AMERICA’S DROPOUT PROBLEM



Chapter 5

Table of Contents

The Attrition Problem 3

PREDICTING ADJUSTMENT TO MILITARY LIFE 4

MANAGING ATTRITION 6

SINGLING OUT GED CREDENTIALS 9

The Evolution of the Three-Tier System 10

Controlling Attrition: Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Equity 12

THE DIPLOMA WORKS, BUT WHY? 15

Empirical Analysis 16

THE RELIABILITY OF EDUCATION CREDENTIAL ATTRITION DIFFERENCES 17

DROPOUT AND GED ATTRITION: WHY SO HIGH? 18

The Next Step: Measuring Noncognitive Factors 22

CONCLUSION 24

REFERENCES 26

CHAPTER

5

The Military Performance of Dropouts and GED Holders

Janice H. Laurence

T

he Armed Forces is the largest employer in the U.S. and one of the first to formally recognize the importance of noncognitive traits in hiring decisions. Each year the U.S. military spends billions of dollars recruiting, outfitting and training new recruits. The Armed Services enlist, equip, and educate recruits for full-time duty not just in the modern infantry but in hundreds of diverse, technologically sophisticated military occupations. To adequately defend the nation today takes a lot more than brawn; it takes the brains and motivation of over one and a half million soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen.

Military recruiting has become a formidable enterprise. Even in the leaner post-Cold War era, hundreds of thousands apply and some 200,000 men and women are chosen each year for the active duty enlisted force. They are evaluated in terms of a host of criteria including citizenship, age, physical fitness, and moral character. Cognitive aptitude is assessed via the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The schooling attainment of a prospective recruit is also considered in the enlistment decision—not for the content but for the credential.

In the past, a draft registrant’s or enlistment applicant’s level of education was used as a proxy for literacy, but it now serves as an indicator of adjustment to life in the military. In the early 1940s, a fourth-grade education was taken as evidence that a soldier could read and write well enough to be inducted into the rank and file. Less than a decade later, standardized tests replaced this education hurdle. Education screens were restored in the 1960s, not to assess aptitude levels but to predict who was likely to finish an obligated term of service.

Readiness to defend our nation is a must, and general military readiness has its base in selecting, training, and managing manpower. Furthermore, maintaining an aggregate end-strength for over one million service members is an expensive endeavor, so the Department of Defense strives to achieve a suitable return on its manpower investments by minimizing attrition. To promote this objective, the Department of Defense screens recruits on the basis of achieving an education credential.

The Attrition Problem

Each year, some 200,000 new recruits enlist in the military. Each recruit agrees to serve on active duty for a specified number of years (typically from three to six years). Failure to fulfill this obligation is a serious problem for the military services given costly training and other investments (e.g., recruiting and salary costs, veterans benefits expenditures, and payment of unemployment compensation). Furthermore, there are non-monetary costs such as force instability, lowered morale, and reduced readiness.

On average, around one-third of accessions (as entering recruits are called) leave service prematurely, with a disproportionate share of attrition occurring early on—during training (General Accounting Office, 1997).[1] First-term attrition occurs for a variety of reasons, most (about 75%) of which (about 75%) is categorized as failure to meet minimum behavior or performance criteria.[2] This category includes a host of reasons for separation, including character or behavior disorder, motivational problems, inaptitude, alcoholism, use of drugs, discreditable incidents, misconduct, unsuitability, a pattern of disciplinary infractions, fraudulent entry, and so on. Half of the remaining instances of attrition appear to be medically related and the rest are for dependency, hardship, or other reasons. Such designators may seem innocuous, but in some cases, behavioral delinquency may be the real reason for being relieved of duty. Among the most prevalent causes noted on personnel records are problems in the areas of work/duty, training, minor offenses, and mental health.[3] There is considerable flexibility as to exactly what constitutes grounds for discharge, how a discharge is coded, and the ease with which a discharge is given.[4] In contrast to “stinginess” in granting early separations under the draft, since 1973, under the All Volunteer Force, a person who seeks to sever the enlistment contract can do so by displaying a pattern of disciplinary infractions tantamount to openly requesting a discharge.

