Sparta Flash Card #1: - The Cohen Curricula



Sparta Flash Card #12: Role of the Spartan Army | |

|Historian |Evidence |Relationship to other Syllabus dot points |

|Ancient Sources |Read through the following web pages and write a detailed account of the Spartan Army using ancient sources- | |

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| |Thucydides | |

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| |Xenophon | |

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| |A History of Ancient Greece | |

| |Ancient History Sourcebook: | |

| |Xenophon (c.428-c.354 BCE): | |

| |The Spartan War Machine, c. 375 BCE | |

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| |Read through the following web pages and write a detailed account of the Spartan Army using ancient sources- | |

|Modern Sources | | |

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|© 2000 Ellen Papakyriakou/ | | |

|Anagnostou | | |

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|anonymous |The Spartan army and population decline | |

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| |/ASmallTowninLaconia/history/spartan_army_n_pop_decline.html | |

| |The Earthquake of 465 BC | |

| |The earthquake Sparta experienced in 464/65 BC. strongly directed politics of the time by contributing to the | |

| |rivalry between the Spartans and the Athenians and has been identified as a significant cause of Spartan | |

| |oliganthropia, or shortage of Spartiate males. Thucydides writes that a single earthquake occurred and places the| |

| |blame for the immediate slave revolt on the Messenian helots, whereas Diodorus refers to multiple earthquakes and| |

| |blames the rebellion largely on the Laconian helots. | |

| |A comparison of Spartan military behaviour immediately before the earthquake and in the years following it | |

| |reveals a decline in aggressiveness. Thucydides acknowledges that they were prepared to invade Attica in support | |

| |of Thasos just prior to the earthquake. However, the Spartans were unwilling to invade Attica at the urging of | |

| |Megabazus, even though a tremendous Athenian force was then engaged in Egypt (Thucydides 99; 1.109). Losses | |

| |experienced in the battle fought for over sixty days at Tanagra in Boeotia (Thucydides 98; 1.108) may have also | |

| |contributed to this change in behaviour. Regardless, a population problem existed arguably at the time of Pylos, | |

| |where the Spartans were ready to sue for peace over a mere 120 Spartiates, and certainly by the time of Leuctra, | |

| |where there were only 700 Spartiates altogether. The earthquake and subsequent revolt provides a finite time | |

| |period in which Spartan behaviour changes, and a significant population decline could have occurred. | |

| |Can the decline of Spartan citizens be attributed to the earthquake alone. Diodorus' estimate of 20,000 deaths is| |

| |a pointer towards that. If even half of the 20,000 were Spartans rather than helots or perioeci, this would have | |

| |serious and immediate results and may be a reason why Sparta petitioned Athens for help at Ithome. Thucydides | |

| |writes, "The chief reason that they asked for help was that the Athenians had the reputation of being good at | |

| |siege operations" (95; 1.102). He assures the reader that the Spartans would have long since taken "the place | |

| |(Ithome) by assault" if it were not for their lack of experience (Thucydides 95; 1.102). A. W. Gomme points out | |

| |that not even the Athenians were especially good at sieges and argues that Thucydides meant "an assault. . . on a| |

| |palisaded camp" rather than a typical siege of a walled fort (301; bk. 1, 102.1). He adds, "Sparta asked for help| |

| |when in a difficult position and not simply in order to convert a slow siege into a quick assault" (301; bk. | |

| |1,.102.1). A major loss of life may have contributed to this "difficult position" which the Spartans would be | |

| |unwilling to admit to the Athenians. Thucydides also has good reason to downplay a loss of Spartan numbers. As | |

| |this precedes the Peloponnesian War, a small Spartan population would weaken his assertion "that the two sides | |

| |were at the very height of their power and preparedness" (Thucydides 35; 1.1). | |

| |Social and Economic problems | |

| |Sometime after the Peloponnesian War or early in the 4th C BC a law, the Epitadeus , was passed which altered the| |

| |rules of the entitlement to land of the homoioi. Previously under Lycurgan law the kleros inherited by the | |

| |Spartiate was inalienable, and this land along with the helots who worked it was the basis of the economic | |

| |support of the homoioi. This new law permitted a Spartan to deed his land to any other Spartan during his | |

