, and judicial levels; while there are also many pressure/interest groups, opposition parties and public opinion that may also compel a review of the roles conceived. Secondly, both were inheriting leadership at very delicate times. Balewa took over government just when Nigeria was attaining independence after about one hundred years of colonial rule. This would affect decision making in terms of absolute independence of mind and action in performing roles conceived. President Shagari was inheriting power after thirteen years of military rule, which could have also impacted in the area of readjusting to a democratic setting and handling inherited domestic problems from the military. The enormous problems of the home-front would certainly occupy top priorities and impair role fulfilment. Thirdly, the two civilian administrations did not have the kind of national wealth to effectively occupy the national roles conceived, like under military rule. Oil in huge quantity was discovered only after the Balewa era; while Shagari’s time was the period of Nigeria’s “oil-doom”.
The role conceptions and Africa policy implementation by the next set of military and civilian administrations would be examined in chapters five and six.
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Chapter Five
Nigeria’s Roles in Africa under Military Rule, 1985-1999
This and the next chapter examine the role conceptions and attempt to contextualize Nigeria’s roles as conceived and assumed by subsequent governments from 1985 to 2007. It attempts to underline whether moral suasion or political realism prompted the role conceptions, and whether there was any hard or soft power use to establish primacy in African affairs.
This particular chapter examines the role conceptions of the three military regimes from 1985 to 1999. The analysis is within the contexts of the decision units or actors conceiving the roles, the politics behind role conceptions, the three basic shapers of role conceptions, the roles each regime conceived, how they assumed or tried to assume them, and of course the pattern(s) each administration’s foreign policy decision units or groups exhibited.
5.1. The Babangida Regime, 1985-1993
5.1.1. Emergence and Backgrounds to Role Conceptions
The general abysmal state from 1983 of the Nigerian state and its declining status in global reckoning had instigated military intervention and had encapsulated the invention of the Babangida rule. General Babangida had said:
This country has had since independence a history of mixed turbulence and fortunes. We have witnessed our rise to greatness followed with the decline to the status of a bewildered nation” (Babangida, 1985:4).
The Babangida administration believed that this trend was escalating the image problem of Nigeria and by extension its external relations. Akinyemi, Babangida’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, reflects:
IBB had on a number of occasions before his coming privately disagreed with the previous administration on a number of issues bordering on governance, and had tried to convince Buhari that the country had suffered enough image trouble. What was required at that point after many years of political and governance crisis was to earn the confidence of the external community that the military were not starting another episode of insensitive leadership (Akinyemi, oral interview, 2009).
The General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida regime was the eighth political leadership and the sixth military rulership in Nigeria. He shot himself to power after sacking the regime of his former boss, General Muhammadu Buhari on August 27, 1985, and thereafter declared himself “Military President”, thus becoming the first Military President in Africa and probably the world. General Babangida’s remarks above were informed by the socio-political situation of Nigeria at the time. There had been the problems of seniority among members of the ruling council from inception; and there was power tussle involving some high ranking officers and multiple disagreements among members of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) on what should constitute the substance of its public policy and the direction the administration should go (Saliu, 2006a: 296). There were also the allegations of Buhari-Idiagbon’s highhandedness culminating in Decrees 2 and 4, which arbitrarily tried and jailed Second Republic politicians, and muzzled the press respectively. These were considered to have almost turned the country into a “virtual military garrison” (Fawole, 2006: 150). Babangida had accused the sacked regime of insensitivity, lack of openness, arrogance of power and of stalemating the International Monetary Fund (IMF) facility initiated by the Shagari regime but which the Buhari administration had abandoned on the basis that it was disastrous for the already prostate Nigerian economy (Olagunju & Oyovbaire, 1991). Akinyemi recalls:
The issues of disagreement were multiple but they all boiled down on governance and the handling of the Nigerian political situation. IBB had a way of registering his strong protests in a mild and unassuming way, but his grouse was on his perceived arrogance and highhandedness of his former bosses. He felt they were not only insensitive to the concerns of Nigerians and the fears of the international community about dictatorship. He felt they were also very insensitive to the thinking and grievances of the military high command that was increasingly growing impatient and disgruntled (Akinyemi, oral interview, 2009).
According to Babangida, these local crises and the mismanagement of certain external affairs such as the “Dikko crate affair” leading to a Nigeria-Britain diplomatic face-off, the xenophobia leading to the expulsion of West African aliens like during the Shagari era, and the IMF stalemate, were a huge embarrassment to a nation regarded as regional leader. These had compromised Nigeria’s international standing and made the country laughable abroad. The new administration lashed at Buhari-Idiagbon’s foreign policy thus:
Nigeria’s foreign policy was characterized by inconsistency and incoherence. It lacked the clarity to make us know where we stood in matters of international concern to enable other countries relate to us with seriousness. Our external relations have been conducted by a policy of retaliatory reactions (Babangida, 1985: 3).
Babangida’s assertion about Nigeria’s historical mixed fortunes lends credence to the fact that socio-political backgrounds of a society always influence the thought of philosophers, scholars, writers, and of course political leaders. In the case of leaders who are policy makers, such social backgrounds shape their thinking, decisions and actions. The roles they play are influenced by the social developments and personal or group judgments, and so are their role conceptions.
Thus, domestic pressures and situations constitute the first environment of national policy. Such domestic issues also affect the image, prestige and respect of the country internationally; just as its power and capacity in the international system could also be eroded by the social and political happenings at home. Babangida was endorsing the fact that from 1980, Nigeria’s international image witnessed a progressive decline as a result of laughable domestic happenings such as electoral violence, high rate of corruption, economic mismanagement, oil doom, and ridiculous role assumption in Africa (Otubanjo, 1989). For Babangida, the 1970s were therefore no doubt the era of Nigeria’s “rise to greatness” while the 1980s opened the chapter of “the decline to the state of a bewildered nation”, with grave consequences on Nigeria’s regional leadership.
However, it may not be overruled that while General Babangida’s regime may have captured the accurate picture of the Nigerian nation, its assertions at inception may not also be far from an attempt to justify its intervention at the time. This line of thinking is premised on the fact that the Buhari administration Babangida was succeeding was adjudged effective in correcting the societal ills responsible for Nigeria’s “bewildered state” and was similar to Murtala-Obasanjo’s regime in tackling neo-colonialism in Africa. Babangida was himself an integral and an important part of that regime as he was the third in command as the Chief of Army Staff (Saliu, 1999).
Nevertheless, it was against the socio-political and economic backgrounds in Nigeria before 1984 or 1985 that Babangida’s own understanding of Nigeria’s foreign policy challenges was demonstrated. He observed:
Our dedication to the cause of ensuring that our nation remains a united entity worthy of respect and capable of functioning as a viable and credible part of the international community dictated the need to arrest the situation…Our role as Africa’s spokesman has diminished because we have been unable to maintain the respect of African countries. The ousted military government conducted our external relations by a policy of retaliatory reactions. Nigeria became a country that has reacted to given situations, rather than taking the initiative as it should and has always been done. More so, vengeful considerations must not be the basis of our diplomacy. African problems and their solutions should constitute the premise of our foreign policy (Babangida, August 27, 1985: 3).
The last sentence in the Babangida’s words above, “African problems and their solutions should constitute the premise of our foreign policy” not only shows continuity in the Africa-centrepiece principle of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence, but also demonstrated a clear premise of moral suasion and platform upon which the Babangida administration would conceive national roles for Nigeria to assume in the continent. President Babangida declared his regime’s immediate national role conceptions. It reads:
The realization of the Organization of African Unity of the Lagos Plan of Action for self-sufficiency and constructive co-operation in Africa shall be our primary pursuit. The Economic Community of West African States must be reborn with the view to achieving the objective of regional integration. The problems of drought-stricken areas of Africa will be given more attention and sympathy, and our best efforts will be made to assist in their rehabilitation within the limits of our resources. Our membership of the United Nations Organization will be made more practical and meaningful. The call for a new International Economic Order which lost its momentum in the face of the debt crisis will be made once again (Babangida, 1985: 4).
As the Babangida administration settled down, the priority issues of its foreign policy were outlined as the abolition of apartheid in South Africa and the continued support for ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity (now African Union). The foreign policy of the Babangida era was eventful, and as Abegunrin (2003) writes, it could be said of, as Charles Dickens in his Tale of Two Cities that, ‘it was the best of times; it was the worst of times.”
5.1.2. Structure of the Military Government: Policymaking Units
5.1.2.1. The Military President and AFRC
The administration restructured the Federal Military Government (FMG), the military version of the Federal Government (FG). The apex policymaking body, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was reconstituted and was later redesignated the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). The title of the number two man in the FMG was also changed from the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters (CSSH), to the Chief of General Staff (CGS). This restructuring had implication for the domestic and foreign policy making during the period. The CSSH was a Prime Ministerial position wielding enormous powers in the FMG in the domestic and foreign affairs level. However, with the restructuring and renaming to CGS, the power of the second in command was drastically reduced and subjected to the oversight of the Military President, who shared no policymaking powers with any (Abegunrin, 2003: 173).
The President was at the helms of state affairs, with absolute domestic and foreign policy powers. In the military hierarchy, the Supremo’s powers cannot be questioned and his policies are unchallengeable. When the Supreme Commander now becomes the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, without constitutional restrictions and legislative encumbrances, a policy conundrum is constructed in which the arrogation of immense powers on the Chief Executive by the centralized and hierarchical military high command would create a policy dictatorship.
Babangida’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Akinyemi corroborates the scenario above:
President Babangida had the final and ultimate say in foreign policy matters. He initiated ideas and policies. He had clear views and ideas of the foreign policies he wanted to execute, but most times subjected them to the court and evaluation of public opinion so as to give his policy leadership the appearance of a listening and popular one (Akinyemi, oral interview, 2009).
In the Cabinet were the Ministers and Special Advisers who had portfolios equivalent to a Minister’s. Their ministries or portfolios played important role of executing the Presidency’s orders as far as foreign policies were concerned. The ministries were either central to or ancillaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These included the Defence, Petroleum, Commerce, Finance, and Sports ministries. There was however a Kitchen Cabinet having President Babangida’s most trusted aides, ranging from the First Lady-a position he institutionalized in Nigerian political leadership- to his most trusted service chiefs, National Security Adviser, Director-General of the State Security Services, traditional rulers, military governors, academics, media practitioners, and some top brass in the military (retired or serving). Among members of Babangida’s Kitchen Cabinet were General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd.), General Sani Abacha, General Joshua Dongoyaro, General Ike Nwachukwu, Rear Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, General Domkat Bali, Dasuki the Sultan of Sokoto, Governor Lawan Gwadabe, Chief Alex Akinyele, Alhaji Rilwan Lukman, Professor Tam David-West, Prince Tony Momoh, and Professor Omoruyi (Omoruyi, 2004). In the foreign policy circles, those in the inner caucus at the time were Professors Bolaji Akinyemi, George Obiozor, Ray Ofoegbu, Alaba Ogunsanwo, and John Elaigwu. Others were Tunji Olagunju, Sam Oyovbaire, and Jide Osuntokun (Akinyemi, 2009; Saliu, 2006a: 67). These Nigerian elite (military, political, intellectual, and royal) served at different times and some eventually fell out with the regime. These include Obasanjo, David-West and Omoruyi (Omoruyi, 2004:76). Their formal or unofficial functions ranged from advising, to influencing, shaping, and even executing the administration’s foreign policy.
As can be see above, despite Akinyemi’s enormous influence in Babangida’s regime, he was not part of Babangida’s kitchen cabinet. He discloses:
I was not part of IBB’s kitchen cabinet. He (IBB) was shrewd when it comes to selecting those who are behind the curtain. He had his peculiar preferences. I cannot say for sure what informed his choice, but I know that he had persons from across professions and walks of life; different ethnic and religious backgrounds whom he calls by their first names and who are very loyal to him. Many of them later found their ways to strategic positions in his government but they were not far from the kitchen cabinet (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
Babangida’s foreign affairs ministry was an active one. This has been attributed to the creativity and activeness of his ministers. An attempt would be made to briefly examine the expertise and initiatives of the ministers which made Babangida to have what scholars have called one of the most active eras of Nigeria’s foreign policy (Abegunrin, 2003: 179; Fawole, 2003; & Saliu, 2006: 296-298).
5.1.2.2. Babangida’s Foreign Policy Actors
The military is believed to have monopolized all domestic and foreign policy processes and institutions because of the undemocratic, hierarchical and centralized nature of its high command. The military may thus be expected to have a “set-man” in the person of the Head of State, who may or may not engage other decision units or take cognizance of public opinion in the making of foreign policy. However, contrary to this universal assumption, the Babangida regime had at different times two very influential and powerful MFAs who had an effective control of not only their ministry, but the entire external environment of Nigeria’s politics. However, there was something more compelling for his concessions, as Akinyemi reasons:
Considering Babangida’s pedigree in government, bright understanding of international politics, exposure and uncommon intelligence, it would be surprising for him to literally entrust the foreign affairs and policy terrains with his aides. The concession to his ministers must therefore have been because of their sheer brilliance, ingenuity and competence, which were the basic requirements at the time to re-earn the confidence of the international community (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
The MFAs under Babangida were Professor Bolaji Akinyemi (1985-1987), Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman (1987-1990), and General Ike Nwachukwu (1990-1993). Akinyemi and Nwachukwu were in the class of Jaja Wachukwu, Okoi Arikpo (1967-1975), Joe Garba (1975-1978) and Ibrahim Gambari (1984-1985), that is the finest MFAs Nigeria has ever produced; while Rilwanu Lukman was in the ilk of Olu Adeniji whose brazen approach in dealing with international organizations Nigeria belonged to were commendable, but who was barely given adequate room by their bosses to perform in the general areas of foreign policy making and implementation.
Bolaji Akinyemi was Babangida’s first MFA at inception of the administration on August 27, 1985. One of Akinyemi’s achievements was the Technical Aids Corps (TAC) initiative. According to Akinyemi,
This was a program in line with the Africa-centred foreign policy, which saw Nigerian professionals being sent to mostly African countries to engage in volunteer work. It was designed to promote the country’s image and status as a major contributor to developing nations and African development Under the TAC scheme, Nigerian medical doctors, nurses, teachers, mechanical engineers, and other professionals were sent to needy nations, including those in Africa, and black nations in the Diaspora. The TAC benefits were extended to nations that asked for them, with the MFA being the clearing house for all the applications, considerations, implementation and any advisory roles for the Nigerian government (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
Shedding more light on TAC, Akinyemi notes:
TAC Scheme is basically an alternative to direct financial aid to Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Nigeria shares its know-how and expertise based on already assessed and perceived needs to the recipient countries, The Scheme also promotes co-operation and understanding between Nigeria and ACP State. The program involves the deployment of highly experienced Nigerian Professionals in the field of medicine, Nursing, Education, Engineering, Agriculture, Accountancy, and other related field to Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries for a period of two years. The assistance offered under the scheme is covered by TAC Country Agreement between Nigeria and individual recipient country. TAC Country Agreement outlines the obligations and responsibilities of each party. Since its inception 17 years ago, 2,000 volunteers have served in more than 27 ACP countries. The program has over the years demonstrated its value as an effective realization of south-south co-operation. The major beneficiaries of TAC were African nations, including Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Togo, Botswana, The Gambia, and Western Sahara, among others. The TAC scheme was primarily seen as an effective instrument of policy, to establish Nigeria’s influence, power and relevance in global politics (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
After its being backed by a decree in 1993 thus perpetuating it as an instrument of foreign policy, modifications were made and its objectives clearly stated. Akinyemi outlines the objectives as:
Giving assistance on the basis of assessed and perceived needs of the recipient countries; promoting cooperation and understanding between Nigeria and the recipient countries; and facilitating meaningful contacts between the youths of Nigeria and those of the recipient countries. In addition to these, the scheme is also aimed at complementing other forms of assistance to other developing countries, ensuring streamlined program of assistance to other developing countries, acting as a channel of enhancing South-south Cooperation; and, establishing presence in countries which for economic reason, Nigeria has no resident diplomatic mission (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009)..
However, the programme suffered setback for a number of reasons. The factors were both internal and external. In Akinyemi’s terms:
First, internal rancour and disputations in the military leadership and political class of the intent of the MFA began to frustrate the scheme. Second, more nations that were benefiting from the Nigerian largesse would praise Nigeria’s leadership role in Lagos only to pass uncomplimentary remarks about the nation on return to their countries, which made politicians (military and civilians alike) to further condemn the initiative as achieving little in realizing the Pax Nigeriana objective (i.e. its hegemony and power in Africa). Third, more opposition arose from the domestic context condemning Nigeria’s unsolicited offer of help to nations that do not appreciate it (Akinyemi, 2009).
In the former MFA’s estimation, the internal disputations about the essence of the TAC were more instrumental in its setbacks. There were petty jealousy, rivalry and suspicions from some military chiefs and fellow ministers who felt the program was just another drainpipe or means for personal; wealth covetousness. The scenario was described thus:
I just knew that some of the officers and my fellow ministers were not disposed to the TAC program. They would pretend to acquiesce with the idea, and nod to my submissions and even welcome my reports, but behind me they would go and tell the Commander-in-Chief all sorts of things, such as that TAC was a white elephant that was yielding nothing to the country. They would go as far as disclosing their suspicions that they knew I was only after my own name and success, and not the success of the administration or the C-in-C (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
The TAC scheme however outlived the Babangida administration, and has remained a tool of policy by Nigeria in the international system to the present times.
Akinyemi also came up with the concept of the Concert of Medium Powers, in which he posited that below the Superpowers was another power configuration in the international system, the ‘Medium Powers” or what scholars have in recent times referred to as ‘Middle Powers” (Goldstein, 2001; Rourke, 2006), which should make their voice heard in the global system so as to engender a sort of checks and balances or balance of power (Akinyemi, 2009). In Akinyemi’s estimation,
Nigeria was an important “Medium Power”, who should be at the centre-stage in the “Concert”. This would be an appropriate means by which Nigeria could assert its prowess and attempt a “power swagger” in the global system. The idea of the Concert of Medium Powers was what later informed Akinyemi’s concept of Pax Nigeriana, in which Nigeria would establish a permanent hegemony in Africa and influence among developing countries, thus becoming the voice of the Third World (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
Akinyemi’s conceptions gave him away as a “power politics” MFA. Power politics implies a number of coherent things having to do with the overall interest of a state to becoming prima inter pares in the international community. The political realist (as a power politics leader or analyst is called) considers national interest as being unencumbered by any moralist or idealist considerations. Indeed, his adherence to moral principles or legal limitations is instigated by the probability that this may work for the nation’s interest. The power politics MFA’s main intent is to establish his nation’s hegemony and influence over other states. This had informed Akinyemi’s “Concert” and national role conceptions for the Babangida foreign policy, such as the idea of the provision of technical assistance to needy nations of Africa and the Third World through the TAC (ibid). Akinyemi, like American State Secretaries Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, Colin Powell, and Condoleezza Rice, had NRCs driven by political realism. By this, the state is expected to grow in political stature and respect, and inspire awe or fear internationally so that it would possess substantial leverage and bargaining power in the international system. For instance, in 1987, Akinyemi declared his support for Nigeria developing nuclear weapons, referring to the proposal as the “black bomb”. He posited that this was quintessential because,
Nigeria has a sacred responsibility to challenge the racial monopoly of nuclear weapons (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
As MFA (then with a different nomenclature, Minster of External Affairs-MEA), Akinyemi headed numerous Nigerian delegations, among which were the delegations to the United Nations General Assembly Session in 1985, OAU Council of Ministers Session in 1986, Non-Aligned Movement Foreign Ministers Conference in 1986, and the UN General Assembly Special Session on Critical Economic Situation in Africa in 1986. Other delegations he headed were the Budget Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU in 1987, the Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU in 1987, and the Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU on African Debt in 1987 (Akindele, 2005). Akinyemi supervised the convention of April 1986 of the All-Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy, where International Relations practitioners and scholars gathered to discuss, analyze, and make recommendations for the conduct of the nation’s foreign relations. The conference “generated lively and often heated debates among scholars of diverse ideological persuasions. It also provided a number of suggestions for the way forward for Nigeria” (Akinyemi, 2009; Fawole, 2003: 152).
In pursuit of Nigeria’s power politics and to stamp its regional authority, Akinyemi embarked on shuttle diplomacy. He moved from one warring zone in Africa to another, mediating in crises. These areas included Libya, and Senegal in which each country’s local political problems arising from failed attempts to dislodge the government had escalated conflict resulting in a government-insurgents fiasco, for which the MFA drummed up African support for cease-fire and later referred the matters to the OAU (Saliu, 2006b: 115). The era of Akinyemi explored and popularized Nigeria’s unilateral approach to conflict resolution in Africa. The prominence of Akinyemi at the OAU and UN summits was as a result of the way he projected Nigeria in the global system and the national roles in Africa he conceived for and made Nigeria to assume at the time. This era witnessed vibrancy in the external relations of Nigeria probably because of the dynamism of the MFA.
The second MFA was Rilwanu Lukman who spent about two years in office (1987-1989). What brings his era into spotlight was his ability to bring Nigeria to the leadership of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). His leadership at the OPEC made Nigeria respectable. His time was however not a frontline one in African policy.
The third and last MFA of the Babangida government was General Ike Nwachukwu. Nwachukwu was appointed in 1987 in a Cabinet change. By late 1980s based on the unfolding realities of global economic diplomacy in the face of a declining socialist enclave, the political realist approach to international relations was considered less expedient. As Nwachukwu assumed the role of MFA, he rather embarked on more sober pursuits, especially his pet scheme of ‘economic diplomacy. This was a relatively novel thrust that was theoretically intended to make foreign policy serve the country’s goal of economic development (Fawole, 2003: 152).
The leeway Akinyemi had serving his tenure to pursue his own realist policies and assume his own role conceptions as demonstrated by his TAC in Africa was a rare luxury in military dictatorship. Fawole opines that the Akinyemi era enjoyed this privilege because these foreign policy programs had served the purpose anticipated by the Babangida regime, namely it had earned for both the regime and country the global acceptance it desperately needed for stability after the western ostracism of the Buhari era (Fawole, 2003: 152).
Nwachukwu’s economic diplomacy was a foreign policy driven by the philosophy of logically pursuing a nation’s interests to result in rewarding economic gains. As such, whatever the relationship Nigeria was to go into- cooperation, intervention, alliance, regional or technical grouping- the immediate and ultimate aim would be to ennoble the economic wellbeing of Nigerians. Such economic diplomacy would thus be the maximization of foreign policy or international relations to benefit the domestic plane; and not the nation throwing so much of its resources into the international system with little or no national rewards.
Hence, both Akinyemi and Nwachukwu foreign policies were realist in nature. However, while Akinyemi’s approach thought of political and military ends as national power, military might and influence as objects of Nigeria’s external relations without minding the cost or means; Nwachukwu’s approach had preference for national economic self-sufficiency and economic power of the nation through carefully thought-out economic and political strategies and well spent funds as the objects of Nigeria’s African and foreign policy.
Nwachukwu’s economic diplomacy in Africa and the world was premised on Babangida’s philosophy that an economic-oriented foreign policy begins with an internal economic reorganization resting on four pillars. These were decentralization, deconcentration, deregulation and restoration of national self-esteem (Babangida, 1991). These resulted in firming up the domestic economy through such acts as privatization, commercialization, deregulation of the oil and other sectors, introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), democratization of the economic and political space, poverty reduction, et cetera: to make the economy more attractive for foreign investment and increase the confidence of the international community in the Nigerian state.
Also, Nwachukwu played a major role in the establishment of ECOMOG and the Gulf of Guinea Commission. He was also the Chairman and leader of the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) Ministerial Delegation to the Conference for the Democratization of South Africa (CODESA). He had served two terms as Chairman of the Liberation Committee of OAU and three terms as Chairman of ECOWAS Council of Ministers. Also as foreign minister, Nwachukwu chaired plenary sessions of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and those of the UN on several subjects.
5.1.3. Babangida’s Regime’s Role Conceptions in Africa
The General Babangida administration had outlined its first set of role conceptions in its inaugural speech on August 27 1985. It stressed that, African problems and their solutions should constitute the premise of Nigeria’s foreign policy. According to the President, Nigeria’s roles in Africa during his tenure would include the realization of the OAU Lagos Plan of Action objectives of self-sufficiency and constructive co-operation in Africa, rebirth of ECOWAS with the view to achieving the objective of regional integration, and rehabilitation and assisting of drought-stricken areas of Africa (Babangida, 1985: 3). In subsequent years as new developments would emerge in the continent and global politics, Babangida’s role conceptions would increase and become modified (Akinyemi, 2009). This implies that national role conceptions of Babangida’s African policy during his eight-year reign were interactionist. Part of this interactionist nature of role conceptions was exemplified by the substituting of the MFA, Akinyemi with Nwachukwu in 1987. The interactionist school in explaining national role conceptions, as discussed in chapter two, holds that national role conceptions respond or change in response to prevailing domestic and international circumstances. Put differently, the interactionist perspective underlines the dynamism or shifts in roles conception and foreign policy making to meet the changing needs. The Babangida administration required changes as the regime matured and stabilized and thus probably considered Akinyemi “diplomatically old-fashioned” in the face of new local needs and emerging themes and situations in Africa. It was observed:
In rethinking the African development agenda, Babangida appraised the post-independence economic development of Africa bemoaning the debt overhang, over-dependence on the west, lack of economic self-reliance, balance of trade deficits for African nations, rise in real interest rates, and import surpassing exports. President Babangida observed that the right kind of leadership was what Africa needed to overcome all these, suggesting that Nigeria would provide the leadership, beginning with West Africa (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009)
Babangida himself had said that, “Nigeria would spare no efforts to ensure the success of ECOWAS to the advantage of all its citizens” (Babangida, 1988a).
On the issue of the iron-rule of apartheid in Southern Africa, Babangida declared that Nigeria would continue to use all conventional means, including dialogue and human and material support for the armed struggle to liberate South Africa and Namibia, stating that Nigeria eagerly looked forward to
the day when we shall be able to welcome a South Africa that is free, democratic and just…That will be the only happy ending to our struggles and the best realization there can be of our common dreams, hopes, and aspirations. For us in Nigeria…it will be the best vindication there can be of our philosophy of not being truly free until our continent is rid of man’s inhumanity to man (Babangida, 1990a).
Setting a date for when this would come to pass, Nigeria had as far back as 1988, targeted year 2000. Babangida had said:
The year 2000 should see an Africa totally decolonized and free…Time and history are on our side. The evil of apartheid would be defeated either peacefully or on the battlefield. Apartheid has no future on our continent, and the future points to a multi-racial democratic South Africa. Nigeria will continue to lend her weight to the armed struggle valiantly waged by our brothers and sisters in those countries (Babangida, 1988a:6).
Like many statesmen have attributed Africa’s numerous problems to leadership ineptitude, Babangida deeply reflected on the leadership conundrum in Africa, identifying leadership training, farsightedness and a total decolonization of the body-politic. He stressed that Africa should “re-examine (its) values as well as policies in order to reach an acceptable stance that would enable (the continent) move forward with hope and confidence (Babangida, 1988b). “What we need is an Africa unbound and an African renaissance. We can achieve this freedom and rebirth not through slogans or rhetorics, but through dedicated actions, sound policies, and a collective dynamic spirit” (Babangida, 1988b: 4).
These remarks showed the vision and philosophy of the Babangida administration about leadership, which most probably would have informed that political group’s perception of what Nigeria’s national roles in Africa should be. The Africa leadership vision of the regime soon began to unfold in policy statements and actions.
For instance, lending its voice to the reparation cause spearheaded by Nigeria’s Bashorun Moshood Abiola, the administration estimated that the 10-30 million Africans carted away during the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade, the great empires and civilizations destroyed during the slave wars, the losses of huge number of manpower during the world wars Africa knew nothing about but which they brought in by colonial masters to fight in, and the over 1.2 million African lives lost during the apartheid era in Southern Africa, required adequate humanitarian, material and financial compensation from the west (Babangida, 1990a). Lamenting that all these implied that the most virile of Africa’s population that would have built a greater continent had been wasted, Babangida declared Nigeria’s stance on the matter and the role it would play:
We demand an African Marshall Plan to compensate for the centuries of abuse and neglect. We demand full equality with all men for Africans at home and in the Diaspora. We call on all the countries of Europe and North America to compensate Africa for the untold hardship and exploitation that the continent had been subjected to in the past (Babangida, 1990a: 4).
The regime however recognized the need for a synergy between Nigeria/African countries and blacks in Diaspora to realize the reparation objective:
unity is strength. We Africans, both at home and abroad, must pool our resources together in order to advance the cause of our race. We must begin by appreciating our relative weakness vis a vis other races…We must overcome the fissiparous tendencies that seem to undermine Africa’s inexorable march towards greater unity. We must unite or perish; for Africa and Africans are both an endangered continent and species. That is the truth. The world is not for the weak but the strong. If we want to survive as a people we must unite and be strong” (Babangida, 1990a: 8).
The aforementioned remarks on African unity and role advocacy for Nigeria and Africa demonstrated a strong Pan-Africanist bent of the Babangida foreign policy. In chapter three, Pan-Africanism had been identified as one of the strong philosophical and ideological underpinnings of Nigeria’s foreign policy from independence.
For instance, as Akinyemi recalls,
at the OAU 29th Ordinary Session in July 1990, Nigeria stressed the need from a talk of continental political unity to a more realistic economic unity as was evident in Europe. In the face of the collapsing of European, American and Far Eastern economies into one, Africa would face a major challenge from such integrated market-economies and must respond immediately. The best option was for the OAU member-states to begin to unite their economies as well and disengage from excessive focus on what others can do for them (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
Nigeria thus called for “self analysis, self-consciousness and self-awareness (Babangida, 1990b). This was characteristic of Babangida administration’s foreign policy of the 1990s: a reflection and self-appraisal to chart another course, which eventually led to its economic diplomacy.
Apart from the problem of formidable economies emerging in the world to challenge African economic independence and development characterized by a slow-down, Nigeria also identified an African Economic Community, border conflicts, internal armed conflicts, internecine wars, racist rule in Southern Africa, economic underdevelopment, and unfair terms of trade, debt burden, poverty, and disunity. Babangida had declared at the 29th Ordinary Session of the OAU of Nigeria’s dream of an Africa, which
has found its true niche in the world because it is secure and strong at home. ..an Africa in which human rights and democratic freedoms triumph…an Africa that is confident, full of promise and full of hope. We can build this Africa by pooling together and by all of us working in concert (Babangida, \1990b: 12).
In the 1970s, Nigeria had occupied a central role in Angola and Zimbabwe’s liberation movement. They earned their independence probably by the exclusive aid of Nigeria. On the role Nigeria would play in post-war reconciliation and reconstruction in Angola, the Babangida regime asserted that it would be actively involved in shoring up the peace, cooperation and development of Angola. Also, the administration declared its intentions to divert the same measure of assistance Angola and Zimbabwe got from Nigeria to Namibia in its struggle for independence. A favourable psychological climate to see to the victory of the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO)-a black dominated party and led by Namibian nationalist, Sam Nujoma- was created (Akinyemi, 2009; Babangida, 1989).
Babangida’s new African and economic diplomacy required a geo-strategic technical, economic and security ties with certain African nations. Hence apart from the ECOWAS, as observed by his former MFA,
Nigeria embarked on bilateral ties with Niger Republic, consolidating the Permanent Joint Commission between Nigeria and Niger, strengthening relations with Equatorial Guinea and Egypt. The reasons for this, included the proximity of the first two which required mutual trust and understanding to ensure that Nigeria’s security was not compromised by either; and the fact that Egypt was at the time the other regional power which Nigeria needed in fulfilling some of its conceived roles and obligations in the continent, such as the pursuit of continental peace, unity, economic cooperation, and attaining economic self-reliance to discourage overdependence on western nations (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
One thing is very clear from all the great charges and addresses by Nigeria at high-profile African forums, where gathered included African leaders, policy makers, and statesmen; and sometimes European, American and Asian leaders. The great speeches and suggested blueprints for an African rebirth were a demonstration of the conceived leadership role Nigeria had of itself. The exhibition of the capacity for the solution and as the engine room to resolve the plethora of socio-economic and political problems, demonstrated the “manifest destiny” to lead Africa to the promise-land as long conceived by the founding fathers and pursued by several subsequent Nigerian leaderships. In other words, the perceived international attitude of successive administrations in Nigeria was most times in line with roles the founding fathers had conceived in the past.
ECOWAS and the West African region, like several other leaderships in Nigeria, were at the centre of Babangida’s foreign policy calculations (Akinyemi, 2009). Nigeria’s national role conceptions about West Africa were clear: “Nigeria regarded ECOWAS as a beacon of hope and should not fail it. Bold and sustained efforts would be taken, and these shall manifest in a disposition of collective self-reliance, solidarity and commitment to ECOWAS programs and aspirations” (Babangida, 1989). Nigeria’s approach would be that of exigency:
Resolutions would be followed by urgent action. Action should take the form of urgent implementation, through our moral and financial support for the recurrent and capital programs of this authority (ECOWAS) (Babangida, 1989: 2).
All this implied that Nigeria strongly believed in a multilateral approach in regional politics. This fact even unfolded as far back as 1975 when Nigeria took on the gauntlet along with Togo to establish the organization. Nigeria’s policy towards West Africa constituted the second phase of the concentric circles. The first is Nigeria’s national interest, and third is Africa-centrepiece.
These have lined Nigeria’s role conceptions and foreign policy from 1960. From independence certain specific imperatives have governed the conceptualization and conduct of the nation’s foreign policy. These have been discussed earlier. Although emphasis may have been placed here as may be dictated by the circumstances of the times and different styles of leadership, the real substance of the foreign policy objectives has tended to revolve around those principles which are held tenaciously in the conduct of the policy. The principal considerations of Nigerian international relations have been the defence and protection of its territorial threshold from internal and external aggression. This explains the 30-month Civil War to keep it a nation. The second has had to do with Nigeria’s immediate neighbours, those referred to as the “Ring Countries” or those with contiguous boundaries with Nigeria. The approach to these countries has been peaceful co-existence, secure neighbourhood and economic progress. The third factor concerns the West African region. The ECOWAS region completed what used to be the three concentric circles of Nigeria’s defence policy at the time (Nwoke, 2005). According to Babangida, the three elements combined,
constitute the only realistic analysis of Nigeria’s primary security boundaries since they are obviously both interlocking and coterminous (Babangida, 1990c).
On Nigeria’s emphatic and self-imposed leadership roles in West Africa, the administration reasoned that,
In a sub-region of 16 countries where one out of three West Africans is a Nigerian, it is imperative that any regime in this country should relentlessly strive towards the prevention or avoidance of the deterioration of any crisis which threatens to jeopardize or compromise the stability, prosperity and security of the sub-region. It was this very objective that propelled our pioneering efforts for the establishment of ECOWAS and made inevitable our continuing strong commitment and support for the organization (Babangida, 1990c: 3).
The regime’s attitude therefore, was that whenever certain event occurred depending upon its intensity and magnitude, which may affect Nigeria, the country would not stand aloof. The role conceptions on peaceful coexistence and secure neighbourhood, were that Nigeria would act
in collaboration with others in this sub-region, to react or respond in appropriate manner necessary to either avert the disaster or to take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquillity and harmony (Babangida, 1990c: 4).
This era was pre-eminently pro-West African, particularly in meeting Nigeria’s interest of securing its immediate neighbourhood in order to ensure its own security. It was indeed the beginning of a shift towards the region, for as it was noted:
These role conceptions were to also shape Nigeria’s attitude towards the Liberian conflict in the 1990s. The Babangida administration took on an effective role for Nigeria in ECOWAS conflict resolution approach in West Africa, and laid the new strong foundation for regional peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
However, this initiative was not without its shortcomings. The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that was formed in the process allegedly became an instrument for Nigeria’s power politics: to stamp its authority in West Africa, fester its national security and defence nests, and promote the political whims of the Nigerian military cabal, thus undermining the real object of regional peacekeeping (Howe, 1997: 65).
On the Liberian crisis which started in 1989 when the Charles Taylor-Yormie Johnson National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) began an insurrection to topple the government of Samuel Doe, the Nigerian government clearly declared:
For the avoidance of doubt, Nigeria has no territorial ambition in Liberia or anywhere in Africa…neither Nigeria nor the members of the ECOMOG forced their way into the Liberian conflict in a manner remotely resembling military adventurism. Nigeria took a solemn decision to restore peace by separating the warring fact-ions in a sister country (Babangida, 1990c: 4).
In line with the second basic assumption of the role theory, namely that expectations of the society (external and internal publics) shape role conceptions, General Babangida affirmed that the Liberian intervention was inevitable because “we are participating in ECOMOG at the level of our capacity and expectations of the other members within the sub-region…because events have led to the massive destruction of property, massacre of thousands of innocent civilians…contrary to all recognized standards of civilized behaviour and international ethics…I ask: should Nigeria stand-by and watch the whole of Liberia turned into one massive graveyard?” (Olagunju & Oyovbaire, 1991: 273).
President Babangida had declared with a tone of determination and in unequivocal terms to take up the task of restoring peace to Liberia and secure the region:
Liberia would not be a Nigerian Vietnam. Our mission there is clear, precise and attainable. Our only desire is for peace in Liberia and in the sub-region. Our responsibilities in Liberia are broadly two-fold: protective and promotional, and which are inherently in the interest of Liberia and humanity (Olagunju & Oyovbaire, 1991: 274).
These were a combination of justification of roles in Liberia and a disclosure of intent to permanently occupy the delicate roles of regional protector for the ultimate purpose of promoting Nigeria’s national defence and security interest in West Africa. It was even the firm belief of the Babangida administration that Nigeria should naturally play certain irrevocable roles. Babangida had a personal perception of the historic roles and responsibilities his country should play in Africa and the world. He thus considered any expression of reservation about Nigeria’s leadership roles laughable and unthinkable. The qualities of Nigeria naturally place it at an incontestable leadership position in the continent and world. Babangida saw potentials that would make the country looked up to by the black world. These potentials include population size and quality, natural resources endowments, great military, enviable history, and invaluable contribution to global development (Olagunju & Oyovbaire, 1991: 275-276).
As earlier outlined, perceptions of leaders or policy makers constitute the first shaper of national role conceptions. Expectations of the public and interpretations of the leaders are the second and third shapers of role conceptions respectively. From this understanding, it could be inferred that President Babangida’s personal perceptions were carried to his political group, the AFRC, which accepted and shared in his political vision.
Against this background, Babangida said of Nigeria’s roles in West Africa:
Consequently, the reasons for our dynamic but positive actions in the ECOWAS and specifically in the Liberian crisis are not mysterious. They are simply our national obligations voluntarily contracted with the other states in the sub-region to ensure our collective security, prosperity, and the welfare of our peoples (Babangida, 1990c: 5).
From Babangida’s geo-strategic partnership in Africa, commitment to regional security and conflict resolution, to economic diplomacy, it was very clear that the regime had an unapologetic and uncompromising resolve to keep Nigeria’s number one position in the Africa. It was also very apparent that the administration had clearly conceived national roles in the continent. Incidentally, we cannot hastily conclude at this juncture whether it also effectively occupied these roles. So, it cannot be claimed now that the regime was a classic example of our sixth strand or pattern, namely, national role conceptions that were clear and effectively filled.
It is even more so, when its concept of “economic diplomacy”, when critically dissected, may mitigate against its position as a regional leader. According to Ogwu and Olukoshi
The chief aim of economic diplomacy is to achieve the country’s further integration into the international capitalist division of labor. Indeed…Nwachukwu has been emphatic that the aim of economic diplomacy is to further open up Nigeria to foreign international economic forces since, in his thinking, the country needs those forces for its development (Ogwu & Olukoshi, 1991).
Saliu reasons that this new commitment to economic diplomacy would erode Nigeria’s commitment to African affairs because it thrived on heavy dependence on extra- African powers for the resolution of economic crisis (2006a: 117). The economic diplomacy which took full course between 1988 and 1992, may have whittled down African diplomacy because the old power politics and diplomacy required a “large heart” with huge spending towards African security and development that may have overstretched its national treasury. Amale (1991) notes that the economic instruments of foreign policy
have a bias for developed states which are in a good position to subordinate other states. They are of limited relevance to most Third World states that are not in a position to offer economic benefits or prove to be a positive threat to other states (Amale, 1991)..
Also any foreign policy underlined by economic diplomacy “must of necessity empty (itself) of any traces of radical impulse” (Saliu, 2006a: 118), which had characterized Nigeria’s behaviour in the international system as regional protector and liberator from independence.
Against the backdrop of this potential impediment, a critical look at Nigeria’s role assumption would now be attempted. Efforts would be made to investigate the extent of assumption by Nigeria of its conceived roles. The following analysis therefore constitutes an interrogation of the role conceptions under Babangida.
