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Allies DA TOC \o "1-3" \u Allies DA PAGEREF _Toc16612398 \h 11NC PAGEREF _Toc16612399 \h 2***Uniqueness*** PAGEREF _Toc16612400 \h 5US-Japan Relations Strong Now PAGEREF _Toc16612401 \h 6US-India Relations Strong Now PAGEREF _Toc16612402 \h 7***Links*** PAGEREF _Toc16612403 \h 8Generic PAGEREF _Toc16612404 \h 9Japan: Generic PAGEREF _Toc16612405 \h 10Japan: Space Situational Awareness PAGEREF _Toc16612406 \h 13Japan: Consultation PAGEREF _Toc16612407 \h 14India: Generic PAGEREF _Toc16612408 \h 15***Impacts*** PAGEREF _Toc16612409 \h 17Asian Space Race: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc16612410 \h 18US-Japan Alliance: Asian Stability: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc16612411 \h 19Us-Japan Alliance: Asian Stability: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc16612412 \h 21US-Japan Alliance: Proliferation: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc16612413 \h 22US-Japan Alliance: Deterring Chinese Aggression: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc16612414 \h 23US-Japan Alliance: Deterring Chinese Aggression: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc16612415 \h 25US-Japan Alliance: Asian War: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc16612416 \h 26US-Japan Alliance: North Korea: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc16612417 \h 28US-India Relations: Laundry List PAGEREF _Toc16612418 \h 29US-India Relations: Hegemony: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc16612419 \h 30US-India Relations: WMD Proliferation: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc16612420 \h 32***Answers To*** PAGEREF _Toc16612421 \h 34US-Japan Trade Tensions Thump PAGEREF _Toc16612422 \h 35US-Japan Trade Tensions/Host Nation Support Fights Thump PAGEREF _Toc16612423 \h 36US-India Trade Tensions Thump PAGEREF _Toc16612424 \h 37S-400 Controversy Hurts US-India Relations PAGEREF _Toc16612425 \h 38Japan Doesn’t View China As A Threat PAGEREF _Toc16612426 \h 39India Doesn’t View China As A Threat PAGEREF _Toc16612427 \h 40US-Sino Relations Are Not Zero Sum With Japan PAGEREF _Toc16612428 \h 41US-Japan Alliance is Resilient PAGEREF _Toc16612429 \h 42US-India Relations Are Resilient PAGEREF _Toc16612430 \h 43Cooperation Solves for Space Races/Space Tensions PAGEREF _Toc16612431 \h 441NC US relations with key Asian allies are strong now Chellaney, geostrategist, 11-14-18(Brahma, “A concert of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region,” The Japan Times, accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Cooperation between India and Japan builds on, among other things, the trilateral India-Japan-U.S. Malabar naval exercises. Malabar has become an important component of the effort to defend freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific region, through which two-thirds of global trade travels. If India signed a military logistics agreement with Japan, as it has with the United States, the Indian Navy would be better able to expand its footprint to the Western Pacific, while enabling Japan to project its naval power in the Indian Ocean. Fortunately, relations among the Indo-Pacific’s four key maritime democracies — Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. — are stronger than ever, characterized by high-level linkages and intelligence-sharing. These countries should institutionalize their “quad” initiative, with the India-Japan dyad forming the cornerstone of efforts to pursue wider collaboration in the region.US-Sino space cooperation tanks US relations with Japan and India and sparks an Asian space raceCheng, Heritage Foundation, 09(Dean, Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs, “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation,” , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Beyond the bilateral difficulties of cooperating with the PRC, it is also important to consider potential ramifications of Sino-US cooperation in space on the Asian political landscape. In particular, cooperation between Washington and Beijing on space issues may well arouse concerns in Tokyo and Delhi. Both of these nations have their own space programs, and while they are arguably not engaged in a “space race” with China (or each other), they are certainly keeping a close eye on developments regarding China. Of particular importance is Japan. The United States relationship with Japan is arguably its most important in East Asia. US interest in Japan should be self evident. Japan hosts 47,000 US troops and is the linchpin for forward US presence in that hemisphere. Japan is the second largest contributor to all major international organizations that buttress US foreign policy…. Japan is the bulwark for US deterrence and engagement of China and North Korea—the reason why those countries cannot assume that the United States will eventually withdraw from the region.35 For Japan, whose “peace constitution” forbids it from using war as an instrument of state policy, the United States is an essential guarantor of its security. Any move by the US that might undermine this view raises not only the prospect of weakening US-Japanese ties, but also potentially affecting Japan’s security policies. In this regard, then, it is essential not to engage in activities that would undercut perceptions of American reliability. Such moves, it should be noted, are not limited to those in the security realm. For example, the Nixon administration undertook several initiatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s that rocked Tokyo-Washington relations, and are still remembered as the “Nixon shocks.” While some of these were in the realm of security (including Nixon’s opening to China and the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine), the others were in the trade area. These included a ten percent surcharge on all imports entering the US and suspended the convertibility of the dollar (i.e., removed the US from the gold standard).36 Part of the “shock” was the fundamental nature of these shifts. Even more damaging, however, was the failure of the Nixon Administration to consult their Japanese counterparts, catching them wholly off-guard. It took several years for the effects of these shocks to wear off. If the United States is intent upon expanding space relations with the PRC, then it would behoove it to consult Japan, in order to minimize the prospect of a “space shock.” Failing to do so may well incur a Japanese reaction. The decision on the part of Japan to build an explicitly intelligence-focused satellite was in response to the North Korean missile test of 1999, suggesting that Tokyo is fully capable of undertaking space-oriented responses when it is concerned.37 That, in turn, would potentially arouse the ire of China. The tragic history of Sino-Japanese relations continues to cast a baleful influence upon current interactions between the two states. If there is not a “space race” currently underway between Beijing and Tokyo, it would be most unfortunate if American actions were to precipitate one. Potentially further complicating this situation is India. With a burgeoning space program, India constitutes yet another participant in a potential Asian space race. Fueled by a growing economy, India has steadily improved its space capabilities, launching the Chandrayaan-1 lunar probe in 2008, soon after the Japanese Kaguya and Chinese Chang’e-1 probes. Again, this is not to suggest that there is a space race underway, but it would be hard to deny that the major Asian powers are each watching the others carefully (or, more accurately, that China is being watched carefully by its neighbors). That space is a major potential arena for competition among these states is highlighted by the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between Japan and India, initialed by the Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers on October 22, 2008 in Tokyo. The final “mechanism of cooperation” listed in the agreement was for cooperation between the two nations’ space programs. “Cooperation will be conducted between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in the field of disaster management.”38 For the United States, cooperating with China on space issues, when it is not yet doing so with India, could well send mixed messages to Delhi. In particular, there is a perception in many quarters that the United States is intent upon balancing China through India.39 US space cooperation with China might allay such concerns and signal that the US is not seeking to counter China through India. It might, however, be seen as “double-dealing” by the Indian government, which has its own concerns about China stemming to at least the 1962 Sino-Indian War.Strong US-Japan alliance is key to prevent great power war and preserve the liberal international order Matake and Przystup, 18(Kamiya and James, “Stronger Than Ever But More Challenged Than Ever: The US-Japan Alliance In The Trump-Abe Era,” April 2018, accessed 8-8-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has defined its national interests in an expansive manner, embedded in a normative international order based on free trade, multilateral economic and political institutions, and alliances in Europe and Asia, backed by American power. The result has been an unprecedented period of major power peace and widespread prosperity to the benefit of the United States, its allies and countries across the globe. The web of the economic, legal and security arrangements, created and maintained by the U.S. leadership, has served as the framework for the open, rules-based international order throughout the post-war era. The U.S.-Japan Alliance has served as one of the most important pillars of this framework.Great power wars result in planetary extinction Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation Policy Analyst, 14(Andrew, “Looking forward, looking backward: World War I, today’s risk of great power war, and nuclear disarmament,” accessed 8-28-14, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The risk of war between nuclear armed great powers, and particularly involving the nuclear armed adversaries of the Cold War era, has been largely absent from arms control and disarmament discourse for two decades. Nuclear weapons often are represented as dangerous anachronisms whose continued presence is almost inexplicable, or at most as driven by the narrow pecuniary interests of arms contractors. Yet we are in a moment characterized by the rise of new economic powers and the relative decline of old ones. In the past, these have been the times when great power wars occurred. As one international relations theorist put it, “Crisis scholars observe a critical fact: states often accept high risks of inadvertent war when initiating crises in order to mitigate an otherwise exogenous decline in power.” At the same time, countries with the most powerful militaries still deploy nuclear arsenals large enough to destroy most of human civilization and to do catastrophic, long-lasting damage to the environment. No nuclear armed state has proposed any disarmament plan that would bring nuclear stockpiles down below country -destroying numbers any time in the foreseeable future. All the nuclear armed countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals to a greater or lesser degree. The United States has plans to modernize its nuclear weapons and the facilities that produce them so that they will last past the middle of the 21st century. Those who believe that the risk of nuclear catastrophe resulting from wars among the most powerful states is a thing of the past must, then, feel confident predicting history a quarter or a half century out —something that has never proved terribly successful.***Uniqueness***US-Japan Relations Strong Now US-Japan security alliance is robust and growing nowChanlett-Avery, Campbell and Williams, Congressional Research Service, 6-13-19(Emma, Caitlin and Joshua, “The US-Japan Alliance,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****U.S. and Japanese forces also have moved to colocate their command facilities in recent years, allowing coordination and communication to become more integrated. The United States and Japan have been steadily enhancing bilateral cooperation in many aspects of the alliance, such as ballistic missile defense, cybersecurity, and military use of space. As Japan sheds its restrictions on the use of military force (in particular the constraints on collective self-defense) and the two countries continue to implement the revised bilateral defense guidelines, the opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese militaries to operate as a combined force could grow.US-Japanese security cooperation is strong now Baker, Stratfor Senior Analyst, 5-30-19(Rodger, As Stratfor's senior analyst, Rodger Baker leads the firm's strategic thinking on global issues and guides the company's analytical process, “The Contradictory Nature of U.S.