Andean Information Network
The Drug War in the Andes
Acknowledgements
I. Note to Teachers
Why Study the “War on Drugs?”...............…………….3
Integrating the Curriculum into the New York State Classroom………………………………………………………………….4
Structuring the Curriculum ……………...……………..……..7
Making the Curriculum Work in your Classroom………8
II. The Curriculum
Day 1: What we know about drug policies……….…..13
Day 2: Introduction to the Andes and U.S. Policy...18
Day 3: Prepare for Debate………………………………………24
Day 4: Debate Andean Drug Policy………..………….….26
Day 5: Continue Debate and Conclusions………….….28
III. Materials Packet
Drug War in the U.S. Information .………………………..……..35
Background on Colombia and Bolivia……………………….… …41
Background Reading on the Drug War………………….……….65
Preparing for Debate…………….………………………………..………83
Vocabulary……………………………………………………………….………85
Drug War Timeline……………………………………….…….…..86
Internet Sources………………………………………………….….94
Documents in Spanish………………………………………..….95
IV. Group Information Packets
U.S. Government………………………………………………..…102
Human Rights Organizations……………………………..…109
Coca Growers…………………………………………………….… 120
Governments of Colombia and Bolivia…………….…..125
Drug Treatment and Prevention providers…….…….133
Acknowledgements
No project like this one is ever realized without the collaboration and willingness of a group of people, in this case mostly women, to dedicate the necessary energy to bring it to life. The idea first took hold when a Brown University student on a 1997 School for International Training Study Abroad program in Bolivia, Hallie Chertok, was inspired by the coca growers she lived with for two weeks who asked her to bring the truth about coca back to the United States. She decided to develop a curriculum as her senior thesis and contacted Linda Farthing, who had begun the SIT program in Bolivia and had been active on Andean drug war policy for years. With the support of Mary Jo Dudley, then Latin American Studies Associate Director at Cornell University, Linda took Hallie’s model and developed it into a full fledged curriculum as part of her work with the Andean Information Network, a small organization committed to changes in drug policy in Bolivia (ain-) When the project floundered due too many other commitments, Ann Peters at LASP stepped in to push it forward towards conclusion. Mary Roldán, history professor at Cornell who teaches a course on the drug war and Kathyrn Ledebur, AIN director, kindly reviewed it to ensure its accuracy and clarity and Tompkins County Drug Court Judge John Rowley commented on the treatment section. Thanks to everyone for helping bring this project to fruition and to all the teachers and students who I hope will use and benefit from it.
Linda Farthing
Ithaca, New York
March 2006
NOTE TO TEACHERS
Why Study the “War on Drugs?” [1]
For the last thirty years, illegal drug use has increased significantly in the United States making drugs of increasing importance as an issue in health, criminal justice and foreign policies. Drug use among all social and economic classes in U.S. society has most frequently led to policies that are punitive in orientation, resulting in the U.S. having one of the highest rates of incarceration in the world. In New York state alone, the prison population grew from 12,500 in 1973 to 71,472 in 1999, with a corresponding increase in the number of prisons from 20 to 71. Most of the increase in prison population is due to mandatory sentencing associated with stringent drug laws.
Internationally, drug policy has become a cornerstone of the US relationship with other countries. Since President George Herbert Bush declared the “War on Drugs” in 1989, over $25 billion has been spent on controlling drugs internationally, making the War on Drugs one of the largest annual recipients of US government overseas funding.
Within the US, the debates over drugs stir strong emotions on the part of both public officials and the community, particularly when the issue touches youth. By high school, most students in the United States have had little choice but to address the issues surrounding drugs in their own lives or in the lives of their peers and communities on a regular basis. Yet despite the extensive education against drug use which has become a key component in health education from elementary school and up, few young adults are aware of the global implications of this same “War on Drugs” that they hear so much about at school and at home.
Goals of the Curriculum
The Drug War in the Andes seeks to close this knowledge gap about a crucial contemporary issue by introducing students to many of the key issues affecting US international drug policy. The immediacy of the “War on Drugs” in students’ lives makes it an excellent topic for educating about international policy issues. Learning about how the drug war is fought in two of the Andean countries where most of the United States “source country” efforts are focused, students have the opportunity to gain an understanding of how US foreign policy functions, how it affects the lives of individuals and governments of less powerful countries and how these link to their own lives at home. The curriculum focuses on Colombia and Bolivia as two principal source countries but much of what is written here is applicable as well to Peru. However we decided that including Peru would be simply information overload in the five day length of the curriculum.
A central goal of this curriculum is teaching the concept that there are competing interests and needs in the formation of all policies. By exploring and representing different perspectives, students gain a deeper understanding of what these interests are and of the values that underlie each of them. The background reading is designed to prepare students to grapple with each of these perspectives and be able to adequately represent them to their classmates. The curriculum also assists students in thinking critically about policy options and in presenting a coherent argument to support their position either for or against current policy.
The curriculum can be used by social studies teachers focusing on global studies or criminal justice issues, as well as health teachers. Materials in Spanish are included in the curriculum making it applicable for use in Spanish language classes as well.
Integrating this Unit into the New York State
Classroom
The curriculum is designed to be utilized as part of the Global History and Geography Social Studies curriculum taught during the Ninth Grade in the State of New York. It fits into the Learning Standards for commencement level Social Studies in New York State (June 1996) in the following areas:
Standard 2 - World History:
Students will use a variety of intellectual skills to demonstrate their understanding of major ideas, eras, themes, developments and turning points in world history and examine the broad sweep of history from a variety of perspectives.
Performance indicators for students:
• Know the social and economic characteristics…that distinguish different cultures and civilizations;
• Interpret and analyze documents and artifacts related to significant developments and events in world history;
• ..Investigate the various components of cultures and civilizations including social customs, norms, values, and traditions; political systems; economic systems; religions and spiritual beliefs; and socialization or educational practices;
• Understand the development and connectedness of Western civilizations and other civilizations and cultures in many areas of the world and over time;
• Analyze historic events from around the world by examining accounts written from different perspectives;
• Understand the broad patterns, relationships, and interactions of cultures and civilizations during particular eras and across eras;
• Analyze changing and competing interpretations of issues, events, and development throughout world history.
Standard 3 - Geography:
Students will use a variety of intellectual skills to demonstrate their understanding of the geography of the interdependent world in which we live –local, national, and global-including the distribution of people, places and environments over the Earth’s surface.
Performance indicators for students:
• Understand the characteristics, functions, and applications of maps, globes, aerial and other photographs, satellite-produced images, and models (Taken from National Geography Standards, 1994);
• Describe the relationships between people and environments and the connections between people and places;
• Understand the development and interactions of social/cultural, political, economic, and religious systems in different regions of the world;
• Analyze how the forces of cooperation and conflict among people influence the division and control of the Earth’s surface.
Standard 4 - Economics:
Students will use a variety of intellectual skills to demonstrate their understanding of how the United States and other societies develop economic systems and associated institutions to allocate scarce resources, how major decision-making units function in the U.S. and other national economies, and how an economy solves the scarcity problem through market and non-market mechanisms
Performance indicators for students:
• Explain how societies and nations attempt to satisfy their basic needs and wants by utilizing scarce capital, natural, and human resources;
• Define basic economic concepts such as scarcity, supply and demand, markets, opportunity costs, resources, productivity, economic growth, and systems;
• Understand how scarcity requires people and nations to make choices which involve costs and future considerations;
• Understand how people in the United States and throughout the world are both producers and consumers of goods and services;
Standard 5- Civics, Citizenship and Government
Students will use a variety of intellectual skills to demonstrate their understanding of the necessity for establishing governments; the governmental system of the U.S. and other nations…and the roles, rights, and responsibilities of citizenship, including avenues of participation.
Performance indicators for students:
• Explain the probable consequences of the absence of government and rules;
• Understand that social and political systems are based upon people’s beliefs;
• Analyze how the values of a nation affect the guarantee of human rights and make provisions for human needs;
Integrating this Unit into other Classrooms
The curriculum is sufficiently adaptable that it can be included in a variety of high school social studies courses. Below are a few ideas of where it might fit into your curriculum:
Global Studies: Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, drug policy has been a major guiding principle of contemporary U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and other parts of the world. The Drug War in the Andes provides a framework to examine contemporary Latin American societies, their histories, economies and challenges. It can provide a useful starting point to spark student interest in international issues.
U.S. Foreign Policy: As a key component of US foreign policy, the Drug War provides a clear and concrete example of the principles and values guiding current policy. Its close ties to domestic policies provide a clear means of examining how domestic concerns influence foreign policy. The Drug War in the Andes provides a tool for examining how complex and competing interests affect the formation of foreign policy and how US policy choices impact countries where the policy is applied.
Economics of Development: Underlying any discussion of drug policy, are the economic issues involved in reducing the drug trade. The Drug War in the Andes allows students to consider the economic options for low and middle income countries and how these affect and interact with US foreign policy.
Structuring the Curriculum
The curriculum is structured for five forty-five minute class periods using various types of media and teaching techniques. Students produce both individual portfolios of the written work they complete during the unit and participate in a group project which provides them the opportunity to debate from a variety of different perspectives solutions to the complicated problems under consideration. The five class periods are designed to be as interactive as possible and teachers are encouraged to revise the curriculum as needed for the characteristics and particular experience of their students.
The five-day format is conceived of as a guideline only. Teachers with a more flexible schedule could revise the curriculum to be taught over six days by extending the time for preparation, debate and discussion. Those with more limited time and where students have time to meet outside of class with their groups may choose to give no in-class time to the preparation of the group presentations, which would reduce the curriculum to four days.
Making the Curriculum Work in your Classroom
Successful cooperative group learning is more of an art than a science, and there is no easy formula for success as every classroom and group of students is different. However, taking the time to prepare for this kind of learning experience and knowing how to provide adequate guidance during the process will help a great deal. This section is aimed to assist you in preparing in a way that maximizes the possibility for success in your classroom.
Student Preparation: Successful cooperative learning requires that clear ground rules are established for students before they begin working in groups. These rules should be simple and be communicated orally to the students as well as posted in the classroom and/or provided to the students in a handout. The kinds of rules that are relevant are: Each student must participate; each student has a role (or job); each student deserves to be heard. With some groups of students, it can be effective (and necessary!) to appoint a group coordinator whose job is to enforce the ground rules.
Time Limitations:
Because time in the curriculum is tightly scheduled, it is essential that students come to class ready to work, especially during the role play simulation. Students must be made aware of the importance of being focused and concise. If it is possible to stretch the class to two periods, or even extend it for some amount of time, this would be very helpful. Spreading the presentations over two days is less effective because the momentum of the debate is lost. In order for the role play to be effective, it is crucial to stick closely to the time limits, and to make students aware of the time limits.
Designing the Groups:
Size: Ideally groups should not be larger than four or five, a size which facilitates effective cooperative learning. However in some cases, it may be necessary to expand the group size to 6 or 7 in which case it should be remember that the curriculum will need to be adjusted to ensure that each student has a role.
Composition: The most successful way of working cooperative for students at this age and grade level, is for the teacher to consider the personality, strengths and needs of each student and compose groups that will ensure the best outcome for the entire class. Random selection of groups is less successful but is certainly preferable to allowing students to simply work with their friends.
The time it takes to carefully plan group composition and size will definitely pay off in the quality of work that students produce. Having the teacher design groups and assign roles (such as spokesperson) helps to prevent having any one student dominate the group. Sometimes it can be effective to place all the most vocal and assertive students together in one group so that each of them does not play a dominating role in the other groups. Try to ensure that the more reticent students have a clear opportunity and responsibility to participate. Spreading the various strengths of students – such as artistic or writing ability – among the different groups is ideal because then the groups are balanced internally and with each other. Students may initially complain about the assignments because they exclude their closest friends, but generally will be satisfied with the group by the time the project is finished.
Adjusting for Class Size:
The Drug War in the Andes curriculum is ideally designed for a class which has 25 students so that each group has five students init. However the groups can be made larger with the expectation that students will research the issues in greater depth. In smaller classes, it may be necessary to either provide the students more information or simplify what is expected for them during the debate. It is also possible to combine two smaller classes.
Adjusting for Different Student Abilities:
This curriculum is designed to be adaptable enough to work with any classroom, no matter what the student abilities. In the case of classes where all the students are either of higher or lower abilities, the following suggestions can help to modify the curriculum for the setting.
Higher Ability:
• Students can be further challenged with additional readings and assignments. An effective way of doing this is to have them work with primary source documents, such as congressional hearings, or conduct analysis of newspaper articles to assess the values underlying the reporting.
Lower Ability:
• To make the background readings easier for students, they can be read aloud in class. Other readings can also be substituted. Another option is to explain key concepts from the background in lecture format.
• An extra day can be added to slow down the pace of the curriculum.
• Students can develop a glossary of key terms which will assist through the curriculum
Assessing Student Achievement:
It is not recommended to give students an individual grade on cooperative group assignments. If students know they will get one grade, then this helps to keep the group accountable because some students will pressure other to complete their responsibilities.
Self –evaluation is an extremely effective tool in having students think about their own learning and take responsibility for it. The self-evaluation provided with the curriculum provides teachers useful insights into the group process which can assist in the formation of better groups for the next group assignment.
Testing is only usually effective if it is based on an assessment of the critical thinking skills the student has developed rather than utilizing a multiple choice approach.
THE CURRICULUM
Day 1: What we already know about Drug Policies
Teachers Outline……… …….....................................13
Student Guide……….………......................................15
Student Handouts: Curriculum Overview……………16
Portfolio Cover ………............................................ 17
Day 2: Introduction to the Andes and the US Drug War
Teachers Outline………….........................................18
Group Descriptions……..........................................20
Student Guide…………............................................22
Group Questions………...........................................23
Day 3: Preparation for Debate on US Policy
Teachers Outline……………………………………….……………...24
Student Guide……................................................25
Day 4: Debate on US Drug Policy in the Andes
Teachers Outline………………………………………………….…...26
Student Guide for Days 4 & 5................................27
Day 5: Debate on US Drug Policy in the Andes and Conclusion
Teachers Outline…………………………………………………..….28
Essay Questions…………………………………………….………...29
Self-Evaluation Form………………………………………………..30
Student Curriculum Evaluation Form………...............31
Teacher Curriculum Evaluation Form……………………….32
Day One:
What we already know about Drug Policies
Teachers Outline
(Introduce Curriculum
Time: 5 Minutes
Handouts: Curriculum Overview
Description: Review the basic goals for the curriculum and review with students the structure of the curriculum and what will be covered each day. Explain the assignments and how students will be evaluated.
(Goals and Questions Brainstorm
Time: 25 minutes
Materials: Newsprint and markers
Description: Choose two students to be recorders. Have the class discuss what they know about drugs as a social issue in the United States (you can begin by asking them where drugs come from and how they get to their communities). Then find out what they know about the ‘source countries’ that supply drugs to the United States. Make a list entitled “What we know about drugs” and a second list entitled “Goals/questions for the unit” or “What we want to learn”. By posting these lists during each class session, they can serve as a reference throughout the curriculum and can be revisited the last day.
(Talking about Drugs in the United States
Time: 15 minutes
Description: Give a brief overview of the social issues involved with drug use and distribution in the US focusing on the social problems generated, increase
in prison population, drug use among youth etc. [See …articles in Sources].
(Homework
Have students read materials on drugs in the U.S. which demonstrate different approaches to drug issues - one focused on a repression/War on Drugs model and one on a harm reduction model. Ask students to write one page on which domestic policy makes the most sense to them and why.
Have students read Background material on Colombia and Bolivia.
Day One: Student Guide
(Objectives for this class period
To identify your questions
To introduce the topic of the “War on Drugs” in a way that links it to your lives.
(Schedule for today
Curriculum Overview - handout
Goals and Questions Brainstorm
Drugs in the United States
(Tonight’s homework
Reading: TWO ARTICLES ON DOMESTIC DRUG ISSUES and Background material on Colombia and Bolivia.
Writing: Read the two articles provided on drugs in the US which demonstrate different approaches to drug issues - one focused on a repression/War on Drugs model and one on a harm reduction model. Write one page on which domestic policy approach makes the most sense to you and why.
Student Handouts: Curriculum Overview
Introduction:
The Drug War in the Andes is a five-day introductory study of some aspects of the “War on Drugs” in two South American countries that are major producers -- Colombia and Bolivia. We will look at how international drug policy affects us in the United States and also how it impacts the countries that are the principal source of cocaine. You will learn how the coca leaf, which is a raw material for making cocaine, has had important cultural uses for thousands of years in the Andes that continue today. Below is an overview of the topic for each day, the homework assignments, and how you will be evaluated for this unit. Each day you will receive various handouts including an overview of each day’s objectives, schedule, and homework.
Daily Schedule
Day 1: What we already know about Drug Policies
Day 2: Introduction to the Andes and the Drug War
Day 3: Preparation for Debate
Day 4: Present and Discuss US Drug Policy in the Andes
Day 5: Finish Presentations, Discuss US Drug Policy and Conclusions
Projects
For this unit, you will complete both a group project and an individual project. The group project will involve working with a group to make an oral presentation. We will talk more about that during the next class. The individual project is a portfolio where you will collect all of the written work you do on the topic. You will be given a cover page that has a list of all the items that must be in the portfolio.
Homework Summary
Each night you will have reading to do to prepare for the next day. You will also have questions to answer using the readings, your group discussions, or material from class.
Evaluation
Your grade will be based on the following items: (*you will not be evaluated based on the curriculum evaluation that you fill out)
(participation in class discussions (10% of your grade)
(group presentation (30% of your grade)
(portfolio (60% of your grade)
Cover Page:
The Drug War in the Andes
PORTFOLIO
by
Name ________________________
Date_________________________
Contents:
1. Domestic Policy Question (one page)
1. Group Questions
1. Notes from Group Planning
1. Self-Evaluation
1. Essay
1. Curriculum Evaluation
Day 2:
Introduction to the Andes and the US “Drug War”
Teachers Outline
(Introduction to the Andes
Time: 15 minutes
Handouts: Maps
Description: Basic introduction to region’s geography and history.
(What is Coca and what happens when it becomes cocaine?
Time: 20 minutes
Slide Show/Video
Description: A scripted slide show which discusses the historical uses of coca, who grows it, how it gets from the Andes to the U.S., policies to date, results of the policies
(Introduction of Group Project
Time: 10 minutes
Handouts: five different packets
Description: Divide students into five groups which will debate on Day 4 and 5 various options for international drug policy from the perspective of different political interest groups or governments.
