ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY and CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN ...



ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY and CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKBahar Rumelili, Koc UniversityABSTRACT: Mainstream conflict resolution approaches often fail to resolve protracted conflicts such as Cyprus and Israel/Palestine because they assume a pre-given set of disputed goods and unsatisfied needs, and overlook the political and social processes through which the parties determine the set of disputed goods and constitute their identities in relation to both the disputed goods and each other. On the other hand, while critical approaches to identity and security scrutinize these very processes, their failure to integrate the political processes of securitization with the social dynamics of identity formation has held them back in offering a perspective on conflict resolution. This paper builds on the notion of ontological security to develop a two-layered framework of security, which then acts as the basis to integrate and develop critical approaches to security and identity into a critical approach to conflict resolution. I argue that conflict resolution induces ontological insecurity, which in turn sets in motion political and social dynamics leading to the re-radicalization of differences and re-securitization of issues. What is needed is a reflexive, self-driven process of desecuritization coupled with a reconfiguration of identity relations in a way that maintains ontological security. The framework and arguments are illustrated by reference to the Cyprus conflict. INTRODUCTIONQuestions of identity and security remain inextricably intertwined in many of the protracted conflicts currently confronting the international community. The internationally endorsed two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict falls apart precisely when issues that mobilize identity concerns, such as the status of Jerusalem, return of Palestinian refugees, and the identity of Israel as a Jewish state come to the agenda. Similarly, in the Cyprus conflict, UN endorsed reunification plans fail to bridge the parties’ different preferences regarding the desirable degree and form of unification. In Bosnia Herzegovina, meaningful reform of the consociational Dayton constitution proves growingly impossible as political identities continue to solidify along ethnic lines.In response to such protracted conflicts, conflict resolution scholars and practicioners have devised a number of solutions and strategies under the guiding assumption that ‘discord among humans can be settled by a fair allocation of a limited set of available goods’ (Farneti 2009: 536). Yet this assumption of a pre-given set of disputed goods and unsatisfied needs has overlooked the political and social processes through which conflict parties come to determine the set of disputed goods and constitute their identities in relation to both the disputed goods and each other. The expectation has been that these political and social processes will be automatically reversed when the conflict is resolved through a fair allocation. In the context of repeated failures, the solutions, interventions, and processes of conflict resolution have been revisited, but this guiding assumption has gone unquestioned.This paper advances a critical approach to conflict resolution which questions this guiding assumption. Since the end of the Cold War, critical approaches to international relations have emphasized the contingent and socially constructed nature of dominant conceptions of identity and security. A driving agenda of securitization theory has been that security, threat, danger, and risk are not objective conditions, but social constructs that are shaped by dominant discourses. We inhabit a securitized world of our own making, where issues and concerns are approached as threats to our survival that merit emergency and exceptional measures (Waever 1995). Hence, conflicts in Bosnia, Cyprus, and Palestine become intractable because issues such as constitution, territoriality, and status of Jerusalem are securitized and politically elevated into matters of survival. Similarly, critical theories of identity have underscored the significance of identity as a constitutive basis for social action, but at the same time drawn our attention to the discursive production of difference (Campbell 1992; Weldes et al. 1999). Thus, the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Bosnian Muslims and Serbs do not stem from pre-given civilizational incompatibilities, but ‘exist’ only because they are continuously re-produced through dominant discourses. No critical theorist would ever claim that securitizations and difference producing discourses are easily reversible. However, to stress that this is a world of our own making invites reflexivity, and at least for some scholars it also opens up the possibility that securitized issues can be brought back to normal politics, redefined as not threatening to our survival, through a process of desecuritization (Waever 1995). Yet, apart from the identification of this possibility, securitization theory have not really engaged with the more practical questions such as how desecuritization takes place, under what conditions and through which underlying processes (Aradau 2004). Similarly, critical theorists of identity have stressed that identity is dependent on difference (Connolly 1991; Campbell 1992; Neumann 1999), and some scholars have pointed to the possibility that difference can be defined in non-antagonistic ways (Rumelili 2004, 2007; Hansen 2006). But, again, apart from the identification of this possibility, scholars have not engaged with the question of how.Although the concepts of identity and security have served as departure points in critical approaches to international relations since the end of the Cold War, their interrelationship has not been conceptualized in a systematic manner. According to Ole Waever (2009), an integrative approach that would bring together the political processes of securitization with the identity formation dynamics at the individual and collective level would greatly facilitate the development of securitization theory as a tool for conflict analysis and resolution. As Waever notes, reminding existentially threatened conflict parties, such as the Israelis and Palestinians, of the socially constructed and contingent nature of their identities is not likely to work as a desecuritization strategy. At the same time, however, the continued reproduction of antithetical identity positions undermines political attempts to remove the perception of existential threat. This deeply intertwined nature of identity and security is what lies at the heart of the many failed conflict resolution attempts.Therefore, in order to advance a critical theory of conflict resolution, it is necessary first to integrate and develop critical approaches to international relations as a theory of conflict resolution. It may be argued that critical theories are geared for a reflexive purpose and therefore not suitable for the problem-solving mission of conflict resolution (cf. Cox 1981). However, there is no reason why certain insights derived from critical theories cannot inform practical questions. In what follows, I will advance a framework that integrates insights from securitization theory and critical theories of identity, and use this framework to address some of the problem-solving concerns of conflict resolution in the context of the Cyprus conflict. As noted above, one of the key reasons that has held back the development of critical approaches to international relations as a theory of conflict resolution has been their failure to integrate the political processes of securitization with the social dynamics of identity formation and negotiation. Given the deeply intertwined nature of identity and security in protracted conflicts, formulas that rest either on reversing securitization or the reconstruction of identities alone are unlikely to bear fruit. In this paper, I will draw on the literature on ontological security to develop an analytical framework that integrates processes of securitization and identity construction within a two-layered conception of security as both physical and ontological. The application of the individual-level notion of ontological security to collective political entities is wrought by a number of problems, and some of these problems will sought to be addressed in this paper through a narrative conception of the state. Yet, despite these problems, the two-layered conception of security as both physical and ontological provides a valuable analytic to integrate the pursuits of distinct identity and physical security in international relations. Ontological security offers important insights to the study of conflict resoution. It highlights the need for conflict resolution to address both the ontological and the physical security concerns of parties. Protracted conflicts and the habits and routines that states have formed around them generate a sense of ontological security (Mitzen 2006), whereas conflict resolution is an ontological insecurity inducing process. Therefore, conflict resolution processes need to position conflict parties in a renewed state of ontological security in order to be successful. Yet, instead of treating the ontological security concerns of conflict parties as pre-given, the critical approach to conflict resolution that I advance in this paper entails reversing and/or reconfiguring the processes through which they arise. In other words, how conflict parties maintain a state of ontological security vis-à-vis