5.1.4. Assumption of National Roles
Performing of national roles may depend on a number of factors. Apart from the point just mentioned above in the case of Nigeria, there is the question of the sincerity of the government to keep faith with its role conceptions. Second is the cooperation or consensus within the political group or government to carry on with the assumption of roles. Third is the cost implication of such roles which may or may not discourage role assumption. Fourth are domestic developments (popular or unpopular) which may erode the moral basis of national role assumption, or home constraints or pressures, which may include public opinion. Fifth is world or regional opinion. Sixth and very important is the disposition or reaction of the group, state, or region for which the nation is playing the roles. Babangida’s government seemed to have overcome these factors in the early stage because of its effective roles in West African affairs. In the 1990s however, the story became different: the Liberian warlords and a few other ECOMOG member-states were beginning to view Nigeria with suspicion as a result of the intransigence of the Nigerian contingent accused of looting and taking sides. Then there was the transition to civil rule program at home suffering adjustments, postponements and inconsistencies in recycling of politicians through bans and unbans: the transition program was no longer on course. Then the regime created the worst legitimacy and moral crisis for itself-aside the corruption problem, harsh economic realities of SAP, and repressive laws at home- with the derailment of the six-year old transition program by the annulment of the Presidential elections of 1993.
In the beginning, the Babangida administration enjoyed tremendous acceptability both at home and abroad. Hence when Nigeria assumed any role anywhere in Africa, it was popularly acclaimed. This was characteristic of his role assumption in the region, as
it also kept faith with its West African and African roles. In line with its declared role to make the region safe and secure, Nigeria took active part in the Burkina Faso-Mali border crisis. By shuttle diplomacy, Nigeria waded in visiting the warring states and bigger African states that could prevail on the feuding states to sheath their swords. The nations approached included Senegal and Libya. This was before Nigeria eventually left the matter for OAU’s oversight. (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
The regime began a policy of damage control to Nigeria-West African relations, which were at its ebb owing to perceived Buhari’s xenophobia against the West Africans. To achieve this, the Babangida administration offered assistance to Niger, Chad and Benin Republic which had suffered economically when Nigeria’s naira currency was changed. In Akinyemi’s terms,
The Nigerian currency became the regional means of exchange. The Babangida regime intervened in the lingering Chadian drought and post-conflict socio-economic crisis offering economic lifeline. These included humanitarian relief assistance, and technical assistance involving civil and military training, general personnel secondment, and military grants (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
It was in these areas that TAC played crucial roles, and Nigeria’s popularity matched its economic importance for the immediate neighbours, so much that the Nigerian currency became the “dollar” of the region (Bukarambe, 1990). Babangida’s largesse in West Africa was criticized at this time for its wastefulness, lacking strategic objective, and considered unnecessary. The rationale was questioned and the context faulted. The aides were in some cases unsolicited and some nations turned them down in suspicion and curious about Nigeria’s genuine intentions for such. Nigeria’s huge spending for the cause of West Africa was considered an avoidable wastage of national resources. This is in line with the general assumption that Nigeria’s African policy is characterized by a mere show of wealth throwing wealth around Nigeria’s neighbours was simply an essential feature of African policy (Bukarambe, 1990: 58). However, the role Nigeria was going to play later showed that the generosity had a strategic objective after all as a lot of goodwill seemed to have been stored up that Babangida was not only elected thrice as ECOWAS Chairman (1985, 1986 and 1987), but also made Nigeria to influence certain actions in the region in subsequent years (Akinyemi, 2009).
In 1989, for instance, Mauritania and Senegal had problems. There were racial undertones in the crisis, depicting an Arab-African discrimination. Nigeria intervened, underscoring the point that their problem of ethnic disunity were rooted in the arbitrary partitioning of Africa by the imposing western powers who divided one group into two or more distinct nations, a fact that both states were encouraged to appreciate and see as a unifying factor (Saliu, 2006a: 302).
The Ghana-Togo conflict was another problem Nigeria promptly intervened in to ensure that the conceived role of securing the immediate neighbourhood was performed. The crisis was rooted in colonial manipulations. The division of the Ewes between Ghana and Togo had been resented by the Ewes who had always preferred to live within the same geopolitical entity. The Ewe, with a larger population in Ghana, were a group of irredentists, whose historical ethnic resentment was capitalized upon by Togo President Gnassingbe Eyadema to accuse Ghana of inciting the group against his administration to call for multiparty system in Togo and remove him from power. The Babangida administration intervened in the matter as an impartial arbiter, with a resolution of the issue thus averting a West African security crisis. (Saliu, 1995).
The biggest test of Babangida’s role conceptions and promises to engender a regional peace order was the Liberian crisis, which started in December 1989. The crisis started like every other military coup attempt in Africa to change government. The rebel group, the NPFL, led by Americo-Liberian civilian Charles Taylor and army Officer Yormie Johnson fighting to topple the Khran, Samuel Doe dictatorship, met a stiff resistance in the loyal Doe Presidential Guards. There had been a long-standing face-off between the Americo-Liberians (resettled Negro slaves from 1822) and the local population led by the Khrans (Oluwaniyi, 2006: 6-8). The mutiny dragged leading to the intensification of the hostilities and inclusion of civilians in the movement to remove Doe. The coup attempt became a protracted rebellion with an ethnic undercurrent escalating the crisis. By June 1990, the civil disturbances had degenerated into a full-blown war, a development that could destabilize the relative regional peace and upset economic transactions. This attracted attention first from immediate neighbours and later the global community. For Nigeria, there must not be delay to arrest the hostilities and practically demonstrate Nigeria’s age-long secure-neighbourhood role conception. However, others (Nigerians and a section of the international community) saw it in a different light. First, a group reasoned that Nigeria under SAP was not considered economically comfortable enough to take on additional burden of stopping a major and complex war in Liberia except there was more to it than meet the eye. Second, Babangida’s intervention was considered by another group as an attempt to save his personal friend and business partner, Samuel Doe from impending doom (Howe, 1997: 147), and as a corollary to that, the intervention was also considered to be Babangida’s pursuit of securing personal business interests in Liberia, a personal mission cloaked in altruism, thus implying that the ECOWAS interventionist force initiative may have been a Babangida contraption to use a regional ploy to save the government of a personal friend (Walraven, 1999). Fourth, the intervention was also seen as a need to project Nigeria’s power in the region, and like Gulliver in the land of the Lilliputs, show its might the way powerful nations like America do in Vietnam, Iraq, and Somalia.
Whatever the perspectives, the Babangida regime fulfilled its role conception to give West Africa security. This role orientation was not peculiar to Babangida alone; it is a thread that runs through all Nigerian foreign policy regimes since independence. Nigeria has been considered destined for greater roles in Africa, more importantly the leadership of the continent, as Babangida’s assertion had indicated: “Nigeria is the only country every other country was looking up to, to provide the desired leadership” (Babangida, 1993).
Justifying the old perception of “manifest destiny’ to lead Africa prompting the 1990 intervention in Liberia, premising it on defence of national interest, the President opined that if the quagmire in the neighbouring country was allowed to escalate, then Nigeria would indeed be a misplaced giant and that it would later be at the receiving end when its regional economic interests become threatened and faces the burden of refugee influx to Nigeria. In view of the interference of Libya in the Liberian crisis, which had been funding the rebels led by Taylor, Babangida viewed this as a slap on Nigeria’s face, noting:
If we allowed a force from outside to come and cause instability in Liberia, chances are that such instability would spread into other neighbouring countries in the region. We the West African leaders said we were not going to allow such a thing to happen, where anybody will just walk into the sub region and take over control. Also the leaders quite rightly decided that in order to ensure peace and stability in the sub region, something has to be done and this is what motivated everybody to get into Liberia (Babangida, 1990d).
A few facts are clear from this. First, West African leaders would not wish to see Liberia become a motivating factor or apposite example for externally-backed internal rebellion in the states with the motive to sack the numerous illegitimate regimes in the region at the time. Secondly, the leaders saw a lack of reprehension of the Liberian debacle as a debauchery of the so called spirit of African brotherhood and solidarity. A corollary to this would be that the collective neglect would imply a collective shame if the Liberian conflict burns down Africa’s first independent nation right before their very eyes. Fourth, the Liberian crisis had begun to constitute a huge humanitarian problem that required collective or multilateral intervention as allowed by the UN.
Whichever prism is used to explain Nigerian interventionism, the clear point is that intervention, at any rate was desirable at the time of Babangida’s response. Nigeria launched a diplomatic offensive in the region, initiating the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) at Banjul in May 1990 to look into disputes which could have a disruptive effect on normal life and on the smooth functioning of the Community. The ESMC was made up of Ghana, The Gambia, Mali, Togo and Nigeria (Ayam, 2006). This was further elaborated upon by Akinyemi:
Nigeria then spearheaded the formation of ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). These originally comprised four countries, including Nigeria, Guinea, The Gambia and Ghana. The ceasefire agreement by ECOWAS had initially tasked the ECOMOG to monitor and maintain peace in Liberia. However, after some time, the deliberate acts of arson, kidnap, ambush and killing of ECOMOG soldiers were seen as a direct confrontation and declaration of war on the peacekeeping group. Thus, a change of strategy from peace monitoring to peace enforcement was required. Peace monitoring does not involve the use of force or taking of sides by the third party intervening. The intervention force is expected to see to it that the feuding parties keep to the ceasefire agreement, and act as a neutral arbiter and mediator (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
However, with the assault on ECOMOG by two rebel factions initially, including Taylor-led NPFL, the third party probably had no better option than to save the government, save itself and still save the nation from the rebel-induced inferno. Saliu observes,
among other obvious limitations of ECOMOG, the situation in Liberia as at August 1990 when it moved in, clearly demanded peace-enforcement operations, not peace-keeping; there was absolutely no peace to keep in Liberia (Saliu, 1995: 302).
Africa at the time was characterized by several armed conflicts of destructive magnitude. That of Liberia (1989) and Sierra Leone (1991) was unprecedented. There were wanton killings of civilians, mostly women and children and a situation of ever-increasing refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) hopelessly emerged, coupled with economic dislocations. Over 150,000 were killed with over a million internally displaced and 75,000 people turned into refugees (Oluwaniyi, 2006: 1 & 12). Nigeria similarly intervened in the Sierra Leonean crisis that started in 1991. The intervention was initially unilateral, beginning with joint efforts with Sierra Leonean Valentine Strasser to stop the menace of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) seeking to topple the government. This resulted in collaboration between both countries in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in 1993. The agreement later changed with the formation and deployment of Nigerian Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG), including the Navy and Air Force stationed in Lungi (Olonisakin, 2004). The unilateral approach of Nigeria to the Sierra Leonean conflict in the beginning and its subsequent domination even when ECOMOG arrived led to the popular reference to the Sierra Leone situation as “Nigeria’s war” (Oluwaniyi, 2006: 16). Two years into the Sierra Leonean conflict, General Babangida quit the Nigerian political scene and Abacha took over.
In the Liberian crisis, the high point of the anarchical situation that required a more active role of the ECOMOG forces was the deposition of the Liberian President and barbaric torture leading to his brutal murder unsuspectingly, by an NPFL faction at the ECOMOG headquarters in Monrovia (Iweze, 1993). These were followed by use of kids and women who are considered as minors by the rebel factions to loot, kidnap, maim, rape and kill. In the middle of the anarchy, Nigerians became the targets of the Taylor rebel group, with the disappearance of Nigerians and their eventual murder. The height of this xenophobia by the groups was the cold blooded murder of two Nigerian journalists, Chris Imodibe and Tayo Awotusin who were war-correspondents of The Guardian and Champion newspapers. Again, the failure of the US to intervene but only evacuate its citizens, the silence of the UN over the issue, and the reluctance of the OAU to act because of its Charter’s non-interference clause, Nigeria which had vowed to play a redeemer role since independence deemed it inevitable to act.
What therefore followed was not only ECOMOG activeness, but a greater Nigerian participation in stopping the warlords. Fawole notes that, at that time Nigeria was forced to take full control and alter direction of operation. The initial Ghanaian commander General Quinaoo was swiftly removed for inefficiency replaced by General Dongoyaro of the Nigerian Army. From that moment on, all successive ECOMOG Field Commanders were Nigerian officers (Fawole, 2003: 162).
This increased the image of Nigeria internationally, with Nigeria having more material, personnel and more spending in the peace operations. However, there were bottlenecks for Nigeria from home as public opinion sharply rose in opposition to what was called wastefulness on “what was not Nigeria’s business”. Neighbouring Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso also opposed Nigeria, condemning its actions as surreptitious means to dominate the region and subsume Francophone nations in its imperialism. They thus supported Taylor with arms and funding, and allowed their borders to be used for gun-running, among other things, by the Taylor movement.
Also, the Babangida administration commenced a program of rehabilitation of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees who were mostly welcomed in Nigeria, and resettled at Oru, Ogun State. The peacekeeping role of Nigeria in the Africa and UN-led conflict resolution missions at the time earned Nigeria the global ranking as the fourth in the world among nations in the UN that help in peacekeeping operations (Saliu, 1995:303).
However, it is pertinent to note that these roles were at serious economic costs for Nigeria. The domestic economy was overstretched, with Nigeria in the face of SAP and huge cost of nation-building at home resorting to begging for African Development Bank (ADB) loans and ECOWAS Fund. The enormous regional and global burdens, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somali, Chad, Togo, Namibia and South Africa, were costly global visibility at variance with national economic development, and contrary to the principles of economic diplomacy. On Liberia alone, Nigeria provided up to 80 percent of the ECOMOG troops (contributing 15,000 out of the total 17,000 soldiers) while spending up to $12 billion (Ayam, 2004). According to him,
No other West African country but Nigeria would have been able to spearhead such an operation. Representing the interventionist phase of Nigeria’s foreign policy it has shown the dominant position of Nigeria in ECOWAS and the region (Ayam, 2006: 19).
Nigeria was a financially committed member of ECOWAS and was reputed to be not only the highest due- paying member of the organization, but was a major financier of ECOWAS programs and projects. It made regular contribution of one-third of ECOWAS’ annual budget. In terms of financial commitment to the OAU, Nigeria was assessed higher than most African states for statutory contributions, and like Bukarambe (2000) notes, it was responsible for between eight and ten percent of the total regular budget of the OAU.
The administration’s premier foreign minister also recalls that,
The Babangida administration had also pledged Nigeria’s role in mid-wifing the birth of a free Namibia and South Africa. Linking the national security of Nigeria to that of the entire African continent, Nigeria continued its involvement with the Frontline States in the concerted efforts to ensure the independence of Namibia and South Africa. In addition, contacts with the Frontline States enabled proximity to first-hand knowledge of the Angolan and Mozambican conflicts which made it possible for resolution instigated by Nigeria. In 1987, Nigeria’s proposal at the Harare Conference of 1986 to heads of states of Non-Aligned countries to create an African Fund to financially assist the Frontline States in the liberation of Southern African was accepted, and Nigeria contributed $50 million (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
General Babangida’s administration spearheaded the boycott of the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games in 1986 to compel the west to stop apartheid South Africa from its racist imperialism in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Adeyemo, 2002), and frowned at the situation of a South African military base in Equatorial Guinea, a close Nigerian neighbour to the south, considering this as abominable to its principle of secure neighbourhood, anti-apartheid stance and a threat to its national security. Pressures mounted on Equatorial Guinea eventually compelled President Obiang Mbasogo to expel the South Africans from the country (Fawole, 2003: 166).
As a mark of disapproval, the Babangida regime led the campaign in Africa to refuse South Africa membership of the OAU. It took the reforms of the regime of President Frederick de Clerk to convince Nigeria to recognize the state of South Africa and support its bid for membership of the OAU, when de Clerk visited in April 1992 making the request and seeking cordial relations with Nigeria (Adeyemo, 2002: 129).
The decisive and tactical roles in African affairs earned Nigeria a number of international positions. These included the Headship of the UN Anti-Apartheid Committee, Chairmanship of ECOWAS in three consecutive terms, Secretary-Generalship of the Commonwealth of Nations, President of the UN General Assembly in 1989, Presidency of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Executive Secretaryship of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and Chairmanship of the OAU in 1991 with Babangida himself at the saddle, with one of his striking achievements being the establishment of the African Economic Community aimed at integrating African economies.
Also as OAU Chairman, President Babangida gave a radical address at the UN General Assembly on the African economic crisis, declaring that the debts African nations owed the west were not repayable. He rather reasoned that what the west should do was a plan to rescue African economies like it was done in the case of the Marshal Plan for dislocated economies in Europe. Four years earlier, Nigeria had canvassed for debt cancellation for Africa, which had culminated in the cancellation by some European nations all bilateral debts owed by the continent (Saliu, 2006: 306).
In conclusion, it could be deduced from all the analysis and accounts that Babangida’s era was a very eventful one as far international politics was concerned. It represented the “golden age” of Nigeria’s claim to regional leadership. The period accomplished the grand African role conceptions of the Murtala-Obasanjo, while declaring its own fresh perspectives in unambiguous terms. Although at a very high price and costs, Nigeria led peace missions and played a prominent role in the dismantling of apartheid in the continent. The manner in which Nigeria went about its Pan-Africanism and power politics was more explicit than implicit, overt than covert and manifest than latent, which made that era a radical departure from the past. The Babangida role conceptions thus fit into the sixth categorization of patterns as the conceptions that are clear and backed up by effective assumption. Like the manner in which Mai Idris Alooma’s diplomacy brought the Second Kanem-Bornu Empire to global limelight in the 17th century, Babangida’s foreign policy scorecard brought Nigeria back to the diplomatic map of the world. Mai Alooma consolidated on the founding of the Second Kanuri Empire by Mai Ali Ghaji by instituting a solid foreign policy that saw Kanem-Bornu establishing diplomatic and economic ties with far away nations including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He was one of the first pre-colonial African leaders to open embassies in other countries, and embark on shuttle diplomacy. His diplomacy brought the sleeping giant Kanem-Bornu to the epicentre of world politics, in the same manner that Babangida’s diplomacy in Africa brought Nigeria to a respectable leadership position in the continent.
It is however instructive to note that General Babangida may have given his Foreign Affairs Ministers the latitude to conceive, explore and assume important roles and strategies,
his own personal and group’s role perceptions and interpretations from the outset had become the template by which the foreign policy actors operated. However, by the 1990s, General Babangida seemed to have divided the foreign policy environment into two, with the area of economic diplomacy handled by General Nwachukwu, and the area of war-diplomacy (including ECOMOG, Southern Africa, Sudan, and Somalia) exclusively handled by the military high command and Babangida leading (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
Babangida’s policy regime was however marred by legitimacy and economic crisis at home. There was a sporadic increase in the rate of drug peddling and corruption, with advance fee fraud (419) becoming a very embarrassing image issue. There were also suppressions of civil society and human rights abuses arising from protests against the SAP reform policy constructing a grievous spatial economy, and against the endless transition to civil rule. The spectre of horrible domestic problems and banality of the Babangida response were beginning to reduce the regime’s popularity at home and abroad. Yet the government’s huge spending to keep to its international role promises was having more excruciating economic effects on the populace.
The outcries of the citizens, lack of support for Nigeria’s regional and global quests, and the litany of ethnic and religious conflicts at home, created a moral problem for Nigeria in its “corrective” roles in Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa. These were subjected to debauchery on the premise that Nigeria needed more “corrective roles” to play in its internal affairs. The worst legitimacy and image problem the Babangida administration would create for itself was the continued cancellation of elections leading to adjustment in transition time-table. The crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and South Africa where Nigeria was passionately working to normalize were caused by the same kind of leadership and ethnic crisis which Nigeria could not tackle at home. The military was holding on to power for too long, had become an instrument of internal colonization, and was no less promoting internal ethnic hatred and sectional imperialism like in South Africa.
The height of all this indulgence was the annulment of the most popularly acclaimed Presidential elections in Nigeria, which saw an ethnic Yoruba man winning overwhelmingly. It was the local and international heat this act generated that marked the fall of the Babangida regime and the end of its declining foreign posture (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
As Abegunrin’s observation (2003) aptly captures the period: the foreign policy exhibited Charles Dickens’ aphorism in his Tale of Two Cities “it was the best of times, it was the worst of times”.
5.2. The Sani Abacha Regime
If Nigeria had regained a mileage of lost grounds in international politics during the Babangida era, the General Sani Abacha regime played an “oversight” role in frittering away much of this regained mileage. This was not because General Abacha did not conceive clear African roles for Nigeria to occupy. It was rather because of Abacha’s defiant posture to the western world about how would govern Nigeria which led to the calculated attempt by the latter to ostracize his regime. In terms of the global public, Abacha was a villain who countermanded the diplomatic manipulations of Britain and the entire west in certain respects that concerned Nigeria’s national interest. However, in Africa and particularly in West Africa, Abacha was a hero of sorts for his administration’s roles in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Nigeria’s conflict resolution roles in Sierra Leone and Liberia during his reign.
Abacha had inherited a litany of domestic problems, and a very unpopular international image. The last two years of Babangida’s regime were marred by domestic political blunders including the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential polls in Nigeria. A spectre of local and international campaigns to force out Babangida that followed ended up in the establishment of an illegitimate government headed by an unelected civilian. Thus, Abacha’s administration was also preceded by this unpopular interim government in which as the serving Defence Secretary he was also the de facto Prime Minister.
The administration of Abacha thus
inherited a precarious external image problem, which was however not irreparable. The Abacha junta only needed to restore the stolen electoral mandate of the June 12 1993 presidential elections winner, and set the transition on course once again. But Abacha had a different agenda. This was demonstrated by the sack of the Shonekan government on November 17 1993 and the attempt to consolidate his power, which characterized the regime’s actions all through the period of reign, making it to be brutal, to violate human rights, and to even orchestrate a political program that had him being adopted by the five political parties as a consensus candidate, a development that a Nigerian elderstatesman Bola Ige once characterized as the “five fingers of a leprous hand” (Ajibola, oral interview 2009).
These developments and more that shall be examined shortly, compelled the international community to isolate Nigeria.
5.2.1. Road to Power
Abacha’s journey to the seat of power was a long and tortuous one. He had been actively part of the military leadership in the country from December 31, 1983. Indeed, he had been the announcer of military coups and reader of the inaugural addresses of the Buhari and Babangida coups, and that of his own on November 17, 1993. A flurry of activities and developments following the June 12 elections created a fertile ground for another military intervention in Nigeria’s political history. The pre and post elections had been marred by politically motivated litigation issues to prevent an imminent outcome of the emergence of M.K.O. Abiola as President. On June 11, 1993, an unregistered Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) had applied to an Abuja High Court presided over by Justice Bassey Ikpeme for an interlocutory injunction to stop the electoral commission from conducting the election on the allegation that the primaries in Jos were characterized by irregularities. The request was granted and an interlocutory injunction was given by which the electoral body was ordered to suspend the election. The elections went ahead as planned, with the Federal Government, electoral body and the electorate disregarding any judicial phony adjudication just hours to the polls. A comedy of judicial errors followed-after polls results from fourteen states and Abuja showed Abiola was in a far lead over his rival Tofa-in which an Abuja High Court ordered the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to discontinue the results announcement; and when another High Court in Benin ordered that the remaining results be released immediately and the winner be declared. The Federal Government remained silent till June 23, 1993 when an unsigned release emanating from government declared that the election had been annulled, alluding to the June 11 judgment and allegations as basis for it. On June 26, President Babangida came on national television to confirm the annulment, premising it, among other reasons, principally on the fact that the assumed winner was not acceptable to the military high command (Taiwo, 2001).
The fact that the military high command was not favourably disposed to Abiola probably explains the coming of General Abacha in November 1993. This allusion may be within prognosis when the event that followed leading to the inauguration of Ernest Shonekan as Head of the Interim National Government (ING) was also rejected in another politically motivated court injunction and the military under Abacha moved to power in the middle of political arrests, violent and persistent mass protests, clampdown on the news media, and a growing hostile reception to the Nigerian government by the international community. It is pertinent to note that Abacha was also the Secretary of Defence in the ING at the time, and the only military officer legitimate and most senior ING secretary allowed by the ING decree to take over the reins of government in the face of resignation, death or any major political crisis. The emergence of the Abacha-led junta barely three months after the ING was sworn in, justified the statement of General Babangida that the military leadership was probably behind the annulment of the 1993 polls, as their solution to the lingering crisis was to take over power and confine the prime actors in the elections behind bars.
5.2.2. Abacha’s Foreign Policy Cabinet
The Abacha foreign affairs think-tank was not as enterprising as that of his military predecessor, Babangida. The defining moments of Babangida’s foreign policy was his ability to read the international terrains properly and appoint foreign affairs ministers that would fit the season. At inception Babangida appointed a Political Realist (Bolaji Akinyemi) as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA). However, when Nigeria had achieved its objective to show leadership in Africa and the world by its sustained positive power relations, the regime introduced Ike Nwachukwu as the MFA to institute an economic diplomacy that would recoup all that was lost in the preceding years.
General Abacha was rather motivated by the domestic partisanship alone without also giving attention to the international terrains. After pre-emergence negotiations, involving Abiola himself and his followers, including Kingibe, his running mate in the election, Abacha appointed Ambassador Babagana Kingibe as the MFA (Eso, 2008; Tinubu, 1998). According to Sodangi,
Kingibe’s appointment was apparently to placate the pro-democracy camps and give them a glib of hope that June 12 election results were still alive. It was therefore not the intention to position Nigeria’s foreign policy better that underlined the appointment. However, this was not to overrule two basic facts- Kingibe’s appointment which would calm the nerves of both the local and international publics that the crisis was nearing resolution; and Babagana’s classic pedigree in governance and foreign affairs (Sodangi, oral interview 2009).
A Kanuri like Abacha, Babagana Kingibe had been a university lecturer, Foreign Service Officer, Ambassador to Greece and Pakistan, Principal Officer at the Supreme Military Headquarters, Political Director in the Cabinet Office, Secretary of the Constituent Assembly, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the 1990s, and Vice-Presidential Candidate of the winning party (Eso, 2008: 2). Hence, Kingibe was no doubt eminently qualified to be the MFA even if the genuine motive was to break the June 12 solidarity in what appeared like a pathway to crisis resolution.
The foreign policy machineries remained entirely the same under Abacha as it was during the Babangida years. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was on paper in charge of all matters relating to the external environment, with the MFA at the head. The other ministries that would have to take important decisions on foreign matters were also present. Principal civilian members in Abacha’s Kitchen Cabinet who were also central in his initial foreign policy making were Kingibe (MFA), Kalu Idika Kalu (Minister of Finance), S.B. Daniyan (Minister of National Planning), Aminu Saleh (Secretary to the Government), Olu Adeniji (Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Ambassador Adeyemi (Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Akinterinwa, 2004). The research institutions and universities were also present. However, unlike Babangida,
these institutions did not seem to be effectively utilized or consulted. Moreover, Abacha soon turned out to be a maximum ruler that only gave out instructions to his ministers, including the MFA on what he or his Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) wanted (Ajibola, oral interview 2009).
Despite his wealth of experience, Kingibe was therefore going to carry out the bidding of the Abacha junta, which had from the beginning as contained in its inaugural speech made no pretensions that it was not ready to entertain any opposition or institutionalized obstacles to executive wishes. Abacha had declared all democratic institutions, political parties, and national and state assemblies banned, while suspending the Federal Constitution (Abacha, 1993a). Hence, for most of the period (1993-1995) that Kingibe served as MFA, he was no more than a puppet under the military leadership (Saliu, 1999; Tinubu, 1998).
It must however be noted that the first two years of Abacha’s reign were not as poorly rated in international affairs as the last two and a half years. Nigeria had not yet descended into a pariah status despite the many domestic challenges at home. While strategic arrests had been made and notable Nigerians including the presidential elections winner were being docked, Abacha seemed to still be earning some international goodwill with the National Constitutional Conference (NCC), anti-corruption and indiscipline program, stabilizing of the ailing economy, and reforms in the banking sector enjoying some international and local confidence. Aside this smooth operation internally, the influence of Kingibe may also not be in doubt as the first two years during which he served as MFA witnessed a relative international respect for Nigeria despite the deep political odds. Indeed, just as he was quitting the office of the MFA in 1995, Nigeria’s descent into a pariah state began.
The era of foreign policy crisis that followed up to the demise of Abacha saw Tom Ikimi, a trained Architect as the MFA. He served from 1995 to 1998. During Ikimi’s years,
Abacha’s policies at home had become both locally unbearable and internationally unacceptable. Internally, there were a number of issues, including a stalemated political transition program, continued detention of Abiola, phantom coup, poor human rights record, arbitrary trial and subsequent hanging of the nine leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the complete militarization of the state. Tom Ikimi’s emergence as MFA was a child of circumstance. His choice was ideal for a military ruler whose personal ambition would require a novice in foreign policy making. His utterances on the government position and refusal of amnesty to the Ogoni Nine at international forum such as the Commonwealth summit in Auckland in 1995, and interviews with the foreign media were hurtful and damaging. Ikimi was inexperienced and lacked diplomatic finesse required for a country with an ailing foreign image that needed image damage-control (Ajibola, oral interview 2009).
It was not entirely Ikimi’s fault that he failed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, or because he was an architect without any pedigree in foreign affairs. After all, there had been foreign ministers who whose profession was far for career diplomacy. Joe Garba and Ike Nwachukwu were career military officers who performed well in the field of international affairs. What seemed responsible for Ikimi’s utter failure was probably the inadequate room given him by the military high command, and the scripts he was possibly always handed by his bosses to act.
5.2.3 Abacha Government’s National Role Conceptions
Pessimism and ill deposition underlined general attitude towards Abacha’s foreign policy during his four and a half year-reign. This could be alluded to the crisis of confidence his regime suffered both at home and abroad because of his very poor domestic human rights records- political arrests and detention, the 1995 coup hoax, the June 12 elections complete truncation, poor handling of the Niger Delta/Ogoni crisis, and his inordinate ambition to hang on to power, all of which led to low international patronage and bad labelling. All of this domestic bungling may have overshadowed the regime’s decisive manner of handling the post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia and the Sierra Leone crisis. For instance, unlike his predecessors who articulated concrete proposals concerning Nigeria’s relations with the rest of the world outside its borders, Abacha cannot be said to have articulated any clear policy. What invariably passed for the country’s foreign policy during his tenure was no more than a series of tragic domestic policies and actions that snowballed into diplomatic controversies (Fawole, 2003).
Contrary to this perception that Nigeria’s foreign policy during the General Sani Abacha administration was not intelligible; the Abacha regime had at inception a clear foreign policy agenda and came up with a set of role conceptions that were comprehensible. However, like previous administrations, some of these “conceived” roles were either recycled or simply restated, implying that there was not always something entirely new about them. At the occasion of the annual dinner of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in 1993, General Abacha had given a foreign policy address in which he made his vision clear:
The vigor and dynamism of a nation’s foreign policy are in today’s world becoming the external manifestation of a virile domestic economy. While it is true that our size and position in Africa have conferred on us historic responsibilities on the continent, it is only prudent that we discharge them mindful of our primary objectives of seeking the betterment of the quality of life of our own people (Abacha, 1993a).
This was a historic declaration in that for the first time, a Nigerian political leadership was making it clear that the traditional Africa-centered roles would be rationally assumed within the larger framework of actualizing the aspirations and hopes of the economic wellbeing of Nigerians. With the financially burdensome peacekeeping and conflict resolution Nigeria had encountered in its unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts in Africa, General Abacha declared that Nigeria would seek an increased United Nations (UN) involvement in order to progressively reduce the country’s burdens (1993a: 42). According to him, Nigeria would continue to assume the mediation, peacekeeping and conflict resolution roles in Africa, but
It is necessary that we should continue to pursue these within the limits of our resources in the overall interest of peace and stability in our immediate sub-region of West Africa and the entire continent (Abacha, 1993a: 40).
Indeed the problem with Abacha’s foreign policy was not whether the administration had a foreign policy agenda. The issue was more of whether the regime was able to execute and sustain its clearly stated foreign policy goals. Aside the fact that General Abacha had problems with the international community because of his very poor human rights records at home and his subterfuge in the transition to civil rule contraption, he also had very wrong choices in the administration of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Babagana Kingibe would have been the administration’s best candidate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but there was always discord in the ministry, which led to a loss of concentration in the handling of the foreign affairs of the regime and inaction. There were personality clashes between the MFA and the senior career civil servants in the ministry. These were caused by disagreements on precedents and the way the MFA wanted things done. Again, politics came to play as some very senior personnel did not trust Kingibe because of his political flirtations in the botched Third Republic. Yet General Abacha was regularly fed with unsavoury tales of executing personal agenda about Kingibe from Abacha’s cronies and some senior officers in the army continually impressed it on the Head of State not to trust Kingibe (Al-Hassan, 2008).
Kingibe’s successor in 1995, Tom Ikimi proved to be the wrong choice because rather than help control the damage suffered by the military leadership in the face of bad domestic clime leading to international isolation, he earned more western enemies for the country. He made inciting and wrong political statements that shook the global reputation of Nigeria, such as the brash use of words in describing opposition to Abacha’s human rights regime at the Commonwealth summit in Auckland in November 1995. Ikimi was neither a professional diplomat, which may have explained his lack of finesse and diplomatic experience. He was a qualified architect who entered politics in the Second Republic. Ikimi may have thus enjoyed political appointments as rewards for liberal attitude towards the military’s botching of the Third Republic. He later became one of those Abacha picked to assuage or placate all political sides irked by the truncation of the transition programme in 1993.
The Abacha regime’s role conceptions can be situated mostly in his own foreign policy and general speeches, addresses and broadcasts. Indeed, his foreign affairs ministers only performed the duty of analyzing what the Military High Command had passed across through the Commander-in-Chief as the role conceptions. If there was any credit the Abacha regime deserved in any other aspect of national life apart from the areas of sanitization of the banking sector, a less politically motivated creation of states and local governments, stabilization of the naira in international economics, fuel prices stabilization, and sports development (Saliu, 2006a), it was probably in the stating of roles Nigeria would be occupying in the continent without any ambiguity. The general role conception was succinctly stated:
We will provide leadership in any significant development in the region…it is our policy to maintain a brotherly and harmonious relationship with all our neighbours and it is our historic commitment to play a special role in our sub-region and in our continent, Africa (Abacha, 1997).
Like most previous administrations, peace and security in Africa were top priorities in the Abacha foreign policy agenda. The regime underlined the pervasiveness and severity of the dislocations and destruction conflicts and wars had wrought on Africa, describing the scenario as of great concern to Nigeria because “these conflicts undermine the capacity of our continent for sustained development and economic growth” (Abacha, 1993a: 34). General Abacha declared Nigeria’s disposition in this regard:
We are determined to continue on Nigeria’s traditional roles in Africa…This administration remains firmly committed to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) where we have advocated the compelling necessity of economic cooperation and the strengthening of joint efforts to promote peace and security in the region (Abacha, 1995).
The government’s emphasis on assumption of roles within acceptable international practices such as jointly or multilaterally was informed by the old cardinal point or fundamental of Nigeria’s foreign policy, reiterated by Abacha that in the general pursuit of its foreign policy, Nigeria had always chosen cooperation, not confrontation, which “is an approach that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states” (1995:11). The cause for this foreign policy attitude and role preoccupation was attributable to the successive conflicts in Mozambique, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. The wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone were particularly negating the age-long foreign policy principle of secure neighborhood and constituted a threat to Nigeria’s own national security and economic wellbeing. Moreover, the vanguardist role of Nigeria as declared by the military leadership was also expected in view of the spillover motivational effect those socio-political crises might have on Nigeria in terms of starting a rebellion that may sweep off the Nigerian dictatorship like in the two cases.
The Abacha administration also made it clear that it would work towards restoring and encouraging the growth of democracy in Africa in view the fact its absence had been responsible for increase in conflict rate. In Abacha’s words: “Our objectives are the restoration of peace and security and the installation of democratically elected government.” This proposed role was reflective of the legendary perception of Nigerian leaders of the political sanctimony of their country which makes it permissible to pass moral judgment on others in deference to its own moral turpitude. This is either characteristic or symptomatic of great nations such as the United States whose nationalist zeal endued by their wealth and greatness place them at a psychological edge to perceive themselves as saviors, while others are the “endangered species” that require salvation. The Nigerian leadership, an obviously undemocratic one, however downplayed the moral question hanging on its neck by explaining its acts away thus:
The process of democratization in Nigeria has been a painful and difficult one. This administration is determined to evolve a truly democratic system which will respond to the peculiarities of the Nigerian condition. With patience and resolute belief in our future as a people, web shall overcome in our inexorable march towards an enduring democratic society (Abacha, 1995:3).
The area of Africa’s representation in the permanent seat of the UN Security Council was also a priority for the Abacha foreign policy. According to the regime, it would play an active role in the movement to actualize the expansion of the Council and inclusion of Africa as a permanent member of the Council. According to Abacha, if the west was so much of an advocate of democracy, then it should show good example by democratizing the Security Council and creating a level playing field for all regions. In his words:
The Security Council should therefore embody the global demand for democracy in its structures and composition. The election of additional permanent members into the Council to represent regions and new centres of power can no longer be delayed. Africa’s quest for representation in the category of permanent members is consonant with the universal quest for justice and fairness (Abacha, 1993b).
Great as it sounded, Abacha’s “intentions” may have been mired in the problems he later encountered with the international community, including Africa that he was offering to assist owing to the very poor, cruel and high-handed governance and conflict at home, which eroded Nigeria’s voice in Africa and undermined Abacha’s own moral and leadership standing in the world.
Another role conception was in the area of Africa’s growing indebtedness to the west. The African debt profile as at 1993 was precarious. It had reached the $275b mark, representing 73 percent of the continent’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The unfortunate result of this was that more than 30 percent of the continent’s foreign exchange earnings was being used to service debts annually (Adeyemo, 2002: 65). Nigeria’s advocacy for Africa’s debt reduction and rescheduling had become popular under the Babangida regime, with a milestone gained when Babangida as the OAU Chairman had openly called for debt forgiveness internationally recanting the many years of slavery and plundering during colonialism as sufficient premise for the west to pay by debt cancellation for the debt it owed the African past. Babangida had called for a New Marshall Plan to cater for Africa’s worsening economies leading to the debt burden, which collectively resonated in the foreign policies of other African states under the auspices of the OAU. The Abacha regime vowed to continue this role of mounting pressure for that Marshall Plan to be rolled out. For the Nigerian leadership, this was desirable because a stronger, independent and united Africa was possible only when a strong and prosperous economic base was built (Abacha, 1993a: 40).
It has to be understood that this New Marshall Plan was not Abacha’s original concept. It was a direct carryover of Babangida’s role concept. This mildly represents the example of the role conception of one regime repeated verbatim or recycled by another regime, with little or no new initiative or modification to address issues in their current form as it is the perspective of the interactionist or dynamic school of role conceptions.
Again, the Abacha administration declared role conception regarding post-apartheid South Africa. The Nigerian authorities made it clear that it would be involved in the social reconstruction and interracial relations rebuilding processes through the multilateral efforts of the UN and OAU (Abacha, 1993a: 37). This role agenda did not last because of the diplomatic face-off with South Africa, the UN and the general global community that the regime would encounter in 1995.
One unique feature of the foreign policy of the administration was the role conceptions to meet new challenges such as racism, drug trafficking, bank scams, money laundering, and terrorism in Africa and the world (Abacha, 1996). The first four had the region at the receiving end because of its vulnerability, and incidentally, Nigeria seemed to be at the center of the first three, which called for a more proactive role to contain them. Interestingly, the regime itself later descended into the pantheons of corruption, looting of public funds stashed in foreign vaults, and various money laundering scams that scandalized its moral basis to continue to assume that leadership role in the continent.
This last role conception is unique because it demonstrates and strengthens the perspective in this study that roles should not be static, but should respond to developing or emerging trends. It is however pertinent to note that most of Abacha’s role conceptions were a recast of traditional national roles conceived-some by the founding fathers and some by successive administrations before 1993. Interestingly, Abacha’s speeches, which incidentally are our most competent sources of his administration’s role conceptions in Nigeria’s African policy of the time, do not obscure the fact that 90 percent of the declared roles were not originally Abacha’s conceptions. Fifty-four public speeches and official addresses/ broadcasts were given by the Head of State during his four and a half-year reign, and only 19 had foreign policy issues raised and 15 were foreign policy addresses.
In the speeches, from where his role “conceptions” can be gleaned, many phrases used demonstrated the continuation of certain foreign policies and indeed continuous assumption of certain roles Nigeria was known for. Hence, the leadership may find such roles unavoidable to either reiterate or assume, even if reluctantly. These phrases included: “Nigeria would remain committed to engaging in”, “Nigeria would continue to play its traditional roles in”, “we shall continue to engage in”, “this administration shall continue Nigeria’s traditional roles”, “we remain committed to the obligation of”, and “Nigeria’s role in regional peacekeeping shall remain uncompromised”.
All together, Abacha through his speeches used those phrases 29 times in all his foreign policy addresses. Such emphasis is significant for foreign policy. Words and nuances used suggest a lot- it can keep the peace, yet it could lead to explosive situations. Abacha’s nuances suggest that apart from the role to meet new challenges of drugs, fraud and terrorism in Africa, his regime was only repeating the NRCs of his predecessors. However, because he stated all of these in no ambiguous terms, it would not be fair to conclude that he did have a clear foreign policy agenda. What he had may not originally be his, not probably because he was mentally incapable of (as that cannot even be scientifically proven), but probably because the issues of his time had not significantly changed from that of the predecessor’s, to discard the old role conceptions; however, what he presented as role conceptions met the needs of his time and were clearly stated. Indeed, Abacha seemed to adopt or adapt the role conceptions of the previous leaderships to back up his vision that was earlier mentioned. Assuming them, though, was an arduous task in view of his unpopularity both at home and abroad as the subsequent sections would examine.