(Homework:
Ask students to read the introductory overview materials about the Drug War in the Andes.
Have students read the Group Information packets. Each packet contains articles from the perspective of the group students will represent.
Group Descriptions
The following are brief and very general descriptions of the five groups. The packet of information will provide you more detailed background on the goals and perspectives of your group.
Group 1: Coca Producers
This group comprises representatives from coca grower organizations in Colombia and Bolivia. You do not have much formal education - perhaps 7-8 years and you are likely to come from an indigenous background. You are poor subsistence farmers who grow coca as your main market crop, but also produce most of your own food on your land. You do not generally have much in the way of savings and are dependent on your yearly crops. Your overall goal is to be able to earn enough money from agriculture to pay for food, clothes, education and other necessities. You want policies which will increase government support to your communities which historically have been underserved.
Group 2: International Human Rights Organizations
This group is made up of representatives from human rights organizations from around the globe. These representatives are generally well-educated and articulate. Your goal is to expose situations which threaten or violate human rights. You seek policies which incorporate human rights concerns. For some of the groups you work for, the definition of human rights includes the right to make a decent living.
Group 3: Governments of Colombia and Bolivia
This group is made up of government officials. Your main goal is strengthen your economies to improve living standards in your country while preserving the privileges of the elite that you come from. You also seek to reduce economic dependence on the U.S. which you feel undermines your country’s sovereignty and national pride. You are very concerned about financial assistance to your military, which has carried out successful coups against elected governments in the past. You press for policies which allow the satisfaction of both the needs of your people, yet not alienate more powerful countries and the international institutions they dominate, in particular the U.S.
Group 4: United States Government
This group is made up of U.S. government officials involved in international drug-related policy-making. Your main goal is to reduce the social problems generated in the U.S. by illicit drugs which requires convincing the governments of the Andean countries to follow your plan of action. Your focus is on reducing the supply of drugs into the U.S. and developing policies abroad which assist in achieving this goal.
Group 5: Drug Treatment and Prevention Providers in the U.S.:
This group is made up of law enforcement and drug treatment and prevention professionals in the United States who daily deal with the difficulties that drug addiction creates in individual lives, the lives of those around them, and the society at large. Your focus is on reducing addiction and crime, and thereby reducing the social costs of drug addiction.
Day Two: Student Guide
(Objectives for this class period
1. To trace the history and influences of US drug policy on Colombia and Bolivia
2. To understand the importance of coca politically and economically in Colombia and Bolivia
3. To learn about the history of coca use in the Andes and the structure of the coca/cocaine industry
4. To introduce the group activity
(Schedule for Today
5. Introduction to the Andes
6. What is coca and what happens when it becomes cocaine?
7. Introduction of the Group Project
(Tonight’s homework
Reading:
Writing: Answer the Group Questions so that you can discuss them with your group
Group Questions
(use both sides of the paper as necessary)
1. What are your group’s priorities?
2. Which are the most important of your priorities?
3. Of the other groups involved in this roundtable discussion, which do you think are most likely to share some of your interests? Why?
4. Which of the other representatives present, do you see as being the least likely to agree with your groups’ priorities? Why?
5. What are the main obstacles facing your group?
6. What group of people are you trying to protect?
7. What types of policies would assist you in achieving your goals? Why?
Day 3:
Preparation for Debate
Teachers Outline
(Prepare for Debate on US Drug Policy in the Andes
Time: whole period
Description: The five groups will review and discuss their packets and prepare their presentations on their perspectives for the debate. Each group should appoint a recorder to keep track of the key points and to note who will make each part of the presentation. Teachers can provide students a structure for doing this: (1) students should identify within their groups the points of agreement in answers to the questions; (2) students will discuss points of disagreement and come to consensus on how to handle these; (3) students will decide who will present each aspect of the group’s position. Each student must speak during the presentation; (4) students will try to anticipate the areas that other groups will disagree with them on and prepare to respond to these. Students should be encouraged to meet outside of class if at all possible to refine their presentations.
During the debate portion of the curriculum, it is important that the teacher emphasize the role of values which underlie the various choices and positions under consideration. At the conclusion, students should be able to come to their own individual conclusions about the issue and should be encouraged to articulate that conclusion and identify the underlying values which have led them to it. This process should be structured into the formal assignment (the essay) as well as in the more informal conclusion on Day 5.
(Homework
Have students read article about participating effectively in a debate.
Have students prepare their part of the discussion.
Day Three: Student Guide
(Objectives for this class period
identify within your group your points of agreement in answers to the questions.
discuss points of disagreement and come to consensus on how to handle these.
decide who will present each aspect of the group’s position. Each student must speak during the presentation.
try to anticipate the areas that other groups will disagree with and prepare to respond to these.
(Schedule for today
Group Discussion
(Tonight’s homework
Reading: Article on how to prepare for a debate
Meet with others from your group if at all possible to practice your presentation. Otherwise practice on your own.
Writing: Write out notes which outline your part of the discussion
Day 4:
Debate on US Drug Policy in the Andes
Teachers Outline
(Discussion: Present and Discuss US Drug Policy in the Andes
Time: 36 minutes
Description: Each group will be given 12 minutes to present their group’s perspective to the entire class. This means that three groups will present today and two tomorrow.
(Homework:
Have students begin work on one essay question
Days Four and Five: Student Guide
(Objectives for this class period
8. To participate in a brief debate about the War on Drugs.
9. To develop oral presentation skills
(Schedule for today
10. Debate on the “Drug War” in the Andes
(Homework
answer an essay question on what you learned in this curriculum unit
fill out the Evaluation form
Day 5:
Debate on US Drug Policy in the Andes [continued] and Conclusion
Teachers Outline
(Discussion: Present and Discuss US Drug Policy in the Andes
Time: 24 minutes
Description: The remaining two groups will be given 12 minutes each to present their group’s perspective to the entire class.
(Conclusion and Evaluation
Time: 16 minutes
Description: The remaining time will be used to discuss how these perspectives clash and to discuss the class’s perspectives after the information they have received and reading they have done. Students will have the opportunity to comment about what they learned from the curriculum and how it impacts their understanding of drug issues in their own communities
(Homework:
Make sure that students fill out evaluation forms.
Have students complete one essay question
ESSAY QUESTIONS
Choose one of the following three questions to write a two to three page essay that will be included in your portfolio. Be sure to consider information from all readings, articles, the slide show, class, and group discussions. Give your own perspective about how to deal with the coca/cocaine problem in your answer. As much as you can, identify the underlying values which have led you to this opinion.
1. What are the most important goals of the “War on Drugs” according to the U.S. government? What are the goals of the governments of Colombia and Bolivia? What compromises could be reached?
2. What policy do you think the United States should promote to deal with cocaine production in the Andean countries? Explain your position.
2. How do you think coca growers justify their position to grow coca which they know is going to be transformed into cocaine? Do you think their perspective is valid? Why or why not?
Self-Evaluation Form
(please feel free to use both sides of the paper or additional paper if necessary)
Group Evaluation:
Please evaluate based on scale from 1 to 5 — 1 is lowest, 5 is highest
Did everyone in your group participate in discussions and planning?
1 2 3 4 5
Did everybody listen to others’ ideas throughout discussions?
1 2 3 4 5
Did everyone participate in your presentation?
1 2 3 4 5
Did your group use time efficiently in your presentation?
1 2 3 4 5
Did you clearly present what is most important to the group you represent?
1 2 3 4 5
If you were not satisfied with how your group worked, what could have made it function better?
Self-Evaluation
Did you participate in all group discussions?
1 2 3 4 5
How do you evaluate your participation in your group’s presentation?
1 2 3 4 5
Did you share your opinions and questions with your group?
1 2 3 4 5
If you were not satisfied with your level of participation in the curriculum, what could have improved it?
Other comments:
Student Curriculum Evaluation
1. Did this curriculum unit help you understand more about “War on Drugs” in the Andes? [1 is not at all; 5 is a great deal]
1 2 3 4 5
2. What else would you have liked to learn about the “War on Drugs” in the Andes that was not discussed this week?
3. What parts of this curriculum were the most interesting to you?
4. What part forced you to think the most?
5. What parts were the least interesting?
6. Did you learn from the presentations and roundtable discussion?
7. What would you have done differently (added, removed, adjusted) with this curriculum if you were the teacher?
Please add other comments on the back
Teacher Curriculum Evaluation
Please respond to the following questions after you have finished using the curriculum in your classroom. Mail your answers to Latin American Studies Program, 190 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 15853 or FAX to 607-255- 8919 (phone is 255-3345). Please feel free to use the back of this sheet or additional sheets. If you prefer, don’t include your name and school.
Your Name: __________________________________________________________
School: ____________________________________ Grade: ____________
School Address: ______________________________________________________
Overall, do you think that the curriculum worked well with your students? Did it meet its goals?
Were the materials and instructions clear and easy to understand and use? Do you have any suggestions for improving this aspect of the curriculum?
What activity worked best with your students? Why do you think it was successful?
What activity was not successful? Do you have any idea why? Or suggestions on how it could be improve?
What other suggestions do you have for improving the curriculum?
|[pic] |
Drug War in the Andes:
Materials Packet
Day One:
Drug War in the U.S. Information .…………………………………..35
Background: Colombia…………………………………………………………41
Bolivia……………………………………………………………………….53
Day Two:
Coca/Cocaine……………………………………………………………………..65
United States Drug Policy in the Andes…………………………….69
Colombia and the Drug War………………………………………………72
Bolivia and the Drug War…………………………………………………..75
Human Rights……………………………………………………………………..76
Drug Treatment and Prevention………………………………………..79
Day Three:
Article on participating in a debate……………………………………..83
Other materials:
Vocabulary………………………………………………………………………………85
US Drug War Timeline…………………………………………………………….86
Internet Resources ………………………………………………………………..94
Documentos en Español..................................................95
Day One: Drug War in the U.S. Information
From Public Agenda /issues/overview.cfm?issue_type=illegal_drugs
ILLEGAL DRUGS: Overview
[pic]
The Issue at a Glance
Compared with the peak years of the late 1970s, government statistics show that drug use is down in the United States. Over the past several years, use of illicit drugs among adults has been stable, and over the past decade the use of illegal drugs by workers has declined by more than half. Teen drug use has held steady for the past four years after rising sharply in the early 1990s. Teen use of some drugs, such as LSD, methamphetamine and cocaine is down somewhat, but use of other drugs like ecstasy has increased, according to the University of Michigan's annual "Monitoring the Future" survey.
Despite the overall decline, most Americans still regard illegal drugs as one of the nation's most serious problems. More than half of the public worries that a family member might become addicted, and seven in ten people say the government isn't doing enough to address the problem.
Getting Tougher with Dealers
Historically, federal and state governments have used two strategies to combat drug use: reducing the supply of illegal drugs and curbing the demand. When most people talk about the "war on drugs," they are thinking about efforts to reduce supply: more aggressive police investigations, tougher sentences for drug users and dealers, greater efforts to intercept drugs before they cross U.S. borders, and supporting anti-drug efforts by drug-producing nations. The number of drug offenders in U.S. prisons has risen dramatically over the past two decades, and drug arrests have doubled since 1985.
Reducing demand has often meant drug education programs in schools, public service messages in the media, treatment programs and drug testing. Despite civil liberties concerns, the courts have generally upheld drug testing programs for employees and even students involved in extracurricular activities. Also, the federal government is currently in the middle of a five-year, $2 billion anti-drug ad campaign.
Critics of the "war on drugs," including an increasing number of law enforcement officials and even a few public officials, such as New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson, say the campaign hasn't worked, and have called for drug legalization. They argue legalization, like the ending of the Prohibition on alcohol, would undercut drug gangs and allow the nation to focus on drug abuse as a medical problem. Those critics, however, are still a distinct minority.
Marijuana as Medicine?
One area where advocates of legalization have made progress is in the the medical use of marijuana. Although the federal government maintains an extremely limited medical marijuana program (so limited that it is down to less than a dozen patients), federal policy for decades has held marijuana to be a dangerous and addictive drug.
In 1996, Californians approved a ballot proposition allowing physicians to prescribe marijuana for specific illnesses, such as glaucoma, even though federal laws ban its sale and distribution. Five more states have followed suit, and similar ballot propositions have passed but been nullified in several other elections. Federal and state officials have fiercely fought to keep the referendums from being implemented, and none have taken full effect. In March 1999, a panel of experts convened by the federal Institute of Medicine found that marijuana does have legitimate medical uses for treating symptoms of cancer and AIDS. While the panel found no evidence marijuana leads to harder drugs like cocaine, the scientists did warn that marijuana smoke was even more toxic in the long term than tobacco smoke.
Nationwide, two-thirds of the public supports the use of marijuana to ease severe pain. Although most people regard marijuana as a much less dangerous drug than cocaine or heroin, a solid majority opposes general legalization of marijuana, and an even more substantial majority opposes the overall legalization of drugs.
The Public View
Opinion polls show the public tends to favor a variety of different approaches to the drug problem, mixing liberal and conservative attitudes. There is strong public support for doing everything possible to intercept drug supplies and punish dealers. At a time when the nation's prisons are filled with criminals serving sentences for drug-related crimes, most Americans want even stricter penalties for deal dealers. Most Americans do not support legalization of drugs.
Many people also think permissive messages from parents and the media are one of the main causes of the drug problem. They favor expanded anti-drug efforts to discourage use. Expanded drug treatment is favored as well, although this tactic is not as widely supported as stepped-up enforcement.
Two Different Perspectives on the Drug Use in the U.S:
#1: Reducing Demand by Holding Users Accountable
What Should Be Done?
• Do everything possible -- in the schools, in the workplace, in homes and in the media -- to convey the message that drug use is dangerous, unacceptable, and not chic.
• Punishing drug users, even those who only occasionally use drugs, is one of the strongest ways of sending an anti-drug message. Users should be penalized by fines, arrest, and forfeiture of driver's licenses.
• Random urine testing for drugs should be required in schools, the workplace and in professional sports. "Zero tolerance" should be taken literally, and employees who test positive should be dismissed.
• Enact laws that would withhold federal money from any organization that cannot guarantee a drug-free workplace.
Arguments against this approach:
• Since it's impossible to stop the supply of illegal drugs, the only way to win the war against drugs is to reduce the appetite for them.
• Since drug use is not always apparent, testing is the only way to ensure that people remain drug free, and it is an effective deterrent.
• Drug users may be victims, but they don't only hurt themselves. The use of illegal drugs is linked to domestic violence, school failure, crime, AIDS, and workplace injuries. For everyone's sake, we need force drug users to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions
• Reducing demand in the U.S. is the best way to help drug-producing nations locked in a struggle with corruption and narco-terrorism.
• While no one opposes antidrug educational programs, there's not much evidence that this approach actually reduces drug use.
• Addiction is a medical problem. You don't punish people for getting sick. Besides, addicts need treatment to get clean -- so how does it help to leave them unemployed and without health insurance?
• Random drug tests and the kinds of drug searches that take place in schools and some workplaces are an invasion of privacy and a threat to our civil liberties.
• As long as drugs are available, some people will be tempted to use them. The only way to win the war is to cut them off at the source by targeting growers and drug dealers.
• Alcohol and tobacco are both addictive substances that cause a great deal of social damage. Yet both are legal. Millions more are addicted to drugs legally prescribed by their own doctors. Why should we treat other drugs differently?
What are the costs and tradeoffs?
• It may take a long time before expanded drug education efforts turn around the drug problem.
#2: Redefining Drug Use as Addiction, Not Criminal Behavior
What Should Be Done?
• Treat drug abuse as a public health problem rather than a law enforcement issue, and eliminate criminal penalties for personal drug use.
• Regulate drug sales, and permit the use of some, like marijuana, under a doctor's care
• Expand drug treatment programs, including those in prison. Require insurance companies to cover substance abuse the same way they would any physical illness. The goal should be to provide treatment to anyone who needs it.
• Restrict drug use among minors by regulating drug sales.
• Focus enforcement on drug traffickers and drop mandatory sentencing for drug offenses.
Arguments for this Approach:
• The harm done by drugs is predominantly caused by the fact that they're illegal. A more sensible policy would control their distribution and discourage their use.
• Prohibition of alcohol didn't work in the 1920s and drug prohibition doesn't work now. Decriminalizing drug use would destroy the illicit drug trade.
• The war on drugs has done tremendous harm by sending thousands of drug users to prison instead of salvaging their lives and communities with treatment. Drug treatment should be widely available, and stigma-free.
• Studies show that treatment programs are the most cost-effective way of dealing with the drug problem. Even expensive treatment programs pay for themselves by reducing the costs of lost productivity, crime, and health care.
• Decriminalizing certain drugs -- such as the use of marijuana -- will permit law enforcement officials to focus on more pressing priorities.
• Making it easier to get drugs would inevitably make them more widely available. For example, legal prescription drugs are tightly regulated but are still the second most common form of drug abuse.
• Too many people believe that making something legal also makes it moral. Drug abuse is morally wrong and blurring this fact by calling it a health problem will only compound the problem.
• Treatment programs are important, but not the whole answer to the illegal drug problem. Many treatment programs have low success rates because so many people relapse.
• Organized gangs won't simply go away if we legalize drugs. They'll move into other forms of crime, just as the bootleggers did after Prohibition ended.
If illegal drugs become legal products, will companies be allowed to market them and promote their use, the way tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceutical companies do? That could make the problem of teen drug use much worse.
What are the costs and tradeoffs?
One result of decriminalizing drug use is that more people may experiment with drugs. Legalizing drugs may lead to more drug abuse in inner cities, where addicts are more numerous and there are few treatment programs.
[pic]
[pic]
[pic]
Day One: Background Reading – Colombia and Bolivia
GENERAL:
These readings provide a general introduction to Colombia and Bolivia, followed by a section on the problems of illicit drug production and trafficking in these countries. The meaning of words in italics can be found in the Vocabulary section at the end of these two sections.
Colombia and Bolivia, along with Peru, are central not only in the trafficking of the illegal drug of cocaine but also to the growth of coca, a key raw material used in manufacturing cocaine. These countries share characteristics such as language and regional history although there are considerable differences in culture, politics, climate, and economy. It is important to remember that the “War on Drugs” extends far beyond the borders of these two countries, both in other parts of Latin America as well as in other parts of the world.