one another and how the perception of imminent physical threat from the Other is reproduced and mobilized emerge as the key questions. Instead of taking ontological security as a distinct concern of states and an additional factor to be taken into account in conflict resolution, I emphasize that ontological and physical security constitute inextricable, non-interchangeable, and mutually reinforcing dimensions of security. The notion of ontological security intimately connects the question of whether we securitize , i.e. perceive and construct certain actors and issues as threats to our physical survival, with how we secure ourselves as beings.It thus highlights that conflict resolution is not only a matter of desecuritization, i.e. the political removal of issues from the realm of security, but also necessitates a parallel process of identity re-construction, where Self transforms its relation to the issues and stakes as well as to the Other. In the absence of the latter, desecuritization runs the risk of inducing ontological insecurity, and unleashing the political processes of the identification of and mobilization against threats.In short, this paper draws on the notion of ontological security to develop a two-layered conception of security as both physical and ontological, which serves as the basis for integrating and developing critical approaches to international relations as a critical theory of conflict resolution. In the following section, I will situate the main premises and concepts of critical approaches to international relations within the literature on conflict resolution. I will also discuss the reasons why critical approaches to international relations have failed to develop as theories of conflict resolution. Then, the third section of the paper will reinterpret the concept of ontological security within a narrative conception of state and present a two-layered framework of security as both ontological and physical. I will conceptualize how conflict resolution processes move conflict parties between two-layered states of security. In the fourth section, I will conceptualize a critical approach to conflict resolution within the two-layered framework of security, and analyze how processes of desecuritization and identity reconfiguration move conflict parties between different states of security. The fifth section of the paper will present the Cyprus conflict as an illustration of the framework. The conclusion will summarize the main arguments. 2. CONFLICT RESOLUTION: ROOM FOR A CRITICAL APPROACH?Considering conflict as a pervasive and natural part of human interaction, the field of conflict resolution has been concerned with conflict at all levels, individual, group, societal, interstate, and in a variety of settings, including schools, workplaces, etc. A common definition therefore universalizes conflict as ‘a social situation, in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources ’ (Wallensteen 2007: 16) Yet, the particularities of conflict between politically organized collectives possessing means of violence have also been noted. As Wallensteen (2007: 3) has stressed ‘conflict resolution takes on an entirely different dimension when parties have been trying to kill each other ‘. That the possession of means of violence and the potential to inflict physical harm transforms conflicts would not come as a surprise to theorists of international relations, who have long established that security as the states’ primary concern under conditions of anarchy. Critical approaches to security have, however, challenged the presumption that security concerns are givens in international conflicts. They have stressed that security, threat, danger, and risk are not objective conditions, but are constructs that are socially produced and politically invoked. Therefore, the threat of physical harm is not an innate part of some conflicts, but its very invocation changes the nature of conflicts, endows them with urgency, legitimizes exceptional measures, and empowers certain technologies. Security discourse is not only characteristic of conflicts involving parties with means of violence, it can permeate and transform issues and conflicts in many areas, including economy, migration, health, and environment . Thus, critical approaches to security would stress that protracted conflicts in international relations are securitized conflicts. Physical insecurity is not only the direct result of what the other party does and/or threatens to do, but also stems from the continuous self-reproduction of security concerns in a political context where security discourses, agents, and technologies have become paramount. The concern with experiencing physical harm extends beyond the military into other spheres of interaction. Therefore, addressing physical insecurity concerns though the development of an impartial solution becomes an impossiblility as it is securitization which prompts the security stakes. Increasing stakes legitimizes the further intrusion of the security discourse and the involvement of security agents, setting in place a bleak, self-perpetuating cycle of securitized conflict. Mainstream conflict resolution approaches define conflict resolution ‘as a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 8). As such, it amounts to a situation which is more than the absence of war but less than a broader understanding of peace,which in turn would involve not only the cessation of hostilities but also justice and integration (Wallensteen 2007: 10). Critical approaches to security would stress that the resolution of incompatibilities would necessitate a prior process of desecuritization, where the conflict is first removed from the realm of security and brought back into normal politics. Such a process would bring the parties to a state of asecurity. Whereas for conflict resolution approaches, security is a paramount concern of parties that absolutely need to be addressed, critical approaches stress that security and insecurity are basically two sides of the same coin. Both involve the continued perception of the threat of physical harm from the other side. A state of security depends on the existence of adequate protection and guarantees against the threat, which may be provided by conflict resolution agreement. However, security always remains an ephemeral state, as the continued perception of threat perpetuates securitization, augments the security stakes and extends them into new areas, making it virtually impossible for all concerns of insecurity to be encompassed within a conflict resolution agreement. Thus, a critical approach to conflict resolution would stress that securitized conflicts cannot be resolved only through negotiations between parties or through impartial mediation. What is first needed is a reflexive, self-driven political process of desecuritization which transforms the conflict parties’ relations with the issues at stake by gradually removing the discourses, practices, and agents of security. Such a removal does not entail giving up on the issues and making concessions to the other side, but delinking the issues from the survivalist mentality and exceptional politics. Yet, this brings us back to our starting point. A critical approach to conflict resolution, drawing on critical approaches to security, underlines the necessity of a prior process of desecuritization, however, it does not provide any insights as to how this may be pursued in a context of antagonistic identities. How can a conflict party initiate a reflexive process of desecuritization, when it perceives the other parties as enemies, inherently aggressive, unwilling and morally incapable to undertake a reflexive process, and likely to exploit it as a vulnerability? The complex intertwining of identity and security makes desecuritization at best a good-intentioned but ill-fated attempt, when pursued alone. Conflict resolution necessitates the transformation of not only the relation of conflict parties to the disputed goods but also of their relation to one another; in other words their identities. Mainstream conflict resolution approaches have drawn on theories of social psychology to understand and intervene in the complex identity dynamics of conflict (Deutsch 2002; for a review, see Cuhadar and Dayton 2011). Particularly relevant in this respect has been social identity theory, which has stipulated the human propensity to categorize people into in-groups and out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). When coupled with the desire for personal and group esteem, these categorizations generate biases and prejudices which fuel inter-group conflict (Brewer and Brown 1998). Having identified this general human propensity, social identity theorists have been occupied with identifying the conditions under which conflict materializes (Brewer 2001). Based on findings that lack of contact reinforces group bias, promoting contact between different identity groups has emerged as a conflict resolution approach Pettigrew 1998). Yet, empirical research has demonstrated that contact does not always diminish prejudice, and that interventions at the interpersonal level do not always translate into outcomes at the intergroup level (Cuhadar and Dayton 2011). For critical theorists of identity, the human propensity to differentiate self from other stems not from an innate cognitive necessity, but emerges as a condition of the discursive production of meaning. In other words, as meaning is produced through distinguishing ‘what is’ from ‘what is not’, identity depends on difference in order to be. Thus, identities at the personal and collective level are constituted through distinguishing one’s self and group from others. They