-Japan Relations,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Japan's strategic location, advanced technological know-how, and parallel interest in countering a rapidly rising China reinforce its ongoing and expanding security cooperation with the United States. At the same time, Tokyo's advanced economy and primary position as a maritime trading nation continue to stir competition in its relations with the United States. It is this duality that defines U.S.-Japan relations, and it is something that is unlikely to fade away any time soon.US-India Relations Strong Now US-India relations are strong nowKaura, Sardar Patel University Professor, 6-24-19(Vinay, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Affairs and Security Studies, Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Rajasthan, “US-India Relations at the Crossroads,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****On the positive side, ties between India and the United States have seen considerable improvement in the last two decades with a convergence of views on many issues. Successive presidents from Bill Clinton through Donald Trump have ensured that the project of deepening ties between the India and the U.S. remains on track. Immediately after assuming the presidency, Trump began to woo Modi, who lost no time in carving out a personal relationship with him. The Trump administration made India eligible for defense-related technologies under a “strategic trade authorization,” going a step further than the Obama administration, which had designated India as a “major defense partner.”US-India relations are increasing nowJaishankar, Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings India, 7-24-19(Dhruva, “Four hurdles to brighter India–US relations,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Furthermore, in contrast to US relations with adversaries such as China and Russia or allies and neighbours such as Germany and Mexico, US ties with India have remained on an upward trajectory despite the transition from the Obama to the Trump administration. Cooperation on counterterrorism, maritime security in the Indian Ocean, infrastructure coordination, defence technology and energy has deepened. There are also hints of some convergence on future telecommunications technology.***Links***Generic US space cooperation with China provokes Allied backlash because China’s neighbors view its space program as an existential threat Moltz, Space Journalist, 4-14-17(James Clay, “It’s On: Asia’s New Space Race,” accessed 8-7-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****China’s rapid expansion in space activity has also raised serious concerns within U.S. military circles and in NASA. But these developments pose an existential threat to China’s neighbors, some of whom see Beijing’s space program as yet another threatening dimension to their deep-seated historical, economic, and geo-political rivalries for status and influence within the Asian pecking order. Even more, space achievements affect the self-perceptions of their national populations, challenging their governments to do more. How this competition will play out and whether it can be managed, or channeled into more positive directions, will have a major impact on the future of international relations in space. The U.S. government has thus far responded with a two-track strategy, seeking a bilateral space security dialogue with Beijing, while quietly expanding space partnerships with U.S. friends and allies in the region, adding a space dimension to the U.S. “pivot” to Asia.Japan: Generic US space cooperation with China undermines the major strategic anchor to the US/Japan security alliance Chanlett-Avery, Campbell and Williams, Congressional Research Service, 6-13-19(Emma, Caitlin and Joshua, “The US-Japan Alliance,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Strategic cooperation between the United States and Japan has increasingly focused on China as it has emerged as a major regional military power after decades of armed forces modernization fueled by a booming economy and fast-expanding defense budget. Emboldened by its own economic growth and a perception of U.S. decline, Beijing has asserted itself more forcefully in diplomatic and military arenas. This has included direct challenges to Japan’s territorial claims to and administration of the Senkaku Islands, a set of five islets in the East China Sea contested between Japan, China (which calls them the Diaoyu), and Taiwan (which calls them the Diaoyutai), and Beijing’s ambitious multicontinent infrastructure programs that stretch across Asia and into Africa and seek to tie those regions more firmly to China politically and economically. In successive Administrations, the United States has appeared to put more emphasis on its AsiaPacific strategy as China expands its power and influence. In the early 2010s, as U.S. forces started extracting from wars in the Middle East in 2011, Washington’s attention turned more toward the Asia-Pacific region. The Obama Administration aimed to build trade and strategic connections to the Asia-Pacific through expanded diplomatic, security, and economic engagement with the region. Its “rebalance” policy included, among other initiatives, the proposed 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement. The Trump Administration withdrew from the TPP, but introduced its own approach to the region, branding it the “Free and Open IndoPacific.” The “free and open Indo-Pacific” expanded the geographic boundaries of the region with overtures to India to engage to its east. Embracing this Indo-Pacific construct was seen as affirmation of a vision that Abe had promoted for years, and helped fuel the sense of strategic alignment in the early days of the Trump Administration.15 Both the “rebalance” and the “free and open Indo-Pacific” were broadly understood as a reaction to China’s rise.16 DOD’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, issued in June 2019, states that the “primary concern for U.S. security” is “interstate strategic competition,” particularly from China.17 Confronting the implications of this rise appeared to emerge as the major strategic anchor to the U.S.-Japan alliance. U.S. and Japanese security strategy and policy documents are closely aligned regarding the perceived challenge posed by China.18 The Trump Administration frames its strategy toward China in terms of “great power competition,” with the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy describing China (and Russia) as seeking to “change the international order in their favor” and “challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” 19 A summary of the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy asserts that China “seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.” 20 Japan’s December 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines acknowledges the United States’ “strategic competition” framework, and asserts “China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order.” 21 In a clear reference to China, an April 2019 joint statement by the U.S. and Japanese defense and foreign policy ministers “acknowledged their shared concern that geopolitical competition and coercive attempts to undermine international rules, norms, and institutions present challenges to the Alliance and to the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” 22US space cooperation with China undermines the motivating force of the US-Japan security alliance Chanlett-Avery, Campbell and Williams, Congressional Research Service, 6-13-19(Emma, Caitlin and Joshua, “The US-Japan Alliance,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Increasingly over the past decade, concerns about China’s rise have animated the U.S.-Japan alliance. Despite normalizing bilateral relations in 1972 and the huge volume of two-way trade between them, China and Japan have long been wary of one another. Efforts to stabilize the relationship in recent years notwithstanding, as China’s military, economic, and political power have increased relative to Japan’s, rivalry between the two countries has become the defining characteristic of their bilateral relationship. Since 2010, mutual suspicion has solidified into muted hostility over the set of uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets, located between Taiwan and Okinawa in the East China Sea. Japanese security officials have been deeply concerned about Beijing’s intentions and growing capabilities for years, but the Senkakus dispute appears to have convinced politicians and the broader public that Japan needs to adjust its defense posture to counter China.Japan views the plan as a US betrayal because their competing with China for space influence now Moltz, Space Journalist, 4-14-17(James Clay, “It’s On: Asia’s New Space Race,” accessed 8-7-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Unlike in Europe, where all of the major powers (except Russia) are members of the European Space Agency and share a cooperative approach to space (including highly integrated cost sharing), Asia’s space arrangements are highly nationalistic, sometimes secretive, and mostly competitive. There are no space security talks currently ongoing among the major powers, no history of arms control talks linking space and nuclear deterrence (unlike in the U.S.-Soviet case), and no civil space cooperation in its key political dyads: China-Japan, India-China, and North-South Korea. At the regional level, China and Japan have sponsored rival space organizations in an effort to “organize” smaller countries in this broader competition and draw them to their side. China has formed an ESA-like body called the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), which now includes Bangladesh, Thailand, and Mongolia among its dues-paying members. APSCO benefits include access to Chinese space training, ground stations, and satellite development projects. Others in the region have opted to participate in the less formal, Japanese-led Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, maintaining greater flexibility.Japan views China as a rival in space and would oppose US cooperation that allows China access to advanced technologyKOSAKA, Nikkei Asian Review Senior Staff Writer, 2-11-16(TETSURO, “Eyeing China, US and Japan aim to keep the space station aloft,” accessed 8-12-19, p. Nexis Uni, ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****NATIONAL SECURITY ANGLE Major powers rely on communications and surveillance satellites to ensure their national security by, for example, keeping an eye on the missile launches and troop movements of potential adversaries. This makes space assets a prime target in any military conflict between great powers. The U.S. and Japan are thus eager to limit China's access to space technology with military applications. Civilian space programs after World War II have also been intertwined with national security for most countries. In the U.S. and the Soviet Union, intercontinental ballistic missiles and warhead re-entry technologies were inseparable from those developed for commercial space applications. The desire to spy on enemies was another driving force behind satellite launches during the Cold War. In Japan, by contrast, post-World War II demilitarization led the country to focus solely on civilian applications. The national security dimension was added only recently, with the introduction of the government's third space development blueprint in January 2015. Kimiya Yui, a Japanese astronaut who worked aboard the ISS, drew attention in Japan because he was a former Air Self-Defense Force officer. This was a first for Japan, although it is common for U.S., Russian and Chinese astronauts to have military backgrounds. Japan's decision to go along with the U.S. move to keep the ISS open was not taken merely for the sake of science or to keep its most important ally happy. At its core, it was about the fierce rivalry among big powers for military supremacy in the 21st century. For Japan, as for the other contestants, national security is a key consideration when it comes to space.US-Sino space cooperation undermines the purpose of US-Japanese space cooperation KOBARA, Nikkei Asian Review Staff Writer, 5-23-19(JUNNOSUKE, “Japan to sign on to US moon exploration platform,” accessed 8-12-19, p. Nexis Uni, ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and U.S. President Donald Trump are expected to sign an agreement on joint lunar exploration and other space-related projects when they meet here May 27, seeking to stay a step ahead of China and other rivals. Japan will join the U.S.