Colombia and Bolivia share one of the principal geological features of South America, the Andes mountain range which runs north-south along the west of the continent from Venezuela to Chile. The Andes are a southern continuation of the Rocky mountains found in North America. At their highest in Argentina, Chile and Bolivia, the peaks reach over 20,000 feet above sea level. In both Colombia and Bolivia, the mountains and highlands are in the west, close to the Pacific Ocean, and to the east the countries have high valleys which give way to large lowland areas.
Colombia and Bolivia both were colonized by the Spanish though, as their histories show, the impact of this is significantly different in both countries. One shared inheritance of this colonization is that both countries’ are Christian, specifically over 90% identify themselves as Roman Catholic, although there are growing pockets of Protestants. In Bolivia, traditional indigenous religious beliefs remain strong and are melded into Catholic celebrations. In both countries, the official language is Spanish. However, in Bolivia, because of its significant indigenous populations, Quechua and Aymara are also widely spoken. The indigenous languages of Colombia did not survive colonization and were replaced almost entirely by Spanish.
Background Readings on Colombia
Geography
[pic]
Source: US Central Intelligence Agency, found on Perry-Castañeda Library
Map Collection, University of Texas, lib.utexas.edu/maps/
Colombia, the fourth largest country in Latin America, is located in the northwestern part of the South American continent, and is the only country with coasts on both the Pacific Ocean (to the west) and the Caribbean sea (to the north). It is roughly equal to the area of Texas and California combined. Three Andean ranges run north and south through the western part of the country, covering almost half of the national territory. The rest of the country comprises a vast lowland which consists of an open grassland (known as llanos) in the north and tropical forest, part of the Amazon River basin, in the south.
As it is situated so close to the equator, Colombia has no real seasons, but its’ climate is influenced by altitude. Overall the country has a high rainfall, and the highland regions are cool for much of the year. The capital city is Bogotá, in one of the Andean ranges, with a population of 7.4 million people. Other major cities include Medellin (2.2 million), Cali (2.2 million), which are both in the same Andean range west of Bogotá and Barranquilla (1.3 million) on the Caribbean coast.
History
Before the arrival of the Spanish, the indigenous Chibcha culture was the dominant ethnic group in what is now Colombia, and had an organized, agricultural based economy. Other groups included the Arawac in the interior plains and the Caribs, on the northern coast, who fiercely resisted the Spanish invasion.
The Spaniard’s first city in South America was founded in Colombia at Santa Marta in 1525. In 1549, the area became a Spanish colony with Santa Fe de Bogotá as its capital. In 1717, Bogotá was designated the capital of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, which included Colombia plus what is now Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. The city became one of the principal Spanish administrative centers in the New World, along with Lima and Mexico City.
The Spaniards initiated a major change in landholding by introducing the encomienda (land grants). The land and its inhabitants were divided among the colonizers who set up large haciendas (estates). Indigenous peoples and African slaves were forced to provide labor to the estates.
In 1810, residents of Bogota who were of Spanish origin but who had been born in the colonies (criollos) along with those of mixed Indian and Spanish blood (mestizos) defied Spanish authority and in 1813, proclaimed full independence leading to the establishment of Gran Colombia in 1819. The Republic included all the territory of the former Viceroyalty but proved difficult to hold together which led to Venezuela and Ecuador breaking away in 1830. Simon Bolivar was elected as its first President and Francisco de Paula Santander as vice president.
The two political parties which developed were based on the differences of political vision between the followers of these two men. These parties, known as the Conservatives and the Liberals have dominated much of Colombian politics ever since. Bolivar's supporters, who later formed the nucleus of the Conservative Party, advocated strong centralized government, the Roman Catholic Church’s involvement in government and education, and to limit voting rights to property owners. Santander's followers, forerunners of the Liberals, supported federalism, separation of church and state, and rights to vote to a broader section of the population.
Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, each party held the presidency for roughly equal periods of time. Colombia maintained a tradition of civilian government and regular, free elections. In a continent fraught with military involvement in government, the Colombian military has seized power only three times, with the longest period being for four years (1953-57).
Despite this commitment to democracy, Colombia's history has been characterized by widespread, violent conflict. Two civil wars have resulted from the bitter rivalry between the Conservative and Liberal parties. The first was the War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902) which cost an estimated 100,000 lives, and was finally resolved when the Conservatives won. This difficult time in Colombia was compounded when it lost control over Panama, the last piece of Gran Colombia, in 1903. The loss occurred after the United States acquired the right to construct the Panama Canal and decided the project would be easiest to complete with Panama an independent republic.
For the first four decades of the twentieth century, political life remained fairly peaceful and Colombia participated in the Second World War on the side of the Allies. However beginning soon after the war, the assassination of a Liberal presidential candidate plunged the country into a decade of conflict called La Violencia, which cost up to 300,000 lives. .
In 1953 the military came to power in part to end partisan violence, but the growing populist ambitions of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship along with accusations of corruption prompted leaders of the two parties to negotiate a settlement in 1957 to alternate the presidency and share offices. While the presidency was determined by regular elections every four years; the two parties equally shared all other elective and appointed offices. The National Front ended La Violencia, and instituted social and economic reforms in cooperation with the initiative begun by US President John Kennedy called the Alliance for Progress. Although the agreement was phased out by 1978, subsequent administrations have always included members of opposition parties.
However shortly after this truce was reached, in the early 1960’s, guerilla movements advocating greater equality in Colombian society took up armed struggle against the central government. The most important of these groups are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces – FARC), which has its origins in the Communist Party and in the countryside among former Liberal guerrillas active during La Violencia. It is strongest in sparsely populated, southern Colombia and is estimated to have a force of about 16,000 to 18,000 combatants. It currently controls or operates freely in 40-60% of the rural areas of a country where 75% of the population is urban. The second largest guerilla group is the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army – ELN) with roots among urban university students and intellectuals identified with the Cuban revolution, and which is strongest in the northeast and portions of the northwestern Department of Antioquia with about 3500 combatants. It mostly supports itself through kidnapping and extortion of oil and hydroelectric industries but recently has lost ground.
Both of these groups have negotiated with various Colombian governments in efforts to end this armed conflict. A 1984 cease-fire ended in late 1985 when another smaller guerrilla group (the M-19) launched a spectacular attack on the national Palace of Justice in Bogotá which was violently suppressed by the army and led to the deaths of 115 people, including 11 Supreme Court justices.
During the 1980s, on the other side of the political spectrum, rightwing paramilitary groups formed in response to guerilla demands and kidnappings. Some paramilitaries were organized and paid by ranchers and rural landowners to defend their properties from guerrilla extorsion, others were the offshoots of former or rogue military personnel, and still others were created by or evolved from the ranks of powerful drug traffickers. The largest paramilitary umbrella group (the United Colombian Self Defense group or AUC) is estimated to have numbered some 16,000 men in 2003, but a 2004 agreement led to the demobilization of some 16-23,000 fighters. Paramilitaries are widely accused of collaborating closely with the regular armed forces and have launched attacks on leftist guerillas, as well as targeting human rights and community organizations.
Throughout the 1970s and 80s, Colombia has had to deal with yet another violent element in its political landscape – the steady growth of powerful drug cartels who control the cocaine industry. These cartels engaged in assassination and intimidation while amassing enormous fortunes, weapons stashes and political influence for those at the top of their hierarchies. The most powerful group during the 1980’s was the Medellin cartel, but once its’ leader Pablo Escobar was killed in 1993, the Cali cartel quickly moved to step into its place, although it never engaged in such spectacular violence. The Cali cartel failed to become as powerful as the Medellin cartel because of almost constant state attempts to dismantle it. In addition, Mexicans who had previously been paid a cash percentage to ship cocaine into the U.S. increasingly shifted to charging their cut in cocaine itself and subsequently became significant distributors on their own. The ‘cartel structure’ to the degree that it ever existed, collapsed and gave way to hundreds of small, constantly shifting organizations instead.
By the late 1980’s, several guerilla groups were finally successfully incorporated into a peace process, which led to a new 1991 constitution. A new leftwing political party, the Union Patriotica (UP), some of whom were former guerilla members, emerged in 1986. But the murder of an estimated 1,000-3,000 UP activists by paramilitaries and drug traffickers pushed many of the survivors to take up arms in the 1990’s.
In 1998, Andres Pastrana was elected President. A member of the Conservative Party, his government’s program was committed to peaceful resolution of Colombia's longstanding civil conflicts and full cooperation with the United States in combating cocaine trafficking. While early initiatives gave reason for some optimism, when Pastrana took over, unemployment rose to a record 20% reflecting a severe recession which began in 1998. Between 1998 and 2002, guerilla and paramilitary attacks increased in severity, and drug production, in particular coca and opium poppy cultivation, grew significantly. An estimated 40,000 Colombians have died in the past 40 plus years due to civil conflict.
After more than three years of talks, President Pastrana suspended the peace process with the principal guerilla group, the FARC, in February 2002, and ordered the military and police forces to retake the safe haven which the government had earlier granted to the FARC. The Colombian Government and ELN, after suspending talks in 2001 resumed discussions in 2005 aimed at opening a formal peace process.
No single explanation fully addresses the deep roots of Colombia's present-day troubles, but they include limited government presence in large areas of the country, the expansion of illicit drug cultivation, struggles to control valuable resources and land, and social inequality. To confront these substantial challenges, the Pastrana administration unveiled a "Plan Colombia" in late 1999, an integrated strategy to address these longstanding, mutually reinforcing problems with a price tag of $7 billion. The wide ranging reforms in Plan Colombia include promoting peace, combating the narcotics industry, reviving the Colombian economy, improving respect for human rights, and strengthening the democratic and social institutions of the country.
The initial Colombian version of the Plan foresaw considerable investment in social and economic development, but the ultimate agreement, decided upon with U.S. support, destined over 80% of funds for military-related assistance. To date, the US has provided $1.3 billion in military aid but little for the Plan’s political, economic and social initiatives. In March 2002, the Bush administration called for widening US military support for Colombia beyond fighting drug trafficking to supporting anti-guerilla operations.
In May of 2002 Alvaro Uribe Vélez, a member of the Liberal Party running as an Independent, won the Colombian presidency on a platform that promised to end Colombia’s decades old conflict through a military defeat of the guerrillas and cooperation with the United States on drug eradication and interdiction. Through a combination of policies that included a war tax on the wealthy, a network of citizen informants and peasant soldiers to police the countryside, intensified aerial spraying of coca and poppy fields, and military presence along critical transportation routes, the Uribe government significantly lowered reported homicide and kidnapping rates in Colombia. Consistent collaboration with the United States in the “War on Terror” has also made his government the United States’ staunchest ally in Latin America. The government’s apparent success in improving internal security conditions (at least in the major cities) prompted a move to lobby for a constitutional change to allow for Uribe’s re-election. Despite widespread opposition, the amendment passed and Uribe is currently the frontrunner in the presidential election for a second term to begin in August 2006.
Sources: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Latin American Bureau – Country Profiles; Central Intelligence Agency – World Factbook 2001
[pic]
[from ]
Social Structure
Colombia has a population of 40 million people which makes it the third largest country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico. Seventy-three per cent of the population lives in cities and towns, up from only 57% in 1970 (US urban population is 81%). Due to the internal conflict, over a million people have been displaced from their homes and are living as refugees somewhere else in the country. Sixty per cent of the population is considered mestizo, 20% of European origin, 18% of African origin, and only 2% indigenous.
Colombia ranks 53 out of 174 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index which measures the average quality of life in a country. Life expectancy is 71 (US is 76) and infant mortality to age five is 30 per 1000 live births (US is 7). Average family size is declining rapidly: in 1960 women had an average of 6.8 children, by 1997, this had dropped to 2.7. Fifty-five per cent of all Colombians live below the poverty line and the society, like many other countries of Latin America, has one of the highest rates of inequality between rich and poor in the world.
Primary education is free and compulsory for five years. In 1995, 85% of the school age population was in primary school and in secondary school 62% were enrolled. Adult illiteracy was 9%.
Economy
Colombia has Latin America’s fifth largest economy. Its principal exports are oil, coffee, chemicals, coal, and some manufactured goods. Its principal trading partner is the US which purchased more than a third of its exports. Most of its imports are manufactured goods from the US.
Colombia has the largest coal reserves in Latin America and is the world’s leading producer of emeralds. It also produces significant quantities of gold and platinum, but these are often mined without mechanization and smuggled out of the country as contraband. The main traditional crops are coffee (it is the world’s third largest producer after Brazil and Vietnam), bananas, sugar, cut flowers and cotton.
[pic]
photo by
Coffee cultivation in Colombia
There are no reliable statistics available for the size of the illegal drug trade in Colombia but estimates range between US $1 billion to US$5 billion (compared with $10 billion in legal exports). During the 1990’s as coca cultivation was increasingly suppressed in Peru and Bolivia, Colombia became the world’s major grower of coca in the southern plains and jungle regions. In recent years, there has been a rapid growth in opium poppy cultivation, and Colombia now exports heroin as well as cocaine. Colombia supplies 90% of the cocaine in the US.
Sources for Social Structure and Economy sections: US Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2001; Latin American Bureau: Country Profiles – Colombia; United Nations Development Programme – Human Development Report 2001
Background Readings on Bolivia
Geography
[pic]
Source: US Central Intelligence Agency, found on Perry-Castañeda Library
Map Collection, University of Texas, lib.utexas.edu/maps/
Landlocked Bolivia, roughly the size of Texas or Ontario, is the sixth largest country in Latin America. It is divided into three distinct geographic and cultural regions. The country straddles the Andes to the west, rising to altitudes above 20,000 ft (6,000 meters). Beginning north of Lake Titicaca, the highest navigable waterway in the world, the Andes divide into two ranges with a huge, very arid plateau (the altiplano) between them. While the average temperature is about 50 degrees Fahrenheit, it can range between 70 degrees above and 25 degrees below in the same day.
East of the altiplano are fertile, agricultural valleys about 8500 ft (2600 m) above sea level which receive almost double the rainfall of the highland areas. The vast wet tropical and semi-tropical lowlands at 2400-4800 ft (750-1500 meters) lie further to the east and north and comprise two thirds of the national territory but only one third of the population.
La Paz, located in a basin in the altiplano, is the administrative capital of Bolivia, with a population of over a million people; the much smaller colonial city of Sucre is the capital for the national courts. Other major cities include the lowland city of Santa Cruz with over a million people, Cochabamba located in the high valleys with 600,000 people and the city of El Alto which is home to close to a million people, and is perched on the edge of the basin above La Paz.
History
Evidence of human society in Bolivia dates from about 21,000 BCE on the altiplano. By 2500 BCE these societies had developed into settled agricultural villages, and by 1800 BCE were forming into states. Even at this time, Bolivia was a metallurgical center, producing gold, silver and refined alloys.
The first culture to dominate the region was the Tiahuanaco, centered close to Lake Titicaca. Its influence spread after 600 CE and lasted until about 1200 CE when it collapsed due to prolonged drought. Aymara culture, centered south of the lake, then grew in importance until it included seven major nations. The Aymaras were conquered in the 15th century during the expansion of the Inka Empire southward from its center in highland Peru. They resisted Inka domination and to this day retain their own language even though surrounded by speakers of Quechua (the language of the Inkas).
When the Spaniards arrived in America in the 1530’s, the Inkas were in the midst of an internal power struggle which hastened their demise. The conquerors were most interested in the huge amounts of silver and gold they were able to send back to Spain. These minerals created enormous wealth which played a significant role in financing Europe’s industrial revolution.
[pic]
photo by Olmo Calvo Rodríguez
Bolivian miner
The vast silver deposits in the Bolivian altiplano city of Potosí led to the creation of the mita, which required indigenous communities to provide labor for the mines. Millions of Indians died due to the harsh conditions and the diseases the Spaniards brought with them and which they had no immunities to. Just as in Colombia, the Spaniards also established a hacienda system using indigenous labor as few African slaves were brought to Bolivia. The feudal agricultural system created by the haciendas remained largely unchanged until 1953.
By the late-18th century, criollos (people of European ancestry born in the colony) began to demand more control over the region’s wealth. Under the leadership of Simon Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre, they won independence from Spain in 1825. Although many indigenous peoples also joined the struggle, independence from Spain did not significantly change their conditions. There was no longer the mita and the miners were paid, but mining conditions were poor and accidents common. Conditions on the haciendas were similar to those during the colonial period.
During the nineteenth century, Bolivia’s political history was characterized by coup d’etats, rewritten constitutions and military governments. Bolivia’s independent history is marked by more coups than any other country in the world. In 1879, in a struggle over access to rich coastal fertilizer deposits, the War of the Pacific saw Chile defeating both Bolivia and Peru, which led to Bolivia losing its access to the Pacific. Bolivia continued to lose territory to its neighbors, notably Paraguay and Brazil, and today is less than half as large as it was at the time of independence from Spain.
Since colonial times, Bolivia’s export economy has been based on the export of a single primary material, despite the variety of resources the country possesses. The first product was silver, later tin. At the turn of the century, when the world price of silver dropped, the “tin barons” became the most powerful sector in the country. This shift brought a significant change in the country’s social structure, creating a mining working class who organized the first miners’ union in 1923.
When oil was discovered in the 1920’s in both Paraguay and Bolivia, Standard Oil (from the US) and Royal Dutch Shell (from the Netherlands) began negotiations for access. The border between the two countries had never been well defined, and conflict grew until 1932 when the Chaco War broke out. By 1936, Bolivia had lost considerable territory to Paraguay.
The Chaco War had a profound effect on Bolivian society. Popular sentiment against the country’s ruling elite grew because of poor management of the war. For the first time, a pro-nationalist President came to power and nationalized the oil reserves in 1937. He was deposed by the tin barons but his replacement continued his policies by taxing tin exports and legislating the eight hour day.
During World War II, the demand for tin skyrocketed and Bolivia was pressured by the Allies to sell at low prices. In 1943, yet another pro-nationalist coup led to the first congress of indigenous peoples and pongueaje (indentured labor) was abolished.
In 1952 a middle class movement (MNR) advocating greater social equality led a revolution after the tin barons prevented them from taking power after they won the 1951 elections. The MNR government nationalized the mines belonging to the tin barons and extended the vote to women and the indigenous majority (known as campesinos). When the campesinos spontaneously began taking over haciendas (large estates) in 1953, the Agrarian Reform was proclaimed and much of the land in the altiplano and high valleys divided into individual plots. With MNR support, the miners established the Central Obrera Boliviana (the Bolivian Workers Central – the COB) which grew to represent the majority of Bolivian workers. The army was disbanded and replaced by popular militias.