lack a pre-given, objective, and stable basis, and exist only by virtue of the continuous reproduction of these differences. In international relations, David Campbell and others have underscored how this lack of a pre-given identity generates a profound sense of insecurity, which underlies the temptation to construct an Other as radically different, morally inferior, and physically threatening to the survival of the Self. Conflict, then, functions as a means to reproduce difference and stabilize identities. By identifying this prevailing temptation to radicalize difference, critical theories of identity, on the one hand, offer an explanation for how conflicts come to defy efforts at resolution. No allocation of the disputed goods can override the discursive necessity to produce meaning through difference, an identity in relation to the Other. Although critical theories of identity do not specify which particular Other will be invoked and (possibly) villified in the process of identity constitution, conflicts set in place a particular Self/Other opposition, which, then becomes profoundly difficult to deconstruct. Moreover, critical approaches to security underscore how securitization fixes identities and challenges their negotiability. Therefore, the discursive production of identity through difference invites the radicalization of difference, which in turn unleashes political dynamics of identifying and mobilizing against the Other as a physical threat. And this brings about the complex intertwining of identity and security which proves so hard to unravel in cases of protracted conflicts. Although the cognitive necessity to categorize and the discursive production of meaning through difference do not rule out one another, critical theories of identity would find the social psyhological approaches to conflict resolution based on transforming individual attitudes somewhat na?ve. Attempts to transform individual attitudes without providing an alternative language wherein they may be expressed in a way that resonates with prevailing discourses are unlikely to be successful.That is why progress made at the interpersonal level in closed workshops often fails to translate into outcomes at the intergroup level. When individuals leave the workshop, they remain confined to the social structures of meaning to articulate their conceptions of Self and Other. Therefore, social psychological interventions to transform individual attitudes can only be useful if accompanied by a broader process of the discursive reconfiguration of the relation of Self to Other.While the radicalization of difference remains a prevailing temptation, scholars, who have empirically analyzed representations of self and other in international relations, have noted the multiple ways in which identities are produced in relation to difference. In certain cases, the constitutive Other is an object of admiration and the Self aspires to it. Discourses of colonialism infantalize and exoticize the Other, instead of constructing it as a physical threat (Doty 1996). Liberal, universalistic discourses construct the Other as less-than-self, rather than anti-Self, and thereby position Self and Other on a temporal spectrum (Schimmelfennig 2001; for a critique, see Prozorov, forthcoming). It has been argued by some that the collective European identity promoted by the EU does not spatialize difference, and instead Others its own war-torn past (Waever 1998). In short, the common denominator of these empirical analyses of self/other relations has been that representations of self and other are situated along multiple dimensions of meaning, where radicalization of difference remains a strong possibility but not a necessity (Hansen 2006; Rumelili 2004, 2007).Given the multiple ways in which identities can be defined in relation to difference, the main contribution of critical theories of identity is to chart out a broad realm of social and discursive possibility. The differences between conflict parties which propel conflict are not the essential properties of the actors; they are socially and discursively produced. Yet, this does not mean that they can be wished away, and that the resolution of the conflicts through a fair allocation of the disputed goods will automatically bring together Self and Other in a broader collective identity. Mainstream conflict resolution approaches often overlook that identities are constituted in relation to difference and profess solutions that are premised on the negation and the elimination of the constitutive differences between Self and Other. These solutions, then, often fail because the constitutive differences continue to be reproduced and mobilized to undermine trust and cooperation between conflict parties. While underlining that constitutive differences cannot be wished away, critical theories of identity do suggest the possibility that the Self/Other relationship between conflict parties can be reconfigured in a way that maintains the constitutive differences between Self and Other while removing the perception of threat. Although identity depends on difference, it does not depend on the construction of the Other as a threat. It is the perception of threat aspect that needs to be undone for conflict resolution to succeed. The removal of the perception of threat does not automatically generate a relationship of amity between Self and Other, as the remaining constitutive differences may continue to construct social hierarchies that may be resented and contested. Yet, what is significant is that these social contestations of identity do not set in motion political dynamics of securitization. The complex intertwining of identity and security is broken. A critical approach to conflict resolution is thus based on altering the structures of meaning within which conflict parties relate to the disputed goods and to one another. This brings us to the question of the possibilities for and processes of discursive change. Securitization theory and critical theories of identity outlined thus far are premised on different understandings of discourse and in turn of the possibility and processes of discursive change. In particular, securitization has been theorized as a ‘speech act’, where language reflects the intentions of the speaker, and analysis focuses on its illocutionary effects, in other words, what security does. In contrast, critical theories of identity have primarily adopted a Foucauldian perspective and emphasized the power of discourse to constitute the subject identities and limit what can be said. A critical approach to conflict resolution does not depend on the existence of purposive actors outside of the structures of meaning that constitute the conflict, for that cannot be. Yet, it highlights the limits and possibilities within those structures of meaning and the ongoing processes of reinterpretation and transformation that accompany the reproduction of discourse through individual articulations. Discursive change only happens gradually and within the available limits. Yet each reinterpretation introduces new possibilities and room for further change (Diez 1999). Despite their emphasis on contingency, critical approaches to international relations have been employed, and hence at present appear to be better equipped, to explain how conflicts are reproduced. Individually, securitization theory and critical theories of identity respectively offer insights into how conflicts may be desecuritized and the underlying identity construction be reconfigured. However, what is at stake in protracted conflicts is a complex intertwining of securitization of issues and the radicalization of difference, where critical intervention into one process is prevented by the persistence of the other. Critical approaches to international relations offer no way out of this conundrum, as they highlight how securitization fixes identities and challenges their negotiability, and how construction of identity through difference activates the temptation to transform the difference into Otherness, and invites securitization. The following section of the article will offer a conceptual framework of security, which offers a way out of this conundrum at least analytically, and enables the insights of critical approaches to identity and security to be better integrated to tackle the complex intertwining of identity and security in protracted conflicts. This framework is based on a two-layered conception of security as both physical and ontological. I argue that ontological security and physical security are inextricable, non-interchangeable, and mutually reinforcing dimensions of security. The reason why conflicts defy efforts at resolution is because conflict resolution induces ontological insecurity, which in turn sets in motion political and social dynamics leading to re-radicalization of differences and the re-securitization of stakes. Therefore, I argue conflict resolution processes need to reinstate conflict parties in a renewed state of ontological security while attempting to reverse the securitization of issues and reconfigure radicalized differences. A critical approach to conflict resolution does not foresee an end to politics, a state where all incompatibilities are resolved and social differences and hierarchies between political collectives are eliminated. A critical approach is not utopian; it recognizes the limits posed by the nature of the political as well as the constitution of meaning through difference, while revealing and celebrating the contingencies and possibilities. Desecuritization falls short of emancipation, and as Aradau (2004) notes, it does not transform the underlying exclusionary logic of security. Desecuritization merely changes the way in which conflict parties approach and handle the issues of conflict. In a parallel fashion, reconfigurations of identity relations between self and other do not eliminate the social hierarchies, and often merely substitute one in place of the other. This, in many ways, mirrors the status of conflict resolution in the broader literature on conflict and peace studies. Conflict resolution remains a conservative alternative to reconciliation, which involves the ‘formation of peaceful relations based on mutual trust and acceptance, cooperation, and consideration of mutual needs’ at the societal level (Bar-Tal 2000). It also falls short of broader notions of peace, which include justice and integration. SECURITY AS BOTH PHYSICAL AND ONTOLOGICALThe concept of ontological security has given birth to a burgeoning literature in IR, mainly building on Giddens (1991). Mitzen (2006a: 341) has argued that, in addition to physical security, states also seek ontological security, which is the ‘security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice.’ (Mitzen 2006a: 344). According to Steele (2005: 526), it entails ‘knowing both what one is doing and why one is doing it’. Certainty, which gives rise to stability and continuity of being, is a pre-condition of ontological security. According to Roe (2008: 783), ‘it is a security of social relationship, that is to say a sense of being safely in control of a cognitive situation’. Zarakol (2010: 6) stresses that ‘it entails having a consistent sense of self and having that sense affirmed by others.’ Ontological (in)security is an individual-level concept. It was first pioneered in psychology by Laing, and later used to describe the effects of globalization on individuals by Giddens. The application of this concept to states in IR necessitates the anthropomorhization of states and brings with it the chronic level-of-analysis problem in IR. Mitzen (2006: 351-2) contends that scaling up the individual-level concept of ontological security to states can be justified –as it is done with respect to other individual-level concepts in IR- by its heuristic value, and by assuming states to be collectives of individual members and decisionmakers, who have concerns of ontological security.A narrative conception of state (Epstein 2011) however, offers a way to apply the concept of ontological security to states, without ascribing personal qualities to states. States are not persons with biologically given needs and abilities, and hence they do not have a ‘need’ for ontological security in the way individuals do. But states, like individuals, narrate themselves into a social existence; they exist as actors and are recognized to be so by others to the extent that they are able to maintain a consistent, coherent, and socially recognized narrative about themselves. Ontological security refers to the freedom to maintain this consistent, coherent, and socially recognized narrative. The emerging literature on ontological security in IR stresses that the pursuit of ontological security constitutes an additional basis and motivation for state behavior. Thus, ontological security is positioned to explain ‘seemingly irrational’ state behavior that cannot be explained by a self-interest in physical security, such as ‘the attachment to conflict-producing routines’ (Mitzen 2006) and ‘actions which compromise physical existence (Steele 2008). I argue that ontological and physical security are not competing explanations of state behavior. They are inextricable, non-interchangeable, and mutually reinforcing dimensions of security, and as a result, state behavior is always motivated by both physical and ontological security concerns. The questions of whether and under what conditions ontological security trumps physical security (or vice versa) are misguided because one cannot be isolated from the other. The self-narratives, which are matters of ontological security, give meaning to actions, which implicate physical security. As will be outlined shortly, their actions and the actions of others move states between different states of ontological and physical security. When their ontological or physical security is compromised, states may take actions primarily to address concerns in that layer of security. And those actions, in turn, may have implications for the other layer of security. Yet this does not mean that they have sacrificed one layer of security for the sake of the other.While challenges to ontological security may not be as pervasive as challenges to physical security, they are by no means less significant. The pervasiveness of challenges to physical security stems from the ways in which the self-narratives of most states are structured –to emphasize vulnerability and the ever-present threat of physical attack. Thus, most challenges to physical security do not challenge the ontological securities of states. Attacks on US interests in the Middle East would not challenge the US self-narrative, just as a Palestinian suicide attack would not undermine the Israeli narrative. Thus, it appears as if states are solely motivated by concerns of physical security because major challenges to ontological security are rare. Self-narratives are flexible and can often accommodate minor challenges. Although the means and the nature of 9/11 attacks challenged certain aspects of the US self-narrative, the latter encompassed those challenges by directing attention to external state enemies (the usual suspects) and securitizing the ‘homeland’. However, extreme circumstances, such as military defeat, secession, or internal revolution generate major challenges to ontological security and necessitate a reconstruction of the state narratives. Zarakol (2011) has analyzed how the defeated powers of Turkey (after WW1), Japan (after WW2), and the Soviet Union (after the Cold War) coped with the ontological insecurity of defeat by seeking a place for themselves at the table of established states. Unexpected security challenges that contradict self/other distinctions, such as allied attack, would also generate ontological insecurity. The European sovereign debt crises, for example, are undermining the self-narratives of southern member states, which are premised on equal (and in the case of Italy, leading) status within the EU. Social stratification and international normative hierarchies (Towns 2010) generate a more structural and chronic form of ontological insecurity. Zarakol (2010) stresses that Non-Western states are more prone to ontological insecurity. Relegated to an inferior status within international normative hierarchies, non-Western states are often constrained in their capacities to secure a social existence as equal or morally superior beings in international politics. Even the liberal universalistic discourses of modernization and development at best position them in a permanent state of becoming, but always falling short of the superior Western self. As a result, non-Western states often develop different narratives for internal and external audiences, because what resonates internally fails to resonate externally and vice versa. Liminal spaces in international politics that straddle socially recognized categories, such as Western/non-Western, also generate ontological insecurity, and constrain the capacity of actors positioned in liminal spaces to narrate themselves unequivocally into a socially recognized identity (Rumelili, forthcoming). Like all discourses, state self-narratives are dependent on reproduction, but this dependence, by itself, does not generate ontological insecurity (cf. Campbell 1992). Instead, reproduction is ingrained in habitual and routinized behavior which is a source of continuous ontological security. Ontological insecurity refers to situations when established structures of meaning fail to make sense, habits and routines need to be broken and new depictions of the world and of self and other need to be established. In its more structural and chronic form, it derives from the permanent disjuncture between self-representations and other-representations. Alternating between different narratives in front of internal and external audiences, a state’s social existence in such cases never achieves stability and takes on an almost schizrophrenic character. Rather than competing with physical security in the explanation of state behavior, the notion of ontological security challenges the exclusive association that conventional theories of IR make between security and survival, physical threat and defense. In its conceptual history as well as current usage, security is equally associated with certainty and stability as it is with survival and defense. The notion of ontological security brings forth this dual meaning of security, invites us to think of security in international relations as related to both being and survival, and explore how these dimensions are interlinked. Thus, the concept of ontological security puts forth a novel understanding of security that is not already captured by distinctions of internal/external security, state/societal security, or objective/subjective security. Although the concept of ontological security, thus, charts a broad research agenda, this paper focuses specifically on ontological insecurity induced by conflict resolution, identifies this insecurity as an obstacle to conflict resolution, and discusses how this insecurity may be addressed. This research problem calls for a rethinking of the relationship between ontological security and change. Ontological security is currently conceptualized in IR as a condition that explains continuity as opposed to change. Mitzen (2006: 343) asserts that ‘ontological security sheds light on the stability of social relationships, cooperative or conflictual, and the difficulty of effecting change.’ This underscores that conflict resolution is an ontological insecurity inducing process. However, it does not mean that ontological security militates against conflict resolution as cooperative social relationships also generate ontological security. The challenge lies in maintaining and reinstating ontological security where conceptions of physical security are changing. Ontological security does not depend on the maintenance of the same narrative but the freedom to adapt the self-narrative to ensure an altered, distinct, and dignified existence in relation to significant Others within the society of states. It is not change per se, but the inability to adapt to change that generates ontological insecurity. The two-layered conception of security expands the possible states of security. If one starts from the assumption that actors in international relations seek both ontological and physical security, then it is possible to deduce that at a single point in time, they will be in a state of security, which has both an ontological and a physical dimension. Following Waever (1998), I define three states of security, namely asecurity, insecurity, and security, but disaggregate the ontological and physical dimensions. The table below attempts to chart out the nine possible states of security. These are not absolute states, but describe the state of security of the Self in relation to the Other.Table 1: States of SecurityPhysical asecurityPhysical InsecurityPhysical securityOntological asecuritySelf is not concerned with stability and certainty/ does not experience concern about physical harmSelf is not concerned with stability and certainty/ experiences concern about physical harm and being inadequately protected against threatsSelf is not concerned with stability and certainty/ experiences concern about physical harm but perceives itself to be adequately protected against threatsOntological insecuritySelf experiences instability and uncertainty of being/ does not experience concern about physical harmSelf experiences instability and uncertainty of being/ experiences concern about physical harm and being inadequately protected against threatsSelf experiences instability and uncertainty of being/ experiences concern about physical harm but perceives itself to be adequately protected against threatsOntological securitySelf experiences stability and certainty of being/ does not experience concern about physical harm Self experiences stability and certainty of being/ experiences concern about physical harm and being inadequately protected against threatsSelf experiences stability and certainty of being/ experiences concern about physical harm but perceives itself to be adequately protected against threatsIn protracted conflicts, parties become locked in a state of ontological security/ physical insecurity. Their self-narratives solidify around a construction of the other as anti-Self, morally inferior and the source of imminent physical threat to the survival of Self. The reproduction of this narrative generates ontological security, and at the same time legitimizes the securitization of the issues of discord between self and other. Thus, even in conflict cases where overt violence has subsided, such as in the Cyprus conflict, the conflict parties experience and reproduce a continuous concern about physical harm, which extends into non-military sectors and is elevated into a matter of survival. The capabilities of the enemy are exaggerated and regardless of its own capability, Self feels inadequately protected. In such situations, mainstream conflict resolution approaches attempt to intervene by resolving the issues of discord between the parties through a fair allocation of their demands. This does not transform the relation of the parties to the issues of discord, but strives to strike a mutually acceptable deal between the parties. As a result, mainstream conflict resolution moves parties to a state of physical security but not to a state of physical asecurity. The issues retain their security significance, but the conflict resolution arrangement provides a precarious guarantee that the key demands of either party will be met and respected by the other. But while conflict resolution attempts to alleviate physical insecurity in this fashion, it generates ontological insecurity. Concessions made to the other side in the context of the agreement disrupt certain aspects of the narrative. The proper implementation of the agreement necessitates that the conflict parties share and cooperate, but these upset the routines and habits established during the conflict. In the absence of a reconstruction of the conflict parties’ identities vis-à-vis one another, there erupts a disturbing inconsistency between the conflict parties’ self narratives and how they are called on to relate to the other. Figure 1: Mainstream Process of Conflict Resolution Ontological securityPhysical insecurityOntological insecurityPhysical securityOntological securityPhysical insecurityOntological insecurity often arises in the process of conflict resolution and constitutes an obstacle to its successful culmination. As the renowned psychiatrist R. D. Laing, who pioneered the term, stressed, in the context of ontological insecurity, ‘the ordinary circumstances of everyday life constitute a continual and deadly threat.’ (1999 [1969]: 43) Similarly, Mitzen (2006a: 345) stresses that ontological insecurity is an ‘incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore.’ When routinized depictions of self/other in self-narratives are disrupted, they generate pressures for the reinstatement of these depictions, and a return to the construction of the Other as a physical threat. During the negotiation process, ontological insecurity raises the stakes, and leads parties to elevate minor outstanding aspects of the deal to existential issues. Thus, ontological insecurity generates new sources of physical insecurity beyond the ones addressed by the conflict resolution agreement. These physical insecurities in turn fuel conceptions of the Other as uncompromising, not trustworthy, and radically different, which reproduce and secure the existing self-narratives. In the context of the new issues of discord, since the parties had not transformed their relation to the issues settled by the agreement, the proposed agreement begins to unravel, and there is a return to a state of ontological security/physical insecurity. Naturally, this does not mean that mainstream approaches to conflict resolution are never successful. There are often internal and external processes that transform the relation of the conflict parties to the disputed goods and to each other, which, in turn, set conditions conducive for conflict resolution. What distinguishes critical approaches to conflict resolution is their ability to theorize how these processes unfold. For example, the reason why the EU has acted successfully as a catalyst for conflict resolution in Central and Eastern Europe is because it provided conflict parties with a collective identity discourse wihin which they could reconstruct their self-narratives. Similarly, much of the conflict resolution literature underlines the importance of ripeness; parties need to be at a mutually-hurting stalemate in order for conflict resolution efforts to be successful (Zartman, 1985). This ripeness in turn implies a readiness to engage in a reflexive process of desecuritization. Because mainstream conflict resolution approaches overlook the political and social processes through which conflict parties define their relations to the disputed goods and to one another, they are unable to identify ontological insecurity as an obstacle to conflict resolution and to theorize how ontological insecurity impacts conflict resolution and how these impacts may be addressed. If security is both ontological and physical, both about the stability of being and the freedom from physical harm, then conflict resolution needs to address both the ontological and physical security concerns of the parties. Mainstream conflict resolution approaches mainly move conflict parties to a state of ontological insecurity/physical security, where the political and social processes that reproduce conflict continue to operate. On the other hand, while critical approaches to international relations theorize the political and social processes that reproduce conflict, they have not been developed and integrated to offer a critical approach to conflict resolution. As was discussed in an earlier section of this paper, individually, securitization theory and critical theories of identity respectively offer insights into how conflicts may be desecuritized and the underlying identity construction be reconfigured. However, what is at stake in protracted conflicts is a complex intertwining of securitization of issues and the radicalization of difference, where critical intervention into one process is prevented by the persistence of the other. Critical approaches to international relations offer no way out of this conundrum, as they highlight how securitization fixes identities and challenges their negotiability, and how construction of identity through difference activates the temptation to transform the difference into Otherness, and invites securitization.IV. ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY AND A CRITICAL APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION The two-layered conception of security offers a way to address this dilemma by analytically disaggregating the mainly social processes implicated in the production of identities, and the mainly political processes implicated in securitization. The pursuits of ontological and physical security in international relations are characterized by different dynamics, processes, acts, and discourses. The pursuit of ontological security leads actors to ‘routinize relationships with significant others’ (Mitzen 2006a: 341) and choose ‘courses of action comfortable with their sense of identity’ (Steele 2005:526). In contrast, the pursuit of physical security entails both the naming and identification of threats, and the development of measures to defend the self against those threats. The distinction between the two layers of security locates the us/them distinction in the realm of security-as-being and the friend/enemy dichotomy in the realm of security-as-survival. Ontological security requires differentiation and in that sense presupposes an other. Yet it does not necessitate the securitization of the other in the sense of defining it as a physical threat (security-as-survival). While the pursuit of ontological security entails practices that reproduce the stability of a self/other relation, the pursuit of physical security is productive of a particular form of self/other relation where the self and other view each other as physical threats.This is not to deny the ways in which identity is deeply intertwined with security. The two-layered conception of security underlines the intimate connection between identity and ontological security, while exposing the contingent link between identity and the construction of an other as a threat to survival (i.e. conceptions of physical security). In protracted conflicts, the securitization of issues is deeply intertwined with radicalised differences. Desecuritization, which holds the promise of moving conflict parties to a state of physical asecurity, is very difficult to undertake in the context of antagonistic identities. Similarly, reconstruction of identities, which would make it possible for conflict parties to narrate a stable existence in the absence of conflict, is very difficult to undertake in the context of securitization. For sustainable conflict resolution, desecuritization and reconstruction of identities need to be pursued simultaneously, and because the pursuits of ontological and physical security are characterized by different processes, they can be. The diagram below outlines how a critical approach to conflict resolution moves the conflict parties between different states of security.Figure 2: Critical Approach to Conflict Resolution Ontological securityPhysical insecurityOntological insecurityPhysical asecurityOntological securityPhysical insecurityOntological asecurityPhysical asecurityOntological securityPhysical asecurityDesecuritization changes the ways in which conflict parties relate to the issues of discord and to one another. It disempowers security agents, delegitimizes emergency politics, and undermines the survivalist mentality and the perception of the Other as the source of imminent physical threat. Such a transformation, however, much like the transformation to physical security discussed earler, generates ontological insecurity because it disrupts the certainty of the self/other distinctions in self-narratives. Hence, the process of desecuritization by itself is not sufficient for conflict resolution; it moves the conflict parties to a state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity. And although desecuritization is a more structurally transformative process, a return from a state of physical asecurity to one of physical insecurity through a process of resecuritization is always possible under conditions of ontological insecurity. Therefore, for desecuritization to be a strategy for conflict resolution, it should also facilitate the transition of conflict parties to a state of ontological security/physical asecurity. The state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity compels the self to engage in practices that re-institute the identity distinctions that would ensure the certainty and stability of its being. At the same time, as was noted before, ontological insecurity triggers physical (in)security, by undermining trust and accentuating the perception of general threat from the outside world. It creates a conducive setting for the manipulation of this distrust and uncertainty by political actors and processes. Hence, when the freedom to constitute a distinct self is challenged, greater is the possibility that this insecurity at the layer of being will be compensated by securitization, the identification of and mobilization against a physical threat. As a result, processes of desecuritization that undermine the ontological security of the self are likely to be unsustainable. In contrast, in a state of ontological security/physical asecurity, Self continues to be concerned in maintaining a distinct social existence vis-à-vis the Other. Representations of self and other that reproduce social and moral hierarchies continue to be employed. Yet, these differences are not imbued with perceptions of the Other as a physical threat. Security communities constitute good examples of such states of security in international relations, particularly the European/ North Atlantic one, although as Waever underlines, European states are only at a state of asecurity vis-à-vis one another and securitization of other issues, such as migration, continue to be prevalent. The constitutive differences between self and other are embedded in a broader sense of collective identity, and a series of routinized actions and habits (Pouliot 2008) to generate ontological security.A number of scholars have underlined that desecuritization cannot be premised on the removal of issues from the realm of security, and that any transformation of security relations need to be accompanied by changes in underlying identity constructions (Huysmans 1998, Aradau 2004). However, their proposed identity reconstructions have all involved the blurring and elimination of differences,and the meeting of self and other in a broader universal. The two-layered conception of security leads me to argue that such proposals are misguided. Desecuritization processes that are based on the negation and elimination of the constitutive differences between self and other generate ontological insecurity as they generate uncertainty about identity and compromise the self’s ability to distinguish itself from significant others. Scholars, who have empirically analyzed representations of self and other in international relations, have noted the multiple ways in which identities are produced in relation to difference. For example, Lene Hansen (2006) has argued that constructions of identity and difference have temporal, spatial, and ethical dimensions. These dimensions give rise to identities with varying degrees of radicalization. In other words, self can constitute itself as distinct from the other by representing the self as advanced and the other as backward along a historical path (temporal distinction), and/or by excluding the other from its territory (spatial distinction), and/or by assuming a responsibility over the other (ethical dimension). Similarly, Rumelili (2004, 2007) has argued that self/other relations vary according to the nature of difference (inherent-acquired), social distance between self and other(association-dissociation), and the response of the other to the construction of its identity (recognition- resistance). These dimensions indicate the ways in which self/other relations may be reconfigured while maintaining the constitutive distinctions necessary for ontological security.Although it may be argued that the ultimate stage of conflict resolution/ transformation/ emancipation is in fact a state of ontological asecurity/physcial asecurity, Europe provides a good example of the difficulties (or perhaps the impossibility) of transitioning to a state of ontological asecurity in a process of voluntary conflict resolution and cooperation. Despite the long-standing expectations that national Self/Other distinctions in Europe would eventually be overridden by transnational identities, and dissolve into a shared European identity, they have remained resilient and a significant source of ontological security in the process of economic and political integration. National and sub-national communities in Europe remain concerned about maintaining their distinct identities vis-à-vis one another. Yet, the European integration project remains a significant source of ontological security even In the context of the current financial crisis in Europe, as national differences are being reactivated and politically mobilized to oppose the imposition of both solidarity and fiscal control. V. Cyprus ConflictNo case better represents the repeated failure of mainstream conflict resolution approaches than Cyprus. As Heraclides (2011) highlights, despite the innumerable attempts at third-party mediation since 1964 including all UN Secretary-Generals, the continuation of direct talks for over forty years, and the absence of violence since 1974, the conflict has come to defy all efforts at resolution. As early as 1986, one analyst had concluded that the conflict “has resisted with tenacity the efforts of nations great and small to bring about a solution. It frustrates diplomats, amazes outside observers, irritates those who believe we have made progress in studying technique of negotiation . . . [and] has been a sore point with secretary-generals of the United Nations.” (Epstein 1986, quoted in Heraclides 2011: 117) This is not to deny the capacity of mainstream conflict resolution approaches to offer post-hoc explanations for each failure. Michael (2007), for