5.2.4. Regional Politics and Leadership
Conceiving national roles is always a different task from assuming them. This section aims at examining the assumption of the roles the Abacha administration had set out to play in Africa. The regime had made regional peace and security its priority, a role objective of Nigeria since independence. The high point of Nigeria’s leadership in West Africa was the peacekeeping and enforcement in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This had started in 1990 when Nigeria along with two other ECOWAS countries had mooted the idea of and raised the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) when the Liberian crisis erupted. Thus, General Abacha inherited the regional peacekeeping commitments in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is pertinent to note however that the Abacha regime could have inherited a foreign policy commitment or burden, but it had a choice to reverse it; however because it was one of its role priorities, the administration continued and intensified this Nigeria’s role in restoring peace and security in the two countries. Indeed Nigeria’s role in Sierra Leone was unprecedented and marked a milestone in any peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa. This would soon be established.
After the war in Liberia, Nigeria led the negotiations that culminated in the conduct of the general and presidential elections in which Charles Taylor emerged as President. As a result of the inauguration of the Taylor government which symbolized the cessation of hostilities and the rejection by Taylor to have ECOMOG remain in Liberia to engage in post-conflict rebuilding of its military, Nigeria’s conflict resolution role in that country came to an end. However, the administration continued to engage humanitarian and diplomatic measures in the reconstruction efforts. These included the provision of safe haven for the refugees shipped to Nigeria in the course of the war and their phased return home after the war (Howe, 1997: 167).
The Liberian war had generated its own ripple effects in West Africa. Besides constituting a threat to the security of the regional neighborhood by way of inspiring other local or civil conflicts, it had also led to the emergence of rebellious elements in other parts of the region. The worst hit was neighboring Sierra Leone whose domestic peace came to abrupt end with the outbreak of violence in April 1991. The Liberian government of Charles Taylor literally backed an anti-government group in Sierra Leone known as the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) led by Foday Sankoh in an invasion (Howe, 1997: 166). The invasion may have been couched in some rather vague patriotic slogans; however there were certain other self-centered motives of both the rebel group and their Liberian benefactor. One of the reasons have been identified as the Taylor’s measure to get back at Sierra Leone’s President, Joseph Saidu Momoh for backing ECOMOG in what was considered its “invasion” of Liberia. Lungi International Airport in Freetown had been the rear base of ECOMOG in its Monrovia operations. Arnold (1999) identified another reason as Taylor’s intent to have a major hold on the Sierra Leone diamond fields from which personal wealth and funding for his own insurgency could be derived.
The invasion of Sierra Leone by the Taylor-backed Sierra Leone insurgents met a weak government resistance because the small size of its armed forces, the detachment of part of it to the ECOMOG operations and its war-weariness from the operations (Howe, 1997: 170). Following this almost helpless state of Sierra Leone, a distress call was put through and Nigeria and Guinea promptly responded. Nigeria’s response has been said to have been motivated by the fact that the Sierra Leone government had been faithful to the ECOMOG cause and should therefore be saved from Taylor’s vengeful reprisal (Howe, 1997: 156).
The Sierra Leone conflict became compounded when government forces led by Captain Valentine Strasser, frustrated by the inability to contain the invasion toppled the administration of President Momoh. However, greed, corruption and ineptitude dogged Strasser’s regime as soldiers abandoned battle duty to chase political fortunes, while poorly motivated officers and men fighting the invaders gave up and joined RUF/SL. This development soon led to the collapse of the resistance and a complete routing of Freetown (Clapham, 2000). General Abacha’s policy towards Sierra Leone was a tough one. Nigeria took on the role of defending the Sierra Leone’s interests, with a grim determination to dislodge the Johnny Paul Koroma junta and the rebels, and restore peace and a democratically elected government. Diplomatic options were exhausted in which Nigeria led the tough move to commit Koroma to quit the political scene. Despite an agreement in Conakry to hand over by April 1998, Koroma engaged in subterfuge which by 1997 had shown that he was not willing to relinquish power. This led to Nigeria’s decisive military intervention in which it led ECOMOG forces to invade Sierra Leone and flush out Koroma and the RUF/SL (Oluwaniyi, 2006).
The blitzkrieg of the interventionist force led by Nigeria compelled an immediate retreat of the Koroma-led junta from the center of power in Freetown to the suburban but diamond and timber-rich country-sides, monopolizing with the help of Liberia’s Taylor and plundering the major sources of economic sustenance of Sierra Leone. The democratically elected government of Ahmed Tejjan Kabbah that was put in place was thus a lame-duck that had no real military and economic powers. Aside this obvious vulnerability of the new administration, the country had become effectively divided into two halves, with the legitimate government controlling Freetown and immediate towns and the rebels having most of the country in their control. Thus, Sierra Leone looked toward Nigeria for succor in terms of the national security and defense of the country, with Nigeria’s General Maxwell Khobe appointed by the Kabbah government as the Sierra Leonean Chief of Defense Staff. The Abacha government continually committed funding, material and human resources to the ECOMOG efforts while effectively backing the legitimate government to get rid of the rebels. It was this situation that subsisted till the demise of the Nigerian Head of State in June 1998.
The peacekeeping and enforcement role of Nigeria in the region during the Abacha era was unprecedented. For the first time, Nigeria practically changed the government of another country and took over the national defense and security of that country in fulfilling its conceived roles to go any length to resolve conflicts and restore democracy in the region. Fawole captured this milestone in Nigeria’s foreign policy in Africa by noting that the near unilateral invasion introduced a decidedly novel dimension to Nigeria’s sub-regional role. Not only did it succeed in forcefully unseating a de facto regime but continued to support the newly restored civilian government in Freetown with troops and weapons. In a way, Nigeria had single-handedly decided the fate of another country (Fawole, 2003: 208).
From the Liberian and Sierra Leonean experience, it thus becomes discernible that the first two role “conceptions” of the General Abacha’s administration to stop internal and international strifes in West Africa and return the countries to democracy were effectively assumed. These represent roles clearly conceived and effectively occupied by a Nigerian leadership. The domestic problem of Nigeria arising from the legitimacy crisis bedeviling the “regional messianic” Abacha junta notwithstanding, the feat in both West African countries represent a regional leadership role earlier conceived by the founding fathers of Nigeria and vigorously pursued at certain times in Nigeria’s international relations. Even if Liberia and Sierra Leone roles were not originally Abacha’s, the regime’s posturing (rhetoric and reality) were landmark.
In terms of the role conception to assist by all means the post-apartheid construction in South Africa, the administration could not assume this. The reasons are not far from the prognosis. First was the fact old wound healed faster than expected and the South African race and ethnic relations seemed to speedily normalize as result of the cross-cultural and inter-racial personality and integrity of President Nelson Mandela. The reforms enjoyed overwhelming backing at home and abroad, so that there would not be any need for a particular nation to be proactive in offering help like during the prime of apartheid in the 1970s (Adigbuo, 2005). Second and more importantly was the fact General Abacha’s very poor approval ratings at home had attracted worries and disapproval from the international community, particularly from Nelson Mandela’s South Africa. Mandela had rather assumed the role of a “Frontline State” in the plethora of Nigerian domestic troubles, which had led to sharp criticisms by Mandela that the African giant had been brought to disrepute by Abacha’s misrule (Kolawole, 2005). Consequently, a diplomatic face-off ensued in which both leaders exchanged venoms and South Africa led African campaigns to isolate Abacha, and Abacha in turn pulled Nigeria out of the 1996 Cup of African Nations taking place in South Africa (Fawole, 2003: 199). Hence, the “conceived role” to effectively work with all institutions to help in the social reconstruction of South Africa was thus technically a failure, and remained unrealistic in the light of Nigeria’s dwindling stature in international politics at the time.
The pariah status of Nigeria in just two years into the Abacha era probably denied it the opportunity to carry out the planned roles in the other areas identified at inception, including continuing the legacy of Babangida in advocating Africa’s debt reduction, rescheduling or outright cancellation by a New Marshall Plan from the west initially mentioned; nor was it able to assume the role of Africa’s advocate for an African permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Indeed, the advocacy became a feeble and laughable one, as it emaciated into a mere call or reminders through Abacha’s addresses at local and international forums such as the OAU and ECOWAS summits, or the speeches of his foreign affairs captains.
There was however, a policy that yet made the western governments have some degree of confidence in the Nigerian economy. This was the reforms of the banking sector, in which unviable or failing banks were identified, liquidated and prosecuted. This represented a mop-up exercise that restored faith of local investors in the economy and gave international competitors hope. This was a step in the direction of the role conception-which was exclusively Abacha’s- to tackle the new problem of money laundering and advance fee fraud, because most of the banks then thrived on these illegal acts which were soiling the image of the country. The international role to join in the vanguard was however limited to the domestic front because of the regime’s unpopularity abroad. The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) was however efficient in arresting and prosecuting drug traffickers and collaborating with the western agencies to fight the menace. However, in terms of assuming a full fledge role in combating financial fraud, drugs, laundering, and terrorism in Africa as conceived at the regime’s inception, Nigeria could not play such roles because of growing international distrust and disregard for it. As a matter of fact, some western nations had begun to doubt if Nigeria had not joined the “circle of terror|” as a result of the Abacha regime’s newfound love with countries the west regarded as terrorism-friendly such as Libya, Iran, Iraq and North Korea (Saliu, 2006a).
It is thus apt to say that the role conceptions of the Abacha era had fewer ambiguities unlike that of some of his predecessors. He had a landslide accomplishment in the area of regional roles in restoring peace and security, and the restoration of democracy. These were successful probably because of the regime’s military background, disposition and capacity to quell violence and instill peace-which equally, is by violence or the use of force. However, in terms of putting a fine leadership in place at home which could have enhanced its positioning to assume African roles conceived, the regime was a dismal failure. Put differently, there was no enabling or favorable political clime put up at home-what Northedge had called a suitable domestic environment of foreign policy- because of misrulership which could help accomplish great role conceptions.
5.2.5. Years of the “Long Knives”
This era refers to the period of 1995-1998 when General Sani Abacha and his security apparatuses embarked on a systematic use of state violence to suppress civil society and eliminate internal opposition. It was an era reminiscent of the 1930s during Adolf Hitler’s reign of domestic terror in Germany, who used a special secret unit, the SS as a Killer Squad to get rid of any group or individual opposed to his rule. This discourse thus constitutes an important one to understanding the domestic environment of the Abacha foreign policy, which led to the decline of Nigeria’s age-long international reputation, and ultimately the fall of the regime.
The rise to power of Abacha was not the most important cause of international attention. Attention had always been on Nigeria since the abortion of the June 12 Presidential polls, which had led to massive protests as it had been matched by massive arrests, detention without trial, arbitrary use of firearms on pro-democracy demonstrators leading to deaths and injuries, sealing off media houses with armed troops, and a general clampdown on civil-society. These were worrisome developments that led to foreign consternation and sometimes condemnation and limited sanctions on the Babangida government. Again, the establishment of the ING was another cause for concern as the world wondered what the lame-duck government could do considering the magnitude of crisis at hand. Hence the attention of the world was that of anger, apprehension and bewilderment, with the fear of a repeat of the 1966-70 civil crisis occurring.
General Abacha’s manner of emergence created more fears rather than the expected alleviation of tension anticipated by the political class, intellectual elite and military (Omoigui, 2005). Abacha had been seen from popular quarters as the appropriate person to intervene in the political impasse that followed the elections annulment and ING setting up. However, from the accounts of the a member of the Babangida Kitchen Cabinet, Omoruyi (2004: 78), Abacha was the actual stumbling block not only to the annulment of June 12 election aimed at stopping a Southern President from governing Nigeria, but was also instrumental in the constant change in the transition to civil rule time-table because of his long and patient quest to have his own turn of presidential power. Thus, when the opportunity was provided by the outgoing unpopular regime of Babangida for Abacha to serve as the most senior secretary in the ING while other old service chiefs had been retired along with General Babangida, he took maximum advantage of the situation and compelled ING Chairman and Head of State, Chief Shonekan to resign (Omoigui, 2005:1-2).
The inaugural address on the night of the palace coup showed indications of the “long knives” that were to follow this desperate seizure of power, to crush any opposition and orchestrate a state terror to consign the June 12 mandate in the dustbin of history. Abacha had declared:
The problems must be addressed firmly, objectively, decisively and with all sincerity of purpose. Consequently, the ING is hereby dissolved…National and State Assemblies…dissolved.. All local governments…dissolved…the two political parties…dissolved…all political meetings and associations…banned…The regime will be firm, humane and decisive. We will not condone nor tolerate any act of indiscipline. Any attempt to test our will shall be decisively dealt with (Abacha, 1993c).
By all these, it was clear that the June 12 mandate was already being relegated in the political calculations of the power-mongers. What followed from 1994 was hope that ended up in political meltdowns as the new junta further distanced itself from the mandate of Abiola-having appointed his Vice Presidential candidate, Kingibe as the MFA, and a few others including Lateef Jakande as Works and Housing Minister, Abacha’s acts that followed attracted Abiola to return home to declare himself President at the Epetedo Declaration in Lagos in 1994. This led to Abiola’s arrest, detention and an endless litigation on charges of treason (Taiwo, 2001).
Abacha’s Long Knives began with the arrest and detention of M.K.O. Abiola, who, along with prominent civil rights leaders, Beko Ransome-Kuti, Gani Fawehinmi and MFA under Babangida, Bolaji Akinyemi had openly called for the General’s intervention because of the belief that he was a professional officer who preferred soldiers to defend the constitution and democratic rule (Omogui, 2005: 12). Abiola’s June 11 1994 Declaration at Epetedo made the regime uncomfortable. Hence a nationwide manhunt for him was done and on June 23 1994, Abiola was arrested and charged with treason. His detention without trial sparked off political violence in most of southern Nigeria, organized protests of civil-society and human rights organizations, protests from the market and student groups, and media war on the military regime. These protests were combated with police and army brutality, with massive use of firearms to quell the riots leading to many deaths and a charade of destruction. There were also arrests and more detentions without trial, clampdown on the media and a general militarization of the state. (Taiwo, 2000: 123-140; Omogui, 2005:13-16).
As the Abiola detention and the violent response of the state to the organized civil disobedience continued to undermine Nigeria’s stature in the international community, the junta alleged a violent coup to topple it. In the ensuing melee, former Head of State General Olusegun Obasanjo and his deputy General Shehu Musa Yar’adua, a couple of military officers that were once regarded as the “ÍBB Boys”, and stubborn civil rights leaders such as Beko Ransome-Kuti, prominent journalists, Chris Anyanwu, Kunle Ajibade and Ben Charles Obi were promptly arrested, detained and were subsequently given different sentences ranging from 25 years imprisonment to death by firing squad, by a military tribunal. Obasanjo and Yar’dua’s sharp criticisms of the regime and the respect they commanded in the military and civil population were considered security risks for the Abacha junta. The media professionals had also used their popular tabloids as outlets for these criticisms and rallying points in the growing opposition camp which could incite the public against the unpopular government. Hence, this was a “test of will” that must be liquidated (Taiwo, 2000: 123-140).
Aside the Abiola detention saga and the coup hoax allegedly involving Obasanjo-Yar’adua and some prominent members of civil-society, the Ogoni crisis presented the most challenging to the Nigerian image crisis and eventual international isolation. Ogoniland had engaged itself in a struggle for their environmental rights and responsible leadership of both government and the Shell Petroleum Development Company in Ogoniland. Precisely in 1990, a non-political organization comprising Ogoni elite and traditional rulers, known as “Kagote” whose origin dates back to the 1970s, drew up and presented to the Nigerian state, the Ogoni Bill of Rights. Among other things earlier highlighted, they demanded political autonomy within Nigeria and a fair access to and use of oil revenue derived from Ogoniland to develop their homeland and language, as well as protection from Shell. As an instrument to pursue the actualization of the demands in the Bill of Rights, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was set up in 1990. MOSOP followed the Bill of Rights up with intense campaigns at both the national and international levels with a view to publicizing the Ogoni predicament (Okonta, 2000). However, the blame for environmental problems was heaped on the natives who were accused of pipelines vandalization leading to spillage. Shell figures show that from 1985 to early 1993, 5,352 barrels of oil were spilled in 87 incidents in Ogoniland after their staff had been withdrawn (Shell, 1995: 12). Shell claimed that out of 87 instances of oil spillage in Ogoniland between 1985 and 1993, 60 (about 70 percent) were sabotage acts; the figure tallied with government claims that out of 11 incidents in Ogoniland in 1990, that eight or 73 percent were due to sabotage (Onadipe, 1997).
However, as MOSOP began to secure public and international support, the state reacted by banning ethnic organizations and others such as MOSOP and the Ethnic Minority Rights Organization of Africa (EMIROAF), both led by Saro-Wiwa. These two organizations and the National Youth Council of Ogoni People were the three main organizations which spearheaded the Ogoni insurrection. Perhaps the Ogoni issue might not have elicited much passion and concern if not for the fact that the problem of environmental pollution and degradation had become a global concern. The world had come to terms with the fact that the environment was the common heritage of mankind and that environmental degradation in any country could not be overlooked because it carried trans-border harm across nations. The focus on the environment thus brought the global searchlight on the activities of multinational oil corporations, whose relentless drive for oil exploration and the attendant unscrupulous drive for profit often culminated in environment abuse and unconcern for their host communities, especially in the developing countries Four traditional leaders of Ogoniland had been killed by Ogoni youth for betrayal of the Ogoni interest by their compromising attitudes with government and the oil companies, which put Ogoniland in environmental and structural jeopardy. The state and local governments had blamed the inciting activities of MOSOP led by Saro-Wiwa as the cause of the brutal murders of the chiefs. Subsequently, Saro-Wiwa and eight others were arrested, arraigned before a kangaroo military tribunal, tried and sentenced to death by hanging without fair hearing (Onadipe, 1997: 2).
Pleas from home and abroad, including the UN to either give them a fair hearing in a regular court or grant the nine Ogoni leaders amnesty fell on deaf ears. Consequently they were hanged on November 10, 1995. The timing of the execution of the Ogoni Nine which coincided with the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland, New Zealand in 1995 was embarrassing to a global community that had pleaded for clemency so much and had been assured even by Ikimi at the Summit that the Abacha regime was redressing the issue. Nelson Mandela had even staked his personal integrity to persuade the Summit not to take a hard-line action against Nigeria, having been assured by General Abacha that all would end well. Rather than take the necessary measures to assuage the wounded feelings of the Ogoni people, the Abacha regime embarked on a ruthless military campaign by establishing and deploying the notorious Rivers State Internal Security Task Force in Ogoniland to apply maximum military action to stop the insurrection. The regime took steps that further made it lose credibility in the international system (Onadipe, 1997: 3).
The regime turned to anti-military groups, including the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Odua Peoples Congress (OPC) and the many non-governmental organizations such as the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), Campaign for Democracy (CD), and the Campaign for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), for elimination. A wave of state-sponsored terrorism began with the Abacha Killer Squad led by Barnabas Msheila (a.k.a. Sergeant Rogers) assassinating many respected pro-democracy activists. These included Kudirat Abiola (wife of the June 12 election winner in detention), Pa Alfred Rewane, Suliat Adedeji, and Admiral Olu Omotehinwa; with persons from the long list of those penciled for elimination narrowly escaping, including Professor Wole Soyinka, Pat Utomi, Alex Ibru, and Abacha’s own Second-in-Command, General Oladipo Diya. Serial bomb explosions took place at public arenas with concentration of pro-democracy activists, and live bullets were directly shot at crowds protesting Abiola’s incarceration and murder of the Ogoni Nine. The regime orchestrated a propaganda that indicted NADECO for all the state violence. This led to massive exile of pro-democracy activists to Europe and North America for safety (Taiwo, 2001: 182). Attempts were also made to systematically eliminate Generals Obasanjo and Yar’adua who were serving prison terms for the phantom coup of 1995. General Yar’adua was alleged to have been injected with a lethal substance which led to a cardiac arrest and subsequent death. A civil rights and democracy crusader and music icon, Fela Kuti who had also been detained by the junta on trumped up criminal charges, died weeks after his release.
Another domestic environment that destroyed Abacha’s foreign policy was the second coup hoax of 1997. The Abacha regime had alleged that very senior military officers in his government had plotted along with top intellectuals to overthrow his administration. These included his deputy, General Diya, and Generals Olanrewaju and Adisa; and two Professors, Femi Odekunle and Otubanjo. These were of Yoruba extraction, three of whom were from the same state as Bashorun Abiola, the June 12 election winner. These were made to face military tribunals and were sentenced to death, until they were rescued by the sudden demise of Abacha on June 8, 1998.
Abacha’s long knives lasted for two years, during which he bled Nigeria’s international image and his own political group’s image. His reputation and integrity were an all-time low, while he commanded little or no respect from the international community. It is this impact on Nigeria’s international relations that the subsequent section attempts to examine.
5.2.5. Era of Isolation
The natural consequence of Abacha’s climax of misrule and domestic recklessness was international isolation. The military regime either forgot or was ignorant of the fact that no nation could exercise absolute sovereignty in its own internal affairs any longer. By being a member of a comity of nations or international organizations, being a contracting party to international statutes and conventions, and by being a party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a state is bound not only by these, whose violation attracts international sanction, but positively compromises its sovereignty part of which it has surrendered to the organizations, particularly on matters of humanitarian, human rights and state terrorism concerns. Global citizenship, on the other hand, has brought the concept and place of state sovereignty to the mainstream of current international relations scholarship. Global citizenship will make state sovereignty pale into insignificance in the light of advances in technology, education, increasing mobility which will ultimately engender modernity or globalism (Kamau, 2006:1-2). For the realist, as power politics galvanises national interest, a state may resort to invading and usurping the sovereignty of other states; just as states compromise sovereignty at times to realise an objective of national economic development or development of military power. States allow foreign investors in form of transnational and multinational companies and go into military treaties and alliances for security. As long as survival and preservation remain states’ objectives, the end justifies the means, even if it is giving away part of its sovereignty. For the idealists, state sovereignty is automatically limited by membership of international organisations, bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, and of course, by international law and moral codes on behaviour (Ojo and Sesay, 2001; Oppenheim, 1962; Kaplan and Katzenback, 1976). It is thus arguable that state sovereignty brings one thing to the fore namely, reconciling what is observable and what is possible.
Contemporary international system, characterized by increased interdependence of states, increased role of global and regional organisations, institutionalization of the collective security system, emergence of a New World Order, New International Economic Order, globalization, escalated internal struggles by ethnic groups for autonomy, etc, has evolved an even different concept of state sovereignty. Nations can no longer take unilateral actions even in matters considered to be overwhelmingly internal.
The Abacha government tried to insulate itself from the rest of the world, warning western nations to steer clear of Nigeria’s internal affairs, which from our understanding of the changing nature of sovereignty in contemporary international politics, was a misnomer. This abnormality or impossibility was what certainly prompted it to desperately seek new allies from a list of discredited and equally isolated regimes of nations such as Libya, The Gambia, Niger Republic, Sudan, Iran, Iraq and North Korea (Omoigui, 2005:15).
The era of isolation was characterized by pressure/condemnation, sanctions, and finally severity or limitation of relations. First, a lot of institutionalized condemnation of the regime came from the west. World leaders, international organizations and civil-society groups, including the US-based Africa-American lobby group, Trans-Africa made up of politicians, serving government officials, popular entertainers, mounted pressure on the regime to “expedite restoration of democracy to 100 million Nigerian people” (cited in Fawole, 2003: 199). The arbitrary detention of Abiola and hanging of the Ogoni Nine in the midst of international pleas for clemency and right when the Commonwealth summit was going on in Auckland, New Zealand, were viewed with extreme consternation and condemnation. The Abacha regime was just seen as one that should be distanced from because of lack of reasonability. A diplomatic face-off ensued between Nigeria and its old western and African allies. President Nelson Mandela rose in sharp criticism of Abacha and began to lead a diplomatic offense to isolate it in the continent. This led to vitriolic verbal exchange between General Abacha and Mandela on the one hand, with Abacha remarking that he would not blame President Mandela for his wrong judgment “because having spent 27 years in detention, he has lost touch with the global socio-political trend in the world” (Abacha, 1995); and MFA Tom Ikimi and Mandela on the other hand, with Ikimi throwing insults at the respected statesman:
Our experience as a people and a nation in world affairs, tell us that the successful struggle for liberation does not automatically endow a newcomer to the international arena with all the nuances to perform creditably. And whoever gave the South African President the song sheet to read has not done him honour (Ikimi, 1998).
The height of the diplomatic face-off with Nigeria was the resolve of the Mandela government not have any direct dealing with the Abacha regime nor accord it any legitimate recognition, a step that many western nations were soon to take. Nigeria’s invitation to an Afro-Asian Soccer Tournament in South Africa was reversed, and the South African authorities refused Miss Nigeria to participate in the Miss World beauty pageant taking place there (Saliu, 2006a: 339). Consequently, Nigeria responded by last-minute ditching and pulling out of the African Nations Cup which it was supposed to defend at the 1996 tournament holding in South Africa. As a result of this act, the Confederation of African Football (CAF) imposed a ban on Nigeria which denied it the opportunity to participate at the 1998 edition of the CAF Nations Cup in Burkina Faso. In terms of severance of diplomatic ties, Canada followed suit by withdrawing its ambassador to Nigeria. The Abacha promptly responded by recalling its own ambassador too. The Canadian government did this in reaction to the arbitrary trial, conviction and murder of the Nine Ogoni leaders despite massive appeals for clemency from all over the world (Saliu, 2006a: 257).
Second, the Abacha regime suffered limited sanctions imposed on his junta by the United States, British and European Union governments. By limited sanctions, it was not really economic but military sanctions to frustrate the regime. The economic sanctions were avoided not to stifle the Nigerian people economically, and probably for the economic good of the west too who had enormous oil blocks in the country, interest in the importation of Nigeria’s very fine oil, and an eye on the huge Nigerian market for their goods and services. The sanctions also affected imposition of visa and travel restrictions on military personnel and government officials. Also, the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) cancelled Nigeria’s hosting rights of the World Youth Championship (Junior World Cup) for 1995, for which Nigeria had spent huge material, financial and human resources to get the FIFA nod in the first place. This was a big blow on Nigeria and a symptom of Nigeria’s descent into a pariah state (Onadipe, 1997: 6).
The Abiola and Ogoni Nine episodes also attracted sanctions from the Commonwealth in which Nigeria had earned enormous respect. The Commonwealth of Nations, with Nigeria’s Emeka Anyaoku as the Secretary-General, having invoked the Harare Declaration of 1991, unanimously agreed to suspend Nigeria from the organization until the regime improved its governance and human rights record and returned Nigeria to democracy (Saliu, 2006a: 256).
The consequences of these included a decline of international stature and respect for Nigeria, and a calculated move to put Nigeria at an arm’s length. All manner of economic and technical aid and assistance to the country were suspended by various countries, ambassadors were recalled, no country wanted to have anything to do with Nigeria, except Abacha’s fellow pariah friends and those he induced with money to court their friendship, including Sierra Leone and Ghana. The stature of Nigeria had paled and its reputation had been hurled into the pantheons of infamy. Nigeria swiftly climbed down from the impressive height of being the African power that it had been from the 1970s and became a pariah, a country derided and isolated by all its traditional allies and friends. In spite of its role (in regional peacekeeping) its major intervention and restoration of democratic rule in Sierra Leone did not give the regime much of the international acceptance it craved (Fawole, 2003:214).
To put it differently, Nigeria’s natural leadership role in Africa was impeded by this pariah status and unpopularity of the Abacha regime. Hence, in order to reap some relevance, it had to concentrate on the peace enforcement role of Nigeria in Sierra Leone. It can also be reasoned that if Sierra Leone and Liberia were not in a helpless state and desperately needed intervention from anywhere, Nigeria may have been rebuffed. No wonder, just after Charles Taylor was sworn in as president, he had indicated his willingness to see Nigeria and ECOMOG retreat from his country. Abacha’s friends including Ghaddafi of Libya, Jameh of The Gambia, Meinassara of Niger, Rawlings of Ghana, and Omar Bashir of Sudan may have accepted Nigeria’s friendship at the time not only because they were dictatorships, but because of material and financial gains their relationship would fetch the rulers. The Abacha era had witnessed the pomp and canopy Nigeria offered during state visits of some African rulers and allegation of money bribes to certain African leaders to earn their support. These were symptomatic of the degeneration of a country’s popularity and its desperate bid to just have any friends. Nigeria did not abandon its roles by virtue of its commitments in Sierra Leone to earn modicum of relevance, but the fact was that its leadership role was no longer natural nor was it acceptable because of its pariah status. Abacha’s national roles may have been clearly identified, but there were no auspicious domestic and external environments to fully assume them. Except for the security and peacekeeping role in Sierra Leone, the kind of leadership role in other areas of Africa’s life was lacking, and African neighbours were obviously not according Nigerians much regards any longer.
This was even evident in the manner by which other Africans began to treat Nigerians. Tales of woes were narrated by Nigerians who were routinely embarrassed, harassed, maimed, raped, or even killed in countries like Libya, Gabon, Angola, South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Liberia. (Saliu, 2006a: 322). The sad lull in Nigeria’s leadership role in other areas of the continent’s life has been captured by Saliu:
Indeed the capacity of Nigeria to hurt African countries was greatly diminished. Repeatedly, scores of Nigerians were unfairly tried and executed or deported from other countries with the government being incapacitated to even seek for an explanation (Saliu, 2006a: 339).
A distinguished career diplomat and one-time ambassador, Oladapo Fafowora summarized the whole period thus:
In recent years, Nigeria’s foreign policy and diplomacy have been in disarray. Its role in international affairs has been on the decline, while its global influence has waned considerably. Nigeria conducts its diplomacy traditionally through three main channels: the UN, the Commonwealth and the OAU. In each of the three theatres, Nigeria is no longer a key player (Fafowora, 2001: 102).
5.3. The Abdulsalami Abubakar Regime
5.3.1. Emergence and Background to Foreign Policy
General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s administration was a child of circumstance. It was never conceived as a possibility during the reign of Abacha, nor would Abubakar have been considered the appropriate candidate to succeed Abacha in the face of any eventuality. Abdulsalami may have been the Chief of Defence Staff, but for the Abacha junta, his days were numbered. This was because Abubakar belonged to that class in the military that were regarded as the Obasanjo elements who got fully integrated in the “Babangida Boys” group in the 1980s. Abubakar had long been listed as one of those to be disgraced out of the army by Abacha because of what was termed his “habitual disloyalty” to the Commander-in-Chief, but faithfulness to Babangida even in retirement and sympathy for the incarcerated Obasanjo to whom he was Aide-de-Camp many years before (Omoruyi, 2004: 172). If the Head of State had had his future demise while in power foretold, he would probably have eliminated the likes of Abdulsalami Abubakar long before 1998, and positioned his most trusted aide, Jeremiah Useni to take his stead. However, General Abacha died in very mysterious circumstances in the night of June 8, 1998, leaving behind a power vacuum that may lead to intrigues among the hawkish senior military officers and eventual barrack revolt. That trusted aide, Useni, was however fenced off in a deft move made by the late dictator’s Chief Security Officer, Major El-Hamza Mustapha, who schemed in a more militarily professional and less political Abubakar to take over (Taiwo, 2001: 243).
General Abubakar inherited the assets and liabilities of the previous regime. The assets included the stabilization of the naira, and the stabilization of fuel and market goods prices. There was also the revitalization and restoration of credibility to the banking sector. The liabilities however undermined the gains- Nigeria was an isolated and disregarded country with an economic backlash, and there was unbridled corruption, and very low human rights ratings. In terms of foreign policy and external affairs, Abubakar was inheriting the pains and the gains. The pains were again the pariah status of Nigeria, which was adversely affecting its ability to pull any influence in Africa and the globe as was hitherto the case, or to play its natural leadership roles because the domestic environment was very bad indeed. The gains were however, Nigeria’s feat in stopping the Sierra Leone conflict and the restoration of the democratically elected government of Kabbah, which were started by the Abacha regime (Kuna, 2005).
If the universal law that government is a continuum is anything to go by, Abubakar would have been expected to carry on the foreign policy of Abacha. But that was far from it. This was because,
it was the same poor foreign policy that brought Nigeria to its abysmal diplomatic state. However, Abubakar differed completely as it even dawned on him that Nigerians and the world needed policy change for Nigeria’s respect and global standing to be restored. For obvious reasons, the Abubakar regime would rather embark on internal overhaul, or a thorough mopping up of the domestic environment for a world-friendly-foreign policy to be instituted (Sodangi, oral interview 2009).
5.3.2. Foreign Affairs Cabinet
Like the Abacha administration or any other military regime for that matter, in which there is always a long command structure in the foreign policy making of which the Head of State is the final court of appeal, General Abubakar called all the shots in the foreign affairs of Nigeria at the time, and what was more, the state of the country at the time required that. General Abubakar however employed the expertise of a seasoned diplomat, Ignatius Olisameka as the MFA throughout his 11-month rule, in the quest to return Nigeria to global reckoning. Olisameka was a veteran career diplomat with over 20 years of experience in the Nigerian Foreign Service, who took over from the combative Tom Ikimi diplomacy of the Abacha era, which has also been described as an era of “area boy diplomacy” (Onadipe, 1997: 12). He had served in several diplomatic missions abroad, including as Nigerian Ambassador to Canada, US and Israel. Apart from his main task of directing affairs at the clearing house of Nigeria’s foreign policy, Olisameka also brought his expertise to bear in reconciling ethnic and sectional differences in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ibid).
All matters relating to external affairs were decided by the military high command. A Nigerian lawmaker, Umar observes:
The Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) of Abubakar took all decisions relating to foreign policy, which the MFA was expected to implement. However, because of the exigency of the time, the Head of State was a Foreign Minister of some sorts as he personally facilitated the implementation of certain roles and indeed attended to some matters that enhanced Nigeria’s reintegration process (Umar, oral interview 2009).
The short period of General Abubakar’s rule, its concentration on domestic or “home repairs” to re-endear Nigeria to the world, and the exigencies of that period were critically responsible for a lack of a strategic foreign policy cabinet, or foreign policy think-tank like that of Babangida’s, that compels a cursory dissection. However, the centralization of policymaking powers could also be explained and justified by the exigencies of the time, for as Umar reasons:
That was the period which required careful steps, foresight, quality control, and damage control. Leaving foreign affairs in the hands of just anyone could destroy the fragile process of taking Nigeria out of the international abyss and image problem (Umar, oral interview 2009).
The Olisameka era however, witnessed a landmark in the Nigeria-US relations over accusations by the latter that Nigeria was probably supporting terror because of the nation’s rebuke of attacks on Somalia. The US had stopped military aid to the Nigerian army, and Olisameka had challenged the US for a baseless accusation, which led to a revocation of the US sanction by the Bush administration (Umar, 2009). Attempt would now be made to examine Abdulsalami Abubakar’s foreign policy agenda.
5.3.3. Abubakar’s Foreign Policy Agenda
Unlike all previous regimes, the Abubakar administration was hurriedly constituted, just as it suddenly assumed power. Hence, there was no proper articulation of what its policies would be at the beginning, nor were there any roadmaps in foreign and African policies. On the first prompting was the tendency to carry on with the policies of the preceding regime, but that would be the last thing any new leader at the time should do. As a matter of fact, General Abubakar was an important part of Abacha’s PRC whose civilian members he even sacked leaving behind only all the old military personnel on taking over. However, what was desirable and required at the time was a total discarding of the policies and programs of the previous administration. To this end, Abubakar was to act based on the compelling issues on ground such as returning Nigeria to global reckoning, rebuilding the country’s image abroad by correcting the plethora of wrongs committed by General Abacha, and returning Nigeria to democracy.
Thus, General Abubakar gave addresses that bore relevance to Nigeria’s immediate goals in Africa and the world, but did not articulate its own peculiar foreign policy objectives and role conceptions. Indeed, General Abubakar’s foreign policy represented the category of regimes that occupy or assume national roles that are not clearly conceived by them. In other words, such leaderships simply either act on impulse, in response to prevailing circumstances, or continue a legacy without their own blueprint. However, in terms of the local affairs of Nigeria, which constituted the domestic environment of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the Abubakar regime had a clear vision. In his maiden broadcast of June 9, 1998, Abubakar declared:
Our vision for Nigeria is a country where nobody would be intimidated on account of their views, tribe and religion. (Abubakar, 1998a).
It is pertinent to mention here that Abdulsalami Abubakar’s foreign policy was basically “domestic-centric”. All that the regime needed to do was put things right at home to first and foremost warm Nigeria back to the heart of the international community, and then earn some trust to engender resumption of diplomatic relations and trade. Nigeria could then regain some international respect and confidence in itself to assert its regional leadership once again. This was probably why General Abubakar’s administration could not really come up with any national role conceptions, nor articulate any distinct African policy. The internal consolidation and external damage control were the cardinal points of Abubakar’s foreign policy. In July 1998, the Abubakar administration made this domestic-centric foreign policy clear:
The internal and sub-regional tasks, challenges and responsibilities facing the Armed Forces are becoming increasingly enormous and complex. This administration remains committed to restoring democracy, the rule of law and full respect for fundamental human rights and civil liberties in our country. We are determined to take Nigeria back to its rightful place among the comity of nations and, above all, we are committed to taking our military back to its constitutional and professional role of defending the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation (Abubakar, 1998b).
The logic here is that for Nigeria to regain its regards in the international community, it would need to embark on a transition program to restore democratic rule and permanently confine the soldiers to the barracks, free political prisoners including the winner of the June 12 Presidential polls, dismantle the State Strike Force, reopen the closed media houses, and tear down Abacha’s human rights records (US Department of State, 2000). Two weeks after assumption, the regime released political prisoners, the most notable of them all being General Obasanjo who was also granted state pardon; and subsequently, a number of obnoxious decrees were repealed to create an atmosphere for fundamental human rights to thrive (Adeyemo, 2002).
On assumption of office, the regime pledged to hand over to a democratically elected government on May 29, 1999. When 26 African ambassadors paid him a visit on June 23, 1998, Abubakar vowed to restore peace in Nigeria and Africa. He said that his regime would consolidate existing relations and maintain positive and friendly ties with all nations of the world without compromising Nigeria’s sovereignty, while protecting the sub-region on all issues (Abubakar, 1998b:3). This sounded like how a typical government that comes into power after another would sound. Desires and aspirations were made in regard to West Africa, it did not however concretely identify a specific role Nigeria would assume, as the term “protect” or “defend” the region was not role-specific because it does not really state how this would be done. However, Nigeria’s role in post-war Sierra Leone subsequently gave a sneak peek into what General Abubakar had meant by defending and protecting the region.
Abubakar’s early speeches cannot be described as foreign policy speeches per se, but the messages were so central to and had foreign policy implications for Nigeria. There is no doubt that his messages earned him tremendous domestic and international support. The international profile of the regime began to swell because of its disposition to the demands of the west. A little lull in Nigerian foreign policy was however encountered as a result of the piecemeal and selective (discriminatory) release of political detainees, delay in reconciling the political class to prepare them for electioneering activities, and more importantly the continued incarceration of the June 12 elections winner. The west frowned at this and called for release of all political prisoners and the respect for the rights of citizens to freely and peacefully express their views (US Department of State, 1999).
The willingness of the regime to bend to such tersely made appeals, and the release of former Head of State, Obasanjo was warmly received by the west, which began to accord the new regime recognition. Following this development, high calibre international figures visited or called Nigeria one after the other to consolidate the goodwill. These included the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan; Commonwealth Secretary Emeka Anyaoku; the British Prime Minister Tony Blair made the first telephone contact on June 24, 1998; and there were American and British delegations who also visited. These important delegations were not just an endorsement of the Abubakar regime’s democratization process. Many observers at the time, had advanced that these diplomatic leaders had also come to persuade Chief Abiola, the assumed election winner, to forfeit his mandate and accept conditional release, which was unacceptable both to him and his supporters.
Shortly however, Abiola died. Just after taking some tea in front of his guests, including the US Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, Assistant Secretary of State (Africa) Susan Rice, and US Ambassador to Nigeria William Twaddell. Ironically, despite the nationwide violence that the death of Abiola caused with many alluding it to a grand conspiracy between the Nigerian authorities and the western nations to get Abiola out of the stage if he refuses to make compromises, the western states did not withdraw their offer to help the Abubakar regime actualize the democratization objective. This further fuelled the speculation that the west and the military junta had, in order to have a fresh start and end the crisis, killed him (Taiwo, 2000:300).
Having “settled” the home-front, General Abubakar began a miniature shuttle diplomacy to buy and store up recognition, favours and goodwill from abroad. The countries he visited included France, Britain, USA and South Africa for the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, all of which represented diplomatic breakthroughs and end of pariah for Nigeria after having hitherto lost international clout for over four years.