In response to these changes, the private sector began to move their investments out of the country which had a serious negative impact on the economy. Agricultural production decreased because the new government lacked the means to provide campesinos with technical or economic assistance. By 1956, the MNR was forced to borrow heavily from the US, and accepted loan conditions which included a brake on nationalization, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization plan which slashed social programs, disarmed the militias and re-established the Bolivian military with closer ties to the US army.
The MNR lost considerable support through these moves, and although they were re-elected in 1964, General Barrientos successfully led a military coup aimed at redirecting resources to exporters of primary materials, large scale agriculture in the eastern lowlands of Santa Cruz and foreign-owned oil companies. Barrientos’ accidental death in 1969 led to another coup by General Ovando who within a few months had nationalized the US Gulf Oil company. The US responded with a blockade forcing Ovando to leave office. Then General Torres, put into office by a coup supported by the COB, nationalized a large zinc mine and increased workers’ salaries. However he eventually lost the support of both the COB and the military.
In 1971, another military coup led by General Hugo Banzer took power promising to fight communism. During the 1970’s, world prices from primary materials increased, permitting Banzer to finance a boom in Santa Cruz agribusiness, the export sector of the mining industry and to pay higher salaries to government workers. This era also marks the beginnings of Bolivia’s involvement in both the cocaine and the contraband industries. Banzer’s regime was marked by repression of union and political activities. Popular opposition combined with US President Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy forced Banzer to call elections in 1978.
A coalition of opposition parties called the UDP won the election but Banzer’s chosen candidate seized power. He was subsequently deposed by General Padilla who called new elections. Again the UDP won, but lacked an absolute majority. Political instability followed with one and then another military dictator taking over. Of these, General Garcia Meza, was the most repressive in Bolivian history, and during his regime the military became active in profiting from the cocaine trade. Finally internal squabbling within the military itself paved the way for the UDP to come to power.
The UDP coalition inherited an economic crisis which was compounded by natural disasters as both droughts and floods affected different parts of the country. The coalition was internally divided and unable to manage the economy. Within two years, Bolivia was experiencing some of the worst inflation the world has ever seen, and the UDP was forced to call an election. The new government, led once again by the MNR, reversed its earlier policies and instituted major economic changes: it closed most of the state-owned mines firing 23,000 miners and destroying the influence of the COB in the process and began to slash government services and privatize state owned enterprises. Since then, Bolivia has had three democratic changes of government, but the standards of living for the country’s poor majority have not improved, despite the continuance of a formal democracy.
This has led to a resurgence of popular resistance, increasingly organized around indigenous rather than class identity. Bolivia entered another economic crisis at the end of the 1990s and groups of indigenous peasants, urban dwellers and unions came together to force the canceling of privatization of water supplies in Cochabamba in 2000. This proved a psychological turning point for popular groups, and since then, they have forced two presidents from office, in large part because they have been reluctant to re-nationalize oil and gas, an issue which has become particularly important as Bolivia has the fifth largest natural gas reserves in the world. In December 2005, an indigenous political party elected Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales.
(Source: Bolivia Bulletin, Centro de Documentación e Información, La Paz, Bolivia)
[pic]
[from ]
Social Structure
Bolivia is economically one of the poorest countries in Latin America while culturally one of the richest. In general 30% of the people are from the indigenous groups conquered by the Inkas who now speak Quechua, 25% are Aymara, 30% are mestizos and 12% are white. Eighty-seven per cent of the population speak Spanish, but 37% speak Quechua and 24% speak Aymara, either in addition to Spanish or as mono-lingual speakers.
[pic]
Dancer at a festival photo by Eduardo Valdivia
In the 2000 census, Bolivia’s population stood at 8.33 million people (current estimates are about 9 million); 62% of these lived in cities or towns, in marked contrast to 20 years earlier when only 46% of the total population lived in urban areas. Like many other low income countries, almost half of Bolivia’s population is under the age of 18.
The United Nations Development Index in 2004 places Bolivia as 114th in terms of average quality of life out of 177 countries. (In contrast Colombia stands at 73rd and the US at 8th) Life expectancy is 63 years (U.S. is 77); of every 1000 children born, 56 die before they are five (the region’s highest). Every woman has an average of 3.8 children (US: 2.01).
Public education is free and compulsory between the ages of 7 and 14, but the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that 700,000 children don’t attend school. On average, urban adults have received 9.8 years of education, while rural adults had only received an average of 3.5 years. Girls generally receive less education than boys and as a consequence, more girls and women are illiterate than boys.
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency – World Factbook 2005; United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index 2004
Economy
With a largely impoverished population of nine million, the Bolivian economy is small and its foreign earnings are primarily dependent on the export of raw materials produced by a small percentage of the workforce. Nearly half the population is employed in agriculture. These campesinos mostly engage in a mixture of subsistence and market-oriented agriculture in the altiplano and high valleys. This agriculture is rarely mechanized and is very labor intensive. Many varieties of potato, plus the traditional Andean grains, quinua and cañava are grown in the highlands, corn and potatoes in the high valleys, and in the lowland regions, cacao, coca, coffee, sugar and tropical fruits. In the past thirty years, the steady increase in world demand for cocaine has led to an increase in small scale coca production by campesinos, especially in the region east of Cochabamba called the Chapare.
The economy struggled through the beginning of the 1980s with some of the worst hyperinflation the world has ever seen and a crippling debt crisis. Average annual growth between 1980 and 1993 was only 1.3 per cent (UNDP, 1996: 186). Between 1989 and 1996 average annual growth in the formal economy slightly exceeded four per cent, but fell to two per cent on the heels of the economic crisis that began with the Asian downturn in 1997.
The World Bank Development Report lists Bolivia as a ‘lower middle income’ country. But these averaging macroeconomic figures mask the degree to which a minority of the population controls the majority of the nation’s income. On many social development criteria, Bolivia suffers the worst living standards of any South American country.
Two thirds of workers are employed in firms with less than four workers, many of them family enterprises. The majority of the country’s manufactured goods, with the most important being jewelry, wooden furniture and textiles, are labor-intensive and require low investment.
Like other low income economies, Bolivia primarily exports raw materials and partially processed goods and imports manufactured products. Oil and gas along with minerals still account for the majority of all legal exports. Mining, Bolivia’s principal export sector for nearly 500 years, did not fare well in the 1990s, despite considerable mineral reserves. As mineral prices have risen, so has international interest, but to date, few impacts of this are seen in the national economy as extractive export industries have limited local impact.
The agricultural sector in the lowlands close to Santa Cruz is the fastest growing export sector with soybeans and vegetable oils increasing by over 300 per cent. At the present time, income from soy and sunflower oil exceeds that of natural gas.
Analysis of the formal sector tells only half the story. The informal economy -- including coca-cocaine, contraband, and remittances -- accounts for as much as half of all economic activity in the country and employs as many as two-thirds of all Bolivians. Until forced eradication of most export coca destined for export in 1999-2000, coca leaf production exceeded all other agricultural products both in value as well as in provision of agricultural jobs. Contraband, a long standing problem, is widely believed to equal legal imports, and remittances from the 1.5 million Bolivians in Argentina -- at some points as high as about one in six -- provide the primary source of cash in some areas.
Source: Kohl, Ben and Linda Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal hegemony and Social Resistance, London: Zed Books, 2006
[pic]
Market seller in La Paz photo by Shir Goldberg
Day Two: Background Reading
[pic]
Coca/Cocaine
For at least four thousand years, coca has been part of daily life in the Andes and filled religious as well as medicinal roles in indigenous cultures. In Bolivia and Peru, offerings of coca are made today during all ritual and ceremonial events from the sowing of crops to the beginning of a house as well as all of life’s passages. In the mines of Bolivia, coca leaves are still offered to the Tío (uncle in Spanish) - the God of the underworld who is believed to protect the miners while they are underground. In contrast, in modern Colombia, which only has a very small indigenous population, coca leaf is virtually no longer in use.
Coca leaves stimulate the human body producing an effect somewhat similar to caffeine, increasing energy levels and decreasing hunger. The leaves can be chewed, used to make tea, or made into medicines. Under the forced labor in the mines imposed by the Spanish colonizers, indigenous people found relief by chewing coca leaves. Many subsistence farmers today in Bolivia and Peru take short breaks to chew coca leaves and revive themselves during their strenuous daily work.
[pic]
Coca leaves for sale in an Andean market
Coca in tea is an everyday remedy for altitude sickness, stomachaches, headaches, and other common ailments. Coca is made into various medicines and in recent years has become an ingredient in herbal products such as shampoos, toothpastes, and soaps. Studies of the leaf have found that coca is not addictive and is especially rich in many nutrients such as calcium, iron, phosphorus, vitamin A, and riboflavin.
Despite these benefits, Peru and Bolivia are the only countries where the leaf is legal. Even though only 0.5% of cocaine is actually derived from the leaf, outside of these two countries, coca is most frequently associated with the drug cocaine. In 1961 the United Nations placed both cocaine and coca on its list of most dangerous and restricted substances. As a consequence, even herbal products made from coca cannot be traded on the international market. The only global market today based on coca production is an illegal one, the drug trafficking market.
The discovery of how to derive cocaine from coca came in Europe in 1859 and coca became popular very quickly as an invigorating tonic, as well as an anesthetic for medical procedures. In 1886, the drink of Coca Cola was introduced based a combination of the Andean coca plant and West African cola nut and it contained both caffeine and cocaine. By the 1890’s, cocaine’s addictive properties were more apparent, and by 1901 Coca Cola removed it from its product. Addiction increased as a serious problem and in 1910, 5000 deaths associated with cocaine were reported in the U.S. In 1912, the United States made cocaine illegal.[pic]
A turn of the 20th century advertisement
During much of the twentieth century, traditional consumption of coca in Bolivia and Peru continued with highly controlled production of cocaine in Europe and the US for medical use. Non-medical use of cocaine was limited until the end of the 1970’s when the drug suddenly became popular and fashionable in the US. This change in consumer demands coincided with a disastrous economic situation at the beginning of the 1980’s for both Bolivia and Peru. As a consequence, increasing numbers of impoverished peasants and unemployed miners responded to rising prices by moving to semi-tropical regions to grow and transport coca.
Over the past twenty years coca has become an important crop in and its reliability. Unlike most crops, coca requires little tending and can be harvested four times a year. It is not fragile like fruits, which makes it easy to store for prolonged periods and to transport on a bicycle or someone’s back. This is an important consideration in an area where infrastructure such as roads and bridges is generally lacking. The other crops coca farmers grow, such as oranges, bananas and yucca, are generally used to feed their families or to sell locally.
[pic]
Peasant farmer tending coca
During the 1980’s, coca production in Bolivia and Peru was transformed into a paste and shipped to Colombia where the cocaine laboratories were located, and where drug cartels, dominated by the Medellin group, had begun smuggling refined cocaine into the United States, and to a lesser extent, Europe. In the 1990’s, as more coca was eradicated in Bolivia and Peru, small farmers to southern Colombia began to grow coca in response to the good prices it fetched and the increase in demand.
Few of the vast profits generated by the cocaine industry have trickled down to the poor indigenous peasants who grow the crop. Most coca growing communities lack electricity or running water and only the larger towns have schools and hospitals. Although they are often better off than many of their peasant counterparts in other parts of the Andes who often barely have enough to eat on their highly eroded land, coca farmers have never grown rich on the crop they grow for export.
Coca growers in all three Andean producer countries resent policies promoted by the United States which they feel unfairly target them in drug control efforts, and they have organized themselves into federations representing their interests. They have openly clashed with security forces in efforts to pressure governments, which have historically done very little for poor peasants, to provide them viable alternatives and to end the human rights abuses they suffer at the hands of anti-drug police and military forces.
United States Drug Policy in the Andes
Over the past fifteen years, the U.S. has spent more than $25 billion on eradication and interdiction in countries around the world are the source of drugs consumed in the US. However, despite this huge sum, there have been no significant or sustained reductions in overall drug production. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 82% of heroin in the U.S. comes from Latin America and Colombia alone produces three-quarters of the world's cocaine supply.
Those who support the US current emphasis on repression argue that drug production constitutes a threat to U.S. national security and the well-being of US citizens. Without effective supply reduction programs, it is argued that cheap and easily-obtainable drugs can undercut the effectiveness of demand reduction programs and increase the drug threat to our communities.
Supporters believe that eliminating the cultivation of illicit drugs is an effective approach to combating availability in the United States. Where crops are destroyed or left un-harvested, no drugs can enter the system. Interdiction disrupts drug flow, increases risks to traffickers, drives them to less efficient routes and methods, and prevents significant amounts of drugs from getting to the United States.
The US policy to reduce the supply of drugs to the US is carried out through destroying coca production (called eradication) and intercepting its transport (called interdiction). Both of these goals are extremely difficult to achieve, and as drug enforcement has become more sophisticated, so has drug trafficking.
[pic]
photo by Ricardo Mazalan/AP
Transporting coca to market in southern Colombia
As most coca is grown by small peasant farmers, eradication has focused on them, in many cases treating them as drug traffickers rather than impoverished farmers trying to make a more decent living from the one crop that pays well. Alternative development programs have in general been a failure, and eradication programs have led to impoverishment and to many farmers replanting coca in more remote areas. Forced manual eradication in Bolivia has led to violent clashes and human rights abuses, and forced eradication by fumigation in Colombia to environmental destruction and hunger as staple crops are also destroyed.
Much of interdiction efforts in Colombia and Bolivia has focused on the small ‘mules’ who transport coca, coca paste or cocaine, and prisons in both countries are filled with this type of trafficker. The ‘big fish’ are often able to bribe their way out of prison or hire expensive lawyers to get them off. Interdicting the transport of cocaine across borders and into the US is extremely difficult. The Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Customs, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Army, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service are faced with patrolling 12,000 miles of shoreline, 300 ports of entry and more than 7,500 miles of border with Mexico and Canada. It is estimated that interdiction efforts only seize 10-15% of the heroin and 30% of the cocaine coming into the U.S.
As the most powerful country in the world, and one which has a particularly strong influence in Latin America, the United States has brought enormous pressure on the governments of Andean countries to comply with its Drug War agenda. This can most clearly seen in Bolivia which is a poor and dependent country with little ability to resist US demands, even if officials feel the policies the US promotes will not solve the problem and are a threat to their country’s sovereignty.
To complicate the matter even further, the enormous economic power of the cocaine industry has extended deep into the governments of both countries, and widespread corruption is commonplace. Bolivia has had the dubious distinction of being declared the second most corrupt country in the world (after Nigeria) and a recent Colombian President has been accused of taking campaign contributions from drug traffickers. As a result, in some cases, it is difficult to know whether resistance to US plans which have caused considerable social upheaval in both countries stem from a genuine desire to protect their country’s citizens or from a desire to protect the traffickers themselves.
The ‘certification’ process is the clearest example of the enormous pressure that the US has brought on countries implicated in drug trafficking. For fifteen years up until 2002, the US Administration conducted a yearly assessment of each country’s efforts to stop the flow of narcotics and if a country was not considered to have measured up to Washington’s criteria, it faced cuts in aid funding. Under pressure from Latin American governments who considered the process humiliating, certification has been changed to apply only to countries the US deems to have the worst records on drug control.
Sources: The Lindesmith Center Online library; US Dept of State 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Colombia and the Drug War
Colombia’s role in the international drug industry had its beginnings in the 1970s, when a boom in marijuana cultivation for the US market created a group of newly rich traffickers. By the late 1970s, these traffickers formed into cartels, first in the city of Medellin and then later in the city of Cali, and expanded from marijuana to cocaine. During the 1980’s, as the demand for cocaine soared in the United States, these family-based empires grew to control a billion-dollar cocaine export industry that processed coca grown primarily in Bolivia and Peru.
The power and violence of the cocaine industry has come to affect all aspects of Colombian society and drug lords achieved unprecedented political influence through threats, bribery, and political contributions. The Medellin Cartel waged war on the Colombian government, killing judges, police investigators, journalists, and public figures.
In the 1980’s rural landowners and drug traffickers formed paramilitary organizations in rural Colombia to fight guerrillas and alleged guerrilla sympathizers, and to protect land, cattle, and cocaine laboratories and strategic shipping routes. These paramilitaries have proven links to the Colombian Armed Forces. The U.S. State Department estimates that paramilitary forces are currently responsible for over 70% of Colombia’s human rights abuses. During the 1990s, much of the para-militaries income has come from cocaine, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has called paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño a “major drug trafficker.”
Beginning in 1989 with George Herbert Bush’s “Andean Strategy,” U.S. funds, equipment, logistical support, and personnel from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), along other agencies have played a leading role in anti-drug operations in Colombia. However U.S. assistance in the breakup of the two largest cartels during the 1990’s did not cripple drug trafficking. Instead smaller, more nimble trafficking organizations emerged which are much more difficult to control. These traffickers employ constantly changing shipping routes through Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean for moving cocaine and, increasingly, heroin.
During the 1990’s, successful eradication in Bolivia and Peru financed by the U.S. led to a huge expansion of coca leaf production in Colombia. Opium poppy cultivation (used to make heroin) has also grown enormously. The shifts in the location of coca cultivation have meant that the overall production in the Andean region has remained fairly constant since the beginning of the 1990’s.
At the same time, guerrilla groups active in coca growing areas, primarily the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), began financing their activities by taxing coca crops and by protecting drug processing labs. This led to a rapid growth in the FARC during the 1990’s and the Colombian military estimates that about half the guerilla group’s income comes from the drug trade.
Over the last decade, U.S. policy has increased counternarcotics operations in Colombia with a continued emphasis on military and police assistance in combating the drug trade. Colombia is the third-largest recipient of U.S. military and police assistance in the world. In April 2001, President George W. Bush announced a new “Andean Counterdrug Initiative,” which increases the involvement of the US Defense Department in Colombia. While over half the aid still goes to Colombia, the Bush package includes an enormous increase for military and police assistance to other countries in the region, including a 20% increase for Bolivia. The plan also increased alternative development assistance.
U.S. programs in Colombia have been two-pronged: eradication through extensive herbicide spraying, primarily of coca fields in southern Colombia, and interdiction through hundreds of millions of dollars in military hardware and training for Colombian security forces. Fumigation, which destroys legitimate crops and the environment along with coca, has met a lot of resistance by local state governments and residents in the areas affected. It has created considerable social discontent which has helped swell the ranks of FARC, who are cast as the defenders of small peasant farmers.