-led Gateway project, which involves putting a manned space station into lunar orbit to use as a base for missions to the moon and eventually Mars. This will mark the two countries' first collaboration on lunar exploration. Such partnerships are growing more important to Washington as it competes with Beijing for supremacy in space. The U.S. plans to establish a Space Force by 2020 and is reaching out to allies, including Japan, to solidify its dominance.Japan opposes space cooperation with China Yamakawa, president of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, 1-30-19(Hiroshi, “Japan positioned for outsize role in NASA's moon, Mars plans,” accessed 8-10-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Does JAXA cooperate at all with the Chinese space agency? No. Not only for lunar exploration but in terms of space development, international collaboration is essential, but at the same time, the collaboration should be mutually beneficial. ... We are in multinational coordination groups with them, but we don’t have direct collaboration.Increased US-Sino cooperation creates Japanese fear and decreased relations with the US Harding, Center for American Progress, 3-17-17(Brian, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in an Age of Elevated U.S.-China Relations,” accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Our workshops made clear that the Obama administration’s approach to U.S.-China relations created anxiety in Tokyo that Japan’s interests would be sidelined in efforts to keep U.S.-China relations on course. For instance, several Japanese experts argued that former national security adviser Susan Rice’s embrace of President Xi Jinping’s “New Model of Great Power Relations” rang alarm bells in Tokyo, which saw this concept as Beijing’s attempt to create a U.S.-China G2 order in Asia.12 As several workshop participants stated, these concerns were realized in the process in which the 2014 U.S.-China climate agreement came to pass and the sense that the United States would concede to China on certain regional security issues to make progress on global issues.13Japan views the plan as a US betrayal because their competing with China for economic supremacy via space accomplishments Moltz, Space Journalist, 4-14-17(James Clay, “It’s On: Asia’s New Space Race,” accessed 8-7-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****In December 2014, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency launched the ambitious Hayabusa 2 mission, which aims to put four landers on an asteroid by 2018 and then return soil samples to Earth. Japanese officials see an intimate connection between their space accomplishments and the ability of its economy to export advanced technologies. They fear that China’s space accomplishments might put Japan’s technological reputation into doubt. Therefore, they believe they cannot fall behind their rapidly advancing neighbor.Japan: Space Situational Awareness US-Chinese cooperation on SSA hurts US relations with Japan Institute for Defense Analyses, 18(Bhavya Lal, Asha Balakrishnan, Becaja M. Caldwell, Reina S. Buenconsejo, Sara A. Carioscia, “Global Trends in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM),” April 2018, accessed 8-4-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****With respect to initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, it is worthwhile to note the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), led by China, and the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF), led by Japan. Both serve as collaborative forums to cooperate on space activities, particularly for space applications. APSCO is arguably more institutionalized and structured than APRSAF. APSCO is modeled after ESA, with a permanent council and secretariat, and has legal status.95 It has formal rules and requires that its members pay dues. In contrast, APRSAF appears to be more flexible and open with a set of overarching principles; it does not have paying members, but rather has both government and non-governmental participants. Through APSCO, China is leading the Asia-Pacific Ground-based Optical Space Objects Observation System (APOSOS).96 The goal of APOSOS is to build a network of optical observation facilities around the world for SSA use. APOSOS aims to have at least one observation facility in each of the eight APSCO member countries and elsewhere.97 These two organizations have been seen by some experts as mechanisms to spread their respective influences (e.g., China and Japan) across the region.98 While this cannot be stated for certain, several interviewees cited geopolitical issues as a potential barrier for their country participating in a regional SSA effort.99 The geopolitical rivalry between China and Japan will likely limit the development of an integrated regional SSA effort, though it does not preclude the possibility of cooperation on space activities. The extent to which these entities may begin to collaborate on SSA remains to be seen.Japan: Consultation The unilateral nature of the plan ensures loss of US credibility and decreased bilateral US-Japan relations Harding, Center for American Progress, 3-17-17(Brian, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in an Age of Elevated U.S.-China Relations,” accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The 2014 U.S.-China climate deal was a landmark achievement for the Obama administration and for U.S.-China relations26—but it came as a major surprise to many, including Japan. As such, despite its obvious public good, it sowed fears in Japan that the United States seeks G-2 solutions on key priorities, even if it means bypassing the traditional cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia—the U.S.-Japan alliance.27 Even more importantly, many Japanese workshop participants argued that the United States acted in a conciliatory way with China on issues of acute interest to Japan, including maritime issues in the East and South China Seas, in the name of getting a deal with China.28 Likewise, U.S.-China consultations in the U.N. Security Council on North Korea have been perceived to be a means—even if inadvertent—to bypass the U.S.-Japan alliance, despite U.S. insistence that it is the cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia.29 U.S.-China surprises fundamentally undermine the premise that U.S. policy in Asia begins with the U.S.-Japan alliance, which ultimately weakens broader U.S. policy in the region. While the United States and China should continue to pursue game-changing cooperation on issues of common concern, these developments should never come as a surprise to Tokyo.India: Generic US space cooperation with China undermines the motivating force for improved US-India relations Fontaine, president of the Center for a New American Security, 1-24-19(Richard, “U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FOREIGN POLICY BRIGHT SPOT,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****At the annual Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi earlier this month, I witnessed a striking degree of optimism about the United States. India’s strategic elite largely welcomes President Donald Trump’s tough approach to China, his skepticism about Pakistan, the administration’s emphasis on a free and open Indo-Pacific, and its willingness to transfer technology. There are warning signs — I’ll get to those — but at the moment they detract little from the overall trend of deepening relations. The improving relationship stems partially from the Trump administration’s clearly articulated strategic priorities in the region. In identifying great power competition as the key driver of U.S. national security strategy, the administration signals a convergence in U.S. and Indian views of China. Prioritizing the China challenge also provides an underlying rationale for greater alignment with India as one element in a broad effort to balance power in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi generally shares the appetite for cooperation: In a forthcoming Brookings India poll of the country’s strategic elites, a full 75 percent say that their country’s most important partner on global issues is the United States, with Russia a distant second at 12 percent.US space cooperation with China undermines the primary rational for improved US-India relations Abi-Habib, New York Times Reporter, 9-6-18(Maria, “U.S. and India, Wary of China, Agree to Strengthen Military Ties,” NYT, accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The United States and India signed an agreement Thursday to pave the way for New Delhi to buy advanced American weaponry and to share sensitive military technology, strengthening their military partnership as both powers warily eye the rise of China. “Today’s fruitful discussion illustrated the value of continued cooperation between the world’s two largest democracies,” said Jim Mattis, the United States defense secretary, at a news conference on Thursday after the agreement was signed. “We will work together for a free and prosperous Indo-Pacific.” The countries also promised to hold joint land, sea and air military exercises in India next year. In the past, they have held joint exercises outside the country.China presents a massive security threat to India. US-Sino space cooperation will be viewed as a betrayal Aghi, 10-15-18(Mukesh, “Strengthening the US-India relationship,” accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****China’s desire to contain India is so well documented that a distinct metaphor has been created to explain it. The “string of pearls" theory posits that China surrounds India—a potential challenger—by gaining access to strategic ports, roads and territory in India’s backyard. China has access to ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Myanmar, which it can use for civilian and military purposes. China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), runs through Indian territory in Kashmir. China is investing in the Maldives as part of BRI. During uprisings in the Maldives in March 2018, India had planned to intervene, but stood back as China indicated that it would not look kindly on Indian involvement. The message to India was: If you come too close, we are not too far away. China consistently encroaches into Indian territory in an attempt to intimidate and grab Indian land, Doklam being a recent example. Disputes with China are not just a strategic loss for India, but an economic one. GMR Group—an Indian infrastructure enterprise—secured the tender to build the Maldives’ international airport, yet the island nation cancelled the tender unexpectedly and gave it to a Chinese company instead. Such a move comes as no surprise when 70% of the Maldives’ debt is owed to China, and the interest alone is more than 20% of the Maldives’ budget. The same story has played out in Africa and Pakistan.***Impacts***Asian Space Race: 1NC Asian space race sparks nuclear conflict Yirka, 12-8-11(Bob, “National security expert warns of Asian space race,” accessed 8-8-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****James Clay Moltz, an associate professor in the department of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, has published a commentary paper in the journal Nature where he warns of a possible space race involving many Asian nations, possibly leading to an arms race. Moltz writes that despite denials by the major Asian players, there exists the beginnings of a space race among the most technologically advanced countries in the area. In the lead of course is China, which besides the United States and Russia, is the only country to have put a person in space on its own. Other Asian countries actively involved in space technology include India, South Korea and Japan, though others such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan are working on building a presence as well. Japan of course, has been actively involved with the International Space station, and India has been putting nerves on edge by mixing its space technology with military goals by building rockets capable of carrying a payload all the way to Beijing. The country has also launched its own rockets into space to deliver satellites, though it’s not yet achieved the broad range of successes of the Chinese program. The problem with an Asian space race, Moltz contends, is that it builds an arena of unhealthy competition bred out of historic geopolitical rivalries. It also wastes resources, but that’s not something that should concern other countries. What should he writes, is the possibility of an Asian space race morphing into an Asian arms race, something that could impact virtually every nation on Earth. The current situation, he explains, is a collection of Asian countries who are unwilling to work together to meet mutual goals such as can be seen with the European Space Agency (ESA). Instead, individual countries work independently, quite often duplicating work done by other countries both in Asia and in the west, resulting in secretive