example, stresses that the negotiation process developed its own logic and rhythm which could not capitalize on the conciliatory effects of internal and external developments, the exclusion of Greece and Turkey from the process was unrealistic, and that common interests have not been sufficiently emphasized. It is also valid that while the Annan Plan sought to build on the EU accession process as a catalyst, it failed because the incentives offered by the EU to conflict parties were assymmetric (Richmond 2006, Demetriou 2008). This paper is not going to engage with all these explanations in order to make the case for a critical approach to conflict resolution. What I offer in this paper is neither a competing explanation, nor the right pathway to resolution which all skilled analysts and negotiators have somehow previously failed to notice. Instead, the critical approach to conflict resolution accepts the impossibility of addressing all aspects of the conflict because it regards the issues at stake to be very much the product of conflict, and not the other way around. Thus, the mainstream explanations for why conflict resolution in Cyprus failed at different historical moments are all correct, but they fail to account for how so many issues became entangled in the Cyprus conflict so as to make a comprehensive resolution impossible. This is by far not the first attempt to apply a critical approach to the Cyprus conflict. A number of studies have analyzed the securitization of the Cyprus issue in Turkey (Tank 2002; Kaliber 2005). Studies of nationalism (Papadakis) Constantinou (2007), for example, have analyzed how ‘a historic alliance of colonial practices and nationalist rationales’ solidified identities in Cyprus along communal lines and set the stage for the inter-ethnic conflict. As Constantinou (2007: 248) underlines, dominant discourses and administrative practices reproduce Cypriot identity as ‘quintessentially and inescapably hyphenated … across the Greek-Turkish axis.’ Given these identity constitution dynamics, it is not surprising that solutions premised on the reunification of the island, albeit under a consociational regime, repeatedly fail. Constantinou points out how select individuals and group espousing hybrid identities, such as Muslim-Christians, have historically challenged the strict and mutually exclusive division of identities historically enforced by regimes in Cyprus–Ottoman Millet system, British colonialism, and the era of territorial division and nationalist conflict.Constantinou’s is a very potent analysis of the historical construction and reproduction of mutually exclusive and irreconcilable identity positions in Cyprus, which in turn are taken as givens by mainstream conflict resolution approaches and sought to be accommodated in various solution proposals. Yet it is disappointing in the sense that apart from the identification of a number of subversive individuals and acts, it does not offer us a way out of this predicament. Analyses such as Constantinou’s invite both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic readings. It is possible to be inspired by subversive transversal individuals like Fatma Usta and become optimistic about the transgression of the Greek/Turkish divide in Cyprus. It is also possible to be pessimistic given the extent to which the ethnic division of identities are solidified and disciplined in and through a wide array of agents and administrative practices. The critical theory of conflict resolution that I offer in this paper cautions against these overly optimistic and pessimistic readings. On the one hand, the pervasiveness of the ethnic division of identities does not mean that conflict resolution might just as well take them as given and strive to come up with solutions that accommodate these differences as they have been produced. On the other hand, conflict resolution cannot be premised on the possibility of a quick and complete transcendence of the Greek/Turkish divide. Conflict resolution is an ontological insecurity inducing process, and while a reconfiguration of identities is necessary for conflict resolution, identity depends on difference and ontological security necessitates the maintainance and the reconfiguration of at least some of the constitutive differences.In the rest of my discussion, I will focus on the 2002-2004 Annan Plan and try to account for the reasons of its failure in terms of my critical framework of conflict resolution. In many ways, at the time, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts appeared particularly well-timed and that the moment of Cyprus conflict’s resolution had finally come. The prospect of Cyprus’ EU accession raised expectations that the EU may act as a catalyst; the post-1999 Greek-Turkish rapprochement eliminated the aggravation of the conflict by motherland states; and to buttress its EU membership bid, Turkey was willing to abandon its support for the hardliner nationalist leader of Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktas, who was, in the eyes of many observers, a primacy obstacle (Heraclides 2011: 122-3). The Annan Plan, with its five versions,was not a blueprint but a comprehensive solution, and represented the most elaborate and sophisticated plan developed by the international community for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict (Heraclides 2011). The final version of the Annan Plan was rejected in the referendum of 24 April 2004, by 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots and accepted by 65 percent of the Turkish- Cypriots. This outcome surprised many observers, who had long assumed that Greek-Cypriots favor reunification, while Turkish Cypriots favor partition. While Kofi Annan and his team tried to resolve all sources of contention within a comprehensive proposal, including functionality of federal government, return of property and refugees, the issue of settlers from Turkey, role of guarantor powers (for a comprehensive list, see Heraclides 2011: 124), they had overlooked how the Plan would generate ontological insecurity and lead to the re-securitization of the issues that they are attempting to address. The comprehensiveness of the Plan simply expanded the issues of discord. Consequently, the verdict of the Greek- Cypriot policymakers was that the Plan serves the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot interests more than it serves theirs. The televised public address of the late Cypriot President Papadopoulos before the scheduled referenda in many ways conveyed an intense ontological insecurity, a pervasive fear of losing meaningful existence. His opposition to the Annan plan did not rest on concerns of physical insecurity; the Plan primarily threatened his (and the Greek-Cypriot community’s) ability to maintain a consistent self-narrative. ‘We are called upon to abolish the Republic of Cyprus, the only foothold of our people and the guarantee of our historic character,’ he explained. ‘There are questions of principles and human rights where the middle solution is not the right answer.’ And he concluded in tears:‘Taking up my duties, I was given an internationally recognized state. I am not going to give back ''a Community'' without a say internationally and in search of a guardian.’ (cite) As a staunch opponent of any settlement, Papadopoulos’ words may not be surprising. But the fact remains that the same fear of uncertainty and ontological insecurity led even the pro-resolution parties to encourage their voters to vote against the Annan plan. The Annan plan had strived to address the outstanding issues in a balanced and comprehensive manner, without realizing how the ontological insecurity generated by the proposal would expand the issues, and generate new reasons for physical insecurity. In the end, the Greek-Cypriots prefered a state of ontological security/ physical insecurity over the state of ontological insecurity/physical security offered by the Plan. All internationally-mediated solutions to the Cyprus conflict have been premised on some level and form of reunification and thus presuppose that the underlying shared Cypriot identity will be automatically activated with a solution. Thus, given the consciousness of and the previous experience with Cypriot identity, they have presumed that reunification would move the parties directly to a state of ontological security/ physical security. From a critical perspective that is sensitive to concerns of ontological security, this is problematic. Although critical perspectives de-essentialize the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot identities and emphasize how they have been historically constructed and politically produced, they also underscore the dependence of identity on difference. In the course of the conflict, Greek- Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identities have become deeply interwoven, making the ontological security of one dependent on the existence of the Other. This dependence cannot be undone without generating ontological insecurity. Thus, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have compensated for the ontological insecurity generated by the reunification plans by constructing different aspects of reunification as threats to their survival. While Turkish Cypriots have securitized the freedom of movement and establishment of Greek Cypriots in the territories that the former now controls, Greek Cypriots securitize the extent of the representation of Turkish Cypriots in the political institutions of the reunified Cyprus to be, and the growing number of settlers from Turkey. Negotiations have repeatedly failed as new securitizations have moved the parties back to a state of ontological