The second major thrust of U.S. counter-narcotics policy—bolstering Colombia’s security forces—has meant increased support for army and police counterinsurgency campaigns. Since 1989, the Colombian National Police (CNP) received the vast majority of U.S. assistance but Plan Colombia has shifted the bulk of US assistance to the Colombian Army. Colombian security forces have repeatedly been linked to human rights violations and to the paramilitary forces.
Although only a small fraction of US aid to Colombia, the development program to encourage farmers to switch from coca to other crops has not had much success to date. Recently released figures compiled by the CIA showed that coca cultivation actually jumped 25 percent in 2001. Security concerns, unfavorable economics and a history of mistrust between the Colombian government and coca farmers have led U.S. officials to shift the program to creating public-works jobs in coca-growing regions and to new development efforts in other parts of the country.
The European Parliament is highly critical of U.S. strategy, noting that “stepping up military involvement in the fight against drugs involves the risk of sparking off an escalation of the conflict in the region, and that military solutions cannot bring about lasting peace.”
Sources: Foreign Policy in Focus, June 2001, Washington Post April 7, 2002; US Dept of State 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Bolivia and the Drug War
The approximately $400 million that the United States has spent on the drug war in Bolivia since 1993 has largely been directed at military and police action. A far poorer country than Colombia, and one with a less developed export economy, Bolivia has always been far more dependent on the income generated by coca/cocaine than Colombia.
In the 1970s, coca production in Bolivia began expanding from the Yungas, the region northeast of La Paz where the leaf has been grown for thousands of years, to the Chapare region east of Cochabamba. The military dictatorship in power 1980-81 was deeply involved in drug trafficking, which consolidated Bolivia’s participation in the trade.
Production in the Chapare mushroomed during the 1980’s in response to increasing northern demand for cocaine, mostly from the United States, combined with a profound economic crisis in Bolivia. At its peak in the early 1990’s, coca was grown on an estimated 100,000 acres, with approximately 90% of this dedicated to the cocaine market. Coca growers were organized into federations affiliated with the national union confederation and demanded fair treatment and compensation for eradicating their coca. But alternative development schemes generally failed to provide alternatives for farmers, partly because it is difficult for any crop to compete with coca, but also because implementation has been poor and often ill-conceived.
When Hugo Banzer became Bolivia’s President in 1997, he responded to US pressure by committing to eradicate “excess” coca production by any means, and vowed that by 2002, his government would destroy all coca beyond the 30,000 acres grown in the Yungas for traditional Andean daily ritual and medicinal use.
Using United States financing of a combined military-police force, the Joint Task Force (FTC), the “Dignity Plan” destroyed about 70,000 acres of coca in the Chapare. By 2001, Bolivia was dropped from the list of major drug-producing countries for the first time in nearly half a century. The country was hailed by U.S. officials as the only South American country that has successfully eradicated coca production. But for one of the poorest countries in Latin America, the cost has been very high. Coca eradication cost the Bolivian economy an estimated $500 million a year and virtually destroyed the regional economy of Cochabamba.
The Banzer government announced in early 2001 that it would begin coca eradication in the Yungas, where the government, based on a U.S. funded study decided that 4,200 acres of coca cultivation was “excess.” or above the legal limit) The six organizations of coca producers in the Yungas have emphatically sworn that they will never allow their coca plants to be destroyed.
Source: North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA); Volume 38, Issue 3, November/December 2004
Human Rights
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law...
These are the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948 without a dissenting vote. It is the first multinational declaration mentioning human rights by name, and the human rights movement has largely adopted it as a charter.
In 1961 a group of lawyers, journalists, writers, and others in London, England launched an Appeal for Amnesty for six "prisoners of conscience" from different countries and of different political and religious backgrounds, all jailed for peacefully expressing their political or religious beliefs, and called on governments everywhere to free such prisoners. It set forth a simple plan of action, calling for strictly impartial, non-partisan appeals to be made on behalf of these prisoners and any who, like them, had been imprisoned for peacefully expressed beliefs. The response to this appeal was larger than anyone had expected. The one-year appeal grew, was extended beyond the year, and Amnesty International and the modern human rights movement were both born.
The modern human rights movement didn't invent any new principles. It was different from what preceded it primarily in its explicit rejection of political ideology and partisanship, and its demand that governments everywhere, regardless of ideology, adhere to certain basic principles of human rights in their treatment of their citizens.
Some people decided to adopt different strategies than Amnesty International. Over the years combinations of these concerns and others led to formation of other human rights groups, among them Human Rights Watch. Recognition for the human rights movement, and Amnesty International in particular, grew during the 1970s. Amnesty gained permanent observer status as an NGO at the United Nations. Its reports became mandatory reading in legislatures, state departments and foreign ministries around the world. Its press releases received respectful attention, even when its recommendations were ignored by the governments involved. In 1977 it was awarded the Nobel Peace prize for its work.
In the early 1990’s, reports of human rights abuses resulting from in the drug war in Latin America, began to gain the attention of both local and international human rights organizations. They reported that repressive policies used as a tool for drug control in the “War on Drugs” were not only unsuccessful in decreasing the worldwide demand for drugs but policies, formulated and paid for by the United States government, were violating basic human rights.
Colombia is one of the deadliest countries in the world for civilians. The number of civilians killed was estimated 5,400 in 2001. For every soldier killed in combat, six civilians die, either from crossfire, assassinations or massacres carried out primarily by right-wing paramilitary groups and to a lesser extent by leftist guerrillas and the military. In southern Colombia, civilians often become targets as armed groups try to exert control over rural areas where coca is grown.
The Colombian government has been completely unable to end the conflict and protect its citizens. Hundreds of towns and hamlets are without police or soldiers because of lack of money or fears for the officers' safety, leaving citizens vulnerable to local guerilla or paramilitary commanders. The paramilitary groups have proven links to the Colombian military and are widely accused of carrying out killings for them. Colombia is also an extremely dangerous place for human rights defenders as well as for government investigators handling human rights investigations. In the first ten months of 2001, thirteen human rights workers were killed.
In Bolivia, the human rights situation is far less extreme than Colombia, but there have been reports of torture and ill-treatment related to Drug War in the Chapare coca-growing region. Members of the anti-drug forces have been repeatedly accused of unnecessarily raiding homes and confiscating property, as well as beating and shooting people taking part in demonstrations. Since 1998 a total of 33 coca growers have been killed during confrontations with the anti-drug forces with the numbers increasing every year until 2005. There have been no legal consequences for the people who committed these human rights violations. Some security officers also died during conflict.
At the end of 2004 an agreement with the Bolivian government allowed farmers in the Chapare to grow a small amount of coca for legal uses. Able to feed their families with income from this production, conflict between coca farmers and security forces diminished greatly. In 2006 a new government headed by the indigenous leader of the coca growers announced a plan to legalize small amounts of coca production and focus on interdiction (capturing drug shipments and production sites and breaking up trafficking rings) instead of eradication of the coca leaf. Many Bolivians supported this proposal, although the United States government expressed concern at the policy change.
Sources: Los Angeles Times, March 3, 2002, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Human Rights Web
Drug Treatment and Prevention
The economic cost to society from alcohol and drug abuse was an estimated $246 billion in 1992. Alcohol abuse and alcoholism make up an estimated $148 billion of this, while drug abuse and dependence cost the remaining $98 billion.
By White House estimates, as many as 57 percent of all people who need drug treatment do not receive it. Former Office of National Drug Control Policy Director Barry McCaffrey has stated, “(A)pproximately five million drug users needed immediate treatment in 1998 while only 2.1 million received it. Limited funding is a major factor in the availability of treatment.” However of course, treatment availability does not mean that addicts will seek treatment – many are so addicted that they put it off “just one more week” or insist “it doesn’t work anyway” or a myriad of other excuses to avoid dealing with their problem.
But when you can get addicts to treatment, the results are dramatic. The National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study (NTIES) found that with treatment, among addicts, drug selling decreased by 78%, shoplifting declined by almost 82%, and assaults declined by 78%. Furthermore, there was a 64% decrease in arrests for any crime, and the percentage of people who largely supported themselves through illegal activity dropped by nearly half.
A study by the RAND Corporation found that every additional dollar invested in substance abuse treatment saves taxpayers $7.46 in societal costs (crime, violence, loss of productivity, etc.) The study also found that additional domestic law enforcement efforts cost 15 times as much as treatment to achieve the same reduction in societal costs.
As a result of these figures, many people working in treatment, prevention and law enforcement believe that more funds should go into treatment and prevention and less to police repression of the drug trade. Others believe that drugs are a crime and that the only way to stop criminals is to punish their crimes, and this has tended to be the view that has shaped US drug policy at a national level, even if there has been a different approach at a local one.
The current US emphasis on a law enforcement approach has led to the U.S. having one of the highest rates of incarceration in the world. In New York state alone, the prison population grew from 12,500 in 1973 to 71,476 in 2004, with a corresponding increase in the number of prisons from 20 to 70. Most of the increase in prison population is due to mandatory sentencing associated with stringent drug laws. An estimated 70% of the people in US prisons or jails are addicted to illegal drugs or alcohol.
Drug treatment in the US is usually based on one of four different models: outpatient methadone, outpatient drug-free, long-term residential, and short-term inpatient. Outpatient methadone programs administer the medication methadone to reduce cravings for heroin and block its effects. Counseling, vocational skills development, and case management to help patient’s access support services are used to gradually stabilize the patient’s functioning. Some patients stay on methadone for long periods, while others are able to move from methadone to abstinence.
Long-term residential programs offer around-the-clock, drug-free treatment in a residential community of counselors and fellow recovering addicts. Patients generally stay in these programs several months or up to a year or more. Some of these programs are referred to as therapeutic communities.
Outpatient drug-free programs use a wide range of approaches including problem-solving groups and specialized therapies. As with long-term residential treatment programs, patients may stay in these programs for months or longer. Short-term inpatient programs keep patients up to 30 days. Most of these programs focus on medical stabilization, abstinence, and lifestyle changes. Staff members are primarily medical professionals and trained counselors.
All of these forms of drug abuse treatment have been found to be effective in reducing drug use, according to a National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) sponsored study. The study tracked 10,010 drug abusers in nearly 100 treatment programs in 11 cities who entered treatment between 1991 and 1993. The study found that success in drug treatment programs hinged on high motivation of the user, legal pressure to stay in treatment, no prior trouble with the law, getting psychological counseling while in treatment, and lack of other psychological problems, especially antisocial personality disorder. The investigators found that programs with low retention rates tended to have patients with the most problems, particularly antisocial personality disorder, cocaine addiction, or alcohol dependence.
However despite the increasing success and sophistication of treatment models, demand for drug treatment in the United States outstrips supply. Drug treatment is not available at all in some states, and there are no methadone maintenance treatment programs in nearly one-fifth of all states.
The United States government spends roughly $2.5 billion on substance abuse prevention (this includes alcohol, tobacco and drugs). For every dollar spent on drug use prevention, communities can save up to $4-5 in costs for drug abuse treatment and counseling. Prevention programs have been shown to be effective in reducing substance use among youth. A Cornell University study of students in grades 7-9 in NY State reveal that school-based substance abuse prevention programs reduced the likelihood of students drinking, smoking and using marijuana by 40%.
According to recommendations made by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, effective prevention programs should be targeted to more than one group (e.g., focused on the family, school and community simultaneously), tailored to the needs of each at-risk target group and designed with input from that group, and occur over an extended period of time.
Many organizations and coalitions of organizations worldwide consider that drug abuse should be primarily treated as a public health concern rather than a law enforcement problem, which is the way it is largely approached in the United States. Those who believe in Harm Reduction accept that, for better and for worse, licit and illicit drug use is not likely to disappear and choose to work to minimize the harmful effects of drug use on individuals and communities.
Sources: Drug and Alcohol Treatment and Prevention Global Network, Harm Reduction Coalition, New Mexico Governor’s Office Fact Sheet on Treatment vs. Incarceration, Office of National Drug Control Policy – Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse Factsheet, March 2003
Day Three: Preparing for a Debate
(from English online, New Zealand Ministry of Education)
Debating is not the same as giving a speech. When debating you will need public speaking skills, but you must also take account of these differences:
• You have opponents who will argue against what you are saying.
• Anticipate (= think of in advance) what their arguments will be, and be prepared to rebut them.
• Make sure you own arguments are well-supported, consistent and logical.
• You must be flexible.
• A speech may be fully prepared, but in debating you must be ready to alter your planned statements to rebut your opponents or steer the debate in a ways which suits your team.
• You have to think on your feet. Some rules of debating allow your opponents to make 'points of information' in which they may ask a brief question or make a comment. You must be prepared to deal with these without getting flustered.
• You must work as a team.
• The leader must divide up the roles. For example: I will show how many areas of society have been damaged by new technology; my second speaker will demonstrate the health risks of computers and cell phones; and our third speaker will show how much better off we would be without these so-called advances.
• As well as researching and arguing their own case, each speaker should support the others and reinforce their arguments. For example, “As my colleague has explained, cellphones have enabled criminals to be caught more easily. The Negative point out that criminals use cellphones too. This is true. But, in the end, criminals need secrecy, while law enforcement is enhanced by better communication. On balance, cellphones have benefited law and order”.
• You should practice appearing confident.
• Public speaking needs confidence, but debating needs more, because you must relate to both your audience and the opposition - and you may have to think up replies on the spur of the moment.
• A lot of confidence is self-created. Many confident people started out feeling terrified, but if you appear confident then other people treat you as a confident person - which gives you confidence. It works!
• These things make you look unconfident:
• Stuttering
• Hiding your face by lowering your head or covering it with your hand
• Giggling nervously
• Awkward gestures such a biting your lip or rubbing your hands together
• This is how to make yourself look more confident:
• Even if you feel 'caught out', embarrassed, or your mind is a blank, make no reaction.
• Fill in time while you think using 'fillers' such as 'Thank you, I was just coming to that.' or 'Yes, a lot of people seem to agree with that. But we don't accept it because...'
• If you can think quickly and rebut your opponent's comment with a witty remark do so - but respond to the argument. Don't insult the speaker. Comments like 'Well, what would you know!' or 'That's the dumbest thing I've ever heard' are childish and lose you points on your grade.
Vocabulary
alloy: A homogeneous mixture or solid solution of two or more metals, the atoms of one replacing or occupying interstitial positions between the atoms of the other: for example, Brass is an alloy of zinc and copper.
altiplano: the high plateau found in the Andean regions of Bolivia and Peru.
Campesino: A peasant farmer; in the Bolivian context, after the 1952 revolution, refers to an indigenous peasant farmer.
contraband: Smuggled goods.
coup d’etat: originally French, but now used in English, meaning takeover of the state.
encomienda: A landgrant provided by the Spanish crown to Spanish colonists in the New World.
extradition: Legal surrender of a fugitive to the jurisdiction of another state, country, or government for trial.
federalism: A system of government in which power is divided between a central authority and constituent political units.
hacienda: A large estate or plantation in Spanish-speaking countries, very often based on a former encomienda.
isthmus: A narrow strip of land connecting two larger masses of land.
llanos: A large, grassy, almost treeless plain, especially one in Latin America.
mandatory minimums: required minimum penalties for certain offenses.
methadone: A potent synthetic narcotic drug, C21H27NO, that is less addictive than morphine or heroin and is used as a substitute for these drugs in addiction treatment programs.
mestizo: A person of mixed racial ancestry, especially of mixed European and Native American ancestry.
mita: A system set up by the Spanish to require each indigenous community to send a certain amount of labor to work in mines.
pongueaje: indentured servitude.
privatization: the turning over of services run by the government to the private business sector.
remittances : Money sent to someone at a distance. It often refers to amounts of money sent home by those working in other countries.
subsistence agriculture: agricultural production for family consumption.
suffrage: The right or privilege of voting; franchise.
US Drug War Timeline
(adapted from PBSonline: Frontline 2000; .)
Late 1960’s: Recreational drug use rises in U.S.
Recreational drug use, particularly of marijuana and psychedelics, becomes popular among young, white, middle class Americans. Drug use becomes representative of protest and social rebellion.
1969: Study links crime and heroin addiction.
Psychiatrist Dr. Robert DuPont finds that 44% of those entering the D.C. jail system test positive for heroin. DuPont convinces the city to allow him to provide methadone to heroin addicts.
1969: Operation Intercept essentially closes the Mexican border.
In an attempt to reduce marijuana smuggling, the US Customs Dept. inspects every vehicle crossing the Mexican border for three-minutes. The two week operation wreaks economic havoc on both sides of the border, but doesn’t seriously impact the flow of marijuana into U.S.
1970: NORML is founded.
The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) is founded by Keith Stroup. The group lobbies for decriminalization of marijuana.
1970: Narcotics Treatment Administration is founded.
The Nixon administration provides funds to Dr. DuPont to expand his methadone program in Washington D.C. The program is controversial because some believe methadone to be nothing more than a substitute for heroin, and others feel there are racial undertones behind the effort. However, one year after the program begins, burglaries in D.C. decrease by 41%.
1970: Congress passes the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
The law reduces penalties for marijuana possession and allows police to conduct "no-knock" searches.
1971: Soldiers in Vietnam develop heroin addiction.
An explosive Congressional report reveals the growing heroin epidemic among U.S. servicemen in Vietnam.
1971: Nixon declares war on drugs.
Nixon names drug abuse as "public enemy number one." For the only time in the history of the war on drugs, the majority of funding goes towards treatment, rather than law enforcement.
1972: The French Connection is broken up.
U.S. and French law enforcement break up the "French Connection," a Marseilles-based heroin industry controlled by Corsican gangsters and the U.S. Mafia. The results are soon evident in a heroin shortage on the U.S. East Coast.
1973: The Drug Enforcement Agency is established.
President Nixon sets up a drug "superagency". It becomes known for its use of law enforcement tactics that stretch the limits of the Fourth Amendment, including no-knock warrants, IRS audits, and wire taps.
1975: Ford administration releases White Paper on Drug Abuse.
The report The White Paper names marijuana a "low priority drug" in contrast to heroin, amphetamines and mixed barbiturates.
1975: Large cocaine seizure indicates significant growth of cocaine trade.
Colombian police seize 600 kilos of cocaine from a small plane at the Cali airport--the largest cocaine seizure to date. In response, drug traffickers begin a vendetta massacring 40 people in Medellin on one weekend.
1976: Carter campaigns on the decriminalization of marijuana.