programs that have as a goal beating one another to the next level, rather than building programs that serve the national, or international good. What is perhaps most chilling about an Asian space race is the way China, which is the clear leader, has gone about its space program, highlighted not by its triumphs in manned exploration, but in it’s destruction of one of its dead weather satellites by an anti-satellite weapon back in 2007. Not only did that action contribute to the vast collection of space junk, but it sent shock waves through the entire international community as it demonstrated very clearly the types of technology China has been secretly working on. And because of its leadership role in the Asian community, the action has likely set other countries to develop their own such weapons. One other worrisome offshoot of the space race is the impact it might have on those Asian countries unable to join in. Pakistan, for example, a country with nuclear weapons, has voiced concerns over the missile technology that India has developed and has repeatedly made it clear that any actions by India it deems a threat to its own survival would be met with all out war, including the use of nuclear bombs.US-Japan Alliance: Asian Stability: 1NCStrong US-Japan alliance is key to Asian peace and stability The Asahi Shimbun, 8-5-19(“EDITORIAL: Japan-U.S. pact remains strategic asset despite Trump’s view,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Trump’s view about the Japan-U.S. pact is one-sided and unacceptable. The security treaty between the two countries not only serves the strategic interests of both countries but also contributes to stability in the region and the world as a whole.The argument that the treaty is unfair is nothing new. Originally signed in 1951 and revised in 1960, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America stipulates in Article 5 that the United States would act to defend Japan in case of an armed attack against Japan. Article 6 of the treaty says for that purpose the United States is granted the use of “facilities and areas” in Japan by its military forces. These “asymmetrical" obligations the pact imposes on Japan and the United States, sometimes referred to as “cooperation between things (bases) and people (troops),” is the distinctive characteristic of the treaty and has been the cause of American complaints about its “unfairness” and “one-sidedness.” To be sure, other mutual security treaties involving the United States, such as the North Atlantic Treaty, which forms the legal basis of NATO, and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), commit all parties involved to defend each other. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is essentially different from these pacts because Japan is banned by Article 9 of its Constitution from exercising its right to collective self-defense. The Abe administration has forcibly changed the traditional government interpretation of the article to allow Japan to partially exercise this right. But Japan’s successive Cabinets consistently ruled out Japan’s engagement in collective self-defense operations. Based on this assumption, the treaty is designed to strike a realistic balance between the obligations of both countries even though they are not symmetrical. The U.S. military bases in Japan are vital for the U.S. global strategy and serve its national interest. Maintaining them has imposed heavy burdens on local residents, especially those in Okinawa. The argument that this treaty unfairly imposes all the burden of defending Japan on the United States is based on complete misunderstandings. JAPAN’S SECURITY COOPERATION WITH U.S. EXPANDED GRADUALLY When the Cold War ended, removing the common security threat posed by the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States in 1996 reaffirmed the importance of their security treaty as a lynchpin of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.In the ensuing years, Washington has been steadily stepping up its demands concerning the security roles Japan plays. In the process, the nature of the bilateral security treaty has changed from “cooperation between goods and people” as it assumed more of the features of “cooperation between people and people.”Asian instability and conflict goes global and nuclear Tan, 15(Andrew T.H., Security and Conflict in East Asia, accessed 11-3-16, p. Google Books, ADA Packet, JFN) ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The high tensions in East Asia, the highest since the end of the Second World War, have led to fears of open conflict involving the states in the region as well as extra-regional powers, in particular the USA. By early 2013 tensions between North Korea on the one hand, and South Korea, the USA and Japan, on the other, had deteriorated to their worst level since the end of the Korean War in 1953, sparking fears of an accidental war due to North Korea’s brinkmanship and political miscalculation (ICG 2013a). Tensions between the People’s Republic of China and Japan were also at their highest since the end of the Second World War, due to their dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Hughes 2013). More seriously, China, the USA and North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, and Japan has always been regarded as a threshold nuclear power, as it possesses plutonium stocks generated through its power industry, ballistic missile capability and the technology to rapidly transform itself into a significant nuclear weapons power should it choose to do so (Rublee 2010: 62-63). South Korea could also be forced to develop its own nuclear weapons if the threat from a hostile, aggressive and unpredictable North Korea continues to grow as it develops its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and uses them to coerce South Korea (New York Times 2013). The impact of any regional conflict in East Asia will be significant and global. Any conflict in this region would involve not only states in the region and US allies from afield, but also quickly escalate into a nuclear conflict, given the superiority that the USA enjoys in terms of conventional warfare capabilities over North Korea and to a diminishing degree, China, thus forcing them to resort to non-conventional means, such as nuclear weapons, in any major conflict. Indeed, the US strategy of Air-Sea Battle, which involves attacking Chinese surveillance, intelligence and command systems, are likely to be interpreted by China as attempts to disarm its nuclear strike capability and could thus lead to a quick and unwanted escalation into a nuclear conflict (Schreer 2013). Moreover, today the centre of the global economy no longer resides in Europe or North America but in Asia, in particular, East Asia. Indeed, three of the key actors in the region, namely the USA, China and Japan, are also the three largest economies in the world, with South Korea ranked 15th in global terms, according to the World Bank. Any conflict in East Asia will therefore have a profound, global economic impact. Furthermore, the fact that any conflict could escalate into a major war, including nuclear war, means that conflict in East Asia will have global implications as well as uncertain consequences for the international system. Us-Japan Alliance: Asian Stability: Extensions Strong US-Japan alliance is vital to regional and global stability Armitage and Nye, CSIS, 18(Richard and Joseph, “More Important than Ever Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” October 2018, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The U.S.-Japan alliance anchors not only American and Japanese strategy, but security and prosperity across Northeast Asia, the broader Indo-Pacific, and—together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—the international system as a whole. The alliance’s success has been due to its commitment to protect shared interests leveraging four enduring strengths: ? First, the allies played leading roles in constructing a peaceful and prosperous regional and international order. Emerging from the ashes of war, the United States and Japan together built a more beneficial and durable postwar order, which is now entering its eighth decade. ? Second, the allies share values relating to the protection of human rights, democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. These fundamental values have served as beacons at home and abroad, strengthening our domestic systems while attracting friends around the world. ? Third, the United States and Japan are two of the world’s largest and most innovative economies. The alliance pairs two of the three largest national economies, accounting for roughly 30 percent of global gross domestic product. ? Fourth, the allies retain substantial military power, particularly in Northeast Asia. Over the decades, the United States and Japan have developed robust capabilities and relationships to deter and defend against a range of threats to the allies’ shared interests.Asian instability causes nuclear war and outweighs on probabilityLanday, Knight-Ridder National Security and Intelligence senior correspondent, 3-10-2000 [Jonathan, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, "Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts," l/n, ADA Packet, mss] ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between North and South Korea and ends on the glacier where Indian and Pakistani troops skirmish almost every day has earned the dubious title of most dangerous part of the world. Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.US-Japan Alliance: Proliferation: 1NCCollapse of the US-Japan security alliance sparks Japanese proliferation and rapid global proliferation Hong Kong Economic Journal, 6-27-19(“Withdrawal from US-Japan security pact: Trump must be bluffing,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****No matter what Trump’s motives might be in talking about withdrawing from the security pact with Japan, the truth is, if he really meant what he said, it would not only topple the geopolitical status quo in Northeast Asia, but could also disrupt the global order. If Washington did walk away from its security commitment to Tokyo, then one could expect Abe to accelerate his constitutional amendment push to turn Japan into a “normal power” that can wage war against other countries if necessary and to elevate the Japan Self-Defense Forces to a regular military force. Worse still, Japan may also develop its own nuclear weapons in order to counter its two neighboring nuclear powers – China and Russia. Once Japan starts building its own nuclear arsenal, North Korea, which is already a nuclear-armed country, will definitely hang on to its nuclear weapons program. So there goes the denuclearization process of the Korean peninsula. US withdrawal from the security treaty with Japan would also send a message to the rest of the world that Washington is nothing more than a “paper tiger” that couldn’t care less about global security, thereby stiffening the resolve of other “rogue states” such as Iran in pressing ahead with their nuclear programs.Proliferation leads to accidents, miscalc and nuclear war- multiple power centers and cross-cutting emotive conflicts mean old models of stability no longer apply Evans and Kawaguchi et al, ICNND co-chairs, 09 (Gareth, University of Melbourne Honorary Professorial Fellow, International Crisis Group president emeritus, former Australian Attorney-General, Minister for Resources and Energy, and Foreign Minister ,and Yoriko, Member of the House of Councillors (Japan) for the Liberal Democratic Party since 2005, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Japan, responsible for foreign affairs, from 2004 to 2005, "Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers," International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, , accessed 12-25-9, mss) ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear armed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions. The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of nonstate actors cannot be ignored. The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or India–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.US-Japan Alliance: Deterring Chinese Aggression: 1NCStrong US-Japan security alliance is key to regional stability and successfully deterring Chinese aggression in the ECS and SCS Quang, Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center, 5-1-19(Huy Pham, “THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND ASEAN-CENTRIC SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: VIETNAM'S PERSPECTIVE,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****ASEAN-centered security institutions have long been criticized for being ineffective, especially in light of challenges from China. Despite these institutions’ weaknesses, the United States and Japan have long supported them. Two recent trends have altered the U.S.