Principles f Modern olitical
Principles f Modern olitical
cience
CJOHARI
vvrrii
/
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCESTERLING PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED
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Principles of Modern Political Science
©1989,J.C.Johari
ISBN: 81 207 09349
First Edition 1989
Reprint 1992,1994,1995,1996,1997,2001,2002,2003,2004
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PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
J.C JOHARI
M.A., LL.B., PH.D.
STERLING PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED1. 2.
3. 4. 5. 6.
7. 8.
9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
18. 19.
Other Books by the Same Author
Reflections on Indian Politics Naxalite Politics in India Comparative Politics Political Thought—Ancient and Medieval Political Thought—Modern (Machiavelli to Marx) Major Modern Political Systems (UK, USA, USSR, China, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, France and Japan) Contemporary Political Theory International Relations and Politics (Theoretical Perspective) International Relations and Politics (Diplomatic History between Two World Wars) Indian Government and Politics Indian Politics
Great Radical Humanist—M.N. Roy 5TWT
Respectfully Dedicated
to Prof. Frank Thakurdas
(1913-1988) —my esteemed friend, philosopher and guide
Foundations of Political Science
Indian Freedom Movement, Constitution and
Administration
\ For
y Pre-Univ.
] Classes
j
Edited Books
1. Indian Freedom Movement and Thought (1919—1929) by Dr. Lai Bahadur
2. Indian Freedom Movement and Thought (1930—1947) by Dr. R.C. Gupta
3. Struggle for Pakistan (1906-47) by Dr. Lai Bahadur
4. Introduction to International Relations by Pierre-Marie Martin
5. Litrnduction to the Methods of Social Sciences by Jean Louis Loubet del Bayle
6. The History of the Indian National Congress
by Dt. Pattabhi Sitaramayya (Abridged Version)PREFACE
Man is a social and political creature by his nature and necessity. This simple dictum signifies that the pattern of collective life under some form of authority or control is as old as human life itself. Besides, as a rational and an intelligent being, man has always thought in terms of improving the pattern of his collective and regulated behaviour of life. Cooperation and competition, concord and conflict, war and peace have been the twin features of man's social and political existence. A study of such phenomena in their past, present and future perspectives has led to the evolution of various social sciences. Politics or Political Science—the 'master science' as designated by Aristotle—is One of them that deals with the subject of man in relation to the phenomenon of rule, control, authority, power. It covers many ancillary issues like sovereignty, citizenship, obedience, obligation, punishment, resistance, revolution and the like. The task of a political scientist is to understand 'political reality' and then critically describe it so that the underlying 'principles of political behaviour' hinging on the basic issue of 'man versus state' may be laid down.
However, it should be emphasised that 'political reality' covers both 'facts' and 'value system'. As such, a student of political science should be concerned with describing the underlying principles of political behaviour in their empirical as well as normative dimensions. Besides, some place should be assigned to the evaluation of existing political reality in the light of future perspective. If so, the term 'theory' should be understood in broad as well as narrow senses. It may be regarded as a set of propositions designed to explain something with reference to available data or inter-relations that may be manifest directly or indirectly. At the same time, it also covers the element of 'prediction', provided it follows from such an explanation the type of which we may see in the case of Marxian socialism. Thus, a study of this kind, in the words of Arnold Brecht, "comprises a thinker's entire teaching on a subject, including his description of the facts, his explanations (whether religious, philosophical, or empirical), his conception of history, his value judgments, and his proposals of goals, of policy, and of principles."
Recently, the courses of many universities have been revised so asVlll
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
to include new theories, concepr% approaches and several other themes, developed particularly by the American writers in the period following World War II, so as to give a scientific character to the study of this subject. Inter-disciplinary focus has become so popular that the implications of the themes of various social sciences have penetrated into the domain of each other. It has had its natural effect on the development of the scone of political theory. Now political science is not confined to the study of state and government, it has become a study of power and struggle for its sake it any level whether local, regional, national, international. Thus, the study of non-state areas has been an important factor in the expanding horizons of this subject. It is due to this that several new topics have been included in this work. I ardently hope that this humble venture will serve well the requirements of those offering this course at the graduate and post-graduate levels and also those preparing it for various competitive examinations.
We learn not only from our teachers and the books we read, we also get much from great figures we come across. The words of such persons come to us in the form of gems of wisdom, though it depends upon our own capacity to preserve them as well as to transmit them to the coming generations with certain amplifications. I had the benefit of this kind by virtue of my long association with Prof. Frank Thakurdas and so I take the opportunity of respectfully dedicating this book to him. Thanks are due to Dr. R.B. Jain, Professor of Political Science, University of Delhi, for giving me useful suggestions from time to time in the light of which some portions of this book have been suitably amended. In the end. I express my gratitude to my Publisher who managed to bring this book out in record time.
—J.C. JOHARI
Saroj Bhavan,
II A, 112, Nehru Nagar,
Ghaziabad-201001.
Phone: 8-712825
CONTENTS
Preface
1. Political Science
Political Science : Meaning and Nature
Scope of Political Science
New Meaning of Political Science
Politics as the Study of Power
Liberal versus Marxist Views of Politics
Behavioural and Post-Behavioural Revolutions
Political Science as a Science
Methods of Political Science—Historical, Observational,
Experimental, Comparative Political Science and Other Social Sciences—Relationship
with History, Economics, Sociology, Psychology,
Ethics Significance of the Study of Political Science
2. The State—Elements, Nature, Functions and End
Meaning and Elements of State
Principal Distinctions—State distinguished from Society,
Government, Associations, and Nation Nature of State—Juridical Theory, Organismic Theory,
Marxian Theory, Idealist Theory Functions of State—Liberal View, Marxist View Purpose and End of State Political System—Meaning, Analysis of Easton, Analysis
of Almond, Criticism
Pages
53
3. Origin and Historical Development of State
Divine Origin Theory
Genetic Theory
Force Theory
Social Contract Theory
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau
95141
175
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
A Note on Rousseau's Theory of General Will Marxist Theory Evolutionary Theory Historical Development of State
4. Sovereignty, Monism and Pluralism
Sovereignty—Meaning of Sovereignty, Characteristics of
Sovereignty, Kinds of Sovereignty Austin's Interpretations Varying Interpretations Monism Pluralism—Meaning of Pluralism, Essential Features,
Leading Thinkers, Criticism
5. Rights, Liberty and Equality
Rights—Meaning and Nature, Theories of Rights, Kinds
of Rights, Protection of Rights Liberty—Real Meaning and Nature, Kinds of Liberty,
Liberal Versus Marxist Views, Liberty and Authority Equality—Real Meaning and Nature, Kinds of Equalitv.
Liberal versus Marxist Interpretations, Relationship
between Liberty and Equality
6- Law, International Law and Justice
Law— Meaning, Sources, Kinds, Theories of the Origin and Nature of Law, Law and Liberty, Law and
Morality International Law—Meaning, Sources, Juristic Nature
of International Law, Problem of Codification,
Relationship between International Law and
Municipal Law Justice—Meaning and Nature, Theories of Justice, Kinds
of Justice
7. Political Obligation, Revolution and Punishment
Political Obligation—Meaning,Theories of
Political Obligation, Grounds of Resistance
Revolution—Meaning, Brinton's Anatomy of
Revolution, Marxist View, Functionalist View
Punishment—Meaning, Justification of Punishment
215
249
CONTENTS
XI
8. Concepts of Political Sociology
Political Development Political Under-development Political Modernisation Political Culture Political Socialisation Political Participation Political Recruitment Political Alienation Political Communication
9. Political Power, Its Operation and Justification
Political Power—Meaning, Power Theory in Politics, Marxian View, Liberal View
Political Ideology—Meaning Liberal View, Marxian View, Fascist View, End of Tdeology Debate
Political Elites—Meaning of Elites, Levels and Ranks of Elites, Leading Theorists, Elite Theory and Political Systems
Political Legitimacy and Effectiveness—Meaning of Political Legitimacy and Effectiveness, Weber's Analysis, Legitimacy and Power, Legitimacy and Conflict, Legitimacy and Ideology
10. Organisation of Government
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances
Separation of Powers, Checks and Balances,
Criticism Executive—Meaning, Kinds of Executive, Selection or
Recruitment, Tenure, Functions, Importance Bureaucracy—Meaning, Features of Bureaucracy,
Functions and Role, Concepts of Commitment
and Neutrality, Critical Estimate Legislature—Meaning, Tenure, Composition, Functions,
Unj-cameralism, Bi-cameralism, Decline Judiciary—Meaning and Necessity, Recruitment and
Functions, Conditions of Independence
11. Forms of Governments
Aristotle's Classification of States Modern Classification of Governments Monarchy—Meaning, Kinds, Criticism
275
322
355
407xu
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Aristocracy—Meaning, Criticism Dictatorship—Meaning, Emergence, Criticism Democracy Meaning, Kinds, Criticism, Future
and Conditions of Successful Working Federal Government—Meaning, Essential Conditions,
Criticism
Unitary Government—Meaning, Criticism Parliamentary Government—Meaning, Criticism Presidential Government—Meaning, Criticism
12. Mechanism of Democracy 466
Franchise or Suffrage
Universal Adult Franchise
Plural or Weighted Voting
Female Franchise
Election and Its Methods
Constituencies
Forms and Methods of Voting
Representation—Meaning, Representation and
Responsiveness, Role of Representative Varieties of Representation—Territorial, Functional,
Proportional. Minority
13. Democratic Theory
Classical Theory of Democracy Neo-Liberal Theory of Democracy Elite Theory of Democracy Pluralist Theory of Democracy
Downs' and Macpherson's Empirical Theory ot Democracy Marxist Theory of Democracy Post-Liberal Theory of Democracy
14. Constitution of State and Constitutionalism 534
Constitution—Meaning, Process of Growth, Kinds,
Necessity of a Good Constitution Constitutionalism—Meaning, Development, Liberal versus Marxist Notions, Problems and Prospects
15. Party System, Pressure Groups and Public Opinion 557
Party System—Meaning of Political Party, Origins and Determinants, Functions, Duverger's Analysis, Leadership of a Political Party, Kinds of Party System, Critical Appreciation
499
CONTENTS
Pressure Groups—Meaning, Difference between Political
Parties and Pressure Groups, Kinds, Role,
Critical Appraisal Public Opinion—Meaning, Crystallisation and Formation
New Interpretations, Agencies of Formation,
Significance
16. Nationalism, Internationalism and Imperialism
Nationalism—Meaning of Nation, Western Versus Eastern Implications, Essential Elements, National Self-Determination, Criticism
Internationalism—Meaning, International Organisations, League of Nations, United Nations
Imperialism—Meaning, Degrees and Forms, Growth and Dimensions, Decline and End, Criticism
17. Socialism and Its Varieties
Socialism—Meaning, Arguments, Criticism
Utopian Socialism
Revisionism or Evolutionary Socialism
Fabianism or English Variety of Socialism
Syndicalism
Guild Socialism
Anarchism
18. Scientific Socialism
Marxism—Dialectical Materialism, Historical
Materialism, Class War, Labour Theory of
Value, Inevitability of Revolution Leninism—State, Communist Party, Revolution,
Imperialism, Lenin as a Marxist Stalinism—Socialism in One Country, Dictatorship of
the Communist Party, Permanent Totalitarianism Maoism—Contradictions, New Democracy and New
Economy, Revolution, Mao as a Marxist Communism—Theoretical Dimension, Practical
Dimension, Transitional Stage, Final Stage Euro-communism
19. Liberalism, Fascism and Idealism 1
Liberalism —Meaning, Classical versus ModernXIV
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
' Liberalism, Criticism Individualism—Meaning, Arguments, Criticism
Modern Individualism
Utilitarianism—Meaning, Features, Criticism Fascism—Meaning, Features, Criticism Idealism—Meaning, Features, Criticism
20. Gandhism and Sarvodaya
Gandhism—Philosophical Anarchism, Non-Violence, Satyagraha, Trusteeship, Ends and Means, Internationalism, Religion and Politics, Swaraj, Swadeshi, Significance
Sarvodaya—Meaning, Philosophical and Ethical Implications, Economic Implications, Political Implications, Criticism
Bibliography index
810
841 850
LIST OF TABULAR ILLUSTRATIONS
5. 6. 7.
8. 9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
23.
24. 25. 26. 27. 28.
29.
30. 31. 32. 33. 34.
35. 36.
Range and Variety of Political Science Scope of Political Science
Traditional, Behavioural and Post-Behavioural Political Science
Germino on the Uses and Relevance of Political
Theory/Philosophy in the Light of Classics
Maclver on Functions of State
Wilson on Functions of State
A Comparative Illustration of the Views of Hobbes,
Locke and Rousseau
4
5
27
51
81
83
118-19
Kinds of Rights Kinds of Liberty Kinds of Equality
Relationship between Liberty and Equality Kinds of Law
Varieties of Revolution—Non-Marxist Versus Marxist Indices of Political Development and Decay Kinds of Executive Commandments of Officialdom Aristotle's Classification of States -Leacock'a Classification of Governments Meaning, Causes, Kinds and Nature of Dictatorship Bryce on Merits and Demerits of a Federal System Arguments in Favour of Proportional Representation Wilson, Munro and Patterson on Functions of Political Parties
Sait on Merits and Lowell on Demerits of Party System Five Ingredients of Democratic Socialism Kolakowski on Main Tenets of Utopian Socialism Main Arguments of Bernstein Basis of Fabian Society
A New Statement of Socialist Principles of British Labour Party in 1958
Principles of Empirical Collectivism of New Deal
in the United States
Socialism and Communism—A Marxist Interpretation
Totalitarianism
Ebenstein on Elements of Fascism
Main Points of Idealism
Principles of Non-Violence and Conditions for its Successful Working
Essentials of Satyagraha in Action 820-21
Distinctive Features of Indian Socialism 839
185 194 210 213 220 263 278 364 380 409 412 426-27 450 495 568
584 652-53 661 664 674 674-75
675
760-61 792
796-97 804
816-17Certainly the state of political theory is today healthy; certainly the health must depend on rejection of the constraints of the past. Two things seem evident in the end: the health depends on allowing a great variety... and the health depends on the faith of political theorists that they have something of their own to say....
—Michael Freeman and David Robertson1
In common language, at the level of general understanding, one would imagine that any political theory merely attempts to explain generalisations leaving the larger political questions of how to improve the world out of its purview to the reformer or politician. Alternatively, Marx insists upon the unity of thought and action. Political theory emerges from political practice end the latter would shape its contents. Though the reader of political philosophy has a challenge, i.e., to make up his mind and think for himself which of the two points of view represented by Marx and Hegel is satisfactory for him.
—Frank Thakurdas2
TTneman and Robertson: "Introduction: The Rebirth of a Daphne in their (ed.): The Frontiers of Political Theory (Sussex: Heritage IWi). P- "• 2. Thakurdas: Essays in Political Thegry (Delhi: Gitanjali, 1982), P- "•
1
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Political Science, in mid-twentieth century is a discipline in search of its identity. Through the efforts to solve this identity crisis it has begun to show evidence of emerging as an autonomous and independent discipline with a Systematic theoretical structure of its own. The factor that has contributed most to this end has been the reception and integration of the methods of science into the core of the discipline.
—David Easton1
Disciplines originate and grow over the period of time; new researches are made and now dimensions added thereto. It happens in the spheres of all sciences, whether natural or social. If physics has made much development from the times of Galileo and New ton to those of Pianck and Einstein and economics has much changed from the days of Adam Smith and Marshall to those of Keynes and Hicks, so is the case of politics (or political science as now popularly called) that has seen remarkable strides from the days of Plato an4 Aristotle in ancient to those of Laski and Lasswell in present times. A peculiar feature of this development, however, should be traced in the fact that social sciences have borrowed much from the natural sciences in the present century owing to their craze for 'scientism'. The result is that, like other social sciences, political science has also been 'scientised' to some extent by the leading lights of the 'behavioural revolution.' It has had its own impact on changing the character of the subject from a largely normative into a largely empirical direction. So Easton observes: "By the turn of the twentieth century, however, as political science blossomed into a separate area of specialisation, it had lost its ethically creative quality."2
Political Science: Meaning and Nature
Though known by several names as 'politics' (Aristotle), 'political science' (William Godwin\and Mary Wollstonecraft), 'science of state' (R.G. Gettell) and 'science of politics' (Sir Fredrick Pollock), this
1. Easton: "Political Science" in David I. Sills (ed.).' International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, p. 282.
2. Ibid., p. 293.PRINCIPLES'OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
subject lacks a precise nomenclature.3 In very simple terms, this subject is defined as a study of state and government. The English word 'politics' originates from three Greek words likepolis (city-state), polity (government) and politeia (constitution). As such, politics, in the original Greek sense, is a study of the city-state and its administration in practical as well as philosophical terms. However, the point of difficulty at this stage is that the term 'politics' is taken by the lexicons and the writers of text-books both as a science and an art. The difficulty is further increased when we take note of the fact that ever since Hobbes identified it with 'power' and Auguste Comte popularised the trend of 'positivism', the original Greek meaning of 'politics' became outdated. Hence, Gilchrist is not wrong in his assessment that the term 'polities', when used in its original Greek sense, "is unobjectionable, but since modern usage has given it a new meaning, it is useless as a scientific term."4
Politics, as generally understood, is the study of state and government. But some confusion is created when eminent writers like Jellinek, Willoughby and Pollock draw a line of distinction between its 'theoretical' or 'academic' and 'practical' or 'applied' dimensions. This distinction shows that while some topics relating to the origin, nature, purposes and ends of the state form part of 'theory ' polities', others relating to the actual administration of the affair: government belong to the sphere of applied politics. In other woras, while the term 'theoretical politics' refers to the fundamental characteristics of the state without reference to its activities or the means by which its ends are attained, the term 'applied politics' refers to the state in action or state considered as a dynamic institution.5
The state is a very complex affair and it may be studied from different points of view. The economists, the psychologists, the sociologists, the historicans and the jurists all study state from their
3. Jellinek remarks that there is no science which is so much in need of a good terminology as is political science. Lowell holds that the study of politics "lacks the first essentials of a modern science, a nomenclature incomprehensible to educated men."' Referring to the amount of confusion created by different nomenclatures of this subject, Garner says: "This is regrettable, because it often leads to confusion and misunderstanding, such as one does not encounter in the literature of the natural sciences, where the terminology employed is more precise and exact." Political Science and Government, p. 2.
4. R.N. Gilchrist: Principles of Political Science, p. 2.
5. Garner, op. cit., p. 4.
POLITICAL SCIENCE ' 3
own points of view. The reason is that state has diverse aspects and each social science deals with one of its particular aspects. If so, it is suggested by some French writers like Du Sablon, Von Mohl and Lewis that in stead of using the term 'political science' (in a singular sense), we should use the term 'political sciences' (in a plural sense). Thus, according to this view, political science is one which is concerned, not necessarily with the state in all of its aspects of relations, but with any particular phenomenon of the state or any class of phenomena either as a whole or incidentally, directly or indirectly. Thus, there "may be as many political sciences as there are conceivable aspects or forms of manifestation of the state."6
The last difficulty in this connection is that the two terms 'political science' and 'politics' are used interchangeably, though a line of distinction between the two may be drawn. One may say that politics conveys ihe sense of political science in its practical form. Garner says that while the term 'politics' is used to describe the activities by which public officials are chosen and political policies promoted or, in a wider sense, the sum-total of the activities which have to do with the actual administration of public affairs, the term 'political science' i$ used to deicribe the body of knowledge relating to the phenomena of state.7 Again, the term 'political science' "has come to be more generally employed by the best writers and thinkers to describe the mass of knowledge derived from the systematic study of the state", while the meaning of the term 'politics' is confined to that of "the business or activity which has to do with the actual conduct of affairs of state."8
In other words, it may be said that while political science is a body of knowledge about the state in its various manifestations, politics refers to the actual operation of a political system. Politics is thus related to the art of statesmanship and diplomacy and, as such, it is an art. But political science is concerned with the fundamental principles of state and government and, as such, it is more of a science. So it is pointed out that the term 'politics' "now-a-days refers to the current problems of government which is often as not are more economic in character than political in the scientific sense. When we speak of a man as interested in politics, we mean that he is interested in the current problems of the day, in tariff questions, in labour questions, in the relations of the executive to the legislature,
6. Ibid., p. 6.
7. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
8. Ibid., pp. 4-5.PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Range and Variety of Political Science*
Theoretical Politics
Applied Politics
A. Theory of the State Origin of Polity
(a) Historical
(b) Rational Constitution
Classification of forms government
Political Sovereignty
of
B. Theories of Government Forms of institutions
Representative and Ministerial Government Executive Departments
Defence and order Revenue and Taxation Wealth of Nations Province and Limits of Executive Law
C. Theory of Legislation
Objects of legislation
General Character and Division of Positive Law (Philosophy of Law or General Jurisprudence)
Method and Sanction of Laws Interpretation and Administration
Language and Style (Mechanics of Law-making)
D. Theory of the State as Artificial Person
Relation to Other States and Bodies of men
International Law
A. The State
Existing forms of Government Confederations and Federal State
Independence
Protectorates and extra-territorial jurisdiction
B. Government Constitutional law and usage Parliamentary systems
Cabinet and Ministerial responsibility
Administrative Constitutions Army, Navy, Police Currency, Budget, Trade
State regulation or non-interference
C. Laws and Legislation Legislative procedure (Embodiment of theory in legislative forms: memorandum, expose des motifs etc.) Parliamentary drafting
Jurisprudence of particular States
Courts of Justice and their machinery
Judicial precedents and authority
D. The State Personified
Diplomacy, Peace and War, Conference, Treaties and Conventions
International agreements for furtherance of justice, commerce, communications etc.
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Scope of Political Science
Broad Themes*
Main Topics"
1. Political Theory
(i) Political Theory (ii) History of Political Ideas
2. Government
(i) Constitution (ii) National Government (iii) Regional and Local
Government
(iv) Public Administration (v) Economic and Social
Functions of Government (vi) Comparative Political Institutions
3. Parties, Groups and Public Opinion
(i) Political Parties (ii) Groups and Associations (iii) Citizen Participation in Government and AdminiV tration (iv) Public Opinion
4. International Relations (i) International Politics
(ii) International Organisation
and Administration (iii) International Law
♦Report of the UNESCO Committee for the Constitution of the Internationa] Political Science Association, see W.A. Robson: The University Teazhing of Social Scienzes— Political Science, Appendix III, p. 183.
1. Origin and Developn States
2. Description, analysis an parison of their presen titutions
3. Governmental structure tical processes and sys law
4. Regulations imposed b} upon individuals and including the regulat business, social relatio education
5. Technical processes and cies through which la enacted, administered, ced and adjudicated
6. Organisation and activi political parties and p groups
7. Nature of public opinic propaganda
8. Relations (political, eco cultural, ideological) b states and the attem regularise and contro' relations by means o national law and or tions.
**CC. Rodee, C.Q, Christc T.J. Anderson: Jntroducl Political Science, p. 5.
*Sir Fredrick Pollock; An Introduetion to the History of the Science of Politics (London Macmillan, 1923), pp. 99-100.6 PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
in any question, in fact, which requires, or is supposed to require, the attention of the law-makers of the country."9
In order to arrive at a satisfactory definition of the term political science, we may come to conclude that in spite of the problem of its precise nomencature, its use in theoretical and applied forms, its connotation in singluar and plural senses, and above all, its distinction with politics, the fundamental point of agreement is that it is a science of the state. It is a branch of social sciences dealing with the theory, organisation, government and practice of the state.10 So Garner says: "In short, political science begins and ends with the state In a general way, its fundamental problems include, first, an investigation of the origin and nature of the state; second, an inquiry into the nature, history and forms of political institutions; and, third, a deduction thereform, so far as possible, of the laws of political growth and development."11 It is also desirable that the term political science should be viewed in a broad way so as to include 'political' (power-seeking) behaviour in or by groups, organisations and institutions which are more or less distinct from the state but which seek to influence public policy and the direction of social change."12
Scope of Political Science
It is not an easy job to determine precisely the boundary lines of political science in view of the fact that there is no aspect of our common life which may not sometimes and somehow become political.13 The subject covers a very comprehensive field that makes its character dynamic. It studies state and government in relation to their past and present and also throws some focus on their probable development in time to come. Addition to its scope has been done by 'power theorists' like Hobbes of England, Weber of Germany and Merriam of America. The new view is that the discussion about the sources and purposes of power is as important as a study of its exercise. It may, however, be clarified at this stage that in the study of political science, power is not taken only in its coercive form, its moral basis and the influence of such ideas over men loom large in the philosophy and psychology of politics. Moreover, such a study
9. Gilchrist, op. cit., p. 2.
10. E.C. Smith and A.J. Zurcher (ed.s): A Dictionary of American Politics, p. 238.
11. Garner, op. cit., p. 9.
12. Rodee, Christol and Anderson: Introduction to Political Science, p. 4.
13. R.H. SoXteu: Introduction to Politics, p. 1.
POLITICAL SCIENCE
informs a student of this subject to make an examination of institutions such as trade unions, churches business corporation; that play an important role in the struggle for power.14
According to traditional view, political science is a study state in its past, present and future aspects. In other words, scope of this subject we study state as it has been, as it is, am may be (or should be) in time to time. First of all, we take up th of the study of state as it has been in the past. Here a political sc looks like an historian concerned with the origin and evolut authority. He makes a survey of the beginning of organised po life, a consideration of the evolution of political forms from sim] complex as well as a study of constitutional history. It involves a study of various currents of political thought as well < understanding of the role of groups and organisations strivit power and influence in society. It is not necessary that the stu political science in this connection should be historically authent is also possible that on account of the obscure origins of state, it be based on speculations.
Then, we study state in relation to the present. Here our concern is with political institutions as they are in existena operation. A study of the evolution of authority and political in tions is of great help in understanding the present institutions, and processes. But the focus of study is on the present. So we ; nature, functions and ends of state in the light of emp: observations. We also discuss the forms of governments, their n and demerits. In addition to this, our scope of inquiry covers study oi" extra-political institutions like political parties and int groups, the issues of liberty and equality and the relatior between the two, the question of liberty of the individual vis-a-vi. authority of the state, the development of state as a member of international community.15
14. William A. Robson: The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Poli Science, p. 17.
15. As R.A. Dahl says; "Whether one likes it or not, virtually no one is o pletely beyond the reach of some kind of political system. A cit encounters politics in the government of the country, town, school, chu business firm, trade union, club, political party, civic association and a 1 of other organisations from the United Nations to the PTA. Politic one of the unavoidable facts of human existence. Everyone is invol in some fashion at the same time in some kind of political system". Mot Political Analysis, p. 7. As an Indian writer (Beni Prasad) says: "Poli started as the science of the affairs of the city. Later, it broadened to a8
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
As a goal-oriented discipline, the scope of politics also covers a study of the state as it may be in time to come, or as it ought to be in its ideal form. It is true that in this direction political science becomes speculative, even Utopian getting away from the world of reality. But it also adds to its goal-oriented or normative character. We also throw some light on what kind of political science would or should be in time to come, or what should be the ideals before human beings so as to improve their institutions. Viewed thus, Getteli well says that political science is a historical investigation of what the state has been, an analytical study of what the state is, and a politico-ethical discussion of what the state should be.16
However, what has enriched the scope of political science in recent times is an attempt to make it the 'study of power'. What is power? What is struggle for power? What are the causes of this struggle for power? These are some of the crucial questions that engage the attention of recent political scientists. It is the factor of power that makes state different from all other associations; it is power that alternates from one party to another in the battle of the ballot box; it is power that enhances or reduces the status of a state. Recent writers like Lasswel], Kaplan, Morgenthau and Russell have thrown much light on the study of politics from this angle. So an English writer says: "It is with power in society that political science is primarily concerned—its nature, basis and results. . . . The focus of interest of the political scientist is clear and unambiguous, it centres on the struggle to gain or retain power, to exercise power or influence over others, or to resist that exercise."17
In recent times, the scope of political science has widened by converting it into 'policy science'. The aim should be to understand political phenomena with a view to arrive at practical decisions about the policy that may be adopted. The prevailing developments and tendencies are studied with a view to discover the likely direction of the course of development; the existing political processes are examined in the light of the purposes they seek to achieve. "It must be remembered that most political discussions have as their final aim to arrive at practical decisons about the policy that is to be adopted or supported."18
prise the larger country-state. It has now to take the final step and stand forth as the science of world organisation." The Democratic Process, p. 6.
16. Gettell, op. cit., p. 4.
17. William Robson, op. cit , p. 17.
18. G.C. Field: Political Theory, p. xviii.
POLITICAL SCIENCE
In fine, political science includes the attempts made since ai times "to draw inferences, state valid generalisations, and an tentative conclusions about the state, government,' law, and po behaviour—conclusions which could serve, at least, as we hypotheses on which future study and research might be based German writer Treitschke, who treats politics as both a scienc an art, states the problem of political science in these words: ' it should aim to determine from a consideration of the actual of states the fundamental idea of the state; second, it should co historically what they have attained in political life, and how third, through this means, it should determine historical law: moral imperatives. As such, it is applied history."20 Willoughb that "there are three great topics with which political science 1 deal—state, government and law."21
New Meaning of Political Science
What we have said above refers to the traditional view meaning and nature of political science in which it is a of knowledge relating to the study of state and government, new or modern view, political science is identified with 'politic; more than that, the latter is preferred to the former: Hen focus is on the 'power' that plays a crucial part in the stru which the individuals and their groups may be found in according to their capability and degree of interest at all 1< local, regional, national, international.22 Thus, Lasswell and 1 define politics as the 'study of the shaping and sharing of pc David Easton defines politics as 'the authoritative allocation of
19. Rodee, Christol and Anderson, op. cit., p. 5.
20. Treitschke: Politics (Eng. Translation by Dugdale and T. de Bille), p. xxxii.
21. W.W. Willoughby: The Nature of the State, p. 382.
22. According to Lindsay Rogers, "The lexicographers usually define po the 'science of art of government'. The term covers the entire political life and behaviour. It embraces the relations between the and the individuals and in this sense is practically synonymoi political philosophy. It comprehends the forces at work whic1 the anatomy and determine the physiology of states. It includes v between the states and their political sub-divisions and between sts other states. Thus, politics can be domestic, national, federal, mu imperial or foreign. The relations thus comprehended and the reg' which they necessitate are inter-governmental." See his "Polii Seligman (ed.): Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XI, p. 204.
23. Lasswell and Kaplan: Power and Society, p. xiv.10
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
that are binding on the society.'24
Viewed thus, politics has three connotations-political activity, political process, and political power. We may bring out their meaning in brief as under:
1. Political activity consists of the efforts by which conditions of conflict are created and resolved in a way pertaining to the interests of the people, as far as possible, who play their part in the struggle for power. Political activity emanates from a situation of'predicament'-a form of human behaviour in which the interests of persons clash or interact for the purpose of having an allocation of binding values in their respective favours. This process goes on and the stage of the resolution of conflict is achieved either by peaceful means of reasoning, persuasion, adjustments, diplomacy or compromise, or by the violent means of force and coercion. So an English political scientist says: "In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage; neither starting point nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel, the s:a is bath friend and enemy..."-"'
2. Political process is an exension of the sense of political activity. Here the case of all those agencies figures in that have their role in the decision-making process. Naturally, 'non-political' associations engage our attention that very much play a part in the political process of the country. Numerous groups are in the field for the protection and promotion of their specific interests. They compete in the struggle for power; they influence the decision-makers; they fight amongst themselves with the result that the government has to play the role of a coordinator or adjustor of group relations. In short, the set of procedures whereby private associations existing in a state seek to influence the government, or participate in policy-formation by the government, or become the government, is the 'political process'.'8
3. Finally, we refer to the case of 'political power' that is described as 'a certain kind of human relationship'.27 Tawney
24. Easton: The Political System, p. 119.
j 25. Michael Oakeshott: Political Education, p. 15.
26. S.E. Finer: Comparative Government, pp. 25-26.
! 27. Carl J. Friedrich: Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 12.
POLITICAL SCIENCE
regards it as the capacity of an individual or a groi individuals to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in a manner as he desires.-8 In other words, pow taken to denote the whole spectrum of those exti influences that by being brought to bear upon an indivii can make him move in a required direction." 9
It is obvious that in its new meaning politics has been made from the shackles of normative dimensions and restated in emp: terms. The result is that it is not merly a study of state and gc ment, it is a study of power, its exercise, and struggle for its sake it is said: "Politics is organised dispute about power and its involving choice among competing values, ideas, persons, inte and demands. The study of politics is concerned with the descrir and analysis of the manner in which power is obtained, exercised controlled, the purpose for which it is used, the manner in v decisions are made, the factors which influence the making of 1 decisions, and the context in which those decisions take place."30
It shows a striking shift from the study of state to the stui power in the meaning of this discipline. The advocates of this hold that this shift has broadened the area of inquiry and serve make political analysis more realistic. In this way, it has savec discipline from narrow formalism and institutionalism whic involved in the definition of the discipline as the science of the s It is said to have two main advantages. ''One advantage that p has over earlier concepts is that it focuses attention on a process on a legal abstraction as state. Political Science becomes the stui the way power is accumulated, used and controlled in modern sec Consequently, it includes not only the legal and formal but als< extra-legal and informal processes involved in government. Anc advantage of using power as the central concept is that pol science pays greater heed to man, especially the political man, basic unit of analysis."31
Politics as the Study of Power
The power theory of politics is as old as the Greeks, though ii assumed much importance in recent times. A study of politics, p
28. R.H. Tawney: Equality, p. 230.
29. Finer, op. cit., p. 13.
30. Michael Curtis: Comparative Government and Politics, p. 1.
31. N.P. Guild and K.T. Palmer, Introduction to Politics, p. 6.Some Definitional Statements
1. The task of political science iMo study in their fundamental relations the public powers, to'examine the conditions under which they manifest themselves, their end and their effect, and to investigate the state in its inner nature. (Jellmek)
2. The science of politics seeks an accurate description and classification of political institutions and the precise determinat.oa of the forces which create and control them, while the art of politics has for its aim the
determination of the principles which it is necessary to observe if political institutions are to be efficiently operated. (Willoughby)
^ ^ ^ f ^ f°Undations of state and the Principles of govern-
4. PoliticalScience considers the state as an institution of power {Machtwesan), in the totality of its relations its origin, its setting (land and people), its object, its ethical signification, its economic problems its life conditions, its financial side, its end, etc. {Gareis)
5. Political Science investigates the phenomena of government as political economy deals with wealth biology with lite, algebra with numbers, and geometry with space and magnitude (Seeley)
6. Political Science deals with the life of men as organised under government and law in what is known as the
I u jn(:iUdeS a study of the organisation and the activities of states, and of the principles and ideals which underlie political organisation and activities. It considers the problem of adjusting political authority to individual liberty, the relations among men which are controlled by the state, and the relations of men to the state. It also deals with the distribution of governing power among the several agencies by which the
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actions of the state are determined, expressed, and exercised' and with the problem of international life.
7 Ever 'since men have been reflecting on politics, they have oscillated between two diametrically opposed interpretations. According to one, politics is conflict, a struggle in which power allows those who possess it to ensure their hold on society and to profit by it. According to the other view, politics is an effort to bring about the rule of order and justice, in which power guarantees the general interest and common good against the pressure of private interests. {Maurice Duverger)
8. Politics is concerned among other things with conflicts-conflict over the proper use of force, power, authority. (H.R.G. Greaves)
9 Politics, then, refers to all that has to do with the forces, institutions and organisational forms in any society that are' recognised as having the most inclusive and final authority existing in that society for the establishment and maintenance of other, the effectuation of other conjoint purposes of its members, and the reconciliation of their differences.... When we speak of political science, however, we refer to the study rather than to the practice of government. (Pennock and Smith)
10. As an academic field, political science includes the study of politics or government on matters which governments consider relevant, and the teaching of the material produced by the this study. {S.L. Wasby)
11. Taken as a whole, political science is about the relations between the rulers and ruled, and the means and
the ends each employs. {David E Apter)
12. We call'political' the pressures exerted upon the public authorities to bring about this or that decision desired by this or that private interest; we also call 'political' the stands taken on the matter by the parties, with a view to attaining or retaining popularity and power. (Bertrand de Jouvenel)
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PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
cularly from the psychological standpoint, leaves this definite impression that human nature has always been the same and, for this reason, power has been the foundational tenet of the game of politics. Though used,, by and large in a pejorative sense, the people donot desire to abolish the element of power, they just desire to make it shorn off its brutish nature so as to usher in a good society. The fact of 'power' can be seen in the conflicting and competitive attitude of the people and their groups that creates the stuff of all social sciences in different ways. So an English philosopher asserts: "Fundamental conception in social sciences is power in the same sense that energy is fundamental concept in physics."32
Though identifiable with some terms like influence, coercion, force, domination, authority, control and the like, the term 'power' has its own meaning on the basis of which it may be differentiated from all other seemingly related themes. We may say that by this term we mean the ability to affect or control the decisions, policies, values or fortunes of others.33 But Friedrich maintains that power is not primarily a thing or a possession, it is rather a relation.34 Power may be distinguished from force on the ground that while the former is the faculty or capacity to conquer in a contest, the latter is its brutal manifestation. Different from both power and force, influence represents the sublimation of power. It is a category which represents the inchoate or inderminate exercise of power. That is, while power is coercive, influence is persuasive. Control is a more comprehensive category than power. It represents something less concentrated than power. It may be in any form, but it certainly depicts a lesser degree of power. Above all, authority is the legitimate aspect of power. Power may be in a proper or improper form, in its proper form it is like authority. In other words, authority represents the moralisation of power.
From what we have said above, following important implications may be gathered:155
32. Bertrand Russell: Power, p. 13. He also says: "Even if we should be mistaken in regarding love of power as the sole human motive this mistake would not lead us so much astray as might be expected in the search for causal laws in social sciences, since love of power is the chief motive producing the changes which social science has to study." Ibid.
33. Guild and Palmer, op. cit., p. 7.
34. Friedrich, op. cit., p. 160.
35. See Bierstadt: '"An Analysis of Social Power" in The American Sociological Review, Vol. XV, No. 6, pp. 738-39.
POLITICAL SCIENCE
15
1. Power is a social phenomenon par excellence, and not merely a political or economic phenomenon.
2. It is useful to distinguish power from prestige, influence, domination, right, force, authority and the like.
3. Power is latent force, foice is manifest power, and authority is institutionalised power.
4. Power which has its incidence only in social opposition of some kind, appears in different ways in formal organisation, in informal organisation, and in unorganised community.
5. The source and necessary components of power reside in combination of numbers (especially majorities), social organisation and resources.
In fine, power "is the ability to determine the behaviour of others in accord with one's own wishes."38 A man is said to have povver to the extent that it "influences the behaviour of others in accordance with his own intentions."37
The 'power theory' finds its brilliant manifestation in the political philosophy of Hobbes. The grandest conclusion of the Hobbesian politics is his clearest and most perfect expression of the naturalistic conception of human nature wherein he tells us that man desires power in ever greater power, spontaneously and continuously in one set of appetite, and not by reason of summation of innumerable isolated desires caused by innumerable isolated perceptions. Search for power is the root cause of competition among the individuals. Interests collide in the race to acquire more and more riches, honours and commands and, for the sake, the competitors take to the means of killing, subduing, supplanting and repelling their opponents. Though the struggle for power has its incessant play among the competitors, it is also true that men like to live in peace in order to enjoy the iota of power they possess, it disposes them to live under a common power. The nature of the civil society is, for this reason, such that everyone, whether with moderate or immoderate desires, "is necessarily pulled into a constant competitive struggle for power over others, or at least to resist his powers being commanded by others."38
After Hobbes the power theory of politics saw its reiteration in the works of Hegel who absolutised the authority of the state to the extent
36. Coser and Rosenberg: Sociological Theory, p. 1 23.
37. Goldiwmer and Shils: "Types of Power and Status" in The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLV, No. 2. 1939, pp. 171-82.
38. C.B. Macpherson: "Introduction" to the Leviathan of Hobbes, p. 37.16
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
of repudiating all ethics of international morality. Power and the urge toward it were very much extolled in the nineteenth century by a good number of writers. In this direction, we may, in particular, refer to some German thinkers like Nietzsche, Treitschke and Bernhardi who elaborated what was given by Hegel This power current of thought witnessed its .ardent protagonists in the present century in Eric Kaufmann who found the essence of state in Machtenfalting meaning anything like development, increase and display of power, along with the will to maintain successfully and assert itself. After the first World War, this idea witnessed its powerful manifestation in the utterances of Mussolini of Italy and Hitler of Germany. Influenced with such developments Prof. Charles Merriam of the United States wrote extensively on this subject in his Political Power.
In fact, the trend set by Thomas Hobbes of England and revived b\ Max Weber of Germany became the foundational touchstone for the study of politics in the period following the second World War at the hands of the behaviouralists of the United States. It was affirmed that politics "as power consists fundamentally of relationships, of subordination, of dominance and submission, of the governors and the governed. The study of politics is the study of these relationships."39 Politics, as a discipline, is the study of the shaping and sharing of political power. It is the study of the influence and the influential.40 In his Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, Morgenthau says that the re-examination of the Western tradition must start with the assumption that power politics, rooted in the lust for power, which is common to all men, is, for this reason, inseparable from social life itself."41
Power has three important forms—political, economic and ideological, Political power belongs to the state and may be manifested through legislature, executive, military, police, bureaucracy, and judiciary. The way the organs of a government work and enforce the commands of the state exhibit political power. This power is shared by political parties, pressure groups, elites, factions, leaders and the like. In the views of the liberals, political power is dispersed and diffused and it alternates from hands to hands. But to the Marxists, ; power is concentrated in a class (dominant class) that never likes its alternation. It is by virtue of having political power in its hands that
39. V.O. Key, Jr.: Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, pp. 2-3.
40. Lasswell and Kaplan: Power and Society, p. xiv.
41. See G.E. G. Catlin: "What is Political Theory?" in Gould and Thursby (ed.s): Contemporary Political Thought, p. 35.
POLITICAL SCIENCE
17
the capitalist class exploits and oppresses the working class. So unless the proletariat captures political power, it cannot save itself from exploitation. Obviously, when the liberals advocate the idea of the diffusion of power among many parties, groups, elites etc., the Marxists emphasise concentration of all political power in the hands of the dominant class. If political power is in the hands of the capitalist class in a bourgeois society, it shall be in the hands of the working class in a socialist society. In short, political power exhibits itself in the form of 'coercion' of any kind by any department of the state.42
Then, we may look into the fact of economic power that lies behind the political power. It finds its place in the ownership and control of the national wealth. Obviously, money power is another name for economic power. It may be in the form of ownership and control of the land and other means of production and distribution. Once again, a line of distinction between liberal and Marxian views may be drawn. A liberal would say that economic power is diffused throughout the society and anybody may have its share by the dint of hard work, a Marxist would say that the dominant class does not like to surrender its economic power unless it is forced to do so in the event of a successful revolution. The liberal writers also talk about the share of economic power by the associations of the middle class entrepreneurs. They hold that in the present industrial societies economic power is not in the hands of the owners but that of the managers (what they call 'managerialism' or the 'managerial revolution') who constitute an elite of their own and, more than that, who have no profit motive of their own and run the industry in the over-all interest of the society. But the Marxists reject such an affirmation; they treat managers as expert functionaries working on behalf of the capitalists. Economic and political powers are closely inter-related. Since the dominant class has economic power in its hands, it has political power in its hands too. The new liberal writers have sought to put a mask on the existence of the capitalist class in an exploitative society by separating ownership and control of capital. But the so-called managerial revolution (as popularised by James Burnham) is a myth of words and concepts 43
Finally, we may refer to the case of ideological power that resides in the prevailing ideas acceptable to the people. Ideology literally means a set of ideas in which people have unquestionable faith and they also strive to put them into action. So the people of the dominant
42. Friedrich, op. cit., p. 166.
43. Ralph Miliband: The State in the Capitalist Society, p. 30.j g PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
class propagate and implement ideas that are congenialJo their interest This is also known by the name of 'persuasion industry or 'business opinion' by which the class in power may suppress the views of others and impose its views on the people as a whole, in this direction, the press, radio, television-and all agencies^f ma, communication play a very important part through which some kind, of views are preached and popularised in a direct way and some other kinds of views are controlled and suppressed in an indirect way. i Marxian terms, it may be said that a particular kind of class con -ousness' is propagated which is 'false'and'alienated . The church the schools, the parties, the groups and numerous unions play-their part in popularising and establishing a kind of ideology , they all constitute 'Meological apparatuses of the state' (ISA) as said by a French writer Althusser. " Marx says that the ideas of the ruling class are in everv epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruing material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual
force "44 i.