Predicting Adjustment to Military Life

Once admitted into the enlisted ranks, recruits are expected to progress through training, to perform their duties competently wherever assigned, and to observe military order and discipline. Unfortunately, not all incoming personnel “shape up” and get through basic and technical training. Even among those who do, not all manage to avoid disciplinary infractions. Still others may abide by the rules but perform well below par on the job, some more from inaptitude and others more from lack of motivation. The consequences for substandard performance include reassignment, various forms of punishment ranging from reprimands to time in the stockade, slow promotion progress, and, in many instances, an early exit from service.

The most thoroughly analyzed indicator of maladjustment to the military is first-term attrition—the failure to complete an initial, obligated period of service. First-term attrition is studied so extensively because it is easy to measure and, more importantly, because it is so costly. A report conservatively estimated the cost of first-term adverse attrition at $200 million per year using a 1989 dollar metric.[5] This cost consists of lost investments in training, higher recruiting and salary costs, veterans’ benefit expenditures, and payment of unemployment compensation to separated service members. There are also non-pecuniary or indirect costs that include force instability, lowered morale, and lack of readiness. Individuals may also pay a price. Recruits who leave before their contracts have expired may be “marked.” Failure in military service may significantly affect their future employment opportunities and earning potential.

The departure rates and specific documented reasons for departure may vary across the Services, but the general pattern is the same: most attrition happens early and for adverse reasons.[6] While some recruits are lost because of medical disabilities and other non-pejorative causes, most are dismissed on more grievous grounds including inaptitude, behavior disorders, alcoholism, motivational problems, acquired civil court convictions, drug use, financial irresponsibility, and other signs of misconduct.

Attrition has grown within the volunteer military, perhaps because of longer active duty enlistment terms and policies that rapidly separate marginal recruits.[7] These days, in light of the volunteer status of the military, a recruit may be discharged simply because he or she has had a change of heart about serving.[8] Almost one third of an entering cohort leaves service before the end of the contracted enlistment term.[9] Whatever the cause, the consequences of such turnover to the military establishment, and often to the individuals, are serious.

Managing Attrition

A substantial breakthrough in predicting and thus potentially controlling attrition was first published in a 1959 Air Force Personnel Laboratory technical report titled Factors Relating to Discharge for Unsuitability Among 1956 Airman Accessions to the Air Force.[10] After studying the contribution of a number of variables including general and specific aptitudes and age, level of education stood out as the single best predictor of military adjustment. Thus the author, Eli S. Flyer, concluded that “The most dramatic way to reduce unsuitability discharge would be to require a high-school diploma from all Air Force recruits” (p. 15). The relationship between high school graduation status and first-term attrition was corroborated by the other Services and has stood the test of time.

Enlightened by such findings, the Services soon incorporated this personal characteristic into the screening process. Beginning with the Air Force in 1961 and culminating with the Navy and Marine Corps in 1965, so-called “education differentials” were established in each Service. Education criteria were used in conjunction with aptitude test scores to screen individuals for entry. In effect, more restrictive selection policies were instituted regarding non-high school graduates.

While it was not prudent at the time, given numerical accession requirements, to heed Flyer’s suggestion and ban high school dropouts from enlisting or from being drafted, dropouts were required to score higher than graduates on the aptitude screening test in order to gain entry. For example, in June 1962, the Army set the minimum aptitude standard for non-high school graduates at the 31st percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)[11]. High school graduates, on the other hand, could score 10 percentile points lower and still be considered for enlistment. Graduates scoring between the 21st and 30th percentiles were permitted to compensate for their lower AFQT standings by demonstrating at least average performance in more specific aptitude areas (e.g., electronics, clerical, combat). These graduates were required to achieve a standard score of 90 or better (on a scale with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 20) in three of nine classification subtest composites. Induction standards were lower, but still were more selective among non-graduates.[12] Similarly, while each of the other Services has set unique standards that have been adjusted over the years, since the early to mid-1960s, non-graduates have been required to possess “a little extra” to compensate for their being higher attrition risks as well as for their proclivity to experience more disciplinary, administrative, and retraining actions.[13]

Setting more stringent aptitude standards for those who do not hold a diploma does not solve the adaptability problem or, more specifically, does not put their chances of completing an enlistment term on par with diploma holders. High school graduates have almost an 80% chance of completing the first three years of service, whereas the corresponding figure for the more “select” non-graduates is between 50 and 60%.[14] To put it another way, about 20 to 25% of graduates leave service by the end of the first three years while over 40% of dropouts do. Aptitude does not compensate for the lack of a diploma, since the “best,” or most trainable, among the higher risk candidates are still doubly likely to leave prematurely, but at least those who are selected are likely to get through training and meet the cognitive requirements of various military jobs while they last.