5.3.4. Regional Roles
As mentioned earlier, General Abubakar’s administration barely had the luxury to conceive national roles because of the circumstances surrounding the rise to power. Hence Abubakar simply found himself filling certain legendary roles Nigeria has been playing in Africa. Among the six role conception scenarios this study has created, the one that Abubakar’s regime fits into is the category of leaderships that find themselves occupying certain role that they did or could not articulate. If there was any regime with an unclear role conception but which still played important roles in the region, it was Abubakar’s.
Abubakar, like Abacha, inherited the old West African policy. Hence the major engagement for the new Abubakar administration was to continue with the peace efforts and democratization in Sierra Leone. He emerged Head of State in the middle of Nigeria’s active involvement in restoring democracy to that diamond-rich but war-torn country. Nigeria’s place in the ECOMOG force protecting the installed democratically elected President Kabbah was both phenomenal and necessary because apart from the fact that a Nigerian senior officer, Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe was the Sierra Leonean Chief of Defence Staff, the Nigerian contingent also engaged in the training of other soldiers.
Incidentally, the Abubakar administration also concluded plans to end Nigeria’s military involvement in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone protested this plan for two reasons. First, that country’s army had been depleted because of the length of war and as such was not sizeable or competent enough to defend the nation. Second, the democratic government of Kabbah would again be susceptible to attacks from the rebel RUF/SL. The many years of human and material investment in Sierra Leone would thus have been in vain. The quest to end the operations in Sierra Leone was said to be because of Abubakar’s wish not to bequeath a heavy regional burden on a new military regime after so many years of internal crisis (Abegunrin, 2003). However, Abubakar’s real reasons were probably the explosive crisis at home which needed absolute attention and little or no regional reaction, and the fact that the regime was too occupied attending to Nigeria’s needs while down-playing regional needs.
As far as Abubakar was concerned, the war in Sierra Leone was over. The country now had a President with a military (trained by Nigeria) to command, and could now protect itself with it. This idea, coupled with the enormous pressures coming from the people that there were enough problems at home to tackle than dissipating resources for another country’s worries, compelled the Nigerian government to soft-pedal on Sierra Leone (Clapham, 2000).
Abubakar’s foreign policy was domestic-centred. Tackling the internal squabbles preoccupied the regime of the time that it barely articulated its own foreign policy, nor set out roles to assume in Africa. The roles Nigeria played during his time were not really roles conceived by his regime. Yet having secured western trust, Abubakar simply wanted to dump the old Nigerian commitment in Sierra Leone, which was perhaps the only African leadership role Nigeria could afford to occupy at the time.
The foreign policy and role conception processes during military rule were centralized, with the Head of State having absolute powers and latitude to initiate and implement whatever they wished to have. Akinyemi however opines that foreign policy formulation lies entirely with the Head of State who may only take advice from whomever he desires (Akinyemi, 2009); hence some decision units may play little or no role in the policy process as the table below illustrates.
Table 7: Politics of National Role Conceptions in Nigeria: Military Rule (1985-1999)
[pic]
Source: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, National Assembly, Abuja, 2009.
The table above shows that the military ruler was the all in all in foreign policy decision making, with reliance on three basic units in that regard. These included the Kitchen Cabinet, AFRC/PRC (that is the military High Command), and the Ministry of Defence. The three were parallel on the policymaking ladder. Generally, the think-tanks for the military were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NIIA. However, under the Babangida regime,
the Foreign Affairs Ministry played more than the role of think-tank; it was the clearing house for all foreign affairs for the government, and attempts to circumvent the MFA by members of the Cabinet and other influential people in government were overtly rebuffed by President Babangida who always referred them back to the MFA for the purpose of due process (Akinyemi, oral interview 2009).
In all cases however, public opinion and other ministries were the least in the foreign policy process. They barely counted.
Military rule in Nigeria was not as encumbered by any slow-down mechanisms as in civilian leadership. The military suspends the Constitution, rules by decrees and allows no opposition. Also power is concentrated in the hands of a few, a ‘small political group’ who constitutes the High Command. Thus, the entire policymaking process is exclusively controlled by the armed forces. Moreover, the Head of State, because of the hierarchical structure and reverence in the army for seniority, has the ultimate power and may render the High Command which is also the ruling council a mere rubber-stamp of his own desires, interests, aspirations and actions. He thus has the latitude to steer the external affairs of the country however he wishes. The successes or failures of the foreign policy process thus falls squarely on the shoulders of the Head of State and his ruling council.
The foreign policy of Nigeria under Babangida, Abacha and Abubakar were thus the reflection of the world as seen or unseen by the rulers; and a demonstration of the perception of the country they led. Their role conceptions reflected their group’s perceptions and interpretations and in some cases, the expectations of the Nigerian people of the roles Nigeria should play in Africa, and the expectations of other Africans of the role Nigeria should play in their affairs. For instance, the Babangida, Abacha and Abubakar administrations perceived Nigeria as a great nation that should respond to and intervene in African issues. Their interpretations however differed and this affected their approaches: Babangida believed in economic diplomacy; Abacha was more combative; while Abubakar because of circumstances paid attention to the ‘political’ and ‘domestic diplomacy’. However, while the Liberian government expected Nigeria to help them in the crisis that erupted in 1989, the rebels from 1990 detested this and wrought violence on Nigeria to protest Nigerian ‘interference’. Majority of Nigerians too particularly from the Abacha period when there was much internal crisis, opposed Nigerian intervention, but government was adamant until during the Abubakar period when the expectations of Nigerians were heeded. Thus, as earlier established in this thesis, perception, interpretation and expectation equal conception of roles. However, as demonstrated sometimes, expectations of the publics (local and international) may not always count.
From the three rulers, the Babangida and Abacha African policy regimes were aggressive as both were occupied with restoration of peace and security in the region and both led the OAU with the popular crusade of combating the African debt overhang. Abacha however soon compromised Nigeria’s global reckoning by his very poor human rights records at home and his administration’s combative nature with the world. He did not meet world and Nigerian expectations at all in the “conception” and assumption of international roles. He ruled like a demented person.
All in all, the second phase of military rule in Nigeria was not as dynamic and creative in African policy. The golden age of military foreign policy was the Murtala-Obasanjo era when Nigeria’s foreign policy was both aggressively Africanist and globalist. The second phase brought Nigeria from a global perspective to regional contexts, while the Abacha-Abubakar era further reduced the bounds and reach to immediate neighbours. Abubakar’s domestic reforms however, brought some international respect to Nigeria.
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Chapter Six
Nigeria’s Roles in Africa under Civilian Rule, 1999-2007
Chapter five has examined foreign policy making and national role conceptions (NRCs) under the military. In this chapter however, the peculiarity of foreign policy making and NRCs under the civilian administration of Olusegun Obasanjo would be discussed. It is noteworthy that President Obasanjo who had ruled and made foreign policy decisions before as a military General, was to engage in the art of foreign policy decision making as a civilian, or what has been described as a democratically elected leader. This chapter attempts to examine the institutions, structures, processes, and manifestations of Obasanjo’s African policy.
6.1. Nigeria’s Global Outlook under Obasanjo’s Administration
The Obasanjo administration claimed to have a global outlook, and a vision to strategically reinvent the Nigerian huge stature in regional, continental and global politics. This was encapsulated in Obasanjo’s foreign policy agenda in 2001, viz:
The current thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy is to regain respectability and relevance in the international community…The grand strategy seeks the conversion of foreign policy activities into concrete achievements which are of direct benefit to Nigeria. The main objective is “peace, security and prosperity through friendship”. The goals to be achieved are as follows: (a) Economic integration of ECOWAS; b) Responsibilities in Multilateral organizations- UN, AU, the Commonwealth, OPEC, NAM, and G-77; (c) Cooperation with the Far East; (d) Promotion of foreign investment and trade; (e) Debt reduction (Gusau, 2001: 12).
The Olusegun Obasanjo era (May 1999-May 2007) was an eventful one in the history of Nigeria’s foreign policy in that it was characterized by a heavy traffic of activities along Nigeria’s international boundaries. It was also unique in several respects. It was both effectively Africanist and globalist on the one hand (Akinterinwa, 2006). On the other hand, it balanced both the domestic and external orientation of Nigeria’s international relations, because of the enormous pressure for Nigeria to regain lost glory in international politics (Abati, 2007). Third, it returned Nigeria to global reckoning (Saliu, 2006b). Fourth, there was an overwhelming personalist style in the foreign policy undertakings (Fawole, 2004).
The main factors in the successes of Nigeria’s foreign policy was, as Senator Aminu posits
because of Obasanjo’s wealth of experience, having once served as Head of State and been actively involved in state matters since the 1960s, his deep knowledge of international politics as a statesman engaged since retirement in 1979 by notable international organizations such as the UN and AU to handle delicate issues on their behalf, his enormous influence and goodwill in the comity of world leaders and statesmen by which he pulled Nigeria through the pariah straddle (Aminu, interview, 2009).
Tyoden (2004) and Adeniji (2000), also share the view above, surmising that Obasanjo had an unrivalled experience in international diplomacy and a deep sense of Nigerian history. The personalist or individualist style was seemingly inevitable because of his international personality and standing, which a former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright (1998) and Princeton Lyman (2004) of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York had once described as “awesome”.
Nigeria’s foreign policy during this period was also characterized by clear and concise NRCs and African policy, a development Aminu attributed to the same factor of individualistic suaveness of the President thus:
The personalist style underlined the role conceptions, as the political group- Obasanjo’s team- played a relatively insignificant role in this regard, one of the features which many scholars have alluded to as also the bane of the administration in certain domestic and foreign policies (Aminu, interview, 2009).
However, that period has also been described as being too externally oriented. This foreign policy regime was an exemplification of the open policy system that was examined in chapter four: a kind of diplomacy that responds more to external pressures and expectations than internal demands and strengths. Such may result in role strain that would certainly culminate in the exertion of national energies to external needs than the country’s domestic demands. According to Akinyemi,
While much national energy was committed to concerns of other states such as in areas of conflict resolution, good governance, supply of electric power, and financial and material aid to needy nations; there seemed to be little show of commitment to Nigerians’ social and economic welfare. The Obasanjo foreign policy, going by the present understanding of the new foreign policy proposition by Ojo Maduekwe, was barely ‘citizen-centred” (Akinyemi, interview, 2009).
There was no doubt that Nigeria came back to global limelight positively. However, did Nigerians benefit from this foreign policy? Attempts would be made to answer this question in subsequent sections.
6.2. Return to Power
The mood and mindset Olusegun Obasanjo was taking into governance was captured in his inaugural speech. This would determine or shape a lot of things in his time, including foreign policy which, before 1999, had been poorly handled by the Abacha administration and at some other points before the Abacha era. According to Obasanjo,
Instead of progress and development, which we were entitled to from those who governed us, we experienced in the last decade and a half, particularly in the last regime but one, persistent deterioration in the quality of our governance, leading to instability and the weakening of all public institutions. Good men were shunned and kept away from government. Relations between men and women who had been friends for many decades, and between communities that had lived together in peace and harmony for many generations became very bitter because of the actions or inaction of government. Our country has thus been through its darkest period (Obasanjo, 1999).
Obasanjo’s return to power was itself an unprecedented manifestation of providence. General Obasanjo had been implicated by the Abacha regime in the phantom coup of 1995 and had been put behind bars serving a 25-year jail term. On June 8, 1998, General Abacha died apparently from heart attack after several months of manoeuvring to succeed himself in the planned transition to civilian government on October 1, 1998. General Abubakar was appointed to succeed him. On assumption of office, Abubakar freed most political prisoners, including General Obasanjo.
The return to civilian rule went as scheduled: elections to the House of Representatives and the Senate were held on February 20 and March 7 1999, respectively, and presidential elections were conducted on February 27. On May 29, 1999, General Abubakar handed over power to the elected president, General Obasanjo. This development has been described as a masterpiece of consensus politics among the northern military with General Babangida at the background (International Crisis Group, 2006).
The election of Obasanjo, the only military ruler to have returned to power to a civilian government, seemingly meant a fresh start for a country that had been mired in military conspiracy for 28 years. Obasanjo was regarded as a bridge across several of Nigeria’s major fault lines: a retired General and former military ruler who had willingly handed over power to an elected President; a Yoruba who, while proud of his cultural heritage, referred to himself as a detribalized Nigerian; and a leader and eminent personality able to repair Nigeria’s relations with the international community (ICG, 2006: 14).
6.3. Obasanjo’s Foreign Policy Cabinet, Institutions, Structures and Processes
An elaborate study of foreign policy decision making in Nigeria has been carried out by Inamate (2001). Another study is that by Fawole, in which he does a critical appraisal of the processes, structures and institutions of foreign policy making in Nigeria under Obasanjo (2004). Inamate analyzes the nature of foreign policy making in both military and civilian regimes. Using the Graham Allison conceptual models of decision making, namely the rational-actor model, the organizational process model, and the bureaucratic politics model, Inamate examines foreign policy making across all the eleven regimes, concluding that all of these manifested both changes and continuities. Importantly, theory from Allison’s model is well integrated with the substantive and analytical portions of the study, and thus it goes beyond the theory of a strong-leader approach in developing countries to demonstrate that developing nations do have organizational structures that deal with foreign policies. For Inamate, foreign policy decision-making dynamics in Nigeria reflected the rational-actor model. In the areas of the economic and cultural components where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to work with other ministries and agencies, some tendencies of the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making often cropped up. Inamate however observes that this model was often superseded by the rational-actor model of decision making in the final phases of foreign policy. In the process of political, security, cultural and economic components of foreign relations that dealt with routine and mundane activities, the foreign policy decision-making dynamics mostly reflected the organizational process model, since the ministries or agencies involved often simply followed the standard operating procedures of decision making used in such ministries or agencies (Inamate, 2001: 289- 292). According to Anda (2002), the foreign policy decision-making system in Nigeria is complex, a position Inamate had taken in his study in which he demonstrated that various organs, ministries, and agencies were involved in all its facets. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be at the hub of decision making in terms of the political dimensions of the country’s foreign policy. However, certain national leadership bodies have played important roles as foreign policy decision-making coordinating structures. In cases of vital and sensitive foreign policy issues, the final decisions were made by these bodies. For Inamate (2001: 292-298) during the Obasanjo civilian era, the Presidency was an active body in the foreign policy formulation.
This position is strongly upheld by Fawole (2001) when he refers to the strong individualistic or “personalist” bent as underlining the Obasanjo foreign policy approach. Fawole in his analysis of the institutions, structures, processes and performance of the foreign policy during this period reached a consensus with Inamate that although the organizational process and the bureaucratic politics models were present in the foreign policy politics at the time, the rational-actor model seemed to have been predominant. In other words, in the final analysis, the rational actor, leadership or what Eulau has called the “political group” (1963) with the leader as the fulcrum, takes the ultimate decision, and could in fact institute a zero-sum game for other bodies in which he and his “kitchen cabinet” hold the ace. Hermann, Preston, Korany and Shaw in their study, “Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals” (2001) have held a similar view, stressing that foreign policymaking is done by three powerful sets of individuals: political leaders, groups, and coalitions.
The Obasanjo administration inherited foreign policy structures and institutions that had been battered and weakened by military misrule, particularly during the latter years of the Abacha administration. Indeed, one of the unfortunate consequences of military rule in the area of foreign relations is the legacy of personalization of policy making by the maximum rulers. This was due to the absence of effective mechanisms for policymaking, the arrogation of excessive powers to the military ruler, the deliberate subversion or marginalization of existing foreign policy making institutions and structures such as the Foreign Service, the Federal Executive Council, research institutes, and policy think-tanks (cf. Fawole, 2004: 6). The 1999 Constitution was however going to alter this trend by the creation of certain new structures and institutions that would occupy some roles in the foreign policy environment. According to Fawole (2004: 8) the institutions included the Presidency, the National Assembly, the Federal Ministries and Parastatals, and other agencies whose schedules of duties and functions have foreign policy implications. Corroborating this, Senator Ajibola observes that
The Presidency had the day-to-day responsibility for policymaking; the National Assembly is empowered to make laws for governing the country, while the federal ministries and parastatals that constituted the executive branch is to aid the Presidency in foreign policy making. However, this is what the constitution says, what happens outside it is another matter entirely (Ajibola, interview, 2009).
In chapter five of this study, the point was strongly made that there are several government agencies that ordinarily appear passive or unrelated to foreign policy terrains, but which in actual fact have specific operations either central or tangential to foreign policy making. These institutions included the Ministries of Finance, Defence, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, institutions such as the armed forces and police, and other parastatals and agencies such as the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the National Agency for Food, Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). The other government arms,
that are expected to complement the process of foreign policy making included the Nigerian Customs, Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), the Nigerian Maritime Authority (NMA), Nigerian Olympic Committee (NOC), the Nigerian Football Association (NFA) and other sport bodies (Sodangi, interview, 2009).
The following would represent a sneak peek into the nature and style of Obasanjo’s foreign policy making.
6.3.1. Presidency
Picking holes in the loose or open-ended nature of the 1999 Constitution which empowered the President not only in domestic affairs, but also placed him at the very top and in a position of monopoly of the power to make foreign policy, the first four out of the five cardinal objectives of the foreign policy were altruistic and vague which put the interpretation and execution of the foreign policy at the mercy and discretion of the President (Akinyemi, 2003). The Executive President, like the American system, was granted important powers for such tasks as agenda setting for both domestic and foreign policies, sending of bills to the National Assembly for passing into law, assenting to or withholding of assents from bills passed by the national legislature, and runs the nation’s affairs on a day to day basis, assisted by a retinue of ministers, advisers and assistants whom he directly appointed. Thus the Nigerian Executive President, by the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, coupled with a long history of military and civilian dictatorship, had assumed the status and image of an “imperial president”. The three decades of military rule and its centralizing tendencies succeeded in reducing the Nigerian Federation to a unitary system in actual practice, although not in nomenclature. The country retains the title “federation” in its name but the reality portrays a very strong, powerful and overbearing central government that appropriates the entire nation’s wealth and distributes to the “federating units” at its whim. It exercises absolute control over the nation’s economy by appropriating all the mineral resources to the central government (Fawole, 2004: 11).
Foreign policy making was primarily within the domain of the President. He was the chief maker of both the domestic and foreign policies. His agenda setting was conditioned by three factors: his personal vision and that of his political group (that is the Peoples Democratic Party) (role perception and role interpretation), and in line with the dynamics and demands of the domestic populace and international community (role expectation of society). He was the principal actor and overall decider of foreign policy matters. President Obasanjo conducted summit diplomacy with other world leaders, signed bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements with other sovereign governments and international organizations, received ambassadors and emissaries, attended meetings and conferences of international organizations and multilateral agencies in which Nigeria was a member, could declare war with other sovereign states in agreement with the National Assembly, and deploy troops for war or for peacekeeping. The President had wide latitude to function in the foreign policy terrains.
6.3.2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Other Ministries
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be the clearing house for foreign policy issues and Nigeria’s external relations generally. It is headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is politically appointed, who leads a large staff of career diplomats and civil servants in the Ministry at home, and in all the missions and embassies abroad, including international organizations. This compartmentalization is known as the Home Civil Service and the Diplomatic Service (Fafowora, 2001). The Ministry because of its skilled manpower or foreign policy technocrats, whose expertise and specialization is garnered from experience, should be key in national role conceptions and foreign policy agenda setting and implementation. Its functions range from supplying the government with information and analysis about their countries of accreditation, conducting negotiations on behalf of the country, attracting foreign investors, to showcasing Nigeria’s rich cultural heritage and generally explaining Nigeria to the rest of the world (ibid). However, the historical experience of Nigeria earlier mentioned by which military dictators headed a “unitary, centralized structure”, the Head of State or President has tended to arrogate foreign policy and role conception powers to himself, while undermining the place of the Ministry. Except on few occasions such as the Babangida era when the likes of Bolaji Akinyemi and Ike Nwachukwu had the latitude to bring their ingenuity to bear in role conceptions and foreign policy agenda setting, most of Nigeria’s leaders had monopolized and politicized foreign policy making (Fafowora, 2001: 36).
Ironically, while a smart external relations system was a priority during the post-Abacha era, and Nigeria’s international relations was indeed a rich and busy one, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was, during the Obasanjo era, almost idle. The foreign policy actors in Obasanjo’s administration were far overshadowed and boxed up by an overwhelming international personality and overzealous posture of Obasanjo in his own foreign policy cabinet. Put differently, Obasanjo’s foreign policy cabinet and indeed Kitchen Cabinet probably consisted only of himself and his onlookers that he employed in the team.
According to Fawole (2004: 13), the personalist style of Obasanjo had its good and bad sides. The good sides included his wealth of experience in governance which was probably unmatched by any person in his cabinet or any leader in Nigeria for that matter; his connections and goodwill all over the world; and his respectable personality as the only Nigerian military ruler that willingly handed over power to civilians. The bad sides were probably offshoots of the good aspects of Obasanjo such as experience and international respectability which probably made him arrogant, conceited and opinionated that he alone could run Nigeria. The President put his personal imprint on the nation’s foreign policy and external relations, and by the third year in office, he had reportedly travelled out of the country more than ninety times on diplomatic assignments, becoming reputed as the most travelled Nigerian leader since 1960.
Akinyemi notes that
Obasanjo’s personalist style manifested in summit diplomacy in which he, and not the MFA, represented Nigeria. This summit diplomacy was informed by his pedigree while out of office. After national and military service, he had attended many international conferences, workshops and forums individually or as a representative of international organizations, notably UN, OAU, Transparency International and Ford Foundation. Obasanjo had created a network of influential friends and world citizens with whom there had been syndicated discussions on good governance, democracy and leadership. The peak of Obasanjo’s preference for summit diplomacy was the establishment of the African Leadership Forum (ALF) in Ota, where professionals, intellectuals, African and world leaders had roundtables on perennial African and global challenges. This was what later probably informed his own part of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiatives (Akinyemi, oral interview, 2009).
On return to office in 1999 therefore, as observed by Ajibola,
Obasanjo had developed a strong sense of individualism to policymaking, believing that a personal involvement in foreign affairs would guarantee a more effective foreign policy for Nigeria (Ajibola, oral interview, 2009)..
This personalist bent was explicated form another perspective. It was rather seen by Aminu as being informed by Obasanjo’s military background:
It must also be understood that Obasanjo had been a military dictator in the 1970s, with unilateral and group (military class) decisions always towering above any decisions from other agencies. It was a military culture that on assumption to power, they literally suspend the Constitution, dissolve the legislature and commence unitary-type of rule in which the Supremo is the all in all by decrees. The traits were thus still there, and as a retired General, he was an embodiment of unilateral dictatorship (Aminu, oral interview, 2009).
According to Aminu, Obasanjo’s personalist style also manifested in the undermining of the National Assembly and his own Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which
created a face-off between the National Assembly and the President several times, including the deployment of military troops to Odi in Bayelsa State in 1999, the intended purchase of presidential aircraft in 2000, granting of loan to Seychelles and Ghana between 2003 and 2005, and the Bakassi hand over decision of 2006, among others which had serious foreign policy implications. At some points, Obasanjo’s recalcitrance had culminated in threats of impeachment by the two Houses of the National Assembly which had nearly destabilized the polity (Aminu, oral interview, 2009).
Obasanjo’s MFAs were four in quick succession. These included Sule Lamido (1999-2003), Oluyemi Adeniji (2003-2006), Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (2006-2006), and Joy Ogwu (2006-2007). This was the first time four ministers would take quick turns within an eight-year period in Nigeria. The closest record was the Babangida era in which three persons served as minister at different times within eight years. However, unlike the Babangida era, Obasanjo’s foreign ministers were as undermined as the National Assembly in foreign affairs, as recalled by Ajibola thus:
Interestingly, apart from Ambassador Adeniji, Obasanjo’s MFAs were not as innovative or fantastic as Babangida’s, not because they were not smart enough, but because Obasanjo was his own ‘MFA’ and tended to take ‘foreign affairs’ far away from the ministers’ domain. Those that were assertive like Lamido and Adeniji did not last too long in the cabinet; and two others had very brief spell- Okonjo-Iweala gaining appointment into the World Bank as a Vice President and Ogwu replaced shortly after Obasanjo exited office in 2007 (Ajibola, oral interview, 2009).
Ambassador Adeniji seemed to be the most experienced of Obasanjo’s foreign affairs ministers. Aside being a career diplomat who started and rose through the ranks in the Nigerian Foreign Service, he had served as Nigeria’s Ambassador to Austria, Switzerland, France at various times, and Permanent Representative to the UN 9first Geneva and later New York), and at various times, Special Envoy of the UN to several places including Central African Republic and Sierra Leone. His diplomatic competence, depth, wisdom, and global horizon matched the President’s, and were probably what informed his choice as MFA under Obasanjo. Adeniji was in the class of Akinyemi, with creativity and independence of mind. This might bring him to conflict with his boss, but his class, panache and style were contributory to the Obasanjo African diplomacy of the early 2000s, which saw Nigeria leading Africa into the global context. This was Adeniji’s own idea of a new constructive concentrism. As MFA, while sustaining his conception of a “concentric foreign policy”, he articulated that,
in a globalizing world, national interests should be articulated in each geographical zone and simultaneously pursued in a manner to ensure that zonal implementations complement one another to avoid the apparent contradictions which sequential pursuit often gives. Such new direction does not imply a mercantilist approach to foreign policy whereby all interventions must produce instant gain to the country. Rather, it implies that the pursuit of peace and security, on one hand, and the challenge of development on the other, has to go pari passu. Both require the wider world at large, including regional and international organizations. Such simultaneous engagement will at once facilitate the playing by Nigeria of its leadership role and strengthen its national base requirement (Adeniji, 2004).
Ambassador Adeniji was by this giving a new twist to Nigeria’s circles of national interests which tended to place more regional and continental burdens on Nigeria than its immediate domestic concerns. The Adeniji position flowed from the analysis of Northedge. According to Northedge, the farther a circle of interest from the centre point of the core circles, the less willing a state will be in securing the interests in the periphery to the detriment of other national interests in the middle range of core circles (1973). Adeniji thus attempted a reconceptualization of Nigeria’s foreign policy concentric circles principle to becoming both beneficial and constructive (Akinterinwa, 2004). This represented a paradigm shift in role conception and foreign policy of Nigeria. There however seems to be confusion as to whether the shift was towards Nigeria or the globe. The President and his foreign ministers added to this confusion and role conflict. Sule Lamido, the first MFA had regarded it as a shift towards Nigerians (what current MFA Maduekwe and Yar’adua now call ‘citizen-based diplomacy”) in which, according to Lamido,
Nigeria has to develop a perspective in which the wellbeing, security and prosperity of Nigerians would be guaranteed (Onoja, 2001).
Meanwhile Obasanjo himself had interpreted this constructive concentrism to mean greater participation in global affairs than hitherto. Obasanjo reasoned that Nigeria’s foreign interests would extend
extend beyond our concern for the wellbeing of our continent. It is imperative that countries from these (less developed) regions harmonize their efforts in their search for a fairer deal from the industrialized nations and this requires of us a more global approach to world affairs than was previously the case (Obasanjo, 2000: 3).
However, Ambassador Adeniji had another understanding, and indeed a harmonization of the two role interpretations. The shift from Africa as centrepiece to globalism would not mean an abandonment of the continent. It would rather mean showing more interests in world affairs for the purposes of the people of Nigeria and Africa as a whole. In his own terms, this would actually mean a shift from centrepiece to cornerstone: that is, a come-back to Africa on the long run after exploits in global economics and politics, and measuring up with global competitors, yields that both Nigerians and the continent would benefit from. This new thinking during Adeniji’s tenure as MFA underlined Obasanjo’s global and African diplomacy for several years (Akinterinwa, 2004: 444-445).
Aside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Obasanjo also
created many other foreign affairs portfolios probably to either take up overlapping responsibilities with the Foreign Affairs Ministry, or to accord the minister marginal tasks so that the President himself would become the de facto Foreign Affairs Minister. These portfolios included the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa, office of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Senior Special Assistant on Foreign Relations, Chief of Staff to the President, and the office of the National Security Adviser (Sodangi, interview, 2009).
There were other government agencies and ministries central to foreign policy making. This is understandable if one understands the complex nature of the contemporary world which requires the interplay of expertise across professionals, and not the monopoly of narrow-minded diplomats alone. These diverse issues, Le Perre and Nieuwkerk (2002) have identified as “investment, migration, energy, inflation, food security, human rights, the natural environment and so on (which have become) a task for multiple bureaucratic players”. Consequently, the Obasanjo administration in its foreign policy pursuit had the following other ministries and institutions complementing in foreign policy roles: Ministries of Defense, Finance, Trade/Commerce and Industry, Agriculture, Education, Petroleum Resources, Power and Steel, Culture and Tourism, Sports, Internal Affairs, Justice; the National Intelligence Agency, and the Police (Fawole, 2004: 18-19). For instance, the Defence Ministry was central in the peacekeeping and conflict resolutions roles of Nigeria in Africa, while the Sports, Culture/Tourism ministries were pivotal to Nigeria’s participation at the World and African Nations Cups competitions, and the hosting of the continent during the All-Africa Games (COJA) in 2003. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not competent in these areas, and as such the matters could not have been better handled than by the relevant ministries.
6.3.3. National Assembly
In a democracy, the legislative arm of government at the federal level is supposed to be an active part of foreign policy making. For instance, as powerful as the President is made to be by the Constitution of the United States of America, the Senate and House of Representatives (Congress) still regulate presidential discretion in foreign policy matters. In the case of Nigeria, there was little or no such regulation, for as observed by Sodangi,
The Nigerian bicameral National Assembly made up of the Senate (Upper House) and the House of Representatives (Lower House), wielded little influence in Obasanjo’s foreign policy matters This again could be attributed to Obasanjo’s towering political (and international) image and his ability, because of experience, to manipulate and overcome the legislature, which was often very much divided or could not match the level of the President’s manoeuvring skills (Sodangi, oral interview, 2009).
However, it is pertinent to mention that the National Assembly’s power and role in foreign policy matters is implied in several ways, for, as noted by Ajibola
First, it controls the national treasury as no money can be drawn for any foreign affairs matters without its approval (FRN Constitution, 1999: Sections 59, 80, 81 & 82). Second, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like other federal ministries would have to defend their budget before the legislature, in the case of the foreign ministry, before the Senate and House Committees on Foreign Relations (Ajibola, interview, 2009).
Thirdly, the National Assembly is empowered by Section 5(4a) by the 1999 Constitution to approve any declaration of power by the President, except on rare emergency occasions such as an external invasion during which there could be legislative delays. Thirdly and closely related to the above is that only legislative approvals can make the country’s armed forces to be deployed for external wars such as collective security purposes, and a legislative notification is also required in the case of peacekeeping missions. Other areas where the federal legislative exercises control in foreign affairs include the ratification and renunciation of treaties and agreements, because once a treaty is ratified, it becomes an integral part of the municipal law (Adelusi, 2009). The legislature also exercises
some control over the appointment of the MFA, other ministers, and ambassadors by scrutinizing the candidates and approving or disapproving the nominations. For instance in 1999, the National Assembly rejected the first list of ambassadorial nominees on the ground that it did not reflect the federal character. The legislature through its Senate and House Committees on Foreign Relations and Defence, perform oversight functions in the country’s foreign policy making (Sodangi, interview, 2009).
6.3.4. Civil Society
The Nigerian civil-society is characterized by specialized non-governmental organizations, organized labour, the press, pressure and interest groups, religious bodies, and public opinion. These, in advanced democracies, wield effective influence in general policymaking, including foreign policy. However, it was not until after the annulment of the June 12 Presidential elections in 1993 that civil-society became more active and influential. They mounted pressure on President Babangida to quit the political scene which he did on August 26 1993, made the June 12 elections struggle an international one, and indeed shaped the foreign policies of Shonekan and Abacha. The Nigerian Labour Congress and oil workers unions for instance created enough domestic and international heat, destabilizing the investment environment and oil sector, which made foreign investment and production of crude for export difficult for the Abacha government. The murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa attracted a legion of international sanctions and earned for Nigeria a pariah status. Public opinion has also become crucial even from the time of military rule. The views, sentiments and criticisms expressed in the press at rallies put government on the edge, so much that they sometimes ban the mass media, and place certain individuals under arrest.
As civil rule returned, the place of civil-society became important. It is difficult to quantify the role of public opinion in the making of foreign policy. However, on assuming power in 1999, the new government heeded the call of Nigerians to pull Nigerian soldiers out of Sierra Leone. The 2002 World Court verdict awarding sovereignty over disputed oil-rich Bakassi to Cameroon was rejected by Nigerians, which compelled government to reject it too and to vacillate over handing it over for several years until the Washington intervention which culminated in the Orange Tree Agreement in which Presidents Obasanjo, Biya and Bush all agreed that Nigeria would hand over Bakassi within a specified period.
6.3.5. Research Institutions and Universities
Research and university-based institutions are often resource-bank of a nation’s foreign policy. This is because of their personnel who have expertise in the theory, art and science of foreign affairs. Some of President Obasanjo’s foreign policy machineries were drawn from research and university-based institutions. This is not to say however, that the resources from here took the shine off his personalist style. Rather, he maximized them to complement his individualism to foreign policy. During President Obasanjo’s reign, the NIIA became active once again (Akinterinwa, 2004). The institution which witnessed a lull in the Abacha regime bounced back to life (producing research materials, publishing informed articles, and offering advice) as democracy returned to Nigeria with the hopes of contributing to foreign policy initiative, agenda, shaping and implementation. However, the government underutilized this institution and only contributed in further dividing it as only a few of the personnel were patronized. These had unrestricted passage in the State House and were generally referred to as ‘Obasanjo scholars”, and could belong to the President’s Kitchen Cabinet (Akinterinwa, 2005). It is interesting to note that this had been the tradition over time, for any President who cared to turn to the NIIA for foreign policy expertise to include the Director-General in their Kitchen Cabinet. George Obiozor was in the Kitchen Cabinet of President Babangida. So was Professor Akinyemi until his appointment as MFA in 1985 (Akinterinwa, 2004: 73). The NIIA produced Professor Joy Ogwu as MFA in the twilight of Obasanjo’s administration in 2006. These people from the NIIA were also university professors. There were also special advisers, special assistants and ambassadors who were drawn from the universities.
6.4. Obasanjo’s “Foreign Policy Kitchen Cabinet”
Beyond the façade of the functionality of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other groups and individuals specifically assigned with foreign policy tasks and thinking, the real work was done by a “clique” assembled by the President himself. Every president has their own ‘inner caucuses’ which do the actual policymaking, while constitutionally or traditionally assigned with certain tasks simply carry the labels. This clique or inner caucus is known as the “kitchen cabinet”. Obasanjo’s kitchen cabinet was constituted
for some time across his first and second terms before he fell out with a few of them, by the National Security Adviser who for a long time was General Aliyu Gusau, Defence chief General Theophilus Danjuma, NIIA DG Professor Joy Ogwu, his Vice President Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Group Managing Director Gaius Obaseki, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Chairman (at different times) Chief Solomon Lar and Chief Audu Ogbeh, the political leader Chief Tony Anenih, Central Bank of Nigeria Governor Soludo, and the industrial czar Aliko Dangote (Aminu, interview, 2009).
However, Obasanjo later fell out with most of his kitchen cabinet aides and sacked almost all of them. These included Gusau, Danjuma, Abubakar, Lar, Ogbeh, Anenih and Obaseki. This was probably because of certain inter-personal irreconcilable differences of public office misconduct, as Obasanjo had said about public office appointment during his tenure:
The quality and calibre of the members of my cabinet and top appointments will send a positive or negative signal to Nigerians and the international community as to the seriousness of the administration to make salutary changes. In our difficult and abnormal situation, great care and circumspection are called for in appointments to the Cabinet and high positions. To be appointed a minister or to any other public office is not a license to loot public funds. It is a call to national service (Obasanjo, 1999: 8).
It is important to state that while these men held their different portfolios, they still constituted the political masquerades that assisted the President behind the scene in taking foreign policy decisions for the country, and indeed in domestic policies. This kitchen cabinet issue strengthens the argument by Eulau (1963) and Isaak (1975) that in politics and governance, the small “political group” is the most powerful and that political decisions are taken behind the scene. It should also be noted that the members of a kitchen cabinet are very close confidants, trusted persons by the President who would not oppose the President’s interest, and know how to fine-tune his ideas and present as national interest (Omoruyi, 2004).
The interesting, busy and fruitful foreign policy terrains of the Obasanjo era was thus mired in individualism and had very few persons calling the shots. However, the plethora of offices, portfolios and ministries gave it a false appearance of an area with multiple democratic forces engaging in healthy interface to save Nigeria from the throes of a pariah nation.
6.5. National Role Conceptions under Obasanjo’s Administration
Table 8: Politics of National Role Conceptions in Nigeria: Civilian Rule
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Source: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, National Assembly, Abuja, 2009
The table above shows that there was a little difference in the politics of foreign policy between the military and civilian leadership. The President was the all-in-all, and because of Obasanjo’s personalist style, the major decision units were relegated to the background while Obasanjo was more like his own foreign policy minister. The National Assembly and Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to be at par in Obasanjo’s administration’s calculations and, while public opinion counted only little. The Kitchen Cabinet was as influential (if not powerful0 as was the case in military dictatorship. Obasanjo’s military backgrounded is always cited as the reason behind this centralized and personalized policy process.
General Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration articulated national roles Nigeria would assume in Africa that were not only clear, but that were also stated with firmness. For instance, in his inaugural speech of May 29, 1999, the President asserted:
Nigeria, once a well-respected country and a key role player in international bodies became a pariah nation. We shall pursue a dynamic foreign policy to promote friendly relations with all Nations…It is our firm resolve to restore Nigeria fully to her previous prestigious position in the comity of nations (Obasanjo, 1999; 13).
Reflecting on Nigeria’s foreign policy from independence to his era, Obasanjo again firmly and clearly stated:
We imported and distributed for Africa. We sacrificed, fought and died for Africa. We have done so and we will not stop doing any of these. When the great nations of the world are vowing not to send their nationals to fight for any cause abroad, we have fresh in our mind, our 1000 troops who, in the last decade, have died trying to restore peace in Our West African sub-region alone. All over Africa, there are tombs of Nigerian soldiers who went to sacrifice their lives for peace. Our troops are still out there. History will surely record for ever Nigeria’s inimitable African Nationalism…and there is no stopping us. Wherever there is a real need for us, we will be there (Obasanjo, 2000).
Obasanjo’s role conceptions were not significantly different from the agenda he and Murtala Mohammed had and pursued during their reign as military rulers. Their era (1975-1979) was regarded as the golden age of Nigeria’s African diplomacy. The Obasanjo administration believed that progress in Nigeria was central to the progress of the African continent when he said that “Nigeria is wonderfully created by the Almighty with human and other resources. It does no credit to us or the entire black race if we fail in managing our resources for quick improvement in the quality of life of our people…we will leave no stone unturned to ensure sustenance of democracy because it is good for us. It is good for Africa.” (Obasanjo, 1999: 2 and 13). The administration articulated a number of roles to assume and strategies to realize them for the sake of Africa’s progress. On meeting global challenges, including globalization, the country set out the task to build on the achievements of the past, identify areas where Africa had not fared and chart a new way forward as regards the socio-economic recovery of the continent. The need to ensure that Africa was fully integrated into the global economy was also articulated for Nigeria which would be through increased participation in such areas as trade, capital flows, information and communication technologies, and human development (Obasanjo, 2001).
Economic recovery was seen as central to African development. Nigeria, in collaboration with a couple of other nations (South Africa, Senegal and Algeria), conceived of a Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAP) to give effect to a united vision for a developed Africa in the new millennium (Obasanjo, 2001).
The Obasanjo administration also declared the determination of Nigeria to lead the campaign for debt reduction or cancellation for African nations. Regarding the external debt burden as a formidable obstacle to the promotion of economic development in the continent, Obasanjo said that debt relief or cancellation would free Africa’s resources for the execution of poverty alleviation and social programs, thereby enhancing capacity to participate in and belong to the emerging markets, increasing the absorptive capacity for foreign investments in the economies, and helping in the reversal of capital flight (Obasanjo, 2001: 4).
The administration considered the health drive for Africa as crucial to the MAP agenda to see a vibrant economic development. Hence, President Obasanjo made a commitment of Nigeria’s role to lead the vanguard of tackling malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and other related diseases in the continent (Obasanjo, 2001: 5). The President promised that Nigeria would solicit the assistance of the UN, USA, and the Gates Foundation to tackle the menace of killer-diseases in Africa.
The administration also had not just a continental focus; it also had a global objective. President Obasanjo declared that Nigeria “will continue to play a constructive role in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, and other international bodies” (Obasanjo, 1999: 14).
On sub-continental (West African) matters, the administration had a very clear conception of the role Nigeria would play. Clearly, Obasanjo opted for diplomacy as against the military option under military rule. According to him, Nigeria’s role would be:
the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the West African sub-region. Specifically, in the case of Sierra-Leone, we shall endeavour to ensure a quick resolution of the crisis by dialogue and diplomatic means by increasing activity on the second track of peace and reconciliation. This will enable us to reduce our commitments in both (Sierra Leone and Liberia) theatres, but particularly in Sierra Leone (Obasanjo, 1999: 12).