Noting that several states had already decriminalized marijuana, Jimmy Carter campaigns to remove criminal penalties for possession of up to one ounce of marijuana.
1976: Anti-drug parents' movement begins.
Families in Action forms as the first parents' organization to fight teenage drug abuse.
1978: Asset forfeiture introduced
Federal drug laws are amended to allow law enforcement to seize all money and possessions of those convicted of drug possession.
1979: Carlos Lehder purchases property on Norman's Cay.
Carlos Lehder, a key member of what becomes the Medellin cartel, purchases land on a Bahamian island. Lehder is the first to use small planes to transport cocaine, using the island to refuel planes between Colombia and the U.S.
1981-2: Rise of the Medellin cartel.
The alliance between the Ochoa family, Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha strengthens into what will become known as the "Medellin Cartel." The traffickers becoming increasing violent, assassinating whoever they decide are their enemies.
1981: U.S.-Colombia extradition treaty ratified.
The U.S. and Colombia ratify a bilateral extradition treaty, which they had previously approved in 1979. When Reagan assumes office and prioritizes the war on drugs, extradition to the US becomes the greatest fear of Colombian traffickers.
1982: Downfall of Norman's Cay.
In response to U.S. pressure, the Bahamian government cracks down on Carlos Lehder's operation.
1982: Deal between Escobar and Noriega allows cocaine transport through Panama.
Panamanian General Manuel Noriega and Pablo Escobar cut a deal which allows Escobar to ship cocaine through Panama for $100,000 per load.
1982: South Florida Drug Task Force is formed.
Outraged by the drug trade's increasing violence in their city, Miami citizens lobby the federal government which under Ronald Reagan forms a Task Force to mobilize against drug traffickers.
1982: Pablo Escobar is elected to the Colombian Congress.
Escobar cultivates an image of "Robin Hood" by building low-income housing, handing out money in Medellin slums and appearing accompanied by Catholic priests. Escobar is elected but driven out of Congress in 1983 by Colombia's Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla.
1982 Largest cocaine seizure linked to Medellin cartel.
The seizure of 3,906 pounds of cocaine, valued at over $100 million wholesale, leads to U.S. law enforcement's realization that Colombian traffickers are working together because no single trafficker could handle a shipment this large.
1984: Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" Movement begins.
Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" anti-drug campaign becomes a centerpiece of the Reagan administration's anti-drug campaign. The movement focuses on white, middle class children and is funded by corporate and private donations.
1984 March Tranquilandia bust.
The DEA and Colombian police discover Tranquilandia, a Medellin cartel laboratory operation deep in the Colombian jungle with 14 laboratory complexes, containing 13.8 metric tons of cocaine, 7 airplanes, and 11,800 drums of chemicals, conservatively estimated at $1.2 billion. This bust confirms the consolidation of the Medellin cartel's manufacturing operation.
1984: April Assassination of the Colombian attorney general fuels the extradition controversy.
Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, who had crusaded against the Medellin cartel, is assassinated. The Colombian government agree to extradiction of drug traffickers with Carlos Lehder first on the list. The crackdown forces the major drug traffickers to flee to Panama for several months.
1984: July The Drug War and Cold War collide.
A Washington Times story links the Nicaraguan Sandinistas' to the drug trade, giving the Reagan government an excuse to increase aid to counterinsurgents in Nicaragua.
1984: Fall Cartel returns to Medellin.
Drug traffickers, Escobar, Gacha, Juan David and Fabio Ochoa are all spotted in Medellin, signaling the end of the government crackdown. The cartel begins to regain its command over the city.
1984: November "Bust of the Century" in Mexico.
The DEA and Mexican officials raid a large marijuana operation, where $2.5 billion worth of high-grade marijuana worth is destroyed.
1984: November Jorge Ochoa is arrested in Spain.
Spanish police arrest Colombian drug trafficker Jorge Ochoa and both the U.S. and Colombia apply for his extradition. The Medellin cartel publicly threatens to murder five Americans for every Colombian extradition. The Spanish courts ultimately deport Ochoa to Colombia where he serves a month in jail.
1985: Colombia extradites first traffickers to the U.S.
Colombia extradites four drug traffickers to Miami. The Medellin cartel issues a "hit list" which includes US embassy staff, their families, businessmen and journalists.
Mid-1980’s: Cocaine transport routes move into Mexico.
Because of a successful crackdown in Florida, traffickers begin using marijuana smugglers to move cocaine into the U.S. and it becomes the major transportation route.
1985: February DEA agent Enrique Camerena is murdered in Mexico. Camarena's disappearance spotlights the pervasive drug corruption in Mexican law enforcement.
1985: July Colombian Superior Court Judge is assassinated.
Bogota Judge Tulio Manuel Castro Gil, who had indicted Escobar for murder, is assassinated. Judicial harassment and intimidation becomes commonplace in Colombia.
1985: Crack explodes in New York
Crack, a potent form of smokeable cocaine, begins to flourish in New York City. A November 1985 Crack is cheap and powerfully addictive and it devastates inner city neighborhoods.
1986: June Death of Len Bias.
The death of promising college basketball star Len Bias from a cocaine overdose stuns the US. Ensuing media reports highlight the health risks of cocaine.
1986: October Reagan signs The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
Reagan commits $1.7 billion to the Drug War, creating mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses. These mandatory sentences are increasingly criticized for incarcerating disporportionate numbers of African Americans and Latinos because of the higher sentences for inexpensive crack than for more costly powder cocaine.
1986: November U.S. indicts the Medellin cartel leaders.
A U.S. federal grand jury names the Medellin cartel the largest cocaine smuggling organization in the world.
1986: December Murder of newspaperman outrages Colombian press.
The assassination of journalist Guillermo Cano Isaza, who frequently wrote in favor of stiffer penalties for drug traffickers, leads to a national outrage and subsequent government crackdown on traffickers.
1987: February Carlos Lehder is captured and extradited.
Major Colombian trafficker Lehder is captured and extradited to the U.S. the next day. Lehder is convicted of drug smuggling and sentenced to life in prison without parole.
1987: June Colombia annuls extradition treaty.
The Colombian Supreme Court, threatened continually by the traffickers, annuls the extradition treaty with the US.
1987: November Drug Trafficker Jorge Ochoa is arrested in Colombia.
Drug traffickers present a communique signed by "The Extraditables," which threatens execution of Colombian political leaders if Ochoa is extradited. Ochoa is subsequently released under dubious legal circumstances and a month later, the murder of Colombian Attorney General is claimed by the Extraditables.
1988: Carlos Salinas de Gortari is elected president of Mexico.
President-elect George Bush Sr. tells President-elect Salinas he must prove to the U.S. Congress that he is cooperating in the drug war--a yearly process by the US government called certification that is applied around the world.
1988: February Noriega indicted in U.S.
A federal grand jury in Miami issues an indictment against Panamanian General Manuel Noriega for drug trafficking, accusing him of allowing the Medellin cartel to launder money and build cocaine laboratories in Panama.
1989: winter Office of National Drug Control Policy is created.
President Bush Sr. creates the new Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Federal spending on treatment and law enforcement increase, but treatment remains less than 1one thirdof the total budget.
1989: April Congressional report on Contra-drug connection.
A congressional subcommittee finds that U.S. efforts to combat drug trafficking were undermined when the Reagan administration ignored evidence of drug trafficking by the Nicaraguan Contras and continued to provide them with aid.
1989: August Assassination of Colombian presidential candidate.
Luis Carlos Galán, who spoke in favor of extradition, is assassinated at a campaign rally near Bogota. President Virgilio Barco Vargas reestablishes extradition. In response, the 'Extraditables' declare all-out war, and begin bombing/murder campaign that lasts until 1991.
1989: U.S. invades Panama
General Manuel Noriega surrenders to the US, is convicted of drug trafficking, and sentenced to 40 years in federal prison.
1990: Bush proposes increased military spending on war on drugs.
President Bush Sr. proposes adding an additional $1.2 billion to the budget for the war on drugs, including a 50% increase in military spending.
1990: September Ochoa brothers surrender.
Colombian President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo offers the traffickers reduced prison sentences in Colombia in order to entice them to surrender. All three Ochoa brothers take the offer.
1991: June New Colombian Constitution bans extradition.
The Colombian assembly votes to ban extradition and the same day Pablo Escobar surrenders to Colombian police.
1991: November Massacre of Mexican Federal Police.
While attempting to stop a shipment of Colombian cocaine, Mexican Federal Police are killed by Mexican army members in the pay of the traffickers. The investigation which follows results in the imprisonment of an army General, who is quietly released several months later.
1992: Mexican President imposes regulations on DEA officers.
The new rules limit the number of US agents in Mexico, designate where they must live, deny them diplomatic immunity, require them to share all information with Mexican authorities, and prohibit them from carrying weapons.
1993: November NAFTA is signed into law.
President Clinton signs the North American Free Trade Agreement, which results in an enormous increase in legitimate trade across the U.S.-Mexican border. The volume of trade makes it more difficult for U.S. Customs officials to find narcotics hidden within legitimate goods.
1993: December Pablo Escobar killed.
Pablo Escobar is finally hunted down by the Colombian police and killed as he attempts to flee with one of his bodyguards.
1995: May Commission recommends revising mandatory minimums.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission releases a report noting the racial disparities in cocaine vs. crack sentencing. For the first time in history, Congress overrides their proposal to reduce the discrepancy.
1995: Top Cali cartel members arrested.
Five leaders of what had become the most powerful drug-trafficking organization in Colombia after the dismantling of the Medellin cartel are captured. By 1996, all of the Cali kingpins are imprisoned.
1996: Ochoas released from prison.
Three Colombian kingpins, all of whom are brothers, are released after serving five-year prison sentences for drug trafficking.
1998 May Operation Casablanca.
Operation Casablanca, the largest money-laundering probe in U.S. history, leads to the indictment of 3 Mexican and 4 Venezuelan banks, and 167 individual arrests. Mexico and Venezuela are furious over the undercover operation, which they consider a threat to their national sovereignty. The US sign an agreement pledging to inform Mexico nations about cross-border law enforcement operations.
1999: Fabio Ochoa rearrested in Operation Millennium.
Law enforcement in Mexico, Colombia and Ecuador arrest 31 kingpins for drug trafficking,
2000: Clinton delivers $1.3 billion in aid to Colombia.
To assist Colombian President Andres Pastrana's $7.5 billion Plan Colombia, President Clinton delivers $1.3 billion in U.S. aid to fund 60 combat helicopters and training for the Colombian military, among other initiatives.
2002: Bush asks for changes in military aid to Colombia
President Bush Jr. asks that military aid to Colombia be expanded to be directed at guerilla insurgencies as well as drug traffickers.
Internet Resources
: US Dept of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2006, released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Criminal Justice Policy Foundation
: a site developed by University of California San Diego with a broad-ranging set of resources on the Andean Drug War
Public Broadcasting Service’s Frontline shows on the Drug War
: National Drug Strategy Network: shares information about drug control strategies without taking any official positions on policy matters, and does not lobby or testify before Congress.
drugnews/index.htm: Drug News Archive, has extensive listing of newspaper articles in the US and Canada on drug related topics.
: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, US Department of Health and Human Services
centers/csap/csap.html Center for Substance Abuse Prevention
Drug Enforcement Administration
nida. National Institute on Drug Abuse
Office of National Drug Control Policy
colombia: Center for International Policy Colombia Project: extensive information on all aspects of international drug policy with links to many other sites
: a Colombian site in English, French and Spanish with a variety of articles challenging current drug policy.
: a US organization working to fundamentally change current policy
press/2002/02/colombia0205.htm: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Washington Office on Latin America Report on Colombia:
: Human Rights Watch
: Amnesty International
: Harm Reduction
Documentos y Fuentes de Información en Español
Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia
Bolivian government website
Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA · MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA
2003
(parcial)
El negocio de las drogas ilícitas
41. El negocio mundial de las drogas ilícitas, que comprende las diferentes fases de cultivo, procesamiento, exportación, distribución y lavado de activos, no sólo pone en peligro la estabilidad del Estado y la cohesión de la sociedad, distorsionando la economía, debilitando las instituciones, alimentando la corrupción, tergiversando los valores y cobrando la vida de miles de jueces, periodistas, políticos, policías y soldados. Se ha convertido también en la fuente primordial de recursos para la financiación de las actividades terroristas de las organizaciones armadas ilegales y en la principal amenaza para la biodiversidad de Colombia, una de las más ricas del planeta.
42. La disputa por el control de los cultivos de coca entre las FARC y los grupos de autodefensa ilegales determina en buena parte la geografía de la violencia en Colombia. Más de la mitad de los frentes de las FARC se encuentran en zonas de producción de coca, lo que explica su rápido crecimiento: en 1982, había aproximadamente 13.000 hectáreas de coca en Colombia; las FARC contaban con cerca de 1.800 hombres armados [13]. Veinte años más tarde, en 2002, había aproximadamente 102.000 hectáreas de coca [14]; las FARC contaban con 16.900 miembros [15]. Los cultivos crecieron por un factor de 8; las FARC de 9. Los grupos de autodefensa ilegales participan de igual manera en el negocio de las drogas ilícitas y su crecimiento ha sido aún más acelerado: pasaron de tener aproximadamente 2.800 hombres en armas en 1995 a más de 12.000 en 2002 [16]. La implicación cada vez mayor de ambas organizaciones en este negocio, que va hoy desde la promoción del cultivo hasta el control de rutas y la comercialización internacional, ha contribuido a la pérdida de disciplina ideológica y, consecuentemente, al uso creciente del terror, mediante el cual amedrentan a la población y, en las regiones de cultivos ilícitos, la someten a un régimen neofeudal de control sobre la producción.
43. El tráfico de precursores químicos es parte integral del negocio de las drogas ilícitas: sin éstos no es posible la producción de estupefacientes. A pesar de que la gran mayoría de los países se ha comprometido a castigar el tráfico de estas sustancias, ratificando la Convención de Viena de 1988, en la práctica los controles en muchos casos siguen siendo mínimos y las penas por incumplimiento leves o inexistentes.
44. El consumo es el motor del negocio de las drogas. Los Estados Unidos, Europa y, cada vez más, Suramérica, son los mayores consumidores y sufren las consecuencias sociales del consumo y tráfico de estupefacientes. Esta amenaza, transnacional como ninguna, debe ser enfrentada de manera conjunta, prestando la misma atención al control de la demanda, el consumo, el tráfico de precursores químicos y el lavado de activos, que al control de la producción y el transporte de drogas ilícitas.
45. Los consumidores en particular deben tomar conciencia de los estragos ecológicos de los que comparten la responsabilidad, como de las pérdidas en vidas. Si continúa el cultivo de coca, la cuenca amazónica colombiana estará en grave peligro: la siembra de una hectárea de coca requiere la tala de tres hectáreas de selva virgen [17]. En la última década, 1.361.475 hectáreas fueron deforestadas con este fin. La tala del bosque conlleva la acidificación y erosión del suelo amazónico, con la consecuente sedimentación de los ríos y la inundación de la selva. Adicionalmente, la tala y quema de bosques para el cultivo de coca contribuye a cerca de un cuarto de las emisiones totales de CO2 del país, exacerbando así el problema del cambio climático global [18]. Por otra parte, varios de los pesticidas utilizados por los cultivadores de coca se encuentran entre los más tóxicos. El Paraquat, prohibido en todos los países industrializados, pero de uso frecuente en los cultivos de coca, es carcinógeno, neurotóxico y se adhiere a los suelos hasta por 25 años, interrumpiendo los ciclos de nutrición del bosque amazónico. En el año 2000, 4.506.804 litros de herbicidas, insecticidas y fungicidas como éste fueron empleados en el cultivo de coca [19]. El procesamiento de la hoja y la pasta de coca no resulta menos perjudicial para los humanos y el medio ambiente: el uso corriente de ácido sulfúrico (1.709.380 litros en el año 2000 [20]) o de permanganato de potasio, por ejemplo, pone en peligro la vida de los cultivadores y es particularmente tóxico para la vida acuática; enormes cantidades de gasolina (357.741.451 litros en el año 2000, equivalentes a una semana del consumo nacional [21]) se vierten indiscriminadamente sobre los ríos y suelos del país año tras año.
46. Por su parte, el cultivo de amapola destruye el bosque andino o de niebla que capta con sus hojas la humedad de la atmósfera en cantidades superiores a la lluvia misma y regula así los flujos de agua hacia las cuencas. Su destrucción erosiona las pendientes, sedimenta los cauces y causa grandes inundaciones que ponen en peligro el ecosistema, la economía local y la vida de las personas que habitan las riveras de los ríos, a la vez que acaba con las reservas de agua de la Nación.
• III. Eliminación Del Comercio De Drogas Ilícitas En Colombia
• Interdicción aérea, marítima, fluvial y terrestre del tráfico de drogas e insumos
• Erradicación de los cultivos de coca y amapola
• Desarticulación de las redes de narcotraficantes
• Incautación de bienes y finanzas del narcotráfico
Eliminación del negocio de las drogas ilícitas en Colombia
95. Con el desplazamiento masivo a Colombia en la década de los noventa de los cultivos de coca, el problema de las drogas ilícitas, tradicionalmente asociado con el narcotráfico y su poder de desestabilización y corrupción, se convierte en un problema territorial. Las organizaciones armadas ilegales luchan entre sí por el control de los cultivos y de la comercialización de la droga, su principal fuente de recursos (42). La solución al problema de las drogas ilícitas requiere entonces, por una parte, la consolidación del control estatal sobre el territorio, para que la erradicación de los cultivos sea efectiva; y por otra, la continuación del desmantelamiento de las organizaciones de narcotraficantes, que con sus actividades ilícitas constituyen una de las mayores amenazas a la consolidación del Estado de Derecho.
96. El Gobierno Nacional ha asumido como meta la eliminación total de los cultivos ilícitos y de la producción y distribución de estupefacientes en el territorio nacional (29). No puede ser otro el objetivo, cuando la lucha de las organizaciones armadas ilegales por el control de los cultivos y de la comercialización de la droga es la principal amenaza a la población. Para cumplir con esta meta, el Gobierno implementará un plan integral que permita actuar de manera coordinada y efectiva sobre cada eslabón de la cadena del negocio de las drogas ilícitas, por medio de las siguientes estrategias:
• La interdicción: se harán todos los esfuerzos para que el impacto disuasivo de la interdicción sobre la producción y comercialización de estupefacientes reduzca los incentivos para la siembra de cultivos ilícitos. El Gobierno fortalecerá de manera prioritaria la interdicción aérea, terrestre, marítima y fluvial de la droga, así como de los insumos y precursores químicos necesarios para su producción.