It'is for this reason that bourgeois intellectuals propagate sucn ldeas that state is an instrument of public good, that the ^ere>gnty of state is in the hands of the people and so democracy is the be.t form of government, that authority of the state is based on genera
will' and that the function of the stare is to establish law and order and'resolve social conflicts. Different from this, the mission ot the Marxist intellectuals is to preach the ideas of class war, create class consciousness and thereby prepare the people for a revolution as a result of which a new socialist order may be established. The mam purpose behind the operation of this 'business,opm,on is hat the political domination, in fact, cannot be maintained through _ the use of physical repression alone, but demands direct and dec.sve mter-venSon of ideology. It is in this sense that the —* "^^ the form of its ideological apparatuses, is d.rectl> involved in the state apparatus which gives expression to political powers. '
On the whole, the essence of the power theory ol state is that politics is nothing but a study of power and struggle for its sake. But such a view may be criticised on these grounds:
■1 The liberals accept it in part only. In their view, politics involves the case of power, but it also involves the case ot public welfare. Politics is an activity for the 'greatest good ot the greatest number' (Bentham), or that power enables people
44. Marx and Engels: German Ideology, p. 61
45. Poulantzas: Fascism and Dictatorship, p. 302.
POLITICAL SCIENCE
19
to achieve ends which win happiness for each of us. (Laski) That is, politics is not merely power or a struggle for its sake, it is also the exercise of influence, the resolution of conflict, and the pursuit of collective goals. (R.H. Wagner) It is also said that force (power) always disrupts, unless it is made subservient to common will. Within society it is only the clumsy and the stupid who seek to attain their ends by means of force. "Coercive power is a criterion of the state, but not its essence."46
2. The Marxian view on this subject is too narrow. The Marxists not only look at the fact of power, they also take its three forms (political, economic and ideological) as integrally connected and forming a single whole. It is again absurd. The residence of power invariably in the hands of a particular social class cannot be accepted. To say that power is always and invariably used for maintaining the rule of the class and that it manifests itself in the exploitation and oppression of one class by another, is to take a wrong view of things. Such a view cannot be accepted by those who not only differentiate the three forms of power, but also reject the whole doctrine of class war. Power may be used for the sake of social service. (Gandhiji) Hence, we may not endorse the view that it is capital and its domination over labour which for Marx "forms the axis of class power within capitalist, society."47 3. Above all, the power theorists have converted their study into a value-free or ethically neutral direction. The study of politics should not be immunised from normative considerations, but the power theorists have done so. The fact is that power is a fact and. as such, it is an empirical concept. But its normative sides should also be taken into view. To study politics just in the form of force and coercion is to present a vulgar view of politics as done by Machiavelli. It is said that if politics has declined in recent times, one of its reasons should be traced in making it just like a study of power and struggle for its sake without involving ourselves in ethical considerations. So it is said: "The decline of political theory may thus be regarded as a reflection of the feeling that ethical values have no place in the field of social dynamics and politics."48
46. R.M. Maclver, op. cit., pp. 222-23.
47. Swingewood: Marx and Modern Social Theory, p, 165.
48. Alfred Cobban: "The Decline of Political Theory" in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (September, 1953), p. 328.20
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Though the element of truth in power theory of politics cannot be denied, in may still be said that it lays too much reliance of the fact of power in physical terms alone. As a matter of fact, power is a very broad concept that includes within itself much that may not be covered by the compass of physical power. One may also refer to the power of the soul, power of mind, power of ideas and the like and thus justify what great sages from Buddha to Gandhi have said.49 Even cooperation is power (Catlin) and even people's sense of justice is power. (Arnold Brecht) In a word, politics should refer to power, but this term "should also refer to some conception of human welfare or the public good.""0
Herman Heller makes a fine observation: "Present-day political science revolves primarily around the problem of the attainment, consolidation and distribution of political power, whether in an actually existing state or in a hypothetical state constructed more or less systematically by a process of, abstracting the common elements to be found in a number of concrete states. Among the many other elements constituting political science, the following may be mentioned— correlation of the processes whereby power is institutionalised with geographic and climatic conditions, racial qualities and other national forces, with the economic, military, religious, national and other characteristics of the population and with the legal system of the state; description and amalgamation of most important types of control, of the organisation and action of the significant political associations with the state, especially parties, evaluation of the role played by political ideas in the origin and evolution of political associations, analysis of the relationship of the organised political powers of the astounding social forces particularly at the present-day, to the social classes, but also to the church, to public opinion, to the press, as well as to the dominant economic forces such as associations of-financial, industrial and agrarian capitalists and workers; and, finally, the survey of state in its relation to international powers and other states, whether in a federal or in an international context."51
49. In opposition to his leader (Hitler), Otto Wels said: "No enabling act can give you the power to destroy ideas that are eternal and indestructible." See Arnold Brecht: Political Theory, p. 347.
50. Christian Bay: "Politics and Pseudo-Politics" in American Political Science Review (March, 1965).
51. Heller: "Political Science" in Seligman (ed.); Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 1967 Ed., Vol. XI, p. 209.
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21
Liberal Versus Marxist Views of Politics
What is politics? On this important question the views of the liberals and those of the Marxists are poles apart. While the former take politics as a study of state, government and power (an instrument of coercion), the latter take politics as the study of power (political, economic and ideological) alone. More than this, as we have said above, while the former regard power as an instrument of coercion as well as of public welfare, the latter take power only as a patent manifestation of class domination. The reason behind it is that both take a basically different view of man and society, and on that basis both take contradictory views about the relationship between personality of the individual and authority of the state. First, we may have a bird's eye view of the liberal view of politics.
The liberal view of politics can be traced in the writings of a very large number of social and political thinkers from the seventeenth to the present centuries chief among whom are Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Bentham, Mill, Green, Barker, Hobhouse, Laski, Macpherson, Oakeshott, Maclver and Wolin. These writers look at man as having his own personality that cannot, and should not, be crushed by the authority of the state. The views of the great liberals in this regard may range from those of Mill and Spencer, who advocate the autonomy of the personality of the individual, to those of Hobhouse and Laski who seek to reconcile the interest of man with the overall interest of the society. But the essential point to be noted here is that both lay emphasis on the worth and dignity of the individual. Social and political theory should, therefore, highlight this fact. If so. society is an organisation in which individuals with their talents and powers compete with each other. Society is thus like a free and competitive arena that is governed by the laws of free con-'tract, exchange and competition. Macpherson calls it 'possessive individualism'. "Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities owing nothing to society for them. The individual is seen neither as a moral whole, nor as a part of a large social whole, but as an owner of himself."52
If so, there should be some mechanism to deal with and resolve social conflicts. Politics is, therefore, concerned with state and government that are required by the society for the establishment of conditions ensuring a condition of competition and also maintaining
52. C.B. Macpherson: The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, p. 3.22
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
a system of law and order in which man may have the best possible development of his personality. That is, every society, has different interests which compete and conflict. To resolve or minimise this conflict, rome social power and some social process is required. The result is that a social power is created that becomes the state,' and a social process is invented that is known by the name of politics. "Politics is, therefore, viewed as a power, a social process, a behaviour that is concerned with the maintenance of law and order in the society and for coordinating and conciliating diverse private interests of individuals and groups. In fine, politics is a source of conflict and a mode of activity that seeks to resolve conflicts and promote readjustments.""3
The fact of social competitions and social conflicts should not be seen like a 'class war', it is a natural and logical fact of the collective life of the individuals. They not only desire a condition of peace and order, they also like to live in a society that is 'free' and 'open' so that they may make best possible use of their energies and faculties. Man is selfish, but he also has the sense of good will towards his fellow beings. Thus, a line of reconciliation between the interests of the individual and the interests of the society may be possible. The purpose of politics is to ensure the existence of a free and open society and to lay down rules by following which the conflicts of different interests may be created as well as resolved. It is well contained in these words of Maurice Duverger: "Ever, since men have been reflecting on politics, they have oscillated between two diametrically opposed interpretations. According to one, politics is conflict or struggle in which power allows those who possess it to ensure their hold on society and to profit by it. According to the other view, politics is an effort to bring about the rule of order and justice, in which power guarantees the general interest and common good against pressure of private interests. . . . Organised power in any society is always and at all times both the instruments by which . certain groups dominate others, an instrument used in the interest of the rulers and to the disadvantage of the ruled, and also a means of ensuring a particular social order or achieving some integration of the individual into the collectivity for the genera! interest. The two elements always coexist."51
53. S.S. Wolin: Politics and Vision, p. 11. So J.D.B. Miller says: "Politics, then, is about disagreement or conflict, and political activity is that which is intended to bring about or resist change in the face of possible resistance." The Nature of Politics, p. 14.
54. Duverger: The Idea of Politics, pp. xii-xiii.
POLITICAL SCIENCE 23
Quite different is the Marxian view of man, society and politics. According to Marxism, man is first a social and then a political creature. The life of a man should be seen in his social context. The individuals exist only as a part of a social whole that includes family, occupational groups, classes and the collectivity as a whole. The bond between the individual and his social context must be genuine. The emergence of hostile classes has alienated man from his society and thereby the dominant class has invented the state as an instrument of exploitation and oppression of the other class. The free will of man requires emancipation and it is possible when man is no longer alienated from himself and from his fellow beings. The interests of the individuals are not opposed to each other. "Man, according to Marx, is the totality of his social connections, hence emancipated society is identical with the emancipated self."55
If so, society should be denned as a living organism which is in continuous development and whose vital functions are based on the development of its mode of production. Society does not consist of individuals, it expresses the sum of inter-relations, the relations within which these individuals stand. In order to live, man invents the means of production and distribution of goods and it creates the relations of productions that make a society divided between two antagonistic classes. While the dominant class is the owner of the means of production and distribution, the dominated class exists by selling its labour power. Production is regarded as an important basis of society and labour is the most important part of it. In every society, on the basis of the relations of production, a mode of production is determined and this mode of production is the substructure upon which the social, political, cultural, moral and ideological superstructures of the society rest.
In this way, politics is the study of class relations and class struggles in society. The state is not an agency of public good, it is an. instrument by which the dominant class manages to exploit and oppress the dominated class. Political institutions, despite their claim to universality and generality only mask the particularistic and egotistic interests of civil society. If the study of politics is to be scientific, then both social and political institutions must be regarded as outgrowths of the material conditions which direct the major paths of human behaviour. It is with the aid of politics that classes hold power, strive to influence the nature of economy, the forms and scales of distribution of material wealth, ideology, culture, morality, family
55. S. Avineri: Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p. 33.24
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
and everyday life. In the final analysis, the state and politics "are an expression of the economic requirements of society and its social groups""'
The most striking feature of the Marxian view of politics should be traced in its revolutionary character. Politics is an essential manifestation of class relations. If so, it shall come to have its end in the final stage of socialism when the classless society is converted into the stateless condition of life. When there are no class contradictions and the character of the society becomes classless, there would be no need of state. But it also implies that in the final stage of social development (communism), the meaning of politics would change. It would no longer be related to the fact of class contradictions, it would be aligned with an emancipated pattern of man's social existence. Revolution settles the political issue of power once and for all in favour of the working class. In fine, Marxism rejects the 'conflict and consensus' model of politics as envisaged and emphasised by the liberal writers, it has a 'revolutionary model' of politics based on the fact of class contradictions and culminating in the era of class eliminations ensuring good life of an emancipated man."7
Behavioural and Post-Behavioural Revolutions
Many important changes have taken place in the field of political science in the period following the second World War. It has been realised by the new generation of political scientists that as their discipline aims at explaining life in relation to the struggle for power, it must come outward from the nucleus of the study of government and take into account sociological, psychological and economic factors. The line of Prof. Charles Merriam58 of the Chicago Univer-
56. B. Fyodorv: Theory of Politics and Lenin's Legacy, p. 34.
57. However, this is a controversial subject whether there would be no politics in the final stage of socialism. A critic says that beside the statist myth of socialism, there is statist myth of communism. S. Stojanowic: "The New Left" in Seminar (May, 1976), p. 14.
58. The pioneering contribution of Merriam was enriched by a galaxy of his students and faculty members like V.O. Key, Jr., D.B. Truman, Herbert Simon, David Easton and G.A. Almond who came to be known as the leading lights of the Chicago School. G.E.G. Catlin did the same at the Cornell University. Besides, a good number of European scholars who shifted to the United States after 1920, brought with them the messages of a psychologist like Sigmund Freud and a sociologist like Max Weber, in this direction, we may refer to the names of Franz Neumann, Paul Lazarsfeld, Hans Speier, Hans Gerth, Reinhard Bendix etc. After 1950 the new trend became so powerful that it represented "a new approach, and a challenge,
POLITICAL SCIENCE
25
sity (that the study of politics should be done ra empirical terms) was strongly followed by the new generation of American political scientists who launched a sort of 'protest movement' against the line of traditionalists who had underlined the significance of normative political theory. Huge financial assistances were given by the American government as well as by philanthropic institutions of the Ford, the Carnegie, and the Rockfeller to remodel the disciplines of social sciences in the light of actual human behaviour. Thus, advanced study centres of behavioural research came into being at Palo Alto and at the university of Michigan. Other universities like the Princeton and the Yale followed suit. It showed tliat the 'young turks' of the community of American social scientists "needed new approaches, new techniques of research and new concepts for which they had to borrow from other social sciences."59
The American writers termed it 'behavioural revolution' the most outstanding characteristic of which was that political science moved closer and closer to the worlds of psychology, sociology and economics at the hands of eminent, figures like David Easton, David Apter, G.A. Almond, G.B. Powell, Harold Lasswell, Robert A. Dahl, Karl Deutsch etc. These writers sought to study political matters in the context of non-political phenomena in a variety of ways. E.M. Kirkpatrick, therefore, underlined four characteristics of the behavioural movement as:60
1. Rejection of political institutions as the basic conceptual units and a substitution of individual and group behaviour,
2. Emphasis on the unity of social sciences, hence an increased willingness to cross-disciplinary lines,
3. Greater attention to precision, measurement and quantification techniques, and
4. Development of systematic political theory.
But a better representation of the behavioural revolution in political science and its key features is contained in Easton's description of its eight 'intellectual foundations' which are:61
a new orientation and a reform movement." E.M. Kirkpatrick: "The Impact of the Behavioural Approach on Traditional Political Science" in Austin Ranney (ed.): Essays on the Behavioural Study of Politics, p. 11.
59. See R.A. Dahl: "The Behavioural Approach in Political Science, Epitaph for a Monument to a ^Successful Protest" in American Political Science Review (December, 1961), pp. 763-72
60. The American Political Science Review, 1963, No. 1, p. 162.
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Germino on Uses or Relevance of Political Theory/Philosophy in the Light of Classics
1. It is the attempt to achieve a noetic, as distinct from a non-noetic, interpretation of political reality.
2. It is the realm of 'sciences of the person' rather than that of the sciences of phenomena and its methods must be appropriate to the investigation of the multi-dimensional participation in political reality experienced from within by the philosopher-theorist-scientist himself.
3. The philosopher exists not in a vacuum but within a specific political culture and civilisation whose collective cultural memory he shares. Ihus he gives a time dimension to political reality that must be explored in depth through the process of self-conscious historical recollection.
4. The political philosopher (or noetic participant in political reality) is one who 'descends' to the depth of the consciousness and his return antidates symbols designed to illuminate the character of political reality within the structure of existence.
5. Political science is a science of the whole man and reductionist theories which pretend to explain all of man's behaviour on the basis of only a part of his experience must be rigorously examined and played in a broader context before they may be regarded as contribution to the subject.
6. A major function of a critical science of politics is to speak'truth to power, however unpalatable that 'truth' may be to the powers that be at that times.
7. There are certain intellectual and existential virtues to be gained from the study and practice of philosophy, such a5 increased critical awareness, a distrust of single-vision, a political argumentation, a love of philosophical reflection as a means of experiencing dimensions of reality absent from contemporary historical existence, intellectual integrity, openness to the perspectives beyond those of one's immediate practical concerns and predilections, and respect for the inquiring human person behind the labels (or masks) conventionally attached to their political life.
8. Technique is only a tool of thought, despite the seeming assumption of advanced industrial society to the contrary, and decision-makers who remain ignorant of philosophy cut themselves off from a vital source of the intellectual and existential virtues so necessary to making tolerance, let alone wise decision.
Source: Dante Germino: "The Contemporary Relevance of the Classics of Political Philosophy" in Greenstein and Polsby (eds.): Political Science: Scope and Theory, Vol. I, p. 257.
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PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
careers in politics, law, teaching, civil services and foreign services (though vitally important) is secondary to the task of equipping them to discharge the obligations of democratic citizenship, which grows constantly heavier in the modern world.
2. Intelligent and responsible citizenship can save democracy; ignorance and neglect can lose it. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. But study, information and understanding of the complexities of modern government and politics are as necessary as eternal vigilance.
3. Political science seeks to gather and impart this knowledge and understanding. The 'good' citizen who behaves himself and votes regularly, is no longer good enough. He must also be the citizen who knows the answers. He must know how his government really operates, what interests and forces are behind particular policies, what the results of such policies are likely to be, who his elected representatives are, and what they stand for.
The report of the American Political Science Association's Committee for the Advancement of Teaching not only stresses education for citizenship but further states that there "is a widespread feeling amongst political scientists that (political theory) should be made the heart of the subject."133
133. Ibid., p. 18. Politics, as a matter of fact, is an activity, a study of this activity, and a social science concerned with the theory and practice of political phenomena. We may remember these words of a Chinese leader: "Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to higher level." See Mao's paper 'On Practice' (1937) in his Selected Works, p. 655.
THE STATE-ELEMENTS, NATURE, FUNCTIONS AND END
But ij we can speak of the Slate at all, we must define it in terms of what is common to all states, while perhaps laying stress on those aspects which become more prominent in the process of historical development. In no attitude of worship, as did Hegel,
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Some Definitional Statements
1. Sovereignty is the supreme political power vested in him whose acts are not subject to any other and whose will cannot be over-ridden. (Grotius)
2. Sovereignty is the supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority in which the highest legal power of
the State resides. (Blackstone)
3. Sovereignty is that characteristic of the State by virtue of which it cannot be legally bound except by its own will or limited by any other power than itself. (Jellinek)
4. Sovereignty is that power which is neither temporary not delegated, not subject to particular rules, which it "cannot alter, nor answerable to any other power on earth. (Pollock)
5. Sovereignty is the daily operative power of framing and giving efficacy to the laws. (Wilson)
6. Sovereignty is the supreme will of the state. (Willoughby)
7. Sovereignty is the commanding power of the State, it is the will of the nation organised in State; it is the right to give unconditional order to all individuals in the territory of the State. (Duguit)
8- Sovereignty is the original, absolute and unlimited power over individual subjects and associations of
subjects. (Burgess) 9. The sovereignty of the State issues orders to all men and all associations within its area; it receives order
from none of them. Its will is subject to no legal limitations of any kind. What it proposes is rightly by
mere announcement of intention. (Laski)
10. Sovereignty is an authority which, in the last resort, controls absolutely and beyond appeal the actions of every individual member of the community. (Jenks)
11. Sovereignty is not power but rather a quality; it is the supreme characteristic of a power—supreme in the sense that this power admits no other above it and no other compete with it. (Carre de Malberg)
12. Sovereignty is the strongest power and supreme authority within a State, which is unlimited by law or anything else, since otherwise it would neither be strongest nor supreme. (Donald F. Russell)
ome- anthrtritv an authority which is independent of any earthly authority. (Oppenheim)
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PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
state. In patent terms, it signifies power of the state to make and enforce a law throughout its territory. It is the final power to command and enforce obedience, and is subject to no legal limitations. Keeping it in his view, Gettell says: "Sovereignty, properly speaking, deals with the internal relations of a state to its inhabitants; it is a term of constitutional law rather than of international law. It is a legal concept and deals with positive law only. It would be conducive to clearness of thought and would avert much controversy if the term 'sovereignty' were applied only to what is usually called internal sovereignty and the term 'independence' were used for what is sometimes called external sovereignty.'"6 2. The idea of sovereignty in external sphere implies freedom of state from any alien subjection or control. A dependent people cannot be called a state, because they live and have to act according to the will of another state. But if a state accepts limitations on its freedom of action in pursuance of some international treaty or agreement, it does not amount to the loss or destruction of its sovereignty. These may be treated as self-imposed limitations. The association of a sovereign state with the Commonwealth of Nations or with the United Nations may be referred to in this connection. If so, external aspect of sovereignty is just an extension of its internal aspect in the international sphere; it "is only an abbreviated expression for designating the totality of rights by which internal sovereignty manifests itself vis-a-vis foreign states." (Le Fur) The two aspects of sovereignty should not be distinguished in as much as both are two sides of the same attribute. In order to avoid confusion of any kind about the meaning of sovereignty, we may say that it has its expression in the form of a 'command' given by the state that is binding on all concerned with it.7 It issues forth in the form of the law of the state. Thus, from the legal standpoint, the state is a total order, and the only total order precisely because the state and the law are identified."8
6. Gettell: Political Science, p. 123.
7. According to Giddings, "In all the dictionaries there is no other word that has more disastrously been conjured with by the metaphysical juggler. . .. Jurists and political theorists, losing sight of concrete fact, gave their minds to abstractions. And sovereignty became for political science a thing that never was on sea or land." The Responsible State.
8. Benn and Peters: Social Principles and the Democratic State, p. 63.
SOVEREIGNTY, MONISM AND PLURALISM 145
Characteristics: The essential characteristics of sovereignty may be enumerated as under:
1. Absoluteness: The authority of the state is supreme as well as absolute. It knows no limits on the formulation, expression and realisation of its will. Translated in terms of law, it may be said that the state may make and enforce any law and it is binding on all concerned. There can be no other authority that may revoke or rescind the law of the state. It is a different thing that a state denies to itself some area of action by the logic of self-imposed limitations as specified in its constitution or in the text of some international treaty or convention. Sir Henry Maine refers to social customs and traditions as important limiting factors on the power of the sovereign. Laski says that in purely juristic terms this implies that, in practice, legally unlimited power "turns out to be, power exercised under condition fairly well-known to each generation."9
2. Universality: The highest power of the state covers all people and their associations living under the area of its control. As such, it is all-comprehensive. It is co-extensive in its operation with the jurisdiction of the state and comprehends within its scope all powers and things within its territory. One may say that this provision does not apply to the embassies, consulates and legations where the law of the foreign country is applied. But we may repeat the point that it all takes place according to the will of the state that accepts some principles of international law for manifesting its commitment to the behaviour of the civilised nations of the world. In a different way, it shows the quality of exclusiveness. It implies the quality by virtue of which there "can be one but supreme power in the state, legally entitled to the obedience of the inhabitants. To hold otherwise would be to deny the principle of the unity of the state and to admit the possibility of an imperium in imperio (state within a state).10
3. Permanence: Sovereignty is the permanent quality of the state. The holder of sovereignty may die, but the power of the state survives that is passed on to his successor. A state may lose its sovereignty only when it is conquered by some other ""*■""
9. Laski: A Grammar of Politics, p. 52. 10. Garner, op. cit., p. 170.146
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
and then converted into a colony or a dependency. So the English people have their national anthem, 'God save the King'. The word 'king' signifies both the mortal person as the head of the state and the immortal authority as supreme power of the state. It is evident from their celebrated phrase 'King is dead, long live the King'. It all implies that "sovereignty does not cease with the death or temporary dispossession of a particular bearer on the reorganisation of the state, but shifts immediately to a new bearer, as the centre of gravity shifts from one part of a physical body to another when it undergoes external change."11
4. Inalienability: This essential attribute of state cannot be alienated. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality of the st >te. When a sovereign dies and his office is given to his successor, it amounts to a change in the government and not to an abdication or surrender of sovereignty. It is a different thing that a state may cede away a part of its territory to another state by some voluntary or involuntary agreement. But such an act does not amount to the surrender of its whole sovereignty. Lieber says that sovereignty can no more be alienated than a tree can alienate its right to sprout, or a man can transfer his life or personality to another without self-destruction.12 Thus, by the quality of inalienability is meant that attribute of the state by virtue of which it cannot cede away any of its essential elements without self-destruction."13
5. Indivisibility: Then, the sovereign power of the state cannot be divided. The state has its own will that cannot be divided into many wills. Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel and Austin are very clear on this point and so they are called monists. Calhoun says that "sovereignty is a whole thing, to divide it is to destroy it. It is the supreme power in a state, and we might just as well speak of half a square, or half a triangle, as of half a sovereignty."11 Sometimes, a point of difficulty arises when we misconstrue a federal system as one based on the division of sovereignty. Different from a unitary system, in a federal system the powers of the government are divided
11. Ibid.
12. Leiber: Political Ethics, Vol. T, p. 219.
13. Garner, op. cit., p. 171.
14. Calhoun: Works, Vol. I, p. 146.
SOVEREIGNTY, MONISM AND PLURALISM
147
between a central (national or federal) government on the one hand and provincial (regional or constituent) governments on the other. But such an interpretation should be made with this important point in view that a federal system stands on the principle of the distribution of governmental powers and not that of sovereignty of the state. As Gettell says: "What is divided in a federal system is not sovereignty which resides as a unit in the state as a whole, but the exercise of its various powers, which are distributed in accordance with a constitutional system among various governmental organs."15
It all shows that sovereignty is the exclusive, all-comprehensive or universal, inalienable, permanent and indivisible power of the state. The pluralists repudiate the indivisible characteristic of sovereignty on the basis of some arguments to which we shall refer afterwards.
Kinds: Since the term 'sovereignty' is used in different senses and thereby it becomes a source of confusion, it shall be worthwhile to understand its various forms. These are:
1. Nominal and Real Sovereignty: In some states, sovereignty may be seen in two forms. A nominal or titular sovereign is one whose authority is in name only; a real sovereign is one who actually uses his powers. The English monarch is the best example of a titular sovereign who reigns but does not govern. All administration is done in his name. But the real exercise of powers is vested in the ministers (under the Prime Minister) who are collectively responsible to the Parliament. Hence, this is a popular saying that 'king can do no wrong'. Gone are the days of absolute monarchy when the king was the real ruler or sovereign of his state. The President of India also belongs to this category. But the Presidents of the United States and France belong to the category of a real sovereign. It is due to the fact that they exercise the power of the state according to their best judgment and may be held accountable for any wrong entailing from an act of their commission or omission. They govern in the real sense of the term. 2. Legal and Political Sovereignty: A legal sovereign is one who has the highest power of making and enforcing a law. A law made by such a sovereign is binding on all concerned people and parties; it may ba changed or repealed by the same authority. The British Parliament is the best example of a
15. Gettell, op. cit., p. 125.148
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
legal sovereign that may make any law as per its best judgment. Legally speaking, it is omnipotent in that it "can adjudge an infant of full age; it may attain a man of treason after death; it may legitimise an illegitimate child, or, if it sees fit, make a man judge in his own case."16 But political sovereignty signifies the power of the electorate. The voters can make and unmake a parliament. The members of the parliament cannot make a law that is not acceptable to the voters and, if it happens, the voters may rise in revolt and thereby change their parliament. It is, for this reason, said that political sovereignty lies behind legal sovereignty. According to Gilchrist, "political sovereignty is the sum-total of influences in a state which lie behind the law."17 It may, however, be conceded at this stage that while the idea of legal sovereignty is a patent fact and so easily intelligible, the idea of political sovereignty is a fiction and so a matter of confusion and controversy. In other words, it may be said that while the will of the legislators may be manifest through their resolution in the form of a law, the will of the electorate cannot be so ascertainable. So Gettell remarks that "any attempt to find a political sovereign at the back of a legal sovereign destroys the value of the entire concept and reduces sovereignty to a mere catalogue of influences."18 3. De Jure and De Facto Sovereignty: Sometimes a distinction is made between a de jure (legal) and a de facto (factual) sovereign. A de jure sovereign is one who occupies his office according to the well-established laws and practices of his state and by virtue of that he has the authority to issue commands and secure their obedience by the persons concerned. It means that his occupation of the office and then exercise of all power rests on the authority of the law of the land. But a de facto sovereign is one who occupies the highest office of the state in an illegal or unconstitutional manner and then makes use of force to enforce his will. It may be as a result of war or revolt in the country. As Bryce says: "The persons or body of persons who can make his or their will prevail whether with the law or against the law, he (or they) is (or are) the de facto ruler (or rulers), the person
16. A.V. Dicey: An Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution, p. 66.
17. Gilchrist: Principles Political Science, p. e4.
18. Gettell, op. cit., p. 98.
SOVEREIGNTY, MONISM AND PLURALISM 149
to whom obedience is actually paid".1'-' History is full of such instances when some ambitious person seized power in a revolt and then declared himself as the real ruler of the country. In England Cromwell became the de facto ruler after the execution of King Charles I and dissolution of the Long Parliament in 1649; Napoleon became the de facto ruler of France after overthrowing the Directory in 1796. Ayub Khan became the de facto sovereign of Pakistan after wresting power from President Iskander Mirza in (958. Such a distinction between de jure and de facto sovereigns goes on for some . time and then it disappears either when the deposed sovereign gets back his power as Emperor Haile Selaisse of Ethiopia (who had taken asylum in England in 1936) returned to his country and once again became the Empsror after the defeat of Italy in 1945, or when the de facto ruler legitimises his authority by changing the constitutional law of the land as was done by President Daoud in Afghanistan and by Khomeini in Iran after overthrowing the system of monarchy in their respective countries.'-0
4. Popular Sovereignty: It implies highest power of the people. Obviously, it constitutes the foundation of a democratic order. In ancient times the Romans held the view that the authority of the commonwealth was derived from the corporate power of the people. During later medieval period it was reiterated by the precursors of the conciliar movement like William of Ockam and Marsiglio of Padua. However, its best exponent is Rousseau of France who idealised the theory of social contract by holding that the authority of the state was based on the 'general will' of the people. Among the nation-builders of the United States, Thomas Jefferson harped on the theme of the highest authority of the people. Since then, this idea has become an integral part of democratic theory, though in actual practice it assumes the shape of political sovereignty. So says Garner: "Unorganised public opinion, however powerful, is not sovereignty unless it is clothed in legal form, no more so than the informal or unofficial resolu-
19. James Bryce: Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol, II, pp. 513-16.
20. Garner well says: "On account of the manifest advantages which flow from the exercise of power resting on strict legal right rather than upon physical force, the new sovereign sometimes has his de facto claim converted into a legal right by election or ratification." Op cit., p. 168.150 PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
tions of the members of a legislative body in law. The sovereignty of the people, therefore, can mean nothing more than the power of the majority of the electorate, in a country where a system of approximate universal suffrage prevails, acting through legally established channels, to express their will and to make it prevail."21
Austin's Interpretation: No doubt, the best exposition of the idea of sovereignty can be seen in its legal or juristic form. The reason is that the will of the state has its best manifestation in the law of the state that has a binding character. It is for this reason that the study of sovereignty from a strictly legal point of view, as given by Hobbes and Bentham, has an importance of its own. In this connection the best exposition of this term is furnished by an English jurist John Austin (1790-1859) who in his work The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832) defines this term in these words: "If a determinate human superior, not in the habit of obedience to a like superior, receives habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate human superior is the sovereign in that society and that society (including the superior) is a society political and independent."
According to Henry Sidgwick, Austin' view may be briefly stated thus: "Positive law of any state is a general command to do or abstain from certain acts which is issued directly or indirectly by the sovereign of the state to a person or persons subject to his authority; the sovereign being that determinate person, or body of persons combined in a certain manner that the bulk of the members of the state habitually obey, provided that he or it does not habitually obey anyone else. It is implied in the conception of Sovereign that the community, that has a sovereign, is independent in the sense that its government does not habitually obey a foreign power, and orderly in the sense that the bulk of the community habitually obeys the laws."
"From this definition together with the assumption that facts exist corresponding to the definition, two important consequences are inferred:
(a) The power of the sovereign cannot be legally limited—for, obviously, the sovereign cannot be coerced to act in a certain way by any command of his own;
(b) Sovereignty cannot, strictly speaking, be legally divided between two or more persons, or bodies of persons acting separately, because any such persons or bodies of persons
21. Ibid., p. 165.
SOVEREIGNTY, MONISM AND PLURALISM
15'
must have ex hypothesis powers legally limited in certaii directions—these are certain things which each of them is b; law prevented from doing; but if so, they are in habitua obedience to the authority that laid down the law, and it i this latter that is the real sovereign. For example, in a feders state, such as the USA, sovereignty, strictly speaking, doe not belong to the Central Government nor to the separal governments of the federated states, but to the body, wha ever it may be, that is recognised as having authority 1 alter the conditions of federation."-
Following important conclusions may be drawn from wh Austin has said about the nature of the sovereignty of the state:
1. That in every independent political community or state, the is a supreme and absolute power in the hands of some pers< or persons (institution) whose will is the law of the state an as such, is binding on all concerned persons and their associ tions.
2. That the sovereign is a determinate person. It means that t highest authority of the state is vested in the hands of soi person or persons who may be identified and who m exercise it as per their best judgment. That is, they m formulate, express and realise their will. If so, sovereigi can lie only in the legal form; to talk of anything like pol cal sovereignty (supreme power of the electorate), or popu sovereignty (supreme power of the electorate) is to play w a fiction. The vast electorate or the vast multitude of peo cannot be identified with the sovereign of a state, nor < they formulate and express their resolve in the form oi law. It also follows that human laws and nothing else in form of natural or divine law may be the proper subject study in this connection.
3. That the sovereignty is indivisible, because sovereign does obey any other authority. The will of the sovereign is supr< over all persons and their associations living in the state, he is under nobody's control or subjection. The determii human superior may act unwisely or unjustly in an eth
22. Sidgwick: Elements of Politics, pp. 651-52. It may be seen in the staten of Stephen Leacock: "The moment one passes from the dry certainty of Austinian conception of legality, all is confusion." Elements of Poll Science, p. 61.152 PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
sense, bat his action is unimportant for the purpose of legal theory on this subject. The laws emanating from, the authority of the state are like commands that must be obeyed s ? as to avoid the agony of suitable punishment.
4. That the sovereign receives habitual obedience from the bulk of a given community means that obedience must be a matter of habit and not merely of an occasional ritual. It "nust be regular, undisturbed and continuous. It is not necessary that society as a whole must render such an obedience because in every society there may be a small section of the dissenters; it is enough that it comes from the bulk or the major part of the community. ,
5. That command is the essence of law. Whatever the sovereign wills is law. Failure to do so invites punishment. Hence, law of the state may be distinguished from a usage and a custom. The former has a mandatory character, the latter's character is volitional. The people may observe ther customs or not, but obedience to law is not a matter of volition.
In short, the whole argument of Austin has a juristic complexion. The idea of sovereignty is expressed in a juristic form. The sovereign power of a state manifests itself in the form of a law that is a command to be obeyed by the persons and groups concerned. As he says: "Every positive law, or every law, simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person or a sovereign body of persons to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body of persons is sovereign or supreme." He further says: "To that determinate superior the other members of the society are dependent. The position of its other members towards that determinate superior is a state of subjection or a state of dependence. The mutual relation which subsists between that superior and them may be styled the relation of sovereign and subject, or ihe relation of sovereignty and subjectivity." In short, law is the regulator of the behaviour of the people and sovereign is the maker and enforcer of this law. There can be no political society without a sovereign power which "is the centre of gravity in a mass of matter."23
The interpretation of sovereignty, as given by Austin, obviously assimilates all the five characteristics of sovereignty—absoluteness, all-comprehensiveness, inalienability, indivisibility, and permanence—given above. As such, it is regarded as the best exposition of the idea of
23. Sir Henry Maine: The Early History of Institutions, p. 339.
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sovereignty in juristic terms. But it has some weak points that may be enumerated as under:
1. The sovereign of Austin is not only a determinate human superior, he is the wieider of highest and absolute authority. It is said that so far there has been no sovereign in the world that may be truly identified with the model of the Austinian sovereign. A leading light of the historical school like Sir Henry Maine contends that even the great Tartars of China and the Mughals of India could not be taken as the concrete examples of the Austinian sovereign. Even the case of Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Punjab could not be invoked in this connection. The reason is thai even the most power-drunk rulers of the world have bowed their heads before the might of some natural or supernatural agency. The power of the sovereign has certain limits that may be in the form of some religious or social customs having their sustenance in the deep-rooted convictions of the people. Only a despot with a 'disturbed brain' may be the sole conceivable example of Austin's sovereign. We cannot ignore . the existence of vast mass of influences which we may call for shortness moral, that perpetually shapes, limits, or forbids the actual direction of the forces by its sovereign."24
2. The Austinian view of sovereignty is immersed in the world of law. It ignores the importance of social usages and customs that definitely have a binding character. The sociologists contend that people obey their established practices in the same way they obey the laws of the state. Machiavelli understood this fact and he cautioned the ruler against olaying with the customs of the people. It is also said that the law is nothing but a custom translated into the form of a written command of trie state. A wise sovereign would never commit the mistake
24. Ibid., p. 359. J.N. Figgis makes a convincing observation: "But the truth is that this State in the ssnse of an absolute super-entity has never existed, and that it cannot exist. In theory it represents a despot ruling over slaves; in practice, even a despot is limited by the fact that slaves are after all, human; deny their personality as you like, then comes a point at which it
asserts itself, and they will kill either ths despot or them elves.....\ttempts
are made to get out of this difficulty by swing that ths sovereign power, though theoretically illimitable, is HmiteJ in practice very materially; psychologically by its own nature, and externally by the fact that there are certain things which no government can do without resistance...." Churches in the Modem State, pp. 86-87.154 PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
of playing with the customs of the people and imposing upon them a law that is opposed to the well-established practices and sentiments of the people. Custom is not a deliberate statute; it is the outcome of ages and even an autocrat, like Peter the Great, is expected to be the guardian and servant of the customs of the people. R.M. Maclver says that all customary laws are in their origin spontaneous, not created by any deliberate will to organise, certainly not created by the will of the state. "The state has little power to make custom and perhaps less to destroy it."25 Again: "For custom, when attacked, attacks law in turn, attacks not only the particular law which opposes it, but, what is more vital, the spirit of law-abidingness."26
3. Austin's argument that the sovereign obeys none and receives habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society is disputed. In every political community there is a division of functions, though not of will, and without such division no government pan be conducted effectively. There is not one sovereign but three sovereigns like the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, and these three ultimate authorities are so far
25. R.M. Maclver: The Modem State, p. 160.
26. Ibid, p. 161. A French sociologist Leon Duguit goes so far as to say that it is not the state which creates laws, but it is laws which create the state. According to him, laws are merely 'the expression of social necessity.' Austin says that law is a 'command' of the sovereign and a command is a 'signification of desire' that is distinguished from other significations of desire by this peculiarity that the party to whom it is directed is liable to evil from the other, in case he does not comply with the desire. "But all laws of the state do not fit comfortably into the 'command pattern' of Austin. Many administrative orders donQt fall ;nt0 the category of a 'command' because of their quality of 'incomplete obligation'. One may ask what about judicial decision given by a court invalidating a law made by the legislature of the country. For instance, the American Supreme Court being the final interpreter of the constitution can make the Congress and the President mean whatever it chooses. But it is not very convincing to treat a body whose primary function is to elucidate, interpret and apply known and established rules of law, as if it were the sovereign will, on whose pleasure their existence depended." Benn and Peters, op. cit., pp. 75-77. Prof. G.N. Singh comments that such a view of sovereignty "might have fitted the conditions prevailing in England before the political reforms of 1832, but it does not square with the situation as it has developed in the world since the middle of the nineteenth century. The conception of legal sovereignty requires today "radical revision." Fundamentals of Political Science and Organisation, p. 79.
SOVEREIGNTY, MONISM AND PLURALISM 155
independent of each other that the executive sovereign alone continues without intermission, whilst the legislature may be dissolved temporarily and the supreme judiciary is not always
in session.27
4. The interpretation of Austin covers the case of legal sovereignty alone; it rejects the cases of political and people's (popular) sovereignty. In Austin's view, sovereignty cannot be vested in the people as a whole or even in the body of the voters, because both have an indeterminate character. The vast body of the voters or of the people of a country cannot have a will of their own that may be translated into the law of the land. Such a view is not acceptable to the scholars of political theory who laud democratic system as one based on the 'will of the people'. The popular saying is 'voice of the people is the voice of God'. We may give numerous instances to prove that even the autocratic legislators have had to bow their heads before the voters (or the people) of their country. Laski has given a challenging observation that even the so-called sovereign British Parliament cannot make a law that is taken as 'uncivilised' or 'barbarian' by the voters (people) of the country. It is a different matter that the people in general may not recognise their real force that is visible to them in the times of a popular uprising. As John Chipman Gray insisted, "the real rulers of a society are undiscover-able."28 So Laski says that it "is impossible to make the legal theory of sovereignty valid for political philosophy.,.. A realistic analysis would probably content itself with saying that the will of the State is, for practical purposes, the will which determines the boundaries within which other wills must live. The will of the State, in fact, is the will of government as that will is accepted by the citizens over whom it rules."29
27. A.R. Lord: Principles of Politics, p. 89. Sidgwick says that "in a modern constitutional state, political power that is not merely exercised at the discretion of a political superior—-and that must, therefore, be regarded as supreme or ultimate—-is usually distributed in a rather complex way among different bodies and individuals; though it is also important to bear in mind that from the many forms of government in any state we can only conjecture very incompletely the actual distribution of th; power of producing political effects." Op. cit., p. 638.
28. See Laski, op. cit., p. 55.
29. Ibid., pp. 55-56. "The electorate is a component part of the sovereign and156
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCiENCE
5, A difficulty arises when we try to study a federal system in the context of the Austinian theory of sovereignty. In such a system the powers are divided between the central and provincial governments and each is taken as autonomous in the sphere allotted to it. In a sense, it looks like the division of sovereignty. The provincial governinents have the status of coordinate governments vis-a-vis central government. It shows that neither the central nor the provincial governments hav& an authority that may be termed absolute, exclusive and indivisible—essential qualities of sovereignty as given earlier. We may also take note of centre-state controversies and confrontations in which victory may rest with either side. A study of this kind may inform a student of political theory that either the interpretation of Austin applies to a country with a unitary system, or it should be revised so as to be also applicable to a federal system. The problem stands as how the Austinian theory can be reconciled with a federal polity in which neither the central nor the regional governments can be termed 'sovereign'. So Laski says: "It has been pointed out that the discovery of sovereignty in a federal State is, practically, an impossible adventure."80
6. A powerful attack on the Austinian theory comes from the side of the pluralists who desire to pluralise the concept of sovereignty. In this connection we may refer tc a very large number of social thinkers like Duguit, Durkheim, Figgis, Lindsay, Barker and Laski who contend that the sovereign state has no right to discard the real significance of numerous social groups and associations that have a 'personality' of their own and also play a quite important part in satisfying needs of the people. It will be in the interest of individual liberty if some portion of sovereignty is shared by these social groups and associations of the people. As Laski says: "Men are members of the State; but they are members also of innumerable other associations which not only exercise power over their adherents, but se;k also to influence the conduct of government itself... But not less important as a limitation upon its power to determine itself is the control exercised over
its election of representatives h only the adoption of a cartain mode of exercising its powers." Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 656. 30. Laski, op. cit., p. 53.
SOVEREIGNTY, MONSSM AND PLURALISM If
their own sphere of activity by different associations."31 7. Finally, we may refer to the attack of the internationalists o the Austinian theory of sovereignty. Like Hobbes an Rousseau, Austin denies the existence of any authority outsic and above the state. The state knows no authority above and, as such, it is the master of its own will. In clear terms implies that every state has the right to produce weapons < mass destruction, or to settle its disputes by means of fore o, to do anything in violation of the principles of inte national law and international morality. The disasters of tl two World Wars tell us that such a view of the sovereign must be discarded. It is required that the power of the sta must be regulated, even controlled, by some internation authority so as to save this mankind from the scourge another great war that would bring untold sufferings, implies that the whole idea of sovereignty should be restat in the light of the canons of internationalism. As Laski fore fully argues: "In such an aspect the notion of an independe sovereign State is, on the international side, fata! to the we being of humanity. The way in which a State should live life in relation to other States is clearly not a matter in whi that State is entitled to be the sole judge.... Internatior government is, therefore, axiomatic in any plan for inti national well-being. But international government implies tl organised subordination of States to an authority in whi each may have a voice, but in which also, that voice is ne> the self-determined source of decision."32
Al! these points of attack have their significance. But the f; stands out that Austinian interpretation of sovereignty has its o significance if attention is kept confined to its purely juristic charact We may find fault with it by studying it from sociological, politi and other standpoints. Garner is correct in his assessment that "a conception of strict legal nature, Austin's theory is, on the whe clear and logical, and much of the criticism direcied against it ] been founded on misapprehension and misconception."33
Varvfrsg Interpretations: From what we have said above, it folk that the term 'sovereignty' has varying implications. Prof. Mcllw observes that "few political conceptions have been the subject of
31. Ibid., p. 59.
32. Ibid., p. 65.
33. Garner, op. cit., p. 181.158
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much discussion amongst us in the last hundred years."31 Prof. F.W. Coker holds: "No word in political science is used with a greater variety of meanings."33 The reason behind it is th.it the origin and history of the concept of sovereignty are closely linked with the nature, the origin, and the history of the state. In the last two hundred years, particularly in advanced countries, the growth of the idea of sovereignty has been so enormous that it has overshadowed all other associations and sometimes gone far towards absorbing all the functions of society. But the students of pluralism and internationalism have sharply reacted to it and desired to make the concept of sovereignty compatible with democracy and international cooperation. As a result, the real meaning of sovereignty now ranges from its absolute to its limited character. We may thus highlight the degrees of variations:
1. On the one extreme is the view that sovereignty is the highest and unlimited power of the state. All social associations are under the complete and unassailable control of the state. It has led to the tendency of obliterating the distinction between the society and the state. Hegel advocates that the predestined end of political evolution is that the nation should be absorbed into the state. But Marx retaliates with the argument that the predestined goal is that political society should annihilate the state. The irresistible growth in the field of state activity is justified by reference to sovereignty, once all considerations of the authority of social groups and organisations had been thrown out of the field, and in its turn the concept of sovereignty, made to serve the state or the nation, was regarded as an absolute end. It was interpreted as justifying the use of political power or symbolising the actual possession of it. "Even in federal countries what was once not true of earlier times has become true in the past hundred years; the federal form of state is always a unitary state in the process of formation or dissolution."36
2. Then, there is the case of 'limited sovereignty'. The sovereign power of the state cannot be absolute, it can, and should, be restricted by anything like a religion or by its position as a 'satellite state'. For instance, religion has an overriding
34. Mcllwain, op. cit., p. 47.
35. Coker: "Sovereignty" in E.A R. Seligman (^^.Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan, New York, 1968, Vol. XIV, p. 268.