Flyer’s seminal study was only the first in a very long line of research to conclude that high school graduates have lower attrition rates. Despite Service variability in overall attrition rates, similar findings have been echoed in countless reports over more than forty years. The research has taken new twists, including the discovery of higher attrition for women and younger recruits and differences by race and marital status, but the one consistent finding is that a high school diploma is the type of educational credential is the best predictor of service completion. This consistent relationship has served as the basis for an efficient and effective selection screen. Asking a prospective recruit whether he or she held a high school diploma is elegant in its simplicity. This one-item screen was seemingly reliable and eminently practical.

Singling Out GED Credentials

Unfortunately, complicating factors were discovered down the road. The Department of Defense (DoD) learned that a simple diploma dichotomy between those with and without diplomas was more complicated in practice. There were other education credentials competing with high school diplomas. The first wrinkle in the system was the GED. The GED credential is earned as a result of passing a battery of tests designed to measure achievement in subject areas that make up the academic side of the basic high school curriculum. This venerable program actually began under the auspices of the United States Armed Forces Institute in 1943.[15] Today the program is directed by the American Council on Education and serves soldiers and civilians alike by conferring diploma equivalency status on persons who have not finished high school but nonetheless demonstrate a certain degree of academic proficiency.

Initially no distinction was made between GED holders and traditional high school diploma graduates in the enlistment process. All such persons were classified as high school graduates (HSGs), and they were therefore a subset of the preferred group of applicants. No doubt, since academic equivalence to a diploma had been bestowed on those who passed the GED tests, equivalence in the military environment was assumed. However, as research accumulated, the findings indicated that GED credential recipients did not remain in service as long as holders of regular high school diplomas. Empirical evidence showing their attrition rates to be very similar to those of non-graduates flew in the face of earlier reasoning. As a result of that research, the enlistment classification of GED credential holders was changed by the Services in the mid-1970s. In 1975, DoD formally modified the high school graduate definition for enlistment purposes, excluding this equivalency certificate. A new acronym was coined—HSDG (high school diploma graduate) — while equivalency certificates were designated as either GED or HSG (minus the D). Those without a diploma or a GED continued to be labeled as “NHSG” (non-high school graduates).

The Evolution of the Three-Tier System

GED holders were no longer among the most preferred group of applicants, enlisted under the lower aptitude standards reserved for high school graduates. GEDs were considered a separate credential category; ; aptitude standards for them were set above the minimums for bona fide diploma graduates and either the same as or below those for NHSGs. For example, in March 1975, the Air Force formally recognized the nonequivalence of “regular” diploma graduates and GED holders and simply switched the AFQT minimum for GED holders from the 21st percentile (the high school diploma graduate standard) to the 65th percentile (the standard then in effect for non-graduates). All were still required to meet the same additional subtest composite percentile requirements of a combined score of 170 across the Air Force’s Mechanical, Administrative, General, and Electronics measures as well as a separate General composite minimum of 45.

By fiscal year 1981, the Services had overhauled their cognitive ability screens and settled how they would deal with GEDs relative to HSDGs and NHSGs. The official standards have been documented elsewhere (Eitelberg, Laurence, and Waters, 1984).[16] In general, the Army, Navy, and Air Force minimum aptitude requirements for GEDs were less restrictive than for non-graduates but more restrictive than for diploma graduates; Marine Corps enlistment standards for GEDs were identical to those set for non-graduates. The degree to which GEDs were treated distinctly in terms of standards varied by Service, with the Marine Corps maintaining the least distinction between GEDs and NHSGs (followed closely by the Army) and the Air Force maintaining the largest distinction.

Ultimately, this scheme faltered as the number and types of secondary schools proliferated throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In response to the credential confusion, the Department of Defense (DoD) sponsored research to examine the attrition behavior among individuals holding various alternate credentials in addition to the GED, such as adult diploma holders, the home schooled, and those with other equivalency certificates.[17] After collecting and analyzing data from a 1983 sample of almost 75,000 service applicants and recruits, DoD and the Services unified and modified the categorization scheme for education credentials in 1988.

