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[Pages:207]THE MARINES IN VIETNAM 1954-197 3

An Anthology an d Annotated Bibliography

Second Editio n HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIO N HEADQUARTERS, U . S . MARINE CORP S

WASHINGTON, D .C . 1985

Volumes in the Marine Corps Vietnam Series

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotate d Bibliography, 1974 ; reprinted 198 3

U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 197 7

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, The Landing and the Buildup, 197 8 U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, An Expanding War, 198 2 U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1984

In Preparation U.S . Marines in Vietnam, January-May 1968 U.S. Marines in Vietnam, June-December 1968 U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1969 U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1970-197 1 U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1971-1973 U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1973-1975

Functional Histories Serie s Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962-1971, 198 5 U.S. Marine Corps Aviation In Southeast Asia, 1962-1975, in preparation

Library of Congress Card No . 77-60477 6

PCN 190 003093 00

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U .S . Government Printing Office Washington, D .C . 20402

Foreword

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, based on articles that appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, and Marine Corp s Gazette, has served well for 14 years as an interim reference on the Vietnam War . It has both complemented and supplemented our official histories on Marine operations in Vietnam . Since it s publication in 1974, however, events in Vietnam and the appearance of additional significant articles in the three periodicals have made both the anthology and bibliography somewhat dated . This expanded edition extends the coverage of the anthology to 1975 and the entries in the bibliograph y to 1984 .

The editors have added 10 articles to the 13 that appeared in the first edition . One article on fir e bases in the original has not been included . The format remains basically the same . The first 16 ac counts give a chronological presentation of the Marine participation in the Vietnam War, from on e lone Marine advisor in 1954, through the buildup and withdrawal of major forces, the "Easter Offensive" of 1972, the evacuation of U .S . citizens from both Phnom Penh and Saigon, and th e Mayaguez incident in May 1975 . In the second group, the remaining six articles are arrange d topically . They concern aviation, logistics, civil affairs, Navy medical support, amphibious doctrine , and maritime support . Part II of the publication is an annotated bibliography of articles fro m 1954-1984, prepared by the Vietnam writers in the Histories Section . Although recognizing that many fine articles pertaining to Marines in Vietnam have appeared in numerous other periodicals , the History and Museums Division, because of limitations of time and resources, confined its atten-

tion to the three aforementioned publications . I wish to thank the editors of the Proceedings, Review, and Gazette for their support and coopera -

tion in permitting the reproduction of these articles . These publications made a significant contribution to the record of the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War by originall y publishing these articles . Reproducing these pieces in our anthology will yield a further dividend .

S:' 5F,dl- e

sove&!n

E . H . SIMMON S Brigadier General, U . S . Marine Corps (Ret . ) Director of Marine Corps History and Museum s

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Prefac e

The opening article of this anthology concerns itself with the beginnings of the Marine involvement in Vietnam following the Geneva Accords in July 1954, which ended the French war with th e Communist Viet Minh and resulted in the de facto partition of the country at the 17th Parallel . Colonel Victor J . Croizat, who served as the first U .S . Marine advisor to the South Vietnamese Marin e Corps, discusses the origins of both the South Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps . Althoug h authorized in October 1954, the first headquarters of the Vietnamese Marine Corps was not established until the following May . By this time, the French political and military influenc e throughout South Vietnam was waning and the American influence increasing . Thus Colone l Croizat concludes that the South Vietnamese Marine Corps, unlike the Navy (which had bee n established by the French in 1952), has been "almost wholly a creation of the United States . . . . The initial consolidation of Corps units into two battalions, the later formation of a three-battalion regiment, and the eventual evolution of the brigade structure all owe their realization to the U .S . advisory effort ." However, he also notes that " . . . the decisions that have brought them to their pre sent status were made by the Vietnamese themselves . "

A new phase of Marine participation began in 1962, six years after Colonel Croizat's departure i n 1956 . Following President Kennedy's decision in January 1962 to expand the U .S . advisory effort with the establishment of the U .S . Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the first Marine tactical unit deployed to Vietnam in April . Marine helicopters belonging to Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-362 (HMM-362), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Archie J . Clapp, lifte d off the deck of the USS Princeton (LPH-5) and landed at the Soc Trang base located in South Vietnam 's Mekong Delta . Organized into a task element code-named Shufly, the Marine helicopter s provided support to the South Vietnamese units combating the Viet Cong . Lieutenant Colone l Clapp in the second article appearing in this series describes the experiences of his squadron in a counter-insurgency environment .