36. F.H. Hinsley: Sovereignty, London, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, II. Ed., p. 219.
authority over state matters in a theocratic system Dr. I.H. Oureshi once Education Minister of Pakistan, said: Progress and Islamic ideals can be reconciled in a threefold definition of sovereignty in an Islamic state: (0 the legal sovereign shall be the Muslim law; its definition shall be in the hands of the legislature; (») the political sovereign shall be the people who will elect and dismiss their governments; (Hi) the real sovereign will be basically the principles of Islam, brought into the public forum and discussion at length"37 The second situation may ' be where a sovereign state becomes a member of some superpower's military alliance. In such a situation the sovereignty of the satellite state is truncated and the super-power has the political right to control its foreign and domestic policies and it mav go to the extent of intervening in its internal affairs as the USSR did in Hungary in 1957, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and recently in Poland in 1984. It all informs Hinsley to remark that somewhat different circumstances conspire with the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism to account for the fact that Soviet Russian state still seeks to uphold through the Brezhnev doctrine-the notion that the Communist states of eastern Europe are semi-sovereign protected states."38 * The growth of internationalism has its own effect on limiting the sovereignty of the state. In international relations where sophisticated and less sophisticated states necessarily coexist, it is not by improbable contingencies but by palpabio anomalous situations that the concept of sovereignty might appear to have been confounded. It may be noted in the behaviour of the states in the period following the first World War It is not from the outset, then certainly by 1918, they oerceived that these efforts required them to relinquish their sovereignty in at least that crucial area of relations between states which involves the decision to resort to war. The evidence which undermines the analogy between the international system and primitive body politik is a positive evidence that the international system is a political system sue generis. And it is to be found in the fact that the states are not only moving towards the centralisation of the functions involved in applying international law which should be incompatible with their sovereignty but are advancing how-
37. Qvaesbi: Paktstan-An Islamic Democracy, pp. 26-27.
38. Hinsley, op. cit., p. 224.160
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
ever solvvly, in a different direction—one in which they are exercising their sovereignty to bring about an agreed redefinition of their rights and duties within the international system."39
4. Some scholars of international law and international relations hold a peculiar view that the internal and external aspects of sovereignty should be demarcated and the concept of absolut-ness and indivisibility of sovereignty should be kept confined to its internal aspect alone. Thus, Quincy Wright suggests that the three aspects of national sovereignty that are inmost need of limitations are the power of self-judgment in international controversies, the power to prepare and use armed force in international relations, and the power to impose arbitrary barriers to international trade.40 Act. 14 of the Draft Declaration of the Rights and Duties of States prepared by the International Law Commission of the United Nations says: ''Every State has the duty to conduct its relation with other States in accordance with international law and with the principle that the sovereignty of each State is subject to the supremacy of international law." Hans Kelsen insists that it had been better, if the authors of this provision had avoided the use of term 'sovereignty' especially in view of the reason that they had not defined it in a way compatible with the meaning of international law.41 So Palmer and Perkins contend: "Sovereignty, in its literal sense, means supreme authority, yet it must be limited under present conditions. It is absolute and indivisible, yet it must be qualified and divided. It is incompatible with international law, yet it must be reconciled with international law."12
5. Contradictory situations arise and the element of contradictions are resolved somehow over a period of time. No doubt, the traditional view of sovereignty does not accord with the growing idea of internationalism. According to new developments in the discipline of international law, the case of 'divided sovereignty' or 'joint sovereignty' has been taken into admission in the name of international cooperation.43 For
39. Ibid., p. 229.
40. Wright: "Fundamental Problems of International Organisation" in International Conciliation (April, 194U, pp. 459-72.
41. Palmer and Perkins: International Relations, p. 29.
42. Ibid.
43. H.E. Cohen: Recent Theories of Sovereignty, p. 85.
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instance, Clyde Eagleton states: "Sovereignty cannot be an absolute term. It is as just foolish to say that sovereignty must be surrendered or eliminated as to say that it must be absolute and unrestrained.... The problem is not one of asking whether we should throw off a thing called sovereignty; it is rather one of asking with regard to what matters would we gain by having an international control, and in which matters would we gain more by reserving control to ourselves."44 We may refer to a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements whereby states happily accept limitations on their sovereignty. An outstanding case in recent times may b; seen in the treaty between India and Sri Lanka of 1987 whereby the former undertook the responsibility of peace-keeping in the disturbed areas of the latter. The desired triumph of international law would take time. At the present moment, it may be said that the civilised states have put self-imposed restraints on their behaviour so as to play their part in the field of international peace and cooperation. States involved in a war stop when the Security Council passes a resolution of cease-fire. Resort to war has become very difficult now and the only loophole is the plea of doing it in 'self-defence'. When the second World War was going on, Carl J. Friedrich painfully commented in 1942 that the two terms 'state' and 'sovereignty* were symbols of 'totalitarian government' and were fraught with implications incompatible not only with democracy ibut with the essence of Christianity also.45
It all leaves this impression that the traditional concept! of sovereignty is outdated and the weight of the new idea of making sovereignty of the state compatible with the disciplines of international law and international relations is growing. We may, therefore, appreciate the view of an English writer that the concept of sovereignty "is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at present."46
Monism
As already hinted, there are two schools on the nature of sovereignty of state—monism and pluralism. While the monists hold
44. Eagleton: The Forces That Shape Our Future, p. 176.
45. See Palmer and Perkins, op. cit., p. 32.
46. Carr: The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-39, p. 230.II
162
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that sovereignty is unlimited and indivisible or singular, the pluralists hold that it is limited and divisible or plural. Moreover, as the former belong to the early modern period, they are called advocates of traditional or classical theory of sovereignty. But the latter belong to the period of nineteenth and twentieth centuries and so they are regarded as advocates of the modern theory of sovereignty. The dividing line between the two is quite sharp. While the former treat state as the highest association endowed with absolute legal power to issue commands and secure their obedience, the latter distinguish between state and society and treat state as a superior, but by no means supreme, association in relation to other groups and associations of the people. First, we shall discuss the case of monists who afford no support to the pluralist ideal of a society in which state is brought down to the level of other associations; to them the state "is the supreme social institution; who recognise other forms of associations as essential to the existence of men but regard the position of the state as unique."47
The school of monism has its first exponent in Jean Bodin of France of the sixteenth century in whose view sovereignty is the supreme and perpetual power of the state. The emperor is the supreme law-maker (legibus solutus) whose authority is unrestrained by any civil law. But Bodin refers to the law of nature and law of nations that bind the authority of the state. An improvement upon this idea of sovereignty is made by Thomas Hobbes of England in the seventeenth century. He maintains that laws, properly speaking, are nothing but the commands of a political sovereign so that there can be no legal limits to his highest legal authority. The leviathan of Hobbes is the sole legislator, principal executive and chief judicial officer. He hears and decides all controversies and makes determination of facts and laws, controls defence and levies taxes to support his administration, chooses his own ministers and counsellors who are like his agents and responsible to him alone. As he says: "By the authority given to him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he has use of so much power and strength conferred on him that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consists the essence of the commonwealth (state)."48
The name of Rousseau of France of the eighteenth century belongs to the same category. He maintains that sovereignty that resides in the 'body politik' or 'general will' has no legal limitations, because
47. F.W. Coker: Recent Political Thought, p. 498.
48. Hobbes: Leviathan, Ch. 18.
the sovereign being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it has, and can have, no interest contrary to theirs; he is the sole judge of what is important for subjection to the general will and errs only when it legislates for particular interests and when partial associations are formed at the expense of the great associations.49 Rousseau, in this way, does the same what is done by Hobbes so far as the doctrine of monism is concerned with this essential point of difference that while Hobbes talks of the legal sovereignty of a despot, Rousseau upholds the case of sovereignty of the true will of the people. It is well observed: "Rousseau, as a matter of fact, unites the absolute sovereign of Hobbes and popular consent of Locke in the philosophical doctrine of popular sovereignty which has since then been the established form of political theory."50
The doctrine of monism has its most abstract or metaphysical interpretation at the hands of German philosopher Hegel. To him state is the highest stage of social development; it is an objectification of the real self of the individual. It is the externalisation of individual's freedom. It alone provides social life and protects the norms of social morality. The will of the individual is merged with the will of the society and then manifests itself in the form of a law or 'command'of the state that must be obeyed unflinchingly. The state can do no wrong, because the law of the state is a concrete form of the will of the society in which the will of the individual is naturally implicit. State, in this way, can claim total allegiance of an individual. As Wapyer says, state "is the school master which brings him knowledge of the Spirit, of Absolute Reason. His real will impels him to identify himself with the Spirit. The Spirit is embodied in the State. Therefore, it is the real will to obey the dictates of the State."51
Hegel died in 1831 and Austin's book on jurisprudence appeared in the following year in which the monistic interpretation of sovereignty had its best representation. As we have already seen, Austin vests all authority in the hands of a 'determinate human
j superior' who is not in the habit of obedience to a like superior and who rather receives habitual obedience from the bulk of a given
j society. It is the existence of such a sovereign authority that makes
I the society political as well as independent. He discards the case of moral laws, metaphysical laws, customary laws and the like and gives
I all importance to the positive laws of the state that are in the nature
49. Rousseau: Social Contract, Book I, Ch. VII.
50. G.D.H. Cole: "Introduction" to Social Contract (Eng. Translation), p. xxiv.
51. C.L. Wayper: Political Thought, p. 168.164
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
of 'commands' and for that reason binding on all concerned persons and their associations. The whole statement of Austin "implies that in the structure of every independent political community it is possible to find a definite sovereign whose function it is to establish the law and whose position is above law; in every state there is some person or group of persons, some organ or collection of organs—the tsar of Russia (before 1917), the British King-in-Parliament, the American Congress and commonwealth legislatures in cooperatively amending the constitution of the United States—that has legally unlimited
authority."52
In fine, the theory of monism holds that state alone is competent to make and enforce law that is binding on all whether individuals or groups living under its control. This power cannot be shared by any other association. There may be any form of government, but the supreme power of legislation, administration and adjudication rests with the departments of the state. Coker makes the meaning of this theory clear in these words: "The SD-calied monistic doctrine has no preference as to the structure of government, as'between centralisation or decentralisation, and contains no presupposition as to the desirable or expedient scope of state activity. Nor does the doctrine in any way imply that to criticise, disobey, or resist state authority is irrational, unethical, anti-social, or even impractical. The analytical jurist holds merely that the state exists to enact and apply law; therefore, the state cannot be subjected to limitations of the same character and authority as those which it is established to formulate and execute. He does not represent the state as irresponsible; he maintains only that it cannot be responsible to any authority of like character to itself. In brief, the state, as an organisation for law within a given territory, is legally superior to all groups within that territory."5'
Pluralism
Meaning: Opposed to the school of monism is the school of pluralism. The pluralists present a new interpretation of the real nature of sovereignty. They consider monism as 'a pernicious or futile doctrine.'54 They distinguish between state and society and try to bring down the state from a place of supremacy to that of servitude. The state is just one of the social associations. As such, it cannot claim total allegiance of man. The authority should be shared by
52. Coker. op. cit., p. 502.
53. Ibid., p. 503.
54. Ibid.
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other social groups also that satisfy man's needs and play an important part in the working of social mechanism. Thus, they advocate a new kind of state that is neither omnicompetent nor omnipresent; it is just a little superior from other social groups and organisations. There is no unified system of law established by the exclusive authority of the state, no centralised system of administration, and no generalisation of political will as so powerfully advocated by the champions of analytical jurisprudence. "On the contrary, the state is a multiplicity in its essence and manifestation, it is divisible into parts and should be-divided." That is, pluralism "undertakes to transform the state. It criticises and discredits the state as it is, and seeks to reduce it from a place of honour to a place of servitude."35
The theory of political pluralism has two sides—negative and positive. In a negative sense, it does not appreciate the contention of the monists that state is an omnicompetent association in dealing with all affairs of the society. In a positive sense, it contends that the authority of the state must be shared by social groups and associations for two reasons. First, these associations have a personality of their own; some of them are even older than the state. Second, they play an important part in meeting requirements of the individuals which the state alone cannot do. In this way, they distinguish between state and society. Hsiao marks out these points of pluralistic doctrine:66
1. It emphasises individual freedom.
2. It introduces the group into political thought and shows the importance of social organisations.
3. It gives a more truly comprehensive view of the political process, which is to include not only government and law, but all social relations between men as many-sided moral beings.
4. It manifests a wholesome reaction to the paternalism and absolutism of the political state.
5. It has helped Western political thought to develop from abstract monism through abstract pluralism to concrete monism.
6. It compels monists to restrict the State to its narrow political sphere.
Essential Features: As pointed out above, the doctrine of political pluralism is a stern reaction against the traditional theory of
55. K.C. Hsiao: Political Pluralism, p. 8.
56. Ibid., pp. 248-49.166
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167
sovereignty. It rejects the contention that all authority should be vested in the state to the extent that social groups and associations become insignificant like stars by the brilliance of the sun. They contend that the subject of the sovereignty of state should be restudied in the light of new facts telling us about the real worth and utility of numerous social groups and associations. As A.D. Lindsay says: "If we look at the facts, it is clear enough that the theory of sovereign State has broken down."37 According to J.N. Figgis, the idea of sovereignty is like 'a venerable superstition' and it would go like the dogma of divine rights of kings.58 E. Barker says: "We see the state less as an association of individuals in a common life; we see it more as an association of individuals already united in various groups for a further and more embracing common purpose."^9 In very harsh terms, Laski says that it "would be of lasting benefit to political science if the whole concept of sovereignty were surrendered."80
Allied with it is the second feature of this doctrine that should be regarded as the alternative model presented by the pluralists. If social groups and associations have a 'personality' of their own and if they also meet the requirements of their members, the state must compete with them while maintaining the federal structure of the society. It must compete with churches, trade unions, employers' associations, friendly societies, political parties, and the like. But in any instance of conflicting demands, the pre-eminence of the state over other associations depends upon the superiority of its moral appeal. The State is like 'an association of associations of the society' (Figgis) and, as such, 'we give to it no peculiar merit.' (Laski) All pluralists harp on the theme of the value of numerous social groups and associations that should entitle them for a share of sovereignty of the state. Coker says that the common feature of all such discussions about the essential function of smaller groups "is the idea that the state is confronted not merely by unassociated individuals but also by other associations evolving independently, eliciting individual loyalties, better adapted than the state—because of their select membership, their special forms of organisation and action—for serving various social needs."61
• 57. Lindsay: "The State in Recent Political Theory" in Political Quarterly (1914), Vol. I, p. 136.
58. Figgis: Churches in the Modern State, pp. 45-49.
59. Barker: Political Thought in England, pp. 175-83.
60. Laski, op. cit., p. 55.
61. Coker, op. cit., p. 508.
Thus, Miss M.P. Follet sums up essential features (merits) of the doctrine of pluralism as:62
t. The pluralists prick the bubble of the present State's right to supremacy.
2. They recognise the value of the group and see that the variety of our group life today has a significance which must be immediately reckoned with in a political way.
3. They plead for a revivification of local life.
4. They see that the interest of the State is not always identical. with the interest of its parts.
5. Pluralism is the beginning of the disappearance of its crowd.
6. Pluralism has seized upon the problem of identity, of association, and of federalism.
Leading Thinkers: A German sociologist Otto V. Gierke and an English historian F.W. Maitland, in the last, quarter of the nineteenth century, may be regarded as the originators of the doctrine of political pluralism. Gierke in his Political Theories of the Middle Ages discovered the medieval social life when guild system prevailed. In the unsettled conditions of those times, merchants, traders, craftsmen and others had their associations (called guilds) which had the character of autonomous corporations. The medieval state was not a sovereign organisation. As such, these social groups enjoyed autonomy. Gierke not only presented his researches on the subject of social system of the middle ages, he also lauded it as a bulwark against absolutism of the state. Maitland translated the work of Gierke into English and he also subscribed to the way of appreciating the medieval guild system. The noticeable point at this stage is that both these writers looked upon social groups as having a will and consciousness of their own as distinct from those of the individual members. In their view, the purpose of the state was nothing more than coordinating and adjusting the working of various autonomous social groups.
Thus, a new idea developed. J.N. Figgis applied it in relation to the church which, in his view, had a personality of its own. He contended that the corporate personality of the church did not exist by any grace on the part of the state, because the church had powers of self-development like a person. The state should recognise this fact. Said he: 'Human society is not a sand heap of individuals.
62. Follet: The New State,168
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related only through the State but an ascending hierarchy of groups.' So the sociologists of France like Paul Boncour and Emile Durkheim defended the case of the autonomy of numerous professional groups in a society. They contended that besides there being a national sovereign deciding questions in cases affecting the common interest of the nation, there should be particular sovereigns to decide matters where the special interest of some group was more important than the remoter interest of the majority. They argued for the restoration of the ancient occupational association as a definitely recognised public institution. They desired professional groups to be the basis of political representation as well as the source of economic regulation, because economic life was too specialised to be reached by the state. Leon Duguit of France and Hugo Krabbe of Holland studied the case of pluralism from a legal point of view. Duguit contended that law was not a command of the sovereign, rather it "is independent of, superior and anterior to political organisation, and is objective not subjective." So Krabbe says: "The state is nothing but a legal community... a portion of mankind having its own independent body of legal relations. Hence, the state performs no function whatever except to impute legal value to certain interests." Thus, both Duguit and Krabbe suggested the course of decentralisation implying plurality of legal authorities. But the merit of Krabbe's work is that he passes on from the plane of state as a national organisation to its adjustment with an international order. His contention is that the sense of right should extend to international affairs as well and before the stage of state in the supernatural society is reached, international community must pass through the phase of the idea of sovereignty.
Some leading English thinkers of the twentieth century have
contributed to the theory of pluralism. Here we may refer to the
works of Lindsay, Barker, Cole and Laski. Lindsay declares that the
corporate personalities in society are numerous, and that many of
them, because they are more homogeneous and represent a closer
community of interest, attract deeper loyalties than the state and, if
permitted, prove themselves to be more effective agencies of social
organisation. Though Ernest Barker rejects the Gierke-Maitland
conception of the 'real personality' of groups, he accepts the main
part of their doctrine -that these groups exist prior to any act of the
state, each as a juristic person created by a common conviction among
its members or its corporate character and function. But G.D.H. Cole
seeks to incorporate this idea into the framework of his theory of
guild socialism. All social affairs must be managed by the guilds of
the consumer»>and the producers with interlinking communes and
SOVEREIGNTY, MONISM AND PLURALISM
1
with a guild parliament at the top making laws for the regulation entire guild system-
But the most important of all is Laski whose ideas in this conn tion may be seen in his A Grammar of Politics published in 1925 £ also in some other writings that appeared earlier. The main argume of Laski are:
1. The state is only one of the social associations. It meets < requirements, but other social groups also do the same varying measures. Thus, the state cannot exhaust the assoc tive impulses of man and it cannot lay its claim for ma total allegiance to itself.
2. If society is federal, authority should also be federal. It imp that society is a network of numerous groups and associati and each group has its autonomous and corporate charac the state should have its own area of activity without destr ing the areas of other social groups and associations.
3. The areas of state authority must also be determined in light of moral adequacy and free conscience of the individ The claim of authority upon the individual is legitimate j portionately to the moral urgency of its appeal. The c state to which a man owes allegiance is one in which he covers moral adequacy. Man's first duty is to be true to conscience.
4. The state should compete with other social groups and asso tions in serving man and winning his allegiance; it ha; right to destroy or encroach upon the autonomy of o social groups and associations. We live not in a universe in a multiverse. Anything like Rousseau's general will is impossibility. Thus, no association's will can be given credit of finality.
5. The monistic view of sovereignty is inimical to the libert the individual. It supports the case of an all-powerful si An omnipotent state is the offspring of the religious stru§ of the early modern age. But facts show that never in his has sovereignty existed as an absolute power and there 1 always been limitations on the scope and exercise of authority of the state.
6. The real function of the state is to set conditions within w other associations move, because its mission is to enable people, through these associations, to be the best selves w]170
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
they are capable of. It coordinates the activities of the groups with a view to that end.
7. Though the state is an association for political purposes, it is not coextensive with society. It may set the keynote of social life, but it is not coextensive with it. It is a communitas com-munitatum and not the crowning point of a hierarchical structure. The state may be the regulator of a community, it is not the coordinator of all that a community includes.
But the astonishing feature of the political thought of Laski is that he discards the case of pluralism after 1930. Once a diehard pluralist, then a modified pluralist, then a Marxist, he ends as a Fabian socialist supporting the case of increasing state activity in the public interest. In the fourth edition of his A Grammar of Politics (1934) he added a preliminary chapter titled 'Crisis in the Theory of State' wherein he frankly said: "The weakness, as I now see it, of pluralism is clear enough. It did not sufficiently realise the nature of the state as an expression of class-relations. It did not sufficiently emphasise the fact that it was bound to claim an indivisible and irresponsible sovereignty, because there was no other way in which it could define and control the legal postulates of society."63 It all shows that while Laski "expressed himself enthusiastically in favour of the group particularly in his earlier writings under the influence of James, he became more and more critical of the pluralist attitude in his later writings. The attempt to dethrone the state or to expunge sovereign authority from the community was abandoned and the necessity of state regulation of individual and group life came to be increasingly recognised."64
Finally, we may refer to the ideas of the leading American sociologist R.M. Maclver who in his book The Modern State contributes to the doctrine of pluralism. His main arguments are:
1. The state exists within society, but it is not even the form of society. We see it best in what it does. Its achievement is a system of order and control. In a word, the state regulates outstanding external relationships of men in society.
2. Society is prior to the state. In earliest phases among hunters, fishers, fruit diggers, and fruit gatherers there have been social groups which knew nothing of the state. State originated at a certain stage of social development.
63. Laski, op. cit., pp. xi-xii.
64. G.N. Sarma: Political Thought of Laski, p. 67.
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171
There are social forms as family, church, club etc. which owe neither their origin nor their inspiration to the state. Stat( protects social customs, it does not create them. Moreover social motives like friendship or jealousy, which establisl too intimate and personal relationships to be controlled b; the great machinery of the state.
Every association makes laws, but the laws of other associa tions bind their members only in so far as they prefer t accept them rather than lose the benefit of their membership The law of the state alone, in a demarcated or advance society, is coercive.
The state and society may not only be distinguished froi each other, but it should be noted that society is independei of and above the state. Moreover, society is an open organis; tion, state is a closed hierarchical structure. Thus, the sta cannot fully control an open organisation like the society. Tl concern of the state is limited to political affairs; hence 'thin which are Caesar's.'
The state is both the parent and the child of law. It mak ordinary law and is above it. But the constitutional law of tl state is above the state which it cannot transgress. In this wa the view of Austin and other analytical jurists is wrong th law is a command that is given by the sovereign authority b it does not bind the sovereign himself. The laws of the rtate are obeyed not because of the eleme of fear as conceived by the monists but because of t consideration of social utility. The root of obedience to 1; is not coercion but the social will of man to obey. If the state is merely an association among other associatioi it cannot be the repository of all powers. Sovereignty shoi be divided between the state and other associations. Powei given to the state to perform some essential functions li those of protection, conservation and development. The state is required to maintain national unity, territoi integrity and civil law and order. But in order to do this ; the state does not need sovereign power. These goal can achieved even without applying the coercive apparatus of 1
state.
Every association of any magnitute has grades of author and control analogous to those of the state. However, Maclver makes it very clear that his entire endeav( "is not to belittle the state that we have drawn these distinctions, 1
7.
10.172
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
to define it. Its true sphere is so vast, its task is so endless, that no rightful limitations can detract from its worth. On the contrary, they reveal the conditions under which alone it can achieve its greatest measure of success. They show us not only what the state is, but they teach us what the state can be."65
On the 'whole, the doctrine of political pluralism is an attack on the classical theory of monists; it is also a rejoinder in as much as it offers an alternative picture of the state as 'an association of associations' with limited area of activity. It "is, in part, a rationalisation of recent practical movements that look in various ways towards a more decentralised application of social control. There are, for example, the plans to give greater recognition to vocational groups with the government service, by enlarging the powers and responsibilities of associations of public employees; the projects for reinvigorating local governing units by enlarging their functions and increasing their administrative autonomy and the suggestions that the state, in reorganising the control of industry so as to bring about a fairer distribution of wealth and broader opportunities of self-expression, under state auspices, rather than establish a direct governmental administration or regulation of industrial enterprises."66
Criticism: The pluralistic theory of sovereignty may be criticised on these grounds:
1. While the arguments of the pluralists are very clear on the point of rejecting the traditional theory of sovereignty and also on giving importance to the position of numerous social groups and associations, the whole picture is quite blurred. To say that sovereignty should be shared by important social groups and associations is understandable, but there is no unanimity of thought on this point. What functions should be given to the state and what to other social associations? In what way and to what extent the division of sovereignty should take place? These are some important questions which the pluralists fail to answer. Coker is right in holding: "Perhaps the defects of the pluralists' analysis lie in part in their failure to make clear which of the specific functions assigned to the state by the monists they would deny to it, and in part in their underlying assumption that, if only an individual or a group be released from state control, then we shall have a condition in which spontaneous action, self-
65. Maclver, op. cit., p. 22.
66. Coker, op. cit., pp. 508-09.
SOVEREIGNTY, MONISM AND PLURALISM 173
expression, and initiative will enjoy free play. Experience hardly bears out this assumption. Many who rake the loudest outcry against state encroachment upon individual or group freedom are the most ardent supporters, or the most complacently tolerant, of other forms of social coercion."67 Alfred E. Zimmern has rightly warned that those "who talk of state absolutism are ignoring the simple truth that there is no tyranny like the tyianny of near neighbours. The smaller the group the tighter the stranglehold over your life and activities."68
2. Then, the pluralists desire to do what is impossible. We have already seen that sovereignty is a whole thing, it cannot be divided. We may appreciate the view of Calhoun that the division of sovereignty would mean its destruction. More honest are the anarchists who frankly condemn the state as an unnecessary evil and an instrument of exploitation and oppression and contend that it must be abolished root and branch. But the pluralists are dishonest in their affirmations. They want to keep their cake and eat it too. They pretent to be non-anarchists, but what they really want to achieve would take them very close to stern anti-statists. They live in a world of paradox. It is well commented: "The pluralists donot want to abolish the state as the Anarchists and the Syndicalists wish to do, although the logical outcome of tiieir theory may well be the same—abolition of the state."69
3. The pluralists adopt a reactionary approach. They draw inspiration from the social system of the middle ages when guilds, burghers and other corporate entities were in existence to manage affairs of the people. But facts speak for themselves when we find that medieval times were full of anarchic conditions that could be done away with when a sovereign state came into being. In stead of moving onwards and offering an alternative suitable for modern times, the pluralists run backwards to take inspiration from the discredited system of the past. What Barker says about guild socialism applies to the theory of pluralism that autonomous social groups like guilds and corporations "may have their own diseases, in the middle
67. Coker, op. cit., p. 517.
68. Zimmern: "Political Thought" in R.W. Livingstons (ed.): Legacy of Greece,
pp. 321-52.
69. Asirvatham: Political Theory, VUI Ed., p. 294.174
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
ages they certainly had;" and today also a system of this kind "might mean a spirit of exclusive monopoly, a spirit of jealousy between guild and guild, a spirit of pettiness which preferred the small association to the great society in which it lives."70 There is much sense in this criticism that pluralism, driven to its logical end, would disintegrate society replacing order and conditions of progress by chaotic mass of bodies or groups all contending for supremacy."71
In spite of these weaknesses, the merit of pluralism may be seen in its attack on the view that goes to justify the case of state absolutism. Liberty of the individual is a very precious thing that must be saved from the onslaught of an all-powerful state. The monists have made the state an all-powerful organisation to the extent that it may justifiably encroach upon the freedom of the people. It has happened in countries under a totalitarian system. The way some states of the world behaved during the times of the two world wars further corroborates this fact. The pluralists have drawn attention of the people in this direction and thereby sought to reconcile the authority of the state with the liberty of the individual. Their solution is that state should recognise the importance of social groups and associations and thereby cut its power to a proper size. In this way, pluralism is more close to the domain of a liberal-democratic system. It "has rendered a great service to modern political theory by inviting the political attention of the states to the reality of group life."72
70. Barker, op. cit., p. 205.
71. Gilchrist, op. cit., p. 108.
72. Asirvathatn, op. cit., p. 313.
RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
Any system of rights, therefore, her three essential aspects from which it must be regarded. There is the interest of the individual, always, at least, ultimately, finally isolatedfrom his fellow men. There is the inte rest of various groups in and through which his personality finds channels of expression. There is the interest of the community which is the total result of the whole pressure of
social forces.
—Harold J. Laski1
Rights, liberty and equality are the three inter-related themes. Possession and enjoyment of certain rights makes the case of liberty; possession and enjoyment of such rights by all without any distinction on some artificial ground makes the case of equality. To talk of liberty means to talk of rights; to talk of liberty for all means to talk of equality. It means that the three concepts (rights, liberty and epuality) exist together. Moreover, a discussion of the three must be made in a particular order. If liberty involves rights, the latter must be discussed first; and since real liberty means liberty for all, a discussion of liberty must be followed by a discussion of equality and the relationship between the two. Hence, in this chapter an attempt has been made to discuss the three important concepts in this particular order. We may well endorse the view of Laski that "without rights there can be no liberty"2 and that "every State is feiown by the rights it maintains." 3
Rights
In order to live, a man must have some rights; in order to develop his personality to the best possible extent he must have some particular rights. If state is the first condition of a civilised life, the civilised
1. Laski: A Grammar of Politics, p. 141.
2. Ibid., p. 142. 3. Ibid., p. 89.176
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RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
177
life requires a set of special rights that a man must have. We may differentiate between governments in the context of their relative merits and demerits taking into account the rights of the people. A discussion of such a problem involves the issue of proper relationship between the individual who has to pattern his life according to the rules and the state that has to ensure their due enforcement. In this way, the concept of rights finds its broad manifestation in the liberties of the individual on the one hand and in the scope of state activity on the other.
Meaning and Nature: Simply stated, a right is a claim of an individual recognised by the community and the state. Obviously, a proper definition the term 'right' has three ingredienrs. First, it is a claim of the individuals. However, not every claim can be a right. It is required that a claim should be like a disinterested desire, or something which is capable of universal application. The guiding factor is that what an individual wills should be of common interest. That is, in asserting a claim one should feel like rendering a public service. In other words, the motivating force should be a rational consideration and not a personal caprice of the individual. Paraphrasing the idea of T.H. Green, Barker says that the will that issues in the form of a claim to something not only wills the good of itself, it wills the goodness of itself in relations to others. "It it wills the goodness of society which is constituted by such relations. The goodness of the relations which constitute society means a system of rights."4
It is also required that a claim of the individual must receive social recognition. Since individual's claim is backed by a disinterested desire, it receives social recognition. For instance, an individual's claim that none should take his life, receives social recognition as every individual wills in the same direction. A recognition of the claim of this type leads to the creation of right to life. Likewise, an individual's desire that none should take away his property creates in him a sense that he should not take away the property of others. When this claim gets social recognition, it becomes right to property. "Claims thus recognised are translated into rights, and it is such recognition that constitutes them rights. Thus, if we care to make the distinction, we may say that rights have a double aspect./On the one hand, a right is a claim of an individual arising from the nature of, self-consciousness for permission to will his own ideal obiects^on-the other hand, it is the recognition of that claim by society and, 'herein
4. E. Barker: Political Thought in England (1848-1914), p. 25.
and thereby, the addition of new power to pursue these objects."5
Finally, we come to the point of political recognition. Rights are like -iioral declarations, until they are protected by the state. Individuals are guided by their real wills when they think in terms of patterning their conduct according to the rules of 'common behaviour.' However, in actual practice, they are motivated, in most of the cases, by their selfish wills. The result is the violation of the system of rights. Naturally, there must be some coercive force to ensure the exercise of these rights. The state translates socially recognised claims of moral rights into terms of law and thereby accords them legal recognition. It, therefore, acts like a coercive agency to prevent the operation of seifish wills of the individuals. Rights, therefore, have a three-fold nature. They are ethical when we deal with claims of the individuals based on their real wills and, therefore, recognised by the community. They are legal when translated into law by the state. In the sphere of politics, we are concerned with 'moral rights' which would be legally enforceable if law were what it ought to be.
A proper definition of the term 'right' should, therefore, involve all the three ingredients. However, in the realm of political theory, the most important ingredient is the fact of political recognition that connects the element of disinterested claims of the individuals with the sovereign authority of the state. The version of Gilchrist, for this reason, is partly correct when he says: '"Rights arise, therefore, from individuals as members of society and from the recognition that for society there is ultimate good which may be,reache«i by the development of the powers inherent in every individual."6 We may in stead appreciate the view of Laski: "Rights, in fact, are those conditions of social life without which no man can seek, in general, to be himself at his best. Since the State exists to make possible that achievement, it i- only by maintaining rights that its end may be secured."7
However, one point relating to the development of the concept of rights in recent times is that the 'claim aspect' has overshadowed the 'duly aspect'of this important term, it may be seen in the marked tendency to inflate the notion of rights. Now the rights are not merely ass: ted defensively against state action, tluy are rather interpreted as legitimate ch;iruj on liovernmeiu to satisfy human needs. Thus, the distinction between rights as 'liberties' and rights as 'claims' has became a matter of its own importance to social and political theory.8
5. !Nd.
6. R.N. Gilchrist: Principl-s of Political Science, p. 135.
7. Laski. op. cit., p. 9L
8. D.D. Kaphaei: Political Theory and the Rights of Man, pp. 56-57.178
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Such an assertion has put a premium on the ideal relationship between rights and duties in view of the fact that the 'claim rights' entitle their holder to limit the liberty of another person. In the case of certain rights, the argument that duties and rights are logically linked seems to be water-tight, but there are uses of the word 'duty' which donot imply correlative rights.9 Sometimes, this is put in the form of distinction between 'special' and 'general' rights. The former, which arise out of specific undertakings and agreements between individuals, presuppose the existence of general rights, befcause one needs a special right or a claim to justify a limitation on another's freedom, and in the absence of such a right everyone has the general right not to be coerced.10
Theories of Rigbts: From time to time, various explanations •egarding the origin and nature of rights have beerfgiven that nave led :o the emergence of different theories in this direction. These are:
In the lint place, we take up the theory oj natural rights. It holds that rights being rationally deducible from man's nature have their universal application irrespective of the difference of place, time and environment. The nature is the author of certain rights that have a universal, rational, eternal and immutable character. The Stoics of ancient Greece upheld the right to equality as given to us by nature, The Roman thinkers like Polybius and Cicero emphasised the existence of law of nature to which the laws of the state must conform. The principles of the law of nature may be understood by man by his ra'ionn! power. But these principles are of a universal and eternal character. In modern times, Thomas Hobbes denned right to life as a natural right which even the sovereign of the state could not jeopardise. But the name of John Locke is very important who treated three rights (relating to life, liberty and property) as natural rights. Effective protection of the natural rights is the responsibility of the state. In case the sovereign authority is incapable of fulfilling the trust of the people, the contract may. be dissolved and a new sovereign may be chosen in stead for securing.effective protection of natural rights.
The doctrine of natural rights became so popular in the early phase of the modern age that it saw its incorporation into important declarations as those of American independence of 1776 and of French Revolution of 1789. Even the Universal Declaration of Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948
9. N.P. Barry; An Introduction to Modern Political Theory, pp. 186-87." 10. H.A.L. Hart: "Are There any Natural Rights?" in Anthony Quinton (ed.): Political Philosophy, pp. 60-64.
RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
179
invokes the spirit of this theory when it says: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." In fine, the whole idea of natural rights is based on the assumption that irrespective of his m;:rit as an individual in his personal or moral capacity, man is at least equal to all others in human worth. Even convicted criminals who have violated the rights of others and, therefore, donot score highly in moral grading, still have the right not to be treated in cruel or inhuman ways by the jail staff.11
The implications of 'natural rights' are:12
1. There is an historical affirmation that man pre-existed society.
2. There is a moral and metaphysical assumption that man is a creature who possesses certain rights by virture of the general nature and plan of the universe and of the part which he has to play in carrying out the plan of the universe.
3. In order that these rights may be preserved, he forms society.
4. Rights, then, are not created by society, but are brought by men into society.
5. The purpose of society is to secure man's rights.
6. If it does not do so, the individual has a right to rebel.
7. Man has no right to rebel even if he does not, because society is, after all, formed to secure his rights, as a whole, and even if on a particular occasion it appears to violate one of them, it does so only that it may better secure them as a whole; or it does so only in order that it may better secure the rights of the most of its members even if it does not secure the rights of a particular member at a particular moment, or of a particular member at any moment.
The theory of natural rights may be criticised on some important grounds. First, it is incorrect to say that rights may be available in the pre-polkical stage. To say that some rights are created by nature is to say that some rights are available to man just after his birth. But, as we have already seen, there are no rights unless there is some machinery to give them effective recognition or protection. The second difficulty is that rights are created in a well-organised social system. A man living in a forest or in some unknown island has no rights of his own, Robinson Crusoe had no rights until he met Man Friday.13
11. Barry, op. cit., p. 192.
12. C.E.M. Joad: Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics, p. 545.
13. Benn and Peters: Social Principles and the Democratic State, p. 97.180
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Third, it is impossible to prepare a list of natural rights. We may refer to the names of Cicero, Hobbes and Locke, but we may not offer a precise definition of the term 'natural right', nor can we prepare a catalogue of such rights. The fact is that there "is no official, or complete, or generally agreed upon list of natural rights."14 Last, to treat rights as pre-political is to make them absolute or beyond the control of the state. The doctrine of natural rights becomes like a dogma at the hands of anti-statists. The new notion is that all rights are subject to the consideration of social welfare, The state may impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise or enjoyment of any right that a man possesses. That is, our rights must be associated with the consideration of usefulness or utility to the community. Jeremy Bentham, therefore, scoffed at the doctrine of natural rights by calling them as 'rhetorical nonsense upon stilts'. Laski also rejects the whole case of natural rights, and yet he realises the significance of this theory in a different way when he says that rights "are not natural in the sense that a permanent and unchanging catalogue of them can be compiled, rather they are natural in the sense that under the limitations of a civilised life, facts demand their recognition."15
Then, we come to the legal theory of rights. It holds that a right is a creation of law. If there is no law, there is no right. Custom may sanction some right, but it is no right as there is no law to enforce it. Hobbes is a powerful advocate of this theory in whose view people make a social contract and thereby establish a leviathan to protect their rights by the force of law. So Bentham holds that rights are the creatures of law and of organised society. The best exponent of this theory is John Austin who says that every right, whether divine, legal or moral, "rests on a relative duty; that is to say, a duty lying on a party or parties other than the party or parties in whom the right resides. And manifestly that relative duty would not be a duty substantially if the law which affects to impose it were not sustained by might."16
This theory has its weaknesses. First, to say that law alone creates right is to dismiss the importance of custom in the life of a community. We know that people have so many rights because of the force of custom behind them. It is true that law of the state protects the system of rights, but to dismiss the value of custom altogether is
14. E. As.rvatham: Political Theory, VIII Ed., p. 163.
15. Laski, op. cit., p. 91.
16. Austin: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, edited by H.A.L. Hart p. 285 n.
RIGH1S, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
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not justified. Second, to say that law is the creator of rights and that the state is the possessor of legal sovereignty is to make the state omnipotent and the people helpless in righting for their rights in the event of any encroachment upon them by the action of the state. Such I a view deprives the people of their right to resist state absolutism. I Last, this theory totally discards the place of ethical considerations. "It does not help us to make the state what it should be."i?
The historical or prescriptive theory of rights takes the factor of time Jin the creation of rights. Every right is based on the force of long ■observance. The essential sanction behind a right is, for this reason, a [tradition or custom on account of its long observance. -A sociologist Hike R.M. Maclver says that a iaw is nothing else than an action of the state in the form of the crystallisation of the age-old custom into a legal sanction. However, a better affirmation of-this view can be seen in the ideas of Edmund Burke relating to his theory of prescriptive institutions. The burden of his argument is that people-have'a right over anything that they exercise or enjoy uninterruptedly over a fairly long passage of time. With this point of view, he condemned the philosophy behind the action of French revolutionaries who desired to uproot the established system of institutions and suddenly erect a new one in its place.
This theory has its weak points. It is true to say that rights are created by the force of time, they donot have an eternal character just by virtue of their force of long observance. Had it been so, the system of slavery would have been in practice even in modern times. There was a time when the masters had rights over their slaves. Times change and with that changes the whole pattern of social life So the system of rights also undergoes a change. Then, it is also possible that the rulers may abolish a particular system of rights and in stead impose a new one in the light of new conditions without bothering for the factor of prescription or long observance. For instance, the British rulers finished some rights of the Indian people (as those burning alive a widow, settling disputes in a panchayat, excommunicating a person by the heads of particular caste or community etc.) and in stead introduced a new system of rights that had to be accepted by the people of the country. However, one part of this theory is plausible that rights are created by the passage of time. We may appreciate the view that history "cannot be ignored, but history cannot be relied on alone."18
17. Asirvatham, op. cit., p. 167.
18. Hocking: Law and Rights, p. 7.182
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
The idealistic theory of rights depends upon the factor of man's rational will that issues in the form of claims and that leads to the creation of a system of rights when moral recognition of such claims is converted into legal sanction. Its best presentation is contained in the political philosophy of T.H. Green who begins v/ith this assumption that human consciousness thinks of the goodness of the 'self as well as of other human beings and thus the recognition of a claim as conducive to common interest brings about a system of rights. It is thus summed up by Barker: "Human consciousness postulates liberty: liberty involves rights.; rights demand the state."19 Same thing may be noted in the affirmations of Prof. Bernard Bosanquet that a right is both a legal and a moral reference. "It is a ciaira which can be enforced at law, which no moral imperative can be; but it is also recognised to be a claim which ought to be capable of enforcement at law; and thus it has a moral aspect.... A typical right unites the two sides."20
In this way, this theory looks at rights from a highly moral point of view. Rights are rooted in the mind of man; they are powers granted to him by the community in order that he with others may realise a common good of which his good is an intrinsic part. A right must establish two things—the individual claiming it must be able to convince society that in doing so he is not interfering with like claims of his fellow beings, and that he must be able to convince society that his claim is absolutely necessary for the sake of his self-development Thus, a right "is a freedom of action possessed by a man of virtue of his occuoying a certain place and fulfilling a certain function in a social order."21
Like other theories on this subject, it also suffers from some weaknesses. First, the idealistic interpretation of the origin and nature of rights is too abstract to be understood by a man of average comprehension. The whole idea of the 'best possible development of a man's personality' is so vague that the state cannot prescribe a particular pattern that may be equally relevant for all. Then, it may also be commented that this theory seems to sacrifice social good for the sake of individual good. However, the merit of this theory lies on the theoretical plane where we find that it furnishes a safe test to rights which can be applied at ail times, and herein it is superior to the legal, historical, and social welfare theories. The one absolute right of all
19. Barker, op. cit., p. 23.
20. Bosanquet: The Philosophical Theory of State, p. 188.
21. N. Wilde: The Ethical Basis of!he State, p. 12.
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human beings is the right of personality."22
We may also have a peep into the social expediency or Social welfare theory on this subject. It implies that the rights are the creation of the society in as much as they are based on the consideration of common welfare. Rights make what is conducive to the greatest good of the greatest number; they are the conditions of social good. Thus, claims not in conformity with the general welfare would not be recognised by the community and thus fail from being rights. It has its best manifestation in the works of Jeremy Bentham who developed the principle of utility so as to show that the system of rights is beneficial both to the individual and to the society. But the best exponent of this theory is Laski who reinterprets the premises of Benthamite utilitarianism in the fashion of his positive liberalism. As he says: "We are making the test of rights utility; andthat, it is clear, involves the question of those to whom the rights are to be useful. There is only one possible answer. In any state the demands of each citizen for the fulfilment of his best self must be taken as of equal worth; and the utility of a right is, therefore, its value to all the members of the State."23
But this theory has certain weaknesses. First, it dwells on the factor of social welfare—a term that is too vague to be put into a precise form. The Benthamite formula of'greatest good of the greatest number' may mean something to the liberals, something else to the socialists, and something quite different to the Marxists. Then, if carried to extremes, the point of individual welfare may be lost, as it seeks to sacrifice individual good at the altar of social welfare. Thus, a critic like N. Wilde is of the view that if rights are created by the consideration of social expediency, the individual is without an appeal and helplessly dependent upon its arbitrary will.-4 However, the essential merit of this theory lies in its linking up the idealistic version of rights with its utilitarian counterpart and thereby making it a commendable affair so far as liberal political theory is concerned.
Finally, we may refer to the Marxian theory of rights that links up the case of rights with the prevailing economic system of the society. It holds that rights cannot be understood in isolation from the pattern of social classes and struggle going on between them as a necessar consequence of the laws of dialectical materialism. The dominant class owns the means of production and distribution and just to keep
22. Asirvatham, o/>. cit., pp. 175-76. '' •''■■■■ ■•■■ -■■■
23. Laski, op. cit., p. 92.
24. Wilde, op. cit., p. 124. ■.■■.:. •;;;>. ■-■.■:■ .'.-.":■. -:•.■;•■'.;-.■. :: .:.:.184
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCONCE
itself in power, it creates a system of rights. It is due to this thar the dominant class has the right to exploit and oppress the dominated class that has no control over the means of production and distribution. The working class cannot have rights until the capitalist system .is replaced by the svstem of socialism. The whole set up would change after the successful revolution when the proletariat has 3 new kind of social life in which its rights shall be associated with the set of duties so as to consolidate the new (socialist) order. For instance. the people would have rights like those relating to work and social security, they would also be tacked with duties like obciiencf* ro 'aw and protection of thy socialist system. It follows that with *!;e advent of the socialist system the society would be able In J'sn rue with the idea of rights prevailing in the bourgeois society.2'
It is quite obvious that the the Marxian liieorv >f rights. Critics may, therefore, pick up holes in it. For instance it may be remarked that every system whether pre-feudal, feudal, bourgeois or socialist, has its own system of rights. Thus, it cannot be accepted that the whole system of existing rights would disappear with the establishment of a socialist society. To say that rights must be tacked with duties is a good thing, but to destroy the whole system of rights in the name of the fulfilment of duties by the role of an omnipotent state is equally bad. Some recent critiqs like Milovan Djilas and Stojanovic of Yugoslavia have rabidly denounced the Russian political system for allowing no meaningful rights to the people.
Kinds of Rights: Rights are of different kinds. A classification of rights in a water-tight form is not possible owing to the fact that some of the specific rights overlap their categories. But in order to discuss them in a simplified form, we may categories them in the following manner:
1. Moral Rights: These rights are the claims of the individuals based on the conscience of the community. In other words, these are the claims recognised by the good sense of the people. For instance, a teacher has the moral right to be respected by his students. But the difficulty with such rights is that they cannot be enforced by the courts; their enforcement depends upon the good sense of the community. When moral rights are converted into legal rights, they become enforceable by the action of the state.
RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
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25. J. Plamenatz: Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man, p. 312.186
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
2. Civil Rights: These rights relate to the person and property of the individuals. They are civil or social rights, as they relate to the essential conditions of a civilised life. This broad category includes a number of rights like those relating to life, personal liberty, thought and expression, property, religion and the like. Of all the civil rights, right to life is most important, since enjoyment of all other rights depends upon it. It implies that no person can take the life of another. Not only this, a person has the right to save his life even by killing another in case his opponent makes an attempt with the intention to kill him. It is called 'right to self-defence.' So significant is right to life that suicide is a crime. Allied to this, is the right to personal liberty. It includes right to live like a free citizen. A person cannot be detained without a proper cause and that he cannot be punished physically or economically unless he is held guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction. The trial of the accused must also be free and open. Right to think and express also comes in this category. So is the case with right to keep arms and property. In legal parlance, it means equality before law and its equal protection for all. Right to religion is also a civil right. 3. Political Rights: These rights relate to a man's participation in the affairs of the state. This category includes rights as giving vote, righting elections, taking public employment, supporting or opposing the government and changing it by constitutional means. In other words, these rights enable a person to send petitions to the government for the redressal of certain wrongs, following or abandoning a particular policy, making or unmaking a particular law, and expressing views for the creation of a healthy public opinion. Democracy is regarded as the best form of government for the obvious reason that it ensures all such rights. 4. Economic Rights: These rights rejate to a man's vocation, %his engagement in a gainful employment so as to solve the problem of food, clothing and shelter. It implies right to earn livelihood by proper means. Right to work falls in this category. Allied to this is the right to rest and leisure so that a person may take relief for the sake of maintaining and increasing his efficiency. So the workers must have a right to form unions and associations for protecting and promoting their interests. Workers should have right to bargain freely for remunerative work and have some share in the manage-
RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
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ment of industry. The socialists go to the extent of including right to social insurance and self-government in industry in this category.
5. Human Rights; A modified version of what was once termed 'natural rights' coupled with cerain civil rights has assumed a significance of its own since the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Human Rights Commission an-1 their adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1948. The Declaration is quite comprehensive. It incorporates a host of rights that have a necessary connection with moral and civil rights pointed out above. It says that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights; they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. It also speaks of the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, old age, or other conditions of destitutehood beyond one's control.
In this connection, we may refer to 'particular rights' stessed by Laski. These are:
1. Every citizen should have the right to work. It means right to be occupied in producing a share of the goods and commodities that are essential for the community.
2. Every citizen should have the right to adequate wages. It means that all those who work must be given sufficient wages to maintain themselves.