A new and improved three-tier system was adopted, with credentials placed within tiers according to average attrition rates.[18] That is, traditional high school diploma graduates and college attendees (regardless of traditional high school completion) received Tier 1 or preferred enlistment status. Alternative credential holders and those without any credential were relegated to Tiers 2 and 3, respectively, and were enlisted sparingly. The categorization of credentials, with an enlistment advantage for those in Tier 1, was, to say the least, contentious. Despite the empirical basis of the taxonomy, proponents of credentials relegated to a lower tier were piqued over what they viewed as a snub of their educational programs.[19] Although attrition data from the 1983 education credential tier sample suggested a Tier 2 placement for adult education diploma holders, lobbyists for such educational programs were relentless and ultimately successful in having Congress intervene and obtain Tier 1 placement at least until operational data suggested otherwise. Since the adoption of the tier system in 1988, DoD has accumulated data and has periodically examined the attrition rates of the various credential holders so as to report on its credential tier categories.

Controlling Attrition: Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Equity

The military does not eschew GED holders on the basis of cognitive achievement or abilities. Rather, the rationale for limiting their enlistment is based on their poor persistence and incompatibility with military order and discipline. Although attitude rather than aptitude is the key to longevity differences among credential tiers, the military considers level of aptitude more strongly for GED candidates. All applicants must take the ASVAB; however, there are higher composite score minimums for applicants in Tiers 2 and 3. Although aptitude does not eliminate the attrition problem, it does promote better training and job performance. GED holders may be more likely to leave service early, but while in uniform, their relatively high aptitude levels make them more trainable and assignable, and more proficient on the job.

Although selection policies permit GED holders and non-graduates to enlist if they make the grade, relatively few have gained access to the military’s rank and file. Since the mid-1980s, over 90% of new recruits have been traditional diploma holders.[20] Among FY 1998 incoming recruits, almost 94% were traditional diploma graduates, around 6% were in Tier 2, and less than 1% were in Tier 3 ().[21],[22]

As recruiting becomes more difficult for the military, restrictions on the enlistment of GED holders may be eased a bit, but not eliminated. In FY 1999, for example, approximately 91% of accessions were in Tier 1, almost 8% were in Tier 2, and just over 1% were in Tier 3.[23] The Army initiated the trial GED-Plus Program through which up to 4,000 otherwise highly qualified non-graduates are sponsored for GED testing prior to enlisting.[24] This test, which is was scheduled to run through FY 2003, is by no means an indication that GED holders will find easy access to the military in the future. More intense and recurring recruiting efforts are being directed toward the “college-bound market.” Once success is achieved in recruiting those in Tier 1, even this modest interest in GED holders is likely to wane.

The GED Testing Service, which manages the GED program, has not been silent with regard to the persona non grata treatment and high hurdles to enlistment for GED holders. Among their arguments in opposition to the limitations are that most GED holders are successful in the military and that, numerically (in contrast to proportionately), more attrition cases are from Tier 1. Further, they have protested that GED credential holders have been unfairly denigrated and that other alternative credentials unjustifiably have made it to Tier 1 status. They have lobbied Congress to push DoD toward other means of attrition screening in lieu of using broad education categories.[25]

Such arguments are not without merit, but from DoD’s institutional (rather than individual) perspective, using three education categories is an efficient and effective way to reduce attrition. Any denigration of the credential on the military’s part is unintentional. Unfortunately, it is rather difficult for those not ensconced in the technical aspects of attrition prediction and control to separate a credential’s academic achievement signal from its comportment value. The Services have clarified their policies to the public and the recruiting community as part of their efforts to avoid misstatements regarding, and indelicate treatment of, alternate credential holders.

The Diploma Works, But Why?

The Services recognized that the high school diploma was a good predictor of adaptation to the military, but they did not know why. What is it about high school graduates that equip them to persevere in the military? Higher cognitive ability did not appear to explain the better staying power of traditional diploma holders over others for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, aptitude has shown only a weak relationship with overall attrition. In fact, graduates scoring in the lowest AFQT range (10th through 30th percentiles) have lower attrition rates than non-graduates who score toward the top of the distribution. Further, a standard level of academic ability cannot be assumed among diploma graduates since the quality of education—not to mention the requirements for graduation—varies widely across schools and states. Finally, the attrition gap persists in the face of minimum aptitude standards for enlistment in general and even higher minimums set for non-diploma holders.