• La erradicación: para la erradicación se aplicará el método de aspersión aérea con glifosato, o con un producto que resulte igualmente efectivo y ambientalmente aconsejable, en todas las áreas del país donde se detecten cultivos de coca y amapola. Se cumplirá con todas las normas técnicas y legales para lograr la mayor efectividad y la mayor protección del medio ambiente. Los campesinos e indígenas que deseen beneficiarse con proyectos productivos rentables y sostenibles tendrán que cortar todos sus vínculos con el negocio de las drogas ilícitas.
• La acción social: programas sostenibles de desarrollo para la población de cultivadores serán una de las principales herramientas para acabar con los cultivos ilícitos y vincular a la población de cultivadores a la economía lícita. Es necesario que los programas alternativos sean realistas y sostenibles, que ofrezcan sustitución de ingresos a las familias campesinas e indígenas que viven del cultivo de la amapola y de la coca, y que cuenten con el apoyo financiero de todos los países implicados en el negocio de las drogas ilícitas, de acuerdo con el principio de la corresponsabilidad. Un ejemplo de programas de sustitución de ingresos son proyectos de reforestación que retribuyan a los campesinos que se encarguen de la siembra y cuidado de los bosques en antiguas zonas de cultivos ilícitos. De este modo, se fomentará la conservación ecológica y el traslado a una economía lícita, orientada al desarrollo integral sostenible.
• El desmantelamiento de las redes de narcotraficantes: se atacarán sus recursos humanos, sus bienes, sus finanzas y sus redes de comercialización.
• El fortalecimiento del marco jurídico: para lograr el desmantelamiento de las redes de narcotraficantes y sus actividades conexas, las herramientas legales serán fortalecidas. La reciente revisión de la normatividad legal en relación con la extinción de dominio es parte de este esfuerzo.
• La reducción del consumo: el programa Rumbos continuará con su trabajo de concientización, para desestimular el consumo interno de drogas.
Desarticulación de las finanzas de las organizaciones terroristas y de narcotráfico
97. El Gobierno Nacional hará especial énfasis en la desarticulación de las finanzas de las organizaciones terroristas y de narcotráfico, en concordancia con los compromisos internacionales adquiridos. La Junta de Inteligencia Conjunta conformará, junto con las entidades del Estado que cuentan con unidades especializadas, un comité de lucha contra el lavado de activos que permita un mejor intercambio de información y, sobre todo, una mejor coordinación entre la producción de inteligencia financiera y la capacidad de los organismos correspondientes de operar con base en esa inteligencia. El Gobierno establecerá mecanismos de cooperación con las entidades financieras del sector privado y con la ciudadanía en general para que se denuncie oportunamente el lavado de activos. Por otra parte, establecerá también mecanismos de control y vigilancia sobre los recursos de las regalías (91, 126), que por medio de la extorsión y la corrupción con frecuencia son captados por las organizaciones terroristas para financiar sus actividades en varias regiones del país. Así mismo, el Gobierno instará a otros Estados a cumplir con el compromiso que tienen de congelar las cuentas de las organizaciones terroristas colombianas e impedir que sus sistemas financieros sean utilizados por éstas (48).
98. En la recolección de información contra el lavado de activos, la Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero -UIAF- jugará un papel preponderante. Sus objetivos, en cumplimiento de su mandato legal, son:
• Centralización de datos: proponer y desarrollar políticas, procedimientos y herramientas para fortalecer el sistema de lucha contra el lavado de activos
• Sistematización de datos: mejorar la calidad de la información recibida de las diferentes fuentes nacionales e internacionales
• Análisis de información: detectar e informar a las autoridades competentes casos potencialmente relacionados con el lavado de activos
De esta manera se evitarán las fallas del pasado: la inadecuada implementación del marco regulativo, la precaria administración de un gran volumen de información y la falta de coordinación entre las diferentes agencias dedicadas a la detección de operaciones de lavado de activos. El objetivo es integrar plenamente la inteligencia financiera con los operativos en contra de las organizaciones terroristas y de narcotráfico.
Cooperación internacional
133. La seguridad no es sólo producto de la solidaridad de todos los colombianos. Dado el carácter transnacional de los principales riesgos y amenazas, la cooperación y la solidaridad entre los países es una condición necesaria para la seguridad de todos. Se requieren acciones simultáneas contra todos los eslabones de la cadena criminal. El Gobierno Nacional buscará en primer lugar un reforzamiento de la cooperación regional, con el fin de:
• Crear un frente unido, a través de mecanismos de cooperación que faciliten la realización de operaciones coordinadas de las fuerzas de seguridad de los respectivos países y el control al tránsito de armas, explosivos, narcóticos, precursores químicos y personas.
• Fortalecer el intercambio de inteligencia e información financiera, para monitorear, identificar y neutralizar las actividades de organizaciones armadas ilegales.
• Fortalecer y ampliar las comisiones bilaterales fronterizas, COMBIFRON, y suscribir acuerdos que permitan a las fuerzas de seguridad controlar las fronteras, en especial los ríos, las aguas y el espacio aéreo, de manera más efectiva, intercambiando inteligencia y realizando operaciones coordinadas de patrullaje, control, registro e interdicción.
• Cumplir con los propósitos del Compromiso de Lima de la Comunidad Andina.
• Promover la reforma del actual sistema de seguridad interamericano, para adecuarlo a las nuevas realidades de seguridad. El Gobierno apoyará la modernización de mecanismos como el TIAR o de instituciones como la Junta Interamericana de Defensa, para traducir en mecanismos operacionales concretos la voluntad política que hoy existe de combatir amenazas como el narcotráfico y el terrorismo. El Gobierno promoverá, igualmente, la ratificación de la Convención Interamericana contra el Terrorismo.
134. La respuesta a una amenaza transnacional como el narcotráfico no puede ser otra que la estrecha cooperación internacional. El principio de corresponsabilidad regirá los esfuerzos de cooperación contra cada eslabón del negocio de las drogas ilícitas.
Todos los países que comparten la responsabilidad del problema de la drogas deben unir sus esfuerzos, para:
• Ofrecer alternativas de empleo y apoyo financiero a los pequeños cultivadores de coca y amapola que erradiquen voluntaria y efectivamente sus cultivos.
• Erradicar los cultivos de coca y amapola.
• Intercambiar inteligencia y fortalecer su capacidad técnica, para combatir las redes de comercialización.
• Coordinar los esfuerzos de interdicción, en particular de interdicción aérea sobre el mar Caribe y el océano Pacífico.
• Armonizar la legislación contra el tráfico de estupefacientes y precursores químicos, para que las penas correspondan al daño que causan a la sociedad.
• Intercambiar información financiera que permita identificar y castigar el lavado de activos de manera más decidida.
• Controlar y reducir el consumo de drogas ilícitas, ofreciendo alternativas de tratamiento, rehabilitación y capacitación.
[pic]
U.S. Government
White House Hails Drop in Andean Cocaine Production
(US Information Service, Department of State 2005)
The U.S. - Colombia Initiative
(Office of National Drug Control Policy FACT SHEET 2005)
Plan Colombia: A progress report 2005 Summary
(Congressional Research Service)
Human Rights Organizations
Colombia Country Report on Human Rights Practiced
(US Department of State)
Colombia Country Summary January 2006
(Human Rights Watch)
Bolivia: Human Rights and the War on Drugs
(Andean Information Network 2005)
Coca Growers
Andean coca grower perspectives
Bolivian Coca Grower Perspectives
Colombia Coca Growers
Governments of Colombia and Bolivia
Colombia: The Roadmap for Peace & Illicit Drugs
(Colombian Embassy to the United States)
Government of Bolivia
Drug Treatment and Prevention providers
National Institute on Drug Abuse's (NIDA) Factsheet on
(Nationwide Trends in Drug Abuse 2004)
NIDA -Treatment Trends
NIDA – Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction
NIDA- Costs to Society
* These materials are not considered exhaustive but rather provide a place to begin
US GOVERNMENT PACKET
White House Hails Drop in Cocaine Production in Andean Region
Drug policy chief says production falls for third straight year – US Information Service, Department of State
|[pic] |[|
| |p|
| |i|
| |c|
| |]|
|A Colombian anti-narcotics policeman| |
|inspects a coca base seized in | |
|southern Colombia in September 2004 | |
|(©AP/WWP) | |
Washington -- Cocaine production in the Andean region of South America is headed in "the right direction -- down," says John Walters, director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.
In U.S. congressional testimony February 10, Walters said cocaine production has dropped for three straight years in Colombia and other countries of the Andean region.
Just as "crucially," he said, progress against cocaine in Colombia has not been offset by increases in cocaine production in Peru or Bolivia. The two countries recorded a net decrease in the total area cultivated in 2003, including a "remarkable 15 percent drop in Peru."
The official added that only trace amounts of coca -- the crop used to make cocaine -- are cultivated in neighboring Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama and Brazil.
Waters testified about President Bush's proposed fiscal year 2006 drug budget before the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources. He told the lawmakers that production levels of cocaine have fallen below the amount produced in 1999.
Waters noted that 2004 marked the fourth consecutive record year for eradication of Colombian coca, with 131,824 hectares sprayed by the aerial eradication forces of the Colombian National Police. He added that President Alvaro Uribe's aggressive eradication program of coca has cut Colombia's potential cocaine production by one-third since 2001, the year before Uribe took office.
The massive spraying of the coca crop, said Walters, left many coca growers in the "unenviable position" of either replanting coca at a furious pace to maintain production, being forced to relocate to other areas to plant their crop or getting out of the coca-growing business altogether.
Walters said coca eradication remains the "most strategic element" of U.S. support for Colombia, because of the coca crop's "inherent vulnerability."
Coca fields can be located and destroyed, said Walters, before the "raw material is harvested and processed and becomes invisible in the illicit smuggling world."
Walters said large-scale coca eradication is an "effective means of targeting trafficker networks because most growers are affected, reducing the production available to all traffickers."
"When Colombia is producing one-third less cocaine than it was just two years earlier, there simply is less to go around," he observed.
In addition to the success against cocaine, Walters said the Colombian government continues its "relentless attack" on poppy cultivation and heroin production. Eradication programs supported by the U.S. Department of State sprayed or manually eradicated 4,152 hectares of poppy fields during 2004 -- an amount close to the entire poppy crop planted at the end of 2003, Walters said.
To put additional pressure on heroin traffickers, Walters said Colombia's Uribe has advanced an initiative to seize farms involved in the cultivation of illicit crops, especially poppy.
The U.S. budget for fiscal year 2006 includes $734.5 million for the ongoing Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which funds efforts to reduce illicit crops, promote alternative economic development, build democratic institutions, and support administration of justice and human rights programs.
Walters said that the initiative was part of President Bush's three-pronged strategy of waging a global war on terror, supporting democracy and reducing the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.
The U.S. strategy against illicit drugs, said Walters, includes working with international allies to destroy the economic basis of the cocaine production business in South America.
To succeed in this effort, said Walters, means "fumigating the coca crops, seizing enormous and unsustainable amounts of cocaine from transporters, and selectively targeting major [drug] organization heads for law enforcement action, and ultimately, extradition and prosecution in the United States."
Created: 11 Feb 2005
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: )
The U.S.- Colombia Initiative
Office of National Drug Control Policy FACT SHEET
Overview
On July 13, 2000 the Congress approved a two-year funding package to assist Colombia in vital counter-drug efforts aimed at keeping illegal drugs off U.S. shores and to help Colombia promote peace, prosperity, and a stronger democracy. The aid package was one of the largest and most comprehensive efforts by the U.S. to help an ally in Latin America deal with a national drug emergency.
Plan Colombia was developed in 1999 by the Government of Colombia (GOC) with strong US Government (USG) encouragement. It focuses on five critical areas:
▪ Curbing narcotrafficking
▪ Reforming the justice system
▪ Fostering democratization and social development
▪ Stimulating economic growth
▪ Advancing the peace process
U.S. assistance is part of a balanced strategy developed by Colombia to deal with that country's multiple problems. A combination of law enforcement, interdiction, alternative economic development, and judicial reform has contributed to reduction in drug production in other countries, such as Peru, Bolivia and Thailand.
Results
The results of Plan Colombia have met all of the goals in the areas listed above. Below is an outline of progress in Colombia to date:
1. Reduce the production, processing, trafficking, and corruptive influence of drug trafficking organizations.
• Reduced coca cultivation by 21 percent in 2003 and 15 percent in 2002. Cultivation in Putumayo has decreased by over 90 percent. Overall coca cultivation was 113,850 hectares in 2003, significantly below the record highs of 169,800 hectares in 2001.
• Interdicted over 150 metric tons of cocaine in the Source and Transit Zones in 2003—will exceed that for 2004.
• Have extradited to the U.S. 92 traffickers in 2004; 68 in 2003; and 181 total under President Uribe since August 7, 2002.
2. Increase the presence and effectiveness of the Justice System.
• 37 houses of justice have been established in Colombia that have handled over 2.6 million cases. Thirty-five oral trial courtrooms have been established and in 2005 Colombia will begin phasing in an accusatory system of justice.
3. Strengthen institutional presence, efficiency and effectiveness at national, regional and local levels in order to improve governance in the nation and increase the citizens' confidence in the State.
• Improved public services at 38 municipalities.
• Fiscally strengthened 97 municipalities.
• Colombian National Police have established a presence in all 1098 municipalities in Colombia for the first time in history.
• Municipal elections in 2003 were held across Colombia without interruption by illegal armed groups.
4. Promote citizen involvement as a means for developing participatory democracy.
• Over 220 citizen oversight committees have been formed and 100 have been strengthened
5. Instill respect for Human Rights and promote compliance with international humanitarian law in Colombian society.
• Commission of jurists reported that of 2,500 human rights allegations in Colombia over the past year, less than 2% were against the Colombian military (constituted 40-50 percent of allegations 6–7 years ago). There have been no allegations of human rights abuses filed against U.S.-trained units. There have been 21 regional Early Warning System offices established that prompted 195 responses from the GOC.
6. Provide humanitarian assistance to those segments of the population which have been victimized by violence, with special emphasis on the displaced population and the most vulnerable groups.
• Over 2,000,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been assisted; the number of IDPs requesting assistance has dropped in the past year.
7. Prevent further deterioration of ecosystems and implement measures to conserve and recover their environmental functions and build sustainable development options.
• President Uribe established the Forest Ranger program with over 20,000 participants to protect several national parks that are being threatened by coca cultivators.
8. Initiate rapid steps in the South to facilitate the transition to legal activities and to generate socially, economically, and environmentally sustainable alternatives to drug trafficking and violence.
• With the help of U.S. AID, sustainable alternatives have been established in Putumayo and other regions affected by coca and poppy cultivation—over 44,000 families have benefited and over 22,000 hectares of illicit crops have been manually eradicated. Over 55,000 hectares of licit crops have been supported and 25,000 hectares of forest have been maintained and protected.
9. Create the conditions for peace in Colombia.
• President Uribe increased the size and capability of public security forces and engaged the narco-terrorist organizations, forcing the AUC to the negotiating table and severely hampering FARC and ELN capabilities to wage terrorism against the populace.
• In 2004 2,972 insurgents voluntarily repatriated, of whom 1,703 belonged to either the FARC or the ELN. In November 2004 a paramilitary peace process began in earnest that has demobilized an additional 2,397 combatants.
10. Establish the security conditions which permit the implementation of government programs.
• The GOC has increased its presence throughout Colombia. Through special security measures, roads outside of Bogotá can be traveled by ordinary citizens without fear of being kidnapped. Capital is flowing back into Colombia, compared to a high rate of capital flight at the start of Plan Colombia.
• President Uribe has reduced lawlessness and human rights violations throughout Colombia:
| |2002 |2003 |2004 |2004 vs |
| | | | |2002 |
|Terrorist Attacks | | | | |
|All types |1,645 |1,247 |709 |-56% |
|Electric Pylons |483 |329 |121 |-74% |
|Towns |32 |5 |1 |-96% |
|Roads |248 |113 |134 |-46% |
|Massacre victims |680 |504 |259 |-61% |
|Kidnappings |2,986 |2,200 |1,441 |-51% |
|Common Homicide |28,837 |23,509 |20,012 |-30% |
Additional Information/Links
One of the most comprehensive sources of information on international drug policy is the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' (INL) publication, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, or INCSR. It can be found online at . For information on Plan Colombia, consult the "Policy and Program Developments" section as well as the "South America" section.
At the State Department website other resources on Colombia can be found at:
▪ Country Program: Colombia
▪ U.S. Support for Plan Colombia
▪ Andean Region Initiative Remarks
▪ Plan Colombia and the Andean Region Initiative
▪ Andean Region Initiative FY 2001–FY 2002 Budget Request
▪ Plan Colombia Fact Sheet
▪ Counter-narcotics Efforts in the Andean Region
▪ Civilian Contractors and U.S. Military Personnel Supporting Plan Colombia
▪ Andean Regional Initiative Fact Sheet
▪ Briefing on the Andean Regional Initiative
Last updated March, 2005
Congressional Research Service: Plan Colombia: A Progress Report
Summary
Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a six-year plan to end Colombia’s long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and social development. The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is the primary U.S. program that supports Plan Colombia. In addition, Colombia receives assistance from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and the Department of Defense’s central counternarcotics account. ACI funding for Plan Colombia from FY2000 through FY2005 totals approximately $2.8 billion. When FMF and DOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S. support to Colombia is $4.5 billion. The Administration has requested Congress to continue support for Plan Colombia beyond FY2005, with an additional $463 million in ACI funding, and $90 million in FMF requested for FY2006. The objectives of Colombia and the United States differ in some aspects, although there is a significant overlap of goals. The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economic development because it contributes to regional security in the Andes. The primary objectives of Colombia are to promote peace and economic development, increase security, and end drug trafficking. Both U.S. and Colombian objectives have also evolved over time from a strict counternarcotics focus to encompass counterterrorism activities.