3. Every citizen should have the right to reasonable hours of work. Jt means that he should be asked to put in that amount of work which does not exhaust him completely and thereby make him unfit to discharge his duties as an active member of the community.
4. Every citizen should have the right to education. It means that he should be given that minimum of education which is essential for the performance of his duties.
5. Every citizen should have the right to share in political power. It means that he should have right to vote, to be elected, and also remove a corrupt government and run machinery of the state according to the provisions of the constitution.
6. Every citizen should have the right to form associations and organise public meetings and be provided with judicial safeguards so that justice may be secured without fear or favour.188
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
189
7. Every citizen should have the right to property limited only to the extent that is necessary for the development o: his personality and does not prove detrimental to the interests of the society.
8. Every citizen should have a right to industrial self-government. It means that he, as an industrial unit, must somehow be given the power to participate in the making of those decisions which affect him as a producer, if he is to be in a position to maximise his freedom.
9. Every citizen should have the right to speech and expression. It means that he should have the right to ventilate his grievances and organise public opinion in that matter.
10. Every citizen should have the right to equality before law so that he may get justice without discrimination. It must not be harder upon the poor than upon the rich.
Protection of Rights: Mere conferment of rights of the citizens is not enough. What, in addition to this, is required is their proper protection. For this, following measures may be suggested:
1. The rights of the people must be enshrined in the constitution of the state so that they have the character of fundamental rights. By doing so the state accords them constitutional protection and empowers the courts to issue prerogative writs for their enforcement.
2. Another safeguard is the rule of law as available in Britain. There is no written constitution in Britain and yet the people enjoy their rights. It is due to the fact that this country is known for having, in the words of Dicey, the 'rule of law.' It has two essential features: First, every citizen is under the same law of the land irrespective of his social, economic or political status. Second, a person cannot be arrested without sufficient cause and he cannot be made to suffer in body or in goods unless declared guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction after a fair trial.
3. It is also necessary that there should be a free and honest press in the country so that the people may have a straightforward dissemination of news and views. If there is any encroachment upon the rights of the people, the press would highlight it and then a healthy public opinion may be created for the protection of their rights against encroachment of any kind.
4. There should be decentralisation of powers. Concentration of powers creates conditions under which the rights of the people are in jeopardy. But decentralisation of powers creates conditions that minimise the possibility of the abuse of power.
5. The existence of an independent and impartial judiciary is also necessary for the same purpose. If the people feel aggrieved by any action of the state or some other institution, they may move the courts for the protection of their rights. It is for this reason that in democratic countries the courts are given special power of issuing prerogative writs for the enforcement of constitutional provisions.
6. It is also suggested that the state should not extend its area of activity into the legitimate domain of voluntary groups and associations.
7. But the most important of all is the fact of eternal vigilance of the people. If the people are apathetic or indolent, their rights can never be secure. It is well said: "It is the proud spirit of the citizens, less than the letter of the law, that is their most real safeguard."26
Liberty
A discussion of the idea of liberty in its various aspects looks like an extension of what we have said in the preceding section in view of the fact that the theme of rights is integrally connected with the theme of liberty. It is the provision of rights with their due enforcement by the state that ensures freedom to a citizen and thereby enables him to seek the best possihle development of his personality. The purpose of the state is not confined to the maintenance of law and order, or the protection of the weak against the strong, it is also concerned with the creation and preservation of that atmosphere in which an individual has an opportunity to sharpen his constructive initiative. The subject of rights naturally ushers in the form of one of the essential ingredients of a liberal political order attaching significance to the continuous initiative of man.
Real Meaning and Nature: The meaning of liberty is generally taken in a wrong way as it is identified with the absence of restraints and limitations. It is taken synonymously with man's right to 'do what he likes'. Hobbes calls it 'license' or 'a condition to do what you like' that prevails in the hypothetical state of nature. In a correct
26. Laski, . cit., p. 104.1
190
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
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sense, liberty means man's right to do what is worth doing. Social life is regulated by a set of principles or norms that make man's life civilised. Tnese restraints lay down the line of distinction between good and bad, right and wrong, moral and immoral, legal and illegal. Thus viewed, liberty means man's right to do what he wants for the sake of making the best possible development of his personality by following a course that is good, or right, or moral, or lawful. In fine, the real meaning of liberty should be understood with this point in view that the liberty of an individual is relative to that of others.27
The meaning of liberty has two dimensions—negative and positive, i In a negative sense, it implies the absence of restraints as far as possible. Here the point of stress is that restraint is bad, because it effects curtailment or dimunition of individual freedom. But as liberty lives within restraints, these should be as little as possible. Here the burden of argument is to accept the fact, of restraints with a sense of compulsion. A classic defender of this argument like John Stuart Mill says that "all restraints qua restraints is an evil...leaving people to themselves is always better than controlling them."28 In order to make his meaning more clear, he divides man's action into two parts—self-regarding and others-regarding. The state has no right to interfere with the liberty of man if his action affects himself alone. Professing any religion, worshipping the Deity, and reading a book may he cited as examples of man's strictly self-regarding actions. However, the state may intervene in the liberty of a man if he harms liberty of his fellow-beings. If a man does something that has its effect on others, it pertains to the realm of others-regarding. As he forcefully asserts: "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.... Over himself, his own
27. Barker: Principles of Social and. Political Theory, p. 145. Sidgwick holds that freedom, when employed without qualification, signifies primarily the absence of physical coercion or confinement. A is clearly not a free agent if B moves his limbs, and he is not free if he cannot get out of a building, because B has locked the door But in another part of its meaning—which from our present point of view is more important—freedom is opposed not to physical constraint but to the moral restraint placed on inclination by the fear of painful consequences resulting from the action of other human beings." Elements of Politics, p. 45.
28. Mill: Essay on Liberty, pp. 150-51.
body and mind, the individual is sovereign,"29
'" Among the recent exponents of this view we may refer to F.A. Hayek who says that every individual has some assured area of personal freedom with which others cannot interfere. The element of 'choice' should be taken as decisive.80 The rock climber on a difficult pitch who sees only one way to save his life is unquestionably free, though we could say that he has hardly any choice. A man is really free when he is not subjected to coercion of any kind and coercion means subjection to the arbitrary will of others. Coercion occurs when an agent's actions are made to serve the will of another, not for his own but for other's purposes. Coercion implies action in the sense that a person, who is coerced, chooses to be what he does. It occurs only when one person threatens with the intention of thereby getting the other to act in conformity with his will."31
The negative view of liberty is not appreciated in the present times. Now individual liberty is sought to be reconciled with the growing authority of the state. Restraints are essential if the state desires to achieve the goal of public welfare. It is said that human actions cannot be divided into water-tight forms as was done by Mill more than a hundred years back. Since man lives in society, his actions have an effect on the liberty of others. There can be nothing like a strictly private or self-regarding sphere. Man cannot be allowed to commit suicide or read obscene literature. The acceptable view is that there "is no side of a man's life which is unimportant to society, for whatever he is, does, or thinks may affect his own well-being, which is and ought to be a matter of common concern, and may also directly or indirectly affect the thought, action and character of those with whom he comes into contact."32
However, the meaning of liberty in its positive aspect is a contribution of T H. Green. He defines it as a p ositive power of doing or enjoying something that is worth doing or worth enjoying in common with others. Since man is a social creature, his life should be regulated by certain social bonds. Liberty of the individual should be considered in relation to these norms of good will. Paraphrasing the meaning of Green, Barker says: "Liberty can only be liberty for this good will; it can only be liberty for the pursuit of objects which such a will presents to itself. It is, therefore, no negative absence of restraints any more
29. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
30. Hayek: The Constitution of Libery, p. 13.
31. Ibid., pp. 12-13. '
32. L.T. Hobhouse: Liberalism, p. 65.192
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
than beauty is the absence of ugliness. Inhering as it does in the good will and in that will only, it is not a power of pursuing any and every object, but a power of pursuing these objects which the good will presents to itself. In a word, it has two qualities. It is positive—a freedom to do something, not a freedom from having something done to one. It is determinate—a freedom to do something of a definite character, something which possesses the quality of being worth doing, and not any and everything."33
As a result of this, the meaning of liberty has come to involve within, itself both the individual and social sides of man's existence. Moreover, as the social life requires a network of regulations, the idea of liberty has also been bound with the necessity of due restraints. Liberty has, therefore, come to have a derivative value arising ultimately from the supreme value of the moral personality acting and developing its capacities as such. If so, liberty which the state upholds and makes a principle of its action must be a liberty relative to and, therefore, regulated by the nature of such a personality. A powerful defender of this view like Prof. Leo Strauss says: "There is no relation of man to man in which man is absolutely free to act as he pleases, or as it suits him.... By virtue ofhis rationality man has a latitude of alternatives such as no other earthly being has.... The sense of the latitude of this freedom is accompanied by a sense that the full and unrestrained exercise of that freedom is not right. Man's freedom is accompanied by a sacred awe, by a kind of divination that not everything is permitted. Restraint is, therefore, as natural or as primeval as freedom."31
It follows that the real meaning of liberty has its negative and positive dimensions. While, the negative view disfavours the case of restraints on the liberty of man as far as possible, the positive view appreciates the system of reasonable restraints in the name of public good. If Mill and Hayek subscribe to the former view, Green and Strauss do the same for the latter. But Prof. Isaiah Berlin of the Oxford University has an interpretation of his own. In his view, the real meaning of liberty involves both sides, and the two cannot be separated from each other. There is some area of a man's life in which
33. Barker: Political Thought in England, p. 24.
34. Strauss: Natural Right and History, pp. 129-30. As Sir John Seeley says: '"We may say then that liberty is primarily the absence of restraint or the opposite of government, but in a secondary sense, which is also convenient, it is the absence of excessive restraint or the opposite of over-government." Introduction to Political Science, p. 120.
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he must be free from the restraints of any kind whatsoever so that he may wish to determine the course of his action without any direction from the side of others, no matter how benevolent. As he affairms: "The extent of my social or political freedom consists in the absence of obstacles not merely to my actual, but to my potential, choices to my acting in this or that way if I choose to do so."35 The state may impose some fetters on the freedom of man, but no fetter should be like one killing his area of choice. "Liberty is increased when sovereignty is put into right hands."38
Kinds: Simply stated, liberty implies"a condition of freedom especially opposed to political subjection, imprisonment, or slavery."37 However, in a wider sense, it is a multiple concept having these important varieties:
1. Natural Liberty: It implies complete freedom for a man to do what he wills. It is another name for the liberty of the woods called 'licence' by Hobbes. It means no restraint of any kind whatsover on the doings of a man. Just as all creatures live according to their will in the world of nature, so should be the pattern of a man's life. Let a man do what he wills. We have already made it clear that liberty lives within restraints. The idea of natural liberty is, therefore, an arrant nonsense; it cannot prevail in a society of human beings. As a social creature, man should lead a life regulated by social restraints. Thus, we find that Rousseau who begins with the assumption that 'man is born free, he is everywhere in chains' ultimately stresses the point that "what man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses."38
2. Social Liberty: What we realy mean by the term liberty lies in its civil or social variety. It has its wider ramifications in personal, political, religious, economic, national and international spheres. It relates to man's freedom in his life as a member of the social organisation. As such, it refers to a
35. Berlin: Four Essays on Liberty, pp. xxxix-xl.
36. Hid., p. 166. The elem;nt of 'choice' is very important in the meaning of liberty. N P. Barry says: "The old lag may deliberately commit a crime in order to recapture the security of prison life, but it would be absurd to-describe his resulting condition as one of liberty." Op. cit., p. 160.
37. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 13, 1967 Ptg., p. 1029.
38. Rousseau: Social Contract, Book I, Ch. VIII.
Kind': of Liberty
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Natural
Freedom to do what one wills; hence total absence of restraints a—condition of licence (Hobbes)
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health,
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person (Hi) Freedom
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p *4 In other words, it desires a state of life in which the (strong and the weak share same privileges for the development of jtheir personality irrespective of any artificial distinction like that of (wealth, religion, colour of the skin, domicile, language, descent, sex (and th-3 like. Keeping it in view, Laski asserts: "It means that my [realisation of my best self must involve as its logical result the realisation by others of their best selves. It means such an ordering of social forces as will balance a share in the tail of living with a snare in its gain also. It means that my share in the gain must be adequate for the purpose of-citizenship." 5
Viewed thus, the idea of equality has two_ sides—positive and negative:
1. f;i a positive sense, equality means the provision of adequate opportunities for all. But it does not mean simply identical treatment for all. Since men differ in their needs and capacities and also in their efforts, they require different opportunities for their self-development. The native endowments are by no means equal. The goal of 'equality of opportunities' is achieved only when there is an appropriate opportunity for each: what is to be equalised is not the opportunity to eater professions or to be successful in business but the opportunity to lead a good life, or to fulfil one's personality."59
2. In a negative sense, equality means no discrimination on some artificial ground like thai of religion, caste, wealth, creed, domicile, descent, sex and the like. A discrimination can be made if the reason behind it is valid. For instance, very hazardous jobs cannot be given to the females. A distinction on the basis of sex in such a case would not be against the principle of equality. But discrimination on the basis of caste (as in Hindu society) cannot be justified by any rational standard. It all implies that t'rure should be no arrangement wh.-reby the authority of few is qualitatively more than that of the many.57
54. Tawney, op. cit., pp. 103-04. /
55. Laski, op. cit., p. 153.
56. Benn and Peters, op. cit., pi 119.
57. Laski, op. cit., pp. 153-54.204
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
One important point that 'should be touched at this stage is the case of discrimination on the basis of merit, efficiency, or excellence. It is known by the name of the doctrine of the desert. The idea behind it is that the principle of equal opportunities for all should be qualified by the maxim of 'deserving'. The doors of progress must be open for all in an equal measure, but due consideration must be given to the factor of talent or ability that a person has in comparison to others. J. Rees says that "natural inequalities of physical strength, beauty and so on are acceptable social inequalities, because they are a product of pure convention, seem to turn upon the assumption that conventional inequalities are alterable while natural ones are not, and it is that seems to live behind the contemporary doctrine of the equality of opportunity."53 A contemporary admirer of the doctrine of desert like John Rawls says the "meritocracy follows the principles of careers open to talents and uses equality of opportunity as a way of releasing men's energies in pursuit of economic prosperity and political domination."5^
On a theoretical plane, the doctrine of the desert has sense. But the difficulty arises when we try to look into its practical implications. It is quite likely that a discrimination in the name of talent or special merit may not be wholly fair and impartial and thereby the whole sanctity of the principle of equal opportunities may be destroyed. But in a poor and backward country some other criteria may be adopted. For instance, the Constitution of India desires special reservations and safeguards for the upliftment of socially and educationally backward sections of the community. The State may provide special benefits to the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Obviously, such an arrangement is violation of the ideal principle of equality. But it may be justified on two grounds. First, it is meant for the benefit of those sections of the society who, for many centuries, have suffered the pangs of social injustice and now some special facilities must be given to them for the sake of the betterment of their lot. Second, it is a temporary affair that is to be abolished after some time when the contemplated goal of social justice is happily achieved. That is why, it is known by the name of 'compensatory' or 'protective discrimination'.
Kinds: Since equality is a multi-dimensional concept, it has its different kinds that may be put as under:
58. John Rees: Equality.
59. Rawls: A Theory of Justice, p. 107.
RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
205
1. Natural Equality: It implies that nature has made all men equal. In ancient times, the Stoics of Greece and then Roman thinkers like Polybius and Cicero contradicted the principle of natural inequality of mankind as advocated by Plato and Aristotle. Cicero said: "For no one thing is like as equal to another one as we human beings are like and equal to one another." The Stoics and the Romans took the argument of the 'law of nature' that was equally applicable to all people irrespective of their country or race. The Christian thinkers identified the 'law of nature' with the 'law of God' and thereby upheld the principle of natural equality of mankind as sanctioned by the Biblical injunction of the 'Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man'. In modern times, Rousseau and Marx may be taken as the best exponents of the case of natural equality of mankind. It may, however, be said at this stage that the natural equality of mankind is a very noble idea which constitutes one of the two foundations of democracy (the other being liberty), in practice things are not so. It is like an ideal to say that 'all earth is surface'.60
2. Social Equality: While natural or moral equality is just an ideal, the social or civil equality is an actuality. What we have said about the real meaning of equality applies here. It implies that the rights and opportunities of all are equal so that each may have the best possible development of his personality. Its best manifestation can be seen in the world of law where we cpme across the principle of equality before law and its equal protection for all. The law of the land is applicable to all from the President or Prime Minister at the top to a constable or a watchman at the bottom. The judicial system protects the rights of all irrespective of anybody's social and economic position. The noted English jurist (Dicey) defines it as one of the two essential principles of the 'rule of law'.61
3. Political Equality: It means the access of all to the venues of power. All citizens irrespective of their differences in matters of religion, caste, creed, race, wealth, sex, language, and the like should have equal voice in the management of public affairs, or in the holding of public offices. Thus, every adult citizen should have rights like exercising franchise, fighting elections, securing a public employment, opposing or support-
60. A. Appadorai: The Substance of Politics, p. 81.
61. A.V. Dicey: An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, p. 202.206
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
ing some official policy or activity, changing the government by constitutional means and the like. If there are severe restrictions on the freedom of franchise, thought and expression, or where such privileges are available to a very limited section of the community, there is no political equality as we may see in the case of South Africa. Impressed with the case of implications of political equality, Laski insisted on the abolition of the privileges of the Lords in Engiand. Cari J. Friedrich rightly feels that "political equality is increased by the degree to which democratic legitimacy is embodied in the political order."62
4. Economic Equality: It implies that there should be no concentration of economic power in the hands of few persons. The distribution of national wealth must be such that no section of the people becomes over-affluent to the detriment of others. No section of the community must be forced to reach the marsin of starvation or economic want. There should be 'a specific civic minimum' in the realm of economic benefits accruing to all. In a technical sense, it implies the case of the 'equality of proportions'. But the difficulty with the case of economic equality is that it has different implications according to different thinkers. While the classical liberals take it as equal opportunities to all in the spheres of production, consumption and distribution of goods with least possible intervention of the state, it means economic freedom to all subject to rules and regulations imposed by the state in public interest so that the rich may not exploit the poor. The Marxists go to the final extent of establishing a 'classless society' in which all property would be under the control of the state and the ideal of economic equality would mean complete absence of the exploitation of man by man just by the use of economic power. Taking the view of a positive liberal or a democratic socialist, Laski says: "State divided into a small number of rich and a large number of poor will always develop a government manipulated by the rich to protect the amenities represented by their property."63
5. Legal Equality: Though we have given a hint of the meaning of legal equality while discussing the case of social or civil
€2. Friedrich: "A Discourse on the Origin of Political Inequality" in Nomos,
IX, p. 222. €3. Laski, op. cit., pp. 157-58.
RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 2
equality, it shall be worthwhile to discuss it under a sepan head. It has three implications. First, all citizens are alike the eve of the law of the land. (Only the head of the st; may be its exception.) Second, the protection of the life a property of each citizen is guaranteed by law and this facil is available to all without discrimination of any kind. Ll-justice is available to all at a low cost and without undue de so that everyone irrespective of his social or economic pc tion may get it according to the established procedure of 1 land. But there would be no violation of the principle equality if law guarantees different sets of privileges : persons belonging to different positions in the society. I instance, the privileges of a member of Parliament can not made equal to the privileges of a cabinet minister by i system of law. In other words, it Implies the case of equal at equal levels. Any yet it implies that the privileges of c must be legally equal to the privileges of others if tl stand at the same level. An English writer is, therefore,: ris in his assessment that it "is in the spirit of modern law hold certain fundamentals of rights and duties equally apj cable to all human beings."64
6. International Equality: Lastly, we may refer to internatioi equality. It means that all nations of the world must be tre ed equally without any consideration for any nation's den graphic, geographical, economic, or military potential. 1 fact that each member-state of the United Nations has c vote in the General Assembly suggests the case of equality the international sphere. But with the growth of internation ism, this term has acquired some more implications. It is a desired that nations must not resort to force; they must ms use of pacific means of the settlement of their dispul Gigantic evils like those of slavery and racial segregati must disappear from the face of the earth. Above all implies distribution of scientific and technological achie ments among all nations of the world so as to usher in a n international social and economic order.
Liberal Versus Marxist Interpretations: What we have said in preceding sections pertains to the liberal interpretation of the r meaning of equality. Its central theme is that "equals should be trea
64. L.T. HoWvusj: The Elements of Social Justice., p. 104.20S
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
equally, unequals unequally, and the respects in which they are considered unequal must be relevant to the differences in treatment that we propose."65 It is, however, a different matter that with the assimilation of the socialist content in the philosophy of liberalism, the real meaning of equality has been integrated with the consideration of social good as a result of which the concept of social equality has become all-pervasive. Keeping it in view, John Ralws suggests two essential points inherent in the notion of equality:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged in a way so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to position and offices equally open to all.
The liberal doctrine of equality, strictly speaking, stands on the premise of the 'equality of adequate opportunities' available to every member of the society. That is, all people have liberty to compete in the midst of equal opportunities with the result that those who can make best use of their chances may go ahead of others. Inequality in the midst of equal opportunities is thus a valid affair. In a very perceptive expression, J.H. Schaar thus explains the meaning of, what is known as, egalitarianism: "The doctrine of equality of opportunity is the product of a competitive and fragmented society, a society in which individualism, in Tocqueville's sense of the word, is the reigning ethical principle. It is a precise symbolic expression of the liberal-bourgeois model society, for it extends the market-place mentality to all the spheres of life. It views the whole of human relations as a contest in which each man competes with his fellows for scarce goods; a contest resting upon the attractive conviction that all should be allowed to improve their conditions as far as their abilities permit.... Thus, it is the perfect embodiment of the liberal conception of reform; the fundamental character of the social-economic system is altered in substance."06
But the Marxist view of equality is different. Here the whole case of liberty and equality is studied through the prism of class war. Equality cannot exist in a society ridden with class contradictions. The class of the 'haves' enjoys all liberty that is not available to the poor, weaker and backward sections who have to undergo the pangs
65. Rawls, op. cit., p. 61.
66. Schaar: "Equality of Opportunity and Beyond" in Nomos, IX, p. 237.
RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
209
of exploitation and oppression. The existence of a classless society is the sine qua non of the existence of the real conditions of liberty and equality. All kinds of artificial distinctions can be eliminated only when the dictatorship of the proletariat removes all kinds of contradictions in the society. Only then the real meaning of equality shall prevail that "lies in the existence of identical conditions and opportunities for the free development of the individual and the fulfilment of the requirements of all members of society, the equal position of people in society being understood differently in different historical epochs."67 ■ ,
In a speech delivered in 1934 at the Seventeenth Congress of the Ommunist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin brought out the meaning of equality in detail. Now he declared that "equality in the sphere of requirements and personal life is a piece of reactionary petty-bourgeois stupidity worthy of a primitive sect of ascetics, but not of a Socialist society organised on Marxian lines, because we cannot demand that all people should have the same requirements and tastes, and that all people shall live their individual lives in the same way.... By equality, Marxism means, not equality in personal requirements and personal life, but the abolition of classes, i.e., (a) the equal emancipation of all toilers from expoitfttion after the capitalists have been overthrown and expropriated; (b) the equal abolition for all priv.iic property in the means of production after they have been transformed into the property of the whole society; (e) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability and the equal right of all toilers to receive according to the amount of work they have done (socialist society); {d) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability and the equal right of all toilers to receive according to their requirements {communist society). And Marxism starts out with the assumption that people's tastes and requirements are not, and cannot be, equal in quality or in quality, either in the period of socialism, or in the period of communism.... It is time it was understood that Marxism is opposed to levelling."68
In other words, the real meaning of equality varies according to the kind of society we have. In the view of the liberals, a classless society under the dictatorship of the proletariat is the model of a single-interest society that guarantees no liberty and hence no equality of any kind to its members. It is another name for a totalitarian set up. Real equality prevails in an open society having different interests
67. A Dictionary of Scientific Communism, p. 85.
68. Emile Burns (ed.): A Handbook of Marxism, pp. 937-38.210
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
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Relationship between Liberty and Equality Negative View
All men are not equal, nor can they ever be. The argument of natural inequality of mankind still stands valid in the light of the 'rule of the privilege' The number of persons competent to share in social, economic and political affairs is limited. Government is an expert undertaking that requires highly specialised technical competence and consequently demands of its practitioners more than ordinary qualities of character or mind. Let the deserving get more than those who deserve less or none at all.
1. Aristocracy and priesthood, a governing class and a teaching class...there did no society exist without these two vital elements, there will none exist. (Thomas Carlyle)
2. The parliamentary principle of decision by majority, by denying the authority of the person and placing it in stead in the number of crowd in question, sins against the aristocratic basic idea of nature. {Hitler)
3. Society is always a dynamic unity of two component factors—minorities and masses. The minorities are individuals or groups of individuals which are especially qualified. The mass is the assemblage of persons not specially qualified. (0.7. Gasset)
Positive View
It is only in their skill, intelligence, strength, or virtue that men are equal, but merely in their being men; it is their common humanity that constitutes their equality. On this interpretation, we should not seek for some special characteristics in respect of which men are equal, but merely remind ourselves that they are all men, because:
1. All are human beings; all belong to the same species, can speak a language, use tools, live in societies, can interbreed despite racial differences etc.
2. 'Treat every man is an end in himself and not as a means'. {Kant) Each man is to be, at it were, free from certain conspicuous structures of inequality in which we find him.
3. The notion of inequality is invoked not only in connections where all men are claimed in some sense to be equal, but in connections where they are agreed to be unequal as in situations of need and merit. {Bernard
CO 5S
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O a O214
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
liberty, is essential to it'. While lamenting over the 'religion of inequality', he says that the people "accepted the mana (a mysterious wisdom) and karakia (a magical influence) of social and economic inequality in the same way that primitive people accepted the ritual of tribal society. There is no rational justification for social inequality; its survival is a matter of prejudice."'4 So says Barker: "It remains to add that equality is not an isolated principle. It stands by the principle of liberty and fraternity."75
The positive view is really convincing. If the aim of normative political theory is to seek and analyse the avenues relating to the development of human personality, it is required that the ideals of liberty and equality should have a simultaneous flow despite the fact that in terms of historical evolution the latter is older than, and no matter now outshone by, the former. Both are necessarily connected with the supreme worth and dignity of human personality and the spontaneous development of its capacities. The modern age is not prepared to tolerate that the boons of liberty and with that of equality remain confined to the world of the 'peers'. While paraphrasing the ideas of Laski, Deane says: "Liberty and equality are not in conflict, nor even separate, but are different facets of the same ideal.... Indeed, since they are identical, there can be no problem of law or to what extent they are or can be related to. This is sureiy the nearest, if not the most satisfactory, solution ever devised for a perennial problem in political philosophy."76
74. Tawney, op. cit., p. 13.
75. Barker, op. cit., p. 159.
76. H.A, Deane: The Political Ideas of Laski, p. 46.
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
There is no better test of excellence of a government than the efficiency of its judicial system, for nothing more nearly touches the welfare and security of the average citizen than his sense that he can rely on the certain and prompt administration of justice. Law is respected and supported when it is treated as the shield of innocence arid the impartial guardian of every civil right. ...If the law be dishonestly administered, the salt has lost its flavour, if it be weakly or fitfully enforced, the guarantees of order fail .. if the lamp of justice goes out in darkness, how great is the darkness.
—Lord James Bryce1
A study of the basic concepts of political theory should begin with a discussion of the idea of law in view of the fact that the state—the fundamental subject of politics—is, in a most widely understood sense, a legal association or 'a juridically organised nation'. The state is distinguished from society, nation, and other associations by virtue of its being the exclusive possessor of a 'coercive power'—a power that issues forth in the form of law. Naturally, the state is like a nation organised for action according to certain specific and well-set rules. It is a fact that every state is known by the system of law it maintains by virtue of its highest coercive (sovereign) power. If so, there is no law above the states in the form of'international law' to regulate and correct the behaviour of the sovereign nations. But the norms of a civilised life tell otherwise. If the sense of law lies in its obligatoriness, international law is a law having its sanction in the behaviour of the civilised peoples of the world. However, law demands its effective and honest implementation and that leads to the issue of justice. The function of the state is not merely limited to the execution of law, it is also to enforce law in a just manner. Hence, in this chapter an attempt has been made to study the concept of law in its national and international ramifications with this point in view that "the essence of the State is a living body of etfeclive rules; and in that sense, the State is law."-
1. Bryce: Modern Democracies, Vol. H, pp. 421-22.
1. Barker: Principles of Social and Political Theory, p. 89.216
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Law
Meaning: The difficulty of offering a precise definition of the term 'law' arises from its use in a variety of senses. For instance, in the realm of physics, it denotes the sequence of cause and effect. The laws of motion and gravitation may be referred to in this connection. There are social and customary laws which guide the behaviour of man in their collective life. Allied with this is the case of moral laws which relate to the question of intrinsic right and wrong, good and bad. That is, their necessary relationship is with the issues of motive and conscience. But the central idea in law is that of control. In a democratic society it is a technique with a purpose—it is the sum of the social influences regularly recognised and applied by the state in the administration of justice."3
Etymologically, the word 'law' comes from the old Teutonic root 'lag' which means to lay, to place, to set, or to fix something in an even manner. Law is, for this reason, something positive or 'imposed', it is something set or laid down. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as 'a rule of conduct imposed by an authority'. In a deeper sense, the word 'law' originates from the Latin word 'jus' that is essentially connected with another Latin word 'jungere' implying primarily a bond or a tie. If so, ,the term 'law' denotes 'primarily a joining or fitting that readily glides into the sense of binding or obliging'.' We may also say that it conveys the idea of'a valid custom to which any citizen can appeal, and which is recognised and can be enforced by a human authority.6 In the field of political theory, however, we are concerned with laws that regulate man's behaviour as a member of an organised society and which, for the most part, "deal with external conduct and are enforced by a system of compulsions."3
Despite the etymological origin of the word 'law', the fact of the »variety of its senses stands out due to its different uses by persons belonging to different schools ranging from the Positivists who treat it as the 'command of the sovereign' to the Marxists who regard it as 'an expression of society's general interests and needs emerging from a given material means of production'. The variety is also affected by the differences in approaches ranging from the historical jurists who trace sanction of law in the established habits and customs of the
3. Rodee, Christol and Anderson: Introduction to Political Science, p. 80.
4. Barker, op. cit., p. 94.
5. Ibid.
6. E. Asirvatham: Political Theory, Will Ed., p. 381.
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
people to the sociologists who discover the same in the needs . interests of the community it serves. Keeping all this in view, law, distinguished from theory, is described as:7
1. the normal expression of conventional morality, or oft which the State should enforce, or
2. a system of rules by which the interests of a dominant cl are safeguarded, or
3. a system of rules held to be binding or obligatory, or
4. a system of rules aimed at realising justice, or
5. a system of rules discoverable by reason, or
6. a command of the sovereign, or
7. what the judges decide in the courts, or
8. a system of rules backed by coercive sanctions.
It is, however, a different matter that, "in the most widely und stood sense, the term 'law' has an imperative connotation; it signif a "body of rules enforced by the courts."8
Sources: In the sphere of social sciences, the cause of embarrassi varieties of the meaning of law finds its place in the world of sources that may be enumerated as under:
1. Custom: In every community the earliest form of law is trac able in the well-established practices of the people. The practices, once started, gradually but imperceptibly developi because of the utility that inhered in them. In due course, practice became a usage which after a sufficient standii was hardened into a custom. History shows that primitr communities attached great significance to the observance < their customs. Even now custom seems to play an importai part where the life of the people is quite simple. The law < today is based on the customs of the people in as much as is, for the most part, a translation of an age-old establishe practices into specific written terms by the state.
2. Religion: Allied to the source of custom is that of religion, finds its sanction in the religious books of the neople. Sine
7. Benn and Peters: Social Principles and the Democratic Slate, p. 57.
S. A.L. Lowell: The Government of England. Vol TI, p. 473. As Henry Sidgwicli says: "Law in the sense in which we are primarily concerned with it, is a body of rules intended to control the conduct of members of a political society, for the violation of which penalties may be expected to be inflicted by the authority of the government of that society; and which, therefore, may be regarded as imposed by government." Elements of Politics, p. 33.218
PRINCIPLES OF iMODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
times immemorial, people have reposed their faith in the power of some supernatural agencies and tried to lay down rules for the regulation of their behaviour so as to be respectful to their deities. The result is that the words contained in the holy books and their interpretations made by the priests and divines constitutes the religious law of the people. In course of time, most of the principles of religious law have been translated by the states in terms of specific rules. Thus, we may take note of the personal laws of the Hindus, the Muslims, the Christians and the like.
?. Adjudication: As the process of social organisation became more and more complex in response to the growth of civilisation, the force of customs declined. Disputes among the people on the meaning and nature of custom were referred to the 'wisest men of the community' who delivered verdicts to settle the points in question. The decisions formed precedents for future guidance even if they were handed down by tradition and only subsequently put in writing as the interpreter and -nforcer of the customs of the people. As judges became the 'wisest men of the community', their decisions came to have a special sanvtity and as these were given in writing, they constituted, what came to be known, the case-law.
4. Equity: One more important source of law is contained in equity—an informal method of making new law or altering an old one depending on intrinsic fairness or equality of treatment. In simple words, it means equity or natural justice in cases where the existing law does not apply properly and judgment has to be given according to commonsense or fairness. Obviously, as a source of law, equity arises from the fact that as time passes and new conditions of life develop, positive law becomes unsuitable or inadequate to the new situations. To make it suitable, either the old law should be changed, or it should be adapted by some informal method. Thus, equity enteis to fill the void. In the absence of a positive law, judges decide cases on general principles of fairness, reasonableness, commonsense and natural justice. The principles of equity thus supplement the premises of lav when they are put into specific terms by the state.
5. Legislation: However, the most prolific source of law is legislation. It means placing of a specific rule on the statute book of the land. It reflects the will of the state as declared by its law-making organs. Whether it is in the form of a royal
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
21
decree, or an ordinance promulgated by the head of the stat or assented to by him after being passed by the legislature, has the validity of the law of the land and is to be implemen ed by the executive and enforced by the judicial departmen of the state. The noticeable point at this stage is that with tl pace of political development, legislation has become tl most important source that has outplaccd the significance < other traditional forces like custom and religion. Due to tl: codification of law, uncertainties and ambiguities which use to get easily accommodated in the spheres of religious an customary law have been sufficiently removed. 6. Standard Works: The source of law may also be traced i scientific commentaries in which leading thinkers, jurists an statesmen express their views on important points of law an which, when recognised, are treated as binding by virtue c being the decisions of the 'wisest men of the community Not only this, the opinions of these great men of the com munity are accepted by the courts and also incorporated int< the law of the land. The works of Coke, Littleton am Blackstone in England and of Kent and Story in the Unite< States may be referred to in this connection. The importano of these standard works lies in the fact that they compile compare and logically arrange legal principles, customs am decisions of the'wisest men of the community' and deciphe important$principles for the guidance of the people in futun possible cases.
Kinds: Law has been classified into various forms according to th< basis taken by a juristic thinker on this subject. For instance, on the basis of the relations which it seeks to adjust between the people anc their organised communities, it has been classified into two varieties —national and international. Then, on the basis of the manner of its formulation and the sanctity behind it, law is divided into two more varieties—constitutional and ordinary. Besides, keeping in view the nature of the wrong committed by a person and the availability of the remedy to undo its evil effect, law is further divided into two varieties —civil and criminal. One may also keep in one's consideration the idea of the creator of the law and the nature of its premises and then divide it into two more categories—natural and positive.220
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Law
Natural
Positive
National (Municipal)
International
Ordinary
Constitutional
Private
Public
Civil Criminal Administrative
A neat and water-tight classification of this subject may hardly be presented, though we may point out essential varieties of law in the following manner:
1. Natural and Positive Law: While the law of nature is abstract on account of being authored by nature or some supernatural agency, the law of state is concrete for the reason of being a creation of man. As such; while the dictates of former are understandable by the rational faculty of man as 'written into the heart of man by the finger of God', the latter can be easily understood as it is written and has its place into the statute book. It is called positive law, for its terms are quite specific and binding. Moreover, while the former has its sanction in respect for or fear of some supernatural power, the latter is enforced by the sovereign authority and, for this reason, it is called deterministic or imperative law. 2. National and International Law: A law formulated by the sovereign authority and applicable to the people living under its territorial jurisdiction is called national (municipal) law. It determines private and public relations of the people living in a state. Different from this, international law regulates the conduct of states in their intercourse with each other. Both are man-made laws. However, the essential point of difference between the two lies in that while the former has the force of a sovereign authority on its back, the latter derives its sanction from the good sense of the civilised nations of the world.
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE 21
3. Constitutional and Ordinary Law: While both are laws of tl state, they diiFer from each other in respect of sanctity attac ed to them. While the former has a higher status on accou of being a part of the constitution of the land, the latt occupies a lower place and lias to keep itself in consonan with the former. The former may be partly written by sor constitutional convention and partly unwritten on account being in the form of well-established practices, the latter the creation of a legislative organ or of some other authori having delegated powers. It is a different matter that in country like the United Kingdom there is no difference t tween the two, because there is unwritten constitution.
4. Civil and Criminal Law: While the former deals with a ci wrong committed by a person going to harm the interests another like non-payment of dues or the violation of t terms of a contract, the latter relates to a criminal act of person like theft, robbery and murder. In each case, t procedure is different.
5. Private and Public Law: According to Holland, while t former is concerned with the relationship between individua the latter involves the relationship between the people a state. Public law is concerned with the organisation of t state, the limits on the functions of the government, and t relations between the state and its citizens.
We may also refer to some other kinds of law. For instam administrative law determines relations of the officials to the state, is that part of public law which fixes the organisation and determir the competence of the administrative authorities and indicates to t person the remedies for the violation of the rights. Then, there is 1 case-law or law made by the courts. In certain situations the coi gives its own opinions to clarify or explain the meaning of a lei provision. Out of such interpretations made consciously or unco ciously, a new kind of law comes into existence known as case-law, has its place in the decisions of the courts Sometimes, 1 he weight a local usage is too strong to be accepted by the court, sometimes I court is guided by the canon of equity or natural justice. Thus con into existence a new kind of law known as common law in Englam
Theories of Jhe Origin and Nature of Law: There are differ theories about the origin and'nature of law. First of all, we take the natural theory that considers law as eternal, universal, consta rational and immutable. It can be understood by the rational facu222
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
of man. Being universal it has the merit of prevailing everywhere; being eternal it has its validity at all times; being constant it is same at all places and under all circumstances; and being immutable it cannot be changed by any power on earth. Nature is the author of this law and, as such, it is based on right reason. It has two aspects-positive and negative. Positively, it is in the nature of a call and a command to one's duty; negatively, it is a warning against the performance of some deceitful or evil act. If so, natural law is higher law and civil law must conform to it in order to be valid.
This idea prevailed throughout the medieval period with this formal distinction that with the advent of Christianity, the law of nature (jus naturale) became the law of God (jus divina) as contained in the Bible. In early modern times social contractualists like Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke referred to it, though in a different sense. In stead of taking it as a creation of nature or God, they regarded it as 'a system in which reason moves progressively from higher order to lower order to lay down some prescriptions.' But it saw its rejection at the hands of analytical jurists like Bentham and Austin who defined law 'as the command of the sovereign'. Thus, the idea of natural law became like a dogma having a normative aspect. It is well observed: "The difficulty with the natural law theories of the absolutist kind is that of securing agreement on the ends which men ought to pursue. Natural lawyers often write as if their prescriptions were as necessary as the laws that govern the physical world, but clearly that is not so. Natural law relates to human conduct and has, therefore, quite a different logic from scientific law; it is normative law; it is normative not predictive or discipline and is, therefore, concerned with demonstrating those rules of behaviour which ought to be followed. But men's needs and desires change and actions which were regarded as universal by one generation must not be acceptable to another."9
Now most widely accepted is the imperative theory of law having ts affirmation in the works of Bodin, Hobbes, Bentham, Austin and Dicey. Sharply contradistinguished from natural law theory, it uses he word 'law' in a positive sense; that is, it maintains that the laws Niih which the jurists or the political scientists have to deal are commands' of a determinate political authority. Also known by the mme of 'legal positivism', it designates that only those norms "are ': uridically valid which have been established or recognised by the :overnment of a sovereign state in the forms prescribed by its written •r unwritten constitution. No Divine Law and no Natural Law is
9. N.P. Barry: An Introduction to Modern Political Theory, p. 25.
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
22:
valid, according to legal positivism, unless so recognised by the state or its government."1" As Hobbes says: "Covenants without sword an but words, and they are of no strength to secure a man at all."11
This theory has two weak points. First, it lays too much reliance on positivism. That is, law is regard as something put in very set oi positive terms by the state whose violation is visited with punishment and thereby it ignores the force of rules emanating from religion oi custom or backed by the force of public opinion in view of their noi being backed by the authority of a determinate human superioi (sovereign). Naturally, it makes the meaning of law rigid and introduce; an element of conservatism in juristic conclusions on the subject o] law and state. Second, the emphasis of /the positivists on the force ol command confuses the distinction between the law as expected to be observed by the people and the order that may even provoke the people to destroy the political system. Laski is of the view that tc think of laws as simply a command is even for the jurist "to strair definition to the verge of decency."1"
Different from the two theories, as briefly given above, is the historical theory that treats law as a result of silent forces at work ir society. The law is neither authored by nature (or God), nor is it £ deliberate creation of the state. In a correct sense, it is the result o: the inevitable but imperceptible social development. If so, it i; independent of, and anterior to, the state. The function of the state i; not to create Jaw but merely to recognise and enforce it. According tc its exponents like Gustav von Hugo and Savigny, law is the organ ol folk right that moves and ever grows like other expression of the life of the people; it is formed by custom and popular feeling through the operation of silent forces and not by the arbitrary will of a legislator. In his Ancient Law Sir Henry Maine has sought to prove how modern law originated and developed from the ancient Romar habits, practices and institutions. So says Bryce: "Law cannot be always and everywhere the creation of the Stale, because instance; can be adduced where law existed in a community before there was an>
State."13
In other words, this theory holds that the law of the state is found in the process of historical evolution of the people. As such, the sanction behind law is the pressure of the will of the people. Such a view
10. Arnold Brccht: Political Theory, pp. 182-83.
11. Hobbes: Leviathan, Ch. 17.
12. Laski: A (Jrum/nor of Politics, p. 51.
13. Brycc:■ Suulies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol. II, p. 249.224
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
has its strong and weak points. Its merit lies in analysing the role of historical forces that play their part in the sphere of legal obligation. It also contributes to the understanding of the nature of law by emphasising that legal systems change and they should undergo modifications in order to meet new conditions. But the weak point is that it errs in ignoring or reducing the element of "command' to the point of a mere metaphor. It may also be said that this theory assumes a conservative character because of its reverence for the past and its distrust for deliberate efforts directed at reforms of the law and legal systems.
Then, we may refer to the sociological theory of law which, in a sense, should be treated as an extension of the historical theory on this subject. It insists that law is the creation of social forces and, for this reason, must be studied in the light of social needs. The state does not create law, it only imputes legal value to a rule or practice that grows out of social needs. The names of Duguit in France, of Krabbe in Holland, of Roscoe Pound and Justice Holmes in the United States and of Laski in England may be mentioned in this direction. They all contend that the obligations of the people are based on the fact that men live in society and they must so live in order to survive and that life in society requires a certain manner of conduct. Law is the totality of the rules, general or particular, written or unwritten, which spring from men's feelings or 'sense of right.' Justice Holmes suggests that we should consider not only what the laws are as they appear in the constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions but also what effects they have produced in the past, how they operate today, and how they may be improved by deliberate human effort in time to come.
This theory has the merit of emphasising the role of social needs in the sphere of legal obligation. It cannot be denied that law exists to serve social purposes and the people obey it because of their 'sense of right.' However, the weakness of this theory lies in its ignoring what the advocates of imperative theory so strongly affirm. We cannot lose sight of the role of forces that lies behind law and which is a result of the will of the sovereign authority. To say that law is prior or anterior to the state is to misunderstand the significance of the analytical theory of law. We may not detach law from the fact of the existence of a coercive power vested in the state that refutes the idea of law being prior, or anterior, to the existence of political authority.
Basically different from all theories given above is the Marxian theory of law. It first integrates law with the state and then integrates
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both with the social and economic structure of a community. According to Marx, the economic structure constitutes the real basis upon which the political and juridical superstructures are built. Since legal relationships are footed in the material conditions of life, laws merely express the will and the interests of the dominant class. As Marx says: "Law is an expression of society's general interests and needs as they emerge from a given material means of production.'' In the view of Lenin, law is an expression of what is expedient for the construction of socialism and to fight for it. Since law is enforced through the courts, judiciary acts like an instrument of class domina-\ tion. As a noted Soviet jurist says: "A court of whatever sort is an ' organ of the class dominant in a given state depending and guiding its interests."11 So says Afanasyev: "Law is the totality of obligatory standards and rules of behaviour of people in society. These rules are expressed in corresponding laws which are safeguarded by the state and its numerous instruments of compulsion and education. Law, like politics, arose with classes and the state. It is the will of the ruling class expressed in legal forms and it defends the political and economic interests of the ruling class."15
Like other theories on this subject, the Marxian theory has its points of merit and demerit. Its merit lies in its integration of the principle of legal obligation with the general character of society. It is this theory alone that puts emphasis on economic structure of society and that has its decisive impact on the organisation and working of political and legal institutions. But it has some grave weaknesses too. For instance, its denunciation of the state, and of law as its corollary, in the name of being an instrument of exploitation and oppression by one class over another may not convince the advocates of a liberal-democratic order. It may also be said that the Marxian theory rejects the case of'rule of law'that is regarded as the hallmark of a democratic order. The Marxian way may prevail only in a communist country where the pattern of government is totalitarian.
Law and Liberty: The question relating to the proper relationship between law and liberty has engaged the attention of many social and political theorists. We may briefly discuss them in the following manner:
1. The anarchists and the syndicalists are rank anti-authoritarians. The anarchists like Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin and syndicalists like Sorel and Pelloutier frankly denounce
14. A.Y. Vyshinsky: The Law of the Soviet State, p. 500.
15. V.G. Aianasyev: Marxist Philosophy, pp. 372-73.226
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
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227
I !
the state as an instrument of exploitation and oppression and desire a classless and stateless society in which there is no law to limit or destroy the liberty of the individual. The dominant class controls the state and uses law as an instrument to protect and promote its interests. The parliament and the courts are the agencies that perpetrate the rule of the class of the exploiters and the oppressors. Hence, the present system of state should go root and branch. By all means law is the instrument that kills libery of the individuals. There should be no state, no law, no authority of any kind to exercise /coercion in the final stage of social development.