If it is not academic ability that separates the credential holders into stayers and leavers, then what does? Several noncognitive accompaniments to the traditional high school experience might be proffered as an explanation. Receipt of a traditional diploma could signify perseverance, spirit, conformity, tolerance of and adaptability to rules and regulations, determination, self-control, and other similar attributes. Finishing high school may socialize one appropriately for aspects of the military environment. After all, sitting in a classroom is part of the training process, and rules and regulations are a fact of service life from the beginning. Teamwork is of the essence in the military, and conformity and self-control are drilled. Such characteristics are difficult to measure, let alone affirm their correlations with attrition. This is why the credential category surrogate has remained despite its broad and ill-defined nature.

Empirical Analysis

Table 1 shows DoD data on 36-month attrition for Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 through 1996 accessions by education credential for each Service and for all Services combined. Of particular note is Tier 2, which comprises predominantly High School Equivalency credential holders. The official DoD definition of this credential code within Tier 2 follows Table 1.

Most persons (88%) within this credential code are GED recipients.[26] At 49.1% across all Services, the 36-month attrition rate for GED holders is well above the rates for traditional diploma graduates. Furthermore, attrition for GED holders tends to be stable and higher than the levels for most other Tier 2 credentials and very similar to the rates for non-graduates in Tier 3 (53.1% across all Services). The levels of attrition vary by Service and are influenced by job characteristics, other environmental and organizational factors (e.g., duty location, leadership style), separation policies, and recruit characteristics in addition to education (e.g., level of aptitude, gender, marital status). Regardless of the fact that the Air Force has relatively low attrition rates, the patterns by tier are the same. Tier 2 and “misplaced” Tier 1 credential holders leave or are discharged to a greater degree than high school graduates. In fact, high school equivalency recruits in the Air Force are more likely to “attrite” than diploma graduates in any of the other Services.

The Reliability of Education Credential Attrition Differences

The tabulated attrition findings are hardly new or spurious. The relationship between high school graduation status and attrition rate is consistent. For example, the 36-month attrition rates across all Services for non-graduates, GED holders, and diploma holders who enlisted in FY 1979 were 43, 45, and 24%, respectively. The corresponding rates for those enlisted in FY 1983 were 52, 45, and 23%.[27] The absolute level of attrition has remained fairly constant as has the magnitude of the differences between credential groups. Not only are these findings reliable across cohort, but behavioral and demographic factors do not eliminate these attrition differences.[28]

Although there are modest correlations between attrition and level of aptitude, pre-service employment, and pre-service arrest record, such characteristics do not account for the differences in attrition among education credential holders. In fact, GED holders are required to meet higher minimum aptitude requirements relative to diploma graduates to be considered for enlistment.[29] Thus, it is particularly notable that GED holders with relatively high aptitude levels are more likely to attrite than lower aptitude high school graduates. Table 2 shows 36-month attrition by Tier within aptitude category. These categories represent score ranges (I = highest; IV = lowest)[30] on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)—the math and verbal test composite of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), the military’s cognitive enlistment screening instrument. Monotonic relationships can be seen across AFQT categories and credential tiers (AFQT Category I and Tier 1 recruits have lower attrition, for example); however, by far the stronger relationship is between credential and attrition. In fact, as has been shown in the past, Tier 1 accessions in the lowest aptitude category had lower attrition rates than Category I accessions in either Tier 2 or Tier 3.

Attrition patterns by credential also hold regardless of gender, race, age, geographic region, and socioeconomic status. And, although attrition varies by job, the patterns remain steadfast within occupational categories.[31] For example, the four most populous occupational areas are: 1) infantry, gun crews, seamanship; 2) electrical or mechanical equipment repair; 3) service and supply; and 4) functional support and administration. Table 3 shows the percentages of FY 1982/1983 male enlistees who remained in service three years later.

Dropout and GED Attrition: Why so High?

Time and again, even after controlling for potential confounding factors, military recruits who did not hold a traditional high school diploma at the time of enlistment have been shown to be greater attrition risks. The robustness of this finding does not resolve the following questions: Why do non-graduates and GED holders, in particular, have greater difficulty adjusting to the military, and why are they more likely to leave before their terms are up?