The third article, co-authored by Jack Shulimson, the Senior Vietnam Historian in the Histor y and Museums Division, and Major Edward F . Wells, a platoon leader in Vietnam and a forme r historical writer with the division, gives a general overview of the commitment of major Marin e combat units to the war during the period 1965-71 . The Marines provided the first major U .S . ground units sent to Vietnam and implemented a strong pacification program . By 1967, the 3 d Marine Division was strung out in fixed defensive positions along the Demilitarized Zone dividin g the two Vietnams and fighting a more or less conventional war against the North Vietnamese Army . The 1st Marine Division continued the counterinsurgency war in the Da Nang area of operations . Shulimson and Wells observe that after defeating the North Vietnamese regulars in the "DMZ" i n 1968-69, Marine operations focused more clearly on the pacification campaign south of Da Nang : "After four years of inconclusive combat . . . the United States began its disengagement from Vietnam . Marines were among the first to leave . "

In the next four articles, Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons, currently the Director of Marin e Corps History and Museums, who served in various staff and command billets during two tours i n Vietnam, presents, in contrast to the Shulimson and Wells piece, detailed annual accounts o f Marine operations .

General Simmons in his first article traces the evolution of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigad e into the III Amphibious Force (III MAF) . Lieutenant General Lewis W . Walt's III MAF by April 1966 consisted of two Marine divisions and a reinforced aircraft wing and was responsible for all U .S . operations in I Corps Tactical Zone, the five northern provinces of South Vietnam . During thi s period, the Marine role expanded from a limited defensive mission for the Da Nang Air base in early 1965 to a fully balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification .

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General Simmons discusses the resulting development in command relations and the so-called differences between the "Army" and " Marine " strategies . During 1966 the Marine effort was hampered by two events . The first was the political upheaval caused by the removal of General Nguyen Chan h Thi, the I Corps Tactical Commander . The second event was the infiltration through the DMZ o f regular North Vietnamese battalions and regiments into Quang Tri Province . The 3d Marine Division deployed north into Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces to meet this new challenge in Opera-

tions Hastings and Prairie while the 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for the thre e southern provinces of I Corps (Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai) .

In the second of his four articles, General Simmons continues the narrative of Marine operation s through 1967 . He discusses the controversies over the " McNamara Wall," the M-16 rifle, and th e CH-46 helicopter as well as covering the major operations and the continuing buildup . By the en d of the year, Marine strength in Vietnam had risen from approximately 68,000 in January to ove r 77,000 . In his concluding paragraph, General Simmons declares : "There was reason for optimism as 1967 ended . The enemy had elected to make the northern provinces of I Corps Tactical Zone th e main battle area and each time he had attempted to take the offensive he had been badly beaten . With the movement of U .S . Army troops into I Corps, an acceptable troop density had been achieved . Pacification efforts . . . appeared to be regaining momentum . "

Quoting General Westmoreland, General Simmons calls 1968 the year of decision . The year opened with the enemy's Tet offensive with strong strikes at Da Nang, Hue, and just south of the DMZ . In countering this sudden conflagration, U .S . forces in I Corps reached 52 battalions (2 4 Marine and 28 U .S . Army) . General Simmons comments that Lieutenant General Robert E . Cushman, Jr ., General Walt's successor, was commanding the equivalent of a field army . In his article, General Simmons discusses the expansion of allied forces, command relationships and changes , as well as describing the big battles such as the defense of Khe Sanh . He concludes with the observation that the first half of 1968 was marked by the greatest combat activity of the war but that afte r August the enemy " gave up on his pursuit of military victory through large-scale attacks an d reverted to small-unit attack and harassment with mortar and rocket fire ." By the end of the year , the Marines along with their South Vietnamese allies were making significant progress in pacification and the Marines began reducing some of their forces . The number of Marine infantry battalion s declined from 24 to 21 at year's end . III MAF strength was down from a peak of 85,250 i n September to approximately 81,000 at the end of December .

In his last article, General Simmons portrays the retraction of Marine Corps forces from Vietna m following 1968 . The year 1969 opens with substantial Marine forces still conducting large operation s while supporting the South Vietnamese pacification efforts . By the end of June, however, President Nixon had announced the first redeployment of American forces . Beginning with the departure of the 9th Marines, the entire 3d Marine Division was out of Vietnam by the end of the year . Throughout 1970 and early 1971, other Marine units left Vietnam in succeeding increments . On 1 4 April 1971, III MAF Headquarters departed for Okinawa, leaving behind the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade . Two months later, the brigade was deactivated . Residual Marine forces in Vietnam consisted of approximately 500 Marines, most of whom were performing essentially liaison, advisory, staff, and guard functions . Approximately 60 officers and men were advisors with the Vietnamese Marine Division which played a large role in the defensive actions incidental to the Nort h Vietnamese 1972 Easter offensive and in the later South Vietnamese counteroffensive . During thi s period, Marine helicopters from the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade on board Seventh Fleet ship ping supported the Vietnamese Marines . Two Marine fixed-wing aircraft groups, MAGs-12 and -15 , returned to Vietnam and supported the South Vietnamese forces . MAG-12 operated from Bien Ho a and MAG-15 later redeployed to Nam Phong in Thailand .

The next three accounts depict specific operations during 1968 and 1969 . Captain George R . Christmas commanded Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines during the recapture of Hue i n 1968 . In his article, Captain Christmas concludes that the major lesson of the Battle of Hue wa s " that imagination and aggressiveness are the best weapons in our arsenal ." Major General Raymon d

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