-Japan alliance: declining support for multilateralism within the Trump administration, and Shinzo Abe’s effort to strengthen Japan’s security capabilities and extend its presence into the “gray zone.” How will these trends affect the future of ASEAN-centered security institutions and regional security more generally? Some observers believe that Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Trump administration’s preference for bilateralism are degrading the role of such ASEAN-centered security institutions as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Also contributing to the weakening of these entities is the members’ perception that their national interests outweigh their shared values. In this vein, the de jure unity among the ASEAN member states could deteriorate due to the U.S.-Japan alliance and Sino-American competition. Others are more optimistic about the impact of the U.S.-Japan alliance on ASEAN-centric security institutions. While China is having an outsized influence on certain ASEAN members — including in Laotian and Cambodian domestic politics — several other Southeast Asian countries are currently expressing some pushback against Chinese initiatives. Still, Beijing under Xi Jinping’s administration may benefit the most from a divided ASEAN. In such an environment, the increased presence of the United States and Japan in the region should be seen first and foremost as a strategic move in the balance against China. In the security sphere, the U.S.-Japan alliance is of strategic importance. Okinawa, located in the southern part of Japan with the largest number of U.S. military bases, is the gateway for any move of U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Hence U.S. military presence in Okinawa allows the U.S.-Japan alliance to play a key role in diffusing Chinese revisionism in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Furthermore, beyond U.S.-Japan bilateral relations, minilateralism — including the U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliances, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United Staetes, Japan, Australia, and India (the Quad) — has also been significantly improved through dialogues, exchange, and maritime capacity building and military cooperation. Japan’s new economic statecraft in Southeast Asia is also impressive, including aid, trade, investment, high-quality infrastructure initiatives, use of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, and the Asian Development Bank. These factors can act as counters to Chinese economic diplomacy by providing alternatives to situations like the debt trap in the Hambantota Port of Sri Lanka and the East Coast Rail Link of Malaysia. By and large, the decline of U.S. commitment to ASEAN institutions is not identical to the erosion of U.S. engagement for overall regional stability — including through the U.S.-Japan alliance. The future regional order By doing so, several scenarios for the future regional order exist: G2 (US and China coordination and cooperation), U.S. hegemony, and G-X multi-polarism or multilateralism. Structural conflicts between the United States and China make the G2 scenario difficult. On the other hand, U.S. hegemony would trigger a “zero-sum” result which ASEAN member states and even Japan — as the first to be affected in any regional tremors — are avoiding. In terms of the G-X or multipolar order, it is difficult to meet the structural interests of both Japan and the U.S. There may also exist the possibility of building a rules-based order and creating a “win-win” game, which would not only offset the boldness of China but also balance the power and the influence of all stake holders. Following this trajectory, both the United States and Japan, in the long term, still have to look forward to the centrality of ASEAN in resolving regional issues. Therefore, Japan continued fostering peaceful security cooperation with ASEAN in the Vientiane vision in 2017, while U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Phil Davidson recently announced an ASEAN-US maritime exercise at the end of 2019. Simultaneously, ASEAN-led security institutions, namely the ARF and the ADMM+, with the centrality of ASEAN, would be of great importance. While these mechanisms have long been regarded as ineffective in solving problems, they could still keep the region in relative peace and stability. In other words, the United States and Japan are cultivating a unity among the ASEAN member states that the existing ASEAN-centric security institutions are lacking, which could help maintain long term regional stability.U.S./China war causes extinctionWittner, State University of New York/ Albany History Professor, 11(Lawerence, 11/28/11, “Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?”, DOA: 9-12-15, , llc) ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. US-Japan Alliance: Deterring Chinese Aggression: Extensions Strong US-Japan alliance is vital to deterring Chinese aggression and warLevine, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 17(Nathan, “Japan Speaker Series: The Rise of China and the US-Japan alliance,” accessed 8-8-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Takagi concluded by arguing that Thucydides’s Trap was not inevitable. In his calculation, war with China is not very likely, at least within the next 10-15 years, for several reasons. First, both sides know the danger of nuclear mutually assured destruction (MAD). Second, the US-Japan alliance, especially the US commitment to include the Senkaku Islands in the defense agreement, achieves a strong deterrence factor: realistic assessments in Chinese publications agree that China should not fight Japan or the US, because it is a fight they are very unlikely to win. Third, any contingency on the Korean peninsula would likely be dealt with through extensive US-China consultation, so they are unlikely to clash. Fourth, Taiwan’s leadership knows better than to declare independence, so a conflict over Taiwan is not very likely.Strong US-Japan alliance is key to deterring Chinese aggression Levine, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 17(Nathan, “Japan Speaker Series: The Rise of China and the US-Japan alliance,” accessed 8-8-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****All panel participants stressed the critical importance of the US-Japan alliance. Nye lauded the “impressive” capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and described the US-Japan alliance as “crucial” for managing the rise of China. He dismissed concerns raised by issues in the US-Philippine alliance, noting that the US-Japan relationship was much stronger, and that Japan was a far more reliable ally. Fravel described the US-Japan alliance as a strong deterrent to Chinese aggression, and suggested helping Japan build up its own forces, especially coast guard forces. Yoshihara noted that geography makes Japan central to US strategic interests, and also suggested the US should do more to enable Japan’s self-defense capabilities.US-Japan Alliance: Asian War: 1NCStrong US-Japan alliance prevents Asian warLynch, 10-3-15(Edward, “Why U.S.-Japan alliance important,” accessed 8-8-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Why are Japan’s recent changes in foreign policy important? The U.S.-Japan alliance has secured peace in the northern Pacific since the end of World War II. Both Japan and China recognize that the U.S. is a Pacific nation, but it lies mainly on the North American side of the International Dateline. U.S. sovereign presence on the Asian side of the dateline is represented by a patchwork of military and business interests scattered on U.S. islands and foreign turf. Japan and China understand that Guam and CNMI are a 500-mile-long archipelago in the middle of what China has named “the Second Island Chain” but are the only U.S.-owned territory in the western Pacific. The islands of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are sovereign U.S. territory, inhabited by loyal U.S. citizens but also make up what China calls “the Chinese second island chain” or the “outer island chain of Asia”. Stability While China’s rhetoric may cause one to question its motive for expansion, the real question is not whether we should view China as looking to control the region, but rather what influence the emergence of China has on the stability of Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance, and the joint presence it brings, balances that question and makes it a non-issue. This is important to the Marianas as stability is needed for economic development and prosperity. Whether you view the Chinese emerging presence in the Marianas as an aggressive land taking, or China’s hedge against perceived future aggression, the point can not be emphasized enough that the U.S.-Japan rebalance of their alliance is not about containing China, but rather should be seen as a stabilizing force within Asia. The recent actions of both the United States and Japan are all about engaging the entire region for mutual prosperity while recognizing that China has focused a strategy of “soft power,” “economic hegemony” and outright possession of disputed real estate in the region they call the Second Island Chain. It should be recognized that it is the existence of the alliance, not just U.S. presence in Asia, that keeps the balance that prevents war in Asia, regardless of your view of China’s recent actions in the China Sea or island nations.Even regional nuclear wars cause extinction Baum, Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, 5-29-15(Seth, “The Risk of Nuclear Winter,” accessed 8-8-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Since the early 1980s, the world has known that a large nuclear war could cause severe global environmental effects, including dramatic cooling of surface temperatures, declines in precipitation, and increased ultraviolet radiation. The term nuclear winter was coined specifically to refer to cooling that result in winter-like temperatures occurring year-round. Regardless of whether such temperatures are reached, there would be severe consequences for humanity. But how severe would those consequences be? And what should the world be doing about it? To the first question, the short answer is nobody knows. The total human impacts of nuclear winter are both uncertain and under-studied. In light of the uncertainty, a risk perspective is warranted that considers the breadth of possible impacts, weighted by their probability. More research on the impacts would be very helpful, but we can meanwhile make some general conclusions. That is enough to start answering the second question, what we should do. In regards to what we should do, nuclear winter has some interesting and important policy implications. Today, nuclear winter is not a hot topic but this was not always the case: it was international headline news in the 1980s. There were conferences, Congressional hearings, voluminous scientific research, television specials, and more. The story is expertly captured by Lawrence Badash in his book A Nuclear Winter’s Tale.1)Much of the 1980s attention to nuclear winter was driven by the enthusiastic efforts of Carl Sagan, then at the height of his popularity. But underlying it all was the fear of nuclear war, stoked by some of the tensest moments of the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, so too did attention to nuclear winter. That started to change in 2007, with a new line of nuclear winter research2) that uses advanced climate models developed for the study of global warming. Relative to the 1980s research, the new research found that the smoke from nuclear firestorms would travel higher up in the atmosphere, causing nuclear winter to last longer. This research also found dangerous effects from smaller nuclear wars, such as an India-Pakistan nuclear war detonating “only” 100 total nuclear weapons. Two groups—one in the United States3) and one in Switzerland4)—have found similar results using different climate models, lending further support to the validity of the research. Some new research has also examined the human impacts of nuclear winter. Researchers simulated agricultural crop growth in the aftermath of a 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war.5)The results are startling- the scenario could cause agriculture productivity to decline by around 10 to 40 percent for several years after the war. The studies looked at major staple crops in China and the United States, two of the largest food producers. Other countries and other crops would likely face similar declines. Following such crop declines, severe global famine could ensue. One study estimated the total extent of the famine by comparing crop declines to global malnourishment data.6) When food becomes scarce, the poor