One axiom in the behavioral sciences is that the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior. For reasons including poor grades, other academic deficiencies, disciplinary trouble, lack of motivation, and the like, GED holders and other dropouts quit high school. They “failed” within the structured classroom environment with its rules, regulations, and requirements. But a structured classroom setting is one of the first things new recruits encounter upon joining the military. Following six weeks or so of basic training or “boot” camp, the vast majority of recruits attend technical training for a few months or even over a year depending upon the assigned occupational specialty. Indeed, regular attendance, books, lectures, notes, homework, classroom participation, and tests are part of the enlistment package.

Given the typical training experiences upon entry and because attrition is higher for GED holders even after controlling for level of aptitude, noncognitive factors can be assumed to account for most of the diploma’s predictiveness. That is, the personal and social skills, experiences, and attributes that enable students to complete high school also enable them to complete their first terms. A high school diploma signifies attributes such as maturity, perseverance, and tolerance for rules and regulations, all of which are important for success in the military.[32] To graduate, students must learn to cooperate with their instructors and to get along with their peers. A high school diploma represents not only a certain level of academic success but, more importantly, a degree of discipline.[33] Data from the 1983 Educational and Biographical Information Survey (EBIS) support these notions. Tables 4 and 5 provide the summary statistics and structure coefficients from a discriminant analysis[34] of a sub sample of military recruits who took the EBIS. Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique that attempts to differentiate between or classify groups on the basis of the available dependent variables (See the technical appendix for a more detailed discussion).

The first discriminant function accounts for nearly all of the variance among groups (98.32%) and effectively differentiates high school diploma graduates from the other credential groups. On the basis of the resulting functions, around 85% of high school graduate sample were correctly classified as such by the first discriminant function. GED holders and non-graduates were less likely to be classified correctly because of the confusion between these two “non-diploma groups”. It is difficult to distinguish between uncertified dropouts and GEDs on the basis of these variables. The second function (for the little that it is worth as a group discriminator) attempts to distinguish between GED holders and those with no credential. The structure coefficients (Table 5) indicate the strength of the relationship between the EBIS variables and functions as well as showing how educational groups differ. When interpreting the discrimination between credential groups, it is important to keep in mind that institutionalization and self-selection likely affected these results. The worst recruits, especially from the non-preferred tiers, are not likely to have made it into the sample and as a result the differences between education groups will be attenuated.

GED holders and non-graduates were more likely to have thought about quitting high school for a variety of reasons, were in more trouble in school (including expulsion), got poorer grades, were more likely to engage in deviant (and some delinquent) behavior and to begin doing so at an earlier age, and less likely to keep a part-time job. They quit school (and jobs) and disobeyed the rules to a greater extent than diploma graduates. The second function is not terribly elucidating, but it suggests that relative to non-graduates, GED holders were less likely to be suspended or disrespectful in school but were more likely to have left a job for varying reasons. These patterns are consistent with the literature on the characteristics of dropouts[35], including evidence that conduct disorders and substance abuse are more prevalent among those who do not complete high school.[36]

These findings are supported by subsequent data on a 1990 sample of Army recruits who were administered a survey upon reception into service.[37] Tables 6 and 7 present the results of a discriminant analysis performed in order to distinguish between regular graduates and others.[38] In contrast to traditional diploma graduates, GED holders and uncertified dropouts thought about quitting school for a multitude of reasons, were more likely to have been expelled or suspended from school, quit their jobs, and were less likely to participate in school activities.[39]

Regardless of the controversy over the cognitive or academic equivalency of a regular secondary school diploma and passing the GED tests, the military experience suggests that the two are not equal in other, non-academic ways. Although it might be argued that it is unfair to judge the “staying power” of GED holders by their adaptation to the hardships, structure, and discipline of the active duty military, similar dropout patterns are evident in the Selected Reserve[40] and in other non-military settings such as higher education and the job market, both of which we address elsewhere in this book. We saw in chapter 3 and 4 that GEDs are more likely to quit a job than those who completed high school and we show in chapter 6 that GEDs are more likely to drop out of technical school and college (both two-year and four-year institutions). All evidence indicates that quitting high school is the first step in a long string of failures for both GEDs and uncertified dropouts in their adult lives.