| |lifetime and bequeath it in his will freely. It was to be done in the guise of a gift for a gift of equal value, | |

| |but the gift could be money. The result was that over some time a minority began to possess the majority of the | |

| |land while another minority though growing more numerous were without land (hypomeiones). Thus the number of | |

| |Equals was reduced still further. This law and its operation could only have been brought about if the Lycurgan | |

| |prohibition against coined money and its ownership by individuals was relaxed. | |

| |By the end of the war with Athens in 404 BC  much Persian gold had been brought into Sparta as subsidies, and | |

| |after victory Lysander brought 470 talents on his return to Sparta. Gyllipus who had been charged with the | |

| |delivery of these subsidies was subsequently found to have had his fingers in the till and was tried and exiled. | |

| |For Sparta to maintain its position as the dominant Aegean power, maintain a fleet and a permanent presence | |

| |abroad, the question of money would have to be settled. In a debate at Sparta in 404 a compromise was reached | |

| |where the laws against private possession were upheld but were relaxed in the case of the state. However the | |

| |machinery to enforce this was probably non-existent or too weak. The influx of annual tributes from the old | |

| |Athenian Empire a sum of 1,000 talents per year was too much for the existing administration to cope with and the| |

| |influences of corruption began to be felt. Many sought to enrich themselves, and there was no better way to do it| |

| |than in the office of harmost where the use of extortion, corruption and bribery were rife. It was as harmost at | |

| |Samos that Thorax made his fortune, he was eventually caught and executed. Clearchus at Byzantium was another | |

| |example though he was only exiled. | |

| |These problems became even graver in the ensuing decades, the state was ready to act against individuals but | |

| |could not cure the underlying causes and by Leuctra Sparta found herself without sufficient manpower due to | |

| |economic problems and insufficient allies due to imperial corruption. | |

| |Population decline and Army organization. | |

| |The defeat at Leuctra can be easily explained in purely military terms as early as 390 new tactics had caught the| |

| |Spartans wrong footed, at Laecheum by Iphicrates at Tegyra by Pelopidas in 375 and in 371 Epaminondas adopted | |

| |even newer tactics. But one defeat hover shattering cannot explain why Sparta was internally too weak to survive | |

| |it as a great power. By Leuctra the Spartan army consisted of 'Equals', Perioicoi and a number of hypomeiones, | |

| |the numbers of which are debatable. The neodamodeis served in separate units of whom there were a large number. | |

| |The Spartans during their period of hegemony also deployed numbers of mercenary hoplites and peltasts. As seen | |

| |the number of 'Equals' was declining thus the number of 'Unequals' by the same token would be rising. Although | |

| |they did not belong to a kleros and could not pay their mess bills because they were landless they would still | |

| |have been part of the Spartan army organization and training although without the full citizens rights. There | |

| |were also a certain number of 'Spartans' who may have been adopted by 'Equals' and sponsored  by them. As well as| |

| |these there were those of military age, either sons with living fathers or younger brothers who could serve as a | |

| |pool of reserves. | |

| |Lets look at the size of the army in the 5th and 4th centuries from the facts as given by the classical writers. | |

| |At Plataea in 479 5,000 Spartiates and 5,000 Perioicoi served separately, Herodotus does not mention how they | |

| |were organized except that there was a lochos of Pitane of unknown size included among the Spartans. After 371 | |

| |the army is described as consisting of 12 units called lochoi by Xenophon. In between both Xenophon and | |

| |Thucydides describe an army of 6 units but they differ on the name of the unit, mora or lochos. | |

| |In 425 the Spartans put 420 men onto Sphacteria drawn by lots from all of the lochoi. Those who surrendered were | |

| |120 Spartiates and 170 non-Spartiates (Perioicoi and Hypomeiones). In 418 at Mantinea Thucydides numbers the army| |

| |at 3,072 on a 32 year call up  consisting of 6 lochoi each of 4 pentekostys of 4 enomotiai,  not enough to make | |

| |sense of the battle. Xenophon mentions the mora first in 403 and in 390 and gives its strength at 600. At Nemea | |