and malnourished are typically hit the hardest. This study estimated two billion people at risk of starvation. And this is from the 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war scenario. Larger nuclear wars would have more severe impacts. This is where the recent research stops. To the best of my knowledge there are no recent studies examining the secondary effects of famines, such as disease outbreaks and violent conflicts. There are no recent studies examining the human impacts of ultraviolet radiation. That would include an increased medical burden in skin cancer and other diseases. It would also include further loss of agriculture ecosystem services as the ultraviolet radiation harms plants and animals. At this time, we can only make educated guesses about what these impacts would be, informed in part by what research was published 30 years ago. When analyzing the risk of nuclear winter, one question is of paramount importance: Would there be permanent harm to human civilization? Humanity could have a very bright future ahead; to dim that future is the worst thing nuclear winter could do. It is vastly worse than a few billion deaths from starvation. Not that a few billion deaths is trivial—obviously it isn’t—but it is tiny compared to the loss of future generations. Carl Sagan was one of the first people to recognize this point in a commentary he wrote on nuclear winter for Foreign Affairs.7) Sagan believed nuclear winter could cause human extinction, in which case all members of future generations would be lost. He argued that this made nuclear winter vastly more important than the direct effects of nuclear war, which could, in his words, “kill ‘only’ hundreds of millions of people.”US-Japan Alliance: North Korea: 1NC Strong US-Japan alliance is key to manage North KoreaHarding, Center for American Progress, 3-17-17(Brian, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in an Age of Elevated U.S.-China Relations,” accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****China has a valid reason to ask what the U.S.-Japan alliance is about if it is not directed at China. Fortunately, the United States and Japan have a strong answer: that it has undergirded stability and prosperity in Asia over half a century and continues to do so today. It anchors the United States in Asia, which is seen by nearly the entire region as fostering greater peace and growth, and it is essential for managing the most urgent threat in the region—North Korea.North-East Asian conflict goes nuclear Adams, 10-13-14(Shar, “Asian Cold War: Escalating Conflict in North-East Asia Bigger Threat Than War on Terror,” accessed 11-12-15, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****CANBERRA—The world may be focused on the “war on terror”, but the arms build up in North-East Asia poses a far greater threat to global stability, says Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defence and security expert at the Australian National University (ANU). A former head of ANU’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Professor Ball is no lightweight when it comes to security concerns. It is Professor Ball’s expertise in command and control systems, particularly in relation to nuclear war, that underlies his concerns about North-East Asia. “North-East Asia has now become the most disturbing part of the globe,” Prof Ball told Epoch Times in an exclusive interview. China, Japan and South Korea – countries that are “economic engines of the global economy” – are embroiled in an arms race of unprecedented proportions, punctuated by “very dangerous military activities”, he says. Unlike the arms race seen during the Cold War, however, there are no mechanisms in place to constrain the military escalation in Asia. “Indeed, the escalation dynamic could move very rapidly and strongly to large scale conflict, including nuclear conflict,” said Prof Ball. “It is happening as we watch.”US-India Relations: Laundry List Strong US-India relations are key to regional stability, promoting democracy, and preserving the international liberal order Smith, Heritage Foundation, 8-5-19(Jeff, Research Fellow in South Asia in the Asian Studies Center, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation, “Modi 2.0: Navigating Differences and Consolidating Gains in India–U.S. Relations,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****These are unfortunate setbacks. India and the U.S. have, in Prime Minister Modi’s words, “overcome the hesitations of history” because the U.S. has done something well with India it has traditionally done poorly: thought strategically and long term in scope. At times, Washington has bent over backwards to establish trust, carve out exemptions, and treat India on par with some of America’s closest allies. Rarely has it sought reciprocal compensation in return. In short, it has avoided being transactional. It has done so because it correctly identified that India’s rise has been a net benefit to U.S. interests and values, and to regional and global security. It recognized that the long-term bet on India has incurred little cost and produced substantial benefit. And it acknowledged the vital role that India has to play in managing China’s rise; combating terrorism; promoting peace, stability, and democracy in South Asia and the Indian Ocean; and preserving an international rules-based order in which India is heavily invested.US-India Relations: Hegemony: 1NCStrong US-India relations are key to hegNarayanan, former Consultant & US-India Friendship Director, 2005[Ram, “The U.S., India and China,” The Washington Times, 2/9, , ADA Packet] ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****However, the leading nations will continue to feel the pressure to achieve and maintain economic, military and technological dominance – and that is precisely where the United States will be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis China. All demographic indicators are in favor of China -- population size, age-structure of the population, the sheer size of the working population, and the numbers of trained scientists and technologists produced every year. Every single indicator relevant to this analysis favors China, and works against the United States. Of the seven superpowers of the 21st century I named at the outset, China is the only aggressive competitor of the United States – and more, it is determined to win that competition, come what may! So, the corollary – is the US doomed to play second fiddle to China? My answer is, NO. Qualify that – not if existing levels of US-India cooperation extend intensively into the coming decades. India’s importance lies in the fact that it brings to the partnership table exactly the attributes the US lacks, and desperately needs, in this competition with China. Look at the list: India’s demographics are even more favorable than China’s. For starters – as then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee pointed out in his August 15, 2003 address from the Red Fort, India boasts over 600 million people in the working age group. This working force will overtake China's by 2025, and decisively so by 2050. Perhaps even more significantly, India edges China handily when it comes to intellectual capital. Its ability to produce first rate scientific, technological and managerial manpower equals, even exceeds, that of China, with the added plus of being able to "think" in English! To sum up – India has exactly what the US lacks. And most importantly, from the US point of view, India can never be, will never be, an aggressive competitor the way China is. China has, for well over a decade now, bent its collective will to one single strategic objective, which it chases with trademark ruthlessness – namely, to dethrone the US from its current position as the world’s sole acknowledged economic, technological and military superpower. One fact is obvious – given the demographic disadvantage the US suffers, it can never win this competition; not if it tries to fly solo. From that fact, emerges another – the only way the US can in fact win, is by teaming up with India. IT HAS NO OTHER OPTION. A US-India partnership, by whatever name it's called, is a winner; it is, in fact, the only possible partnership with the ability to offset the surge in China's geo-political and economic powers.Hegemony prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear war and checks all the aff impacts Kagan, Carnegie senior associate, August/Sept 2007 [Robert, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , German Marshall Fund senior transatlantic fellow, "End of Dreams, Return of History," Policy Review, , accessed 12-24-9, mss] ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw theUS-India Relations: WMD Proliferation: 1NCStrong US-India relations are vital to combating WMD proliferation and upholding US hegemony and leadership efforts Bharati, 17(Mausam, “India-US Bilateral Relations: All You Need To Know,” accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Why India Matters to the USA? India is an indispensable partner for the United States. Geographically, it sits between the two most immediate problematic regions for U.S. national interests. The arc of instability that begins in North Africa goes through the Middle East, and proceeds to Pakistan and Afghanistan ends at India’s western border. The Indian landmass juts into the ocean that bears its name. With the rise of Asian economies, the Indian Ocean is home to critical global lines of communication, with perhaps 50 percent of world container products and up to 70 percent of ship-borne oil and petroleum traffic transiting through its waters. India’s growing national capabilities give it ever greater tools to pursue its national interests to the benefit of the United States. India has the world’s third-largest Army, fourth-largest Air Force, and fifth largest Navy. All three of these services are modernizing, and the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy have world-class technical resources, and its Army is seeking more of them. India is an important U.S. partner in international efforts to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction. India’s broad diplomatic ties globally (most importantly in the Middle East), its aspirations for United Nations (UN) Security Council permanent membership, and its role in international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency makes New Delhi an especially effective voice in calls to halt proliferation. India’s position against radicalism and terrorism corresponds with that of the United States. India’s English-speaking and Western-oriented elite and middle classes comfortably partner with their counterparts in U.S. firms and institutions, including more than 2.8 million Indian Americans. The U.S. higher education system is an incubator of future collaboration, with more than 100,000 Indian students in American universities. As India modernizes and grows it will spend trillions of dollars on infrastructure, transportation, energy production and distribution, and defence hardware. U.S. firms can benefit immensely by providing expertise and technology that India will need to carry out this sweeping transformation. India-USA cooperation is critical to global action against climate change. India is genuinely committed to a world order based on multilateral institutions and cooperation and the evolution of accepted international norms leading to accepted international law. Indian culture and diplomacy have generated goodwill in its extended neighbourhood. New Delhi has positive relations with critical states in the Middle East, in Central Asia, in Southeast Asia, and with important middle powers such as Brazil, South Africa, and Japan—all of the strategic value to the United States. India’s soft power is manifest in wide swaths of the world where its civil society has made a growing and positive impression. Indian democracy has prospered despite endemic poverty; extraordinary ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity; and foreign and internal conflicts.WMD terrorism causes global nuclear conflict Ayson, Victoria University Centre for Strategic Studies, 10 (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volumne 33, Issue 7, July 2010, p. EBSCO) ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.” Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.***Answers To***US-Japan Trade Tensions Thump US-Japanese trade tensions don’t spillover to effect the security relationship Baker, Stratfor Senior Analyst, 5-30-19(Rodger, As Stratfor's senior analyst, Rodger Baker leads the firm's strategic thinking on global issues and guides the company's analytical process, “The Contradictory Nature of U.S.