The Next Step: Measuring Noncognitive Factors

DoD and the Services have researched other selection measures, most notably, biographical and temperament inventories.[41] Regardless of the apparent power of biodata, technical, practical, and political concerns precluded its operational adoption. Among the nullifying issues is concern about the realistic potential for recruiter coaching and applicant faking of a self-report biodata inventory.

Although biodata was were never operationally implemented, the Navy has tested a Compensatory Screening Model (CSM). A trial CSM was implemented in July 1992 and included factual background information rather than a self-administered, self-report biographical inventory. The Navy CSM was applied only to Tier 2 and 3 applicants in the upper half of the AFQT distribution (Categories I to IIIA). More specifically, the Navy trial CSM considered a prospective recruit’s aptitude score, employment status, years of education completed, age at enlistment, participation in a youth military program (e.g., Junior ROTC), and criminal record in addition to the particular credential within Tier 2 or 3 in an attempt to compensate for the attrition risk associated with individuals with alternative credentials. Up to 5% of Navy enlisted accessions were authorized to be drawn from CSM-screened applicants.

In September 1994, the Navy implemented a revised CSM for operational use. An eligibility score was computed from Tier 2 or 3 applicants’ AFQT score, age, years of education, and education credential. In addition, a less stringent CSM cut score qualified military youth program participants and applicants who passed a recruiting district commander’s interview. FY 1995 operational results showed an increase in the proportion of GED holders within Tier 2 and 3 accessions of 8 percentage points above the pre-CSM period (FYs 1988-1991).[42] CSM-screened recruits had higher aptitude and educational attainment, and attrition was reduced slightly. The Navy reported a 4-percentage point drop in 24-month attrition among the CSM-screened accessions in comparison to a 1993 control group of non-screened Tier 2 and 3 upper aptitude level personnel. Though the overall impact on attrition was small, the Navy has continued to experiment with CSM-like programs as a means of improving personnel quality and filling understaffed occupations with average or above aptitude sailors.

The Army has turned to a temperament measure as part of its GED-Plus test program. Enlistment candidates sponsored for GED testing are evaluated with regard to their scores on the Assessment of Individual Motivation (AIM), among other factors. Again, such screening does not replace reliance on education credential but is used to expand the recruiting market by identifying the “least risky” from among the set of risky candidates.[43] Results from the use of AIM to reduce attrition are encouraging but modest. Taking the AIM score into account helped reduce 3-month attrition by nearly 10%.[44] Preliminary research on a new scoring system that significantly increases the tests validity in predicting attrition is even more promising. Regardless of whether the military decides to use AIM on a mass scale, this new research represents an important stride toward implementing noncognitive tests in a high stakes test and this application may have implications outside the military attrition context (e.g. educational testing).

Conclusion

According to evidence from the nation’s largest employer, the military, the GED program does not adequately prepare its “graduates” for work, particularly with regard to the non-cognitive or non-academic demands of the job. Despite the fact that GED recipients are screened more thoroughly (and thus, may be atypical of GED holders overall), they are more likely to create discipline problems and as a result are twice as likely as traditional diploma holders to be dismissed from or quit the military.

The GED purportedly documents whether or not a dropout possesses academic knowledge equivalent to the level acquired by an average high school graduate. Being prepared for a military career, or more generally the world of work, involves much more than minimum preparation for a day’s worth of testing. Proof of persistence, teamwork, adaptability, work ethic, and the like are needed as well. Training and instruction toward these ends would be fitting goals of the GED program in addition to marketing an academic test.

In response to the relegation of the GED to Tier 2 status, the Testing Service has been quick to remind DoD of the military origins of the program. What the Testing Service fails to realize, or at least mention, is that the GED tests were used to certify military members for college after they successfully completed their time in service. Employers are looking not only for basic skills but also for prosocial skills, attitudes, and behaviors.[45] Likewise, the military provides occupational training in exchange for maintaining personal discipline and commitment—for at least a few years. Failure to fully equip those looking for a second chance is not good from either an individual or an organizational perspective.

References

Boesel, D., Alsalam, N., & Smith, T.M. (1997, draft). Performance of GED Recipients. Washington, DC: National Library of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education.

Brady, E.J., Busciglio, H.H., White, L.A., & Young, M.C. (1991). The Relationship of Education Credentials to Enlisted Job Performance. Paper presented at the Military Testing Association.