2. A somewhat modified view in this respect is furnished by the individualists like John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Adam Smith etc. who take state as a necessary evil and for that reason desire minimum possible interference of the state in the liberty of die individual. Spencer treats law as a 'sin' and legislators as 'sinners' who destroy the liberty ot the individual bv imposing limitations of law on it. In other words,such thinkers support the case of minimum possible control of law so as to allow maximum possible liberty to the individuals.
3. But the socialists treat law and liberty as complementary terms. To them state is a 'welfare agency' and it can ensure a better and just social order by its legal machanism. Law imposes restraints that are essential for the sake of social welfare. If it is a fact that the capitalist class exploits the working class, the state may eradicate the evil of exploitation by making necessary laws. No freedom is absolute; hence the state may impose necessary restrictions on the use and enjoyment of rights of the people. It may make laws for the regulation of working conditions or maintenance of social security; it may even make laws for the nationalisation of private property in the public interest. Laski says that law comes very close to the world of liberty that demands observance of common rules that bind the conduct of men in their civilised collective life.
4. But the idealists go to the extent of worshipping state as a moralising agency. Every law represents general will of the community; hence, every law of the state must be observed by the people. A man is free when he obeys the law of the state; in case a man does not do so, he may be coerced for this sake. Thus, Rousseau and Green hold that the state can use force to create freedom. In the view of Hegel, state cannot
do anything opposed to the real interest of man. 5. The fascists give a practical expression to the idealistic version given above. 'Nothing against the state', says Mussolini. It follows that state must make law to protect the interest of the individuals and they, in turn, should take it for granted that their real interest lies in rendering complete obedience to it. :t is impossible to think of a law that is antithetical to-public interest, because the state can do no wrong. Man should fall down and obey law so as to worship the state.
The issue of relationship between liberty and law is really of a very delicate nature. Law protects liberty of the individuals by impos-ing necessary and reasonable restrictions. It is rightly said: 'No restraint, no liberty'. Thus, law is required to impose due restrictions )n the behaviour of man so that he may not be a spurce of nuisance ,n the liberty of others. At the same, time law destroys liberty of the Individuals as we may see in a fascist or a communist country. Both situations are possible. But the problem of legal obligation finds its proper solution in the affirmation that the state based on the general will of the people should devise its legal machinery in a way so that obedience to law is sincerely associated with the consent of the people. People rise in revolt and disturbances of a very serious nature follow, if they refuse to obey a law which they denounce as a 'black' or a Draconian measure. We may appreciate this view: "So long as the actions of the state are in the interest of the common good, the disobedient individual can be forced to be free, for even when he is being compelled, he is constrained in his own true interest."16
Law and Morality: The matter of relationship between law and morality is a very delicate affair. It is owing to this that law and morality differ from each other in their content, sanction and definite-ness. While law (positive law) is concerned with the outward actions of man, the morality with his inner motives. In other words, while iavv is concerned with the regulation of the objective behaviour of man, morality has its connection with the subjective aspect of the same. As such, while the purpose of law is to restrain a man from doing a crime like theft or burglary, the purpose of morality is to save him from committing a sin like speaking untruth or practising ingratitude. Moreover, the two differ in respect of their application. While law is universal in character and, as such, it is applicable to a large number of people in a uniform measure, morality has its appli-
16. Asirvatham, op cit. p. 192.228
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
cation to individual cases and, as such, it differs from man to man and from group to group. Moreover, law is quite specific and its terms are very clear, morality is rather ambiguous and uncertain. Above all, while the former is mandatory and is backed by the authority of the sovereign, the latter has an optional character having its source of sanction in the good sense or conscience of the people.
While taking up the matter of relationship between law and morality, we should first distinguish between natural (divine) law and positive law. As we have already seen, the concept of the law of nature was nothing but a justification of the principles of a higher moral order. The concept of the law of God did trie same thing. If natural law or divine law ordained that all men are equal, it laid down a moral precept in the form of a law. If so, law and morality are the same thing. But the situation is different when we look into the issue of relationship between positive law and morality. Many laws of the state are meant to protect what the morality of the people demands. For instance, Hindu personal law prohibits polygamy, it is so sanctioned by the traditional morality of the Hindu people. But it is possible that a law may break a principle of public morality in the name of general good or public welfare. Thus, a law could abolish the system of sati. The government of Turkey under Kemal Ataturk made many laws to reform the personal law of the Muslims drawing sustenance from the principles of traditional Muslim morality.
It is also a fact that the people rise in revolt when law breaks a celebrated norm of their morality. Laski has made a point that even the 'sovereign' British Parliament cannot make a law that undermines the norms of a civilised behaviour. It follows that law should protect morality of the people, but it may do otherwise if it is so desired by the enlightened sections of the community. "In order that a law may be valid, it is enough that it should satisfy the canon of declaration, recognition and enforcement by a constituted authority acting on behalf of the community."17
International Law
Theinclusion of international law in a chapter on law has its own purpose. If man is a social creature and the law of the state regulates his behaviour, the state is a creature of international society and, as
17. Barker: Principles of Social and Political Theory, p. 117. Prof. R.M. Maclver is, however, correct in his affirmation that law cannot cover total sphere of morality in view of the fact that "to turn all moral obligations into legal obligations would be to destroy morality." The Modern State, p. 157.
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such, there should be a law to regulate its behaviour vis-a-vis other, states- It follows that not only individuals but the states also require certain rules to regulate or govern their conduct and mutual relations. The existence of such rules is necessary for the sake of advancing their common interests as well as for the sake of avoiding conflicts among themselves. Thus, certain rules of behaviour among the states of the world have come up that are known by the name of international law. As such, this term denotes all rules and regulations which modern civilised states of the world follow and which they feel legally bound to observe in their mutual dealings.
Meaning: Simply stated, international law is a body of rules which regulate inter-state relations and which are indispensable for the purpose of keeping, the society of states in order. "International Law or the Law of Nations is the name of a body of rules^ which "regulate the conduct of the states in their intercourse with one another."18 In the words of Fenwick, international law "may be defined in broad terms as the body of general principles and specific rules which are binding upon the members of the international community in their mutual relations."19 International law "is the aggregate of the rules which determine the rights which a state is entitled to claim on behalf of itself or its nationals against another state."20 It "is the name for the body of customary and conventional rules which are considered legally binding by civilised states in their intercourse with each other."21
From the above, it is clear that international law is a body of rules and regulations which the civilised states observe in their intercourse with each other. So Hall says: "International law consists in certain rules of conduct which modern civilised states regard as being binding on them in their relations with one another with a force comparable in nature and degree to that binding the conscientious person to obey the laws of his country, and which they also regard as being enforceable by appropriate means in case of infringement."22 J.G. Starke offers a detailed definition of this term as: "International law may be defined as that branch of law which is composed for its greater part of the principles and rules of conduct which states feel themselves bound to observe and, therefore, do commonly observe in their relations with
18. Hans Kelsen: Principles of International Law, p. 3.
19. ,Fenwick: International Law, p. 27.
20. Sir Cecil Hurst: International Law {Collected Papers), p. 8.
21. Oppenheim: International Law, Vol. I, p. 4. 22. Hall: International Law, p. 1.230
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
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each other and which includes also:
(a) the rules of law relating to the functioning of international institutions, or organisations, their relations with each other; and their relations with states and individuals, and
(b) certain rales of law relating to individuals so far as the rights or duties of such individuals are the concern of international community.''3
Sources: We should look into those historical facts which prove the existence of such rules of international behaviour and the historical facts which impart them binding force. These are:
1. Usages and Customs: The most important part has been played by the force of custom, international law has many important customary rules having their sanction in the fact of prescription or long observance. Such a rule may be denned as one which the states have since long been recognising as a right norm of conduct. For instance, it is a matter of customary rule that a state should not attack another state without giving a word of caution. When states start some practice and it is followed again and again, it becomes a usage; when it is hardened, it becomes a custom. In order that a rule may be held as a binding customary law, it must be proved by satisfactory evidence that the particular rule is of such a nature, and has been so widely and generally accepted, that it can hardly be supposed that any civilised state would repudiate it. Art. 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice provides for the application of international custom as 'evidence of a general practice accepted as law.'
2. Treaties: In recent times treaties have become a very import-tant source of international law. Their importance lies in the fact that they embody rules which have been agreed to be binding by the states making them. But all treaties cannot be included in this category. Fot instance, a trade treaty between two or more states cannot be a source of international law. What is required is that a treaty should have a fairly large number of signatories and that it should spell out some important principles of international behaviour. For instance, we may refer to the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 that was signed by a very large number of states and that incorporated the Covenant of the League of Nations. So is the case with the 23. Starke: An Introduction to International Law, p. 3.
4.
5.
Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris) of 1928 that was initially signed by the USA and France but it was subsequently adopted by a good number of states. The importance of this treaty lies in the fact that it exhorted the states of the world to renounce the course of war as an instrument of their policy and in stead seek a pacific settlement-of disputes. Its best example is the Charter of the United Nations adopted in 1945.
Judicial Decisions: Decisions of international courts, courts of arbitration, as well as of national courts dealing with the cases of international law have their own importance in this connection. Art. 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice requires the Court in administering international law to apply judicial decisions as "subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law." The decision of a national court as one dealing with prize cases containing an exposition of the principles of law on a particular matter constitutes an authoritative source of international law. The decisions in the Alabama Claims and the Behring Sea Fisheries Case furnish" notable instanes of the work of arbitration tribunals in the development of international law. The point of agreement on such a subject is that "the decisions of the courts of every country so far as they are founded upon a law common to every country will be received not as authority but with respect."
Great Works: The opinions, observations and commentaries of eminent writers have their own place in this connection. The Statute of the International Court of Justice recognises "the teachings of the most qualified publicists of various nations as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law." Great juristic works are resorted to by the judicial tribunals not for the speculation of their authors concerning what the law ought to be but for a trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. The importance of such works lies in the fact that they furnish evidence of customs and usages and deduce rule of law from the materials noticed by them. Thus, the works of great jurists like Grotius, Oppenheim, Hall and Fenwick are regarded as great sources of international law. General Principles: Lastly, we may refer to general principles of international law recognised by the civilised nations of the world. It is universally accepted that there is no reason wh> the general principles of morality, equity and justice, whicl232
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCONCE
apply to the cases of the individuals, should not be applicable to the cases of states in their mutual relations. We knov that the Permanent Court of International Justice applied the rule of res judkata in thz Chor Zow Factory Case and the general principles of subrogation in the case of the diversion of water from the Meuse. Many principles of municipal jurisprudence were followed by the Court in the trial of war criminals at Nuremberg and Tokyo after the termination of the second World War. It is laudable that the Statute of International Court of Justice expressly recognises the practice of referring to and invoking general principles of law as a wholesome affair. The provision of the Statute in making general principles of law applicable to international problems widens the sphere of the development of international law.
Juristic Nature: It is a matter of some controversy whether international law should be treated as 'law' in the true sense of the term. There are two sharply different views on this subject. One view, as given by the advocates of the analytical school, is that it cannot be treated as law, because there is no international sovereign authority to enforce it. Austin says that law should be studied in positive t:rnis. As such, unless there is a sovereign authority (as we find in th■:- case of states), there can be nothing like international law. In the words of Holland, international law shows the vanishing point of jurisprudence. Thus, international law is nothing but a fine name for a set of customary or conventional rules of international behaviour followed by the states in their mutual intercourse as a matter of their volition. In other words, international law should be identified not with the law of the state but with the dictates of positive international morality.
On the other hand, we have a good number of eminent jurists contending that international law should be treated as 'law' in the true sense of the term for these reasons:
1. Custom has played a very important role in regulating the behaviour of individuals and their groups. If customary rules can regulate the conduct of individuals, why can they not regulate the behaviour of the sovereign states. The researches of historical jurists like Sir Henry Maine highlight the observance of customs in primitive communities when there was no sovereign authority al all the kind of which Austin tells us. So today the fact of the observance of customary rules by thefstates in their dealings with each other confirms the fact of the force of bindingness that places international law in the
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE 2?3
category of a law.
2. In the present century states have signed a very large number of treaties out of which written rules of international iaw emanate. The international agencies like the League of Nations and the United Nations have done much to implement the rules of such treaties. The Permanent Court of international Justice as a part of the League of Nations and now the Court of International Justice as an organ of the United Nations system have given recognition to such rules.
3. Some-states of the world have given recognition to the principles of international law in the formulation of their municipal law or national policy. For instance, the Peace Constitution of Japan (1947) affirms renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. The Indian Constitution (Art. 51) desires the state to follow the course of observing international law and treaty obligations and striving for pacific settlement of disputes.
4. In international disputes the states donot deny the existence of international law, they interpret the rules of law in a way so as to justify their conduct or action. It is indicative of the fact that they show respect to the principles of international law.
5. Above all, the norms of a civilised behaviour require ihat each state should observe the principles of international law. We often take note of the fact that civilised states of the world condemn the action of any state if it is subversive of the principles of international law. American intervention in Vietnam and Russian intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia thus became the subjects of wide denunciation. The attack of Britain, France and Israel on Suez in 1956 was strongly resented by the peace-loving states of the world.
All this shows that international law has a binding character in spite of the fact that there is no international sovereign authority. It informs us to look into the basis of international law. Some jurists like Oppenheim contend that international law is based on the consent given by a state either implicitly by following a customary rule or expressly by entering into a treaty or convention. It is due to the fact of consent that a state observes the rules of international law. But such a view is wrong due to some reasons. First, this theory is simply inadequate to explain the assumptions upon which states appear to have acted from the time international law saw its rise and234
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
development. Second, it is the fact of necessity of a civilised life and not mere consent that should be taken into account. To leave anything to the factor of consent would be to admit the possibilities of the withdrawal of consent. But in actual practice, we may feel convinced with the necessity of leading a civilised life in the world thai every state must take into recognition. Above all, none can trace the fact of consent in the behaviour of a state so as to substantiate the contention of the consent theorists.
It follows that the true basis of international law is not consent but the exigencies of modern life which provide binding force to international law. We may endorse the view of Fenwick: "The prevention of war, the regulation of conflicting claims, the promotion of the general welfare of the group, are conditions which create a moral and material unity among the nations in the same manner that they create a moral and material unity between individuals within the State. The fact that nations have these common interests constitutes an actual community of States and, at the sane time, imperatively demands a rule of law, so that International Law may be said to be based upon the very necessity for its existence, upon the very human beings in constant touch with one another under the conditions of the present day. Beyond that all discussion of its philosophical basis is academic."24
Problem of Codification: A matter of great difficulty with international law is that it is not in a codified form. It is widely scattered in the form of rules arising out of well-established customs and international treaties, agreements, conventions and important judicial decisions. The term 'codification of international law' means the process of reducing the whole body of law into a code in the form of enacted law. It may also mean a systematic arrangement of the rules of law in existence, modification of the existing rules to suit the needs of the times, and also formulation of rules on controversial subjects after necessary reconciliation of the divergent views. Though the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius produced his great work on this subject, it is Jeremy Bentham of England who conceived the idea of codification of the international law. Individual as well as collective efforts were, therefore, made for this purpose. Francis Lieber published a code of laws of war on land at the request of President Lincoln. In 1868 a Swiss jurist (Bluntschli) producsd his code containing 862 articles. An Italian jurist (Pasquale Fiori) published his code of international law in 1890 and then a Brazilian jurist (Expitacio
24. Fenwick, op. cit., p. 31.
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
235
'pessoa) did the same in 1910. In recent times we have great works on this subject by Fenwick, Oppenheim, Hall, Phillimore and Hyde.
We may also refer to the efforts of groups and other organisations in this direction. A Belgian body of jurists founded in 1873 based at Ghent (Institute of International Law) came forward with its own contributions. The Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations founded in 1934 adopted a series of resolutions proposing measures that might be taken against violations of the Pact of Paris of 1928. In 1924 the General Assembly of the League appointed a committee of 16 jurists to report on this matter. In pursuance of a report of this committee, a conference on progressive codification was held at The Hague in 1930. It adopted three conventions- on questions relating to conflict of nationality laws, a protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of double nationality, and a special protocol on cases of statelessness. Art. 13 of the Charter of the United Nations says that "the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of encouraging progressive development of international law and its codification." In oursuance of this, the UN set up Human Rights Commission and adopted a Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. In 1951 it adopted a convention on the rights of the refugees.
No doubt, the work of codification will entail many positive results. It will make the rules of international law clear and easily understandable and thereby add to their binding force. But the difficulty is that sovereign nations have their confl eting interests on many important points of international law. Yhe big powers of the world would not like to surrender themselves on many points such as control of nuclear and thermo-nuc'oar weapons or the idea of equality of nations in the international sphere. Any serious attempt in this direction would lead to numerous controversies. We may refer to this observation of Sir Cecil Hurst: "If it is left to governments to meet in conference; for the purpose of deciding what are the rules of international law, it is inevitable that their efforts will be directed to agreeing—or trying to agree—on the rules of International Law as they ought to be, i.e., the rules which would be appropriate to their present-day requirements; and delegates will find that the requirements of the government are so diversified, so contrary that agreement is impossible."-"
Relationship between International Law and Municipal Law: Finally, ws may look into the issue of relationship between law of
25. Hurst: International Law (Collected Papers), p. 146.
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
237
236
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
the state (niunicipal law) and the law of states (international law). We have already seen that the two laws differ in their nature, sources and binding character. While the municipal law is certain and has a positive character by virtue of being enforced by the sovereign authority of the state, international law is not certain on many points and it has no imperative character on account of the non-existence of a sovereign power in the international sphere. Moreover, while municipal law regulates the behaviour of the individuals and groups living in a state, international law deals with the behaviour of sovereign states. It is also possible that the principles of international and municipal laws may conflict and in that situation the latter may prevail over the former. It informs us to look into the issue of relationship between the two kinds of laws and the ways of their reconciliation. In this connection, we may refer to these theories. \
The advocates of the monistic theory on this subject contend that the two laws are one and the same thing. They hold that the object of both is the same with this line of distinction that while the law of the state regulates the conduct of the individuals and their groups, the law of nations is concerned with regulating the behaviour of the sovereign states which are corporate bodies of the individuals. Ultimately, both laws deal with the civilised behaviour of the individuals. Both are phases of a single legal order; they are not independent systems. Both have their origin in 'a 'higher law' like law of nature or law of God signifying the principle of eternal right and wrong. For instance, the concept of the equality of states under international law and the idea of equality of all individuals in the eye of law are drawn from the same source. In short, there is no conflict between the two laws. Hans Kelsen, Leon Duguit, Krabbe and Wright are the leading exponents of this view.
Then, there is the dualistic theory on this subject. Its advocates like Triepel, Anzilotti and Oppenheim contend that the two systems are distinct from each other; they have their different sources of origin and development; the two have different character in respect of their imperativeness; the two are independent of each other. And yet the two systems donot conflict with each other, because they are concerned with different objects—national law with individuals, international law with the states. The rules of international law may be implemented through the laws of the states. For instance, the provisions of an international law cannot be put into operation unless enabling legislation is effected by the concerned states.
An interpretation of the dualistic theory in this vein leads to the
emergence of the transformation theory. It holds that the conflict between the municipal and international laws may be avoided if the rule> of international law are incorporated into the municipal laws of the iand. For instance, by signing a treaty of extradition, a state may change its law so as to catch a fugitive and then hand him over U> the demanding state. In other words, it follows that the rules of international law may have an imperative character after they are accommodated or transformed into the national law of a siate. Kelsen supports this view.
Finally, there is the delegation theory. It asserts that international law constitutes a kind of general constitution which delegates to each state the competence to enact law in conformity with the rules of international law. It holds that a state is grounded upon international law and that international law loses its validity if it conflicts with the Saw of a state. In this way, it assumes the primacy of the international legal order. It goes ahead of the transformation theory by contending that the very act of incorporating a rule of international la'v into the municipal law amounts to merely an extension of the same act.
But in order to arrive at a plausible conclusion we should look into the practices of the leading states of the world. They have tried to look at this issue in a way that the chances of conflict between two laws are minimised to any extent. For instance, in England Blackstone gave a statement that "here international law is adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the laW of the land." In the Chung-chi-Cheung case, Lord Atkin observed: "The courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which nations accept among themselves. On any judicial issue they seek to ascertain what a relevant rule is, and having found it, they will treat it as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes of finally declared by their tribunals." Article VI of the American Constitution specifically prcVides that "all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." The result is that as soon as the President signs a treaty and it is ratified by the Senate, it is transformed into American law and if the treaty is self-executing, it is binding on the courts also as part of the law of ihe land.
Similar points may be seen in the practices of other states of the world like France, West Germany, Norway, Spain, USSR, China,238
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
Japan and India. It all shows that the relationship between national and international laws is one of inter-dependence. The purpose of law is to correct a wrong; if it is done by an individual, there is municipal law; and if it is done by a state, there is international law. The logical conclusion would, therefore, be that both these systems of laws have a binding character in the sense that they are parts of a single Segal order. What an English judge (Lord Alverstone) in the case of West Rand Central Gold Mining Company said applies to a situation prevailing in any part of the world that "whatever has received the common consent of civilised nations must have received the assent of our country and that to which we have assented along with other nations in general, may properly be called international law and, as such, will be acknowledged and applied by our municipal tribunals when legitimate occasion arises for those tribunals to decide questions to which doctrines of international law may be relevant." In fine, the practices of the civilised nations of the world confirm the point that "States have become increasingly aware of the fact that a law governing inter-State relationships is irreconciliable with the freedom to evade
it...."2
"28
Justice
If political theory is studied in purely normative terms, one comes to this important conclusion that what really connects the themes of law, rights, liberty and equality (including fraternity or cooperation) is the element of justice. In every organised community these ideals have their value and there must be something to bring them together so that we may understand the nature of a well-ordered community. As we shall see, justice is one of the important themes of political theory that "is the reconciler or synthesiser of political values; it is their union in an adjusted and integrated whole: it is in Aristotle's words, 'what answers to the whole of goodness...being the exercise of goodness as a whole...towards one's neighbours."27 It is obvious that the theme of justice has a significance of its owu in the realm of political theory in view of the fact that among the proper/ ends of state and government, it has been given a high rank at all tim"es. "Two axioms have been generally accepted without question; first, that government's own actions ought to be just; second, that governmental institutions such as law courts, ought to ensure the preserva-
26. Hyde: International Law, Vol. Ill, p. 1681.
27. Barker, op. cit., p. 102.
tion of justice."26
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55. Almond and Powell: Comparative Politics, p. 64.
56. S.L. Wasby: Poltiical Science, p. 333.
57. F.I. Greenstein: "Political Socialisation" in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 361, p. 2.
CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
297
rather than resorting to the techniques of taking matters to the streets or creating conditions of a violent upheaval. Political socialisation thus covers the whole process by which an individual "born with behavioural potentialities of immense range is led to develop actual behaviour which is confined with a much narrow range—the range of which is customary and acceptable for him according to the students of his
group."5*
In this way, the term.'political socialisation' should be taken as a doctrine that seeks to inculcate values, norms and orientations in the minds of the individuals so that they develop their trust in their political system and thereby keep themselves like well-functioning citizens and also leave their indelible imprints on the minds of their successors. It may be thus defined as a process by which an individual becomes acquainted with the political system and which determines the reactions to political phenomena. It involves the examination of the social, economic, or cultural environment of society upon the individual and upon his political attitudes and values."'0 As Roberta Sigel says: "The goal of political socialisation is to so train or develop individuals that they become well-functioning members of the political society."60
Major Agents: If political socialisation concerns itself with the orientation of the individuals towards political objects, let us look into the role of the agents that play their part in the process of norm-internalisation. In other words, an inquiry into this matter covers the role of those factors that have their latest as well as patent influence on the minds of the individuals and thereby make up his political personality. These agents are:"1
1. The family is the first institution that should be described as 'child's first window on the world outside, it is the child's first contact with authority.' A child tends to identify his outlook with that of his parents towards the political system and its institutions. Robert Lane suggests that there are three ways in which the foundations of political beliefs may be laid through the family—by overt and covert indoctrination, by placing the child in a particular social context, a~d by moulding child's personality. Davies also says that the family
58. I.L. Child: "Socialisation" in G. Lindzey (ed.): Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 655.
59. Michael Rush and Phillip Althoff: An Introduction to Political Sociology,
pp. 13-14.
60. Sigel in Annals, op. cit., p. 2.
61. A.R. Ball: Modern Politics and Government, p. 69.298
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
provides the major means for transforming the mentally naked infant organism into adult, fully clothed in its own personality. And most of the individual's political personality, his tendency to think and act politically in particular ways has been determined at home, several years before he takes part in politics as a citizen.
2. Then conies the school. The imparting of education at the schools has its own part in the process of political socialisation. The kind of education that is given in the schools through their curriculum shapes the views and behaviour of the students. The environment of a school teaches students to behave in a particular way. The behaviour of the elders, whether senior students (>r their teachers, leaves its own impression on the minds of the yotingers. So the people fight for including or excluding some portion from school text books. For instance, the American ncgores often light for the inclusion of the achievements of their community in the building of the United Slates, or for the exclusion of some portions that undermine their social and political stat"; in the 'land of liberty.'
3. This process continues imperceptibly. It has a cementing effect when the students enter colleges and universities or other places of higher learning. The organisation of debates, symposiums, discussions, competitions, speaking contests and the like not only add to their stock of information but also make them aware of the ways of life. The working of the unions of the students thus comes to engage our attention. The way student leaders fight elections, form executive bodies and light for their rights gives others a sort of !raining in democracy. The centres of advanced learning thus produce leaders who after some time become the rulers of the country.
4. Every citizen joins some official and non-official groups when he is an adult. He has some employment and in the oilicc be seesjthc behaviour of his elders and learns from that. Besides, he is also a member of so many oilier religious, cultural, social and economic bodies whose functioning determines his political behaviour. The workers have the membership of trade unions which teach them how to organise and agitate for the redrcssal of their grievances or for meeting their demands by their employers. Some people join political parties whose leaders give them training in the direction of fighting elections, capturing power, forming government, staging opposi-
CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
299
tion and the like.
5. Finally, we may refer to the variable of people's direct contact with their political system through the means of mass communication as well as 'symbols.' The press, radio and the television give programmes which add to the political information of the people. The national flag, the national anthem, May Day Parades, coronations, inauguration of the Presidency, celebration of the birth days of great national leaders, processions and demonstrations, all leave certain strong impressions on the minds of the people. They learn from them and thereby cultivate a sense of liking or disliking towards them.
These are the agents or instruments which play their part in the irresistible, though imperceptible, acquisition of the*political values by the members of a political community. "A young child not only sees all such activities and events, he also develops an affective and evaluative orientation towards the regime."62
Development in Democratic and Non-Democratic Countries: In every country political socialisation has its part, but its operation may be differentiated in advanced and backward, and democratic and undemocratic countries. In a free country society has a plural character. Different interests are allowed to exist as a result of which people have diverse loyalties. Dissent is allowed with the result that the people may accept some pattern, criticise another, and also change their views from one side to another with the growth of their knowledge about their political system and its institutions. From the very beginning a child learns the way of a 'free' life; he undestands the value of an open sysitem. His views about the meaning of'democracy,' its distinction with 'dictatorship,' the implications of the 'rule of law,' the significance of an independent judiciary and the press etc. are well confirmed. Thus, a citizen of a democratic country receives education in the free atmosphere of schools and colleges and universities; he expresses his views and reactions on the burning problems of the day in a free and frank manner, exercises his franchise like a free man and, in short, develops a very strong impression about the importance of a free political life.
Opposed to it in a totalitarian system, whether fascist or communist, political socialisation has a basically different character. A new sort of political culture is imposed on the people by the power-drunk rulers. The all-powerful state deprives the people of any right
62. See Djnnis Kivangh: Political Culture, p. 33.300
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
I
to dissent. An official ideology is imposed on the oeople and the opponents are mutilated by it in a most ruthless manner. By all means, the dissenters are liquidated through the process of brainwashing or some other treacherous means. The line of a Mussolini or of a Hitler, or of a Stalin is the line of the state tint has to be followed by all. The school text books and all courses are tailored in a particular fashion and the functioning of political institutions is given a form that leads to the inculcation of a particular kind of political culture. Lenin makes it clear in these words: ''Only by radically remoulding the teaching organisation and training of the young shall we be able to ensure that the results of the efforts of the younger generation will be the creation of a society that will be unlike the old society that is a communist society."ca
The main purpose of political socialisation is to train citizens in a way so that the political system gets legitimacy and stability. So the democrats and the totalitarian desire to make use of this process in their own ways. While the democrats desire to make the people 'democratic' by their conviction and in their behaviour, the fascists and the communists seek to inculcate in the minds of their people a particular pattern that is conducive to the official ideology. It is for this reason that the beh iviour-pattern of the citizens of a democratic country is different from the behaviour-pattern of people living in a totalitarian country. It is rightly said: "The totalitarian societies differ from modern democracies in the degree of control they exercise over the political socialisation of their members. All governments seek directly or indirectly to socialise the members of society in varying degrees by the control of information, but in the totalitarian society the control is all-pervasive."M
Political Participation
Meaning: Participation is an ingredient of every political system whether traditional or modern, democratic or totalitarian, large or small. The political system may be of any kind, someone must take political decisions and do other related things like appointment, reshuffling and removal of office-holders from time to time. An important line of distinction may, however, be drawn in that whereas in the traditional and monarchical systems participation is severely restricted to the 'nobility' and its agents, the democratic systems have, in principle, transformed these prerogatives into rights available to
63. V.I. Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 661.
64. Rush and AlthofT, op. cit., p. 55.
CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
301
every Tom, Dick and Harry. The reason is that a democratic system is regarded as the only system based on the will of the people desiring participation of as many people as possible in the struggle for power. Sucn an expansion of participation "was partly stimulated by the desire to give meaning and force to the principle of consent, accountability and political opposition. Participation is the principal means by which consent is granted or withdrawn in a democracy and rulers made accountable to the ruled."05
The term 'political participation' refers to those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of public policy. These activities are like casting vote, seeking information, holding discussions, attending meetings, making financial contributions to political parties, staging strikes and demonstrations, communicating _with the legislators and other leading figures and the like. However, the most active forms of political participation are formal enrolment in a party, canvassing and registering votes, speech-writing and speech-making, working in campaigns and competing for public and party offices.66 A trend in the opposite direction makes up the case of 'political apathy' that "refers to a state of withdrawal from or indifference to such activities."67
It follows that political participation "is the involvement of the individual at various levels in the political system. Political activity may range from non-involvement to office-holding. It is also important to stress that participation "may result in the motivation for increased participation, including the highest level—that of holding various types of offices — whicKinvolves the process of political recruitment."68 It all depends upon these important factors:69
65. Herbert McClosky: "Political Participation" in David I. Sills (ed.): International Encyclopeadia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, p. 253.
66. Ibid., p. 252.
67. Ibid.
68. Michael Rush and Philip Althoff: An Introduction to Political Sociology, p. 14.
69. Herbert McClosky, op. cit., pp. 256-59. This writer makes a good point: "Despite their historical conviction, widespread participation is not peculiar to democracy. Even greater emphasis is placed upon participation by the modern mass dictatorships, both Communist and Fascist. Their desire to involve every citizen in political aiTair is evident not only in their efforts to achieve unanimous voting in elections but also in then" organisation of the masses into an elaborate network of youth groups, mass parties, trade unions, people's councils, cooperatives, recreational and cultural societies, study circles, conferences rallies, demonstrations and staged mass demonstrations." Ibid., p. 253.302
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1. Social Environment: The magnitude of political participation in a country should be studied in the light of education, occupation age, race, sex, mobility, domicile etc. These are the variables correlated to the degree of political participation in a country. Thus, we may take note of the wider political participation in a country like Britain and the United States where the educational and occupational levels of the people are very high, political participation is not restricted on the basis of religion, creed, sex and the like, and, above all, the element of political indifference, anomic disturbances and use of violence are very rare.
2. Psychological Environment: Participation also occurs by virtue of its capacity to provide rewards for those who engage in it. Here important variables are need for power, competition, achievement, affiliation, aggregation, money, prestige, status, recognition, approach, manipulation, sympathy, responsibility or virtually every need that impels human behaviour. People, in general, are peace-loving. But they resort to use of violence or other kinds of agitational politics when their patience is unduly taxed by the rulers of the country, or when they find that the operation of the political system is not upto their expectations.
3. Political Environment: Here we may refer to other variables as size, remoteness and complexity of modern political systems, frequency of elections, number of offices to be tilled, tenure of office, levels of administration (national, provincial, regional, local), number of political parties and other brokerage agencies and the like. To put the variables in the reverse order, we may say that political participation is allectcd by hurdles like cumbersome registration procedures, literacy tests, poll taxes, residence requirement, inadequate provisions for absentee voting, inaccessibility of polling places and some 'situational factors' like war, external aggression, and serious disturbances in the country or abroad.
Levels: It is true that people participate in the political process of their country, but the level of participation varies from place to place, time to time, and fr in one section of the people to another.7" We
70. Milbrath suggests that political participation varies in relation to four major factors—the extent to which the individual receives politic.il stimuli, individual's personal characteristics, individual's social characteristics, and political setting or environment in which the individual finds himself. Political Participation, Chapter 2.
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may highlight the following important levels of political participation:
1. Very Active Level: Here we may refer to the leaders holding high positions in the legislative and administrative spheres; they are concerned with the exercise of formal political power. In other words, they are the repositories of power. Most of the leaders belonging to this category have their place in the political parties that play their role in political mobilisation, or in organisations through which members of the society may participate in certain types of political activities involving the defence or promotion of particular ideas, positions, situations, persons or groups through the political system. So we may throw focus on the interest groups which seek to promote, defend or represent limited or specific attitudes.
2. Occasionally Active: Here we may refer to a case where people take part in the political process of their country occasionally as well as in an informal manner. It is possible that people take interest in issues as per their social and economic interests. For instance, the agriculturists would jump into the fray of politics when the government takes a decision going against their interests, others would not. It is also true that voting is the commonest form of political participation, but a fairly large section of the people refrains from voting either because of 'electoral fatigue' (as happens in Switzerland), or because of some other reason like terror, apathy, non-existence of a burning public issue etc.
3. Inactive Level: The inactive level of political participation reveals the elements of apathy, alienation, anomie and violence. All these smack of the state of non-involvement or very limited involvement in the political process of the country. It is likely that the people in very large numbers donot vote because of their impressions about futility of such an exercise, or it may be that they find more satisfaction in keeping themselves away from the political process than being an active participant in it, or it may be that the events of anomic disturbances frighten them to a very great extent.
It is true that the above factors may cause the levels of political participation to vary, but it must also be kept in mind that the over-all scale of participation for a given country and in a given era tends to remain fairly stable and that the changes in the scales of participation from one election to another are usually small. It suggests that the304
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broad social and psychological predispositions set severe limitations on the role of political and sjtuational elements.71
Antitheses of Political Participation: The concept of political socialisation has its antitheses in the forms of political apathy, cynicism, alienation, anomie and violence. Apathy may be defined as lack of interest in or lack of concern for persons, situations or phenomena in general or in particular. In the sphere of political participation, the most important trait of the apathetic individual is his passivity or abstention from political activity. It may be due to three reasons.72 First, it is the perceived consequence of political activity. The individual may feel that his political activity might invite a threat to his life, or it might alienate his friends and supporters, or it might devalue his personality and the like. Second, the individual may regard a particular activity as futile. Third, the individual may feel that the matter before him is not very interesting, or that it might not yield any desired result or so. In sum, political participation is perceived as utterly inappropriate to the personal and material needs of the individual."73
Now we may look into the factor of cynicism. It involves relative passivity and inactivity. It may be denned as being 'contemptuously distrustful of human nature' and by means of an attitude scale designed to measure the degree to which their respondents were cynical, both personally and politically, they sought to relate cynicism to various aspects of political behaviour.71 "Cynicism, then, is the feeling that the actions and motives of others are to be regarded with suspicion, that pessimism is more realistic than optimism, and that the individual must look after his own interests, because society is basically self-centred. Politically cynicism manifests itself in a variety of ways; that politics is a dirty business, that politicians arc not to be trusted, that the individual is at the mercy of the manipulating groups, that real power is exercised by 'faceless men', and so on.7-7"
71. David E. Apter refers to some other factors like spatial relationships-clusters of locational groups in neighbourhoods, towns, districts, provinces, regions, states, and national units—affect participation, political support, and authority and its existence differently. An Introduction to Political Analysis, p. 345.
72. Morris Rosenberg: "Some Determinants of Political Apathy" in Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1954, pp. 34 66.
73. Rush and Altholl". op. cit., p. 92. , '{'.'■
74. R.H. Agger, M.N. Goldstein and S.V. Pearl: "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning" \n Journal of Politics, Vol. 23, 1961, pp. 477-506^
75. Rush and Althoff, op. cit., p. 92.
Then, we may briefly refer to other factors like alienation and anomie. While alienation (as we shall see later in detail) is a personal sense of estrangement from the matters of politics and administration for the reason of their being run by a set of unfair rules,76 anomie (a term coined and popularised by Emile Durkheim of France's signifies 'a sense of value loss and lack of direction'in which the individual experiences a feeling of ineffectiveness and that the 'authority does'nt care', resulting in the devaluation of his goals and the loss of urgency to act'.77 All these four factors indicate the fact of non-involvement, or very limited involvement, of the people in the political process of the country and though one may discover the lines of distinctions in^tieir basic implications, it is certain that all have the common direction of creat;ng violence for political ends.7"
The factors of apathy, alienation, cynicism and anomie play a negative, rather destructive, part in the sphere of political participation. It is quite menacing as is evident from the arguments of McClosky:7a
1. Those who fail to participate are not properly represented. Government is thereby deprived of its broadest possible assessment and the benefit of whatever these non-participants have learned from their experience.
2. Widespread apathy increases the chances- tha-t government will be dominated by men who are unresponsive, self-aggrandising and unscrupulous; participation, on the other hand,
i
76. Robert Lane: Political Ideology, p. 111.
77. Robert Lane: Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics, pp. 166-69. '
78. Rush and Althoff say that it "is important, however, to make the disti x-tion between apathy, cynicism, alienation and anomie clear. Defined simply, apathy is lack of interest, cynicism is an attitude of distaste and estrangement, while alienation an&pnomie both involve a feeling of estrangement or divorce from society, but where alienation is characterised by hostility, anomie is characterised by bewilderment. The available evidence suggusts that the totally apathetic are, at the very least, cynical and more often alienated or anomie. Apathy, cynicism, alienation and anomie, however, are all matters of degree and may, therefore, affect not only those who shun all forms of participation, but those who are involved in political activity. Relative degrees of apathy, cynicism, alienation and anomie may account for non-participation at the higher levels of political participation while not precluding activity at lower levels of the hierarchy. However, alienation, far from t. king a passive form, may result in considerable political activity, particularly that involving violent political action." Op. cit, p. 97.
79. McClosky, op. cit., p. 263
1
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reminds those who govern that they "must attend to their duties and serve the electorate. Wherever apathy prevails, it becomes more difficult to organise and maintain a political opposition—an essential ingredient of the defence against tyranny and the abuse of political power.
3. Even if the opinions of the non- participants are presently ill-informed, there is no better way to improve the quality of their judgment than by the experience of participation. In the course of participating, one is impelled to acquire the knowledge needed for a sound judgment to become aware of one's best interests, to learn how the system works and what principles and beliefs it values.
4, Apathy is a symptom as well as a cause of weaknesses in the system. It signifies a failure to involve all members of the society in their own governance, or failure to inspire interest and loyalty. Such failures may be dangerous to democracy, for whenever a large number of people exist outside the normal channels of politics and are enabled to shape their lives, the political atmosphere becomes potentially exclusive.
Such an assumption of McClosky may be correct to some extent, but we may also refer to the views of some sociologists like Robert Lane and J.L, Walker who are not in agreement with dangers arising from the state of political apathy. Their arguments are:80
1. Little is gained and something may be lost by encouraging the involvement of men and women who are politically uninformed and uninterested. Such people are likely to misperceive their own and society's best interests. They are likely to have the poorest understanding of the requirements of a democratic system (civil liberties, tolerance of non-conformity etc.) and are most susceptible to misleading propaganda and the appeals of popular but inappropriate leaders. Encouraging them to participate may actually cause harm to democratic government.
2. To insist that all must participate because all are affected by politics is to substitute piety for judgment. Little is granted merely by increasing the number of voters. Political activity may be addressed to undesirable as well as desirable ends. Voting may be had to elect a Hitler as well as a Roosevelt or a Churchill. In a democracy, moreover, a citizen has the right
80. Ibid., pp. 262-63.
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to disdain if he chooses. Better apathy'than heedless participation.
3. Since even under optimal conditions the great mass of the electorate can never possess the awareness the complex political judgments now demand, the business of politics might better be turned over to those active minorities who by virtue of their interest, knowledge and judgment, have shown that they are capable of governing in a democracy.'
4. Widespread political activity, while desirable in some respects, also carries disadvantages. A too active electorate may impede those who rule from making decisions they are best qualified to make. A highly politicised electorate may lead to excessive controversy, fragmentation and instability.
Opinions may differ on the point touched above,, but it remains to be added that political participation is a universal phenomenon and one may draw a degree of difference in making a comparative study of political systems of the world. More important than this, it remains to be added that if the level of under-participation is undesirable, so is the case with the proposal of over-participation in political sphere. To claim that more participation is always preferable is to blind oneself to the possible disadvantages of enlarging participation under certain circumstances.... Nothing is to be gained by converting participation into either a fetish or a taboo."81
Political Recruitment
Meaning : Political recruitment looks like a corollary to the concept of political participation in its own way. It "refers to institutional processes by which political jobs beyond the citizenship level are rilled. Political careers are patterns of incumbency in these political offices and roles. Subjective career perspectives are moving vantage points from which men in politics, whether treating public affairs as calling or as a vocation, appraise their duties and opportunities."8'2
81. Ibid., p 263. The apathetic's characteristics—inability to recognise personal responsibility or to examine—or even to accept—his own emotions and feelings; vague, incomprehensible feelings of worry, insecurity and threat: complete,, unchallenging acceptance of constituted authority (social codes, parents, religion) and conventional values form a self-consistent pattern which, in a clinical situation, would be labelled passivity." P.H. Mussen and A.B. Wyszynski: "Personality and Political Participation" in Human Research, Vol. 5, 1952, pp. 78-79.
82. Dwaine Marvick: "Political Recruitment and Career" in David I Sills (ed.): International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, p. 277.30;'.
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In other words, it "is the process by which individuals secure, or are enlisted in the roles of the office-holders in a formal or informal manner. That is, the individuals may be recruited openly by means of institutional machinery of selection or election, or they may be recruited privately with little or no recourse to such machinery.83 institutions use a variety of devices to fill jobs as :"
i. Through cooptcition. equals augment their ranks or sustain their numbers.
2. By mobilisation, supporters are rallied to perform basic tasks in organised efforts to 'act out' their contributions.
3. Through appointment, a key figure designation subordinates to hold office or dicharge tasks.
4. The election elevates a man to act as spokesman, leader or representative for the 'legally defined electorate that chooses him.
5. The systems of lot and rotation are deliberately arbitrary methods for securing incumbents for specialised roles from among a group of presumed peers.
6. The apprenticeship and examinations, both formal and informal, often precede incumbency in political jobs.
In short, recruitment is a two-way process in that the individuals may themselves seek the desired opportunity to hold some office (as happens in most of the cases), or they may be approached by others to become the holders cf such po-itions. But the essential fact stands out that the proportion of individuals in any given society, who are active at the highest level of political participation, "constitute only any minority of the total population.'"^
Methods of Recruitment : if our concern is with the holding of political and administrative offices, we may look into their different methods as available in different political systems of the world. These
are : 1.
Entitlement by Hereditary Claim : It applies to the case of a monarchical system where the king (or queen) is chosen according to the principle of heredity. When a monarch dies or abdicates, tne office goes to his child or to some other member of the royal household according to the law of primogeniture. To cite some instances, we may refer to the
83. Rush and Althoff, Op. rit., p. 14.
84. Marvick, cp. cil , p, 277.
85. Rush and Althoff, Op. ci!., p. 115.
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monarchical systems of Britain, Nepal, Japan, Saudi Arabia etc. The eldest son of an English peer gets membership of the House of Lords after the death of his father.
2. Ejection : It is the most widely appreciated system prevailing in democratic countries of the world. The head of the state (President) and the head of the government (Prime Minister i are elected by the people. The methods of election may be direct or indirect. For instance, the Presidents of the USA and France are elected by the people, but the seven presidents (ministers) of Switzerland are elected by the Federal Assembly in a joint session for a term of four years. So is the case with the legislators. Political leaders manage to win elections so as to get seats in the legislature. In communist countries even judicial offices are filled by the election process.
3. Nomination: Some offices of the state may be filled by means of nominations. For instance, the American President appoints his ministers and federal judges whose names are ratified by the Senate. The Governor-General of Canada nominates members for the upper chamber of the Parliament. (Senate). The President of India may make 12 nominations in the Rajya Sabha. The Prime Minister may also advise the head of the state to appoint an eminent person as a minister and subsequently he may get a seat in the Parliament either by election or by nomination. It may also be done to give representation in the parliament to a very small community. For instance, the President of India may nominate two members of the Anglo-Indian community in the Lok Sabha and the Governor of a State may nominate one member of this community in the Legislative Assembly.
4. Selection: It applies generally to administrative posts where public servants are recruited on the grounds of their merit. It may be done by means of direct personality test, or on the basis of results of a competitive examination. In order to avoid the chances of 'spoils', it is also necessary that this work of recruiting public servants should be entrusted to a civil service commission having men of great integrity and efficiency. It is also necessary that the persons recruited by such autonomous bodies should be given promotions from time to time on the basis of seniority as well as efficiency, but (as happens in most of the democratic countries) they should observe the principle of 'neutrality' in political matters. The public servants should act faithfully and honestly310
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without involving themselves into political controversies.
5. Unconstitutional Means : In some exceptional situations,
political offices may be grabbed by means of force or fraud,
by purchase, or by mobilisation. For instance, President Ayub
Khan of Pakistan captured power in a military coup in 1958.
It is said that a person with big money power may manage to
get seat in the American Senate. In 1922 Mussolini could grab
power in Italy by means of the mobilisation of his followers
in Grand March to Rome in the uniform of black shirts.
Political Recruitment and Elite Theorists: Elite theorists like Mosca
and Pareto lay stress on the point that whatever may be the system of
recruitment to political offices, it is the members of the elite who get
the lion's share. All appointments and nominations to fill various
offices are recommended and accomplished by powerful elites and
their declaration by the head of the state is just a matter of formality.
To Marx and his followers, it appears that all offices are shared by
men belonging to the 'dominant class' of the society. It implies that if
all important political and administrative offices are in the hands of
the bourgeois class in a bourgeois society, these would be grabbed by
the men of the working class after the occurrence of a successful
socialist revolution. It is also possible that the new order under some
Lenin or Mao may deprive a certain section of the people of the
very right to vote, to be elected, or have any political office of the
state on the charge of being reactionary or counter-revolutionary
elements.