-Japan Relations,” accessed 8-6-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The result was the floating of the Japanese yen, changes in investment and industrial policies, and as a secondary consequence the decline of Japan from a rapidly growing economic power to a country that slipped into 25 years of relative economic malaise. Significantly, Washington targeted the Japanese economy even in the midst of the Cold War, at a time when the United States was deeply at odds with the Soviet Union, and thus where the Japanese alliance was a critical security component. The apparent mismatch between U.S. security and economic interests that was obvious during Trump's recent visit to Japan, then, is not an anomaly but is rather a baseline element of the relationship between the two Pacific partners. In this context, what appears on the surface to be counterintuitive — engaging in strategic competition with China while simultaneously attacking trade relations with key ally Japan — matches a pattern of past relations. The structure of the U.S. government and society frequently leads to seemingly contradictory policies on economic and national security interests, in contrast to countries like China or even Japan in the 1960s through the 1980s. For Tokyo, this is not a new situation, nor is it one that the Japanese perceive as fundamentally straining their security relationship with the United States. In many ways, that aspect of the alliance is growing even more significant as Japan moves further away from its strict interpretation of both the Yoshida Doctrine and the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Tokyo no longer sees its national security as something to leave in U.S. hands, but neither does it see an advantage in breaking from the U.S. security orbit.US-Japan Trade Tensions/Host Nation Support Fights Thump Disputes over burden sharing and trade won’t thump the DA Armitage and Nye, CSIS, 18(Richard and Joseph, “More Important than Ever Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” October 2018, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****U.S.-Japan relations have been unsettled by domestic politics in both countries. Although Prime Minister Abe’s return to office steadied alliance management, the more recent transition in U.S. leadership has rattled many in Japan. President Trump’s election suggested a testing period for Japan. The Trump administration has brought back old themes of alliance burden sharing and spotlighted U.S. trade deficits, which the president sees as a source of economic weakness. In addition, President Trump has made headlines by suggesting that U.S. allies in Asia should do more to defend themselves and by openly questioning the value of forward-deployed U.S. forces. Despite these challenges, the bilateral relationship has maintained forward momentum. Prime Minister Abe reached out early to President-elect Trump, meeting him first at Trump Tower in New York and then subsequently during visits to Washington and Mar-a-Lago. The Abe-Trump relationship has allowed for frequent communication on security matters, and it eased some of the initial worries on trade. Negotiations with North Korea and discussions over the bilateral trade relationship have focused the alliance’s attention for much of the last year-and-a-half.US-India Trade Tensions Thump US-India trade tensions are being contained now Saran, President of the Observer Research Foundation, 8-1-19(Samir, “The India–US trade dispute and India’s evolving geopolitical role,” accessed 8-12-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Samir Saran: These trade tensions are a manifestation of a bilateral relationship that is maturing in the midst of several interrelated structural transformations in the world order. Two interconnected transformations are particularly relevant to friction in the trade relationship: first, the digitalisation of the global economy and second, the politics of ‘techno-nationalism’. Around the world, there is disagreement over the governance of data and the role of technology in development and security. Countries are used to conceding sovereign power over the course of decades, through long and hardened negotiations on say, trade and migration. India is no different: one only need look at New Delhi’s gradual embrace of liberal internationalism since 1947. But the explosion of digital platforms has pulled the rug from beneath governments: it has taken away their agency over their populations and businesses overnight. It would be naive to think that a government of over a billion people will cede the management of its democracy and its all-important services sector to technology companies half way across the world. This is why data localization, e-commerce, mutual legal assistance, and data protection are the most contested issues between the U.S. and India. Both countries are routinely termed "natural allies", but few acknowledge the fact that the maturation of the democratic system in India as well as the expansion of its economy will follow a trajectory different from that of the United States. Rather than viewing ongoing negotiations as part of a process of self-discovery, as it is of self-preservation, the strategic and business communities in the U.S. and India have been talking past each other. At issue is a fundamental disagreement about how digital technologies will shape our societies. In the United States, there is a firm belief that Silicon Valley can create value in developing economies like India while protecting human rights and cybersecurity. The Indian perspective is dramatically different. There is a sense that Indian industry and governance propositions must manage the development and deployment of emerging technologies. The assumption that U.S. firms are able to protect the economic rights and civil liberties of Indian users better than its own government has been proven wrong by some recent events and developments. While both states have done well in keeping these tensions from affecting the broader bilateral relationship, the question of the digital economy will only continue to get larger and more consequential.S-400 Controversy Hurts US-India Relations India has been granted a waiver over its purchase of the S-400Aghi, 10-15-18(Mukesh, “Strengthening the US-India relationship,” accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Critics may argue that nothing has changed if CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions are imposed when India receives an S-400 from Russia, but this issue was recently resolved, thanks to Secretary James Mattis’ herculean efforts to convince the US Congress to carve out a waiver “allowing" the S-400 purchase without sanctions. India should rest assured that Mattis’ work won’t go to waste. It would not make sense for the Donald Trump administration to spend significant political capital on India with the US Congress, only to have the US State Department not grant a waiver—especially after India signed COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement )—a decade’s old ask of the US and the key deliverable of the recent 2+2 dialogue—allowing the US to transfer secure communications and data equipment to India and offer real-time data-sharing with the Indian military over secure channels. This victory for the bilateral demonstrates that India understands that its non-alignment rhetoric should not push India closer to Russia or China.It’s likely the US will give India a waiver over their purchase of the S-400Hasan, 7-19-19(Saad, “How far can the US go to stop S-400 sales?,” accessed 8-12-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Washington also has its long-term interests to consider when threatening sanctions. For instance, it wants India as a counterweight to China in the region and sanctions over the S-400 purchase could undermine its efforts, says Lamrani. “But just because CAATSA says that the US will impose sanctions if you buy from Russia does not necessarily mean it will follow through on those threats” he added. When it comes to economic and financial penalties, Washington has given waivers in the past such as when it allowed Iraq to continue buying energy from Iran.Japan Doesn’t View China As A Threat Improved economic ties isn’t spilling over to security cooperation; Japan still views China as a security threat Putz, Reporter for The Diplomat, 1-30-19(Catherine, “The Art of the Balance: Japan, China and the United States,” The Diplomat, accessed 8-12-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Ohno, as noted above, commented on China’s relatively friendly attitude toward Japan over the course of 2018. But, he continued in the next breath, “when it comes to the security environment, [Chinese] activity in the South China Sea and the East China Sea are still going on and not changed. “Face to face, we are smiling; but under the table… we are kicking each other,” he summarized. The kicking under the table is typified by incursions of Chinese vessels and aircraft into what the Japanese claim as sovereign territory. The territorial dispute between Japan and China regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the extent of each country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea is a closely watched flashpoint between the two. While in fiscal year 2017, the number of intercepts of People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft approaching Japanese airspace decreased by 23 percent over the previous fiscal year, 2018 saw an uptick. As Franz-Stefan Gady reported last month the number of intercepts of Chinese military aircraft “increased by approximately 20 percent in the first six months of the current fiscal year” (that is, from April to September 2018).India Doesn’t View China As A ThreatIndia still views China as a security threat Abi-Habib, New York Times Reporter, 9-6-18(Maria, “U.S. and India, Wary of China, Agree to Strengthen Military Ties,” NYT, accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Although India is worried about China’s growing influence in the region — the two militaries engaged in a tense standoff over a disputed border region last year — New Delhi prefers to avert confrontation with Beijing when it can. That reluctance may stymie Washington’s plans for India to be a linchpin of its efforts to counter China, American officials worry. India’s military budget this year is $45 billion, while China’s is $175 billion. India has 18 submarines in service; China has 78. New Delhi has been alarmed by the growing presence of Chinese submarines in its traditional sphere of influence, and as Beijing strikes seaport deals with countries encircling India. Western and Indian diplomats worry China may turn these seaports, currently used for commercial purposes, into calling docks for Beijing’s navy by leveraging the enormous debt of countries it has lent money to across the region.US-Sino Relations Are Not Zero Sum With JapanUS-Sino cooperation trades-off with US-Japanese relations and Tokyo views the situation as zero sum Harding, Center for American Progress, 3-17-17(Brian, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in an Age of Elevated U.S.-China Relations,” accessed 8-13-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****If the primary goal of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region was to hedge against China’s rise, the challenge for U.S.-Japan relations would be easily manageable. However, the reality is that over the coming decades, U.S. leaders—both Republican and Democratic—are likely to continue to pursue engagement instead of containment, and U.S.-China relations will continue to move along two tracks: managing differences and maximizing cooperation. U.S.-China relations will take extraordinary amounts of time and attention from leaders in both countries. Already, the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue brings together more U.S. government officials than any other bilateral engagement on the diplomatic calendar.4 On the cooperative side of the ledger, as an agenda for U.S.-China cooperation on shared challenges expands, concerns will inevitably rise in Tokyo that Japan’s interests will be sacrificed in Washington for the sake of U.S.-China relations. This dynamic cannot become zero-sum. It is urgent that the United States and Japan develop strategic principles to maintain and adapt the U.S.-Japan alliance as power dynamics shift in the Asia-Pacific.US-Japan Alliance is Resilient US-Japan security alliance is on the brink and showing cracks Armitage and Nye, CSIS, 18(Richard and Joseph, “More Important than Ever Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” October 2018, , ADA Packet) JFN ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The United States has no better ally than Japan, and today the alliance is more important than ever. Due to the allies’ many strengths—which include shared values, robust democracies, innovative economies, geopolitical influence, and substantial military capabilities—the U.S.