President Obasanjo regarded the era of war and application of military measures to conflict in the Nigerian neighbourhood as gone, ostensibly because of both the need for diplomatic engagements to consolidate the gains of peace, and to cut costs, for as the Minister of Defence, Theophilus Danjuma reasoned, “I think we have done very well (in regional peace keeping) but at great cost both monetarily and in manpower” (1999). This stance was understandable. ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone had cost about 4 billion dollars since 1994, with Nigeria assuming most of the financial burden, bearing a cost of 1 million dollars per day, whereas there was a loss of Nigerian oil revenue because of a decline in oil prices (The Washington Times, 1999). To consolidate the peace situation, Obasanjo’s administration felt Nigeria should see the need to stop the proliferation of light arms and small weapons which was escalating conflict in the neighbourhood. This did not preclude the fact that conflict was considered inevitable in human affairs. Just as Morgenthau observed that “if you take away their (men’s) arms, they would fight with their bare fists” (1973), Obasanjo recognized the fact that war was inescapable, but reasoned that the proliferation of light weapons made West African societies more prone to war or resulted in the escalation of it, a development his administration posited Nigeria would arrest (2001: 5). Nigeria thus declared its intention to see to it that the moratorium on non-proliferation of the weapons was well coordinated for application in West Africa and extended to the continent, and to rid the continent of the menace of illicit arms trafficking and proliferation (Obasanjo, 2001: 6).
In a further clarification of the new regional role of Nigeria, comparing Nigeria’s role to the US in global context, Danjuma explained that the there was a compelling need to use greater part of Nigeria’s resources to fulfil domestic social needs in the face of a growing unpopularity among Nigerians of the country’s expansion abroad, pointing out that if the international community was willing to provide financial assistance, Nigeria would continue to play a leading role; and that Nigeria’s role had elicited concerns of regional domination from other African countries and France (1999: 3). It is however obvious that the financial factor was more pressing in Nigeria’s proposed diplomatic option of the Obasanjo role agenda in the region, because Danjuma had contradicted himself when he stated that Nigeria would continue to play a leading role if financial assistance would come from the west.
What separates Obasanjo’s role conceptions from that of any other leader’s was the statement of how to achieve a particular role objective. It is commonplace in Nigeria’s foreign policy to have roles stated, no matter how clearly stated, not to be followed up by how they would be played or realized. This is why many foreign policy analysts describe the foreign policy of successive regimes and administrations “bogus’, “vague” or “grandiose”. That is, they were mere fantastic statements which may never be realistic because the leaderships do not explain the modus operandi.
6.6. Obasanjo Administration’s African Diplomacy
This section critically examines the performance of Nigeria’s role conceptions by the Obasanjo administration. Some Nigerians have been of the view that Nigeria’s African diplomacy during the Obasanjo years had basically been the assumption of national roles aimed at changing swords into ploughshares (Okoroma, 2005; Mbu, 2000). From inception of his administration, Obasanjo had himself showed an appearance of a statesman whose preference was for diplomacy. His words:
Needless to say that, for us, development and progress is not an idle debate. For us, it is a matter of life and death! We certainly cannot afford the intellectual luxury of writing off our continent. Nor can we even begin to weigh the possible validity of the rather racist connotation that underdevelopment is innate to the character of Africans. Almighty God has also used our country (Nigeria) and her leaders to assist African states, especially those facing political and economic turmoil and those engulfed in leadership crises. We thank God that we have, as a people and nation, been able to make some positive impact in the areas where we have intervened. (Obasanjo, 2000: 3)
The speech by President Olusegun Obasanjo at the Sixth Montreal Conference in 2000 captures the essence of this section. Nigeria’s diplomacy in Africa has always been hinged on the belief, exemplified in the actions of its successive leaders, particularly General Obasanjo that the country, with its vast human and natural endowments has a natural role to play in the development of the continent.
The capacity of any nation, Nigeria inclusive, to play any meaningful role in international politics- or put differently, the measure and kind of international role- is contingent upon a combination of several factors namely, national strength or power which naturally compels obedience, availability of scarce but highly demanded natural resources which are vital as bargaining chips in international politics, national wealth, and political will. All these three are a function of domestic forces. Thus, the kind of diplomacy or the success of a nation’s international relations is determined by internal factors. Hence, an examination of the domestic context of the Obasanjo foreign policy would be closely examined, and the import of this on his African diplomacy would x-rayed.
6.6.1. Domestic Imperatives
The establishment and gradual entrenchment of democratic rule in Nigeria offered a tremendous opportunity for the country to reverse its negative image in the world. Prior to this time, the relationship with the west and other African countries was very poor, while Nigeria’s external image was an all-time low, with adverse effects on its capacity to take leadership position in the continent and inability to retain its enviable position even in West Africa. Democratic rule also offered the best guarantee for the respect of the rule of law and observance of fundamental human rights. The repeated minuses of the country on these scores had hitherto created in Nigeria a pariah state which other states kept at an arm’s length. International goodwill however returned to Nigeria by the inauguration of the Obasanjo administration, with the USA and Canada, two countries that had led the sanctions regime during Abacha’s brutal reign, and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), offering much of it (Saliu, 2006a: 358).
Akindele (2000) identifies a number of domestic imperatives to which President Obasanjo’s own foreign policy was anchored. The first was the creation of a better image for Nigeria in the comity of nations and thus making the isolation and ostracization of the country from the mainstream of international interaction of a relic of the recent past. Positive image-building had become realistically desirable political strategy whose goal was to move Nigeria away from the latter’s post-1993 international pariah status into a proactive and respected member or an actor in the international community of states. On the grounds of image-building and confidence-building which flows out of it, the President’s frequent trips abroad, despite the media furor that cropped up, were instrumental in the image projection following the strong diplomatic links with Nigeria reopened by the west as earlier mentioned.
The second domestic imperative, which was also pivotal to the image-building objective, was the consolidation of the democratic system at home. Repositioning Nigeria as a champion and defender of democratic values which the Obasanjo administration attempted to do barring criticisms of half-measures flowed from the belief and conviction that durable political stability and sustainable economic development in Nigeria, as well as in any other country, can best be actualized and enhanced only under a regime of democratic governance and culture, demanded and venerated by the international community. Hence, Obasanjo’s administration stressed human rights and fundamental freedom, good governance, private sector-driven economy, and periodic multi-party elections at home, and led in condemning military coups in Sao Tome and Principe, Cote d I’voire and Pakistan (Akindele, 2000: 25). The Oputa Panel set up to interrogate past human rights violations of successive military regimes was a measure of this democratic consolidation.
The third domestic imperative of the Obasanjo administration’s foreign policy was the promotion and attraction of foreign investment. This was in view of the fact that foreign investment is an instrument for expediting economic development and industrialization in the country. The campaign for foreign investment in the Nigerian economy, conducted along with other vigorously pursued strategies, elevated economic diplomacy to the most important priority in Nigeria’s foreign policy agenda (Akindele, 2000: 25).
The debt burden and debt reduction, debt cancellation or forgiveness constituted the fourth domestic imperative to which Obasanjo’s diplomacy was anchored (Akindele, 2000: 26). Maintaining that debt relief through forgiveness or reduction had become absolutely imperative in order to freeze a large chunk of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings for use for social and economic development, the administration embarked on a vigorous campaign to demonstrate that consolidation of democracy depended on a successful program of poverty alleviation which was hardly possible under the debt overhang. It is interesting to note that the debt relief or forgiveness campaign had also characterized the domestic environment of the foreign policy of Babangida, while the Abacha regime also had the objective but could not pursue it because it had turned the world against itself by the other attitudes and actions on the domestic scene that were unpalatable to the international community.
The debt relief campaign by Obasanjo was also linked with the fifth domestic imperative to which his foreign policy was anchored. This was the campaign for the repatriation of money looted from the national treasury and lodged in foreign banks by corrupt rulers, government functionaries and their associates (Akindele, ibid). Obasanjo drew up an international convention which would facilitate the repatriation of money proven to have been stolen and illegally transferred abroad into private bank accounts. Part of the Obasanjo strategy was to also stress that the refunded loots could be used to service part of Nigeria’s debts.
Fawole identifies anti-corruption crusade as another feature of the domestic environment of Obasanjo’s foreign policy (2004: 26-37). Corruption had become institutionalized, having come a long way from the oil boom of the 1970s, to the 2000s, with government functionaries and their associates in the private sector in a fit of furious greed engaging in “state robbery” and absolute plunder. Other ramifications of this corruption was bribery in public and private circles from the top to the bottom, nepotism and favouritism (which is popularly called “man-know-man”), economic and financial crimes such as money laundering, impersonation and forgery for financial crimes, and advance fee fraud (419). These were contributing to Nigeria’s image problem and another pariah scenario in which no one around the world who knew Nigeria well would want to have anything to do with its citizens. It also hampered President Obasanjo’s debt relief drive as the creditor-nations believed that the official corruption was practically responsible for Nigeria’s indebtedness and underdevelopment, and not because of genuine economic development programs. To earn the confidence of the international community therefore, the Obasanjo administration started the Anti-Corruption Crusade, which led to the formation of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). This crusade would arguably become the fiercest anti-corruption battle in Nigeria’s long but chequered history. The privatization policy mentioned by Akindele was, according to Fawole, another means to fight corruption. Fawole (2004: 29) argues that the public enterprises such as the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), Nigerian Telecommunications Plc (NITEL), Ajaokuta Steel Plant, the Nigerian Airways, Nigerian Railways, Nigerian National Shipping Line (NNSL), et cetera had been looted out of existence by government functionaries in charge of them. While selling these enterprises off was a recommendation of the IMF and World Bank to strengthen the economy by encouraging the efficiency, the Nigerian government also thought this would reduce official corruption.
Also shedding light on the debt relief campaign earlier mentioned, Fawole (2004: 30) posits that to free itself from the debt overhang and enjoy a possible relief, Nigeria would have to accept and implement certain global socio-economic and political standards prescribed and monitored by the Bretton Woods. These included removal of subsidy from all public services and goods, deregulation of the economy, privatization and commercialization: a macro-economic policy that ran contrary to the popular wishes of the electorate.
Other domestic imperatives included the diversification of the economy leading to the development of the non-oil, gas and solid minerals sectors; development of the telecoms sector which led to the ‘revolution’ of the mobile telecoms technology in which telecommunication became accessible and affordable to majority of Nigerians; overhaul of the aviation sector on two occasions, leading to among other things, the emergence of more efficient private airlines and the development of the Lagos airport to contemporary international standards and building of the Port Harcourt, Kano, Calabar and Abuja airports to international airports level; the rehabilitation of the maritime sector; attempts at putting the power sector back on track; and the development of the tourism sector. The National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) was also instituted and the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (NEEDS) with its state variants (SEEDS) was also created to empower the citizen’s economically and financially. All these had foreign policy implications as they were to either facilitate foreign investment, tourism or a return home of Nigerians in the Diaspora.
The Obasanjo administration also embarked on reconciliation and pacification in the Niger Delta after the Ogoni episode of the 1990s that had elicited a hostile disposition to Nigeria. His administration also carried out reforms in the military. This was characterized by the compulsory retirement from the armed forces of personnel that had had any stint in politics, either as beneficiaries of political appointments, or as coup makers. This was a major purge to rid the armed forces of what Fawole calls “political soldiers” (2004:32), and restore professionalism to the military after over thirty years of political adventurism (Usen, 1999).
However, aside these domestic imperatives were certain internal unsavoury developments that also affected the foreign policy of Nigeria during Obasanjo’s reign. These included religious/sectarian conflicts, ethnic conflict, general insecurity arising from an uncontrollable spate of robbery and assassination, political rivalry, collapse of the power sector, all of which rubbed on Nigeria’s foreign policy and reputation as the regional protector and ‘giant of Africa”.
The first problem was the inter-ethnic and communal clashes that had ethnic undercurrents in Sagamu, Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, and Osogbo. These were quickly followed by the second, which was the Sharia law crisis. This was the outcome of a politically motivated act of some powerful northern elite-both in government and out of government- mobilizing Moslems and impressing it on their governors to establish the Islamic law as the state religion. The political heat that came from that from 1999 to 2003 was what led to the establishment of the Sharia legal code in no fewer than six states of northern Nigeria, and a spate of riots and killings in Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Katsina and Jos (Folarin, Atobatele, and Folarin, 1999). The Jos crisis lingered for a long time, as Moslems challenged the Christian community and the government, seeking the establishment of the Moslem legal code in a predominantly Christian state. This eventually led to the declaration of a state of emergency in Plateau State, with the removal of the Governor Joshua Dariye and his replacement with an Administrator, General Chris Alli. The third problem was the protracted Niger Delta crisis, which, apart from the traditional struggles against the government and the oil companies, a more dangerous dimension of cult groups and militant activities emerged. The most challenging of the developments at the time was the Odi crisis of 1999 in which cultists killed eleven police officers, and a reprisal from government led to the deployment of hundreds of military personnel in armoured tanks and other war instruments to the sleepy town in Bayelsa State. Odi was razed down. Another problem brewed in Choba, Rivers State in which military men reportedly abused their power, killing young men and raping the girls and women. Reasons for the destruction in Odi included the news story that armed militants protesting against government’s insensitivity towards the plight of the masses had ambushed and killed about twelve police and security agents (Seminitari, 2000).
The Niger Delta crisis soon degenerated to a situation in which ferocious militant groups including the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) with more sophisticated weapons and better organized mode of operation began a chapter of domestic terrorism. Their tactics included raids of police outposts and oil company facilities, capture of oil vessels, destruction of oil pipelines, kidnap of government personnel or their children or relatives and expatriates (Olatunji, 2003; Seminitari, 2005).
Apart from the Niger Delta crisis, there were also a number of ethnic and communal conflicts across the country with government intervention that sometimes ended in worse conflict scenario. The conflicts included the Ife-Modakeke conflict in western Nigeria that resulted in well over 500 deaths and wanton destruction (Folarin, 2000), Umuleri-Aguleri clashes in eastern Nigeria, and Zaki-Biam conflict in north-eastern Nigeria (part of what was hitherto known as the Middle Belt). Government forces intervention in Zaki-Biam conflict, the height of the age-long Tiv-Jukun face-off, was a mess. The Defense Minister, Theophilus Danjuma who ordered military intervention, was Jukun; while a leader of the Tiv cause was former ECOMOG Field Commander and immediate past Chief of Army Staff (CAS), Victor Malu. The soldiers took sides and became divided: some allowed Jukun infiltrators in the ranks to wear army uniforms with the intent to destroy and kill rather than enforce peace; the other group tried to protect their former boss, Malu. In the end, the Nigerian army was fighting against itself, while the Tiv and Jukun militias wrought destruction on one another and killed members of the Nigerian Army. This made a detachment of troops of other ethnic extraction to be made, whose main object became to avenge the brutal murder of their compatriots in Tivland. The casualties from this blitzkrieg included the relatives and family members of General Malu, his properties and personal home. Like Odi, the Zaki-Biam “peace enforcement’ was a complete disaster (Olatunji, 2004).
The eruption of violence after May 29, 1999 has been explained away as the manifestation of cumulative or pent-up anger that had been present since the era of military rule, which out of frustration, longer minded any military reprisals. The other explanation is that the plethora of ethnic militias and sectional associations championing sectional interests and separation had galvanized the ethnic and communal violence. Other scores of domestic crisis for the Obasanjo administration were air crashes resulting from corruption and poor maintenance culture in the aviation industry; the diplomatic brouhaha between Nigeria and the United Kingdom caused by the bail-jumping and return to Nigeria by the Bayelsa State Governor Alamesiegha, and the political crises in Ekiti State which led to the imposition of a state of emergency (Olatunji, 2006).
The consequences of all these conflicts and disasters were a state of insecurity and general apprehension that discouraged foreign visit and worked against Obasanjo’s aggressive crusade to promote foreign investment. The crises in the power and aviation sectors also discouraged investment and tourists respectively, while the corruption and fraud perpetrated by Nigerians reduced Nigeria’s reputation in the global system. The many cases of mishandling of the local violence by government put to moral question Nigeria’s regional leadership in conflict resolution. One mishandling led to another conflict spiralling a widespread national crises, that messed up Nigeria’s international roles as mediator, protector and peacekeeper, and that attracted African and global worries and apprehension.
6.6.2. External Context
In Foreign Policy analysis, like in International Relations study, there are three basic levels of analysis. These include the Individual, State or National, and International or Systemic levels (Goldstein, 2001). The systemic level shows that the attitudes, roles and actions of states, institutions and individuals behind them are influenced or shaped by happenings in the international system or community. The state or national roles and behaviour may thus be responses or reactions to the international system. For instance, the national roles and behaviour of the United States between 1945 and 1990 were informed by the character of global politics dogged by ideological rivalry (Chomsky, 2006; Rosati, 2006). For Nigeria, its foreign policy was a combination of domestic imperatives and happenings, and international pressures and expectations. Hence, the external environment of the Obasanjo foreign policy was as eventful as the internal dynamics. This section will examine the general external context of the Obasanjo foreign policy; while the next section would examine the performance or actualization of the African roles as conceived by the Obasanjo administration.
First, Obasanjo used his towering international image, goodwill and statesmanship which he had earned from 1976 to 1999 to put Nigeria on a good standing globally. He was a Pan-Africanist military ruler from 1976 to 1979 fighting the cause of liberation and dismantling of apartheid in southern Africa; first military leader to hand over power voluntarily to a democratically elected government in 1979; Chairman of several summits of international organizations, convener of international workshops in Nigeria which hosted serving and past presidents and heads of states, a well-known personality in the UN circles as leader of mediation and reconciliation missions, and a pro-democracy activist who launched vitriolic attacks against former Nigerian dictators since out of power. All these gave him a colossal stature that worked in the interest of Nigeria’s re-emergence as a global and African force.
Nigeria’s reintegration to the global system flowing from this towering image of the President, manifested in several ways. It was given the hosting rights and Chairmanship of the 2003 Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM), got the Chairmanship of the G-77 in 2000, and regained its voice both in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and UN, which put Nigeria in strong contention for one of the two slots for Africa in the proposed enlarged permanent membership of the UN Security Council (Saliu, 2006b: 243-262). Hence, the fact the world had moved fast ahead during the period of Nigeria’s pariah experience, compelled the government to pull all its strings of international goodwill to move with the tide, and this worked.
The Obasanjo fight against corruption, fake and expired drugs, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and smuggling, among others, was more externally motivated than internally induced. The west, led by the US and UK, had mounted pressure on Nigeria to fight all these international crimes, and had even blacklisted the country and rated it as one of the ‘no-go” areas for its citizens. This translated to lots of losses in tourist and investment revenues, and an undermining of its quest to regain global reckoning. To earn the confidence of the international community and be reassured that Nigeria was on the righteous path, the Obasanjo administration wasted no time in instituting the anti-corruption crusade, and created the National Administration of Foods and Drugs Control (NAFDAC), and the strengthening of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), among others (Saliu, 2006b: 254-255).
The Obasanjo administration enjoyed international acceptance and popularity because of its summit diplomacy and frequent physical presence of the President at global forums where frantic efforts were made to make Nigeria’s voice heard and presence respected. These yielded further dividends for the country, as two serving US Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush came in succession, and which also saw to former US President Jimmy Carter, Microsoft founders Bill and Melinda Gates, and Indian Prime Minister paying either private or state visits to Nigeria. The pariah state had come to occupy a noticeable position in world politics once again.
The external context of Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Obasanjo was trifurcated and was in tandem with the concentric circles theory of Nigeria’s international relations. It would be recalled that the concentric circles explains the scale of preference or order of importance of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives: Nigeria’s national interest and security, West African interests, African interests, and then global interests. The first external context of Obasanjo’s foreign policy was Nigeria’s role in its immediate neighbourhood, which represented the second level of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The second was its role in Africa, which was in agreement with its third level of external relations. The third was Obasanjo’s diplomacy in the world, but that would be mentioned only to establish the fact the administration’s global significance earned Nigeria more respect on and made it more actively involved in the affairs of the continent.
On the regional platform, the Obasanjo administration inherited the country’s subsisting obligations, including the country’s role in the peacemaking efforts in Sierra Leone. The Abacha administration had launched a blistering military intervention in that country in 1998, four years into the worsening civil crisis, and General Abdulsalami Abubakar had inherited this, same year. The Obasanjo administration had also inherited this regional obligation, when the Nigerian authorities were not able to pull out as planned because of other huge tasks at home and abroad such as the transition program, and the repair of external image (Mbu, 2000).
The Obasanjo administration was however committed to the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone because of growing popular public opinion at home to effect this in the face of huge cost for Nigeria. Obasanjo was mindful that the huge expenditure on such foreign operations amounted to a drain on Nigeria’s national resources, a fact he had made known during his erstwhile presidential campaigns in 1998/99. The decision to pull Nigeria out was against the backdrop of popular domestic outcries that the prohibitive daily commitment of one million dollars by Nigeria on ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone was unsustainable for a country that was suffering from a crippling external debt overhang of about thirty-two billion dollars. Moreover, Nigerians had been generally skeptical of their country’s involvement in another country’s inter-ethnic conflict, after Somalia, Rwanda, and particularly Liberia, when there were numerous unresolved or protracted intra and inter-ethnic conflicts at home. Again, the Nigerian involvement at the time had become unacceptable to Nigerians who had viewed Abacha’s anti-dictatorship posture in the region as hypocritical because his own dictatorship at home was not only cruel, but it was also denying the country of democratization (Fawole, 2004: 40).
In 1999, the Obasanjo administration began a negotiation for a peaceful resolution of the Sierra Leone crisis, with a milestone reached on July 7, 1999 with the Lome Peace Accord in which the Government of Sierra Leone led by Tejan Kabbah and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) agreed to an armistice. The accord provided amnesty for the RUF/SL leader Foday Sankoh and his rebels, guaranteed their return from exile and incorporation in the government through a power-sharing formula, and the granting of control of the country’s mineral resources by Foday Sankoh (Africa Policy E-Journal, 1999). This peace effort led by Nigeria has been heavily criticized for carelessly conceding to the age-long self-conceited desire to plunder the country by the RUF/SL. For instance, the sub-regional plenipotentiaries that hurriedly cobbled this agreement together naively expected that the unpredictable RUF would faithfully implement it. They were wrong, as the RUF had its own designs to grab power by all means. The ink was barely dry on the agreement paper the rebel group abducted 34 people, including members of the UN Monitoring team, Nigerian soldiers, British military personnel and journalists (Fawole, 2004: 41).
Nigeria’s role in the Sierra Leone peace efforts from 1994 had been steadily commendable until this period. While the active role of Nigeria in regional peace and the Sierra Leone conflict is not in doubt, it is noted-while not particularly interested in delving into the controversy of success or failure of the Lome peace deal-that the leadership of Nigeria in striking this deal represented an anti-climax of its erstwhile workable military and diplomatic roles. This was one of Obasanjo’s two major regional role blunders. The second was the Charles Taylor asylum saga, which would be discussed shortly. The complication of the Lome peace deal made a quick pull-out impossible; hence Nigeria hailed the intervention of and joined the ECOMOG in working with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) which arrived in November 1999 (Adedigba, 2003). Nigeria remained active in the UNAMSIL operations, however with some problems. Nigeria’s long stay in Sierra Leone was an asset to the peacekeeping force. It understood the strategies and methods of operations of the Sankoh-led rebels, and it knew their locations and hideouts. The knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the rebels thus provided hindsight to the UNAMSIL, which made the decimation, disarming, dislodgement, and encampment of the rebel force possible. Also, as a result of Nigeria’s familiarity with the truce which it led in broking, it assisted the UNAMSIL in the monitoring and implementation of the Lome Accords (Sanda, 2004).
Nigeria’s leadership role in the Sierra Leone peace efforts were undermined between 1999 and 2001 by a number of scandals and allegations. The UNAMSIL led by India’s Vijay Jetley accused Nigeria of lack of commitment and compromising UNAMSIL’s moral justification to act as a mediator and peacekeeper in some ways. For instance, the Nigerian troops were accused of joining in the illegal minerals mining and secretly having cuts and deals in the “blood diamond” which had been the resource curse issue in the war from the outset. Jetley also accused Nigerian diplomat and UN Secretary-General’s Representative, Ambassador Olu Adeniji of lack of cooperation. In response, the Nigerian authorities swept all the accusations under the carpet and lampooned the UNAMSIL Commander for incompetence and lack of tact, whose ability could not match the skills of several Nigerian regional peacekeeping forces commanders over the years with enviable scorecard in regional conflicts settlement. Nigeria also carpeted the United Kingdom whose forces dominated UNAMSIL of attempting to underplay its late arrival to help and undermine Nigeria’s track record as initiator and executor of peacekeeping in West Africa since the end of the Cold War (Akinbobola, 2001). At the height of Nigeria’s positive contributions to Sierra Leone’s crisis during the Obasanjo era, its Defence Minister, Joe Blell says of Nigeria’s roles in the region and country:
We wish to express our appreciation and thanks to the Government and people of Nigeria, for helping to halt the violence that had divided our people and for bringing peace to Sierra Leone…our people will never forget the role of the Federal Government of Nigeria in bringing peace to our beloved country. Rather, Sierra Leone would ever remain grateful to Nigeria for the great sacrifice made in both material and men in the course of bringing peace and stability back to Sierra Leone (Blell, in Nigeria Direct, 2006).
The Sierra Leone conflict was closely followed by a number of other regional crises. These included Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia and Sao Tome and Principe. Nigeria was involved in all albeit with differences in degree of involvement. The most engaging for Nigeria were however the Ivorian and Sao Tome civil and political crises respectively. It can be argued that Nigeria’s interventions in these countries may have been informed by the fact that considerable number of its citizens dwell or engage in trade there. The government may therefore want to secure its own nationals numbering over two million people and at the same time maintain its leadership reputation in the region. While the ECOMOG was deployed in Guinea-Bissau to unsettle the junta that seized power, the Nigerian government rather sought subtle means and diplomatic pressure to dislodge General Ansumane Mane. The Nigerian rejection of the overthrow and call on the junta to return power to the civilians were instrumental in the stirring up of a domestic revolt which eventually consumed the General as he was killed, and brought the crisis to an end (Sanda, 2004: 278-279).
In some cases, West Africa tended to have looked up to Nigeria for help in both conflict situation, and for aid. Nigeria is mostly always expected to sponsor ECOWAS programs, including the regional soccer body’s competitions such as the West African Football Union (WAFU) Cup, which went moribund for years because Nigeria withdrew sole sponsorship until recently that a Nigerian, Amos Adamu revived it with the aid of the Nigerian Sports Ministry and organized the WAFU Nations Cup which Nigeria won in April 2010. Nigeria was also seen as a big partner in the ECOWAS which had more than enough to share with its neighbours. The Ghanaian High Commission’s Minister-Counsellor (Trade and Tourism), Kofi Afresah Nuhu recalls:
For the past eight years or so, Nigeria has played significant role in
our economic sector. Nigeria has helped with the constant supply of
crude oil on very generous basis. Most times we pay cash-down, and
at times Nigeria allows it on credit basis. Ghana has benefited this way
in the area of energy. This is because Ghana expects that as a West
African friend, Nigeria is blessed enough to assist (Nuhu, oral interview, 2009).
Aside this, Nigeria also went into a special arrangement with Ghana in such a way that gas pipe runs across the sub-continent from Nigeria through which the latter and other countries are allowed to tap gas directly from Nigeria at a generous cost. There were also many investors from Nigeria who went to establish big business, including in the media and communications sector, foods, electronics, clothing and fashion, and in movies and music sub-sectors in Ghana. This has helped the Ghanaian economy in foreign direct investment (FDI) which has been a boost to the local economy. To Ghana, Nigeria has been a reliable economic partner with lots of resources that have benefited the recipient, and Nigeria has been a very huge market for other West African nations. The country is indispensable to regional economic growth and stability. The expectations from the countries are high. The Ghanaian High Commission regards Nigeria as a responsible West African country that has used its resources well rather than embarking on short-changing smaller regional countries, and which has maintained a good neighbourliness with other West African nations and has been principally responsible for the peace and security that reign in several countries and indeed the region through its many peacekeeping and conflict resolution missions (Nuhu, oral interview 2009).
Ghana however does not expect Nigeria’s intervention in all West African issues any longer because of its own many problems which need local and international intervention as well. According to Nuhu,
If the many problems of the country are looked into, Nigeria would be in the position to lead the region again. But for now, it should focus on its economic decline and other socio-political issues that have rubbed off its shine as a regional force (Nuhu, interview, 2009).
However, contrary to the positive perception of Ghana, which albeit is laced with some envy and circumspection; part of the region has been apprehensive of Nigeria’s real intentions most times. The Francophone countries surrounding it, including Benin, Chad, Niger and the Central African country, Cameroon were particularly not too disposed to Nigeria’s so called good neighbourliness and secure neighbourhood objectives. They believed that Nigeria had more than just securing the neighbourhood as motive. Ngalim reasons,
It is generally assumed that Nigeria’s real intention is a subtle regional imperialism as Nigeria rather views its neighbours not as its regional and equal partners but rather its backyard like the US has always seen Mexico and other immediate neighbours as potential conquests (Ngalim, interview, 2007).
The friendly disposition of Nigeria on issues concerning its neighbours is mostly reflected on and most times unwelcome by them. From the 1980s up to the Obasanjo era, Cameroon, Chad and Benin continually had problems with Nigeria’s intervention to resolve their domestic political crises and had sometimes called the bluff of diplomatic intervention by Nigeria. Ngalim assumes that,
This was because each of them had land and territorial disputes with Nigeria along their borders, and as such would not believe that Nigeria would have their interests so much at heart. Cameroon had several issues over the Adamawa and Cross River borders with it (Ngalim, interview, 2007).
Chad and Nigeria had conflicted over territorial integrity of the Lake Chad region. Nigeria and Niger had scuffled over borders with Kano and Katsina, while Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria had had years of diplomatic and direct military face-offs over oil-rich waters bordering both countries with lots of hostilities towards Nigeria and torture and killings of Nigerians in Malabo from the late 1970s to the 2000s (Obadare, 2001).
Akinyemi also posits that
The Francophone countries have never trusted Nigeria wholesale and often greet Nigeria’s offers with grim apprehension, caution and sometimes outright rebuff. During the days of the Technical Aid Corps Scheme which the Babangida administration initiated, while many countries including Africans in the Diaspora accepted Nigeria’s human and material assistance to build their domestic economies and polities from the wealth and abundance of Nigeria’s expertise, the few nations that turned it down were Francophone (Akinyemi, oral interview, 2009).
These included Cote d’ Ivoire, a country that had always been hostile towards Nigeria because of fears created by the French hegemon that Nigeria had an imperial objective to foist an Anglophone agenda on the whole region (Ngalim, 2007). The Ivorian had also called the bluff of Nigeria in the early 2000s when President Obasanjo had deployed ships and troops to assist President Laurent Gbagbo in suppressing the rebellion, with a “no thanks, we don’t need your help” disposition that fuelled Ivorian-Nigerian cold war, until the crisis in Abidjan had reached a crescendo that led to a UN intervention. The hostility had once climaxed in the 1960s when the Ivorian government was one of the very few countries in Africa that had supported Nigeria’s disintegration with the belief that this would shatter the myth of any Nigerian superiority. The object of France’s propaganda has however been not to lose grip of its West African interests and loyalty to Nigeria and Britain (Akinterinwa, 1999).
On the contrary however, the Liberian perceptions for Nigeria’s role conceptions and assumptions in West Africa are favourable. The country has been one of the greatest beneficiaries of Nigeria’s largesse. Liberia’s appreciation of Nigeria’s roles from 1990 to the Obasanjo era is captured in the position of the assistant Chief envoy to Nigeria:
Our people look at Nigeria in high esteem and have a very respectful view of Nigeria as a great and responsible country. We are indeed very grateful for all that Nigeria has done for our country over these years. Its role in ECOMOG and the present UN mission in stopping the conflict in Liberia cannot be forgotten in a hurry. Nigeria has invested so much of human and material resources to see to it that our country does not disintegrate (Conteh, interview, 2009).
According to Conteh,
the Liberian people were also grateful for not walking away as other African countries did after the cessation of hostilities, by staying back and being an active part of the UN peacekeeping mission activities with the largest contingent in Liberia, Nigeria made the political environment of Liberia calm and favourable to now talk of democratic elections and a stable polity since the beginning of the Obasanjo democratic dispensation (Conteh, oral interview, 2009).
Aside the security and military interventions, and the national reconciliation process of which Nigeria was actively involved, Liberia had from the Babangida era also benefitted from technical aid from Nigeria. Nigeria sent medical experts, university professors, civil engineers, and economic experts on regular basis to the tiny West African country to assist it. Indeed, Liberia has been a major beneficiary of the Technical Aid Corps (Conteh, 2009; Akinyemi, 2009). The Obasanjo administration also assisted Liberia in paying off part of its external debts and the outright waiving off of all the debts Liberia owed Nigeria. Unlike other apprehensive West African nations, Liberia made requests for these technical aides because it views Nigeria as a ‘‘big brother whose help and tutelage should be solicited with all sense of humility’’ (Conteh, oral interview 2009).
The Nigerian intervention in Cote d’Ivoire caused initial embarrassment and questioned its competence as a regional peacekeeper. Its immediate response to the Ivorian crisis was to support the government with three Alpha military jets to help in getting rid of the rebels, probably as earlier mentioned with the security and protection of more than two million lives being behind the action. However, the Laurent Gbagbo government shunned the offer regarding the act as self-imposed unsolicited roles. Not long after the planes were sent back home however, a full-scale civil war began, which required immediate military assistance from ECOWAS and France. However, partly as a result of the initial insult and Ivorian arrogance, Nigeria refused to contribute troops to the ECOMOG force that was to assist in restoring the peace in the country. Other reasons were Nigerians’ opposition to further commitment to other nations’ problems at the expense of Nigeria’s myriads of domestic issues; the huge cost of spearheading or leading another conflict resolution endeavour for which Nigeria had paid its dues; and the inhibitions caused by Francophone sensibilities: the apprehension by Nigeria not to overtly or covertly clash with its Francophone neighbours and avoid head-on-collision with France (Fawole, 2004: 43).
Also, Nigeria-Cote de I’voire relations had not always been good. From the Civil War era in 1967-1970 when the Ivorian government recognized and supported Biafra and Nigeria’s dismemberment, to the mid 1970s when France used it to frustrate Nigeria’s efforts to establish the ECOWAS, and the 1990s when the West African country opposed Nigeria’s ECOMOG idea in Liberia (Akinbobola, 2001: 89). However, Nigeria’s initial embarrassment seemed to have turned into a blessing for, as the crisis took another dimension in 2004-2006, and as President Obasanjo assumed the leadership of the AU, the intervention was more of an intimate contact thing which went a long way in bringing the warring parties to a common table to reach a consensus. A testimonial of the efficacy of Obasanjo’s semi-formal intimate approach to settling the dispute was made by the Ivorian Minister of Communication, Hammed Bakayoko who had been deputized by President Gbagbo to deliver a letter of gratitude to Nigeria. He said:
My generation in my country knows that you saved us, our children and grandchildren from clear chaos. You treated issues like a father, objectively and without any personal interest, as is done in Africa (Nigeria Direct, 2006a).
The Sao Tome and Principe crisis management and the quick restoration of stability unilaterally done by Nigeria constituted the height of Obasanjo’s diplomatic masterstroke in Africa. When the coup in that country threatened to permanently push him out of office, Nigeria felt morally obligated to help him. As the country’s democratically elected President Fradiqe de Menezes was on a visit to Nigeria on July 16, 2003, a group of young soldiers called Junta of National Salvation led by Major Fernando Pereira toppled his government. In a brief burst of gunfire and grenade explosions, they had seized the national radio and television stations, rounded up the Prime Minister and members of her cabinet, and declared themselves as the new leadership of the tiny oil-rich island off the southern coast of Nigeria. Major Pereira declared himself Army Commander and leader.
The coup leaders said they had seized power in frustration at the persistence of grinding poverty among Sao Tome's 170,000 inhabitants despite the imminent arrival of an oil boom in the island state. They also complained about the rapid enrichment of senior government officials whom they accused of corruption. Seismic surveys indicate that the offshore waters of Sao Tome, which the country had agreed to develop in partnership with Nigeria, contain rich oil reserves. The former Portuguese colony had before then eked out a living from cocoa exports. But it was anticipated that the country receive a first windfall from oil by 2004 when it would be banking about US$100 million of front end signature bonuses for the award of nine offshore blocks to foreign oil companies, including Nigeria. This windfall payment would be more than twice the islands' annual budget. Although Sao Tome had a per capita income of just $280 before the coup, it had high hopes of becoming one of Africa's leading oil exporters over the next decade. Seismic data gathered indicated the presence of between four and eleven billion barrels of oil reserves in water depths of 1,500 to 2,500 meters. New technology developed in recent years had made it commercially viable to extract oil in such challenging conditions. The mountainous and heavily forested islands, which gained independence from Portugal in 1975, suffered one previous short-lived military takeover in 1995 (IRIN, 2009).
In the wake of the Pereira coup, President Menezes had escaped arrest and possible assassination because he was in Nigeria negotiating a deal he had signed to explore for oil on the two countries’ shared maritime border. Nigeria condemned the coup and demanded its immediate reversal (The Economist, 2003). President Obasanjo’s media secretary, Remi Oyo had said:
The government of Nigeria has received with shock and consternation the news of the coup d’état in the sister state of Sao Tome and Principe. The government condemns unequivocally this violation of the democratic Process (Oyo, 2003:2)
The Nigerian government led by Obasanjo mounted pressure on the junta to relinquish power and impressed it on the illegitimate occupants of the seat of power that their coup was a violation of the ECOWAS provision on non-forceful change of government in the region to which Sao Tome and Principe was a contracting party (Sanda, 2004:278). Within a brief period of one week, the Nigerian diplomatic pressure laced with subtle threats and warnings to bring the coup plotters to book by force if they remained adamant, yielded dividend. An agreement was proposed in which the coup plotters would hand over power to President de Menezes who had been elected since 2001 peacefully, while amnesty would be granted to them. President Menezes had flown from Nigeria to Gabon for the peace accord with the junta, which had also been pressurized by other African states and the United States to step down (Ohia, 2003).
Flying along with President Obasanjo on July 23, 2003, President Menezes was received in the Sao Tome and Principe capital in a red carpet reception. The one-week old coup had ended, becoming the shortest lasting military rule in Africa made possible by the combined diplomatic efforts of Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, and the ECOWAS as a body, Brazil, Portugal and the USA (Ohia, 2003:2).
There was a manifest power politics in the response of states to the Sao Tome and Principe political situation. Beyond the “morality” in the action to help restore democracy and save African states from the resurgence of military intervention, oil vantages, from which Nigeria, Portugal, Brazil, Angola, Gabon, the USA and a number of other states would benefit directly from, had elicited the instantaneous unilateral and collective action to swiftly restore political stability in the country. The flurry of diplomatic activities following the coup was thus motivated by nations, including Nigeria to protect their national economic interest. Nigeria was particularly a major beneficiary of the country’s huge oil prospects. A lose of Bakassi already in sight after the 2002 World Court ruling giving Bakassi to Cameroon, here was Sao Tome and Principe offering a rare immediate opportunity for replacement. Nigeria was the country’s official partner to help in the drilling of oil, an agreement that President de Menezes had come to Abuja to seal with President Obasanjo. Nigeria’s efforts would guarantee great stakes including the control of oil blocks that would earn it hundreds of millions of dollars annually (Sanda, 2004: 278).
The Sao Tome and Principe crisis thus offered the Obasanjo administration a platform to test its new foreign policy thrust enunciated by his MFA, Olu Adeniji who had conceived of a set of African roles that would be regulated by a constructive concentrism that would benefit Nigeria. This was supposed to be a departure of the old national roles which saw Africa as a centrepiece while Nigeria’s national interests were even at stake. The Sao Tome and Principe episode was a successful test of Obasanjo’s power politics or economic diplomacy in Africa.
A succession of three diplomatic blunders however followed the Sao Tome masterstroke. These were the Bakassi dispute and handover, the Charles Taylor saga, and the Equatorial Guinea crisis. Some scholars have however praised the handling of the Bakassi dispute by the Obasanjo administration referring to it as one of the diplomatic and pacific measures of Nigeria in the region and with immediate neighbours, complementing its role as a leader (Sanda, 2004: 278-279). The Nigerian Yoruba tradition-like the traditions of many other ethnic group in Nigeria-is that when an elder and a youngster have any disputation of any sort, the elder wins the contest by a soft and calm response. This was what underlined Obasanjo’s disposition towards the World Court ruling of 2002 in which Cameroon won the case over Bakassi. As intractable as the problem was, which had brought Nigeria and Cameroon to the brink of war several times in the past, Nigeria in an unexpected move, accepted the ruling, and proceeded to work actively towards its implementation. Government had sent a high-powered delegation to The Hague, seat of the international court, with a strong commitment to abide by whatever the ruling would be. As a follow-up to the ruling, Nigeria appointed a group of experts to serve on the Mixed Commission. The governments of the two countries proceeded to the USA under the auspices of the UN and Government of the USA to reach the Orange Tree Agreement on modalities for a peaceful handing and taking over of the oil-rich region. A number of controversies erupted in Nigeria, with the Senate and House of Representatives showing dissent to the Executive decision to hand over Bakassi, contending that on an issue involving the self determination of about a million Nigerian people and that had to do with Nigeria’s socio-cultural and economic existence as the Bakassi issue had been, the Executive could not take unilateral decision and sell the nation cheaply to another country (see for instance, Ita-Giwa, 2006). Despite the many altercations between the Executive and the National Assembly, and the apparent disfavour of public opinion, the government went ahead to implement the Orange Tree Agreement which had sixty days timeframe for handing over to Cameroon.