| |the strength of the army was 6,000 in 5 units. In his Lakedaimonian Politeia Xenophon describes an army of 6 mora| |

| |consisting of 4 lochoi each of 2 pentekostys of 2 enomotiai. At Leuctra 4 mora were present on a 35 year call up | |

| |and according to Xenophon only 700 were Spartiates. Now 700 Spartans could not make up 4 mora, so who were the | |

| |rest? I believe the Perioicoi were not expected to serve outside the Peloponnese except as volunteers. Therefore | |

| |the remainder must have been hypomeiones with  Perioeci volunteers and that these served as part and parcel of | |

| |the Spartan field army. The Perioicoi must have always been brigaded separately as attested by Xenophon in | |

| |several passages where the Spartan field army had advanced beyond the frontier only to have to wait for the | |

| |perioicic contingent. Pausanius in 395 specifically waited at Tegea for them and 8 years later Agesilaus sent | |

| |some of the hippeis to hurry them up. Another objection to the supposition that both Spartans and Perioicoi were | |

| |brigaded together is that they were amateurs and unaccustomed to the day to day training in tactics and drill. | |

| |Thus Xenophon in his Politeia is describing a purely Spartan Mora undiluted by Perioicoi and Thucydides has in | |

| |his description of the Spartan forces at Mantinea missed out one whole level of organization, the Mora and has | |

| |given the numbers of the Spartans alone ignoring the Perioicoi. | |

| |When scholars talk of Spartan population decline they are not talking about the population of Lacedaemon which | |

| |would have retained a healthy growth in the 5th and 4th centuries, the perioicic communities were as healthy as | |

| |any other but of the decline in the number of Spartiates or 'Equals'. The losses from the earthquake of 465 were | |

| |soon restored, the losses of 400 at Leuctra could be replaced. Economic factors and the loss of the Messenian | |

| |kleros combined with a declining birth rate among Spartans caused by the laws of inheritance, a general | |

| |unwillingness to produce children and the inadequacy of the public kleros were contributing factors in this | |

| |decline. The loss of perioicic territories in Laconia and allies in the Peloponnese after Leuctra further reduced| |

| |the pool from which Sparta could build an adequate force with which to play in the first division nor had she | |

| |enough money to make up the difference by hiring enough mercenaries. | |

| |The mirage of equality | |

| |Equality was supposed to be secured by a land apportionment that assigned 9,000 equal lots to full Spartiates and| |

| |30,000 to the larger population of perioikoi. The lots were defined not by size but by productivity. Scholars | |

| |have endlessly debated whether there ever was such an equal distribution and whether it worked. On the whole, I | |

| |think the evidence shows that equality of land was the Spartan ideal, as it was in several other Dorian states | |

| |originally. This equal distribution impressed political theorists like Plato (D.M. MacDowell, Spartan Law. | |

| |Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1986). | |

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| |The insistence upon equality created several problems. In the first place, it meant that those who became | |

| |unequal, that is fell below a certain minimum standard of wealth, were no longer citizens, because they could no | |

| |longer make their contribution to the common messes. Since Sparta refused to recruit new citizens from the | |

| |perioikoi, this meant a steady diminution in the citizen body. | |

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| |Some non-Spartiate boys admitted to troops and later to the men’s messes—mothakes: These might be children of | |

| |foreigners like Xenophon, illegitimate sons of citizens, or sons of families that had lost their citizenship | |

| |status, typically for lack of money. In general they could never become full citizens. | |

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| |Obviously, a system in which lots are fixed will inevitably discourage large families. The optimum family size at| |

| |Sparta must have been one boy—and no girls to pay dowries for. Greeks at this time did not typically practice | |

| |abortion—though we hear of a mythical Spartan Queen who offered to abort her child, the future king of Sparta if | |

| |a male, if Lycurgus would marry her—or expose healthy children. But various effective means of contraception were| |

| |available. Let us suppose three generations of a 5th-century family in which only 1-2 sons are born to a married | |

| |couple. What is the likelihood, after the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War, that the third generation has a| |

| |male heir? Failing a male heir, property ended up in the hands of daughters, who if married took it out of the | |

| |family but if single retained it, which tended to increase further the power and liberty of women. | |