T.B. Bottomore suggests that it is possible to identify various elites as 'groups which have high status' (for whatever reason) in a society; a political class consisting of 'all those groups which exercise political power or influence, and are directly engaged in struggles for political leadership' and a political elite, comprising 'those individuals who actually exercise power at any given time.' This having been done, "we can attempt to distinguish between societies in which there is a ruling class and, at the same time, elites which represent particular aspects of its interests; societies in which there is no ruling class, but a political elite which founds its power upon the control of the administration, or upon military force, rather than on property ownership and inheritance; and societies in which there exists a multiplicity of elites among which no cohensive and enduring group of powerful individuals or families seems to be discoverable at all.8* "However, such an affirmation is untenable on the ground that the holders of political and administrative offices are frequently drawn 86. Bottomore: Elites and Society, p. 14.
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from particular social groups in society; nor is it difficult to demonstrate that the members of these groups have common interest^ by virtue of belonging to their respective groups; but it is an entirely different matter to show that these groups are conscious of those interests and act cohesively in response to them. This is not to say that political elites or ruling classes do not exist in the sense that those who wield power may be drawn from particular segments of society, but merely to question why they exist."37
One thing may, however, be added in the end. While the concepts of political sociology as political development, political modernisation, political culture, political socialisation, political participation and political alienation have been analysed in detail by social theorists to the extent that some political theories have been built on them, the case of political recruitment is the weakest. So far no political theorj on this theme has emerged in a full and convincing form.8' Some studies as those of Philip Buck and Kenneth Prewitt have not come upto the standard. Not much'success has been achieved by the new writers in this direction by applying the law of demand and supply tc elaborate the phenomenon of contestants forming the side of supply and their selectors or recruiters displaying the side of demand in th« whole struggle for power.89 Towards a theory of political recruitment much remains to be done in this area of political recruitment,90
Political Alienation
Meaning: As a matter of fact, the term 'alienation' has its parti cular application in the disciplines of philosophy, psychology ant sociology. But as modern political theory has sought to borrow rnucl from other sister-disciplines, concepts like those of political socialisa tion, political acculturation and political alienation have come t< assume an importance of their own in this realm. The word 'aliena tion' means aloofness, estrangement, apathy, indifference, turning o keeping away, cutting off and the like from something or somebod; whether, soeiety, religion, administration, even the self. As general!; understood in social sciences, according to Kurt Lang, it "denotes ai estrangement or separation between parts of the whole personaiit; and significant aspects of the world of experience. Within this genera
87. ibid-, P. 44.
88. Rush and Althoff, op. cit., p. 152.
89. See Buck: Amateurs and Professionals in British Politics, pp. 67-69; and Kenneth Prewitt: "Political Socialisation and Leadership Selection" in The Annals, 361, September, 1965, pp. 96-111.
90. Rush and Althoff, op. cit., p. 158.312
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denotation, it may refer to (a) an objective state of enstrangerrent or separation, (b) the state of feeling of the estranged personality, (c) motivational state tending towards estrangement. The separation denoted by the term may be between (a) the self and the objective world, {b) the self .;nd the aspects of the self that have become separated and placed over against the self, e.g., alienated labour, (c) the self and the self.""1
The vvord.alienation has its own place in the fields of various social sciences as we may take note of:
1. In the realm of phvosophv (as taken by Hegel and Feuerbach), it lays stress on man's estrangement from 'religion' and the 'role of spirit'.
2. In the realm of psychology (as taken by Freud and Weber), it / sntacks of the sense of helplessness, hatred of the self and
others, a feeling that man is without his recognition as a man.
3. In the field of sociology (as taken by Simmel and Persons), its implications range from the pole of estrangement to that of 'reification'. It means man's separation from the society, from what he himself produces and even from his ownself.
4. In the realm of economics (as taken by Marx and Engels). it signifies man's estrangement from what he produces by his own labour and in stead the creation of his enemy in the form of a capitalist by his own labour power.
5. In the field of politics (as taken by Sartre and Camus), it throws hight on the fact of disaffection of the people with the present system that inheres the potentalities of a civil war or a revolution in the form of people's accumulated anger towards the rulers of their state.
It is obvious that now the term 'alienation' is used extensively in sociology, psychology, literature, economics, philosophy and politics. It has become a bianket word to describe every conceivable aspect of cultural fragmentation, social isolation, economic exploitation, philosophical abstraction, political non-existence and the like.
But in the field of politics, the term 'alienation' has some important implications that may be summed up as under:92
1. It indicates a feeling of political powerlessness or helplessness of the people. That is, they may feel that the political process
91. See Julius Gould and William K. Kolb (ed.s): A Dictionary of Social Sciences, p. 19.
92. A.W. Finifter: "Dimensions of Political Alienation" in American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, June, 1970, No. 2, pp. 390-91.
3NCEPTS OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY ?! 3
of their country is not subject to their control or influence and, as such, they cannot be effective participants in the working of their political system.
2 It refers to the rejection of political norms and values :-Jid goals that are widely shared and held by other members of the society.
3. It may indicate that the norms and rules intended to govern political relations have broken down and the departures from common or accepted behaviour have become a common affair
4. It hints at a situation when people feel that political choices open to them are quite meaningless, because they cannot establish a reconciliation between what they expect and what they get from the government in the form of official policies and actions.
5. The conditions of public life may bS so much distorted that citizens feel like self-estranged even when they plav a role in the political process of the country.
Marxian View: Alienation has a very significant place in the sociology of Marx. Hegel discussed this term from a metaphysical angle and discovered the source of alienation in man's running away from the force of religion or spirit (God). But Marx finds the cause of alienation in the prevailing mode of production and distribution ofv goods. It is the system of capitalism that constitutes the alienation of human labour, for capital dominates completely the worker as a labourer and also as a man. Alienation occurs only when man, having externalised himself in nature and society, finds his activity, his 'essence' operating on him as an external, alien and oppressive power."95
While condemning the capitalist system, Marx says that it "alienates man essentially from his own activity, from the product of his labour, thus turning labour's product into an alien object; the more he works, the more he finds himself dominated by the world of objects his own labour has created. The worker puts his life into the object, and his life then belongs no longer to himself but to the object. The greater his activity... the less his processes. What is embodied in the, product of his labour is no longer his own. The greater this product is... the more is he diminished."94 In simple words, under capitalism the work process invariably leads to alienation. In this connection, two main conditions may be referred to:
93. A. Swingewood: Marx and Modern Social Theory, p. 93. ^4. Marx: Early Writings, pp. 123-24.314
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315
i '
to
1. The worker who has sold labour power to the capitalist is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object; it exists outside him independently as something alien to him. His labour creates the alien and hostile social power of capitalism.
2. Alienation is found in the act of production within the labour process. The worker is unable to work creatively. His work is not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. On the one hand, the ownership and control of the work process are vested in the capitalist, who decides what is to be produced, how much, and in what way, as well as the disposal of the pr6duct. On the other hand, the technical exigencies of the work process, the subordination of the workers to the machine, and the division of labour mean that he cannot engage in life activity.
In both ways, man is alienated from his species being his essential nature. It itself logically entails that each man is alienated from every other man and this for Marx is reflected in the political economist's conception of civil society.95
The Marxian theory of alienation has been attacked on two grounds. First, the philosophical concept of alienation, as taken by Marx and his followers, is too vague and metaphysical to perform the explanatory function which he tries to assign it. The system of capitalism is not as bad as he thinks and if capitalist system creates an alienated man, the socialist system of economy (as prevailing in the USSR) is worse than that.96 Second, the assumption that this unfortunate state of alienation would go in the final phase of socialism (communism) is Utopian. Marx wrongly presumes that the final stage of social development would create a fully emancipated man. A basically empirical concept of alienation takes a normative turn at the hands of Marx. Moreover, the whole idea of alienation takes a deterministic form that militates against the fundamental law of historical materialism. Thus, Marx's humanist conception of alienation is one-directional and deterministic, more philosophical and speculative than sociological and concretely historical."97
Neo-Marxian View: The neo-Marxists of the present century have given their own interpretations in this direction. Herbert Marcuse says
95. Michael Evans: Karl Marx, pp. 92-93.
96. B. Oilman: Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in a Capitalist Society, pp. 135-36.
97. Swingewood: Marx and Modern Social Theory, p. 96.
that throughout the world of industrial civilisation, the dominance of man by man is growing in scope and efficiency. For the vast majority of the people, the scope and mode of satisfaction are determined by their own labour, but their labour is mere work for an apparatus which they donot control, operates as an independent power to which individuals must submit if they want to survive. In his words: " Men donot live their own lives, but perform pre-established functions. While they work, they donot fulfil their needs and faculties, but work in alienation."93 Obviously, such a view demonstrates the fact that man does not realise himself in his labour; that his life has become an instrument of labour; and that his work and its products have assumed a form and power independent of him as an individual. Unlike Marx, he envisages the transformation of labour into pleasure as the solution, to the problem of alienation. He believes that this can be achieved only by complete change in social institutions, a distribution of social product according to the need, the assignment of functions according to talent, and the provision of attracted labour."99
George Simmel throws focus on the evil of the system of division of labour that draws a wedge between a producer and the thing produced by him. The significance attached to the 'over-specialised' functional performance makes a man a mere cog in the enormous organisation of things of powers which tear from his hands all progress, spirituality and value in order to transform them from a subjective form into the form of a purely objective life. He regrets over the developments of'rationalised technology' that makes man like an alienated creature. The objects which belong to man as a part and parcel of his 'cultural development' attain a fetishistic character as objects independent of man, becoming more and more linked to each other in a self-contained world which has increasingly fewer contacts with the subjective psyche and its desires and sensibilities."10"
However, a very candid expression of alienation should be seen in the theory of existentialism where it is identified with 'inauthentic life'. A leading light of this theory like Jean Paul Sartre of France says: "The worker exhausts himself in producing a car and in earning enough to buy one; the acquisition gives him the impression of having satisfied a 'need'. The system which exploits him provides him simultaneously with a goal and with the possibility of reaching it. The
98. Marcuse: One-Dimensionil Man, p. 32. Also see Marcuse: Eros and Civilisation, p. 35.
99. B.K. Jha: "Marxism and the New Left" in the Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4. 1978, p. 545.
100. See L. Coser: "Introduction" in his (ed.): George Simmel.316
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consciousness of the intolerable character of the system must, therefore, no longer be sought in the impossibility of satisfying elernentarv needs but above all else in the consciousness of alienation—in other words, in the fact that this life is not worth living and has no meaning, that this mechanism is a deceptive mechanism, that these needs are artificially created, that they are false, that they are exhausting and only serve profit."11-1 Other existentialists like Albeit Camus hit at the fact of loss of individuality of man. They insist that man should lead a really free and meaningful life that is free from exploitation and anguish of any kind.
The concept of political alienation hits at the character of modern, as a matter of fact thoroughly materialistic, way of life that has destroyed the fact of 'individuality', the most prized possession of man. Marx discovered its cause in the bourgeois system itself that dehumanises man and its final solution in the socialist system; to the neo-Marxists the cause may be discovered in the present capitalist system. But its solution cannot be found in the socialist system of the Russian model that is another name for a closed society. No doubt, the present system is based on the exploitation of man that has placed him in a state of mental and spiritual agony and taken away the real charm of his individuality. But the solution offered by the social theorists as Marx's era of emancipated humanity' in the final stage of socialism, or the future society without classes and state as conceived by the Anarchists is nothing but a pleasant dream of a poet or a grand hope of a philosopher.
Political Communication
Meaning: The term 'communication' refers to a body of basic concepts underlying several contemporary approaches to human behaviour - including the interaction of nation-states.102 This term may be used in both narrow or specific and wider or general senses depending on its use or application by a student of natural of social sciences. As used by a mathematician like Weaver, it includes all the processes by which one mind may affect another.103 Another writer belonging to the same discipline, while developing his theory of messages, used the word 'cybernetics' which he derived from the Greek word kubemetes meaning in English 'steersman,' the same word
101. Sartre: Between Existentialism and Marxism, pp. 124-25.
102. R.C. North: "The Analytical Prospects of Communication Theory" in J.C. Charlesworth (ed.): Contemporary Political Analysis, p. 300.
103. C.E. Shannon and W. Weaver: The Mathematical Theory of Communication, p. 95.
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from which 'governor' derives.104 Used in a wider sense, the term "communication' involves not only oral speech but all human behaviour. In an even broader sense, it may be Used with reference to the ways in which the physical environment excites signals in the central nervous system—together with the ways in which the human being operates upon the physical environment. In these terms, the organism aiiects the environment and the environment affects the organism.10'
it is for this reason that the approach of'political communication' is also known by the name of 'political cybernetics.' As developed by Wiener and others, cybernetics is fundamentally "a body of theory and technique for the study of probabilities in different but analogous universes such as certain types of machines, animals, individual human beings, societies and nation-states—and the ways in which message transactions function to control such universes."106 W. Ross Ashby, who is regarded as the pioneer of this approach, refers to cybernetics as the study of all possible machines, the word 'machine' being construed to include men and animals as well as inanimate systems. Thus, really speaking, cybernetics has its place in the natural sciences in vievv of the fact that it "is a theory of information self-regulating machines, computers and the physiology of the nervous system."107
The term 'communication' has a different connotation when it is used in the context of 'political cybernetics.' Here it consists of (i) a model drawn from the information theory and cybernetics, (ii) a theory of communication nets, and (Hi) a set of propositions partially derived from other theoretical areas such as democratic theory, organisation theory and decision theory, about the characteristics and effects of communications and their media on attitude change, public opinion formation, voting behaviour, maintenance and stability of a political system, consensus, coercion, political socialisation, political development, perception and ideology."108
104. North, op. cit., p. 300.
105. Ashby: Design for a Brain, p. 87.
106. Norbert Wiener: The Human Uses of Human Beings, p. 15.
107. S.L. Wasby: Political Science, p. 142.
103. Ibid., According to Rush and AlthofT, "Political communication is the process -by which politically relevant information is transmitted from one part of-the political system to another, and between the social and political systems. It is a continuous process involving th^ exchange ~of information between individuals and groups of individuals at all levels of society, and includes not only the expression of tne views and wishes of members of society but also the means by which the views and proposals of those in power are transmitted to society and the latter's reaction to those views, and proposals." Op. cit., p. 14.318
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Thus, according to this approach, politics and government appear in essence as processes of steering and coordinating human efforts towards the attainment of some set of goals."109 In this framework, we refer to the basic mechanism through which these processes manifest themselves in the decision. Hence, this approach may be taken as analogous to and also different from the decision-making approach, since it devotes particular attention to the process of making decisions as contrasted with the actual consequence of decisions.110 It leads to two orientations. First, it empahsises at all points problems of dynamics and of the various information flows attendant upon communications and decision-making. Therefore, the information flow constitutes the basic unit of analysis. The actual flow arises from the movement of the bits of information through the relevant system. Second, there are various structures that shape this flow of information with important consequences for the resultant decision."111
Political Communication and Political System: The study of political communication approach is, therefore, integrally related to the study of political systems. It is the communication that gives dynamism to political system. As a result, we have to make a study of political communication in the same way as we study political system as a whole, i.e., in terms of the interpenetration and reciprocal influences between structures and behaviour. Such a study, therefore, raises three salient questions. First, what consequences follow from the general principle that the study of communication is truly the study of dynamics of the political system? Second, what is the nature and characteristics of these processes and structures of communication in various types of societies, and what is the relationship, between these processes and structures? Third, what are the effects of these structures and processes on the communication levels of a given polity? This approach, as taken by Karl Deutsch, may be said to have three main characteristics:112
1. It no longer seeks power as the key variable in the explanation of the political phenomenon. Power is neither the centre nor the essence of politics. In stead the essence of politics becomes the dependable coordination of human efforts and
109. O.R. Young: Systems of Political Science, p. 50.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. See R.L. Tooze: "Communications Theory" in Trevor Taylor (ed.): Approaches and Theory in International Relations, p. 218*
CONCEPT OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
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expectations for the attainment of the goals of the society.
2. There is a strong emphasis on the empirical nature of the concepts. The attempt is to operationalise each concept through measurement and mapping.
3. Such an approach is relevant to the organisations of people of any size, whether government or groups and also interactions between them.
But Young suggests its four characteristics as:113
1. It is certainly related to an emphasis on decision-making as a process rather than on the results of decisions. It tends to focus on the flows of information and on the forms of various structures rather than on the substance of either.
2. It deals quite explicitly with various processes and dynamic movements so that it is quite well equipped to handle questions concerning change.
3. It is also attuned to the problem of evolutionary change, a fact which gives its real advantage to some areas of political analysis. Decision-making operations are likely to transform themselves completely over time in response to their own activities.
4. It throws its focus primarily on the problems of keeping systems going on and on the various processes of adaptation that can be utilised to meet destabilising forces.
In this way, communication approach "plays a a crucial role in the political system; it constitutes its dynamic element and is a vital part of political socialisation, participation and recruitment."114
Case of Democratic Versus Totalitarian Systems: According to Karl Deustch, political communication—the transmission of politically relevant information from one part of the political system to another, and between the social and political systems—is the dynamic element of a political system and the processes of political socialisation, political participation and political recruitment are dependent upon it.115 Each political system develops its own network of political communication and the significance of particular sources, channels and audiences will differ accordingly. We may also take note of the fact that the memberships of political and quasi-political organisations may involve the individual only intermittent political communi-
113. Young, op. cit., pp. j'6-58.
114. Rush and Althoff, op. cit., p. 14.
115. Karl Deutsch: tte Nerves of Government.320
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cation but the more active participants are involved in more frequent communication in which information is passed vertically from them tc those holding higher positions in the hierarchy of participation anu horizontally between members of the same organisation and between organisations."11"
But in a study of this kind we may distinguish between demo-craiic and totalita'ian systems. A democratic system is 'open' and so in it the flow of messages is unrestricted The prc; s, the radio, the television and other means of communication have a free role with the result that 'feedback' mechanism plays a positive part. The people know about their decision-makers; they also know about the pressures thai bear upon this end. The 'inputs' and the 'outputs' are connected through the mechanism of 'feedback.' There is hardly any censorship on the dissemination of news and views with the result that to keep an important decision a 'secret' for long is almost £in impossibility. Moreover, when the implications of a 'secret decision' are made public, the criticism entails heavier consequences. Thus, in open systems decisions taken by authorities art given to public knowledge, unless some decision is of a very crucial nature. It is a different thing that the bureaucrats are required to maintain secrecy of governmental matters, otherwise they may be penalised under the official secrets act.
But different is the case of a totalitarian system A-here the state lias strict censorship over the dissemination of the news. It is nick-nan ed as the existence of an 'iron curtain' there. It may be seen' in there directions—monopoly (as far as possible) by the authorities of all means of communication; concentration on the belief vhat a massage was more effective if it was simple and constantly repeated, and reinforcement or the use of all channels for the same me/ssage at the same time. It may, however, be added here that total suppression of the news is impossible in a political system. The existence of an 'iron curtain' has virtually been substituted by the existence of a 'bamboo curtain.' Even the top secret decisions of the government are leaked that leads to serious consequences. The press and other mass media agencies play their part in the totalitarian countries, but the f'ow of information is uni-directional. Meaningful implications may be drawn out of such uni-directional flow of information that is taken -,, propaganda' in which the authorities of the state are themselves involved. The whole case of communication in a totalitarian country is thus summed up by a student of public opinion: "Both the system
1K-. Rush and Althoff, op. cit., p. 165.
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fof communication and the control apparatus are oriented towards a single goal. They must serve as instruments through which the party and government mobilise the mind and will of the population; they must see to it that what ought to be done is done, what should be thought and felt is thought and felt."117
The communication approach to the study of politics may be criticised for some reasons. First, it establishes a wrong analogy between human associations like government and numerous associations on the one hand and a machine on the other. That is, it elaborates an essentially engineering and mechanistic orientation towards human behaviour. Nor can social system be identified with a natural system. Second, it is true that social sciences are concerned with systems that are 'steered,' it is also important to note that a cybernetic model is a very general, abstract one, and its principal concepts may acquire different meanings according to particular system to which [hey are applied, be it a computer, an irrigation system, the human Drain or society. Above all, the whole approach looks like 'biased' vhen we find its advocates revealing their impressions in a way so as |to laud their 'democratic' systems and undermining other systems sn the charge of being 'closed.' The fact is that no system of the vorld is now fully closed and that each system has its own strong and weak points.
Inkeies: Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, p. 317.POLITICAL POWER, ITS OPERATION AND JUSTIFICATION
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111
POLITICAL POWER, ITS OPERATION AND JUSTIFICATION
At the present day we are better able to recognise the important role of ideologies in social change, because we have the experience oflhe achievements of Marxism ...as an ideology which powerfully assists rapid industrialisation and, on the other hand, of the retarding influence of traditional creeds in such under-developed countries as India.
—T.B. Bottomore1
In the preceding chapter we have briefly discussed some important concepts of political sociology. But a discussion of some more topics remains to be done. Political power is one of them; ?it is the central theme of political ideology. Though democracy implying power in the hands of the people is universally recognised as the best form of government, relevance of the 'iron law of oligarchy' of Michels cannot be thoroughly refuted by a student of empirical politics. It shows that, in actual practice, power in the hands of a small group or elite rule is a universal fact. If so, the fact of minority rule in contradistinction to the rule of the majority creates the issue of political legitimacy and effectiveness. Hence, in this chapter an attempt has been made to discuss these important and related concepts. However, all these concepts should be taken as inter-related in the light of this interpretation that power may be captured and maintained according to certain action-oriented ideas (ideology) and only on that basis the ruling minority (elites) may justify the legitimacy and effectiveness of its rule. Today the crucial point of debate is democracy versus totalitarianism. The entire discussion is centred on this issue that "political ideas are, then, the theories and doctrines about how institutions are, can, and should be worked."2
Political Power
Ever since the Leviathan of Hobbes appeared in 1651, the concept of power in the realm of national and international politics has
1. Bottomore: Elites and Society, p. 28.
2. Bernard Crick: "The Tendency of Political Studies" in New Society (November, 1966), p. 683.
become a momentous subject of investigation so much so that now it js regarded as the key area of fundamental research. Curiously, it is so jn spite of the ; fact that the real meaning of this term has been a matter of controversy on account of its social, economic, political, psychological arid metaphysical ramifications. Recently the idea of power has assumed an importance of its own in the realm of political theory. The reason for this should be traced in the fact that the meaning of politics has now changed from one of being 'a study of state and government' to that of being a 'study of power'. As Curtis says: "Politics is organised dispute about power and its use, involving choice among competing values, ideas, persons, interests and demands. The study of politics is concerned with the description and analysis of the manner in which power is obtained, exercised, and controlled, and the purpose for which it is used, the manner in which decisions are made, the factors which influence the making of those decisions, and the context in which those decisions take place."3
Meaning: The problem of defining the term 'power' in a quite precise manner arises from the fact that different writers have taken different views about it. The result is that its real meaning seems to range from Friedrich's description of it as'a certain kind of human relationship'4 to Tawney's emphasis on the identification of power with the capacity of an individual or a group of individuals to modify the conduct of others in the manner which one desires.'5 Not merely this, while a great political thinker like Hobbes identifies power with some 'future apparent good', a modern psycho-analyst like Harold Lasswell likens it with 'influence'. We also 'find that while a great communist leader like Mao of China says that 'power flows from the barrel of a gun', an apostle of peace, truth and non-violence like Mahatma Gandhi substitutes the force of gun and bomb with the power of love and truth emanating from the hearts of the people.
The sourge of difficulty lies in the fact that the word 'power' is used in different senses. Power is ascribed to different things on different grounds. For instance, we speak of horse power, power of ideas, economic power, power of social status, healing power, brain power, purchasing power, executive power, military power and the like. The common thread among all is that the term 'power' behaves in much the same way as the word 'ability'^or 'capacity'. In fact, the English word 'power' derives from certain Latin and French words
3. Michael Curtis: Comparative Government and Politics, p. 1.
4. Carl J. Friedrich: Constitutional Government and Democracy, pp. 12-14..
5. R.H. Tawney: Equality, p. 230.324
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which mean 'to be able'. Thus in stead of involving oneself in the cobweb of different ramifications of the term and its application in different disciplines and situations, one may take a generalised view and say that power "is taken to denote the whole spectrum of those external influences that, by being brought to bear upon an individual, can make him move in a required direction."6
If so, the sense of the term 'power' becomes interchangeable with several related themes like control, influence, authority, force, might, persuasion, coercion, domination and the like irrespective of the fact that different writers make use of different terms at different places and in different situations in their peculiar ways with the result that it becomes a highly tedious job to say as to what the word'power precisely conveys. Some other writers, however, warn against the insidious tendency of equating power with other k'ndred themes like influence, force, control and authority in order to have a proper understanding of each term. For instance, Max Weber says that power and authority are different things in as much as the latter invariably conveys within its fold the sense of 'legitimacy'. Likewise, force and power are dissimilar things in view of the fact that the former necessarily involves some brutal manifestation which may, or may not, form an integral part of the idea of power, no matter we invoke the observation of Bertrand Russell who takes power as 'the capacity to influence the actions of others."
In fine, power "is the ability to determine the behaviour of others with one's own wishes."8 That is, a man is said to have power to the extent that it "influences the behaviour of others in accordance with his own intentions."9 Likewise, we "ascribe power to those who can influence the conduct of others even against their will."10 Again, it "is simply the probability that a man will act as another man wishes. This action may rest on fear, rational calculation of advantage, lack of energy to do otherwise, loyal devotion, indifference, or a dozen of other individual motives."11 Certainly, it is because of this diversity in the meaning of the term 'power' that its whole study has become like
6. S.E. Finer: Comparative Government, p. 13.
7. Russell: Power, p. 1.
8. Coser and Rosenberg: Sociological Theory, p, 123.
9. Goldhamer and Shils: "Types of Power and Status" in The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLV, No. 2, 1939, pp. 171-82.
10. Gerth and Mills: Character and Social Structure, pp. 193-95.
11. Ibid.
POLITICAL POWER, ITS OPERATION AND JUSTIFICATION
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a 'bottomless swamp'.12
Power Theory in Politics: As pointed out above, this theory has its first brilliant expression is the Leviathan of Hobbes. The grandest conclusion of the Hobbesian politics i s his clearest and most perfect expression of the naturalistic conception of human nature. Hobbes tells us that man desires power ana ever greater power, spontaneously and continuously in one set of appetite, and not by reason of summation or innumerable isolated desires caused by innumerable isolated perceptions.1:1 According to him, search for power is the root cause of competition among the individuals. Interests collide in the race to acquire more and more riches, honours and commands and, for this sake, the competitors take to the means of killing, subduing, supplanting and repelling their opponents. Though the struggle for power has its incessant play among the competitors, it is also Jrue that men like to live in peace in order to enjoy the iota of power they possess, it disposes them to live under a common power. The nature of the civil society is such that everyone, whether with moderate or immoderate desires, "is necessarily pulled into a constant competitive struggle for power over others, or at least to resist his powers being commanded by others"14
After Hobbes, the idea of power had its powerful reiteration in' the works of Hegel who absolutised sovereign power of the state to the extent of discarding all ethics of international morality. Power and the urge towards it were very much extolled in the nineteenth century by a good number of writers. In this direction, we may, in particular, refer to great German thinkers like Nietzsche, Treitschke and Bernhardi who elaborated what was given by Hegel. This power current of thought witnessed its ardent protagonist in the present century in Eric Kaufman, a young German student of international law, who found the essence of the state in Machtentfaltung meaning anything like development, increase and display of power, along with the will to maintain successfully and assert itself.15
Among the leading advocates of this theory in the present century, we may also refer to Prof. H..T. Morgenthau who says that politics is nothing but struggle for power. In one of his writings titled Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, he says that the re-examination of the
12. R.A. Dahl: "The Concept of Power" in Roderick Bell, D.V, Edwards and R.H. Wagner (eds.): Political Power, p. 79.
13. Leo Strauss: The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, p. 10.
14. Macpherson: "Introduction" to Leviathan, p. 37.
15. Brecht: Political Theory, p. 345.
326
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Western tradition "must start with the assumption that power politics, rooted in the lust for power which is common to all men, is, for this reason, inseparable from social life itself. In order to eliminate from the political sphere not power politics—which is beyond the ability of any political philosopher or system—but the destructiveness of power politics, rational faculties are needed which are different from and superior to the reason of the scientific age.... Contemptuous of power politics and incapable of statesmanship which alone is liable to master it, the age has tried to make politics a science."16
The power theory found its concrete manifestation in the emergence of Fascism in Italy in 1922 when Mussolini declared 'nothing against the state, nothing above it'. As a reaction against such an affirmation, Prof. Charles Merriam sought to examine the premises of power theory in detail. He undertook to mark out the situation in which power "comes into being; that plurality of competing loyalties; the sham of power and some of credanda, miranda and agenda of authority; some of the techniques of power holders who survive; and some of the defence mechanism of those upon whom power is exercised; the poverty of power; the integration, decline and overthrow of authority, the emerging trend of power in our time."17
Though the element of truth in power theory cannot be denied, it may still be said that it lays too much reliance on the fact of power in physical terms alone. As a matter of fact, power is a very broad concept that includes within itself much that may not be covered by the compass of physical power. One may also refer to the power of the soul, power of mind, power of ideas and thus justify what great sages from Buddha to Gandhi have uttered. Catlin is of the view that even cooperation may be a form of power perhaps more subtle and difficult to construct, but also more subtle than domination.18 Brecht appreciates the view that even people's sense of justice is power as emphasised by Otto Wels who, in opposition to what was said by his leader (Hitler), went to the extent of saying: "No enabling act can give you the power to destroy ideas that are external and indestructible."19
Marxian View: Here power is treated as an instrument that connects economics with politics. Politics signifies a sphere of social activity
16. G.E.G. Catlin: "What is Political Theory?" in Gould and Thursby (eds.): Contemporary Political Thought, p. 35.
17. See Charles Merriam: Political Power.
18. Catlin, op. cit., p. 36.
19. See Brecht, op. cit., p. 347.
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which two contending classes engage in a struggle for the control of the state—the organised force of society. It is the means of production whose ownership involves control over the labour power of those who own little c. no means of production and it is this fact that determines the distribution jf political power or, what Marx calls, the 'relations of production'. In this sense, property ownership involves control over production as weil as political control. Only a class whose members are aware of their objective class interest, who have a will to forward that interest and who possess a political organisation, can be said to act politically. Hence, political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class oppressing another.2"
Political power, or class power as it may be called in the strict Marxian sense, is the general and pervasive power which a dominant class exercises in order to maintain and defend its predominance in the civil society. The class power is challenged by a counter-power. Thus, class war takes place in which the contending classes as well as their subordinate allies take part. In the present society it may be traced in the conflict between the capitalist and the labour classes having their subordinate allies—the former in the family, school and churches and the latter in the socialist and communist parties and trade unions. Marx also tells us that in the period of acute social crisis and conflict, class power "does tend to be taken over by the state itself, and indeed gladly surrenders to it; and it may well be argued that even in the normal circumstances of advanced capitalism, the state takes over more and more of the functions hitherto performed by the dominant class, or at least takes a greater share in the performance of these functions than was the case in the previous periods."21
However, the peculiar feature of the Marxian theory of cower should be traced not in the integration of the case of political power with the prevailing socio-economic system as in the disappearance of the political power with the ushering in of a new society having its hall-mark in the emergence of a stateless pattern of collective life. Like politics, power also becomes a transient phenomenon. In a capitalist society, out of the separate economic movements of the workers, there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say, a movement of the class, with the object of enforcing its interests ...in a form possessing general, socially coercive, force. However, in a full communist society private property would be abolished and that would entail the disappearance of classes and hence class conflict. And
20. Marx-Engels: 'Communist Manifesto' in Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 36.
21. Ralph Miliband: Marxism and Politics, p. 56.328
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when class rule has disappeared, no state would exist in the current political sense. In this way, the 'public power' would lose its political character.s£
The Marxian theory of power may be criticised on some grounds. First, it "is grasped as a mechanical theory in which the economy determines absolutely the political structure."23 One may refer to the various theories on the subject of power and then assert flat the source of power lies not only in the realm of economics but also very much in the realms of psychology and sociology. Lust for power is a psychological fact. Second, Marx wrongly argues that power is an essential instrument of class war and, as such, in the capitalist society state is a class institution that serves and protects the interests of the dominant bourgeois class in an exclusive manner. State is a welfare agency. It has its ethical end also that consists, as Aristotle said, in the realisation of the ideal of 'good life'. Thus, Marx may be accused of not working out a satisfactory theory of power in a capitalist society. Finally, Marx fondiy hopes for the emergence of a stateless pattern of collective life in which there would be no place for state or political power. Hence, Marxism becomes Utopian in the end.41
Liberal View: Power is not merely a fact having its manifestation in the forms of control, influence, coercion, persuasion and manipulation, it is value also. Essentially speaking, power signifies the capacity of an individual which may either refer to his ability to develop his personality or to extract advantages from the like abilities of others. In this way, power has both developmental and extractive capacities and thereby it carries a normative dimension in the former and an empirical dimension in the latter. It should always be borne in mind that if power refers to the capacities, the capacities of man are more and higher than those of an animal. Moreover, the norms of social life require that the use of such capacities be made for the betterment of the personality of man_ as well as of his community. Whether the existence of especially human capacities "is attributed to divine creation, or to some evolutionary development of more complex organism, it is a basic postulate. It is an empirical postulate, verifiable in a broad way by observation. It is at the same time a value postulate in the sense that rights and obligations can be derived from it without any additional value premise, since the very structure of our thought
22. Marx-Engels: Works, Vol. IV, p. 482.
23. Alan Swingewood: Marx and Modern Social Theory, p. 138.
24. Michael Evans: Karl Marx, p. 162.
POLITICAL POWER, ITS OPERATION AND JUSTIFICATION 3;
and language puts an evaluative content into our descriptive stat ments about man."25
Though Western political theory studies the case of power in i normative as well as empirical dimensions, most of the literature fro: Machiavelli and Hobbes to Weber and Lasswell concerns itself wil latter dimension. It dwells on man's ability to get what he wants r. controlling others. However, as the power of money has become tr most important of all powers in modern market societies, the idea c political power has become essentially connected with the theme ( 'economic power'. Keeping this fact in view, Easton refers to a Ion line of modern writers who see that the characteristic of politic; activity, the property that distinguishes th the chief and sometimes the only representative organ, being directly responsible to the citizens, it raises and discusses questions relative to the conduct of the executive and the judiciary." The Modern State, p. 371.
12. Hitchner and Harbold: The Pattern of Modern Government, p. 423.
ORGANISATION OF GOVERNNENT
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says: "The presence of the executive in the legislature enables it to explain its policy in the way that ensures adequate attention and organised criticism. It is not attention and criticism in a vacuum. It is attention from, and criticism by, those who are eager to replace the executive if it proves unconvincing. It thus makes for responsibility. It prevents a legislature which has no direct interest in administration from drifting into capricious statutes. It arrests that executive degeneration which is bound to set in when the policy of a ministry is not its own. It secures an essential coordination between bodies whose creative interplay is the condition of effective government."13
4. A good government is one that has the qualities of responsibility as well as of efficiency. The constitutional^ system must be so devised that one quality is not sacrificed at the altar of another. "Perhaps the real problem of the 'division of powers' is to so articulate these functions that responsibility shall not be divorced from efficiency. Responsibility implies representation; efficiency demands expert knowledge; the two can scarcely be united in a single organ of government."14 It is rightly feared that the separation of governmental functions, as desired by Montesquieu, would inevitably create frequent deadlocks as each department acting in defence of its own powers "would never lend its aid to other and the consequent loss in efficiency would outweigh all the possible advantages arising from independence."15
5. While a theory of individual liberty should be appreciated, its implications should also be thoroughly examined. Montesquieu's idea is quite appealing when he lays stress on the separation of powers that really means the separation of functions of the three organs of government. But a critic may say that this theory does not ensure a condition of complete safeguard of liberty. There may be some better and more effective ways in this regard. Stephen Leacock makes a point when he says: "The law enforced by the executive and adjudicated on by the courts would still be the law,made by the legislature. It is to be noted also that such a law might conceivably be extremely tyrannical and unjust. The executive and
13. Laski: A Grammar of Politics, p. 299.
14. Maclver, op. cit., p. 372.
15. See J.S. Mill: Considerations on Representative Government.362 PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
the judges would still have to apply it, and thus the separation of powers in and of itself would offer no guarantee of individual liberty."16 So Laski says: "To separate powers with the theoretic nicety of the American constitution may be rather to confound them than to make them clear. At best, such separation is merely an index to competence; but the use made of the index will depend upon the prevailing atmosphere of the given state. It is the legislature of modern Italy which has made of Mussolini an executive and a legislature in one."17
Despite this all, it may be added that Montesquieu's exposition of separation of powers should be regarded as one of the great contributions to the stock of liberal political theory. It seeks to save the liberty of the individual against arbitrary actions of the state. It ensures the system of constitutional democracy that, as Carl J. Friedrich says, "presupposes a balanced system of divided powers, for only within such a system could the citizens hope to enjoy a measure of independence and freedom through a guarantee of civil liberties."18
Executive
One of the astonishing features of modern political systems is that the distrust in the dominance of the executive has been replaced by the confidence in its leadership. The reason for this is that the political process has become a subtle interplay of public pressure and effective leadership. Vast expansion of the scope of state activity has made the executive a much more important organ of the government with the result that the classical doctrine of'the three organs of political organisation with equal powers' has been subjected to the need for a theoretical restatement. The pattern of modern politics keeping the large body of legislators confined in a dull and mechanical discipline has established a surprising degree of contrast between the creative force of the leader (executive) and the equalitarian mediocrity of the
16. Leacock: Elements of Political Science, p. 140.
17. Laski, op. cit., p. 104.
18. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 20, XI, cd., p. 227. "It is a cardinal doctrine of Political Science that the three branches of government— the legislature, the executive and the judiciary—-should be kept separate from one another. A dilt'erent body of persons should administer each of the three departments and neither body should have a controlling power over either of the others. "It is thought that in this way a peculiar guarantee, indeed the only adequate guarantee, might be given to public liberty." Leacock, op. cit. p. 137.
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mass majority (legislature).19
Meaning: The first question that arises at the very outset is as to what is meant by the term 'executive'. This term has its broad as well as narrow connotations. "In a broad and collective sense, the executive organ embraces the aggregate or totality of all the functionaries and agencies which are concerned with the execution of the will of the state as that will has been formulated and expressed in terms of law. In this sense, the term embraces not only the supreme head of the government—the chief of state, as he is called on the continent of Europe (president, king, emperor)—but also the ministers and the whole mass of subordinate executive and administrative functionaries who constitute what in Great Britain, the United States and other democratic countries is known as the Civil Service. As thus understood, it comprehends the entire governmental organisation, with the exception of the legislature and the judiciary and possibly the diplomatic corps. Thus, tax collectors, inspectors, commissioners, policemen and perhaps officers of the army and navy are a part of the executive organisation."20
However, its narrower meaning is taken in the field of political theory.21 It is the executive heads and their principal colleagues who run the machinery of government; they formulate national policy and see to it that it is carefully implemented. The large army of administrators is there just to carry out the policies laid down by the top executive authorities. It is for this purpose that a line of distinction is made between the executive and administrative departments. As Laski says: "The executive of a state has two aspects—political and departmental. On the one hand, it is a small body of statesmen who recommend a policy for the acceptance of a legislature and, after its acceptance, are responsible for its application; on the other, it is a much larger body of officials who carry out the determinations at which the statesmen have arrived."22
Kinds: Whereas the term 'executive' can be used both in a wider and a narrower sense, its various types may be mentioned with the help of a tabular illustration:
19. Carl J. Friedrich: Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 355.
20. J.W. Garner: Political Science and Government, p. 677.
21. Laski has a different point to make in this connection. At one place, he says that the executive in modern times has three aspects. It is, firstly, a committee of the party in power in the legislative assembly carrying on measures with the consent of that body. Secondly, it is an administrative body applying enforcing legislation. Thirdly, as an administrative agency it has to be in direct touch with the people. A Grammar of Politics, p. 356.
22. Laski: An Introduction to Politics, p. 63.
I Hi:364
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Executive
|! | | |! |
|Nominal | | |Real |
| | | |i |
|1 - 1 | |1 Singular 1 |1 Plural |
|Hereditary Elective | | |i |
|1 Political |Non-politica (Permanent |
|(Non-permanent) | |
|1 | |1 Totalitarian |1 Colonial |
|Democratic | | | |
|1 Parliamentary |1 Presidential |Quasi-Presidential or |
| | |Quasi-Parliamentary |
2.
The difference between nominal and real executives obtains in a system where there is constitutional monarchy or parliamentary form of government. The monarch or some elected head (like President) is a constitutional figurehead with little or no real powers, though the entire administration is carried in his name. Its best example is the English monarch who, according to the established convention, 'can do no wrong'. In such a system, real power is given to the council of ministers (headed by a Prime Minister) accountable to the legislature. The ministers constitute the real executive. Besides, the nominal executive may be of two kinds—hereditary and elective. That is, the head of state may secure his office by the rule of hereditary succession, or he may get it for a specified period by the process of election whether direct or indirect. What actually matters is the real executive. It may have two forms —singular and plural. A singular executive is one that is headed by a single leader who does not share his powers with others. The leadership of the President or of the Prime Minister belongs to this category. Different from this is the case of a plural executive where the directing authority is shared by a group of ministers. History has some instances of this kind. Ancient Sparta was governed by two kings and ancient Rome by two Consuls. In modern world its only instance is found in Switzerland where the burden of the government is shared by seven ministers (Presidents) who are
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3.
4.
5.
elected by the national legislature for a fixed period of four years and, just for the sake of doing some ceremonial functions, one of the ministers is formally designated as the President of the Confederation for one year. The office rotates among the seven presidents of the Federal Council. The real executive may further be divided into two kinds — political or non-permanent and non-political or permanent. While the former1 consists of the ministers headed by the President or the Prime Minister or the Chancellor who hold their office for some time and who have connections with some political party or parties, the latter consists of a host of civil servants who are selected on the basis of merit and efficiency and who remain in office till they complete a specified age of retirement and who are also required to have no connection with any political party. Top officers belonging to this category accumulate real authority in their hands and thereby create a system that is known by the notorious appellation of 'bureaucracy'.
The political executive has three categories—democratic, totalitarian and colonial. It is democratic when its members are chosen by the people and remain accountable to their constituents. There is the freedom to criticise and censure the conduct of the ministers with the result that the real executive may go out of office in case a vote of no confidence or a motion of impeachment is passed against it. But in a totalitarian system the real executive cannot be removed by the people or their chosen representatives, since there is no freedom to criticise or censure the conduct of government. The top leaders of a particular political party or of a military junta run the government in a way that the opposition means mutilation or death. It happens in a country having a fascist or a communist political system. Finally, a colonial executive is one that acts under the superintendence, direction and control of a colonial power. It may be called 'nominated executive' as well, since the real rulers of a dependent country are nominated by the colonial power. This kind of executive existed in India before the advent of independence. The democratic model of executive may have three sub-varieties—parliamentary, presidential, and quasi-presidential. A parliamentary form of executive is one that is run by a cabinet or a council of ministers under the headship of a Prime Minister collectively responsible to the legislature. It366
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
works on the principle of concentration of powers, for cabinet is the buckle that binds the executive and the legislative departments of the state. Different from this is the presidential executive. It works under the leadership of a President who is not accountable to the legislature, though he may be removed by it by the process of impeachment. This kind of executive works on the principle of the separation of powers as in the United States. In between these two is the model of French and Sri Lankan executives that may be designated as either quasi-presidential or quasi-parliamentary, though the former designation is more appropriate. Here the President is the real executive and the Prime Minister and the cabinet under his control are responsible both to him and to the national legislature.
Selection or Recruitment: A pertinent question arises as to how the holders of the executive power, particularly the heads of the state and government, should be recruited. In this direction, five methods may be suggested, each having its own elements of strength and weakness. These are:
1. Hereditary Principle: It implies the system of monarchy where the head of the state (king or queen) gets the office by virtue of the conventional law of hereditary succession. The application of this principle may be seen today in countries having a monarchical system like Britain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Nepal, Japan, etc. However, the case of British monarchy is qualitatively different where, in legal theory, monarchy is treated as 'elective' and the English people proudly call the country a 'crowned republic'. It is for this reason that the English writers appreciate the system of hereditary succession. For instance, Walter Bagehot says that the masses have little respect or reverence for an executive which they assist every half-dozen years to create. A hereditary monarch is a powerful means of attaching the masses to the government and of securing their loyalty and obedience.23 However, emphasis on such points has lost its relevance in modern times and wherever it prevails, it is not preferred but tolerated just for historical reasons. "The testimony of experience is against it. It can be looked upon only as a survival of a past age and its ultimate disappearance will doubtless follow in the course of
23. Bagehot: The English Constitution, Chapter 3.
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the political evolution of the future."2*
2. Direct Popular Election: In some countries like Brazil, Ireland and the Philippines, the head of the state is elected by the votes of the people.^ It is regarded as democratic; it stimulates interest of the people in national affairs; it affords political education to the masses. But it cannot work well in a country where most of the people are illiterate or politically apathetic as a result of which the selection of the head of the state becomes like a play of the demogogues. In the words of Chancellor Kent, "the election of the supreme magistrate for a whole nation affects so many interests and addresses itself so strongly to popular passions and holds out such powerful temptations Jo ambition that it necessarily becomes a strong trial to public virtue and even hazardous to the public tranquillity."26
3. Indirect Popular Election: In most of the countries the principle of indirect election of the head of the state is preferred. For instance, the Presidents of America and France are elected by an electoral college. It has its own merits. It affords a means of avoiding the 'heats', the 'tumults', and the 'convulsions' of direct election; it also leads to a more intelligent choice by restricting the immediate selection to a small body of capable representatives. But it has its demerits too. While referring to the election of the American President, Laski ridiculed it as 'four-month political debauchery'. Garner says that "the difficulty lies in the fact that the electors are apt to be chosen under party pledges to vote for a particular candidate, and thus become mere agents for registering the will of the voters."27
4. Election by Legislature: The best example of this system may be seen in Switzerland where all the seven ministers (Presidents) are elected by the Federal Assembly in a joint session.28 We
24. Garner, op. cit., p.'6S7.
25. Garner well says: "In form, the method of electing the President of the United States is indirect, though owing to a metamorphosis of the electoral system, the method has, in fact, come to be practically almost direct " Ibid., p. 687.