Buddin, R., & Kirby, S.N. (1997). GED Accessions in the Selected Reserve: How Long Do They Serve? Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Cameron, S.V., & Heckman, J.J. (1993). The Nonequivalence of High School Equivalents. Journal of Labor Economics, 11(1), Part 1, 1-47.

Cheatham, C.W. (1978). The High School Graduate, an Indicator of a Quality Marine? Fort Levenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

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Department of Defense. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1996. Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy).

Eitelberg, M.J., Laurence, J.H., & Waters, B.K. (1984). Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry. Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).

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Laurence, J. H. (1984). Education Standards for Military Enlistment and the Search for Successful Recruits (FR-PRD-84-4). Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization.

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[1] General Accounting Office, 1997

[2] Laurence, Ramsberger, and Arabian 1996; Laurence, Naughton, and Harris 1995

[3] Klein, Hawes-Dawson, and Martin 1991

[4] Foch and King 1977; General Accounting Office 1980, 1998

[5] Klein, Hawes-Dawson, and Martin 1991

[6] Laurence 1984; Klein, et al. 1991

[7] The philosophy of attrition can be viewed differently depending upon the volunteer status of the military. When people are being forced to serve under the draft, “easy” separation policies might result in a surge of recalcitrant recruits. Discharge under draft conditions might very well be welcome—a reward rather than a punishment. Volunteers, on the other hand, enter willingly, so separation may be viewed as a punishment.

[8] General Accounting Office 1980

[9] Buddin 1984; Laurence 1987

[10] Flyer 1959

[11] Between 1950 and 1976, the AFQT, a combination of verbal, math, and spatial subtests, served as a separate enlistment and induction screening test. Since 1976, the AFQT minus the spatial component was incorporated into the ASVAB, which is used for both selection and classification.

[12] See Eitelberg, Laurence, and Waters 1984

[13] Department of Defense 1974; General Accounting Office 1976

[14] Department of Defense 1981; Laurence 1987

[15] Means and Laurence 1984

[16] Eitelberg, Laurence, and Waters, 1984

[17] Laurence 1983, 1987

[18] Laurence 1993

[19] See Laurence 1993

[20] Laurence, in preparation

[21] Department of Defense, 1999

[22] These statistics are those reported by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Other official statistics submitted to DoD by the Services after “cleaning” may not match these figures exactly.

[23] Department of Defense, 2000

[24] Among the additional screens are aptitude level, moral character, participation in scouting, Junior ROTC, and score on the Assessment of Individual Motivation (AIM). In addition to 4,000 active duty accessions, the program is also available to 2,000 reservists.

[25] Laurence, 1993

[26] See Means and Laurence 1984

[27] Laurence 1987

[28] Laurence 1997

[29] Waivers of moral character standards (e.g., traffic offenses, misdemeanors, and the like) also are less likely to be granted for Tier 2 and 3 recruits.

[30] There are actually five main categories with percentile score ranges as follows: I = 93-99; II = 65-92; IIIA = 50-64; IIIB = 31-49; IV = 10-30; V = 1-9. Category V applicants are ineligible, by law, for enlistment. The ability distribution is based on a nationally representative sample of youth ages 18 to 24.

[31] Laurence, 1987

[32] Laurence 1984

[33] Cheatham 1978

[34] A set of 66 out of 121 EBIS variables was used for this stepwise, Rao analysis. This set was derived from previous research that examined items in relation to attrition. This set was neither expanded nor winnowed down nor otherwise refined for the present analysis, which was not published previously. The data set was not available for reanalysis at the time this chapter was prepared.

[35] Smith 1996

[36] Kessler, Foster, Saunders, and Stang 1995

[37] See Sipes, Strickland, Laurence, DiFazio, and Wetzel, 2000

[38] Note that because there were so few non-graduates—17—this group was combined with the GED group.

[39] Again, the caveat regarding the “selected” nature of this sample also applies here. Greater differentiation between groups might well be realized within a more representative sample of education credential groups

[40] Buddin and Kirby 1997

[41] See Trent and Laurence 1993

[42] Thomas Trent, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, CA (personal communication, 1996).

[43] Young, Heggestad, and Nason 1999

[44] Knapp, Heggestad and Young 2004

[45] Nelson 1997

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