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| |So for all these reasons, Sparta was doomed, and after her defeat by Thebes at the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C.,| |

| |she lacked the manpower resources to recover her shattered prestige, and although in the 3rd century Agis IV and | |

| |Cleomenes III tried to restore the old Sparta by promoting deserving periokoi to citizenship and redistributing | |

| |the land, they were prevented from carrying out their reforms the first by internal opposition and the second by | |

| |external opposition. | |

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| |Aristotle has the benefit of hindsight. Had he lived 100 years earlier, when the Spartan system functioned | |

| |reasonably well, he might have been a good deal less skeptical. He does say in a previous chapter that the | |

| |Spartan model mixes, as a true politeia ought to, the elements of monarchy (the kings), oligarchy (the Council of| |

| |elders), and democracy (the ephors and the assembly). Near the end of the Politics (VII.13), he grudgingly | |

| |concedes them one great advantage: Their superiority does not lie in the fact that they have a different | |

| |conception of what things are the greatest goods, but their conviction that these goods are to be obtained by | |

| |applying the virtue of courage. That, at the very least, is a useful lesson to take from the Spartan model. | |

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|BOS NOTES 1 |Role of the Spartan army | |

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| |Keep the helots in check and put down rebellions | |

| |Defend Laconia and Messenia | |

| |Be constantly ready for warfare particularly with its strong enemy Argos to the north | |

| |Maintain its leadership of the Peloponnesian League | |

| |Support oligarchies and defend Greek liberty | |

| |Maintain its hegemony of Greece after the Peloponnesian War | |

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| |Spartan Army | |

|BOS NOTES 2 |The whole of Spartan Society was aimed at producing a strong fighting force of great warriors who were willing to| |

| |die for Sparta | |

| |Throughout the 6th century to the beginning of the 5th century, the army was composed of all Spartan citizens. | |

| |Towards the end of the 5th century, non-Spartiates began to perform military duties | |

| |Divisions of the army | |

| |Mora – regiment | |

| |Lochos – battalion | |

| |Pentekostys – company | |

| |Enomotia – platoon | |

| |Another group was the Hippeis (knights) consisting of 300 men who’s main purpose was to guard the kings | |

| |Hoplite | |

| |Was a heavily armed infantryman, named after the shield he carried – the Hoplon | |

| |Most hoplites dropped their shields if they fled the battlefield, however Spartans saw this as a loss of honour. | |

| |Bronze greaves for protection of the lower leg | |

| |They also carried a long spear used for thrusting, and an iron sword | |

| |They were trained to fight in formations, not as individuals | |

| |The success of the army depended largely on the discipline of the troops in the massed hoplite formation or | |

| |Phalanx, which were usually 8 or more ranks deep. The aim was to break the opposition’s line by deploying a | |

| |group-and-shove technique | |

| |Role of Helot | |

| |They were bag carriers | |

| |The Lakedaimonian state used them as fighters | |

| |Dressed in skin caps and wore animal skin | |

| |Battle procedure | |

| |While still in Sparta, the king sacrificed to Zeus Agetro to ensure that the army had fire to cook with at all | |

| |times | |

| |The army was ordered to engage in athletic exercises while on campaign, and this took place both in the morning | |

| |and the evening. | |

| |Marching songs were important because the army could advance in line and keep in good timing. This was done so | |

| |the ranks won’t be broken | |

| |Began to use cavalry in 442 when the Lakedaimonians received a dangerous threat. It was financed by the state | |

| |Archery was despised as the right way to fight was with heavy infantrymen at close quarters; any other from of | |

| |warfare was cowardly | |

| |As a result of the Persian invasions of 490 and 480 BCE, the Greek city-states organized themselves into a | |

| |defensive alliance called the "Delian League." Athens was the strongest naval power among the Greek city-states | |

| |and it contributed the most men and ships to the naval effort. Sparta was the strongest of the land military | |

| |powers, and it played a dominant roll in the organization of the army. The other city-states each contributed | |

| |what they could to the alliance, which meant in practice that those near the coast provided ships and sailors | |

| |while those from the interior provided soldiers, food and other forms of wealth to support the navy. | |