Some scholars have criticized this decision and described it as a reflection of the old foreign policy of African patronage in the name of keeping a self-imposed label of ‘giant’ or ‘big brother”, this time at the expense of millions of lives and huge economic prospects (Akinyemi, 2005; Akinterinwa, 2005: 103-104). This act was against known principles of power politics which great and powerful nations that exhibited for the sake of advancing first and foremost their national interests before any other thing. Ambitious nations in global politics like Nigeria seemed to be, would not necessarily break law or violate agreements when their national interest is at stake, particularly when they have a good cause as Nigeria which has more than one million Efiks and Efiats of the Cross River and Akwa Ibom states whose heritage had been Bakassi long before oil politics or modern territorial integrity disputes were conceived. In political realism which is the driving force in contemporary inter-state politics (Carr, 1958; Morgenthau 1973), international law and morality are marginal when national survival are at stake; and any diplomacy that earns more losses for a nation than gains is a blunder and not a plus. The nation could dissipate its human and material resources to help other nations as Nigeria has done since independence, but a loss of territories, history has shown is the hallmark of national failure and the height of weakness. France’s loss of Alsace-Lorraine and Metz to Prussia (Germany) in 1870-71 was considered a mark of defeat and international humiliation, a stigma France had to live with until 1918, when it immediately took back its territories at the fall of Germany. The loss of territories to the European gun-boat politics by the African kings and chiefs in the nineteenth century represented surrender and defeat, which was responsible for colonialism for about one hundred years. No matter the concession the end-result of an act of international diplomacy should not be losses of sovereignty, territory or source of revenue. It should be the realization of national interest and the ennobling of the citizens.
Obasanjo’s ‘large heart, discipline, and law-abiding’ disposition to the Bakassi issue was incongruent to the wishes of Nigerians, and represented a foreign policy that negated its number one objective. Akinterinwa notes:
Taking the matter to the ICJ for adjudication is a non-solution and therefore a waste of time. Government should reach an understanding with France, who initially encouraged Cameroon to go to the ICJ. However, for as long as the residents of the disputed peninsula are emphasizing non-preparedness to be part of Cameroon, the ICJ ruling cannot but be of little or no effect. The principle of self-determination has to prevail. This means that the only feasible and lasting option is to seek political solution to the problem (Akinterinwa, 2005:103).
Going to court over the matter in the first place put a question mark on Nigeria’s leadership or giant stature. A leader would use its diplomatic arsenals to sway a smaller nation or at least adopt manipulative measures to settle a score politically with compromises that would rather result in favourable outcomes. For a ‘big brother’ to allow a dispute with a smaller power to become an international court matter showed the potholes in African diplomacy and leadership.
The second diplomatic blunder was the Charles Taylor asylum saga. Again commentators and scholars differ on Nigeria’s wisdom in meddling and handling of Charles Taylor’s matter. Obasanjo had severally defended his position that he had been at the centre of African and international efforts to encourage Taylor to resign from power to allow the Liberian peace process to succeed, and that as such he was morally and logically bound to provide a safe passage for Taylor even if it meant he would have to be given a haven in Nigeria, for the overall interest of peace and democracy in Liberia and the region (Obasanjo, 2004). This has been justified by the argument in traditional Nigerian foreign policy thinking that as a regional power and a long time settler of the Liberian dispute, it would be rewarding and gratifying to Nigeria to complete the settlement process it had long started.
According to Akinyemi (2003), the Taylor asylum issue was second to neither the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) nor the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issue in terms of foreign policy issues that had raised so much tension and temperature both domestically and internationally. Akinyemi, like some other scholars however reasoned that the decision by African heads of states to persuade Taylor to resign and be kept in safe custody was a political move to score a point that they would not allow Africa to be used to set the legal precedent as the first sitting president to be arrested and tried, and possibly convicted by a war crimes tribunal. Hence, a rapprochement was reached in which African leaders led by Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki were in Monrovia to negotiate Taylor’s exit and safe passage with the agreement to welcome him in Abuja immediately. The war crimes Tribunal sitting in Freetown, Sierra Leone had indicted Taylor on many charges, including genocide, gross abuse of human rights, and inciting of war that led to mass murder and banditry in neighbouring Sierra Leone. But the while the Presidents would not approve of Taylor’s wrong-doings and who had been severely criticized by some of them, they were trying to save Africa from global reproach and believed that the deposition and trial of Taylor would not restore the peace or heal the wounds in Liberia or Sierra Leone (Akinyemi, 2003: 45). Akinyemi argues that leaders had this in mind when agreeing to create a safe landing for Taylor:
We don’t regard the arrest and trial of Taylor as being instrumental in bringing peace to Liberia. There are other heads of states who also have appalling records. Why pick on an African President? This is an attempt to rubbish a whole race and I suspect that this may be that asylum was granted Taylor. I can also speculate that Nigerians claim to be the big brothers in West Africa. As the big brother, there are some responsibilities that go with that role (Akinyemi, 2003: 46).
This was typical of Nigeria’s foreign policy thinking of the past: “just help, even at the expense of yourself.” Incidentally, this thinking also countermanded the principle enunciated by the Obasanjo MFAs that a constructive and beneficial concentrism would now underlie Nigeria’s African policy. The decision to accept Taylor was also against popular opinion, while in fact the government did not consult the legislature or civil-society before agreeing to the step. It was even a move that could earn Nigeria western hostility once again since the United States was determined to punish Taylor. But why was Taylor’s asylum in Nigeria so controversial?
Apart from the over 300, 000 Liberians that were killed, and the more than 3 million persons displaced both internally and externally many of whom had been refugees in Nigeria, with hundreds of thousands others maimed or raped and an economy ruined to rubbles all because of Taylor’s war, Nigerians were from the beginning of the crisis in 1989 the major victims of Taylor’s attacks. He saw Nigeria’s intervention in the Liberian conflict as a side-taking with the sole aim to help Samuel Doe keep his power. This was running diametrically opposed to Taylor’s ambition to seize power, and as such specifically carried the war to Nigeria, either as members of the ECOMOG force, journalists, residents, embassy staff, et cetera, killing, maiming and abducting hundreds of Nigerian citizens. Besides these killings and maiming, he orchestrated anti-Nigerian emotions as a rebel, Vice-President, later as a rebel again and subsequently as President (Adedigba, 2003). Taylor had even sponsored the Foday Sankoh RUF/SL rebellion which led to the deaths of tens of thousands in another theater of war because of Sierra Leone’s tacit backing of the Nigeria-led ECOMOG ‘invasion” of Liberia (Adebajo, 2008). Taylor had made it very clear that he was an enemy of Nigeria and as such it became unexpected that the Nigeria authorities would volunteer to grant him political refuge. He agreed to quit power which he did in August 2003 under international pressure and took exile in Nigeria. Wanted by the UN-backed Special Court in Sierra Leone that charged him a 17 count charge of war crimes, including supplying arms to the ferocious rebels in return for diamonds.
Taylor’s welcome in Nigeria and VIP treatment in sedate and beautiful Calabar hurt the Nigerian people, particularly families of the civilians, journalists and soldiers whom Taylor had gruesomely murdered. It was considered a slap on Nigerians and an emotional torture: a measure that most foreign policy analysts have considered a big goof in foreign diplomacy (IRIN, 2006). Developed countries usually consider such issues as very serious foreign policy matters. For instance, in September 2009 when the government of Libya gave a heroic welcome to their freed citizen suspected to have been involved in the terrorist bombing o the 1991 flight over Lockerbie killing over 250 people on board in which over 100 passengers were Americans, the US President Obama condemned it in strong terms, which translated to a shaky US-Libya relations again. Indeed, the whole essence of the American war in Afghanistan and Iraq was because terrorists entered the US in 2001 and killed their citizens. Taylor’s head was even desperately sought by the US because of among other things, his atrocities against American people and interests in the region and his escape from prison custody in the US many years back.
The fact the Nigeria was now providing accommodation for someone who had tormented Nigeria for about fourteen years fell short of expectations. The international embarrassment of this Nigerian role conflict was worsened by Taylor’s sudden disappearance from his palatial ocean-front home in Calabar. This was after President Obasanjo, conceding to western pressure and Liberian government’s request to turn Taylor in for trials, had declared on March 25 2006 that Liberia was free to take Taylor. Obasanjo had earlier promised that Nigeria would hand Taylor over to Liberia on the request of an elected Liberian President. Johnson-Sirleaf took office in January 2006 as Liberia’s first elected President after 14 years of on-off civil war. Taylor’s disappearance vindicated popular criticism which had held that Mr. Taylor was a security risk to Nigeria and that he did not deserve the excessive honour the country was according him nor would he be grateful for it. Taylor had been found along Gamboru-Ngala border town with Cameroon in far-away Borno State in a Range Rover jeep with diplomatic corps number plates, and plenty of US dollar bills, sneaking through immigration points until the customs checkpoint stopped and searched the jeep to discover that it was Taylor. He was trying to escape out of the country with the aid of Nigerian security personnel (BBC News, 2006). Subsequently, Nigeria captured him and packaged him off to Monrovia following an order by President Obasanjo.
The foreign policy behaviour in the Taylor and Bakassi incidents were role blunders by the Nigerian government of Obasanjo. A third act was the deployment of Nigerian troops to Equatorial Guinea to help avert a possible international conspiracy to topple African government in Malabo. The same Equatorial Guinea had dared Nigeria many times in the latter’s territorial waters, harassing, capturing and sometimes killing Nigerian soldiers and civilians. These acts were the peak of a long history of the neighbour’s hostility towards Nigerians. On the eve of the Nigerian intervention, the security forces of Equatorial Guinea had commenced a sweeping arrest and expulsion of hundreds of illegal immigrants most of whom were Nigerians, and some of whom sought refuge in Nigeria’s embassy at Malabo to escape the police torment. Nigeria sent a warship on March 15 2004 to patrol off the coast of Equatorial Guinea amid allegations that foreign mercenaries were seeking to overthrow the government. The ship was deployed from Calabar to patrol Bioko, the country’s main offshore island and Malabo, the capital. The Equatorial Guinean government had not solicited this assistance (War. wire, 2004). The Federal Government had explained the intervention away this way:
It’s just to register Nigeria’s place as a peacemaking country, a country that delights in peace and tranquillity, not only for itself but for its neighbours. Equatorial Guinea remains a close ally of Nigeria…If there is a threat to peace anywhere, there’s a threat to peace in Nigeria, and there’s a threat to peace in West Africa (Oyo, 2004: 1).
Thus, the Equatorial Guinea issue, the Taylor and the Bakassi moves were over-exaggerated Pan-Africanist stance which undermined the principle of nationalism and worked against the so called constructive concentrism of the Obasanjo era.
There was however a few other roles Nigeria played in Africa that constituted assumption of conceived roles by the Obasanjo administration. These included the Sudan (Darfur) conflict, Congo-Rwanda crisis, Congo DR conflict, and the Togo crisis; and its handling of certain security issues with immediate neighbours. Nine years earlier Nigeria and the Organization of African Unity (AU) had stood by as genocide in the tiny African country of Rwanda claimed close to a million lives. The Darfur crisis presented another opportunity for Nigeria to prove its leadership in peacekeeping beyond regional level. It also offered a test of Africa’s promise to begin policing its own conflicts. The Darfur crisis which started in 2003 was a product of a long history of inter-racial but intra-African conflict in Sudan which had started as far back as 1956. The Arab minority who were mainly Moslems and the black majority had always been having deep-seated ethnic animosity towards each other that had become politicized as the Government of Sudan (GOS) seemed to be indecisive in curbing the problem and had even allowed a rebel group of the Arab stock, the Janjaweed to embark on a spree of mass murder of the black ethnic stock in Darfur. This had attracted the African and global communities as a spectre of government-backed genocide as in Rwanda in 1994 seemed to be rearing its ugly head on the African soil yet again. There were other issues that made the Darfur crisis more complicated. These included the activities of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and another parallel rebel organization who seized the opportunity of the chaotic situation to unleash a religious cum ethnic agenda; and the cantankerous attitude of the GOS in rebuffing both AU and UN attempts to intervene and stop the genocide, a reaction that confirmed the international fears of government’s complicity in the crisis (Goering, 2004)
The Nigerian government began a peace process with a meeting in Abuja in August 2004 between the rebels from the western region of Darfur and the GOS. The Nigerian pacesetting efforts were as a result of the fact that President Obasanjo was then the serving Chairman of the new-look African Union. The AU which succeeded the OAU was launched in 2002 with a new power: the right to intervene militarily in African conflicts, a role it had exercised only once when a handful of troops were deployed in Burundi to keep the peace. At the meeting President Obasanjo proposed the deployment of AU peacekeeping forces to Darfur made up of 2,000 troops with most Nigeria contributing the lion share. This was strongly rejected by Khartoum. The rejection was informed by the apprehension in Sudanese quarters that the AU dominated and led by Sub-Saharan Africans might be prejudiced and take sides with the Christian blacks in western Darfur (Goering, 2004: 2).
The Darfur crisis attracted stronger response from the AU for a variety of reasons: first African leaders more committed to solving the continent’s problems were emerging, particularly Obasanjo of Nigeria and Mbeki of South Africa. According to Stremlau, this has been informed by the new thinking that “we can take care of ourselves” (Global Policy Forum, 2004). Second, the US and Europe were mounting pressure on African leaders to find quick resolution to the conflict in Sudan and provided support to that cause recognizing that conflict zones could become breeding grounds for terrorism. Third the Rwandan authorities’ crusade to stop genocide elsewhere resonated in AU’s proactive stance in Darfur. Lastly, the statistics of death estimated about 30,000 within a short period, rape, and the amount of destruction and incalculable loss on the side of the black Africans were alarming and called for immediate action to save the blacks from their Arab militias’ tormentors (Goering, 2004:2).
The AU under Nigeria’s Obasanjo leadership invented the AU standby peacekeeping force to move swiftly into conflict zones, first of its kind on the African scale which would debut in the Darfur crisis. This innovation is reminiscent of Nigeria’s concept of ECOMOG in the West African region in 1990, to assume a role of a rapid response squad in conflicts in the region, which ended up succeeding in arresting the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. The proposed AU force was to be made up of five brigades. However, the immediate force that would be raised before a more permanent force would emerge was constituted by Nigeria and Rwanda (Goering, 2004: 2). The Nigeria-led AU intervention force however faced a number of challenges in its Darfur campaigns. The intervention would cost 723 million dollars, military Hardware and other aid. These would cover the cost of six helicopter gunships, 116 armoured personnel carriers, 466 million dollars for a 7,700 strong force to cover the cost of salaries, feeding and shelter; other challenges included the escalating death toll with over 180,000 dying by 2005, 2 million people displaced, and the refusal of the GOS to allow AU operate. The AU however overcame some of these problems when international pressure made the Sudanese authorities to allow a joint UN/AU force to enter Sudan (Nigeria Direct, 2006b).
September 2006 was a particularly engaging one for Nigeria on the Sudanese conflict. President Obasanjo met Omar Bashir of Sudan in Abuja at the 7th Leon Sullivan Summit on September 17th to review the situation reiterating Nigeria’s commitment to seeing a restoration of peace in the Darfur region. Obasanjo had impressed it on the Sudanese President that there would be need to urgently implement the agreement that the GOS and the rebels had already reached in Abuja earlier in 2004 and 2005 (Nigeria Direct, 2006b; 1). At another meeting with a Special Envoy of President Bashir, General Bona Malwal who had come to deliver a special letter appreciating “Nigeria’s steadfast commitment to peace in Sudan”. Obasanjo also pledged that the other parties would be persuaded and pressurized to honour the peace agreement (Nigeria Direct, 2006c: 2).
Another trouble spot of Nigeria’s peacekeeping and conflict resolution-inclined foreign policy concern was the Democratic Republic of Congo. Beyond the election crisis in DR Congo were age-long political, economic and ethnic cleavages that had led to specters of fratricidal wars, led at one time or the other by Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila. Like Sierra Leone, diamond and gold had been a resource curse, with a struggle between government officials and ‘rebels’ (including sometimes itinerant gun-wielding fortune hunters) for the resources. The ethnic and political violence thus had deep-rooted economic undercurrents, which only manifested in electoral manipulations and outcomes, inter-ethnic fighting, and clashes between government forces and rebels. Another dimension of the DRC problem was in May/June 2004 with the dispute with neighboring Rwanda whose Hutu elements live in DRC. The Rwanda authorities led by Paul Kagame, a former Tutsi leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the genocide era, believed that the DRC was sheltering and supporting Hutu extremism in that country, which constituted a security threat to Rwanda. Kabila had earlier accused the smaller state of the Central Africa Great Lakes Region of backing a rebellion by renegade troops in the eastern Congolese town of Bukaru. Kabila had sent 10,000 loyal troops to crush the insurrection near the Rwandan border, a move denounced by Rwanda as hostile. But Kabila had considered the renegade insurgency as a blow to his government’s program of reconciling all parties that had been feuding in DRC for many years. Fighting around the mineral-rich Bukavu had led to the displacement of 85,000 people with fears that the conflict between both countries which had ended in 2003 with the loss of 3 million lives as a result of diseases and starvation might recur (Onuorah, 2004).
Following the continued hostilities between both states, Kagame sent his National Security Adviser to Nigeria to brief Obasanjo on the situation. On his way back from Lusaka, Zambia on June 20-21, Obasanjo stopped over in Kinshasa to meet with Kabila over the report from Kagame. From then, Obasanjo engaged in constant dialogue with both parties. President Obasanjo’s approach was similar to how he handled the Ivorian situation, by creating a semi-formal interpersonal platform where the disputing parties within DRC, and between Presidents Kagame and Kabila, would sit to discuss their grievances. In Abuja, the three parties signed a statement declaring their recommitment to the Joint Verification Mechanism to see to the end of hostilities. The two Presidents with Obasanjo as the mediator also reiterated their commitment to the Pretoria Agreement. The Pretoria Agreement had spelt out the modalities for the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, rehabilitation of ex-combatants in both countries (Onuorah, 2004: 2).
The Togo crisis was another test of Obasanjo administration’s African role conceptions. The April 24 2005 elections created a lot of political furore that landed the tiny West African country in a protracted violence that nearly tore the nation apart. The election of Faure Gnassingbe Eyadema, scion of the late Togolese Life-President was riddled with controversies centring on massive rigging. As claims were that the elections were not representative of the people’s decision, the opposition refused to recognize Eyadema, began constant protests that ended up in a protracted civil unrest in which 30 people were killed in the first instance, as even the main opposition Dr. Bob Akitani declared himself President. The ECOWAS was also accused by the Coalition of Opposition parties of contributing to the crisis by supporting Eyadema and quickly accepting the election verdict and recognizing Eyadema as the President. The West African leaders were accused of asking Eyadema to only step aside while a transition was going on instead of compelling him to relinquish the power handed over to him by his late father for the sake of fairness. The Coalition had also acknowledged the role of the ethnic army created by his father to return him to power (The Guardian, 2005).
The Togo crisis had thus become problematic as the body that was supposed to provide a platform for resolution had already been indicted. This was the situation until the African Union under the leadership of Obasanjo called a one-day summit to resolve the Togo political crisis. The ECOWAS plan to be present made the Coalition to threaten a boycott of the Abuja summit. The Coalition spokesman had said:
The coalition plans to travel to Abuja to participate in a meeting to which it has been invited by President Obasanjo-not to attend an ECOWAS summit. If upon our arrival, we note that it is an ECOWAS summit, we will take the necessary moves (The Guardian, 2005: 15).
The Obasanjo-chaired peace meeting advised Eyadema to create a broad-based government of unity in which the opposition was to be incorporated (The Vanguard, 2005: 39; The Guardian, 2005:15). The meeting was attended by Faure Eyadema, members of the opposition, African Union Commission Chairman, Alpha Omar Konare, and a few other African leaders.
The conflict resolution and peacekeeping role conceptions of the Obasanjo administration’s African policy were therefore effectively occupied. Most of the role conceptions earlier identified and discussed were unambiguous and clear; and many of those conceived roles as far as conflict management was concerned were performed, with a unique very traditional personalist style, the manner African village elders resolve conflict between two feuding adults or youngsters. Obasanjo performed so many other roles conceived during his tenure. He almost always had a clinical finishing to self-imposed and solicited continental assignments.
However, perceptions of Nigeria’s roles in Africa under Obasanjo differ. The Zimbabwean envoy in Nigeria, Mvunduura perceives Nigeria as possessing qualities as a continental leader, and was expected to occupy significant roles in the continent. The Zimbabwean High Commissioner to Nigeria recalls not only the roles Nigeria played in the 1970s and 1980s to liberate and stabilize Zimbabwe and ward off neo-imperialism in the country, but also perceives Nigeria as a country in whose hands lies the African destiny as demonstrated with little or no pressure by successive Nigerian regimes, but concludes that the country’s capacity dropped during the Obasanjo administration:
Zimbabwe viewed Nigeria as a brotherly country. We viewed Nigeria as one of Africa’s pillars. Nigeria takes a leading role in the continent. Nigeria is an important element in Africa. There is no country in Africa where you can miss a Nigerian. In terms of contributions and development Nigeria is one of the big countries in the continent However, Zimbabwe has two major reservations about Nigeria’s leading roles. First, is the fact that Nigeria joined other African and Commonwealth countries to expel Zimbabwe from the institution. This act was not considered as a leadership move because as head of the African Union (AU) at the time (2003), Nigeria was not expected to side with extra-African powers to victimize a fellow African country. Nigeria is like a gold fish that has no hiding place, because of its roles and activities in Africa. We held Nigeria’s roles in high esteem and remember, and this was why Mugabe and Museveni of Uganda had come to Abuja in 1997 to save the life of and release Obasanjo. But things suddenly went sour under Obasanjo (Mvunduura, oral interview, 2009).
However, the role performance of Nigeria by Obasanjo is perceived by Botswana as secondary after South Africa in African leadership; and like Zimbabwe and Ghana, the country posits that what Nigeria needs to regain its first position is an internal reorganization that would include “good democratic culture, an entrenched culture of the rule of law, free and fair elections, protection of minority rights, regular supply of electricity, taking ICT to all nooks and crannies of the country, etc., by which Nigeria can then call herself the giant of Africa” (Luke, 2009). He continued:
Look at South Africa, they have good infrastructures, roads, rail, protection of minorities, protection of human rights, good political system, free and fair elections, a strong process of industrialization and their activities in the world are highly recognized. That is the giant. These are the necessary ingredients Nigeria needs to become the giant (Luke, oral interview, 2009).
Botswana however believed that in another context, Nigeria’s role conceptions and performance in Africa during the eight-year reign of Obasanjo were desirable based on its geographical advantages, including rich natural resources and population size, which Nigeria has maximally used to better the lot of other nations in Africa. Its military with which it rather provided security, protection and liberty for many states, including Southern African states, engendered a situation in which Nigeria was able to translate its potentials to reality; but to be like South Africa or even be better, Nigeria would need to have a foreign policy that begins from the domestic plane. This again is in agreement with Bach (2007), (Mvundura, 2009), and Nuhu (2009), that a diplomacy, which would entrench internal democracy, the rule of law, genuine fight against corruption, a firm establishment of strong pillars of economic development, is what Nigeria requires to re-launch itself to African and global reckoning.
All in all, Nigeria’s active contribution-in collaboration with South Africa in almost all cases- to the restructuring and formation of the AU, formation of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and the creation of an in-built self-appraisal mechanism for governance called the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). These were the hallmarks of Nigerian power and African diplomacy, which has prompted Mazrui in his A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa to conclude that the continent’s post-colonial history has been shaped by the two powers. The study would now examine the exceptional diplomatic exploits and role assumptions by Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.
6.7. Nigeria’s Roles in AU, NEPAD, and APRM
The most significant of the external contexts of President Obasanjo’s foreign policy was his African diplomacy. It is pertinent to note that the trends in global socio-economic and political development, the happenings in West Africa and the entire African continent, the expectations of some African leaders, and Obasanjo’s own perceptions and perspectives of Africa, all combined to shape both the role conceptions and roles Nigeria played in Africa between 1999 and 2007. This section therefore further examines the realization or manifestations of the special roles Nigeria assumed within the period.
Nigeria’s African diplomacy from 1999 to 2007 was unprecedented. Four reasons may have accounted for this: Obasanjo’s awesome personality in Africa and the world, the President’s aggressive and personalist style of pursuing foreign policy objectives, experience in African diplomacy during and after office since 1979, and his old-school orientation that it is Nigeria’s “manifest destiny” to lead Africa.
A firm statement of intention and readiness of the Obasanjo administration to assume significant roles in the continent was made when the government created for the first time a separate Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa with a cabinet rank minister in charge. This was first with the view to pursuing inherited commitments to the development and economic integration of the continent through the African Economic Community whose treaty was signed in Abuja in 1991. Nigeria’s initiative in the adoption of a regional Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security whose protocol was signed in Lome on December 10 1999, was central in the repositioning of ECOWAS to a body whose major focus would be to engender an integrated economy like the European Union (Nwoke, 2005).
The repositioning of the ECOWAS was closely followed by the proposition for the repositioning of the OAU, with Nigeria playing a key role. The journey towards the AU began long before the Sirte Conference of African States (SCAS) that was hosted by Libya. However, it was at the Sirte Conference that proposed Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi proposed the “African Union”. Gaddafi’s isolationist posture from the 1970s had changed into fortunes of international openness and gradual acceptability. African and Arab leaders who had distrusted Gaddafi for his eccentricity and dissent to universal standards or rules of international diplomatic engagement began to relate with Libya as the leader changed his foreign policy stance from that of dissention to conformity. This acceptance made Gaddafi to become more involved in Sub-Saharan African matters and to seek greater national roles in African affairs (Adetula, 2005). In August 1999, Gaddafi stressed peace and development, and infrastructure that would link Sub-Saharan Africa with the rest of the northern African countries. He also proposed the creation of an African Development Bank and a single currency for the continent in the future, which were all preparatory to his future proposition of a United States of Africa (USA) (ibid). In the proposed African Union, Gaddafi was to have political institutions as Presidency and Parliament, effect the elimination of state boundaries and sovereignty. Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt were not in full support of this kind of African Union arrangement. The Nigerian support for Gaddafi’s African Union was marginal. If not for the historical functionalist approach of Nigeria to African relations, the African Union proposed by Libya would not have got any support from Nigeria. Put differently, while the idea of an African Union was welcome to Nigeria because it wanted a refocused OAU, it did not trust Libya’s intentions and suspected that it might be Gaddafi’s power politics to use Libyan wealth to buy over poorer African countries to its side in a grand quest to become the African power. Nigeria’s distrust for Libya was based on succession of acts. Nigeria had viewed with suspicion Gaddafi’s OAU ten year-dues buy-back for some West African member-states, offsetting of 17 million dollar expenses for the 2001 OAU meeting, 1 million dollar and Cherokee Jeeps donation to Zimbabwe in 2002, 360 million dollar oil deals with Zimbabwe and similar deals with Ghana to end their shortfalls, and grants to Togo and Burkina Faso (Adetula, 2005: 172). This thinking that Gaddafi was rather playing pranks to upstage other nations than genuinely committed to African development had characterized Nigeria’s diplomacy when it sternly warned Libya to stay off the attempt to annex part of Chad in the 1980s, and when it meddled in the Liberian crisis in the 1990s.
It would be recalled Nigeria had opposed Ghana under Nkrumah in a similar manner in the 1960s when Nkrumah had proposed a radical approach to African unity. Balewa had called the bluff of Ghana saying that Nigeria would not need to join other nations in any organization, but that Nigeria would prefer a pragmatic process to unity while whoever wished to join Nigeria could do so. In the 2000s, Nigeria’s opposition to Libya’s African Union was as a result of certain basic principles which were still not different from the Balewa era: pragmatism and caution. Obasanjo’s own conception or vision of an African Union was described:
Africa’s integration arrangement must focus primarily on trade promotion through trade liberalization schemes based on the creation of Free Trade Area (Obasanjo, 2001:4).
As Nigeria commands respect in the ECOWAS zone, so did South Africa among the member-states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Due to this two-power situation, which was also characterized by mutual understanding, friendship and mutually shared dreams of Africa’s development, Nigeria and South Africa closed ranks to harmonize their common visions of African Union and upstage Gaddafi’s rather political union that would have one sitting African President (Adetula, 2005: 175).
The Nigeria-South Africa model of African Union was thus European Union (EU), which enhances functional integration emphasizes economic unification. Gaddafi’s model was thus only modified and not disposed of, as rather his political engraftments were adapted to economic contexts to suit current global challenges. Thus, on July 12 2001, thirty-six African states signed a draft treaty of the African Union (AU). The AU retained only the principles of non-interference and sovereignty of the OAU, while the objectives of the AU were more comprehensive and different. On July 9 2002 in Durban, South Africa, the OAU formally got dismantled and African nations met under the umbrella of AU with South Africa’s Mbeki becoming its first Chairman. However, Nigeria had gone a step further a step further in the continental union along this functionalist line. President Obasanjo in his address at the 19th anniversary of the SADC had asked for the integration of the two regional bodies ECOWAS and SADC as a step towards a unified African economic community. According to the Nigerian government, this would be one of the pragmatic ways to realize its continental objective of “cooperation in building and strengthening sub-regional capacities for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts” (The Washington Post, 1999).
Since co-founding the AU, Nigeria naturally occupied leadership role in the new organization. President Obasanjo emerged the AU Chairman in the 2004/05 year, and because of Nigeria’s unique military muscle, the Force Commander of the AU, Major-General Collins Ihekire was a Nigerian, and most of the peacekeepers in the AU force were from Nigeria while at a point the head of the UN/AU joint force in Darfur, General Agwai was also a Nigerian (Shoup, 2007). In terms of financial commitment, Nigeria contributed immensely to the organization, making an annual contribution of 24 million dollars. These huge bills were explained away by the Nigerian Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a measure of “investment Nigeria has made for the unity of Africa…it reinforces our country as a leader in Africa; it reinforces Nigeria’s capacity to actually advise in areas of conflict. It reinforces our negotiating hands…it places Nigeria in a situation where it can actually help other African countries who are not fortunate enough to help themselves” (cited in Josiah, The Punch, 2007).
NEPAD was another African initiative that had Nigeria’s President Obasanjo playing a prominent role both in its establishment and running. NEPAD had come before the AU. The 37th Summit of the OAU in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001 adopted a document setting out a new vision for the revival and development of the continent, which became known as the NEPAD. Indeed, the NEPAD had co-existed with the AU thinking. The NEPAD initiative was the brainchild of a tripartite brainstorming by Nigeria’s Obasanjo, South Africa’s Mbeki and Senegal’s Wade. Algeria’s Bouteflika and Egypt’s Mubarak were also part of the formative stages of the organization. NEPAD was a means by Nigeria to address at Africa’s socio-economic issues of Africa and having a wider look at the political development of the continent. NEPAD was thus an instrument of the foreign policy of the three countries to reach out to the continent in solving its problems internally. NEPAD thereby advocated the Africa Peer Review Mechanism to engender good governance, promotion of the rule of law and human rights, reduction of the dilemma of corruption, and democratization (NEPAD Annual Report, 2005). NEPAD has its pedigree in both original African and UN initiatives. The organization had been known as the New African Initiative (NAI). The Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 and the Final Act of Lagos of 1981 were effectively the early measures to end Africa’s perennial crises of poverty, economic underdevelopment, corruption, and political challenges that were undermining economic development. The failure of these early measures prompted the UN to invent other initiatives, including the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) of June 1986, UN New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UNNADA) in December 1990, and the UN Special Initiative on Africa’s Development (UNSIAD) in March 1996 (Olaniyan, 2004: 136). However, still in line with the belief by Obasanjo and Mbeki that solutions to Africa’s problems lie in Africans’ hands, the NEPAD idea came up in 2001.
A 60-page document of eight chapters containing NEPAD proposals was put forward to a 15- member state Implementation Committee which ratified it in October in Abuja, Nigeria. The new NEPAD got the acceptance of African leaders and indeed the international community due essentially to Obasanjo and the other founding fathers, Wade and Mbeki. The international community has accepted the initiative as a realistic framework for the promotion of sustainable economic growth and development, as well as for the eradication of poverty in the continent. The G-8, UN and EU have taken up NEPAD programs as the framework for cooperation for development in Africa (Olaniyan, 2004:134).
However, the organization had its own problems. Credibility problem set in as the two most important members of the organization, Nigeria and South Africa, gave implied support to the Zimbabwean Mugabe who had allegedly rigged elections to remain in power, which had resulted in widespread violence and human rights violations on the path of government. The refusal of Nigeria and South Africa to censure the deviant in their midst was considered as African solidarity in the face of western opposition to the election outcome and Mugabe’s policies, particularly his land reforms. The political issues had revolved around Mugabe’s attempts to hang on to power at all cost. In the exercise of this objective he tried to amend the constitution, an attempt that failed as referendum that was conducted showed the unpopularity of this move among Zimbabweans. His land distribution policies also targeted the white farmers whose lands and properties were confiscated. The land policy was vehemently opposed by western nations, with the Zimbabwe-Britain relations becoming critical. But for the intervention of Nigeria which unilaterally mediated between Britain and Zimbabwe, and which also joined South Africa in prevailing on the Commonwealth, Zimbabwe would have been sanctioned and suspended respectively. Nigeria, South Africa and Australia had even constituted a committee to determine the extent of Mugabe’s intransigence and recommend to the Commonwealth. In a two-against-one vote, the committee recommended a no suspension action positing that Mugabe deserved and sympathetic treatment to help it resolve its intractable political crisis, a position that was considered a solidarity act for a fellow African leader. The expression of the west’s disappointment with the African leaders was evident in the decision by the G-8 to pledge a financial support to the NEPAD of only 6 billion dollars when the required yearly sum earlier presented by NEPAD leaders was 64 billion dollars (Fawole, 2004: 47). Nigeria remained committed all the same, and it was Obasanjo, an important member of the NEPAD Steering Committee, that had come out to declare that the amount promised by the G-8 may not be encouraging, but that it was only the beginning. If there was anything the unilateral and multilateral approaches to solving the Zimbabwean problem and shouldering of responsibilities in AU and NEPAD offered for Nigeria, it was continental and global visibility once again, with a firm return to Commonwealth reckoning which it hosted and chaired in 2003, and relevance again in the G-77 which it chaired in 2000 and the Non-Aligned Movement.
The APRM was a product of NEPAD. Indeed, the APRM was one of the major instruments by which the objectives of good governance, rule of law, democratization, poverty reduction, economic development of NEPAD could be realized. At a brainstorming summit in Algeria on March 21st 2007 where African leaders from Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Egypt, and Algeria had met to decide on the integration of NEPAD into the institutional framework of the AU, the APRM was considered so central to the NEPAD initiative that even while NEPAD was being integrated, the summit clearly stated in their recommendations that the “APRM is to pursue its mission independently from the African Union” (NEPAD Report, 2007). In July 2002, a year after the formation of the NEPAD, the Durban AU Summit supplemented NEPAD with a Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance. The Declaration affirmed that states participating in NEPAD ‘believe in just, honest, transparent, accountable and participatory government and probity in public life”, and that the states would undertake to work with renewed determination to enforce the rule of law, individual and collective freedoms, the right to participate in free, credible and democratic political processes, and the adherence to the separation of powers, including protection for the independence of the judiciary and effectiveness of parliaments (NEPAD Report, 2003).
The Declaration also committed participating states to establish an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to promote adherence to and fulfilment of its commitments. The Durban Summit adopted a document setting out the stages of peer review and the principles by which the APRM should operate. In March 2003, the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee meeting in Abuja, Nigeria adopted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the APRM, which effectively operated as a treaty taking effect immediately. Countries not acceding to the document were not subject to review. The March 2003 meeting also adopted a set of objectives, standards, criteria and indicators for the APRM; agreed to establish a Secretariat for the APRM; and the appointment of a seven-man Panel of Eminent Persons” to oversee the conduct of the APRM process and ensure its integrity (NEPAD Report, 2003).
The APRM was therefore a mutually agreed instrument voluntarily acceded to by the member states of the AU as a self-monitoring mechanism. The mandate was thus essentially to encourage conformity in regard to political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards among African countries and the objectives in socio-economic development within the NEPAD. Nigeria’s role in the APRM initiative is appreciated from the perspective of its role in the formation and functioning of the NEPAD. The African Leadership Forum in Ota, Nigeria owned by President Obasanjo had before and after the creation of the APRM been a hub of intellectual discourse among African scholars and leaders on the conceptual and theoretical discourse, and even appraisal of the APRM initiative. The President had personally chaired many conferences and workshops on both NEPAD and APRM themes, from where ideas were generated for policymaking at the levels of both AU and APRM member-states. It is pertinent to note that Nigeria and South Africa that midwifed the APRM in 2003 with the exception of Algeria, did not sign the MOU in same year. Nigeria and South Africa did sign the MOU in 2004. Nigeria and South Africa had had a face-off over whether the political issues such as good governance should be one of the briefs for peer review. Mbeki had believed that the AU should have the sole right to handle the political aspect of national life in Africa. But Obasanjo had led the opposition to this, contending that good governance not only encapsulates the entirety of the objectives of the APRM, but that the AU leaders would not be objective in their assessment and may even politicize the whole exercise (Eyinla, 2004:. This had made Mbeki to shift ground and come over to the Nigerian side, culminating in their membership same year in 2004.
A third initiative which had Nigeria’s active involvement was the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Program (MAP). MAP had come earlier than NEPAD and APRM. The origins of the MAP can be traced to the mandate given to South Africa’s Mbeki of the NAM and Algeria’s Bouteflika, OAU Chairman, during the September 1999 OAU Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya, to engage Africa’s creditors in debt cancellation talks and persuasions. Nigeria’s President Obasanjo who had just been elected as G-77 (Group of Developing Countries) Chairman also presented the African debt overhang issue before the G-8 (Group of Developed Countries) and the Breton Woods institutions with the persuasion to cancel Africa’s external debts. The efforts of the three Presidents received the endorsement of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in July 2000 in Togo. It was in Lome, Togo that Bouteflika, Mbeki and Obasanjo were jointly mandated by the OAU to engage African development partners in the developing of a constructive partnership for the regeneration of the continent. In September 2000, after their tripartite presentation of the African agenda at the Okinawa, Japan G-8 Summit, a six-man Steering Committee charged with the task of developing and fine-tuning the concept paper by Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika, was inaugurated. It was the Committee that produced the policy framework document for the MAP (Eyinla, 2004:163).
There was a growing disquiet from the Francophone quarters that the MAP did not represent their interest as such. Hence, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal came up with a parallel to MAP called the Omega Plan for Africa. This Francophone-Anglophone dichotomy was not considered to be in the interest of the continent. Hence the March 2001 Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya harnessed the presentations of Obasanjo on MAP and Wade on Omega Plan and recommended that a merger of the two be made with the existing New Global Compact Plan for Africa’s Renewal of UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The Assembly thus set up a 9-man Steering Committee which included the consistent “Africa Big Five”, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Senegal, which had their inaugural meeting in Abuja, Nigeria from June 2-4 2001. After several other processes and meetings, an integration of the MAP, Omega Plan and UN Compact Plan was made, which resulted in an integrated document known as A New Africa Initiative: Merger of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program and the Omega Plan, to be known as the New Africa Initiative (NAI) for short (Eyinla, 2004: 164-165). The OAU Summit of July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia adopted it, and it was at the meeting of the Implementation Committee meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in October 2001 that the NAI was rechristened NEPAD. Logically therefore, NEPAD was midwifed in Nigeria, which was a diplomatic feat for Obasanjo’s administration’s African diplomacy.
6.8. Overview of Nigeria’s Role Conceptions (1985-2007)
The analysis below is the compilation of the author culminating from data gotten from the speeches and addresses of political leaders, policy makers, reports of other research works, and newspaper reports from which the foreign policy role conceptions and Nigeria’s diplomacy in Africa were sifted. The evaluation, resulting in ranking and qualification of each leader’s strengths and weaknesses, focus and orientations are thus the conclusions of the author from the variety of sources of data after deep reflection; and a summation of the foregoing analysis in chapters five and six.