26. Kent: Commentaries, Vol. I, pp. 274-/5.
27. Garner, op. cit., p. 691.
28. The Swiss system of 'plural executive' has its unique place. The people of Switzerland are well satisfied with it and an eminent student of democracy like Lord James Bryce has opined that it 'deserves best study'. But a critic368
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may also refer to the systems of USSR and China where the legislatures elect the members of the council of ministers. Slightly different is the case of France where the President nominates the Prime Minister who has to seek confidence vote of the Parliament. To carry this point a little further, it may be said that the names of the ministers (secretaries) appointed by the President are ratified by the Senate in the United States. To a certain extent, it applies to all countries having parliamentary form of government in view of the fact that the Prime Minister aiid his ministers remain in office by virtue of enjoying confidence of the legislature. It has its merits. For instance, it is thoroughly democratic; it is better than the system of indirect election of the head of the state for the reason that the members of a legislature play a better role in this direction than that of the vast electorate consisting mainly of illiterate and politically apathetic masses. But it has demerits too. It violates the principle of the separation of powers by bracketing the executive with tlie legislature; the head of the government becomes a tool in the hands of the legislators; clever and unscrupulous leaders may capture ministerial position by distributing favours among the leaders of the legislature. So Chancellor Kent could say that "all elections by the representative body are peculiarly liable to produce combinations for sinister purposes.""' 5. Nomination: This system prevails in subject or dependent countries where the rulers nominate a man of their choice to work as the representative of, what they proudly call, the 'Home Government'. For instance, in India before independence the Governor-General (also designated as the 'Viceroy' and Crown's Representative in India') was nominated by the English monarch on the advice of the Prime Minister. So happened in other 'colonies' under the imperial control of France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal etc. In defence of this system it is said that only a good administrator equipped with qualities of head and heart is chosen by the ministers on the
like Prof. Uyas Ahmed is of a different view when he comments: ""At first sight, there appears a decided gain in this system in the direction of matmiiy of judgment and mutual control of members against any possible tyranny on the part of any of them. But the necessary loss in promptness of revolution and the danger of actual conflict of opinion in a moment of crisis more than offsets the gain." Machinery of Government, p. 417. 29. Kent, op. cit., p. 279.
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basis of his fitness for the job and he also remains above petty' political squabbles. But, in fact, it is thoroughly undemocratic. The master-rulers invariably prefer a man of their confidence and he acts like a virtual 'despot' over the subject people.
A question may now arise as to which is the best of all. In answer we may say that while the systems of hereditary succession and nomination now become entirely unacceptable, the systems of direct (popular) election and indirect election by means of an electoral college have their strong and weak points. The best of all is the method of election of the executive by the legislature in any form whatsoever as prevailing in many democratic countries of the world. It may be regarded as the best model approximating to the system of democracy Hence, we may endorse the view of Garner: "Whatever the merits and demerits of the system of election by the legislature, the prcse*ht practice is distinctly in favour of it."30
Tenure: For how much length of time the head of the executive should remain in office? We have taken note of the fact that the head f the executive lives in office for life, or until he abdicates where the law of hereditary succession prevails. We have also noted that this system is inconsistent with democracy and, as such, it is not preferred, though it is tolerated in some countries just for certain historical reasons. The better way is to have the system of optimum tenure of the head of the executive. A look at different constitutional systems of the world shows that the tenure of the executive head varies—seven years (as in France), six years (as in Chile, Argentina, Mexico and Sri Lanka), five years (as in the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan), four years (as in the United States and Brazil). In the case of the States of the USA the term of the Governor varies from two to four years. Peculiar is the case with cabinet government in which the tenure of th; executive may be anything from five years to a month on an average (as in France under the Fourth Republic) for the obvious reason that the legislature may dismiss the executive at any time by passing a vote of no-confidence.31
It leads to the question of optimum tenure. It is said that a short tenure is better than a long tenure as it removes the possibilities of a tyranny. The head of the state would not be able to assume dictatorial
3 . Garner, op. cit., p. 695.
31. The Swiss Federal Council is a unique body of seven ministers elected for four years, but it stands dissolved with the dissolution of the Federal Assembly even earlier. Its senior most member is designated as the President of the Co i federation for one year.370
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power on account of being subject to election after a short interval of two to four years. But it has its demerit too. Such a system would lead to political instability. It would also cause much distraction and disturbances in the sphere of administration. In the words of Judge Story, it is equivalent to the surrender of the executive power as a check on government and also lead to 'an intolerable vacillation and imbecility.' Similar is the case with long tenure of the executive. If the term of the head of the executive would be too long, it would make him an autocrat in spite of the fact that it would create conditions of political stability. For instance, Hitler in Germany converted his chancellorship into life term and thereby destroyed the system of democracy in the country. So was done by President Soekarno of Indonesia whose life presidency was overthrown in a military revolt in
1965.
Allied with it is the issue of re-eligibility for election. One view is that the head of .the state should not be eligible for re-election as it would open the possibilities of the abuse of power, the other view is that the number of terms should not be restricted and the people should have the power to re-elect their head of the state any number of times. It is said that the ministers of Switzerland are elected again and again by the parliament with the result that some persons could have the chance to be in office for more than 30 years without break. In the United States President Roosevelt won four elections in succession. But the other view is that such an unduly long tenure is against the spirit of democracy. As such, the American constitution was amended in 1951 so as to put a limit of not more than two terms which a person may avail for the post of the President of the United States. The American writers express their satisfaction with the desirability of four-year term that is neither very long nor very short, such a term is the best inasmuch as it makes the executive feel firm and independent in the discharge of his trust and to give stability and some degree of maturity to his system of administration and certainly short enough to place him under a dire sense of independence on the public approbation.32
No doubt, the weight of opinion is in favour of neither very long nor very short tenure of the executive. It is in favour of an opitimum period that may be four to five years, though some scope for re-eligibility should also be taken into account. The key point to be considered is that the incumbent should not be left in a position so as to abuse his power and the administration of the country should
32. Kent, op., cit., p. 280.
not suffer for want of political stability. The element of re-eligibility for any number of times is not bad, if the system of democracy is maintained as we may see in the case of Swiss plural executive. We may appreciate this view: "Controversies over the length of term and re-eligibility are no longer generally regarded as of prime importance; far more vital is the matter of genuine accountability of the executive to the people or their elected representatives."33
Functions: As its very nomenclature indicates, the chief function of the executive is to execute laws, orders, rules, regulations, decrees, and the like for maintaining peace and 'good government' in the country. Such an important function also covers prevention of the breaches of law and punishment to the delinquents. Moreoer, it also covers within its fold maintenance of foreign relations, regulation of national finance, and rendering a host of social welfare^services in modern times. Hence, we may enumerate the functions of the executive under these heads:
1. Internal Administration: This'may be described as the primary
or the principal function of the executive. Maintenance of law and order is the first and foremost function of the state and it is entrusted to its executive branch. For this sake, : it keeps a large body of police, military and para-military forces. All the departments and agencies of the state are manned by staff and it becomes the function of the executive to appoint persons for the posts and also to take suitable action against those who violate the terms of the law of the land. All disturbances must be quelled. For this sake, the executive makes use of police. Military and para-military forces are used in the aid of civil administration to maintain ' law and order. The executive may make top appointments but for most of the public services this work should be entrusted to some public service commission so as to set aside the possibilities of 'spoils system' as much as possible. In short, these powers of the executive include (/) the power to appoint and remove public officials, (ii) power to direct their work (in), power to issue orders organising and defining their work, and (iv) power to use military force when necessary to get the work done.31 2. External Relations and Defence: No state can live in isolation.
33. Rodee, Christol and Anderson: Introduction to Political Science, p. 127
34. Roucek Huszarind others: Introduction to Political Science, p. 305.372
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Moreover, a state may face aggression or encroachment on its territory from outside. For this sake, the executive has a large army of diplomats, ambassadors, envoys, etc., who visit foreign countries and maintain foreign relations. The head of the state accepts credentials of foreign diplomats. He signs treaties of peace, friendship, cooperation and defence for the protection and promotion of 'national interest.' The executive heads frame foreign policy of the state that is pursued by the trained and professional diplomats. The representatives of the state attending international organisations are duly instructed by the heads of the executive departments. The head of the state may go to the extent of declaring war or peace. It is in the times of war that the powers of the executive are very much enlarged. It is aptly visualised: "Even in democracies the exigencies of modern war necessitate conferring upon the executive arm not only control over all military and naval phases of the war, including ground strategy, but power over the disposition of raw materials, the manufacture of needed products or all materials entering into consumption, including their prices and the amounts consumed. Territory conquered from the enemy is governed by' the executive until peace is made. In areas under military operations, the executive may suspend the civil courts and establish martial law disregaiding for the time being the will of the habeas corpus, and the constitutional guarantees of rights to the individual. In European countries, these emergency powers have been conferred upon the executive even in the time of peace to deal with situations which threaten the safety of the State."35
3 Legislation: The executive administers, it also legislates in its own way. It may be seen in its positive and negative roles. On the positive side, the head of the state may promulgate an 'ordinance' that has the force of law. By all means, an ordinance is a law despite the fact that it is issued at a time when the legislature is not in session and it remains in force for a limited time. In a parliamentary form of government it may be seen in the form of bills that are introduced by the ministers, then passed by the legislature, and finally assented to by the head of the state. Apart from this, the executive
35. Ibid., p. 303.
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4.
departments also issue letters, circulars and notifications from time to time so as to cover up the unspecified portions of the law. It makes up the case of 'departmental' or 'delegated' legislation. Even in a presidential system, the head of the state manages to have bills introduced in and passed by the legislature through his 'friends.' On the negative side, the role of the executive m iv be seen in the exercise of veto power. The head of the state has the power to 'veto' a bill passed by the legislature. Bv virtue of this power, the executive head may either reject a bill, or return it to the legislature for reconsideration, or may keep it under his 'consideration' for any length of time (as in India the President can do in case of bills passed by State legislatures), or. may 'kill' a bill by taking no action upon it within 10 days of the adjournment of the Congressional session. (It is called 'pocket veto' of the President in the United States). The general view is that the veto power is intended to provide a check against legislative attempts to encroach upon the executive authority, it (as in the USA) "has come to he used as a major weapon of the Chief Executive representing the people, to prevent passage of legislation which he considers ill-advised or in conflict with his policies as a party and popular leader."3'' Finance: The executive controls the 'purse of the nation.' It prepares annual statement of the income and expenditure of the government (called budget) that is introduced in the legislature and thereform passed into the forms of bills dealing with 'revenues' and 'appropriations.' In a country with parliamentary form of government, the members of the legislature cannot make any addition to the 'revenue' side of the budget for the reason that such a proposal can be introduced with the prior recommendation of the head of the state that may be available only to a minister. They can simply propose a 'cut' in the appropriation side. Moreover, as the defeat of the budget amounts to a veto of no-confidence, the ministers see to it that the budget is passed in a form they like. In this way, the executive has usurped the inherent power of the parliament and converted itself into the controller of the 'purse' of the nation. Judicial: The judicial functions of the executive may be seen
36- Ibid., p. 308.374
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in the power to grant reprieve or pardon to the offenders. The head of the state has the 'prerogative of mercy' whereby he may commute the sentence given by the highest court of the land. He may also grant amnesty to the offenders or reduce their sentence by his discretionary authority. A new example of this kind of executive functions may be seen in the role of administrative tribunals that hear and decide cases of the employees working in government and semi-government concerns. The executive departments and the tribunals composed wholly or partly of officials are vested with judicial powers to decide cases arising out of the enforcement of the various kinds of administrative orders as well as a large variety of rules made under the Statute relating to labour, trade, industry etc.
nne important point that may, however, be stressed at this stage is that while the executive organ of every state performs a number of functions as given above, a line of fundamental distinction may be drawn between democratic and non-democratic (dictatorial) executives. The powers of the executive are enormous in modern times, of course, but these vary from the point of being 'controlled' and 'checked' in democratic systems to being quite arbitrary in the dictatorial systems. "The basic difference lies, not in the amount of power possessed by the executive (although this is highly important), but rather in the fact that the democratic president or prime minister holds office either for a fixed term or at the pleasure of the legislature, while the dictator enjoys indeterminate or life tenure. Put in another way, the democratic executive is responsible to the people or to their representatives and must give periodic or continuous accounts of his stewardship, while the dictator is both irremovable and irresponsible. A democracy may confer sweeping powers upon its chief executive for the duration of a war or other emergency without thereby becoming a
dictatorship.37
However, the working of the executive requires some reforms. For this following suggestions may be advanced:38
1. The ministers not only see that the departments are properly run, they must also think about policies of reform in a systematic manner.
2. The cabinet should be associated with a planning commission
37. Rodee, Christol and Anderson, op. cit., p. 125.
38. Beni Prasad: The Democratic Process, pp. 256-63.
composed of the experts and other nominated members of vocational associations.
3. A national investment board should be charged with the function of assisting through loans and purchase of shares in agricultural and industrial enterprises.
4. The ever-widening range of governmental functions means a bureaucracy at all points of political control and service and departmental immunity may impose inordinate delay in business.
5. A network of advisory committees consisting of scientific experts and private men and associated with departments of administration or their administrative branches in the whole hierarchy of government should bring services into organic association with public men let in a continuous stream of ideas and suggestions and perform the equally necessary functions of educating public opinion.
In fine, the development of the executive into, what may be called the multi-functioning organ, is one of the notable features of modern government.
Importance: A look at the functions and powers of the executive in modern times confirms this impression that the executive has become the most important organ of the political organisation of a country.39 More than this, what was detested or abhorred in the last century has now become a settled and accepted doctrine. Following reasons may be given for this:40
■ 1. On the one hand, the earlier enthusiasm for the wisdom and competence of representative assemblies has declined; on the other, a century and more of experience with popularly elected (or popularly controlled) executive power has dissipated earlier suspicions and established coniidence. 2. The rapidly multiplying problems and functions of democratic government have virtually compelled the transfer of many
39. It is well observed: "If the growth of the legislative organ, in consequence of the development of the cabinet system, was the notable feature of the eighteenth century, it may be said that the growth of the executive organ, in consequence of the extension of rights and the corresponding extension of services which mostly fall to the lot of the executive, is the notable feature of the twentieth." E. Barker: Principles of Social and Political-Theory, p. 261.
40. Rodee, Christol and Anderson, op. cit., p. 123.376
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5.
powers from the legislature to the executive. The growing need for prompt governmental action in the field of both domestic and foreign policy has caused the modern legislature . to delegate much legislative authority to the executive, subject, as a rule, to guiding principles and limitations set forth by the legislature.
-3. The long intervals between legislative sessions (during which governmental action may be imperative), the inability of the legislature to provide in advance and in detail, for all possible contingencies, and the notorious delays incidental to the "partisan and acrimonious debate often characteristic of the legislative process, combine to justify the conferring of wider discretion in matters of policy upon the executive branch.
4. The new.realisation is that the head of the state (as President in USA) or the working head of state (as Prime Minister in Britain) is the representative chosen by the people of the entire nation, whereas the legislators represent only sectional interest that may be in conflict with national welfare The new concept of state as a welfare agency has also contributed to the growth of the functions of the executive. To the people in general the state must render socially useful services. For this sake, the executive has widened the area of its activity in social and economic spheres.
■ 6. Above all, there is the factor of war and national crisis. The new conditions of great national crises have increased the weight of their impact to the extent that the executive has become bound to expand its scope of activity so as to save the country from destructive forces and tendencies emanating from national and international environment.
In fine, the growth of the executive power in recent times had led to an increase in its manifold importance in every kind of political system, whether democratic or dictatorial. It is well observed: "One of the most striking and significant recent trends in democratic government has been this increase in the legislative powers and responsibilities of the executive and administrative establishments. Though viewed with alarm in conservative quarters, this tendency continues unabated."41
41. Ibid., p. 122. So D.G. Hitchner and V.H. Harbold observe: "One of the most striking aspects of modern government is the constant tendency towards aggrandisement of the executive. So long as, therefore, as the
Bureaucracy
Meaning: As earlier pointed out, the executive of a state has two layers—the upper or the political and the lower or the non-political. The former can be seen in the offices of the President, Prime Minister and ministers; the latter can be seen in the large body of administrative heads who are selected or recruited on the basis of merit and promoted from time to time on the basis of seniprity and efficiency. For this reason, this kind of executive is also known by the name of administrative executive or civil service. As Laski says: "The executive of a state has two aspects—the political and the departmental. On the one hand, it is a small body of statesmen who recommend a policy for the acceptance of a legislature and, after its acceptance, are responsible for its application; on the other, it is a much larger body of officials who carry out the determination at whidh the statesmen have arrived. Obviously, the two categories are more distinct as to persons than as to power; for an important official of long experience, while he is technically the subordinate of his political chief, will -have great weight with the latter, and count for much in the making of decision."*2
The astonishing fact in this direction is that now the lower layer has dominated its upper counterpart with the result that a new term 'bureaucracy' has come into currency. It signifies the hold of the bureaucrats or chiefs of the departments by virtue of being efficient in the work of public administration. While the ministers are like the birds of passage coming in and going out according to change in the political climate, the chiefs of the departments have a fixed and permanent tenure. For this reason while the ministry makes up the part of 'non-permanent' executive, civil services constitute the part of 'permanent' executive. Moreover, while the ministers have their rise and fall with the swing of political climate in the country, the work of the departments goes on undisturbed owin^ to the role of permanent officials who act anonymously. As such, the civil service is also
democratic executive is responsible and responsive to popular control achieving his position within the framework of established constitutional arrangements, and performing hs duties in accordance with the law, the . concentration of authority he represents is not in itself a threat to democratic institutions or processes. The dictator appears after, and not before, representative and republican government fails. Indeed, the absence of adequate executive power and the failure of the executive to provide leadership are the far greater dangers to the successful continuation of democracy." The Pattern of Modern Government, pp. 367 and 370. 42. Laski: An Introduction to Politics, pp. 63-64.378 PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
dubbed as bureaucracy and it is defined as a personnel system where the employees are classified in a system of administration, composed of a hierarchy of sections, divisions, bureaus, departments and the like.
Although known by many good and bad nomenclatures like non-political executive, permanent executive, officialdom, official despotism and the like, bureaucracy means a group of persons (not some mysterious super-entity such as suggested by the term 'state') who "perform definite functions which the community at large considers worthwhile."13 They arc supposed to be 'neutral' in the politics of the country and 'expert' in the field of administration. But when such 'experts' control their political chiefs who constitute the 'lay' element of government, it becomes 'bureaucracy'. Thus, a government is said to be bureaucratic when it "is carried on largely by ministerial bureaus and in which important policies are determined and decisions rendered by the administrative chiefs of small bureaus. In a wider sense, it means any government, the administrative functionaries of which are professionally trained for the public service and who enjoy permanency of tenure, promotion within service being partly by seniority and partly by merit."44
Features: The first best exposition of bureaucratic system was given by a German sociologist, Max Weber, in the form of his theory of'bureaucratic rationality.' He termed authority of the bureaucrats as "rational-legal' and suggested certain key features of this system having universal relevance what he termed its 'ideal-types'. In his explanation, the eight fundamental principles of rational-legal authority are :*"
43. Carl J. Fried rich : Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 37,
44. Garner, op. fit., p. 357. Prof. B.B. Misra does not appreciate the way of identifying bureaucracy with "civil service', because the latter conveys a restricted legal sense and its use at times to signify public servants at a higher level only does not cover as full a range of public employees as doss the term 'bureaucracy'. He says : "Technically, a bureaucracy is an impermeable and complex hierarchy, its emphasis being on the principles of organisation, recruitment, education, training, conditions of service, rules of business and so on. In other words, it deals with the machine and the whole structure of rules designed to keep the machine together. Politically, on the other hand, bureaucracy is a form of government with officials either acting as rulers themselves, or coexisting with elected executives, but connected conceptually in all cases with the exercise of authority as members of a class of power elites." The Bureaucracy in India, p. 33.
45. Ibid., pp. 28-29. Although many important decisions are taken at the higher level, they are passed down to the subordinate officials in the form of 'chain of commands'. This hierarchical arrangement is supposed to charac-
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1. Organisation of official functions on a continuous rule-bound basis,
2. A specified sphere of competence and distinct functions based on systematic division of labour,
3. Principle of hierarchy with a lower office under the control and supervision of a higher one,
4. Trained personnel for the conduct of business,
5. Complete separation of members of the administrative staff from the ownership of the means of production or administration, with a clear separation likewise in principle of the property belonging to the organisation and controlled within the sphere of office and the personal property of the official available for private use,
6. A complete absence of appropriation of official position by the incumbent,
7. The formulation and recording in writing of all acts, decisions, and rules, and
8. The ideal type being the purest form of legal authority or 'imperative coordination'.
However, Laski's explanation is more forthright when he enumerates these features of a bureaucratic system :10
1. The business of the ministers is to frame a policy which satisfies the largest possible volume of public demand, and on , its acceptance by the legislature, to maximise its effective participation. Obviously, also, in the scale of the modern state, they can give no more than a general oversight to this task. They must be dependent upon their officials for
terise the 'ideal-type organisational form known as httrecriciicy to which much attention has been paid ever since Mat Weber developed the content of the concept. Weber suggested quite a number of characteristics for bureaucracy, ii part to distinguish it from other forms of organisation from earlier historical periods. \ bureaucracy was hierarchical Cand pyramidal) in form; cninmuni :ation w.-s written and specific, and full records were kept, people were appointed to positions in a bureaucracy on the basis of merit, and they m ide careers of their positions ; there was a sharp separation between one's persona! goods and the matcriil belonging to the organisation, and the organisation had a continuity beyond the life of any of its members. Accordh? to We;,er, bureaucracy w;i; the most advanced form of organisation as well as the most efficient, and was descriptive of large-scale organisation in particular. S.L. Was by : Political Science, p. 446. 46. Laski : An Introduction to Politics, pp. 65-mandments Of Officialdom
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For as it is the public that officials have to serve, so by the public they must be judged. If both service and judgment are to be properly performed, public opinion must be rightly related to the process of administration.
Functions and Ro5e: It is generally taken for granted that civil servants merely act according to the wishes and the dictates of their political chiefs. But such a view is mistaken. The civil servants perform a number of important functions as:
1. The civil servants not only carry out the orders of their political masters, they also advise them. They serve as the reservoirs of information with the help of which ministers make programmes or lay down policies. Being 'laymen', the ministers lack both the knowledge and the ability to conduct the work of the department; they have to depend upon the advice of the experienced departmental chiefs in dealing with many knotty problems. The civil servants put before their masters useful suggestions supported by convincing arguments and facts which they accept in most of the cases. The political heads have to answer questions in the Parliament and also outside as in press conferences; they have to give statements and explanations so as to clarify their position and mould public opinion in their favour. The fear of 'accountability' always hovers over their heads. As a result, they have to bank upon the cooperation and advice of their expert officials. Thus, bureaucracy thrives under the cloak of ministerial responsibility.47
2. Not only in the field of administration where the political chiefs in most of the cases sign on the dotted lines, this penetrating role of bureaucracy may also be seen in the field of legislation. The bills are passed by the legislature and, after being assented to by the head of the state, are placed on the statute book. But the work of drafting a bill is done by the departmental chiefs. The ministers may give an outline, but the civil servants may incorporate much into the text of the provisions that they like. In a dexterous way, they may even ' change the real nature, of legislation with or without the knowledge and the consent of their political heads. More important than this is the role of the bureaucrats in the sphere of departmental or administrative legislation. They
47. Ramsay Muir : How Britain is Governed, p. 44.
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issue letters, circulars, regulations, notifications etc. from time to time so as to supplement the blank portions of the law made by the legislature. These rules and regulations (constituting the case of delegated legislation) arc placed before the legislature for approval and, in most of the cases, they are passeo within a couple of seconds, unless some conscientious member raises his objections and draws the attention of the House towards violation of its wishes in a particular manner, it shows that while the cabinet has usurped the powers of the parliament, the bureaucrats have in their own way, usurped the powers of the political chiefs. Asa result, bureaucracy, behind the veil, ''wields so much of the reality of power."ls 3. So in matters of finance, the bureaucrats manage to incorporate their desires and decisions into the provisions of the budget. Whether the minister is a conservative or a progressive, a liberal or a socialist, he has to count upon the gracious advice and cooperation of his subordinate officials. When the budget is prepared, the expert administrators occupying their position in the departments of finance, taxation and planning sourcefully suggest that how much money is to be raised and how it is to be spent on various items. The framing of the budget is so technical a job that it can be handled only by the experts and, for this reason, the bureaucracy "not only spends the proceeds of taxation, it largely decides how much is to be raised and how it is to be raised."'IJ
It well demonstates the fact that bureaucracy has (become a far more vital and potent element in a modern system of government than generally understood by the people. What Ramsay Muir has said about the English system of government applies to all democratic countries of the world that the power of bureaucracy has become enormously strong in the fields of administration, legislation and finance. "Under the cloak of ministerial responsibility and cabinet dictatorship, it has thriven and grown until like Frankenstein's monster, it sometimes seems likely to devour its creator."00
Concepts of Commitment and Neutrality: It is a matter of controversy whether the puhlic servants should be politically committed or neutral. The idea of 'commitment' has its application in totalitarian (particularly communist) countries where the civil servants have to
48. Ibid., p. 49.
49. Ibid., p. 58.
50. Ibid., p. 51.384
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follow the linexif 'official ideology'. All civil servants are commanded to implement official policies faithfully, otherwise they are 'purged' or suitably tortured. New courses are introduced and fresh instructions are given that must be faithfully followed by all functionaries of the state. Not only this, all important public offices are given to the 'faithful' elements with the result that the difference between the party cadres and the civil servants is virtually blurred. In short, the concept of 'commitment' signifies that the progressive goals of a government cannot be realised effectively unless the civil servants are full1.' dedicated to them and to the political process through which they are formulated.
But in liberal-democratic countries the concept of 'neutrality' of public services is appreciated. It implies anything like strict impartiality, anonymity, obscurity and political aloofness of the public servants. Viewed thus, bureaucracy is lauded for being a 'neutral' instrument of the power of modern state and, for this reason, one of the most powerful bulwarks of democracy essential to the system of parliamentary democracy where the political complexion of the ruling party is ever subject to periodic changes.51 Giving vent to such an idea, an English writer says : "The requirements of the civil services are that it shall be impartially selected, administratively competent, politically neutral, and imbued with spirit of service to community."12
The liberal view, however, requires reinterpretation in the light of the prevailing conditions, particularly of the Third World countries. Here it is stressed that civil servants should be committed to the 'ideals' of the constitution as well as to the cause of service to the community. There cannot be anything like programme neutrality when gigantic schemes of public welfare are taken up for the social and economic reconstruction of the country. In other words, civil servants cannot take a neutral position between welfare and stagnation, between service and apathy, and between action and inaction. As an eminent Indian bureaucrat says: "Thus, the concept of neutrality, in stead of being redundant, requires to be reinterpreted and reaffirmed in a positive perspective in a fast changing socio-political spectrum as well as obligations. As the administration must be in tune with the public opinion and changing needs of the society, the public servant has all along to be a student of public opinion, but no
51. See Earl Attlee : "Civil Servants, Ministers, Parliament and the Public" in W.A. Robson (ed.) : The Civil Service in Britain and France, p.. 16.
52. E.N. Gladden : The Civil Services, p. 35.
party politician."-3
Critical Eastimate: Ramsay Muir has criticised the system of bureaucracy for creating 'red-tapism' or making unnecessary delay, 'self-aggrandisement' or tendency to see others with contempt as 'amateurs', and 'departmentalism' or the evil of splitting up the work of government into a number of isolated and self-dependent sections, each pursuing its own ends without any adequate correlation with the rest.:! Justice Lord Hewart of Bury has condemned the hold of bureaucracy as 'new despotism'. These points of attack are valid. But equally valid is the argument that no government can function without the role of expert civil servants. The heads of the political executive are politicians who devote most of their time for party work or in political activities. They have very little time to spare for departmental work. Moreover, they change quickly under the weight of political winds. It is the community of civil servants who run the administration of the country. It may be endorsed that policy is made by those who know the secret of mechanism: those who are in charge of daily administration tend to accumulate awe-inspiring knowledge, surround themselves with mystery, and assume operational control."55
A fine conclusion can be that while the ministers must not be like tools in the hands of their permanent officials, the latter must not live like 'stooges' of their political chiefs. A happy coordination bet-wet:"; the two must prevail. The civil services must operate within a liberal-democratic framework in sincere cooperation and harmony with the norms of a social welfare state. What Laski wrote about the parliamentary government of England is a workable ideal for others to emulate that most successful cabinets "have always been those in which a number of dynamic personalities have been balanced by , secondary men of this kind."56
Legislature
Meaning: In spite of the fact that now executive has become the most important organ of government, the legislature, most commonly known by the name of parliament, is still regarded as having the most
53. T.N. Chaturvedi : "Commitment in Public Service—Its implications and Imperatives" in Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies., New Delhi, Vol. XI, No. 1, 1977, p. 23.
54. Ramsay Muir, op. cit., pp. 54-56.
55. Bernard E. Brown, rp. cit., pp. 49-50.
56. Laski : Parliamentary Government in England, p. 287.386
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celebrated place in the political organisation of a country. The word 'parliament', that originally meant 'a talk', is derived from'the French word Parler (to speak or parley) and the Latin Parliamentum. Garner savs: "Of the several argans through which the will of the state is expressed and carried out, the legislature unquestionably occupies the paramount place... In all states it exercises a large control over the sources of supply and its power to create public offices and to establish new services. Thus, the legislature is, in a sense, the regulator of the administration."57
It is said that modern parliaments arose through a fusion of the legislative and judicial functions and the voting on taxation or supply. In medieval times a parliament was usually a meeting of the king-in-council to which the judges were summoned for consideration of pleas and petitions to the king to redress grievances. On the other hand, the word 'parliament' may be applied to what was more usually described as a colloquium, a meeting of the clergy, or any or all of them. Such a colloquium might be summoned, for instance, to discuss measures for dealing with raids by the Scots over the border, or the sending of any army to Gascony. More often, the purpose was to obtain assent for the levying of an aid or custom duties. In fine, the parliament signifies a body of persons assembled for discussion.
As such, the legislature is regarded as the 'mirror of the will of the nation'. It is taken as the chief means of the expression of the popular will; or a body that can speak on behalf of the people. By virtue of being a body of the representatives of ;the people, it is considered to be the most important organ of the political system. Hence, the legislature is exalted in colourful phrases as 'grand inquest of the nation',, 'embodiment of the general will of the community', 'a committee of grievances', 'a congress of opinions' and the like.
Tenure: What should be the length of the life of a legislature? For instance, the members of the House of Lords in England and the Senators of Canada enjoy life tenure;58 on the other hand, the tenure of the American House of Representatives is two years. The tenure of the Swiss Federal Assembly is four years, but the tenure of the Lok Sabha in India and of the Soviet of the Union in the USSR is five years. So is the case with British House of Commons which had
57. Garner, op. cit., p. 593.
58. By an amendment of 1965, it has been provided in Canada that a Senator would retire on completing the age of 75 years. But it would not apply to the Senators nominated before the enforcement of this law in 1965.
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a term of seven years before the Parliament Act of 1911. In the case of the upper chambers of the USA (Senate) and of India (Rajya Sabha) the tenure of the members is of six years, though 1/3 members retire every second year. Same is the case with the Japanese upper chamber (House of Councillors), though the tenure of the lower chamber (House of Representatives) is four years. The Australian House ofe's Representatives has a term of three years. It shows that the terms ns of the legislatures (whether unicarri?ral or bicameral) vary from country to country.
But the question arises as to what should be the optimum tenure of a legislature. In this connection, two points may be given. First, the system of life-long tenure (as of the British House of Lords and the Canadian Senate) is entirely undesirable. It is an unpardonable violation of the norms of a democratic system. Second, too short a term of the legislature (as two years of the American House of Representatives) is also undesirable in view of the fact that it prevents stability. A fairly long tenure (as of seven years of the British House of Commons before the Act of 1911) is also undesirable, because it weakens the bond between the electorate and the representatives. Final preference may be given in favour of a term of four or five years. It is also required that the composition of the legislature must be governed by the rules of representative system.
In this direction, we may refer to the view of Laski. Says he: "The legislature of a state needs, under modern conditions, to be based on universal suffrage if it is to speak with proper authority to its constituents. It must be large enough to enable its members to keep in effective touch with the electorate, and small enough to enable genuine discussion to take place; in a body, for instance, as large as of the Russian Soviet Government all individuality in debate is lost, and the assembly becomes a mere organ of registration for the will of the dominant party machine. It must submit itself for reelection to the citizens at the end of a given term the length of which it is itself unable, under normal conditions, to alter. This term must be large enough to secure two results: The legislature must be able to make itself responsible for an ample programme and its members must have time enough thoroughly to acquaint themselves with the operation of its procedure. But the term must also be short enough to make it certain that the legislature does not lose touch with constituents.... On the whole, it appears that a life of about five years corresponds to these requirements."59
59. Laski : An Introduction to Politics, pp. 53-54.38;
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Composition: A question arises as to what should be the mode of comoosition of the legislature. We may lake note of two important points in this connection. It is universally taken for granted that the members of the first, or lower, or popular house should be elected by the people. Thus, the members of the House of Commons in England and Canada, of the House of Representatives in the United States. Japan and Australia, of the Lok Sabha in India, of National Assembly in France and Switzerland, of National People's Congress in China, and of the Soviet of the Union in USSR are elected by the people. Second, the mode of the composition of the upper or second house varies. For instance, the members of the House of Lords (English Peers) enjoy hereditary membership, the Senators of America, Australia and New Zealand and the members of the Swiss Council of State are elected directly be the people; the members of the Indian Rajya Sabha and the Senators of France are elected indirectly by the governments of the units; the Senators of Canada and South Africa are appointed by the Governor-General.
in this direction, it may be suggested that the best course is to have direct election of the members of the first chamber of the legislature and, for that reason, jt is known as popular chambc - In case the legislature is bi-cameral, the members of the second or .,, house should be elected indirectly so as to give representation 10 different sections, interests, classes and units (in the case of a federation). Moreover, the members of the upper house must be persons of higher age and experience. It is, therefore, well counselled: "Reason and experience wou!A seem to suggest that if legislative bodies are to continue to be organised on the bi-camera! principle, the two chambers should be constituted on different bases and principles. The members of one chamber ought to enjoy longer tenures, they ought to represent a larger constituency, higher membership qualifications ought to be require! of them, and they might well be chosen in a different manner and by a differently constituted electorate."60
60. Garner, op. cit., pp. 621-22. Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb suggest two parliaments in stead of two houses of a parliament—Social Parliament and Political Parliament—so as to deal with different problems. While the former would deal with social matters, the latter with political affairs only. They tell us nothing about the composition of the two parliaments, nor of -coordinating a nancies between the two. Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth ofGreat'Britain, Part II, Chapter 1. But Laski feels that, despite its merits, it is ":in inherently -inworkable plan." A Grammar of Politics, p. 337.
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Functions: In strict terms, the function of the legislature is to make laws and have deliberations over important matters of public importance. In fact, the functions of legislature are many that touch administrative, financial and judicial spheres as well. We may enumerate them under these heads:
1. Law-Making: The first and foremost function of a legislature is to make laws. The bills are moved, debated and passed by the legislature that become acts after getting the formal assent of the head of the state. In all democratic countries, it is a common affair that bills are given three readings and references to the committees are made invariably to discuss the proposals threadbare. Basically different from this, however, is the case of a communist country where not the legislature as such but its small committee (as Presidium in the USSR and Standing Committee in China) adopt a bill (decree) at the invisible behest of the party in power and that is formally adopted by the legislature afterwards to assign it the form of a proper legislative measure. We may also take note of the fact that an 'ordinance' promulgated by the head of the state having the force of law is adopted by the legislature in the form of a bill and then it takes the form of a law. Thus, the laws of a country are a creation of its legislature and, for this reason, it is known as the law-making or the rule-making department of the state.
2. Control over Administration: The legislature exercises control over the administration of the country. In a parliamentary system, the ministers are individually as well as collectively responsible-to the legislature. As such, the legislature may censure the ministers. The ministers may be removed by a no-confidence motion. In a presidential system, the legislature may remove the head of the state by adopting a motion of impeachment. We know that the American Congress took up impeachment proceedings against President Andrew Johnson in 1868 who could survive by a single vote. Impeachment proceedings were started against President Nixon who resigned in
[ 1973. The English Parliament condemned the action of Prime Minister Macmillan and he had to resign in 1963. The Bundestag of West Germany forced Chancellor Erhard to leave in 1966. By asking questions and their supplementaries, by adopting motions and resolutions and, above all, by censuring the conduct of the executive, the legislature exercises390
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
its control over the administration of the country.
3. Elective: The legislatures also perform elective functions. It may be seen in the election of important office bearers of the house. Although British Parliament does not choose the monarch, it can make a law to determine the mode of his or her successionand abdication. The American House of Representatives has the power to elect the President in case no candidate gets absolute majority of votes in the presidential election. The Knesset elects the President in Israel; the Parliament of India (with State Legislative Assemblies) elects the President. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR elects from amongst its members the President, the Prims Minister and the ministers. So the Federal Assembly elects seven members of Federal Executive. The French Parliament approves the nomination of the Prime Minister made by the President and the American Senate approves nominations of the secretaries made by the President. The Parliaments of Canada and New Zealand prefer names out of which one is nominated as the Governor-General of the Dominion by the British monarch. The list of the entire ministry is approved by the Knesset in Israel. The monarch appoints a Prime Minister, but this nomination must be approved by the Diet in Japan. Besides, every legislature elects its.own presiding officer and his deputy and may also remove them by a vote of a no-confidence.
4. Financial: The legislature performs some financial functions as well. The annual statement of the income and expenditure of the government (budget) is prepared by the ministers, but it is passed by the legislature. Supplementary budgets may also be passed by the legislature. The legislature may also vote on accounts in advance so that the government may work before the budget is passed. It may be done to meet some urgent situation. It is true that the legislature cannot insert new proposals of revenue in the budget, it can certainly propose 'cuts' and thereby modify some of the provisions of the budget.
5. Judicial: Finally, the legislature performs some judicial functions as well. The British Parliament may discuss the issue of 'privileges' of the house and then take a decision to admonish, reprimand "" or imprison the guilty person or persons. The Parliaments of Britain and India and the Congress of the United States may take a decision to disqualify a person from the membership of the house on a certain
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serious charge. The house is the master of its proceedings and, as such, it can take action against a person who commits 'contempt' of the house. The legislature becomes a court when it hears and tries cases of impeachment against the President or other high officers of the state. In such cases the judgment of the legislature is final. Hence, it cannot be challenged in a court of law. In a way, the legislature has a prerogative of mercy of its own. It may, however, revoke punishment given by it to a certain person on the basis of reconsideration.
We may now come to form the impression that the functions of a I legislature cover many fields.6l It may well be said that the role of an organised assembly is to analyse, criticise, and pass or reject the 'policies and proposals of the government; to voice the desires and anxieties of the mass of the citizens; to protect their liberties against any abuse of power by the government; to educate public opinion through its debates; and, finally,—as the term 'legislature' implies— to participate in the process of law-making to the extent this is still possible in an areas that relies increasingly on the expert and the administrator.02
61. A line of distinction may, however, be drawn between the old and the new interpretations of the functions of parliament. Referring to the case of English Parliament, Walter Bagehot said that legislation was the most fundamental function. Taylor says that even the work of criticising and controlling the government is covered by the law-making function of the Parliament. "Indeed, much of the force of the criticising power of the House is derived from this fact: that it is a body which can, by means of passing laws, do anything it likes." The House of Commons at Work, p. 126. But Laski argues that the real function of the Parliament "is to watch the process of administration to safeguard the liberties of private citizens." Parliamentary Government in England, p. 167.
62. On the issue of the control of the legislature over the government, the traditional view rf J.S. Mill is different from the modern view of Michael Curtis. For instance, Mill says that a popular assembly is not allowed to administer, or dictate in detail those who have the charge of administration. Even when honesty meant, the interference is almost always injurious.' Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government, p. 231. Again: "In stead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to. watch and control the government to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable; to ce-n.sure them if found condemnable and, if the men who compose the government abuse their power, or fulfil it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office and392
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Unicameraiis'.-i: in early modern period unica'reraiism or a legislature with one chamber was preferred. After Ihe revolution of 1789, the National Assembly of France voted in ftvoi-r of such a system. !t continued until (848. At the same time, in England such a system was favoured by Sentham. Its great advocate in America, Benjamin Franklin, compared a bicameral legislature to a cart with a horse hitched to each end, both pulling in opposite directions. In the present century the idea *of unicameralism lost its significance, though the Spanish constitution of 1931 boldly subscribed to it. Today unicameralism is out of fashion, though its instance can be seen in a small state like Nicaragua and Panama. To the astonishment of all, it prevails in a vast^ .country like China where National People's Congress is the legislature. Another instance is Bangladesh.
Th.. defence of the system of unicameralism, it may be said that it secures unity in stead of duality in the organisation of the legislative branch of the government. A prominent American leader like Benjamin Franklin could say that two or three houses would be like two or three 'sovereignties.' "The law"' said Abbe Sieves, "is the will of the people; the people cannot, at the same time, have two different wills on the same subject, therefore, the legislative body which represents the people ought to be essentially one. Where there are two chambers, discord and division will be inevitable and the will of the people will be >, ralysed by inaction. If a second chamber dissents from the first, it is mischievous; if it agrees with it, it is superfluous/'63 "It is a dilemma," said Bryce, "which recalls that what was attributed to Caliph Omar when he permitted the destruction of the library of Alexandria: "If the books agree with the Koran, they are not needed; if they differ, they ought to perish."64
The leaders of the French revolution like Condorcet and Robespierre echoed the same thought. The burden of their argument was that keeping of two chambers would amount to the bifurcation of sovereignty of the state. Legislation being merely the expression of the common will, the necessity of committing it to two separate assemblies, each having a veto upon the action of the other was not justified. In America Judge Story said: "All the arguments derived
either expressly or virtually appoint their successors." Ibid., p. 239. But Curtis says that "probably the most significant contemporary function of assemblies is the supervision over and inquiry into the performance and behaviour of governments.' Comparative Government and Politics, p. 188.
63. See Garner, op. cit., p. 603.
64. Bryce: Modern Democracies, Vol. II, p. 399.
from the analogy between the movements of political bodies and the operations of physical nature, all the impulses of political parsimony. all the prejudices against a second coordinate legislative assembly stimulated by the exemplification of it in the British parliament, -v;re against a division of the legislative power."6"' In short, as Garner says, "a double-chambered legislature was an assembly divided against itself."66
The main points in defence of the principle of unicameralisrn have been thus enumerated:67
1. As it concentrates authority in a single house, the electorate knows where responsibility rests for any legislative aciion.
2. A single house also avoids duplication of effort, additional expense, and the tendency of separate bodies to disagree, if only for the people of asserting their independence.
3. Procedure through a single house may allow greater sp;ed in the legislative process a significant consideration in modern times when action rather than delay is required.
4. It is more democratic, because it avoids the possible obsf action of the popular will by. an unrepresentative upper house.
But as we shall see in the following section, the principle of unicameralism has lost its relevance in modern times. A most uncompromising critic of unicameralism like Lecky says: "Of all the forms of government that are posssible among mankind, I donot know any which is likely to be worse than the government of a single omnipotent democratic chamber. It is at least as susceptible as an individual despot to the temptations that grow out of the possession of an uncontrolled power, and it is likely to act with less sense of responsibility and much less real deliberation."63
Bi-Cameralism: ft means a legislature with two houses. The British Parliament is bi-cameral for having House of Lords and the Hou^e of Commons as the upper and lower chambers respectively. So is the case with the American Congress where the Senate is the upper chamber, and the House of Representatives is the lower chamber The Parliament of India has the same pos'tion by virtue of having Rajya Sabha as the upper and Lok Sabha as the lower chamber. The Canadian Parlia-
65. See Garner, op. cit., p. 604.
66. Ibid.
€1. D.G. Hitchner and H.V. HarbiP: 7V P-ittiri of Hiivn Government,
p. 396. 68. Lecky: Democracy and Liberty, Vol. I,"p. 299.394
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
J
ment has the Senate and the House of Commons, the Japanese Diet has theHouse of Councillors and the House of Representatives, the French Parliament has its Senate and National Assembly and the Australian Parliament has the Senate and the House of Representatives respectively as the upper and lower chambers. The Council of State and National Council are respectively the second and the first chambers of the Federal Assembly in Switzerland. The Supreme Soviet has its Soviet of Nationalities and Soviet of the Union as the upper and lower chambers, though the Russian leaders detest the way of designating one as the lower chamber and the other as the upper chamber. In short, bi-cameralism means the existence of a two-chambered legislature.
A pertinent question arises as to why the second chamber is constituted when the work of legislation can be done by one chamber. It is obvious that the existence of the second chamber is informed by certain points of advantage. These are:
1. The second chamber "acts as a check upon hasty, rash and ill-considered legislation. Legislative assemblies are often subject to strong passion and excitement and are sometimes impatient, impetuous and careless. The function of a second chamber is to restrain such tendencies and to compel careful consideration of legislative projects. It interposes delay between the introduction and final adoption of a measure and thus permits time for reflection and deliberation."89 So says Chancellor Kent: "One great object of the separation of the legislature into two houses acting separately and with coordinate powers is to destroy the evil effects of sudden and strong excitement and of precipitate measures springing fro m passion, caprice, prejudice, personal influence, and party intrigue, which have been found by sad experience to exercise a potent and dangerous sway in single assemblies."70
69. Garner, op. cit., p. 605.
70. Kent: Commentaries, Vol. I, Lecture XL As Gettell says: "A single chamber is in danger of being ' rash and one-sided, swayed by emotion or passion, satisfied with incomplete and hasty generalisations. Between two houses there is likely to bs health rivalry, causing each to subject the measures of the other to careful scrutiny, and resulting in more careful analysis of principles and needs than would b e the case if the contest were between a majority and a minority in a single house only. By interposing delay between the introduction and the final adoption of a measure, the second house compels time for further reflection and deliberation." Op. cit., p.-U3.
ORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT
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2. The second chamber also acts as a check against legislative despotism and tyranny. In case all law-making power "is vested in a-single chamber, the danger of its drawing to itself all political power in the state and of becoming corrupt or tyrannical is increased. The security of liberty is protected by the existence of two houses, each of which may check any tendency towards despotism on the part of the other."71 In the view of ^fvlill, the second chamber serves an important purpose as a check upon legislative despotism. A majoruy in a single assembly with no check but their own will "easily becomes despotic and overwhelming, if released from t!he necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred i\ by another constituted authority."72 There is a natural propensity on the part of legislative bodies to accumulate power in their hands or "to draw into their grasp the whole government of the state."73 Under these circumstances, said Judge Story, the only effective barrier against oppression, whether accidental or intentional, "is to separate its operations, to balance interest against interest, ambition against ambition, the combination and spirit of dominion of one body against the like combination and spirit of another."74
3. The bi-cameral system affords a convenient means of giving representation to special interests and classes in the state, particularly to the aristocratic sections of the community, "in order to counterbalance the undue preponderance of the popular element in one of the chambers, thus introducing into the legislature a conservative force to curb the radicalism of the popular chamber."75 At first glance, this may seem to be undemocratic, but it should be observed that democracy "is not merely a matter of effective will of the majority; it requires some protection of the interests of minorities as well.'""