| |Although the Greeks were outnumbered by the Persians in both campaigns, they used their knowledge of geography | |

| |and the winds to position their forces and gain victories. They had no way of knowing after the defeat of the | |

| |second invasion that the Persians would not return, so they kept the Delian League in existence. Skirmishes with | |

| |remnants of the Persian forces continued for another thirty years and seemed to confirm that they still posed a | |

| |danger. | |

| |As long as there was a Persian threat, the Delian League operated fairly smoothly. But as time passed and the | |

| |Persian raids subsided, other Greek city-states resented the fact they were expected to make payments to resist | |

| |an invasion that never came. Resentment was particular strong among interior states who believed that the Delian | |

| |League became a device that enabled Athens to tax everyone else. As resentment mounted, two factions developed | |

| |around Athens and Sparta, and their rival social and political organizations developed into ideologies that | |

| |influenced politics in every city-state. Athens maintained only a part-time military organization, directed by | |

| |councils of its citizens, many of whom were traders and artisans. Sparta maintained a full-time military with | |

| |generals for leaders. The Spartan population contained a higher percentage of free farmers and slaves. | |

| |The first war between Athens and Sparta, fought from 459- 445 BCE, ended in a draw. The second war between | |

| |431-404 BCE became known as the Peloponnesian War and was described in great detail by an Athenian general named | |

| |Thucydides. This second war involved all of the Greek city-states, and ended with a Spartan victory and the total| |

| |destruction of Athens. Sparta emerged unchallenged as the most powerful Greek city-state by the beginning of the | |

| |fourth century BCE, but the other Greek city-states came to resent the Spartans as much as they had resented the | |

| |Athenians. In 371 BCE, Thebes led a coalition of Greek city-states that conquered Sparta, and fighting erupted | |

| |periodically between the Greek city-states for the next forty years. | |

| |Questions | |

| |How did the Spartan treatment of the defeated town of Mantinea make their control of the conquered people secure?| |

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| |Did Xenophon think that the Spartans were successful in Mantinea? Explain your answer | |

|BOS NOTES 3 |ARMY | |

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| |( Spartans were known for their excellence in warfare and to be in the army ages ranged from 18 to 60. Hoplites | |

| |(heavily armed infantry men) had large concave shields and a 2.5m spear. They were needed to fight the helots and| |

| |the messenians and they had excellence defensive tactics in the right conditions (eg plains). The army was | |

| |organised into age divisions and their massed formation was known as a phalanx (group and shove technique). Men | |

| |were expected so show courage, discipline, obedience, respect, athleticism and devotion. Their role was to keep | |

| |the helots in line and protect the state. | |

| |Sparta – Military and the Culture of War | |

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| |Welch (p.184) briefly outlines how and when Spartans “became the best”. List the significant points made here. | |

| |More than any other aspect of culture, Spartans were known for excellence in war. | |

| |Their tactics, esp. in mastery of the hoplite phalanx were legendary by the beginning of the 5th century. | |

| |When the Athenians did overcome them at Sphacteria in 425 BC, they defeated them by using light-armed mercenaries| |

| |to harass them on uneven ground, not as hoplite against hoplite. | |

| |It is hard to know when and how Sparta gained this reputation. | |

| |Part of the answer must lie in the final victory over Messene in the mid 7th century BC. | |

| |Once victorious, Sparta was able to divide the rich Messenian land into extra allotments to be farmed by Helots. | |

| |The newly acquired wealth of Messene allowed the privileged class in Sparta to become a full-time army, unlike | |

| |the farmer-soldiers of other | |

| |city-states in Greece. | |

| |This wealth also allowed the state to institute a system of providing equal weaponry of high quality for all the | |

| |members of the phalanx. | |

| |Cartledge uses this institution to explain what he thinks ‘Equals’ really meant in Sparta: the fact all Spartans | |

| |carried the same weapons. | |

| |Pericles in Thucydides’ Funeral Oration overtly criticizes the aspect of Spartan life (men eating together and | |

| |acting under military law at all times), but many admired it. | |

| | | |

| |Using HSC Online and the information below, sketch and label a diagram of Spartan army Organisation. | |