Table 9: Summary of Nigeria’s National Role Conceptions from 1985-2007
|Political Leadership |Babangida Admin |Abacha Admin |Abubakar Admin |Obasanjo Admin |
| |1985-1993 |1993-1999 | | |
|No. of FP-NRC Speeches |12 |19 |3 |24 |
|Sampled | | | | |
|Clarity of NRCs |Good |Good |Good |Very Good |
|Perception of Nigeria (Role |Continental/Regional power |Regional power/Pariah |Pariah State |Continental/Regional |
|Profile Status) | |State Globally | |power |
|Motivational Orientation(s) |Nigeria as Hegemon |Nigeria as Hegemon |Nigeria as Pacifier |Nigeria as |
| | | | |Hegemon-Pacifier |
|Substantive Problem Area(s) |Regional Security/ Economic |Regional Security |Internal |Continental Security/Good|
| |Diplomacy | |Restructuring/S/Leone |Governance in |
| | | |Crisis |Africa/Global Relevance |
|Instrument of Policy |Technical & Economic |Military Instrument/ |Vague Instrument of Policy | Diplomacy (Shuttle, |
| |Cooperation/Assistance |Sometimes Vague | |Summit & Individualist |
| | | | |Diplomacy) |
|Role Performance |Significant |Significant |Significant |Very Significant |
|Constraints to Performance |Image Problem |Image Problem/Isolation |Domestic Crisis/Debt |Internal Strifes/Debt |
| | | |Overhang |Overhang |
Source: Author’s compilation
Table 9 above shows that all the four administrations had similarity of perspectives of what Nigeria should be in the region and continent. From Babangida to Obasanjo, the role conceptions were clear, and the perception of Nigeria as a “power” and a “hegemon” is a common thread, except for the Abdusalami era which inherited the global ostracism that Nigeria went through under Abacha as a result of gross human rights abuses at home. The perception of ‘regional power” and “hegemon” was a clear departure from the past when Nigerian leaders rather perceived their nation as a “leader”. The new perception of power and motivational orientation as hegemon sounded more like an imperialist with a new agenda to foist a Pax Nigeriana on the continent. This may explain the new suspicion and apprehension of Nigeria’s intentions when being “nice” in the continent.
Also, the role conceptions of all the leaders may be clear; however many of them tended to be repetitious of old national roles conceived by predecessors, like it was the case of General Abacha who kept on reiterating to “continue” what was already known to be Nigeria’s traditional roles. Another problem was that the roadmap or instrument for performing the role was vague in many cases. Except for Babangida whose strategy for occupying perceived roles was mainly by technical and financial aid to needy African nations, and Obasanjo’s instruments of shuttle and personal diplomacy; the techniques of Abacha and Abdusalami were vague. At some points, Abacha provided military aid to stop the war in Sierra Leone, and Abdusalami tried to help Sierra Leone’s democratic process; however both instruments were mere happenstance and not clearly the roadmaps to actualize their role conceptions.
Among four administrations from 1985 to 2007, the Obasanjo administration stood out in terms of concrete African roles and foreign policy dynamism. The Babangida regime followed, while the Abacha regime, despite its clear role conceptions, comes last even after Abdusalami’s whose regime barely had time for African politics, because of its many internal and external problems.
Nigeria’s African role conceptions under Obasanjo were not only very clear; they were also effectively and enthusiastically assumed by the country. These roles made Nigeria to fully reintegrate itself in the global community, restore its position in global reckoning and regain its prominent position in African leadership. Apart from occupying important positions in the world, continental and regional bodies, most initiatives were either berthed in Abuja or Lagos, or all-crucial meetings for Africa’s rebirth were held in Nigeria. These Nigeria’s roles prompted African countries to honour it with the joint-hosting of the Confederation of African Football (CAF) Cup of African Nations with Ghana in 2000, and the hosting of the All-Africa Games (COJA) in 2003.
There was however no doubt that at this stage of Africa’s political transition, South Africa had emerged as a force in Africa; and other African states such as Algeria, Libya, Ghana and Egypt had also redefined their national roles in Africa as well. Hence, it was no longer business as usual as was the case in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s when Nigeria almost always, had the exclusive task of meeting all Africa’s security and economic needs. The 1990s were not the best of time in Nigeria’s historical development. Domestic corruption, poor economic policies, bad leadership leading to steady backwardness, and tyranny had weakened its foreign policy posture, and the capacity, integrity and reputation to sustain its continental roles and respect. It probably re-emerged as a continental power in 1999 to meet other powers and ambitious powers with whom it must share roles. No wonder, Nigeria may have had upper hand in most of the actions taken in the interest of Africa and in continental development efforts, probably because of its pedigree in constructive contribution in African affairs, and more probably because of Obasanjo’s wealth of diplomatic experience, imposing stature, goodwill and respect; it shared almost all the roles with other emerging African powers. No wonder too that Ali Mazrui (2006), echoing Eyinla (2004: 162) has said that the 2000s was rather a tale of two “Africas”, with Nigeria and South Africa sharing hegemonic influence.
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Chapter Seven:
Summary, Recommendation and Conclusion
This chapter is a convergence of the explorations from chapter one to chapter six in a summary. From the findings enunciated, it makes policy recommendations and concludes, making suggestions for future research.
7.1. Summary
The preoccupation of this study has been to examine the Nigeria’s African role conceptions and assumption from 1985-2007. Divided into seven chapters including this one, the study has adopted the national role theory as a framework for analysis because it is considered the most appropriate instrument to estimate the political behaviour of a state, as it ascribes a sociable and human character to the state and its actions in the international system.
7.1.1. Summary of Findings
This study had asked a number of questions relating to the clarity and politics of national role conceptions, and the politics and differences in the assumption of such roles in Africa by successive administrations in Nigeria between 1985 and 2007. In the course of the investigation and analysis of the findings, it was found that national roles are discernible in Nigeria’s African policy of the Babangida, Abacha, Abdulsalami, and Obasanjo administrations. What was lacking in the Abacha and Abdulsalami regimes however, were clearly defined or vague techniques or instruments of policy to fill the roles. Abacha and Abdulsalami simply responded to stimuli by involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict as their rhetorics about what they wanted to do in the region were not backed up by concrete action plan. Second, in terms of role conception, all administrations (military and civilian) were not different in who does the conception. The foreign policy terrain was very undemocratic as the chief executive and their political group (kitchen cabinet or military junta) called the shots and most times circumvented constitutionally recognized institutions and individuals decision units. Also, one of the known basic elements of the role theory, the expectations of the public, was almost always disregarded. It was only the other two elements namely the perceptions and the interpretations of the political leadership that counted. The third and fourth questions were also answered: there were differences between conception and assumption in most cases as there were limiting factors in occupying conceived roles, such as the dwindling popularity of the Babangida regime after failed political transition programs; Abacha’s infamy because of gross abuse of human rights; and Abdulsalami’s albatross of a pariah state; and Obasanjo’s multiple socio-political problems at home. Other factors in the disparity between conception and performance of roles were international reactions such as the apprehension of Nigeria’s real intents in regional helps, like when Ivory Coast initially rejected the Obasanjo offer to assist in arresting the civil crisis in that country in 2001.
The study also made tentative statements with a deliberate negative denotation, in an attempt to rigorously investigate and establish the actual situation in regard to Nigeria’s role conception and performance towards the African continent. Clarity of national roles seemed to be evident in all the regimes’ African policies; but there were weakening factors in the strategies or instruments of policy. All the military and civilian administrations had hierarchy in which orders and government functions flowed, and the chief executive (including the so called democratic leadership) and their cabal controlled the foreign policy process, and sometimes abused such powers. There were differences in conception and performance informed by problems at home and external reactions to certain Nigerian role assumption.
One pertinent denominator of Nigeria’s role conceptions and assumptions in Africa-whether by those with clear strategy or roadmap such as Obasanjo’s and Babangida’s, or those who reacted spontaneously like Abacha and Abdulsalami- is role strain. Nigeria has constituted itself into a bellwether of African troubles, scaling up its roles all the time and struggling hard in the 2000s up to 2007 to stay relevant in the face of challenges for African leadership by other emerging African politico-economic powers as South Africa, Egypt, Libya, and Ghana. These have led to strains and stresses that the nation has not overcome. These have also overstretched its resources, which partly account for economic disincentives at home and agitations in places like the Niger Delta for what is regarded as government’s insensitivity to the problems of the home-front.
7.2. Conclusion
A study of the politics of national role conceptions in Nigeria has shown that a very small informal or semi-formal political group (the group within the group) conceives external roles of the country, take decisions, and formulate policies. The Federal Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Assembly, think-tanks, and research-based institutions that are supposed to be decision units in foreign policy formulation have rather been most times, consigned to the waste-bin of policymaking, or manipulated, coaxed, off-loaded, or simply used to rubber-stamp what are purely the ideals of an executive and his kitchen cabinet. The roles of these units in national role conceptions- military or democratic -have been very marginal; they are under-utilized sometimes divided or bought over, just for the executive to have their way.
In terms of the roles conceived and assumed, it has always been premised on the fact that Nigeria would always have a leadership role to play in Africa because whatever is in Africa’s interest is invariably in Nigeria’s interest. Under various Nigerian administrations-military and civilian-efforts have been made to toe such guidelines and policy constructs, sometimes more faithfully, at other times not. However, the nation has been at a discordant inflection point in its foreign policy. Nigeria’s Africa-centred policy has mostly been borne out of sympathy for the African situation, which it believes it could tackle with its enormous human and material resources, wealth and strong military. The implication of these would be that Nigeria’s role-driven approach in Africa is prompted by a genuine moral suasion.
If one is to join in the debate of the use of “hard” and “soft” power by states, which put differently, implies political realism and moral suasion respectively, where would Nigeria be placed? For instance, which form of power could Nigeria have used under military rule? Has Nigeria ever had capacity and a clear idea of the form of power it used at any time? In the foreign policy history of Nigeria, an American style and aspirations are discernible: regional protection, regional hegemony, global influence, active humanitarian policy, interventionism, conflict resolution: all self imposed burden of international leadership that costs fortunes and could be to the detriment of internal politics and economy. For America, the cases of Vietnam, Korea, and Iraq come to mind. For Nigeria, the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Namibia are readily remembered. The use of hard power was apparent in the case of America in those three places mentioned. But for Nigeria, it is difficult to place. Could Nigeria’s approach all through 1985 to 2007 or even before, then be another dimension of hard power: the “soft” use of hard power? These are important questions that require future research.
7.3. Recommendations
In view of the role strain of Nigeria in Africa, and the wrong prioritization of government placing Africa above national interests, a new direction becomes imperative. While it is a truism that an average Nigerian is proud to find their country playing important roles in global politics, they are more likely to be prouder when this is done after their own dignity is improved at home and abroad. This study recommends a policy shift from wasteful and unrewarding Afrocentrism to a “Nigeriacentrism”. This Nigeriacentrism would not imply the abandonment of leadership in Africa; it would mean the use of African leadership/national roles to better the interest of Nigerians, and attending to national issues first which is a more honourable thing to do in the face of competing domestic and external pressures. Thus, Nigeriacentrism would complement Nigeria’s traditional leadership in Africa and the principle of good neighbourliness, which in fact, implies that Nigeria is good to African neighbours only in so far as it serves the purpose of national (citizens’) interest.
The problem of Afrocentric policy is that it has been at a very huge cost, and at the expense of Nigerians’ happiness. Nigeriacentrism would imply a citizen-friendly foreign policy, more encompassing than the prototype “citizen-based diplomacy” of the Yaradua-Jonathan administration. Ojo Maduekwe’s articulation of citizen-based diplomacy is a narrow one that is not different from the well-known responsive or retaliatory reaction of old, or “diplomacy of consequence”, which is broken down to mean, “do unto others as you see them do unto you”. The diplomacy of consequence, according to many Nigerians, is sensible but not adequate. They advocate the diplomacy of human dignity. By such the main or primary concerns of every government would be the basic necessities of life. These would include potable water, modest housing for citizens, good and affordable educational opportunities, regular supply of electricity for luxury and economic development, motorable roads, prosperous economy, employment opportunities for all, provision of good roads, good health care delivery and reduction of poverty. The reasoning here is that if all these infrastructural facilities are available to the citizens, more Nigerians would return home, and less Nigerians would seek better life abroad, which would in turn make the “diplomacy of consequence” unnecessary. The reason why many Nigerians become victims of assault abroad is because they flee to other countries for greener pastures and become susceptible to the intimidation and molestation of their hosts who see them as competing with their limited or abundant national resources and opportunities. Therefore, for the advocates of the policy change, charity must begin at home.
Flowing from the above, the argument also goes that if the citizens are not individually assaulted but collectively done as a nation, with impunity, disregard or mockery; it is because there are fundamental problems with the nation for it to degenerate to an object of debauchery. The internal problems of corruption, sectarian violence, general insecurity, political instability and persistent electoral imperfections, poor infrastructural facilities, poor management and bad leadership: are sufficient to attract international disdain and jest. Incidentally, these symptoms show very battered internal components of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Once the domestic context is warped, the foreign platform is weakened, and it is then that external insults are hurled, and then that a diplomacy of consequence becomes necessary. However, with the domestic plane stable and good, the nation would be respectable and not be taken for granted.
The arguments above point to a need for a refocus from the vanguardist roles in Africa to responsible leadership roles at home. This means a change to citizen diplomacy that goes beyond the diplomacy of consequence. A broad concept and practice of citizen diplomacy in which the citizens are ennobled (as it is done in the American and European and many South East Asian countries), and as such they are proud and patriotic, just as the nations become naturally respected.
From the insight above, it can therefore be adduced that the wrong priorities and seeming unconcern for its citizens in foreign policy calculations may have been largely responsible for commitment to other African citizens’ wellbeing, which manifest in proactive roles conceived and performed by successive Nigerian rulers. For the Nigerian rulers, charity begins abroad, and this has conditioned role conceptions and foreign policy. For instance, while the electricity generating body could not provide and stabilize power supply, the nation generates and supplies electricity to a few neighbouring countries, including Benin, Burkina Faso and Ghana. The electoral crisis caused by the annulment of the June 12 elections deepened and created unresolved security problems at home, while the Babangida, Abacha, and Abdulsalami regimes performed stabilizing roles in Liberia and Sierra Leone to end the security problems and wars. The list is inexhaustive, of grand role conceptions and exceptional performance of Nigeria in near and far countries of Africa to restore government and establish good governance.
The problem is further compounded by the lack of popular participation in foreign policy making. It is a truism that there cannot be popular participation by way of physical presence of the populace in any public policy making process. However, there can be regard for popular opinions and increased representation of civil-society in the process. The other “decision units”, which have now occupied the fringes or margins of the society, often add a dramatic and dynamic twist to policymaking. This is what makes the American policymaking system thrive. The system in Nigeria is characterized by a closed approach, with a privileged few made of the Head of State’s friends, with policy decisions reached by a political mafia (the predominant political group) in an atmosphere of complete sacred and dreaded secrecy.
Consequently, Nigeriacentrism is long overdue. The Nigeria-centred foreign policy proposed here is such that would also regard Nigerian citizens as unofficial diplomats, and hence persons such as academics, writers, poets, musicians, movie stars, sports stars, et cetera whose integrity and global popularity could earn Nigeria international legitimacy, could be constantly used over international issues as it is done in the United States. The citizen foreign policy would also promote and take adequate advantage of democratic institutions such as the legislature, research institutions, universities, mass media, pressure and interest groups, and public opinion which are central to foreign policy making, that have unfortunately been much maligned by successive regimes.
This proposed foreign policy would resolve two critical deficiencies in Nigeria’s external relations since independence: first it would compel Nigeria to off-load its excess luggage of African commitment with the view of being seen as “the’’ or ‘‘a’’ giant of Africa while its citizens have nothing whatsoever to show for this; and second, it would allow for democratic participation in NRCs and foreign policy making as a wider spectrum of people through institutions as the National Assembly, mass media, interest groups, among others, pull more influence in the African policy, thus breaking the monopoly of the possibly selfish or technically bankrupt political elite. How can Nigerian citizens be more actively engaged and made to share equal responsibilities with statutory political groups in the politics of its external relations? This is a question for further study.
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PRIMARY SOURCES
Interviews
Adelusi, Olufemi Patrick (2009) Senior Lecturer and ECOWAS Consultant; Former Special Adviser to the Honourable Speaker of the Federal House of Representatives, Ghali Umar Na’abah (1999-2003); interviewed in his Department of Political Science/International Relations Covenant University, Ota office on October 15, 2009.
Ajibola, Simeon Sule (2009) Senator of the Federal Republic, and Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, interviewed in his Senate office in Abuja on August 24, 2009.
Akinyemi, Bolaji (2009) Professor, Former Nigerian Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs, Former Director-General NIIA, interviewed in his Ikeja-Lagos office on October 4, 2009.
Aminu, Jubril (2009) Professor and Senator of the Federal Republic; Current Chairman, Nigerian Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, interviewed in his Senate office on August 24, 2009.
Conteh, Al-Hassan (2009) Liberian Ambassador to Nigeria, Abuja, interviewed in his Abuja office on August 20, 2009.
Courtney, A. (2007) Program Assistant, United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Interview conducted on July 12, 2007 in her USAID World Headquarters office, Washington, D.C.
Luke, Harold C. (2009) Head of the Botswana Mission to Nigeria, Abuja, interviewed in his Abuja office on September 12, 2009.
Kerry, John (2007) Former US Democratic Presidential Candidate, Chairman, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Interview conducted on July 15, 2007 in his Capitol Hill Office, Washington, D.C.
Mvundura, John .S. (2009) Zimbabwean High Commissioner to Nigeria, Abuja, 65 years Old, interviewed in his Abuja office on September 15, 2009.
Ngalim, Aloysius (2007) Senior Lecturer and Fulbright Scholar at University of South Carolina, interviewed in his USC Columbia home on July 3, 2007.
Nuhu, Kofi Afresah I. (2009) Minister-Counsellor (Trade and Investment) Ghanaian High Commission to Nigeria, interviewed in his Abuja office on September 12, 2009.
Smith, Daniel (2008) Namibian High Commissioner to Nigeria, Abuja, interviewed in his Abuja office on December 2, 2009.
Sodangi, Abubakar. (2009) Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, interviewed in his office in Abuja on August 24, 2009.
Soremekun, Kayode (2009) Professor of International Relations, University of Lagos. Interview conducted on February 21, 2009 in his University Guest House Room.
Thomas, Dapo (2008) Lecturer and Former Special Adviser Policy and Programs to His Excellency, Governor of Lagos State, Senator Bola A. Tinubu, interviewed in his Department of Political Science Lagos State University office on September 13, 2008.
Umar, Salisu D. (2009) Honourable Clerk, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, interviewed in his office in Abuja on August 24, 2009.
Wilson, Joe (2007) US Congressman, Member, House Committee on International Relations. Interview conducted in his Capitol Hill Office on July 15, 2007.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Questions for One-on-One Interviews
A: Political Leaders/Policy Makers/Politicians
Lead Questions
1. Who should be making foreign policies?
2. Who should be conceiving national roles?
3. Do our leaders conceive or know anything about conception of roles in foreign policy making?
4. What actually goes on?
5. What are the factors that influence the conception of roles?
6. How can a nation assume conceived roles?
7. Are all roles compatible with national interest?
Follow-up Questions
1. Do Nigerian policy makers know that a country needs to identify and conceive national roles in foreign policy making?
2. Has Nigeria ever had role conceptions as it makes its African policy?
3. What would you regard as Nigeria’s African roles?
4. What goes on in policy makers’ minds when making African policy/what are your perceptions of Nigeria vis-à-vis other African nations when conceiving roles to play in the continent?
5. What are the bases for Nigeria’s Africa-centrepiece in its foreign policy?
6. What roles does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs play in foreign policy making and role conceptions?
7. What are the peculiar domestic yardsticks to still refer to Nigeria as giant of Africa?
8. Is Nigeria still Africa’s giant?
9. What concrete measures has Nigeria taken to fill its conceived roles?
10. How is foreign policy making under military rule in Nigeria?
11. What were the peculiarities under the civilian administration of President Obasanjo?
12. Describe national role conceptions and the foreign policy making process during your time.
13. Are there peculiar challenges in Nigeria’s national role conceptions?
14. Is the “conceptions’ corridors” politicized or problematic?
B: Diplomatic Community (African Nations’ Envoys in Nigeria)
1. Do you consider Nigeria relevant in African affairs?
2. Would you consider Nigeria as a giant of Africa/who is the giant now?
3. Do you trust Nigeria’s intentions in its Pan-Africanist activism?
4. What roles do you expect Nigeria to play in your country/Africa?
5. In what specific ways has Nigeria helped your country?
C: Research and Intellectual Community
1. Do you think foreign policy makers are driven by NRCs?
1. Describe the politics of foreign policy making.
2. Can you identify NRCs in Nigeria’s African policy?
3. Has there been any problem with assumption of conceived African roles?
APPENDIX B
Oral Interview Excerpts
Ajibola, Simeon, Senator of the Federal Republic and Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Q: Do you have a sneak view of the inner circle of the Executive branch in policymaking?
The President is assisted by a retinue of advisers and ministers who occupy key foreign and domestic policy positions. The Vice President, the Ministers and the Special Advisers in the Presidency make up the Cabinet. The Cabinet's role is to advise the President on any subject he may require relating to the duties of each member's respective office. This group occupies the role of helping the leader to fine-tune the policy proposals and ideas of the President. The relevant officers also advise him on foreign relations matters and their discussions on state matters and other issues help mould the President’s opinions or stimulate new foreign policy ideas. They sometimes also suggest or recommend certain policies. The President’s aides on foreign relations matters are particularly of importance in this regard.
Q: Who are the major actors in Foreign Policy making?
These include actors such as President, Foreign minister, ambassadors, and embassies, the press and the active business community are all involved in the process. A supposed vital actor in the policy process in democratic Nigeria is the National Assembly. The National Assembly is a bicameral legislature established under section 4 of the Nigerian Constitution and comprises a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. The body, modelled after the Federal Congress of the United States, is supposed to guarantee equal representation of the states irrespective of size in the Senate and proportional representation of population in the House. The National Assembly is located here in the federal capital, Abuja. The Assembly has broad oversight functions and is empowered to establish committees of its members to scrutinize bills and the conduct of government officials. The Senate also confirms the President's nomination of senior diplomats, members of the federal cabinet, federal judicial appointments and independent federal commissions. The National Assembly controls the national treasury as no money can be drawn for any foreign affairs matters without its approval. Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like other federal ministries would have to defend their budget before the legislature, in the case of the foreign ministry, before the Senate and House Committees on Foreign Relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs are supposed to be arenas for producing strategies for international exchanges. The Foreign Ministry has diplomatic missions with objectives of promoting and protect the interests of citizens abroad, and enhance Nigeria’s security and prosperity; provide efficient and effective consular and legal services; seek market access, trade and tourism; attract foreign investments and promote scientific, technological and cultural cooperation with other countries and institutions; promote fruitful political and economic relations with all countries especially neighbouring countries in the interest of peace, stability and development; play a positive and creative role in international organizations; and upgrade the Ministry’s human and institutional capacity for the efficient execution of foreign policy objectives.
Q: Has the National Assembly been able to hold out in public policy matters?
Since the restoration of democratic rule in 1999, the Assembly has been said to be going through a "learning process" that has witnessed the election and removal of several Presidents of the Senate, allegations of corruption, slow passage of private member bills and the creation of ineffective committees to satisfy numerous interests. The Presidency had the day-to-day responsibility for policymaking; the National Assembly is empowered to make laws for governing the country, while the federal ministries and parastatals that constituted the executive branch is to aid the Presidency in foreign policy making. However, this is what the constitution says, what happens outside it is another matter entirely. Obasanjo had developed a strong sense of individualism to policymaking, believing that a personal involvement in foreign affairs would guarantee a more effective foreign policy for Nigeria. Obasanjo’s personalist style manifested in summit diplomacy in which he, and not the Minister of Foreign Affairs, represented Nigeria. This summit diplomacy was informed by his pedigree while out of office. After national and military service, he had attended many international conferences, workshops and forums individually or as a representative of international organizations, notably UN, OAU, and Transparency International. Obasanjo had created a network of influential friends and world citizens with whom there had been syndicated discussions on good governance, democracy and leadership. The peak of Obasanjo’s preference for summit diplomacy was the establishment of the African Leadership Forum (ALF) in Ota, where professionals, intellectuals, African and world leaders had roundtables on perennial African and global challenges. This was what later probably informed his own part of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiatives. All of these were overwhelming so much that many people, and institutions including the National Assembly would just simply overlook what he is doing with the belief that he should know it all and know it best.
Q: What was different in foreign policy between Obasanjo and Abacha?
Abacha inherited a precarious external image problem, which was however not irreparable. The Abacha junta only needed to restore the stolen electoral mandate of the June 12 1993 presidential elections winner, and set the transition on course once again. But Abacha had a different agenda. This was demonstrated by the sack of the Shonekan government on November 17 1993 and the attempt to consolidate his power, which characterized the regime’s actions all through the period of reign, making it to be brutal, to violate human rights, and to even orchestrate a political program that had him being adopted by the five political parties as a consensus candidate, a development that a Nigerian elderstatesman Bola Ige once characterized as the “five fingers of a leprous hand”. These institutions did not seem to be effectively utilized or consulted. Moreover, Abacha soon turned out to be a maximum ruler that only gave out instructions to his ministers, including the MFA on what he or his Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) wanted. Abacha’s policies at home had become both locally unbearable and internationally unacceptable. Internally, there were a number of issues, including a stalemated political transition programme, continued detention of Abiola, phantom coup, poor human rights record, arbitrary trial and subsequent hanging of the nine leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the complete militarization of the state. Tom Ikimi’s emergence as MFA was a child of circumstance. His choice was ideal for a military ruler whose personal ambition would require a novice in foreign policy making. His utterances on the government position and refusal of amnesty to the Ogoni Nine at international forum such as the Commonwealth summit in Auckland in 1995, and interviews with the foreign media were hurtful and damaging. Ikimi was inexperienced and lacked diplomatic finesse required for a country with an ailing foreign image that needed image damage-control.
Interestingly, apart from Ambassador Adeniji, Obasanjo’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs were not as innovative or fantastic as Babangida’s, not because they were not smart enough, but because Obasanjo was his own ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs’ and tended to take ‘foreign affairs’ far away from the ministers’ domain. Those that were assertive like Lamido and Adeniji did not last too long in the cabinet; and two others had very brief spell- Okonjo-Iweala gaining appointment into the World Bank as a Vice President and Ogwu replaced shortly after Obasanjo exited office in 2007.
Q: What would you regard as Nigeria’s African roles?
These include seeking peace, stability, trade, to alleviate poverty, and also to put pressure on repressive government, to create good governance. These have been Nigeria’s African roles conceived by its leadership at various times.
Q: What goes on in policy makers’ mind when conceiving African roles?
It is basically to get the best for the country and to portray a big image in the international scene. In the Senate, when it comes to issues that relate to external affairs, we try to make sure the country has a larger share of the bargain when it comes to policies towards Africa. It is also to oppose the dependency theory that frowns against total dependence on foreign aid and as result of that we have to let go of a large amount of resources. We see every African country as an equal partner of the international body; hence we don’t conceive roles that are repugnant to the rule of fair diplomacy.
Q: What is the basis of Nigeria’s Africa-centrepiece foreign policy?
Nigeria’s Foreign policy is centred on peace and security, two things that are lacking in the continent. Nigeria’s foreign policy has been pursued consistently since 1960 within established parameters. The placing of Africa at the centre of Nigeria’s foreign policy and the pursuit of policies such as “economic diplomacy” by successive regimes demonstrate a level of continuity in the country’s foreign policy with the intent of making the continent enjoy relative security that guarantees Nigeria’s own smooth sail in African affairs..
Akinyemi, Bolaji (Professor) former University Lecturer, former Director-General of the NIIA, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Q: Could you let us know why IBB came to power in 1985?
IBB had on a number of occasions before his coming privately disagreed with his boss in the previous administration on a number of issues bordering on governance, and had tried to convince Buhari that the country had suffered enough image trouble. What was required at that point after many years of political and governance crisis was to earn the confidence of the external community that the military were not starting another episode of insensitive leadership. The issues of disagreement were multiple but they all boiled down to governance and the handling of the Nigerian political situation. IBB had a way of registering his strong protests in a mild and unassuming way, but his grouse was on his perceived arrogance and highhandedness of his former bosses. He felt they were not only insensitive to the concerns of Nigerians and the fears of the international community about dictatorship. He felt they were also very insensitive to the thinking and grievances of the military high command that was increasingly growing impatient and disgruntled.
Q: Sir, as a very experienced scholar and practitioner in the field spanning several decades, could you give us an insight into foreign policy making process?
The President’s aides on foreign relations matters are particularly of importance in this regard. The ministries and bodies of equal status as ministries assisting in the daily making of foreign policy include: Office of the Vice President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Foreign Service, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Culture and Tourism, Petroleum Resources, Education, Sports, the National Security Adviser and other Advisers to the President. There are other federal agencies as Customs, Immigration Service, State Security Services (SSS), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the National Administration of Food and Drugs Control (NAFDAC). All of these have advisory or implementation roles to play in the Executive in the foreign policy process. The President’s small group of the think-tank is also important in foreign policy decision making. The think-tank is made up of experts and experienced hands in the field of the country’s international affairs, and could be at different times made up of members of the academia, diplomatic community, intelligence community, politicians and a few State Governors, leaders in the National Assembly, and a select-few from the Federal Cabinet, including the Foreign Affairs Minister. The think-tank’s tasks include to advice, recommend, enlighten, and possibly warn the chief executive on external relations policies.
Q: What did the politics of foreign policy under Babangida look like?
President Babangida had the final and ultimate say in foreign policy matters. He initiated ideas and policies. He had clear views and ideas of the foreign policies he wanted to execute, but most times subjected them to the court and evaluation of public opinion so as to give his policy leadership the appearance of a listening and popular one.
Q: And how is foreign policy implemented?
Nigeria has always followed the traditional ways in implementing its foreign policies. These ways have been largely peaceful: establishment of a strong and effective foreign office; establishment of diplomatic, consular and trade missions in foreign countries; conference diplomacy; shuttle diplomacy; and personal diplomacy. However, in the entire process and politics of foreign policy-making in Nigeria, the President calls the shots. He is surrounded by policy makers whom he has appointed into his Cabinet, Vice President, Kitchen Cabinet, team of Special Advisers and Assistants relevant in the area of foreign policy, the National Security Adviser, Minster of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Minister of Sports, Minister of Justice, Minister of Education, Military Service Chiefs, and other agencies and offices that have roles to occupy in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Top on his priority list is the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is directly charged with the task of foreign policy-making. The President wields real powers in foreign policy making, but as experience has shown, he can barely take decisions alone without considering the interests of these political stakeholders, which eventually shape his opinions and perceptions. These also include members or leadership of his political party and political godfathers. The political veneration of the President and his co-stakeholders in policy matters seems to have rendered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which should play a central role in policymaking, almost irrelevant most times. The Constitution of Nigeria partly accounts for this situation.
Q: Why do you think it is like this?
The 1999 Constitution empowers the central government led by the President to have unhindered powers to initiate foreign policy. Again, the long years of military traditions in governance have also made the executive to have the overriding policy powers, including that of foreign policy. However, this does not foreclose the fact that the other foreign policy agencies are still useful. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) act as think-tank for the executive. The MFA is primarily a clearing house for external relations and point of implementation of foreign policy. It also plays a central role in stimulating foreign policy ideas. Practically, Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Nigeria, have, over the years, acted as chief advisers on external affairs, except in some cases, to a democratically elected President or Military Head of State.
Q: What is the role of the small and informal political group?
They are always there. Very influential. Probably more influential than any other formal group or organ. Under the military, the formal group, the high command may not be as important. The ruler may not have to consult the formal group or seek their opinions. His policies are a fait accompli-he simply presents his thoughts and plan of action before the Supreme Military Council (SMC) or Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) for their knowledge or information and then present to the nation as the decision of the armed forces ruling cabinet. Also, the policy centres including universities, research institutions, and public opinions are ignored or under-utilized. This is even when known democratic structures for policymaking such as the legislature and judicial systems have either been banned or replaced by military tribunals.
Q: The political group you were mentioning, could you be referring to a kitchen cabinet?
Oh very well yes! There was a kitchen cabinet, and his (IBB’s) was a very powerful one. I was not part of IBB’s kitchen cabinet. I know of two very well. One was Tunji Olagunju, who was a Special Adviser/Special Assistant. Then there was Babagana Kingibe. Among the military guys, John Shagaya and David Mark were the most powerful. There were also Air Vice-Marshall Shekari, and Colonel Ukpo. Aikhomu was a very, very loyal officer, and one of the most trusted. The British and Americans found me too radical on the Southern African issue, and hence the boys in IBB’s kitchen cabinet would rather nominate Ambassadors, or take serving Ambassadors behind my back and take them straight to IBB. But because he knew better, IBB would rather defer the commitments to be made of the Ambassadors to me. Some of the Ambassadors were so carried away by this act of the kitchen cabinet staff that they sometimes would tell me they were only answerable to the President and not me. This only created tension between me and my colleagues. Even though IBB has never told me why I was removed at some point, even after I asked him even recently again, I have an inkling that these boys must have mounted pressure on him with the kind of things they fed him with. There were also some of my colleagues in the universities who were being employed to write foreign policy papers, I was told much later after service. These papers were never passed on to me, but at the same time, I was never overruled by IBB. But this happens all the time. Another experience was when Nigeria proposed to host the 25th OAU anniversary, which we prepared very well for and solicited to host. After much campaigns and hype, suddenly there was a backing off, and a kind of mystery that shrouded the entire thing. We were in Addis Ababa preparing to ask for the hosting in Lagos when suddenly IBB refused to turn up, delegating Aikhomu to represent him and asking us not to lobby to host the OAU Summit. It was so confusing and embarrassing to me as every other African nation was expecting Nigeria to formally declare its intention. It was not clear to me and up till now, I really don’t know who went behind to cause us this embarrassment. That was the summit at which a transition of the OAU to African Union would have been proposed, which would have had a Lagos Declaration in the annals. But Gaddaffi eventually got that glory. On my return he asked me why I had not come to brief him about the proceedings, but I told him since Aikhomu was there, protocol demanded that I allow his deputy to do the briefing. Anyway, there was lot of political undercurrents about the whole summit thing, and I think it was not impossible that some very powerful members of his kitchen cabinet, may be Abacha or whoever might have thought otherwise and pressed it on him to abandon what we had worked so very had to get. The kitchen staff can be from anywhere and may never be known, but they play very crucial roles. This is common in military politics. He (IBB) was shrewd when it comes to selecting those who are behind the curtain. He had his peculiar preferences. I cannot say for sure what informed his choice, but I know that he had persons from across professions and walks of life; different ethnic and religious backgrounds whom he calls by their first names and who are very loyal to him. Many of them later found their ways to strategic positions in his government but they were not far from the kitchen cabinet. The kitchen cabinet had a very big role in Babangida’s policymaking.
There were instances their informal views and advice nearly marred my Technical Aid Corps (TAC) scheme initiative. Some of the members of that cabinet were fellow ministers like me, who obviously didn’t like the TAC. They stared saying all manner of terrible things about the TAC, its wastefulness, failures, avenues for some people to get rich, and all manner of things. They met IBB at very informal hours and even at formal settings to try to convince him that the initiative should be dropped. But for his strong personal belief in the TAC, the whole thing might have been dropped months into its existence.
Q: Did you have your own kitchen staff or inner circle?
Yes I did. My office and home were work places for me, where I bring in my staff for series of brainstorming over tea or meals. They included both people very junior to me, whom I gave the latitude to question my thoughts, ideas, and policy propositions. They were young bright people that were blunt. I don’t believe in this “I can’t look my boss in the face” or “yessir’ kind of minister. Those who knew me at NIIA were not surprised, that was how I used to do it. I had Olu Apata who later became ambassador, George Obiozor who later became an ambassador. From the NIIA, I brought in Dr. Aribisala as one of my Special Advisers. On Saturdays, I would have lunch in my house, and encourage those boys to argue with me.
Q: Was that Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB) shrewdness also instrumental in his selection of ministers, including that of Foreign Affairs?
Considering Babangida’s pedigree in government, bright understanding of international politics, exposure and uncommon intelligence, it would be surprising for him to literally entrust the foreign affairs and policy terrains with just anybody. The concession of public policy to his ministers must therefore have been because of their sheer brilliance, ingenuity and competence, which were the basic requirements at the time to re-earn the confidence of the international community.
Q: What was that TAC all about?
This was a programme in line with the Africa-centred foreign policy, which saw Nigerian professionals being sent to mostly African countries to engage in volunteer work. It was designed to promote the country’s image and status as a major contributor to developing nations and African development. Under the TAC scheme, Nigerian medical doctors, nurses, teachers, mechanical engineers, and other professionals were sent to needy nations, including those in Africa, and black nations in the Diaspora. The TAC benefits were extended to nations that asked for them, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being the clearing house for all the applications, considerations, implementation and any advisory roles for the Nigerian government. The TAC Scheme is basically an alternative to direct financial aid to Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Nigeria shares its know-how and expertise based on already assessed and perceived needs to the recipient countries. The Scheme also promotes co-operation and understanding between Nigeria and ACP states. The programme involves the deployment of highly experienced Nigerian Professionals in the field of medicine, Nursing, Education, Engineering, Agriculture, Accountancy, and other related fields to the ACP countries for a period of two years. The assistance offered under the scheme is covered by TAC Country Agreement between Nigeria and individual recipient country. TAC Country Agreement outlines the obligations and responsibilities of each party. Since its inception, 2,000 volunteers have served in more than 27 ACP countries. The programme has over the years demonstrated its value as an effective realization of south-south co-operation. The major beneficiaries of TAC have been Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Togo, Botswana, The Gambia, and Western Sahara, among others. The TAC scheme was primarily seen as an effective instrument of policy, to establish Nigeria’s influence, power and relevance in global politics.
Q: How does TAC Scheme meet Nigeria’s national interest?
It meets the needs of Nigeria’s aspiration to be an influential nation in the world, to be regarded as the voice of the black world, earn enough international goodwill which it requires going by the spread of Nigerians everywhere in the world, and much more. So it gives assistance on the basis of assessed and perceived needs of the recipient countries; promoting cooperation and understanding between Nigeria and the recipient countries; and facilitating meaningful contacts between the youths of Nigeria and those of the recipient countries. In addition to these, the scheme is also aimed at complementing other forms of assistance to other developing countries, ensuring streamlined programme of assistance to other developing countries, acting as a channel of enhancing South-south Cooperation; and, establishing presence in countries which for economic reason, Nigeria has no resident diplomatic mission.
Q: Were there problems with the scheme?
First, internal rancour and disputations in the military leadership and political class of the intent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs began to frustrate the scheme. Second, more nations that were benefitting from the Nigerian largesse would praise Nigeria’s leadership role in Lagos only to pass uncomplimentary remarks about the nation on return to their countries, which made politicians (military and civilians alike) to further condemn the initiative as achieving little in realizing the Pax Nigeriana objective (i.e. its hegemony and power in Africa). Third, more opposition arose from the domestic context condemning Nigeria’s unsolicited offer of help to nations that do not appreciate it. In terms of the first problem, let me talk more on the problem with my colleagues over the TAC scheme. I just knew that some of the officers and my fellow ministers were not disposed to the TAC programme. They would pretend to acquiesce with the idea, and nod to my submissions and even welcome my reports, but behind me they would go and tell the Commander-in-Chief all sorts of things, such as that TAC was a white elephant that was yielding nothing to the country. They would go as far as disclosing their suspicions that they knew I was only after my own name and success, and not the success of the administration or the C-in-C.
Q: What was your Concert of Medium Powers all about? How did it inform your role perceptions for Nigeria?
I considered the fact that Nigeria was an important “Medium Power”, who should be at the centre-stage of global politics as the go-between of the Superpowers and the less powerful states. Nigeria in my estimation was a mid-range power that was continually growing into a superpower state. There were other nations like her, and for them to play a meaningful role in global politics, they should come together in a “Concert”. This would be an appropriate means by which Nigeria could assert her prowess in the global system. The idea of the Concert of Medium Powers was what later informed the concept of Pax Nigeriana, in which Nigeria would establish a permanent hegemony in Africa and influence among developing countries, thus becoming the voice of the developing countries.
Q: Your Nuclear Bomb proposition, what was it for?
Nigeria has a sacred responsibility to challenge the racial monopoly of nuclear weapons. It was not for war per se, it was for peace, deterrence, and better bargaining.
Q: Did you have adequate space to operate and implement your own ideas considering your serving under a maximum dictator?
Yes, I did. This was why most of my ideas were acceptable and tested-TAC, Concert, Pax Nigeriana, et cetera. I supervised the convention of April 1986 of the All-Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy, where International Relations practitioners and scholars gathered to discuss, analyze, and make recommendations for the conduct of the nation’s foreign relations. The conference generated lively and often heated debates among scholars of diverse ideological persuasions. It also provided a number of suggestions for the way forward for Nigeria. The IBB regime was so disposed to such scholarly evaluations and recommendations. He was a smart guy. He may have his own plans, but he liked the idea of subjecting it to public and enlightened opinions for legitimacy.
Q: What was Babangida’s African policy?