security/physical insecurity. Conflict resolution is an ontological insecurity inducing process, but ontological insecurity is not an insurmountable obstacle. There are often internal and external processes that transform the relation of the conflict parties to the disputed goods and to each other, which, in turn, set conditions conducive for conflict resolution. Amongst the Turkish Cypriot community, economic difficulties and tense relations with Turkey are already disrupting the established self-narratives, and creating a conducive context for a self-redefinition (Akcali 2011). The context of EU membership also offers an alternative discourse within which Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities may be reconstructed. However, at present, in the context of the partial membership of Cyprus (legally Cyprus, with the Greek-Cypriot government representing the entire island, is a member yet the European acquis is not applied in the North), the strategic employment of the discourse of European identity only accentuates the differences between the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (i.e. the former is a full EU member, while the latter is controlled by non-European Turkey, and therefore opposing a ‘European’ solution to the conflict) (Christou 2010). At the same time, the efforts by the EU, UN, and other international organizations and agencies to foster bicommunal contacts are ongoing. Yet, as noted before, such interpersonal approaches often fail to generate results at the intergroup level because upon leaving the bicommunal space, individuals remain constrained by the communal self-narratives. What would, then, be the proposal of a critical approach to conflict resolution in Cyprus? First, the energy of those advocating the resolution of the Cyprus conflict in and outside of Cyprus should be diverted away from ‘adversarial’ and overly ‘legalistic’ negotiations, ‘with their emphasis on tangible gains and losses’ (Heraclides 2011: 125)toward triggering a process of reflexive self-transformation in the North and South of the island, aiming at the desecuritization of the contested aspects of reunification. As Heraclides underlines, the context of conflict and ongoing negotiations, along with the fear of conceding to the other side has kept the parties away from engaging in a frank public discussion about what they really want. Yet, this process of desecuritization would trigger ontological insecurity, and in turn, the resecuritization of issues unless it is also coupled with the reconstruction of self/other distinctions in communal self-narratives. Therefore, the question boils down to: How can the Cypriot communities maintain their certainty of being while transitioning from a state of physical insecurity to one of physical asecurity? In the Cyprus conflict, the main constructions of identity and difference revolve around the spatial dimension and the construction of inherent difference. Plans for the reunification of the island generate ontological insecurity because they collapse the spatial dimension.The strengthening of the temporal and ethical dimensions would allow the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to relate to each other in new ways, and reinstate a new state of ontological security. Therefore, the construction of discursive conditions wherein the Greek-Cypriots assume a moral responsibility for the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriot community could be a way to facilitate a solution. Similarly, the construction of discursive conditions where both the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots represent one another as capable of transformation (possibly along the temporal axis of nationalist past to Europeanized future) would greatly facilitate a solution. The weakness of the ethical dimension is a big stumbling block to eventual reunification. Under international isolation, the North of the island has been mired in economic stagnation, while the South has flourished into a prosperous market economy. In the absence of a sense of moral responsibility, no agreement can actually induce the Greek-Cypriots to take on the economic burden of uniting with the North. The ethical responsibility dimension in self/other relations depends neither on altruism nor on shared identity, and therefore it should not be dismissed as utopian wishful thinking. To the contrary, the ethical dimension reproduces the differentiation of Self from Other and places the Self in a position of moral superiority. Such a reconstruction of the self-narrative would allow the Greek-Cypriots to maintain ontological security when facing the uncertainty of reunification. The temporal dimension in the Cyprus conflict is basically frozen at the 1963-7 intercommunal violence for the Turkish Cypriots and at 1974 Turkish military invasion for the Greek-Cypriots. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots essentialize the Other’s differences and consider the Other as unable to change. Activating the temporal dimension of differentiation would maintain the constitutive differences, yet grant the Other the possibility of transformation. In fact, EU membership provides a conducive context for the activation of the temporal dimension, as it allows both conflict parties to construct the Other as ‘Europeanizing’. These suggestions are likely to disappoint the reader. They neither offer a comprehensive strategy, nor do they promise an emancipatory state of equal and dignified co-existence. Yet, they indicate the realm of possibility within the present limits of identity discourses and concerns for ontological security. CONCLUSION:Protracted conflicts are puzzling to both rationalist and critical approaches to international relations. For rationalist approaches, it is puzzling why states, as rational actors, prefer a state of physical insecurity over physical security, and why, in some cases, a ‘rational’ solution to the conflicts cannot be found despite the best efforts of the international community. Critical approaches find it hard to account for how the constructions of antagonistic difference, which they claim to be ultimately contingent, become so resilient. This paper has sought to demonstrate how the pursuit of ontological security, the concern of states to maintain stable self-narratives, addresses these puzzles. Protracted conflicts become intractable because conflict resolution is an ontological insecurity inducing process. Mainstream conflict resolution approaches start from the assumption that parties have a pre-given set of issues and needs that can be addressed through a fair allocation. However, in protracted conflicts,it is often the conflict that prompts the stakes (Farneti 2009), rather than the other way around. Mainstream conflict resolution approaches do not address the political and social processes through which parties construct their identities in relation to both the disputed goods and each other. As a result, they are unable to address the ontological insecurities that are generated by their interventions. Conflict resolution disrupts the self-narratives of the parties and the pursuit of certainty and stability fuels the processes of the securitization of the issues and radicalization of identities. In the end, far from being resolved, the conflict expands into new areas. Critical approaches to international relations are better equipped to understand and address these political and social processes which prompt the conflict. In this paper, I have explored whether and how they may be developed to offer a distinct approach toward conflict resolution. As they stand, critical approaches to international relations suggest remedies such as the desecuritization of issues and the reconfiguration of identity relations. Yet what is at stake in protracted conflicts is a complex intertwining of securitization of issues and radicalization of identities, where critical intervention into one is prevented by the persistence of the other. What is needed therefore is a framework that will integrate securitization processes with identity formation dynamics, to understand both how they are linked with one another, and how this linkage may be broken for the purposes of conflict resolution.In developing such a framework, this paper has brought together distinct literatures on ontological security, securitization theory, and poststructuralist approaches to identity. The backbone of the framework is an alternative conception of security as both ontological and physical. I have argued that ontological and physical security are inextricable, non-interchangeable and mutually reinforcing dimensions of security. As a result, conflict resolution affects the parties’ states of both physical and ontological security. A critical approach to conflict resolution entails the analysis of how parties may move toward a state of ontological security/physical asecurity, a state where the Self does not view the Other as a physical threat, yet sustains a stable self-narrative in relation to the Other. I have argued that such a transformation necessitates, in addition to a self-driven reflexive process of desecuritization, a reconstruction of identities in a way that maintains the constitutive differences while removing the perception of physical threat. In short, ontological security matters for conflict resolution, but it does so in a particular way. Ontological security is not an additional need that conflict resolution processes can and should satisfy. Rather, it underpins the constitutive relations between conflict parties and the issues at stake. As a result, all interventions in conflicts generate ontological insecurity. 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