| |Organized according to age divisions specified in the agoge. | |

| |Originally 5 divisions called ‘Morai’ drawn from 5 tribal regions or Obai of Sparta. | |

| |Later this was increased to six Morai. | |

| |Sources differ on exactly how many men comprised a Mora (between 500-900). | |

| |The Mora was divided into of basic unit composing of groups of eight men. | |

| |Another group within the Spartan army was composed of Hippies (knights) – picked group of 30 men whose main | |

| |purpose seems to have been to guard the kings (references include: Thucydides V, 72.4 and Herodotus VIII, 124.3).| |

| |(Believed to have been chosen annually on the basis of the age classes). | |

| |[pic] | |

| | | |

| |Why did the Spartans lose the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC? | |

| |The Thebans were alarmingly growing their strength in Greece. | |

| |Jason of Thessaly became allies with Thebes. | |

| |Most part of the Spartans was relying on size, battle experience, and a reputation for winning. | |

| |The Spartans were perhaps overconfident by their reputation and so therefore foolish in the implementation of | |

| |their attack. | |

| |Their battle plans evolved into one simple plan – to show up with a large enough forces, to begin fighting, and | |

| |to wait. Inevitably, enemy soldiers lost heart, their lines broke, and they ran. | |

| |The Spartans expected to take casualties at the start of a battle, but early losses were not enough to shake the | |

| |confidence which came from repeated victories. | |

| |The Spartans were believed to have been around 11,000 against 6,000 Thebans. | |

| |Thebes did not rely on the same military tactics as Sparta had come to expect from her other components. And | |

| |therefore the Thebans in this battle followed a different tactic (due to change in society) and marched against | |

| |the Spartans (unchanged military tactics). | |

| |The Spartans at the site of the Theban army got shocked but thought it was just a wishful thinking from the | |

| |Thebans. | |

| |The Thebans had reorganized their whole society and government structure, including changes in the military | |

| |formation of the hoplite phalanx. Conventionally Spartans set at 12 rows deep, the Thebans made their lines 50 | |

| |rows in depths. | |

| |The Thebans were also convinced by their leader that they can defeat the Spartans. | |

| |An immediate tactical problem for the Spartans was the superiority of the Thebans cavalry. Before the Spartans | |

| |could reorganize their attack, the Thebans had driven the Spartan cavalry to its own lines. | |

| |In the moments of confusion of this failure, the Thebans ordered the Sacred Band to advance. At this the Spartan | |

| |officers were confused and didn’t know what to reply. Was this the main attack or just a feint? | |

| |The Spartans were savagely attacked and Spartans were falling numbers as quickly as never seen before. | |

| |The Thebans at this stage could hold their ground till they won the battle. | |

| |The Spartan king and his 300 body guards were wiped out. | |

| |The realization finally came to Spartans that to continue, with the same battle plan, was to risk even more of | |

| |their army. The Spartans felt compelled to ask for a truce to bury their dead. Some 400 Spartans and 600 allied | |

| |soldiers had been killed. | |

| |After the Spartans had asked for truce, they publicly acknowledged a battlefield reversal and sent a message to | |

| |Sparta for extra backup soldiers. | |

| |The Thebans sent for Jason and were in no hurry of finishing Spartans off. | |

| |When there was no sign of any additional backup troops from Sparta and they were faced by two armies, so the | |

| |Spartans asked for a second truce and by Jason persuasion to Thebans, they were allowed to go back to Sparta. | |

| | | |

| |How can the loss be seen as a reflection on Sparta as a society? | |

| |The Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC saw the Spartans lose their military supremacy – the sort of supremacy evidenced | |

| |at Thermopylae and Plataea. | |

| |The loss at the battle of Leuctra represented through Spartan society by demonstrating how the act of an | |

| |unchanging or stable society can bring to the downfall of its society as a well as its rise. | |

| |Also, the Spartans created all Greeks as their enemies and so therefore they lost all their allies and friends. | |

| |In conclusion, we can say that the Spartan society brought her own end by its government system. | |

| |The loss/defeat served as a signal to her enemies that Sparta was weak and her administration was thrown out. | |

| |The unchanging and stable society of Spartans imprisoned the Spartans to their own downfall in the end. | |