In rethinking the African development agenda, Babangida appraised the post-independence economic development of Africa bemoaning the debt overhang, over-dependence on the west, lack of economic self-reliance, balance of trade deficits for African nations, rise in real interest rates, and import surpassing exports. President Babangida observed that the right kind of leadership was what Africa needed to overcome all these, suggesting that Nigeria would provide the leadership, beginning with West Africa. At the OAU 29th Ordinary Session, Nigeria stressed the need from a talk of continental political unity to a more realistic economic unity as was evident in Europe. In the face of the collapsing of European, American and Far Eastern economies into one, Africa would face a major challenge from such integrated market-economies and must respond immediately. The best option was for the OAU member-states to begin to unite their economies as well and disengage from excessive focus on what others can do for them.
Q: Did the Babangida regime conceive roles that Nigeria would play in Africa?
That is a difficult question to answer because in dealing with concepts, I try to make a distinction between elementary concepts and substantive concept. I’m probably not using the correct words if actually the correct word came to mind, I will bring them in. And what do I mean by this/ Every Head of State has an idea of the role his country should play in international politics, the only think is whether such conceptions have come out of actual reflection and setting of goals and targets because that is what would set the roles. I think that when you look at Nigerian leaders, it’s an act of intellectual laziness to simply say our policy is Africa-centred and we’re peace-loving and therefore we’ll give UN support for global and African peace. To me, the critical thing is to see beyond the thin line of expectations and see whether there are fundamental issues and a more thorough conception of the role the country would fill. I can identify only two leaders in this country whom I can say have shown some tendencies towards a clear definition of Nigeria’s role in Africa and the world. The first is Gowon who came up with ECOWAS. ECOWAS was an initiative in favour of cooperation among African states. I mean he could have just carried on with the Balewa approach, or as usual like other leaders do, exchanged visits from time to time, made a few donations here and there. But he went beyond that to the extent that he perceived Nigeria as being the power house or engine of functional West African unity, and fortunately he had the assistance of a sound technocrat as Professor Adebayo Adedeji, a Development Economist who helped him to sharpen and fleshen the conception. Now with Ministers and Heads of States around, it is always difficult to know where the conception is coming from, vertically up, or vertically down? Was ECOWAS or functional regional cooperation really Professor Adedeji’s conception which he managed to sell to Gowon, one cannot say. But one would ascribe the conception to Gowon.
The second was Murtala Mohammed. I think Murtala perceived Nigeria as being an African power and by extension a robust international actor. He was personally prepared to examine old concepts or conceptions and project Nigeria in a rather robust way. His act went beyond the usual mere rhetoric of his predecessors. I am privileged to read his mind very well because as the DG of the NIIA during his time, I had numerous discussions on various topics of African and global concerns with him, and he gave me many tasks; all within a very short time that his reign lasted. For instance, he asked for a total re-examination of Nigeria’s Middle East policy based on his own conception, and to use his exact words, “Israelis and Arabs are bloody cousins and we have no business really getting ourselves involved. We should seek to define Nigeria’s interest in the Middle East and come up with conceptions of roles that would promote and drive the interest” and thus tasking the institute to prepare a detailed report on the Arab-Israeli conflict. If not for his unfortunate assassination midway, something like that was going to mark a radical departure from existing policy given our domestic configuration; and to think that a northerner with a strong personality who is a Moslem would rather not take sides with the Arabs! I was always having arguments with my northern colleagues. They wanted this anti-Israeli policy in support of Yasser Arafat who of course was on our side during the anti-apartheid struggles. Murtala also went against the idea of rushing to sign any document of the UN which had the US and UK proposing such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was hitherto the case before him even as a member of the Non Aligned Movement during the Cold War. That treaty was supposed to legitimize the monopoly of nuclear weapons by the “big boys”.
Then there was Babangida who used many formal and informal means to attempt a redefinition of the foreign policy of Nigeria. He had a good disposition to intellectualism, and he extended this to foreign affairs. He accommodated my new and relatively strange concepts and ideas, and I got room to experiment them. The TAC was welcome, like several other ones, including those of my successors which I wouldn’t want to talk about.
Q: What were the role conceptions and assumed roles in Africa during your time?
In the 1970s, Nigeria had occupied a central role in Angola and Zimbabwe’s liberation movement. They earned their independence probably by the exclusive aid of Nigeria. On the role Nigeria would play in post-war reconciliation and reconstruction in Angola, the Babangida regime asserted that it would be actively involved in shoring up the peace, cooperation and development of Angola. Also, the administration declared its intentions to divert the same measure of assistance Angola and Zimbabwe got from Nigeria to Namibia in its struggle for independence. A favourable psychological climate to see to the victory of the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO)-a black dominated party and led by Namibian nationalist, Sam Nujoma- was created. Nigeria embarked on bilateral ties with Niger Republic, consolidating the Permanent Joint Commission between Nigeria and Niger, strengthening relations with Equatorial Guinea and Egypt. The reasons for this, included the proximity of the first two which required mutual trust and understanding to ensure that Nigeria’s security was not compromised by either; and the fact that Egypt was at the time the other regional power which Nigeria needed in fulfilling some of its conceived roles and obligations in the continent, such as the pursuit of continental peace, unity, economic cooperation, and attaining economic self-reliance to discourage overdependence on western nations. These role conceptions were to also shape Nigeria’s attitude towards the Liberian conflict in the 1990s. The Babangida administration took on an effective role for Nigeria in ECOWAS conflict resolution approach in West Africa, and laid the new strong foundation for regional peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa. Nigeria also kept faith with its West African and African roles. In line with its declared role to make the region safe and secure, Nigeria took active part in the Burkina Faso-Mali border crisis. By shuttle diplomacy, Nigeria waded in visiting the warring states and bigger African states that could prevail on the feuding states to sheath their swords. The nations approached included Senegal and Libya. This was before Nigeria eventually left the matter for OAU’s oversight.
The Nigerian currency became the regional means of exchange. The Babangida regime intervened in the lingering Chadian drought and post-conflict socio-economic crisis offering economic lifeline. These included humanitarian relief assistance, and technical assistance involving civil and military training, general personnel secondment, and military grants. Nigeria then spearheaded the formation of ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). These originally comprised four countries, including Nigeria, Guinea, The Gambia and Ghana. The ceasefire agreement by ECOWAS had initially tasked the ECOMOG to monitor and maintain peace in Liberia. However, after some time, the deliberate acts of arson, kidnap, ambush and killing of ECOMOG soldiers were seen as a direct confrontation and declaration of war on the peacekeeping group. Thus, a change of strategy from peace monitoring to peace enforcement was required. Peace monitoring does not involve the use of force or taking of sides by the third party intervening. The intervention force is expected to see to it that the feuding parties keep to the ceasefire agreement, and act as a neutral arbiter and mediator. The Babangida administration had also pledged Nigeria’s role in mid-wifing the birth of a free Namibia and South Africa. Linking the national security of Nigeria to that of the entire African continent, Nigeria continued its involvement with the Frontline States in the concerted efforts to ensure the independence of Namibia and South Africa. In addition, contacts with the Frontline States enabled proximity to first-hand knowledge of the Angolan and Mozambican conflicts which made it possible for resolution instigated by Nigeria. In 1987, Nigeria’s proposal at the Harare Conference of 1986 to heads of states of Non-Aligned countries to create an African Fund to financially assist the Frontline States in the liberation of Southern African was accepted, and Nigeria contributed $50 million.
The major problem of the regime was the annulment of the most popularly acclaimed Presidential elections in Nigeria, which saw an ethnic Yoruba man winning overwhelmingly. It was the local and international heat this act generated that marked the fall of the Babangida regime and the end of its declining foreign posture.
Q: What is the problem with Nigeria’s foreign policy?
While much national energy has been committed to concerns of other states such as in areas of conflict resolution, good governance, supply of electric power, and financial and material aid to needy nations; there seemed to be little show of commitment to Nigerians’ social and economic welfare. The Obasanjo foreign policy, going by the present understanding of the new foreign policy proposition by Ojo Maduekwe, was barely ‘citizen-centered”. The Francophone countries have never trusted Nigeria wholesale and often greet Nigeria’s offers with grim apprehension, caution and sometimes outright rebuff.
Q: What would you recommend to arrest this situation?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I have argued so many times, is a peculiar ministry that should be a separate service like the British Foreign Service where you have the Foreign Office and the Home Office. The number of level 17 officers and permanent secretaries is probably more than what you have in other ministries; and secondly it spends its money in dollars. And again in most countries in the world, after the Head of Sate is the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I have made the proposal that the ministry should be changed to Foreign Office because of trends in global politics where all domestic matters are now foreign affairs issues. But the problem is always that your colleagues won’t like it, and they wouldn’t like you. They even said I wanted to enhance my status, but I asked them in what way when it would neither increase my salary nor change my title to Super Minister of Foreign Affairs. They even turned it into an ethnic thing. Because I said we need a Foreign Service Commission separate from the Civil Service Commission, they said I was targeting the Civil Service Commission which was headed by a northerner. They went to the Head of the Commission that “see, he is targeting you”, and went to Abacha to say ‘he is targeting northern interests”, and even held a forum of northern ministers in the cabinet, to make sure that proposal never see the light of the day, and that proposal never saw the light of the day. Everybody thinks foreign affairs is a glamorous affair, and so they would go to IBB to tell him something about foreign affairs and counter me, with the hope that they could have a chance to be part of that “glamour”.
Sodangi, Abubakar, Senator of the Federal Republic, and Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Q: How much of the Nigerian foreign policy from 1993 do you know?
The first thing Abacha did on coming to power was to appoint Babagana Kingibe, Chief Abiola (winner of the annulled June 12 Presidential election) as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Kingibe’s appointment was apparently to placate the pro-democracy camps and give them a glib of hope that June 12 election results were still alive. It was therefore not the intention to position Nigeria’s foreign policy better that underlined the appointment. However, this was not to overrule two basic facts- Kingibe’s appointment which would calm the nerves of both the local and international publics that the crisis was nearing resolution; and Babagana’s classic background in governance and foreign affairs. The foreign policy of Abacha was the same poor foreign policy that brought Nigeria to its abysmal diplomatic state. However, Abubakar differed completely as it even dawned on him that Nigerians and the world needed policy change for Nigeria’s respect and global standing to be restored. For obvious reasons, the Abubakar regime would rather embark on internal overhaul, or a thorough mopping up of the domestic environment for a world-friendly-foreign policy to be instituted.
Q: Under democratic rule, apart from the National Assembly, Foreign Ministry, and other legitimately known institutions of foreign policy, which are the ‘hidden’ ones?
The other institutions that are expected to complement the process of foreign policy making included the Nigerian Customs, Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), the Nigerian Maritime Authority (NMA), Nigerian Olympic Committee (NOC), the Nigerian Football Association (NFA) and other sport bodies. President Obasanjo also created many other foreign affairs portfolios probably to either take up overlapping responsibilities with the Foreign Affairs Ministry, or to accord the minister marginal tasks so that the President himself would become the de facto Foreign Affairs Minister. These portfolios included the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa, office of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Senior Special Assistant on Foreign Relations, Chief of Staff to the President, and the office of the National Security Adviser.
Q: How does the legislature come in?
The Nigerian bicameral National Assembly made up of the Senate (Upper House) and the House of Representatives (Lower House), wielded little influence in Obasanjo’s foreign policy matters This again could be attributed to Obasanjo’s towering political (and international) image and his ability, because of experience, to manipulate and overcome the legislature, which was often very much divided or could not match the level of the President’s maneuvering skills. However, we have some control over the appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, other ministers, and ambassadors by scrutinizing the candidates and approving or disapproving the nominations. For instance in 1999, the National Assembly rejected the first list of ambassadorial nominees on the ground that it did not reflect the federal character. The legislature through its Senate and House Committees on Foreign Relations and Defence, perform oversight functions in the country’s foreign policy making.
Umar, Salisu D. Clerk, Nigerian Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Q: Who should be making foreign policies?
Foreign policy making does and should not lie in the hands of a group or an individual. There has not been continuity in Nigeria’s foreign policy because each leader has implemented his own ideas, making it difficult to define Nigeria’s national interest. An example was Olusegun Obasanjo, who wanted to be and was his own foreign minister. However, foreign policy is elite-driven, because they are the informed group. The fact that it is elite-driven does not mean only a small group should control it; it should involve a wide spectrum of the Nigerian elite. Thus foreign policy should involve a large group of elite across the sectors of the nation. The problem is that not all the elite participate, as some dominate and monopolize the policy process. So, I would say diplomats, technocrats and national institutions, the President, the Foreign Minister, pressure groups, and the media constitute the elite that should be part of the process.
Q: What then is the picture of what actually happens?
A notable group that participates actively in the formulation of foreign policies is the President’s Kitchen Cabinet. The Kitchen or inner Cabinet is an informal group but strong enough to influence the President’s thought and position on foreign policy matters. The difference between the group and the think-tank is that it may operate in secrecy and its membership is only known by the President and his very close aides. They may meet at informal times and can be made up of “unofficial people”. The members of the Kitchen Cabinet play a key role in the running of the state and their decisions would probably take preeminence over the decisions of the real Cabinet. The members of the President’s Kitchen Cabinet may include his most trusted friends and indispensable aides: Foreign Affairs Minister, directors of the national intelligence and security councils, Vice President, party chieftains, some members of his think-tank, some senior legislators, and even the First Lady. You remember when Babangida created Delta State and made Asaba the capital of the state; it was against people and some of his own ministers’ expectations as Warri was touted to be the capital. Babangida’s decision had been influenced by his wife, Mariam who hails from that town. That may not be a foreign policy issue, but it tells us how influential the First Lady could be in public policy making. Also, don’t forget that as an oil-producing state, the creation would have foreign policy implications; Asaba becomes important in international oil market.
However, there are judicial influences in foreign policy litigation and judges. They systematically rule in favour of foreign affairs when confronted with certain domestic challenges. The federal judiciary is prone to support foreign policy interests. For instance, the courts stood by the Federal Government in implementing the Orange Tree Agreement of 2006 in which Nigeria was to engage in a seamless handover of Bakassi to Cameroon. The litigations of individuals and groups challenging government’s plan or attempting to stop the handover were turned in favour of government. The federal and state high courts drew inspiration from the precedents of the National Assembly and Supreme Court which had given sanctimony to the ICJ ruling and the Treaty of Washington (Orange Tree) in the domestic law, to rule in favor of hand over. There are several influences that impinge on the judicial contribution to foreign policy making in Nigeria.
Q: What is the peculiarity of foreign policy making under the military rule?
The Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) of Abubakar took all decisions relating to foreign policy, which the MFA was expected to implement. However, because of the exigency of the time, the Head of State was a Foreign Minister of some sorts as he personally facilitated the implementation of certain roles and indeed attended to some matters that enhanced Nigeria’s reintegration process. That was the period which required careful steps, foresight, quality control, and damage control. Leaving foreign affairs in the hands of just anyone could destroy the fragile process of taking Nigeria out of the international abyss and image problem. It should be understood that generally, military rule offers abnormalities in public policy making. The army seizes power, dismisses all democratic institutions, and the high command takes over everything. The army does not allow for slow motions, and one man (the Head of State) is sufficient to take crucial decisions, as long as his cabal is carried along.
Q: Who conceives national roles?
It should be a joint decision by the presidency, national assembly, ministries, government parastatals, the media should set the agenda, public opinion should count, you scholars from the ivory towers should set the intellectual, philosophical, and research base, et cetera. However, national role conceptions: who conceives it in Nigeria? If at all it is conceived, the President does. The Head of State does. If they can’t do so because of their lack of exposure, they have very enlightened persons in their group who do the conceiving. The small group does it again. Role conceptions are elitist, and I mean the power or political elite (the executive). It does not take into consideration what others want for Nigeria. The kitchen cabinet decides. My friend, the kitchen cabinet does it all. We (National Assembly) try to do our bit, but the executive hijacks and manipulates it, with some of the lawmakers being their friends in the cabinet.
Q: Are you suggesting that the role conception process and foreign policy making is heavily politicized and problematic?
Yes. Sometimes there are meeting behind closed doors to avoid external press that can create or carry false information. Sometimes, our own members from the Upper and Lower Houses would go to their kitchen cabinet meetings with the executive and return to the House as if nothing ever happened only to turn around and back up the President’s position. So you can say there are corridors sometimes to avoid or make decisions less problematic when brought up for debate. But it ends up becoming more problematic than anticipated. Thus, the fundamental challenge that Nigeria’s leaders face is to nurture a culture of openness, consultation and consensus-building in the country’s foreign policymaking, while continuing to benefit from the views of experts
Q: What influences you as a lawmaker in the conception of national roles?
The first thing that comes to my mind is the national interest. This implies the development of human security and other internal considerations such as the impact of a reputation for corruption on Nigeria’s foreign relations. Then I consider the big image of Nigeria in international circles, I reflect on the massive expectations of us as a nation by Africa and the world. I see myself as being in a position to push for active Nigeria’s role in the continent and the world. However, I am disturbed by the corrupt and dwindling image of Nigeria. It affects my choice of decisions in the legislature. And I think all these apply to my colleagues too.
Q: How has Nigeria assumed conceived African roles?
We have participated in conflict resolutions across Africa, we intervened in apartheid rule, and practically worked from the 1960s to the 1990s to dethrone apartheid and plant a desegregated administration in South Africa. We helped Namibia in the 1990s to have freedom and a black rule. We settled border disputes in the 1980s. We gave assistance to needy nations with our Technical Aid Corps which Professor Akinyemi initiated in the 1980s. The Obasanjo administration has helped using his deep experience in African diplomacy and popularity in the world to intervene in Togo, Ivory Coast, Sao Tome, and Congo- Rwanda crises.
Q: You did say that you consider national interest in offering to the legislature what roles Nigeria should play in Africa. Have our national roles been compatible with national interest?
Nigeria’s foreign policy is built around core national interests based on the promotion of peace and security, as well as development and democratization at home and abroad. Hence, you would see that from 1999 Nigeria has occupied those enviable roles of consolidating democracy abroad particularly in Africa, and helping with security issues even before 1999. The reasons were to safeguard Nigeria’s own security and democratization process. If there are problems elsewhere, there may be problems in Nigeria too, so Nigeria’s interest, if we look at it well, also plays a major role in the kind of roles we play in the continent.
Q: Has Nigeria ever really had African role conceptions or it just takes on any roles as situations demands without any thorough articulation or planning?
Nigeria has always looked beyond its borders. While Africa has been the cornerstone of its foreign policy, Nigeria has seen itself and been perceived by others, as a global player on the world stage, from its role in the African liberation struggle to its recent peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria has often acted in what it considered to be its national interest. This can be seen in the way that Nigeria played significant roles in the creation of the Organization of African Unity ( OAU) and used the arena of the Commonwealth and in particular, the United Nations, to advance national, as well as African interests. Nigeria’s approach to both Africa and its immediate neighbours has been based on a policy of decolonization, non-interference, respect for inherited borders, economic integration and a commitment to practical policies that promote African unity.
Q: What then would you regard as Nigeria’s African roles conception, because I have not really seen any holistic document from government or National Assembly articulating Nigerian roles or national interest?
Nigeria undoubtedly played an indispensable role in the construction of the African Union and NEPAD. One could even go so far as to say that, without the leadership role of South Africa and Nigeria, the creation of the AU and NEPAD would have been more difficult, if not impossible. Even if NEPAD and the AU had been created without the involvement of Abuja and Pretoria, their nature, purpose and timing, would likely have been very different and much slower in coming about.
Q: What is the basis of Nigeria’s Africa-centrepiece in Foreign Policy?
Nigeria is a giant in Africa.
Q: How do you mean?
We have massive natural resources that other Africans don’t have. We have got historical experience that other nations could have bungled, we have remained united despite too many challenges when others have crashed and become dismembered, we have contributed more than any other African nation in global peace and security, and we have helped too many nations with our wealth. No other African nation has done this, or can afford to do it without crashing economically. However, we must understand that Nigeria being often described as the “Giant of Africa” is best understood and assessed in the context of its regional and continental ambitions which have been demonstrated over the years and it is clear from a historical examination of Nigeria’s foreign relations that these hegemonic ambitions have been wasteful and not led to relevant, coherent and effective policies. It should rather focus on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African sub-region, and assessing only key bilateral relations with South Africa and Cameroon; and Nigeria’s relations with key bilateral (France, Britain, the US and Japan) and multilateral actors and organizations outside Africa (the UN, the European Union [EU] and the Commonwealth).
Q: What roles does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs play in Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Making?
In analyzing the role of the key institutions involved in Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations, it is clear that the institutions and processes of Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation cannot be separated from the country’s political economy, the character of the state or the worldview of its ruling elite. It is therefore necessary to address the issue of the fundamental nature of the Nigerian state and its connections with the wider society. Nigeria’s immense potential is clearly based on its demographic size of over 100 million people, its multi-ethnic population, its vast oil reserves and its reservoir of highly skilled and educated people, the majority of its people remain poor with a per capita income while Nigeria has played an important role in international peacekeeping both under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), as well as ECOMOG (the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays little role in the actual sense. The Obasanjo experience despite its supposed democratic nature, is a very clear example.
Q: What are the peculiar domestic measures for Nigeria in conceiving roles to fit into its perceived giant of Africa status?
This includes an examination of both individual security issues such as the Bakassi border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon; Nigeria/Chad border skirmishes; Libya’s role in Chad; and the security situation in potentially oil-rich Equatorial Guinea. Peace keeping and providing of relief has been our major contribution.
Q: Are there peculiar challenges with role conceptions?
Significantly, this has been complicated by the phenomenon of prolonged military rule and the pervasive legacies of this past, which still condition and temper the current transition to democratic governance. Many participants raised the issue of the “crisis of rising expectations,” with Nigeria’s masses expecting that as democracy in Nigeria develops, so too should consultation and the involvement of civil society in the country’s foreign policy process. How Nigeria’s leaders manage these expectations will continue to be fundamental to the success of its future foreign policy. Some participants also raised the need to examine the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nigeria in more detail, since many of them tend to be externally funded, and are often accused by the government of pursuing foreign agendas. While policymakers and executors of Nigeria’s foreign policy appear to be committed to responding to demands, pressures and influences from the external environment, particularly in the context of the challenges posed by globalization, they also need to respond appropriately to domestic pressures and influences, especially those derived from popular public opinion. The move away from parliament and public opinion in Nigeria’s foreign policymaking towards research institutes, which are intrinsically more exclusive and narrow, was said by several participants at the conference to have obstructed a more responsive and democratic foreign policymaking process in Nigeria. There is need for promotion of peace and security, as well as development and democratization at home and abroad. Also, Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs reshaping and strengthening, with foreign policy objectives translated into more specific national interests and a programme of action designed to respond in a timely manner to changes in the external environment. Finally, Nigeria, having led efforts to create ECOWAS in 1975, should be at the forefront of efforts to build viable and effective economic communities in Africa. Along with South Africa, Nigeria should champion the building of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) to responsible levels.
Aminu, Jubril (Professor and Senator of the Federal Republic), former Vice Chancellor of the University of Maiduguri, former Minister of Petroleum, and current Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Q: Who are the actors in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Process?
The legislature should be a major actor in the formulation of foreign policies of states. The body is the second arm of government. The submission that the legislature is probably the major player is logical. Their primary responsibility is lawmaking. They also act as check to executive powers and minimize executive arbitrariness in the policymaking process. Nigeria operates a bicameral legislative system with an upper and a lower chamber, which has rather been called the right and left chambers, with the Senate being the right chamber and the House of Reps being the left chamber. These are the Senate and the House of Representatives of the National Assembly. The Nigerian Senate has the sole power to confirm President's appointments that require consent, and to ratify treaties. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule: the House must also approve appointments to the Vice Presidency and any treaty that involves foreign trade. The Senate also tries impeachment cases for federal officials referred to it by the House.
In order to pass legislation and send it to the President for his signature, both the House and the Senate must pass the same bill by majority vote. If the President vetoes a bill, they may override his veto by passing the bill again in each chamber with at least two-thirds of each body voting in favor. Matters of foreign policy coming from the executive reach the Senate after preliminary debates at the lower House. Thus, the Senate becomes the highest court of appeal for bills or policy proposals emanating from the executive arm of government. There is also the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which takes a scientific look and evaluation at technical matters and make recommendations to the Senate before there is a verdict on and what becomes of a foreign policy bill.
The Nigerian Senate President is very influential in foreign policy making. His views count, and most times, on matters of national exigency, he encourages his colleagues in the Senate to pass a bill with dispatch. The hallowed chambers of the Senate are considered very considerate and reasonable on issues presented by the President. In Nigeria, the Senate President is the “third in command” after the President and Vice President, unlike in the US where the Senate President is the Vice President of the nation. Although matters would be eventually put to vote when there are party delineations, the Senate President’s influence would facilitate the passage of bills proposed from the Presidency where he belongs.
Q: Was this the picture during the era of President Obasanjo?
Not quite.
Q: What did it look like?
Because of Obasanjo’s wealth of experience, having once served as Head of State and been actively involved in state matters since the 1960s, his deep knowledge of international politics as a statesman engaged since retirement in 1979 by notable international organizations such as the UN and AU to handle delicate issues on their behalf, his enormous influence and goodwill in the comity of world leaders and statesmen by which he pulled Nigeria through the pariah straddle, he commanded lots of respect and little opposition as he dictated the pace in all foreign affairs. The individualist style underlined the role conceptions, as the political group- Obasanjo’s team- played a relatively insignificant role in this regard, one of the features which many scholars have alluded to as also the bane of the administration in certain domestic and foreign policies. It must also be understood that Obasanjo had been a military dictator in the 1970s, with unilateral and group (military class) decisions always towering above any decisions from other agencies. It was a military culture that on assumption to power, they literally suspend the Constitution, dissolve the legislature and commence unitary-type of rule in which the Supremo is the all in all by decrees. The traits were thus still there, and as a retired General, he was an embodiment of unilateral dictatorship. Obasanjo’s personalist style also manifested in the undermining of the National Assembly and his own Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which created a face-off between the National Assembly and the President several times, including the deployment of military troops to Odi in Bayelsa State in 1999, the intended purchase of presidential aircraft in 2000, granting of loan to Seychelles and Ghana between 2003 and 2005, and the Bakassi hand over decision of 2006, among others which had serious foreign policy implications. At some points, Obasanjo’s recalcitrance had culminated in threats of impeachment by the two Houses of the National Assembly which had nearly destabilized the polity.
Q: Was President Obasanjo acting alone or he had a political group outside the formal structure?
Like almost every political leadership, Obasanjo had a kitchen cabinet. Obasanjo’s kitchen cabinet was constituted for some time across his first and second terms before he fell out with a few of them. These included the National Security Adviser who for a long time was General Aliyu Gusau, Defence Chief, General Theophilus Danjuma, Professor Joy Ogwu, his Vice President Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Group Managing Director Gaius Obaseki, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Chairman (at different times) Chief Solomon Lar and Chief Audu Ogbeh, the political leader Chief Tony Anenih, Central Bank of Nigeria Governor Soludo, and the industrial czar Aliko Dangote. But like I said, for some matters of principles on the part of Obasanjo, he dropped some of these people.
Adelusi, Patrick (Ph.D), formerly Senior Lecturer at Covenant University, and former Special Adviser to Speaker of the Federal House of Representatives, Umar Ghali Na’aba.
Q: What was the relationship between the Executive and Legislature during the Obasanjo era?
It was not cordial at all. The executive carried on with policies without due consultation with the National Assembly. Both domestic and foreign policy matters were hijacked by the President. The President acted as if the legislature never existed. He did as if he was still a military leader, and it was not far from it that his military experience impinged greatly on his idea of democratic governance. For the first four years, President Obasanjo simply disregarded the legislature and other democratic institutions, public opinion, and research and university institutions in the making of public policies. It was not until he was tackled by some leaders of the Assembly that he began to consult the legislature occasionally.
Q: Could you let us know some instances of the negligence and face-off?
President Obasanjo was very influential and powerful, and even among the legislators. He succeeded in dividing them. He had his men in strategic positions in the right and left Chambers. In fact he survived all their many plots to impeach him because of the loyalty he enjoyed from the leaders in the Chambers. Those that opposed him did not last long in the Chambers, and those that lasted the first four years couldn’t return to the House at both levels. Examples were Okadigbo who was impeached, Wabara who was forced to resign, and Na’aba who had problems of controlling his Chamber because of opposition to Obasanjo. There were instances of face-off between him and the Speaker, Na’aba. Na’aba took him on, on many areas of negligence and executive recklessness over legislative oversights. There were disputes over Bakassi handover which was done without due consultation with the legislature. The Nigerian debt pay-off, assistance to Ghana and Seychelles in terms of loans and grants, intervention in Equatorial Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire, were all done without carrying the National Assembly along. However, many of his friends in the Chambers knew of these, and kept mum, only opening up in his support whenever such issues were raised leading to impeachment attempts.
Q: Why did the President have so much leeway in the legislature under democratic rule?
The Nigerian experience in the Fourth Republic as it was in the Second Republic was that the ruling party also produced the Senate President and even the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This has been an advantage for the Presidency who has little brick-walls to realizing his foreign policy ideas. The House of Representatives led by Ghali Umar Na’abah between 1999 and 2003 was however cantankerous towards the executive and acted as active opposition to the Presidency on most occasions on matters having to do with policymaking.
Nuhu, Kofi Afresah (Ghanaian High Commission’s Minister-Counselor (Trade and Tourism)
Q: What’s your perception of Nigeria among African nations?
Ghana regards Nigeria as a responsible West African country that has used its resources well rather than embarking on shortchanging smaller regional countries, and which has maintained a good neighbourliness with other West African nations and has been principally responsible for the peace and security that reign in several countries and indeed the region through its many peacekeeping and conflict resolution missions. Ghana however does not expect Nigeria’s intervention in all West African issues any longer because of its own many problems which need local and international intervention as well. If the many problems of the country are looked into, Nigeria would be in the position to lead the region again. But for now, it should focus on its economic decline and other socio-political issues that have rubbed off its shine as a regional force.
Q: How has Nigeria assisted Ghana?
For the past eight years or so, Nigeria has played significant role in our economic sector. Nigeria has helped with the constant supply of crude oil on very generous basis. Most times we pay cash-down, and at times Nigeria allows it on credit basis. Ghana has benefitted this way in the area of energy. This is because Ghana expects that as a West African friend, Nigeria is blessed enough to assist.
Q: Do you think Nigeria has any problems in carrying on with these roles?
Yes. Nigeria has many socio-economic challenges. If the many problems are looked into, Nigeria would be in the position to lead the region again.
Q: Do you consider Nigeria a giant of Africa?
Giant of Africa? In what? In terms of population? In terms of the economy? In terms of the military? What is the giant? I can conveniently say that Nigeria is ‘the’ giant in population. They are the most populous country in the whole of Africa. Nobody can take that away from Nigeria. I don’t think they are giant economically. Nigeria has the resources to become a giant, but it has not really transformed its resource-base to becoming a giant that we expect them to be. In fairness though, Nigeria has all the trappings of a giant, but seriously I have not seen it translate these to power.
Conteh, Al-Hassan, Liberian Ambassador to Nigeria, Abuja
Q: What’s your perception of Nigeria’s roles in Africa?
Our people look at Nigeria in high esteem and have a very respectful view of Nigeria as a great and responsible country. We are indeed very grateful for all that Nigeria has done for our country over these years. Its role in ECOMOG and the present UN mission in stopping the conflict in Liberia cannot be forgotten in a hurry. Nigeria has invested so much of human and material resources to see to it that our country does not disintegrate.
Q: What are the roles Nigeria has played in Liberia and the continent to warrant this perception?
The Liberian people are very grateful for not walking away as other African countries did after the cessation of hostilities, by staying back and being an active part of the UN peacekeeping mission activities with the largest contingent in Liberia, Nigeria made the political environment of Liberia calm and favourable to now talk of democratic elections and a stable polity since the beginning of the Obasanjo democratic dispensation. Aside the security and military interventions, and the national reconciliation process of which Nigeria was actively involved, Liberia had from the Babangida era also benefitted from technical aid from Nigeria. Nigeria sent medical experts, university professors, civil engineers, and economic experts on regular basis to the tiny West African country to assist it. Indeed, Liberia has been a major beneficiary of the Technical Aid Corps. The Obasanjo administration also assisted Liberia in paying off part of its external debts and the outright waiving off of all the debts Liberia owed Nigeria. Unlike other apprehensive West African nations, Liberia made requests for these technical aides because it views Nigeria as a ‘‘big brother” whose help and tutelage should be solicited with all sense of humility. The fact is that Liberia believes that no other nation has played or can play both the amount and the kind of roles Nigeria has played in assisting African nations, or measure up to the diplomatic feats and achievements of Nigeria in global politics in the past 49 years
Mvundura, John S., Zimbabwean High Commissioner to Nigeria
Q: How does Zimbabwe view Nigeria’s roles in Africa?
Zimbabwe views Nigeria as a brotherly country. We viewed Nigeria as one of Africa’s pillars. Nigeria takes a leading role in the continent. Nigeria is an important element in Africa. There is no country in Africa where you can miss a Nigerian. In terms of contributions and development Nigeria is one of the big countries in the continent However, Zimbabwe has two major reservations about Nigeria’s leading roles.
Q: What are these reservations about Nigeria’s leadership?
First, Nigeria joined other African and Commonwealth countries to expel Zimbabwe from the institution. This act was not considered as a leadership move because as head of the African Union (AU) at the time (2003), Nigeria was not expected to side with extra-African powers to victimize a fellow African country. Nigeria is like a gold fish that has no hiding place, because of its roles and activities in Africa. We held Nigeria’s roles in high esteem and remember, this was why Mugabe and Museveni of Uganda had come to Abuja in 1997 to save the life of and release Obasanjo. But things suddenly went sour under Obasanjo. Secondly, Zimbabwe views Nigeria as having other contenders in the ‘big brother’ or ‘giant of Africa’ issue. Unfolding realities have shown that South Africa, Egypt, Ghana and even smaller countries as Namibia, Kenya, Algeria and Libya are increasingly occupying regional and continental roles which Nigeria hitherto exclusively assumed. Zimbabwe’s attitude to Nigeria’s multiple roles in Africa is that the roles Nigeria occupies are most times misplaced and unnecessary; hence the country has dissipated many resources on finding solution to Africa’s problems whereas there are multiple local problems Nigeria needs to address.
Q: So what are your role expectations of Nigeria in the continent?
Zimbabwe expects some more solution-specific and relevant contemporary roles from Nigeria to remain a continental power. These include playing a leading role its local population capacity building, keeping faith with the new administration’s Seven-Point Agenda to enhance the dignity of its own people; and to use its good position of influence and experience to make AU and the African Development Bank (ADB). These mean that Zimbabwe expects so much more from Nigeria because of its legendary experience and great legacies, but strongly believes that Nigeria would need to help its citizens first by enhancing their capacity to earn the people the respect that Nigeria deserves.
Lukes, Harold, Head of the Botswana Mission to Nigeria
Q: Is Nigeria a giant of Africa?
Look at South Africa, they have good infrastructures, roads, rail, protection of minorities, protection of human rights, good political system, free and fair elections, a strong process of industrialization and their activities in the world are highly recognized. That is the giant. These are the necessary ingredients Nigeria needs to become the giant.
Q: You mean before South Africa got to this level, Nigeria had no right to call itself a giant?
Interestingly, Nigeria was able to translate all the trappings of a giant into concrete action. That Nigeria was one of the very few countries in the world that established diplomatic relations with Botswana shortly after independence is a mark of a leader and giant. A true leader does not discriminate between the big or the small. A true leader is truly humble. Nigeria has shown qualities of good leadership in the continent, and deserves the appellation. However, Botswana believes that Nigeria now takes a second place after South Africa in African leadership.
Q: What do roles do you think Nigeria can now play in the continent?
What Nigeria needs to do to regain its first position is an internal reorganization that would include good democratic culture, an entrenched culture of the rule of law, free and fair elections, protection of minority rights, regular supply of electricity, taking ICT to all nooks and crannies of the country, et cetera, by which Nigeria can then call herself the giant of Africa”.
Q: What you are submitting sir, is that Nigeria’s continued claim to leadership is misplaced…
It isn’t a misplaced one or self-placating. With what its problems, Nigeria still plays very active leadership roles in Africa. However, on who the true leader in the continent is today, it is difficult to tell, as there are so many demographics today that really cannot make a particular nation to stand out as a the leader.
Ngalim, Aloysius (2007) Senior Lecturer of History at the University of Beau, Cameroon, and Co-Fulbright Scholar at University of South Carolina in 2007.
Q: What’s your perception of Nigeria in African politics?
It is generally assumed that Nigeria’s real intention is a subtle regional imperialism as Nigeria rather views its neighbours not as its regional and equal partners but rather its backyard like the US has always seen Mexico and other immediate neighbours as potential conquests. The Francophone countries surrounding it, including Benin, Chad, Niger and the Central African country, Cameroon are particularly not too disposed to Nigeria’s so called good neighborliness and secure neighbourhood objectives. They believe that Nigeria has more than just securing the neighbourhood as motive. The friendly disposition of Nigeria on issues concerning its neighbours is mostly reflected on and most times unwelcome by them.
Q: How would you substantiate this claim?
In the 1980s, Cameroon, Chad and Benin continually had problems with Nigeria’s intervention to resolve their domestic political crises and had sometimes called the bluff of diplomatic intervention by Nigeria. This was because each of them had land and territorial disputes with Nigeria along their borders, and as such would not believe that Nigeria would have their interests so much at heart. Cote d’ Ivoire, is a country that had always been hostile towards Nigeria because of fears created by the French hegemon that Nigeria had an imperial objective to foist an Anglophone agenda on the whole region
Wilson, Joe, (Republican) Congressman in the United States Federal House of Representatives, a Rep of South Carolina, and Member of US House Committee on International Relations
Q: What is the role of the Congress in Foreign Policy making?
The House of Representatives has a Committee on International Relations. This performs the exact functions of the Senate Committee on same matters, but differs in where it reports or to whom it recommends- the House. The House has several sub-committees that bear relevance to foreign policy. There are sub-committees. These sub-committees looking at key areas of foreign policy concern include that on Iraq, Middle East, North Korea, Africa and Asia. Each sub-committee reports to the central committee, which in turn recommends policy ideas to the Congress. The Congress and the Upper Chamber, the Senate forward their policy recommendations to the Federal Government, and use outcomes of their policy search to approve or disapprove of bills from the executive.
Q: Does the legislature have problems with the Executive on oversight or certain policies?
Absolutely. There will always be problems. We had problem with President Bush over what America’s position would be in a post-terror war situation in Afghanistan. There have been serious cleavages over US’ presence in Iraq. We’ve had challenges over Vietnam, Israel-Palestine, and so much more. The House is divided. The Congress disagrees with the Senate. The legislature is daggers-drawn with the President. Mr. Bush and the legislature have not had it smooth. However, Bush’s stubbornness in what is in the national interest has been seen as imperial presidency, arrogant presidency, and democratic bodies have distanced themselves from him. You know, in democracy, there will always be such feud. It is good for the practice.
Kerry, John (Democrat), former Presidential Candidate, and Chairman, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Q: What could be the reason for Executive-Legislature feud in the US all the time?
There are party differences. Then there are ideological differences. Also, we have limitations of what we can do coming from our constituencies. And then individual differences. However, party differences have had more roles to play in the executive-legislature problem in the United States. The legislators act as a watch on government on one hand. On the other, they act as check on the ruling party. Hence, the Chambers are a sort of balancing act between the Democrats and the Republicans. There are more feuds under Mr. Bush because he is popularly perceived as abusing powers and overriding legislative oversights in crucial matters as Iraq, Middle East, Afghanistan, and generally on war spending. The Senate last gave its full support to Bush in 2001 and early 2002 when the war on terror was at the top of our foreign policy. At the moment, a logical reason for spending so much and intervening in Iraq can no longer be advanced. But Bush, with his war-happy Neo-cons have pushed ahead in a Doctrine that we in the legislature don’t understand or have any input in.
Q: Could you enlighten us on the role of the Senate Committee in foreign policy making?
The Committee is influential: from approving the purchase of Alaska in 1867 to the creation of the United Nations in 1945 to the present day. This committee is responsible for overseeing the foreign policy agencies of the U.S. government, including the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Peace Corps. The Committee reviews and considers all diplomatic nominations and international treaties, as well as legislation relating to U.S. foreign policy.[pic]
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Table 2: Organogram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1960-1972
Permanent Secretary
Parliamentary Secretary
Head Admin.
Head Africa
Head
International
Organization
Overseas Communication Services
Chief of Protocol
Head Consularr
Head information
Head Research
Head Economics
Head European
Head American
Pilgrim
(Pilgrims Board)
Director, Research Dept
Director, External Information and Cultural Dept
Director, International Organ. Dept
Director, Asia
Director, Asia
Director, European
Director, Africa Dept
Director, International Economic Cooperation
Director, Protocol Dept
Overseas communication
Internal
Liaison Office
Director Consular/ Legal Dept
Admin. Dept.
Permanent Secretary
Table 3: Organogram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972-1979
Commissioner
Table 4: Organogram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs up to 1992-2001
HMFA
HMOS
DG (now Permanent Secretary)
DDG (IECD) (now Director (IECD)
ADG (BECD)
ADG (MECD)
ADG (TID)
DADG
(now AD)
DADG
(now AD)
DADG
(now AD)
DADG
(now AD)
DADG
(now AD)
DADG
(now AD)
................
................
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