-Japan alliance is often labeled the cornerstone of regional peace and security. Yet, cracks are starting to show in the alliance. Renewing the U.S.-Japan alliance for the decades ahead will require tough decisions and sustained implementation. Preserving the peaceful and prosperous regional and international order environment that the allies seek will require that the United States and Japan work more closely with key regional partners, to include Australia, South Korea, India, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and others. The agenda outlined here would build on the important work done to date to better prepare the alliance—and the world—for the remainder of the 21st century.US-India Relations Are Resilient US-India relations are on the brink nowPress Trust of India, 7-17-19(“India-US ties at tipping point, must manage trade tensions urgently: Report,” accessed 8-12-19, , ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****A strong commitment to improve the bilateral trade relationship and build a sound foundation for future successes can start now, it said, adding that the current state of play suggests that the two countries were now at a crossroads, with one direction leading to an initial bilateral agreement, and the other to outright conflict.Cooperation Solves for Space Races/Space Tensions Extend the Cheng 09 evidence, the link only goes one direction:--For Japan, the US is the essential guarantor of its security. ANY move by the US that undermines this perception tanks relations and makes the US look unreliable. --Unilateral US-Sino space cooperation, without consulting Japan first, creates a “space shock” that destroys relations and sparks an Asian space race. --US-Sino space cooperation sends mixed signals to India, because US-India space cooperation is still limited and the plan would be perceived as US “double dealing” by the Indian government. Space cooperation doesn’t moderate Chinese behavior Cheng, Senior Research Fellow for the Asian Studies Center, 15(Dean, with the Heritage Foundation, February 18th, “Jeffrey L. Fiedler and Senator James M. Talent Hold a Hearing on China's Space and Counterspace Programs, Panel 1”, p. Nexis Uni, ADA Packet) JFN****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Let me first note, I don't think anyone is claiming that we can stop China's space program. Although I do find it intriguing that Joan, at the same time, argues that no one can stop the Chinese space program from progressing however they're going to progress which is certainly true. But that somehow by offering cooperation, we can create stakeholders within the Chinese system if they aren't stakeholders already. And let me note here that when we are talking about stakeholders, this goes with fundamental question about cooperation, which is, who is exactly is IT are we cooperating with. As of right now, here we are eight years after the Chinese ASAT test of 2007, I'm not sure anyone can tell us who actually made that decision. Walk us through. We know who ultimately fired these systems. And let me note here, that at the time, there were some fascinating arguments being made including by some realists, that this may have been evidence of a rogue PLA. The PLA just did it on its own. You know, maybe there weren't even, you know, the political authorities didn't know. Why? Because the foreign ministry didn't know, except, of course, that within the Chinese political structure, foreign ministry is actually largely irrelevant which makes them very different from our national security council and foreign policymaking structure, or even the old Soviet Politburo. And that goes to the second point here, which is where do civilian space authorities, presumably the stakeholders who would like cooperation to facilitate understanding and joint hogwash (ph) and do all those other things. Where do they sit within this system? The reality is that they seemed to have very little voice. Do we think that offering cooperation is going to somehow make them -- give them a seat at the table? What you would think that the foreign minister in their system already would have a seat at the table, and yet, there's very, very good evidence that I don't think there are too many China analysts out there who would argue that the foreign minister has anywhere near the kind of authorities that we would want.China won’t follow norms in spaceYang, 18(Yang, Adam., Adam Yang is a Major in the U.S. Marine Corp and a student at the Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. The opinions expressed in this piece are his own. 3-16-2018, "How Should the US Engage China in Space?", accessed 8-5-2019, , ADA Packet) JCW****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Deriving Strategic Insights from Sea to Space To derive strategic insights from the maritime environment for the space domain, this article surveys how China: 1) applies force, 2) manipulates laws, 3) shapes the environment, 4) cooperates internationally, and 5) conducts diplomacy. First, China possesses three major maritime agencies that apply force in order to protect and pursue its interests: the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the Maritime Law Enforcement Forces that include the Coast Guard, and the Maritime Militia. As Andrew Erickson notes, each agency represents the largest of its kind globally. The PLAN commands over 300 ships (whereas U.S. Navy has 277 as of 2017) and its Coast Guard has over 1,200 ships. In their research on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, scholars Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty find that China utilized its military and paramilitary forces 148 times from 1995 to 2013 – more than all other active claimants (Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan) combined in the same period. Their research concluded that as China’s capabilities increased, Beijing was more likely to use force to advance its interests and less likely to defer to legal or multilateral solutions. From a space perspective, U.S. policymakers can surmise that if China had a comparable offensive capability in the space domain, it might also prefer utilizing force to challenge rivals over other means. Though China currently does not have an offensive space capability on par with the scale of its maritime forces, the U.S. Department of Defense 2017 Annual Report to Congress asserted that the PLA is aggressively acquiring a range of counterspace capabilities. Given the fact that there are no international limitations on developing ground-based counterspace weapons, China may pursue an equivalent path of developing a high quantity of systems to overwhelm adversaries during conflict. Second, China could reinterpret laws as a pretext to apply force. In the maritime domain, China reinterprets the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to challenge U.S. freedom of navigation patrols through the South China Sea. China claims waters extending past 12 nautical miles and into the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), saying that foreign states must refrain from threatening the “territorial integrity or political independence” of the owning state. Concurrently, in 1992, China promulgated domestic maritime laws that extended its sovereign claims and deemed the commercial or research activities of other states illegal in contested waters. The international community at large does not recognize this reimagining of the EEZ; however, it does provide China some legal footing and domestic cover to deploy maritime forces in this region. Similarly, the Central Military Commission is exploring the legalities for the use of force in space. PLA doctrine proclaims the need to destroy, damage, or disrupt an adversary’s space capability to secure victory in the information space. Nationally, China codified its security strategy of active defense – using defensive counterattacks in order to spoil the offensive actions of an adversary – in its National Security Law of 2015. By watching the evolution of China’s space-related domestic laws or reinterpretations of international laws, U.S. policymakers may find China strategically telegraphing its intentions through legal maneuvering. Third, when China feels international laws are unfavorable, it may create an alternate framework that advances its own interests. Shortly after a tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague ruled against China’s activities in the South China Sea in 2016, China announced that it would create a “maritime judicial center” and a “maritime arbitration center” to promote its own vision for maritime law. China claimed that this endeavor would advance the nation’s role as a maritime power and support the development of its Belt Road Initiative. Skeptics assert that China initiated this endeavor to harden its claims on disputed territories and to divert cases away from UNCLOS courts. By doing so, China can create legal precedents to interpret international maritime laws and begin to undermine the international maritime system framed around UNCLOS. In the space arena, China is not anywhere close to rearranging an entire judicial system around its views; however, it actively participates in international space organizations and introduces measures that could limit the ability for the United States to project force. Through the United Nations, China and Russia have twice (2008 and 2014) proposed the legally binding Treaty of Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The primary U.S. objections to the treaty were that it did not include verification mechanisms, only applied to space-based weapons, and did not include ground based ASAT weapons – a primary counterspace capability China is advancing. Fourth, policymakers could also examine China’s maritime cooperation initiatives to envision potential space cooperation. China’s counterpiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden has slowly emerged as a valuable mechanism to improve U.S.-China cooperation as seen through the counterpiracy exercises of December 2014. On a grander scale in June 2017, China laid out an ambitious vision for cooperation in relation to the “Maritime Silk Road” as part of its larger Belt and Road Initiative. This plan envisions the establishment of cooperative principles, environmental norms, maritime security, and “collaborative governance” to achieve mutual prosperity. If one believes in China’s sincerity, working cooperatively across these lines could greatly reduce security tensions and set conditions for long-term mutual gain. Subsequently, China is pursuing international cooperation in space – not only for security and economic reasons, but also to bolster the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party to domestic and international audiences. The European Space Administration (ESA) has already expressed desires to cooperate with China on human space flight and the use of its future space station. China especially values its relationship with ESA due to the opportunities to trade and transfer technologies denied by the United States. China and Russia have also agreed to cooperate on human space flight and deep space exploration. Though these initiatives are not on the scale of a Maritime Silk Road, they do offer U.S. policymakers opportunities to work with a rising space power for positive ends. Finally, the United States should pay attention to China’s diplomatic and engagement efforts with other nations. Contrary to the cooperative tenets for a Maritime Silk Road, in 2016, China convinced Cambodia to block an Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) joint statement that recognized The Hague’s arbitration ruling on the South China Sea dispute in favor of the Philippines. In June 2017, Vietnam resisted China’s demands to vacate an oil venture within its EEZ, but eventually capitulated when China threatened to use force. The most concerning aspect for Vietnam was an atypical silence from its neighbors – particularly from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore. Apparently, China’s political and economic leverage over these nations prevented them from publicly sympathizing with Vietnam or rebuking China’s actions. Seemingly, when pressed, China uses soft and hard power tactics bilaterally to dislodge multilateral initiatives that counter it interests. Could China disrupt the U.S.-European alliance as it did with ASEAN unity? At this stage, Chinese-European cooperation in space seems well intentioned. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers should consider whether China’s growing space relations with Europe, Russia, or any other space power could complicate U.S. interests in other areas. As China strengthens its partnerships, its ability to shape laws, institutions and the strategic preferences of others increase as well. ................
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