| | | |

| |Notes on Hoplite Warfare – (e.g. their dress, armor, philosophy, bonding, battle drill/information/tactics, | |

| |communications [and its problems] and etc). | |

| |The classical hoplite phalanx (battle formation) was a massed formation made up of ranks or lines (usually 8-12 | |

| |deep) of heavy armed infantry soldiers. | |

| |They held a large round bronze shield (hoplon) on their left arm and a 2.5 metres thrusting spear in their right.| |

| |The formation advanced with shields interlocked and pushed together against a similarly armed opponent. | |

| |Whoever could push hardest and most cohesively would break the opponent’s line. | |

| |Their culture of a warrior community also reinforced the spirit of maintaining the line against all comers and | |

| |standing together with totally trusted companions. | |

| |The Spartans relied upon hoplite armies. | |

| |Their shields were made of wood in inside and bronze outside. It weighed 7 kg. | |

| |The classical hoplite wore: a cloth tunic covered by a bronze breastplate; a Distinctive red cape; a helmet made | |

| |of thin bronze, often decorated with a crest of horsehair – though it protected the face, the helmet had no ear | |

| |holes so the hoplite must have been virtually deaf on the battlefield (not hearing orders or attacks?); bronze | |

| |greaves for protection of the lower leg. | |

| |Apart from the hoplon, the hoplite carried a long spear (almost 3 metres) used for thrusting not throwing, and an| |

| |iron sword. | |

| |They bonded with each other with dancing or otherwise known as marching tactics on the battlefield. | |

| |The success of the Spartan army depended largely on the discipline of the troops in the massed hoplite formation | |

| |with the aim of breaking the opponents’ line by developing a group-and-shove technique. | |

| |Another group within the Spartan army was composed of Hippies (knights) – picked group of 30 men whose main | |

| |purpose seems to have been to guard the kings (references include: Thucydides V, 72.4 and Herodotus VIII, 124.3).| |

| |(Believed to have been chosen annually on the basis of the age classes). | |

| |Welch – There were other contingents in the army besides these professional warriors. The Perioikoi provided up | |

| |to half the hoplites at Plataea and there were many units of light-armed Helots. Sparta had no cavalry until the | |

| |4th century BC. | |

| | | |

| |Evidence – Using “Sparta and Culture of War part 2 sheet + the Xenophon handout and Plutarch’ Lives (Lycurgus) | |

| |complete the following: | |

| |Source | |

| |Context/Reference to | |

| |Features of Spartan warfare | |

| | | |

| |Herodotus | |

| |Persian Wars 490-479 BC | |

| | | |

| | | |

| |Tyrtaeus | |

| |C7th BC – maybe around 2nd Messenian War | |

| | | |

| | | |

| |Simonides | |

| |Plataea 480-479 BC | |

| | | |

| | | |

| |Xenophon | |

| |c. 375 BC | |

| | | |

| | | |

| |Plutarch | |

| |Lycurgus | |

| | | |

| | | |

| | | |

| |Bury – The Messenian Wars – Section 2. | |

| |Why did Messenia “excite the covetousness” of Sparta? | |

| | | |

| |Outline what is known of the First Messenian War c. 736-716 BC. | |

| |What caused the Second Messenian War? (650 BC) | |

| |Explain Tyrtaeus’ role in the war and Sparta’s eventual success. | |

| |What was the result of the war for Messenia? For Sparta? How did the war affect Spartan warfare and politics? | |

| | | |

| |Bury – Section 3. | |

| |What picture is given of early C7th Sparta? (prior to the 2nd Messenian War). | |

| |As you have seen this war caused a re-organization of Spartan warfare. How was a similar transformation seen in | |

| |Spartan society? | |

| | | |

|ARCHIDAMUS son of |-In the Peloponnesian War (431-421), when his allies sought to know hoe much money would be needed, and said that| |

|Zeuxidamus (King, 469-427):|it was only fair that he should set a limit on their contributions, he said "War does not feed on fixed rations."| |

| | | |

| |-When he saw the missile shot by a catapult (which had been brought then for the first time from Sicily), he | |

| |exclaimed, "Heracles! The valor of men is lost!" | |

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