4. The existence of the second chamber lightens the burden of legislation by dividing the work into two chambers and thereby makes it possible to see things from different angles and standpoints. Since the composition of the two houses is
71. Gettell op. cit., p. 314.
72. Mill: Considerations on Representative Government, Chapter 13.
73. Garner, op. cit., p. 604.
74. Ibid
75. Gettell, op. cit., p. 314.
76. Hitchnerand Harbold, op. cit., p. 395.396 PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
different and since elections take place at different times, it is possible for the people to demonstrate their will at the time of elections so that the legislators may take due note of the will of the people. Hence, it is said: "The two houses make possible a more correct interpretation of general will. A single house, especially if all its members are elected at one time, is in danger of growing out of sympathy with popular opinion before its term expires. Two houses chosen at different times or for different terms, may remedy this defect, and may represent more accurately public opinion on new issues tiiat appear."77
5. Finally, bi-cameralism is necessary in a federal state where the people have their representation in the first chamber and the units have their representation in the second one. It is, . however, a different matter that the number of seats allotted to the component units of a federation be the same irrespective of the territorial and demographic composition as in USA, Switzerland, Australia and Nigeria or different as in Canada and India.
But the system of bi-cameralism has its demerits too that can be seen in the light of the merits of unicameralism given earlier. It is rightly said that the existence of the second chamber makes an additional burden on the public exchequer; it leads to the tendency of bitter rivalry between the two chambers; it can be proved that the second chamber acts not as a revising but as a delaying chamber: and, above all, it lives like an ornamental institution of state structure. But it may also be pointed out that the system of bi-cameralism has gained universal recognition as a result of which its prevalence may be seen in most of the states of the world. What is required, above all, is the introduction of sobriety and wisdom into the government. It is expected that the second chamber would meet this requirement, "But if other institutions can-fulfil the conditions of good government, a second chamber is not necessary.'""8
Dedfae: However, the most astonishing thing about the study of legislature is that its authority has been overshadowed by that of the executive on one side and by that of the judiciary on the other. Further, it has been eroded by the role of party politics. The net result of all this is that the position of legislature has declined, though
77. Gettell, op. cit., pp. 313-14.
78. Finer, op. cit., p. 435.
iRGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT
397
Isome may go to the extent of dubbing it as 'demised' keeping in their view the case of a country under a totalitarian system. The affirmation of such a point draws its sustenance from the following main points:
1. The area of authority originally belonging to the legislature has been usurped by the executive. While confining our attention to the case of a legislature in a country having parliamentary form of government, we find that it is the cabinet that decides about ^'many important matters like summoning, adjourning and proroguing the session of the parliament, dissolving the popular chamber of the legislature, writing the text of the inaugural address that is delivered by the head of the state, preparing daily time table of the business of the house, effecting initiation of debate on a bill or a resolution moved by it, introducing a money bill or a budget, ox making demand for grants or appropriation and the like. In a country having presidential form of government, the head of the executive (President) may 'veto' a bill passed by the legislature and it is seldom'that 'veto' is overriden by the readoption of that bill by special majority. Moreover, the President has his 'friends' in the legislature with whose help he may influence the work of legislation. The prerogative of making an appeal to the electorate is the most powerful weapon in the hands of the executive chief by which he may deal with the 'refractory behaviour' of the legislators. In short, the legislature has now become like a tool in the hands of the executive.7'1
2. The authority of the legislature has been further eroded by the role of the judiciary. Particularly in a country having 'judicial review' (as the United States and India), things have reached a point that 'the constitution is what the judges say it is'. What the legislature and the executive in combination may do in the form of having a law, it may be set aside by the courts on the plea of being 'unconstitutional'. Irked with the behaviour of the Supreme Court in the 1930s, President Roosevelt had to debunk the American constitution as the
79. What Ramsay Muir has said about his English Parliament applies to other legislatures as well that the "cabinet has to a remarkable extent diminished the power and position of Parliament, robbed its proceedings of significance, made it appear that Parliament exists mainly for the purpose? of maintaining or of somewhat ineffectually criticising an all-good but omnipotent cabinet and transferred the main discussion of political issues from Parliament to Platform and the members." How Britain is Governed, p. 69.il
398 PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
'relic of horse and buggy days'. So happened in our country when the Supreme Court invalidated some executive and legislative measures made by the government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1969-70. Then the executive had to think in terms of 'packing up' the judiciary. Despite this all, the inflated authority of the courts draws sustenance from the faith that people repose in its venerable position. It is an irony of politics that while people look at the increase in the authority of the executive with fear and suspicion, they happily bear with the enhanced authority of the judiciary in the name of its being a temple of justice. The result of all this is that the authority of the legislature has been overshadowed by the executive on the one sid? and by the authority of the courts on the other. Laski says that "every executive act should be open to scrutiny in the courts and the decisions of the judiciary should always be binding on the executive, unless the legislature otherwise resolves."80
3. Above all, the role of party politics has its own place in the attenuation of the authority of its legislature. The members of the parliament have to toe the official line. The control of the whips is always there to keep the members like 'robots'. The leaders act like 'political bosses' and the members have to submit willy-nilly to the dictates of the party leaders. Action may be taken against a member for doing anything in the house against the 'command' of the party. He may be suspended, even expelled, from the party on the charge of being a defector or a violator of the discipline. One may say that these things donot exist in the case of American Congress, but we may also say that even there the'autonomy'of the legislators has been crushed very much by the role of pressure groups that indulge in the techniques of 'lobbying' and Mog rolling'.
These points hint at the decline of the legislatures in present times. A student of comparative politics says: "But almost all political analysts are aware that the golden age of parliaments is over."'1
Judiciary Meaning and Necessity: As already pointed out at several places
80. Laski: A Grammar of Politics, p. 298.
81. M. Curtis: Comparative Government and Politics, p. 201.
ORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT
399
judiciary is the third and a separate as well as an independent organ of a political organisation It includes those officers of government whose function is to apply the existing law to individual cases.82 In other words, judiciary means the body of those public officials who interpret and enforce the law of the state. In the words of Laski: "The judiciary of state may be defined as that body of officials whose work consists in the resolution of complaint, whether between subject and subject, or between state and subject, that the laws of the state have been a matter of fairly common agreement among thinkers that the judicial power should be regarded in its nature and even more in the persons who administer it as separate from other aspects of political authority."83
The significance of judiciary is contained in its very meaning. In every state the citizens expect justice at the hands o£ their administrators who are entrusted with the task of maintaining a good government in the country. The work of the legislators is mainly confined to the making of law; but the administrators are required to implement the laws of the state. Disputes may take place between the citizens or between the citizens and their rulers. For this it is needed that there should be a separate department of the state to maintain the 'rule of law'. Locke well says that 'where law ends, tyranny begins'. The role of the judiciary figures in so as to enforce the system of law. "Considering that one of the primary objects for which the state was established was the creation and protection of individual rights, the necessity of judicial organ or organs as the means through which this object might be accomplished has been recognised from early times. A society without legislative organs is conceivable and, indeed, fairly developed legislative organs did not make their appearance in the life of the state until modern times, but a civilised state without judicial organs and machinery is hardly conceivable."84
It follows that the existence of an independent judiciary is a proof of the existence of a good state. It is one of the hall-marks of a civilised political community. So says an eminent English writer: "The importance of the judiciary in political constitution is rather profound than prominent. On the one hand, in popular discussion of forms and changes of government, the judicial organ often drops out of sight; on the other hand, in determining a nation's rank in political civilisation,
82. Gilchrist: Principles of Political Science, p. 34.
83. H.J. Laski: "Judiciary" in E.R.A. Seligman (ed.): Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, New York, 1967, Vol. VII, p. 464.
84. Garner, op. cit., p. 750.PRINCIPLES OFTV1ODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice, as defined by the law, is actually realised in its judicial administration, both as between one private citizen and another, and as between private citizens and members of the government.1'35 Likewise, says Bryce: "There is no better test of excellence of a government th:m the efficiency of its judicial system.... If the lamp of justice goes out in darkness, how great is the darkness."ss
Recruitment and Functions: There are various methods of the recruitment of judges, each having its own points of strength and weakness. They may be nominated by the head of the state vide his discretionary power, or may be appointed by the executive chief on the basis of the results of some competitive examination, or may be elected by the legislature of the country, or may be co-opted by fellow judges. Different modes prevail in different countries. For instance, in the United States, the judges are nominated by the President and their nominations are ratified by the Senate afterwards.*17 In Japan the judges are designated by the cabinet and their appointments are formally made by the monarch that are subsequently continued by the Diet. In Britain judges are selected from amongst the banisters. West Germany and France provide cases of hierarchical career structure for judges. In both countries the judaes are appointed by the government after they acquire a university degree in law and then undergo a period of legal training following a stiff competitive examination. In communist countries (as the U3SR and China) the judges are elected by the legislature. The election of the judges for the lower courts takes place in some States of America also. In India the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are appointed by the ('resident, but judges of the lower courts are selected by the State public service commissions on the basis of written tests followed by interviews. In spite of having some weaknesses of its own, the best method of recruitment of judges is to select them on the basis of written and verbal examinations, though some place should be given to appointment of judges on the basis of their distinguished juristic career.
The functions of the judiciary may be thus enumerated with this word of caution that these differ from one political system to another:
S5. Sidgwiek: Elements of Politics, p. 481. So. James Bryce: Modern Democracies, Vol. H, p. 421.
87. While criticising this system, Laski says that it "may tend to inject purely partisan considerations into the process of confirmation." Op- cit., p 466.
ORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT
401
1. Adjudication: The first and foremost function of the judges is to administer justice. They hear and decide cases—civil, criminal, constitutional—in the light of the arguments given by the concerned parties. The courts are regarded as the defenders of the rights and liberties of the people. In countries having written constitutions, the courts are also entrusted with the power of interpreting the fundamental law of the land. They are charged with the duty of upholding the constitution as the supreme law of the land and thus acting as the guardian of the constitution.
2. Legislation: Though legislation is the work of the legislature. the courts also make laws in a different way. A different kind of law comes out of the decisions of the courts which is known as case-law. What an American judge (Hughes) said is not a legal fiction but a fact that 'judges do legislate.' Where a law is silent or ambiguous, or appears to be inconsistent with some other law of the land, the courts decide what the law is and how it should prevail. In this respect they are guided by the norms of equity and judicial commonsense. In other words, the process of adjudication "amounts to a supplementary form of legislation and a large part of existing law is said to be made by the judges."88
3. Guardian of the Constitution: In a federal system the courts act as the guardian of the constitution and an umpire between the'central and provincial governments. All constitutional disputes between the units or between the units and the centre are settled by the highest court of the country and its decision is final. In other words, the highest court of a federal state acts like a constitutional convention at work. An independent and impartial court is indispensably needed in a federal state to resolve constitutional disputes between central and regional governments and also to keep them within reasonable limits laid down by the constitution. As J.S. Mill says: "It is evidently
Leacock, op- cit., pp, 199 200. "The judge is primuily an interpreter of law. No law. however, when it is made, can possibly foresee all cises that may arise under it, and frequently judges ha> e to decide cases in which no direct law is applicable. Such cases are decided on various principles such as equity or common sense and that what is known as precedents are formed. These precedents are followed by other judges in similar crm degenerates and the other takes its pla:e. Thus, the cycle goes on. For instance, the rule of a virtuous man, called monarchy, is degenerated into that of a tyrant, or the class of virtuous wealthy persons is replaced with the class of those who are men of vice and greed; likewise, polity is replaced by democracy in which there is no place for merit and liberty is substituted by licence. It may also happen that monarchy is replaced by aristocracy and thereafter aristocracy by democracy. The rule of the mob is the perverred form of the rule of many persons. This cycle goes on in a way as - sunshine is replaced by darkness and vice versa. Monarchy is replaced by tyranny, aristocracy by oligarchy, and, finally, polity by democracy, and then out of the prevailing darkness, there "arises the supremely virtuous man, some Caesar, who alone can restore order410
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
OF GOVERNMENTS
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and reason, the cycle is completed and begins all over again.3
In modern times, such a classification is defective for various reasons. First, it does not cover all prevailing forms of government that have emerged to find their place on a typological presentation of political systems. For instance, this classification ignores dictatorship, cabinet government, presidential government, quasi-presidential government, unitary government, federal government, quasi-federal government, etc. Second, political situations have now become so complex that one may hardly make a distinction between the 'true' and "perverted' forms of a political organisation. Even rank totalitarian systems (whether farcist or communist) are lauded by the writers for their own reasons. Third, the rule of a single person like monarchy, as conceived by Aristotle, is now quite impossible. Fourth, we may not appreciate the view that democracy is a perverted form of government. Last, it is a classification of'governments and not of states as designated by Aristotle. As R.G. Gettell sums up: '"'To this classification several objections may be urged. The basis is quantitative and numerical rather than one of principle. Aristocracy and democracy shade off into one another in such a way that a clear distinction between them is hard to make. Many states combine elements of the various forms, and any attempt to apply this classification to existing states would lead to wide differences of opinions. Finally, this classification also is in reality based on the nature of the state's organisation and, except as a vague description of the general spirit of the state, is actually a classification of governmental forms."4
Modern Classifications of Governments
From ancient to modern times, attempts to classify political systems have been innumerable. A good number of writers ha\e Jone the same in modern times. The name of a German writer Waitz comes first who classified political systems as republics, theocracies, kingdoms, unitary states, composite or compound states, federal states, and confederations. Pradier-Fodere, an eminent French writer on international law, classified them into two groups—single state:, and united states. Within the first category he placed personal unions, real unions and incorporated unions; in the second categorv, he placed confederated and federal states. However, the attempt of another German writer Von Mohl is better who described diiYerent
3. E. Barker: Plato and Aristotle, pp. 473-74.
4. Gettell: Political Science, p. 193.
categories of states as partriarchal states, theocracies, patrimonial states, classic or antique states, legal states, despotic states, and military vassal states. Further, he divided his classic states into sub-categories as monarchies, aristocracies and democracies.
Attention may now be paid to a German-cum-Swiss publicist, Biuntschli, who sought to make an improvement upon the classi-fic:iuon of Aristotle. To him, Aristotle's sixfold classification was the best example of a typological study of 'states.' However, he suggested that a further variety should be added to or inserted into the paradigm of Aristotle showing theocracy in the normal and ideocr?cy in the perverted spheres. Moreover, while he named the above forms as 'primary,' he designated some 'secondary' forms as well by labelling them as 'free,' 'half-free,' and 'unfree' states and went on to add that theocracy, aristocracy and democracy belonged to the three categories'respectively. The attempt of another German writer Jeilinek is also well-known in this connection who classified political systems into two broad varieties—monarchy and republic. He further divided monarchy into hereditary and elective forms with absolute and limited forms and the republic into three forms—democratic, aristocratic and oligarchical. Finally, he categorised democratic variety into direct and indirect forms.
We may also refer to the work of Burgess who suggest? four principles of distinction and then tries to place several forms of government into those categories. First, he suggests the grounds of identity or non-identity of the state with its government on the basis of which political organisation may have primary and representative forms; second, by using the nature of executive tenure as the basis, governments can be hereditary and elective; third, the relationship between the executive and legislative departments creates the distinction between parliamentary and presidential forms; finally, the concentration and distribution of powers makes the case of unitary and federal governments. Likewise, the classification of Marriott shows that there can be unitary and federal governments on the basis of the concentration and distribution of powers between the centre and the units. The existence of a rigid constitution in a federal state creates a line of distinction between the ordinary and the higher laws of the land, while a flexible constitution in a unitary state has no distinction between the two. Finally, the relationship between the executive and the legislative departments leads to the distinction of four kinds of governments—monarchical, presidential, parliamentary and despoti ,
However, Leacock presents the classification of governments in a simplified manner as:412
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Governments
OF GOVERNMENTS
413
Despotic
Democratic
Constitutional Monarchy Republic
Unitary
Federal Unitary Federal
Parliamentary
Presidential Parliamentary Presidential
According to him, the broad division may be despotic and democratic, while the latter may be classified into two forms—constitutional monarchy and republic. These two sub-varieties may have two other subordinate categories—unitary and federal. Finally, each of these two categories may have two forms—parliamentary and presidential.
From what we have said above, it is quite clear that different writers have made attempts in their own ways, but none has been able to present a scientific or universally acceptable classification of governments. It may be essily remarked that the nature of the problem is such that no writer has been able to lay down a standard criterion whereby political organisations may be distinguished on the bases of their form, spirit, or fundamental characteristics. There is a lot of overlapping as well if we compare the paradigms of different writers on this important subject. It shall, therefore, be better to deal with the formal classification of governments into broad categories as monarchy, aristocracy, democracy and their subsidiary forms like unitary and federal governments, parliamentary and presidential governments, or a queer mixture of them.
Monarchy
Meaning: It is the oldest form of government in which the ruling power is vested in a single person who wears a crown. He holds his office by virtue of hereditary succession, though we may trace some instances of his election by the influential sections of the community as well. He may be having the title of a king, an emperor, a czar and the like, but the essential point is that the government works according to his will. So Garner says: "In its widest sense, any government in which the supreme and final authority is in the hands of a single
person is a monarchy, without regard to the source of his election or the nature and duration of his tenure. In this sense, it is immaterial whether his office is conferred by election (by parliament or people) or is derived by hereditary succession, or whether he bears the title of emperor, king, czar, president, or dictator. It is the fact that the will of one man ultimately prevails in all matters of government which gives it the character of monarchy."5 So Jellinek defined monarchy as a government by a single physical will and he emphasised that its essential characteristic is the competence of the monarch to express the highest power of the state."6
Since monarchy is the oldest form of government, its prevalence may be seen in the history of all states of the world. It declined with the growth of democracy in modern times. For instance, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, etc. became republics. Another significant development in this regard is that while some European countries desired to retain their monarchical system, they preferred to harmonise it with the institutions of parliamentary democracy. Its best example can be seen in Britain where constitutional monarchy enables the people to call their system 'crowned republic'. Similar is the case with other monarchies as of Belgium and the Netherlands. So it is said: "Modern Europe's monarchs are ceremonial heads of their respective states, often loved and respected by their people, but actually devoid of political power. Such constitutional monarchs are symbols of the unity of the nation or empire; as such, they are useful, visible personifications of the state."7
Viewed thus, monarchy in fact may be differentiated from the monarchy in name. While the former signifies a system in which the monarch acts according to his will, in the latter the monarch is like a symbol of the headship of the state. In other words, while the monarch reigns as well as rules in the former position, he merely reigns in the latter capacity. Thus some writers make an attempt to identify monarchy of the latter type with a democratic system in which, as the English proverb goes, 'the king can do no wrong'. Behind such an attempt the motive of immunising the system of monarchy with its inherent stigma of 'despotism' may also be traced. So says Bryce: "By monarchy I understand the thing, not the name, i.e., not any state the head of which is called king or emperor, but one in which the personal will of the monarch is constantly effective, and, in the last resort,
5. Garner, op. cit., p. 305.
6. Ibid.
7. Rodee, Christol and Anderson: Introduction to Political Science, p. 37.414
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
OF GOVERNMENTS
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predominant factor in government."8
Kinds: Keeping in view the manner a monarch occupies his office, the system of monarchy may be categorised as hereditary and elective. Most monarchies of the world are and have been of a hereditary character in view of the fact that the oftVe goes by the fixed law of succession. Thus, the office remains co /ined to a particular dynastic house or family as of the Bourbons in France or Hanoverians in England. But the instances of an elective monarchy may also be seen in history. The early Roman kings were elective and so were the kings of Poland. The .emperors of the Holy Roman Empire were chosen by a small college of electors, usually from the same family. During the days of feudalism, the kings were elected by the nobles, the barons and the lords. Speaking of the election of early English monarchs, it was observed that the king "was in theory always elected and the fact of election was stated in the coronation service throughout the Middle Ages in accordance with the most ancient precedents."9 Even in early modern times, the first monarchs (as of Belgium and of some of the Balkan states) were chosen by election. But in due course the system of election was superseded by the system of hereditary succession.
The distinction between hereditary and elective monarchies is hardly of any practical significance, since in most of the cases the institution of monarchy has a hereditary character. What is of real importance at this stage is that monarchy may be classified into absolute and limited varieties. In case the monarch acts according to his will and caprice and, in the words of Louis XIV of France, he is 'the state', then it is a case of absolute or unlimited monarchy. Hobbes defends such a system in his Leviathan. In Austin's words, law of the state is the command of such a monarch (sovereign). The examples of such a system can be seen in the rule of the Tudors and the Stuarts of
8. James Bryce: Modern Democracies, Vol. II, p. 535.
9. Stubbs: Constitutional History of England, Vol. I, pp. 520-28. After the Glorious Revolution of 1683, William and Mary were chosen as the monarchs by the Convention Parliament in England. After the death of Queen Anne in., 1714, the office of the monarch was given to George T of the Hanover family by a decision of the Parliament. In 1936 Edward VIII abdicated according to a law of the Parliamant. Thus, in a sense the English monarchy is still elective, since Parliament claims and exercises the right to regulate the law of succession at its pbasure. To cite other cases we may say that Louis Napoleon becams the Emperor of .France in 1852 through a plebiscite and a vacancy in the Spaiiish throne was filled by parliamentary election in 1873.
cng!and, Mughals of India, Ottomans of Turkey, Czars of Russia etc. Such a monarchic?! system, as said above, has now declined, though jts instances may still be seen in the autocratic behaviour of the kings of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Nepal. While defining such a system, Garner says: "An absolute monarchy is one in which the monarch is not merely the titular head of the state, but is actually the sovereign; that is, his will is the law in respect to ail matters upon which it is proclaimed. In short, he is bound by no will except his own. Under such a system, the state and the government, legally speaking, are identical, the monarch being not only an organ of government and the sole organ, but also the sovereign."10
Basically different from this is the case of limited or constitutional monarchy in which the position of the monarch is like that of a titular head of the state. He simply reigns; all orders are issued and all laws are made in his name. But it is the will of the popular ministers that counts. For this reason, a constitutional monarch is lauded as the 'dignified executive' and also satiricised as 'magnificent cipher'. Locke in his Second Treatise of Civil Government justifies the case of such monarchy. As Garner says: "What is usually described as limited monarchy is restricted by the prescriptions of a written constitution or by a certain unwritten fundamental constitutional principles such, as the British monarchy. These constitutional rules or principles define in some degree, the powers of the monarch, of limit what is called the 'royal prerogative' and usually upon his accession to the throne, he is required to. take a solemn oath to respect and observe them.""
Criticism: Now we may briefly discuss the merits and demerits of monarchy. Its merits are:
1. Monarchy should be given the credit of establishing a stable political order. In ancient times when man was almost a savage, it was the prowess of the monarch that could tame man into a political animal. By virtue of his family or clannish traditions, the force of local customs, and his intrinsic mettle, •the ruler could prove equal to the occasion in establishing conditions of peace and security. The heavy hand of the monarch could deal with the ways of the barbarians. Order was established and normalcy restored by the hand of a powerful ruler like Charlemagne and Peter the Great.
10.; Garner, op. cit., pp. 307-8. 11. Ibid.416
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
OF GOVERNMENTS
417
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2. Monarchy means a stable government. The monarch lives in office for a long period. He is a much experienced man in the administration of public affairs. He cannot be removed by anything like impeachment or vote of no confidence. By virtue of living in office for about half a century even, a ruler like Queen Elizabeth I in England and Akbar in India could give stability to administration that may hardly be seen in a democratic system where government depends upon the vagaries of an elected legislature and executive.
3. A monarchical system should also be appreciated for promptness and vigour in action. The policies made by the monarch are implemented quicklv. No time is wasted on lengthy discussions and deliberations as we see in a democratic system. The word of the monarch is the law that must be followed faithfully. It is for this reason that the rule of a benevolent monarch like that of Asoka or Akbar in India is described as 'golden period' in the history of the country.
4. Since the rule of the monarch runs for a fairly long time, a consistent policy, home as well as foreign, is followed. There is no scope for sudden or unexpected change, because the ruler does not change his views with the shift in the public opinion the kind of which may be seen in a democratic system.
5. Above all, the monarch recognises the talents of the artists, poets, painters, musicians, architects and the like. He honours and patronises a galaxy of such talented persons as a result of which great works in the form of books, paintings, buildings and fine arts come into being.
But monarchy has its demerits too that may be briefly enumerated as under:
1. In most of the cases a monarch acts like a despot or a tyrant. His word is law that is enforced with the might of the sword. We have numerous examples of corrupt, incompetent, feebleminded and callous kings who ruled tyrannically. Such a king has no regard for the rule of law. Anyone speaking against the 'wisdom' of the monarch is taken to task and may be put to any degree of torture. The names of Queen Mary of England, Changez Khan of China and Aurangzeb of India may be referred to in this regard.
2. A monarchical system gives no place for self-rule. The people have no voice in t^e administration of their country. It
is the will of one man that counts. The apologists of monarchy say that the rule of a benevolent king is the best form of government. But an apologist of democracy would say with greater force that a good monarchical government can be no substitute of a self-government.
3. A monarchical system inheres the danger of imperialistic tendencies of the ruler. Generally, the kings remain keen on acquiring more power and expanding their kingdom so that it may be converted into an empire. The result is a war. The history of the world is full of such wars which have proved utterly destructive for the common people. It is also possible that an ambitious ruler may involve his country into a war for the sake of distracting the attention of his people and may thus bring great harm to the people by implementing his hazardous expansionist schemes.
4. Inefficiency, corruption and dishonesty prevail in a country having monarchical system. The sycophants thrive on the patronage of the king. Spoils system prevails in matters of recruitment to government posts. All benevolences are showered on the 'favourites' of the monarch indiscriminately.
5. Above all, the monarch has to live under a fear of perpetual revolt from the side of his opponet , He is always afraid of sinister conspiracies and intrigues by his enemies, including his courtiers. The result is that the monarch adopts a very repressive policy in dealing with such elements. Such acts of repression breed discontent and ultimately lead to rebellions in which a monarchical system may find its doom.
As a matter of fact, monarchical system is said to inhere tendency of despotism that is the very negation of a popular government. The office of a king, howsoever benevolent he may be, is taken for granted as the symbol of autocracy based on the whims and caprices of the ruler. So Lord Brougham in his paper 'The British Constitution' could frankly endorse: "The tendency of all monarchy is towards despotism and its evils; and a constitutional monarchy which provides no checks, that is, a pure monarchy, ha^ enormous scope to the sovereign's interest or passions, benefits the people very little by the alliance he always forms with the nobles, gives facilities to humour his ambition by wars, allows recklessly extravagance of every kind, entourages habits of costly ostentation and of prido towards413
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
FORMS OF GOVERNMENTS
419
inferiors, and begets a spirit of frawning and truckling towards those in authority."12
Aristocracy
Meaning: The word 'aristocracy' originates from a Greek word 'aristo' which means the best. Thus, aristocracy may be denned as the rule of the chosen few or a very small section of the populace marked out by birth, wealth, talent, status and the like. It stands foi the residence of power in and its exercise by few persons distinguished by their superiority, ability and merit. In the Aristotelian sense, it may be defined as a form of government in which political power resides in and is exercised by the few. Thus, it may be defined as a form of government "in which only a relatively small proportion of the citizens have a voice in the choosing of public officials and in determining public policies."13
If aristocracy means the rule of the 'few', the problem arises as to what does the word 'few' imply. Historical evidence shows that these few may be chosen on the basis of blood, birth, family, wealth, culture, education, physical power, charismatic potentialities, religious position etc. But whatever may be the method or the basis of classification or the form which aristocracy may take, the general principle is the same; namely, that aristocratic government "is government by comparatively small proportion of the population."14 One may have a feeling that the rationale of such a government should be appreciated. Sir James Stephen remarked that the few (meaning the wise
12. Brougham: Works, Vol. XI, p. 3. Sidgwick remarks that it is not only a defeet of monarchy in the sense in which we are here considering it, that the supreme law-making power is in the hands of a single individual, who may or may not employ it in the interest of the community, but that the execution of the laws being under the supreme control of the same person, there is no sufficient guarantee that he will observe his own laws, if passion or favour urges him to break them. Development of European Polity, pp. 412-13.
13. Garner, op. cit., p. 309.
14. Ibid., p. 379. "There are many versions of 'government by the few', Aristocracy, in its original sense of government by the 'best' citizens, who were presumably men of highest integrity and intelligence rather than merely a hereditary ruling class or a wealthy oligarchy, remains an ideal seldom, if ever, attained in practice, Plato in his Republic envisioned an ideal commonwealth ruled by all-wise and selfless philosophers; Edmund Burke idealised the later eighteenth century British aristocracy in terms which were scarcely deserved by most of its members." Rodee, Christol and Anderson, op. cit., p. 37.
and the good) should govern in all countries, but the implications of the 'few' remain confused.- Seeley doubts that the implications may remain confined to the wealthy or well-born persons and in such a case aristocracy becomes 'oligarchy' or a perverted or 'diseased' form of aristocracy.15 ,
Sometimes, the two terms—aristocracy and oligarchy—are used interchangeably. We have seen that Aristotle defined oligarchy as the perverted form of aristocracy. A French writer Pradier-Fodere treated aristocracy as a government by a 'class' and oligarchy as a government by 'a small number of persons' who donot, strictly speaking, constitute a class. But Lord James Bryce used the two terms interchangeably and prophesied that in future oligarchies would have to be either a mixture of plutocracy and bureaucracy or else composed of the leaders of labour or trade union organisations.'16 But the fact stands out that in recent times the distinction between the aristocracy and the oligarchy (the former as government of the best and the wisest and the latter as government of the wealthy minority) has almost disappeared so that aristocracy "connotes in the popular mind the same characteristics which the ancients associated with oligarchy."17
The most striking point about aristocracy is that it has hardly existed in an independent form like monarchy, dictatorship and democracy. It has survived, of course, but under the superficial garb of monarchy. Its determining features have been heredity as well as wealth. Thus, the aristocratic systems of England, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain and Russia rested upon an economic foundation until they were removed in a popular revolt. Since wealth constituted the most significant part, aristocracy was also dubbed < as 'plutocracy'. Thus, the residence of power in the hands of hereditary nobilities constituted the case of aristocratic or oligarchical systems in many countries of the world until the revolutions brought about the system of representative government.18 The aristocratic elements lost
15. Seeley: Introduction to Political Science, pp. 331.
16. Bryce, op. cit., p. 537.
17. Garner, op. cit., p. 380.
18. Some writers prefer to stress the poimk of distinction between aristocratic and oligarchical governments. "Where modern states are ruled by the few rather than the many, such systems may more appropriately be termed oligarchies, rather than aristocracies. Both terms mean government by a few, iut oligarchy usually (though not always) carries the connotation Of rule by the wealthy, whereas aristocracy suggests su^ p O J-t-
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supported this idea. A leading Ficnch jurist Duguit appreciated ihe medieval social system when professLnal guilds had autonomy. In his view "general \ 'ill' could find it-, proper representation through social groups and functions. Leading English Fabians like Sidney Webb and Britiice Webb recommended a new kind of Pg liament having two parts—Social Parliament and Political Parliament— the former based on the doctrine of functional representation. Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, pp. 116-20.
32. Cole, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
33. Cole: Social Theory, p. 707.490 PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
rightly said that an equitable distribution of representation given to various interests or functions is impossible. It lays too much emphasis on the autonomy of the social groups that becomes a sort of potential challenge to the sovereign authority of the state. Prof. Herman biner weii visualises that this idea "does not proceed from the integration of the community and then tempers this with the representation of difie;ences, but it proceeds at once from the postulate of integration into a large number of separate communities whose ultimate integration is thenceforward to be fabricated."34
Proportional Representation: It stands on the principle that 'votes should be weighed, not counted.' It has three ingredients: (/) there should be a multi-member constituency, (ii) a candidate should be elected not by gaining an absolute or relative majority but by obtaining a quota of votes Uv.it is equivalent to the total number of votes cast and divided by the number of seats to be filled, and {Hi) there should be a mathematically exact, as far as possible, representation of the electorate in the legislature. In other words, the system of proportional representation implies, firstly, a multi-member constituency and, secondly, a fact that the candidate is not to be elected by gaining what is called relatively absolute majority, but that he is declared elected only if he roaches a quota which is equivalent to a number of votes equal to the total of votes cast, divided by the number of seats to be fiUed. This is done, thirdly, to bring about a mathematically exact representation of the electorate in the legislature. It implies:3''
i. That any legislature elected on the basis of a single-member
34. Finer: Theory and Practice of Modern Government, Vol. II, p. 907. "Opponents of the plan argue that it is inconsistent with the principle of national sovereignty, which is best maintained by choosing representatives who have at heart the general interests of the people as a whole rat;,or than the special interests of particular classes." Gettell, on. cit., p. 319.
35. A.V. Dicey: Introduction to the Study of th?. Law of Constitution, p. LXVi. C.F. Strong says that proportional representation rrmns very little taker: by itself, since th°re are m.my varieties of it—almost as many in fact a-there are states which have adopted it, and many more in theory. But a!1 the varieties have at least one common factor which is, indeed, indispensable to this method of voting; it is that no system of proportional representation can possibly be worked on the basis of a single-member constituency. Modern Political Co»stitiitio»s, p. 175. Large electoral districts "are us;d, each providing several representatives, and the system of voting is so arranged that the representatives will be allotted to different parties in proportion to the number of votes cast by that party." Gettell, op. cit., p. 279.
MECHANISM OF DEMOCRACY
491
constituency fails to represent with precision or accuracy the state of opinion, e.g., as to woman suffrage existing among the electorate. It fails to be the mirror of the national mind or exactly reflect the will of the electors.
2. That it is possible by some system of proportional representation to frame a legislation which could reflect much more nearly than at present the opinion of the nation, or, in other words, of ths electorate.
3. That it is pre-eminently that every desirable opinion existing among the electors should be represented in the legislature in as nearly as possible proportion in which it exists among the same electors.
A question arises as to how the method of proportional representation can be put to application. For this sake, two devices have been evolved—single-transferable vote system and list system.
The single transferable vote system was first evolved by a Danish minister Carl Andrae, but it was presented in a refined form by Thomas Hare of England in 1859. So it is also known as the Hare System. Hare, however, could not make it free from the basic defect that has now been removed. According to this device, the voter is given a ballot paper having names and party symbols of all candidates on the left side and blank columns on its right side. He has to fill these blank columns with figures of 1, 2, 3, and so on in order to show his preferences. He may fill all the columns or some of them, but it is required that the marking of preferences must be done correctly, otherwise the ballot paper shall bz taken as cancelled. At the time of counting, all invalid papers are cancelled and the total number of valid ballot papers is divided by the number of seats to be filled up plus 1, and then the figure of 1 is added to the quotient. In case the remainder is more than half of the denominator, the figure of 1 is further added to the quotient. This is called electoral quota. Its formula may be presented thus:
r, . , rt , Total Number of Valid Votes , ,
Electoral Quota = ----^t~r^—r-----jr^—-——.-------hi
Total Number of States -+-1
A candidate securing votes equal to or more than that of the quota is declared successful. If some seats remain vacant, the candidate having least number of votes is eliminated and his votes are transferred to other candidates according to the order of second preference marked on the ballot paper by him. If still some seats remain to be filled up, the candidate with least number of votes is eliminated and his ballot papers are transferred to other candidatesPRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
according to third preference. This process continues until all the St^refflled up, or on.y the required number of candidates ^ in the field after the elimination of other candidates. In this « only those candidates are declared elected who attain th^U^ the transfer of surplus votes, or the votes of those candidate^ who . Have procured the least number of votes at the polls are, theieiort,
progressively eliminated.36 . h
In the list system, the candidates are grouped accord ngtohe labels of their p .litical parties. Each party submits a list of its chosen candidates equal to the number of seats to be filled up or even i ^ than that. The voter is asked to vote for a particular list that dlso means his preference to the candidates in the order given in that ver list. It is a different thing that in some countries the voters are given extra freedom to show their individual preferences to the can™a as we:i. At the time of counting, election quota is determined in the
same manner as given above. Then, it is seen as to which party ^ secured votes in what percentage and the seats are apportioned , tween or among them according to the same percentage. It ma, that some parties either fail to have a clear-cut Percentage «t.Mng them for certain seats, or they may have to forgo some ot the P centage of votes. In such a situation, the party may take its s^I percentage to the adjoining or some other multi-member constitu^y and get its claim duly adjusted there by capturing onewat 01^ by the accumulation of rump sui pluses, or it may .c.ui •-percentage to some other party so that a seat is ob-ainedtoi a
common candidate. n.a^;---A
The system of proportional representation has been appiec.-ui for several reasons. It is said that it is the best way to ensure representation to all sections of the people as far as poss.o e It ^es political education to the masses and a sense of secuntv to ,iose people or parties that are in min-rity. It leads to the recognition of political parties on social A^ economic considerations. Tne mdo.-..-d-v.ce of the voters is secured and an orf.-ctive check cm be pla^- -n the practices of electoral corr-iption. It recognises tne nntu ■.■ .. mo^rn political partis as based not altogether on sectsona, c.v--,-n. but on social and economic problems of national importance. As i^ra
36 So David Robertson savs:'This is a method of election which seeks to ensure that minorities as well as majorities and pluralities are adequately represented in the legislature and which distributes seats or umts of legula-tfve representation in accordance with the proport.on of votes recorded in the whole electoral division."'^ Dictionary of Modern Politics, p. 277.
MECHANISM OF DEMOCRACY
493
Acton says: "It is profoundly democratic, for it increases the influence of thousands who would otherwise have no voice in the government and it brings men more near an equality by so contriving that no vote shall be wasted and that every voter shall contribute to bring into a parliament a member of his own."
In defence of proportional representation system, A.B. Keith has given these arguments:37
1. The electorate should be so represented that there may come to be a proportional strength of parties in the popular chamber.
2. Many people donot simply vote because they have no pleasure in voting for a candidate with whose policies they donot agree, and yet in the single-member system they have no option but to choose the lesser evil.
3. Under this system the voters will be able to vote for men of character and independence of judgment and they will not be forced to accept the policy of a particular party.
4. The margin of unattached voters, the swing of which usually decides the fortunes of elections, will diminish to insignificance.
But the system of proportional representation has its demerits too. It perpetuates a multi-party system with possible undesirable consequences for a stable or effective government. It prevents development of disciplined parties and encourages factional groups and also frequent and temporary party alliances. Its worst experiments can be seen in France under the Fourth Republic (1946-58) when the life of a government had come to a month on an average. It was due to the introduction of this system that the Nazis managed to emerge triumphant in the elections of 1933 and 1934. A French critic like M. Keith: The British Cabinet System, pp. 335-36. Samuel Seabury offers this argumsnt: '' This (proportional rsprjsintatioa) doss away with t':is gerrymandering of districts. It break? the monopoly of the party machine by recognising the political rights of the voters in proportion to their numbers. It secure independence of choice to every individual votor, emancipates him from being required to vote for the candidate of one of the two political machines, and thus relieves him from t'ns frequent necessity of making a choice between two evils. It accords representation to minority groups, but accords larger representation to more numerous groups. Ft allows full opportunity for political parties to function. But it does not permit the plurality party to deny representation to other groups in proportion to their number. It ensures the equitable division of political power." Refer to his 'Foreword' to G.H. Hallet's Proportional Representation: The Key to Democracy. Also see J.R. Commons. Proportional Representation, pp. 8Off.£ 2 £• s
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Arguments of Hallet in Favour of Proportional Representation System
1. It makes nearly every vote count, but in plurality elections half or more than half of the ballots are usually wasted.
2. Voters agree on policies and each member represents a part of the voters who agree.
3. It gives representation to minorities or to various sorts of minorities as the voters make their own groupings according to their interest.
4. It assures real majority rule, for under the single direct system it is necessary that a majority of voters may elect a majority of members.
5. It gives a new kind of freedom to the individual; he can nominate and vote for the candidates he really wants.
6. Under it a political machine cannot rule unless with every votes free to vote effectively against it, it can get a willing majority for its candidates.
7. Under it a political organisation can change itself according to the desire of the people, it can thus nominate candidates who are popular and trustworthy.
8. Under it the voters control party organisation in stead of being controlled by them.
9. It does away with all need for periodic redrawing of district lines, hence the chances of gerrymandering decline.
10. Big districts under proportional representation, in fact, offer the easiest and fairest solution of periodic redrawing of district lines, for existing local divisions may permanently elect their fixed members.
11. It assures a continuity of personnel and members are usually re-elected. It also avoids landslides, because only the less popular members come and go, the leaders of both sides usually remain. ,
12. This continuity of able members helps the coming into prominence of future leaders.
13. Under it voters feel interested in voting, because they have a chance of voting for one whom they really want.
14. The supervised central count and checks in counting, that go with it, make even a small amount of fraud difficult.
15. It does away with the need of primaries (as in US Presidential Election).
16. It promotes decency and good feelings in elections and afterwards. Needless attacks or rivalry are not necessary.
Source; Hallett: Proportional Representation: Key to Democracy.
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PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE
the professional organiser in politics.
2. We should destroy any prospect of personal relations between the member and his constituents; he would become simply an item in a list, voted for almost entirely on party grounds.
3. We should get weak government, without that body of support which enables it to operate a great programme.
4. We should multiply the number of vagaries which from time to time obscure the clash of real issues.
5. We should be unable to have bye-elections as a test of changes in opinion; and we should encourage all dissidents within a party to seek that independent structure which ultimately means the group system. Thereby we should transfer the place where governments are made from the country as a whole to the obscurer recesses of the legislative assembly.
6. Not least, we should diminish the responsibility of the private member by increasing his sense that, whatever his personal effort, the party organisers who maintained the list of candidates would be able to ensure his return. Every such complication of electoral machinery is bound to result in the decline of civic interest in the political process.
7. Political decisions are not made by an arithmetical process of counting votes. More urgent is the weighting of influences that take place in the law-making process.
Minority Representation: The issue of giving representation to those who are in a minority because of their religion, language, culture, racial make-up and the like, is, indeed, a delicate affair. While democracy means majority rule, it does not at all mean the suppression of minorities. It is true that in a representative system of government majority must rule and the few must yield to the will of the many, but from this it does not follow that the majority should have no representation at all. As Mill forcefully asserts: "In any really equat democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man they would be as fully represented as the majority, and unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of inequality and privilege—contrary to all just government, but above all contrary to the principle of democracy which professes equality as its very root and foundation."42
42. J.S. Mill: Considerations on Representative Government, Ch. 7.
MECHANISM OF DEMOCRACY
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It follows that in a democratic system some provision should be made for the representation of the minorities. Following devices may be suggested for this purpose:
1. Limited Vote System: It requires that there should be at least three seats in a multi-member constituency and the voters be given votes less than the number of seats; they should also not be allowed to cast more than one vote for a candidate. In such a situation the position of the minorities is improved a little and they may have a chance of capturing one seat if they are fairly, united and well organised.
2. Single Vote System: It prevails in a multi-member constituency with one vote of such voter. The candidates are elected on the basis of the majority of votes. The position of the minorities is much improved in this system in as much as they may cast their vote for their own candidate, while the votes of the persons in majority would be distributed among different candidates.
3. Proxy System: Under it a voter may cast his vote for one candidate in a multi-member constituency. A minimum number of votes is fixed and a candidate securing that point is declared elected. It is also provided that those who vote for a candidate, who fails to be successful, may vote again for others so that the unfilled posts may be filled up. Obviously, this would require either a preferential ballot, or one which is most secret.
4. Cumulative Vote System: Under this system a voter has as many votes as there are seats to be filled up and he is allowed to cast his votes either for different candidates or all votes for a single candidate. It is obvious that the persons in minority may cast their all votes in favour of a candidate of their community. It is also known as plumping vote system.
5. Weightage: It means that the persons in minority may be given some extra benefits. That is, they may be entitled for more votes than those given to the persons in majority. For instance, in India in pre-independence days, the Muslims, the Sikhs, and the Christians had one vote in the general constituency and one more vote for election in a separate constituency for the candidates of their own community.
6. Nominations: There may be some system of nomination by the head of the state or reservation of seats for the candidates of a particular class in minority. We may see that in our country498
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCB
some seats are reserved for the persons of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,,while two members of the Anglo-Indian community may be nominated by the President in the Lok Sabha and one member of this community by the Governor in the State Legislative Assembly.
Though the systems of functional representation and proportional representation have their merits and demerits, the system of majority representation is taken as the best of all for practical reasons. Let there be an election and a candidate or the candidates having votes more than others may be declared elected to the vacant post or posts. This is the easiest and so the best way of representation. The majority system has the great advantage of being simple to administer. It is also easy to understand that the candidate, who gets largest number of votes, is elected. In systems of proportional representation, rules are more complex, so much so that they may sometimes defeat their own purpose. It is not immediately clear who has been elected or how, and the process may be lengthy if preferential votes have to be transferred. Quotients have to be calculated and the result, although fair, may not always seem to be so. There is also a noted tendency to manipulate the system, for instance, by introducing candidates in order to split the votes so as to benefit from the mechanics of the quotient calculation. Proportional representation is not a panacea. It works well in many countries, but the majority system has achieved generally acceptable results in others. "Many able political writers have condemned the system of group and proportional representation both on principle and because of the practical difficulties encountered in operating it."43
43. Garner, op. cit., p. 653.
1 2 1 ~>
DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Democracy, we could say, is the fruit of an ideocracy, meaning by this that no historical venture of man has depended in so pronounced and hazardous a manner on the force of ideas, and therefore on our capacity for employing them and on our ability to master the symbolic world. It is no wonder, then, if democracy suffers more than any other ethico-political formula from that deadly disease—mental confusion. If we no longer believe in the value of ideas, or if the ideas which feed the democratic ideocracy approach the vanishing point, it is hard to see how a democratic reality can survive. And the prospects, it must be admitted, are not comforting.
—Giovanni Sartori1
After discussing at length the case of democracy as a form of government and its mechanism in the preceding chapters, we may now pass on to the study of democratic theory as espoused by the classical liberals, the neo-liberals (including pluralists and elitists) and the Marxian socialists. Two points baffle us at this stage. First, democracy is no longer a political contrivance; it has penetrated itself into social and economic spheres. As such, a theory of democracy should be broad enough to cover all these directions in a consistent form. Second, a study of this subject should be made in the light of all available classical and modern interpretations so as to present a full picture of the view its advocates take about its dimensions in theoretical as well as practical perspectives. As we shall see, such theories may be grouped broadly into two parts—liberal and socialist—and while they have their strong and weak points, an ideal situation would be to harmonise their strong points at the cost of 'heir weak elements so as to offer the most plausible theory of democracy.
Classical Theory of Democracy
Democracy is a very old form of government and so its theory ^ back to the days of the Greeks who identified it with 'people's ' (Pericles), or a system in which 'rulers are accountable to the for what they do therein'. (Herodotus) Such a view saw its
Sartori: Democratic Theory, p. 445.PRINCIPLES OF MODT--N POUT.CAL SCIENCE
500
reaffirmation in modern times when Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysberg oration of 1863 called it 'a government of the people, by the people, and f-.r the people'. Great liborals like John Locke anu 3
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