Because Plan Colombia is a six-year plan, due to expire at the end of 2005, Congress will likely assess its progress in light of the Administration’s request to continue funding the ACI account, the latter having no statutory end-date. Congress has expressed the expectation that funding would begin to decrease in FY2006. Some Members have also expressed the opinion that the ratio between interdiction and alternative development should become more balanced, and that the U.S. role should diminish as Colombia develops more operational capabilities. While there has been measurable progress in Colombia’s internal security, as indicated by decreases in violence, and in the eradication of drug crops, no effect has been seen with regard to price, purity, and availability of cocaine and heroin in the United States. Military operations against illegally armed groups have intensified, but the main leftist guerrilla group seems no closer to agreeing to a cease-fire. The demobilization of rightist paramilitary fighters is proceeding, but without a legal framework governing the process. Critics of U.S. policy argue that respect for human rights by the Colombian security forces is still a problem, and that counternarcotics programs have negative consequences for the civilian population, and for the promotion of democracy in general.
For more information on Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initative, see
CRS Report RL32250 Colombia: Issues for Congress by Connie Veillette, and CRS
Report RL32337 Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding
Programs: FY2005 Assistance by Connie Veillette. This report will be updated as
new data becomes available.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PACKET
Colombia
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State
March 8, 2006
Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy with a population of approximately 44 million. In 2002 independent candidate Alvaro Uribe won the presidency in elections that were considered generally free and fair. The 41-year internal armed conflict continued between the government and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and certain blocs of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) that were not involved in demobilization negotiations with the government. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted in violation of state policy.
Although serious problems remained, the government's respect for human rights continued to improve. All actors in the internal armed conflict committed human rights violations; the majority of violations were committed by illegal armed groups. There were improvements in certain human rights categories related to the government's concentrated military offensive and ongoing demobilization negotiations with the AUC. The following human rights categories and societal problems were reported:
• unlawful and extrajudicial killings
• insubordinate military collaboration with paramilitary groups
• torture and mistreatment of detainees
• overcrowded, underfunded, insecure prisons
• arbitrary arrest
• high number of pretrial detainees
• pretrial detainees held with convicted prisoners
• impunity
• an inefficient, significantly overburdened judiciary
• harassment and intimidation of journalists
• journalistic self-censorship
• significant internal displacement
• unhygienic conditions at internal displacement camps, with limited access to health care, education, or employment
• corruption
• harassment of human rights groups
• violence against women that was exacerbated by the conflict and displacement, including rape
• child abuse and child prostitution
• trafficking in women and children for the purpose of sexual exploitation
• societal discrimination against women, indigenous persons, and minorities
• illegal child labor
The government took steps to improve the human rights situation. Government statistics noted that killings decreased by 10 percent, terrorist massacres by nearly 4 percent, killings of trade union leaders by 67 percent, and forced displacements by more than 27 percent. According to authorities, the number of homicides during the year was the lowest in 18 years. Perceptions of corruption improved slightly.
Despite a unilateral cease-fire declared by the AUC in 2002 and ongoing demobilization negotiations with the government, paramilitaries continued to violate the cease-fire, recruit soldiers, and commit human rights abuses. The following violations by paramilitaries were reported during the year: political killings and kidnappings; forced disappearances; torture; interference with personal privacy; forced displacement; suborning and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of movement; attacks against human rights workers, journalists, and labor union members; recruitment and employment of child soldiers; and harassment, intimidation, and killings of teachers and union leaders.
The FARC and ELN committed the following human rights violations: unlawful and political killings; kidnappings; forced disappearances; killings of off-duty members of the public security forces; killings of local officials; massive forced displacements; suborning and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of movement; widespread recruitment of child soldiers; attacks against human rights activists; harassment, intimidation, and killings of teachers and union leaders; and use of female conscripts as sex slaves.
Representatives of the government, the ELN, civil society, and international observers met in Cuba starting on December 17 to explore the possibility of peace talks.
Colombia Country Summary January 2006
Human Rights Watch
350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor
New York, New York 10118-3299
Tel. 212 216 1200
Colombia presents the most serious human rights and humanitarian situation in the region. Battered by an internal armed conflict involving government forces, guerrilla groups, and paramilitaries, the country has one of the largest populations of internally displaced persons in the world.
Colombia’s irregular armed groups, both guerrillas and paramilitaries, are responsible for the bulk of the human rights violations, which in 2005 included massacres, killings, forced disappearances, kidnappings, torture, and extortion. Despite ongoing negotiations with the government, paramilitary groups repeatedly committed abuses in breach of their cease-fire declaration.
Members of the armed forces have at times been implicated in abuses, independently or in collaboration with paramilitaries. Impunity for such crimes, particularly when they involve high-ranking military officers, remains a serious problem. Ties between military units and paramilitary groups persist, and the government has yet to take credible action to break them.
Demobilization of Paramilitary Groups
2005 was marked by the passage of Law 975, a controversial package for the demobilization of armed groups that the government called the “Justice and Peace Law. The law offers reduced sentences to members of these groups responsible for serious crimes, if they participate in a demobilization process. Drafted in the context of extended negotiations with paramilitaries, the law fails to include effective mechanisms to dismantle the country’s mafia-like armed groups, which are largely financed through drug trafficking. It also utterly fails to satisfy international standards on truth, justice, and reparation for victims.
Although Colombian President Alvaro Uribe signed the demobilization law in July 2005, the government has not begun applying it. The law faced several constitutional challenges, which were still pending at this writing in late November 2005.
Even before the demobilization law was passed, the government sponsored large-scale demobilization ceremonies in which thousands of paramilitaries handed over weapons. The government portrayed these demobilizations as important steps towards peace, but there were widespread reports of continuing abuses and illegal activity by paramilitaries around the country, including the recruitment of new troops.
Little effort has been made to investigate the past crimes of demobilized paramilitaries or to collect intelligence that could be used to dismantle the groups’ structures or identify their supporters and assets. Cross-checking of individuals’ names against prosecutors’ records resulted in only a few dozen paramilitaries being linked to ongoing investigations, given that in most investigations, the perpetrator is not identified by name but rather by alias or other factors.
Many top paramilitary commanders remain in the specially designated area of Santa Fe de Ralito, safe from arrest or prosecution. In June 2005, prosecutors ordered the arrest of top paramilitary commander, Diego Murillo Bejarano (also known as “Don Berna” or “Adolfo Paz”), for allegedly ordering the assassination of a local congressman and two other people two months before. Nonetheless, the government announced that Murillo would be allowed to demobilize and eventually receive the benefits of Law 975. The government also suspended extradition orders for Murillo and commander Salvatore Mancuso, both of whom are wanted in the United States for drug trafficking.
Impunity and Military-Paramilitary Ties
The overwhelming majority of investigations involving human rights abuses are never resolved. The problem of impunity affects crimes committed by all armed groups, as well as the military.
Units of the Colombian military continue to tolerate, support, and commit abuses in collaboration with members of paramilitary groups. In 2005, there continued to be reports of abuses by members of the Army’s 17th Brigade as well as by members of the armed forces operating in the region of Chocó.
In February 2005, eight residents of the Peace Community of San Jose de Apartadó, including four minors, were brutally killed. The government’s immediate reaction to the massacre, prior to any investigation, was to blame it on guerrillas and deny any military presence in the area. Yet members of the community have alleged that military and possibly paramilitary groups were involved, and there is evidence pointing to military movements near the location of the massacre. The investigation has proceeded slowly, in part due to the unwillingness of witnesses to come forward, apparently out of fear and distrust of authorities.
During the tenure of Attorney General Luis Camilo Osorio, starting in 2001, major investigations into abuses by high-ranking officers were seriously undermined. This troubling trend continued in 2005, as the Attorney General’s office closed its criminal investigation into Rear Admiral Rodrigo Quiñonez’s alleged involvement in the Chengue massacre, in which paramilitaries killed over 20 people.
In May 2005, the Attorney General’s office also closed the investigation of General Eduardo Avila Beltran for his alleged complicity in the 1997 paramilitary massacre of 49 civilians in the town of Mapiripón. Two separate courts - military and civilian - had previously ordered the Attorney General’s office to investigate Avila’s role in the massacre.
Osorio’s term ended in mid-2005. The new Attorney General, Mario Iguarán, has expressed an interest in working more closely with human rights groups.
Human Rights Monitors and Other Vulnerable Groups
Human rights monitors, as well as labor leaders, journalists, and other vulnerable groups are frequently threatened and attacked for their work in Colombia. Investigations into such threats and attacks generally move slowly and are rarely resolved. The problem has at times been exacerbated by high-level government officials, who in 2005 once again made public statements suggesting that legitimate human rights advocacy was aimed at promoting the interests of armed groups.
In May 2005, three prominent journalists received anonymous funeral wreaths, accompanied by notes of condolence, at their homes or offices. As reported by the OAS special rapporteur for freedom of expression in 2005, such threats and prevailing impunity for killings of journalists have a chilling effect on the media.
Monica Roa, the lead attorney in a constitutional challenge to Colombia's almost complete ban on abortion, received numerous death threats in 2005. Confidential case files and two computers were stolen from her office during a break-in.
Human rights defenders from the Jose Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective and other organizations were also threatened in 2005. Meanwhile, there was no obvious progress in the investigation into Operation Dragon, a large scheme allegedly involving retired members of military intelligence, to conduct surveillance of human rights defenders, trade unionists, and politicians in Cali.
Violations by Guerrilla Groups
After a prolonged slowdown in their armed activity, guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) once again increased their level of violent activity in 2005. FARC attacks on government forces were accompanied by numerous and serious abuses, including massacres of civilians and targeted killings.
In April, the FARC used gas cylinder bombs in the region of Cauca, launching them in an indiscriminate manner in the direction of residential areas. The attacks primarily affected members of indigenous communities, resulting in numerous deaths and the displacement of much of the population. Other FARC attacks targeted media, including radio stations.
Both the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the FARC continue to kidnap civilians, holding them for ransom or political gain.
Child Recruitment
At least one of every four irregular combatants in Colombia is under eighteen years of age. Of these, several thousand are under the age of fifteen, the minimum recruitment age permitted under the Geneva Conventions. Eighty percent of the children under arms belong to one of two guerrilla groups, the FARC or the ELN. The remainder fights for paramilitaries.
Internal Displacement
Colombia has the world’s largest internal displacement crisis after Sudan. In the last three years alone, more than three million people, as much as 5 percent of Colombia’s population, have been forcibly displaced because of the country’s armed conflict. More than half of all displaced persons are children under the age of eighteen. While Colombia is among a handful of countries that have enacted legislation to protect the internally displaced, displaced families are often denied access to education, emergency healthcare, and humanitarian aid.
In 2004, Colombia’s Constitutional Court held that the government’s system for assisting displaced persons was unconstitutional. In September 2005, the Court found that the steps taken by the government to comply with its ruling were insufficient in terms of both resources and institutional will.
Key International Actors
The United States remains the most influential foreign actor in Colombia. In 2005 it provided close to U.S. $800 million to the Colombian government, mostly in military aid. Twenty-five percent of U.S. security assistance is formally subject to human rights conditions, but the conditions have not been consistently enforced. Certification of 12.5 percent of the assistance was delayed in the first half of 2005 due to serious setbacks and lack of progress in key investigations of military abuses, among other factors. Nonetheless, the certification was ultimately granted, with the U.S. State Department citing late progress in some specific cases.
In February 2005, the member countries of the G-24 group of international donors to Colombia met in Cartagena to discuss continuing cooperation with Colombia. Members of Colombia’s human rights community expressed disappointment over the resulting Cartagena Declaration, which, while reaffirming the terms of the preceding London Declaration, was viewed as weaker than the earlier document on various human rights issues.
While some European and U.S. assistance to the demobilization process seems likely, its extent and nature remained an open question as of this writing in late November 2005. The U.S. Congress approved U.S. $20 million in assistance for the demobilization process, but the aid is conditioned on full Colombian cooperation with U.S. extradition requests and on specific measures to ensure accountability and the dismantlement of paramilitary structures.
The E.U. Council of Ministers stated that Law 975 could, if effectively implemented, contribute to peace. It expressed concern, however, over the law’s failure to adequately take into account international standards on truth, justice, and reparation.
The OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, which is charged with verifying the demobilization process, was widely criticized by victims and human rights groups. Not only has it failed to adequately monitor paramilitaries’ cease-fire declaration, it has also failed to follow up on complaints of abuses, and it shows little or no independence from the government. As of November 2005, the OAS Secretary General reportedly was considering possible reforms to the Mission’s structure and activities.
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights is active in Colombia, with a presence in Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali. Its relations with the government are difficult due to Colombia’s repeated failure to implement the office’s human rights recommendations.
Bolivia: Human Rights and the War on Drugs - Andean Information Network (1998)
For more than a decade, victims of the "War on Drugs," especially in the main coca growing area of the Chapare, have experienced harassment and abuse, frequent torture and rape and even murder at the hands of the US backed and funded anti-narcotics police. The following characteristics of this war create an environment that encourages human right violations:
First, the UMOPAR, the Bolivian counter-narcotics force, focuses training on military jungle operations and actions against drug traffickers. Little attention is given to police activities, crowd control and other skills that would protect peasants from abuse and misuse of US supplied weapons and riot control agents.
Second, the tremendous US political pressure on the Bolivian government to meet the yearly coca eradication deadlines pushes human rights concerns to the bottom of the list of priorities for Bolivian anti-narcotics forces.
Third, the UMOPAR and other police units operate under conditions of total impunity. Charges of human rights violations against them are ignored. Even cases of serious abuse, such as torture and murder are rarely investigated or, if so, the investigation is done in a superficial manner that never incriminates individual officers.3 The Andean Information Network and other organizations who monitor human rights have repeatedly challenged the US Embassy to take a leadership role in the investigation of abuses. To this date, responses have been limited to denials that violations exist.
If just one investigation would produce a conviction, it would set a precedent for change in the appalling state of human rights in Bolivia. However, due to the US and Bolivian governments' attitudes that in this war the ends justify the means, the anti-drug forces continue to condemn the population of the Chapare to a life of abuse.
The Five-Year Plan (Plan Dignity)
The coca farmers of the Chapare region have been on pins and needles awaiting the implementation of the government's Five Year Plan. This plan calls for the elimination of all illegal coca plantations by the year 2002 (illegal coca is any coca cultivated over and above the 13,000 hectares of coca legally designated for domestic usage, such as teas and medicines). The plan includes four pillars:
• alternative development ($700 million)
• prevention and rehabilitation ($15 million)
• eradication ($108 million)
• interdiction ($129 million)
The total price tag is $952 million, of which $791 million will have to be provided by the international community over the next five years. To date the eradication pillar has been the most heavily emphasized by officials in both the United States and Bolivia. At its core is a gradual transition away from providing compensation to farmers for the coca plants they eradicate. This process involves moving from individual to community compensation, then, within five years, to the complete elimination of compensation. It is difficult to argue that eradication programs have been successful. Using the figures from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCURS) for Bolivia, one can calculate that between 1996 and 1997, for each hectare of coca eradicated, .63 hectares were replanted--not exactly the success story officials would like to tell.
The elimination of individual compensation has a high price for the farmers of the Chapare. Coca farmers were never consulted in the formulation of a new system of compensation and their reaction has been fear and distrust. They fear that they will have to completely eliminate the only crop that gives them a steady income without the security of a marketable replacement crop. And they believe that the compensation money they once used for starting up another income source will instead be diverted to the government's alternative development fund, leaving the individual farmer without a means to provide for his family. The government has done nothing to dispel these fears, and no new alternative crop programs are in the offing.
The residents of Chapare are also frightened by Section 4.4 (d) of the Plan, which calls for the relocation of 5,000 families to other zones of the country. To date the government has yet to define either how or where these families will be moved, though it recently announced that there is a possibility the community compensation plan would provide the finances necessary to move the families. Relocation has been firmly rejected by the coca growers' union, as well as by the municipal leaders of the suggested zones of relocation such as Santa Cruz. AIN believes that the forced relocation of families is in violation of the international human rights treaties to which Bolivia is a party.
Criticism
Since the announcement of the Five Year Plan, many sectors of Bolivian society have criticized its contents. Government representatives claim that the Five Year Plan is based on the National Dialogue, a series of roundtable discussions that took part in late 1997. However, participants in the National Dialogue say the conclusions reached in the plenary on narco-trafficking are not reflected in the document and that contributions to the dialogue were used selectively and opportunistically to support the government's prejudices. The coca growers were systematically excluded from the dialogue, signifying that the plan is a far cry from the reflection of national consensus that the government claims.
The Five Year Plan has never been debated or approved by the National Congress. Antonio Araníbar, Minister of Foreign Relations under the previous government, says that the plan jeopardizes Bolivia's democracy and social stability for goals that are unreachable. He adds that the government's implementation of this plan is destined to end in violence, causing human rights violations and the militarization of the Chapare.
Additional criticisms label the plan both unrealistic in its call for the eradication of all coca within five years and irresponsible for not taking into account the drastic economic impact of the intended elimination of coca, as the drug trade, though illegal, is a major contributor to the Bolivian economy. The plan has also been critiqued for focusing almost entirely on the coca growers, while putting too little emphasis on narco-traffickers and money laundering. The heavy focus on the coca growers has manifested itself in extensive forced eradication, which in turn causes violence.
Forced Eradication
Since April 14, the military, UMOPAR (Mobile Rural Patrol Units), the Ecological Police and agents from DIRECO, the organization that oversees eradication efforts, have been forcibly eradicating coca in many sectors of Chapare. Under Law 1008, Bolivia's infamous antinarcotics law, this eradication is illegal. The law states that the coca in this zone is transitional and must be eradicated voluntarily, with both compensation and crop substitution. This strategy of forced eradication causes further erosion of confidence in the government and generates even more social tension, making it difficult to reach accords.
In response to the continued forced eradication, the coca growers' unions have reorganized their self-defense committees. These committees -- armed with sticks and stones -- physically block the entrance to growing areas in order to avoid eradication. On June 1, these committees blocked the entrance into the Isiboro Securé Park, demanding that the forced eradication stop and the zone be demilitarized. To date, five people have been killed in acts of resistance, including two policemen, Andrés Achá and Pedro Doming Torres Franco.
Approximately 2,414 hectares have been eradicated since the first of the year. The government is selectively compensating by signing eradication agreements with individual farmers. This is a strategicpolicy designed to divide the farmers from their union leadership. Dozens of poor coca farmers also face hardships, like hunger or even starvation, as a result of this policy. The case of Felipa Mamani is one such example: Two years ago, she lost her right leg from a bullet wound in a confrontation with UMOPAR police; on April 27 of this year, her one hectare of coca, as well as her food crops, were eradicated in Villa Victoria. She faces starvation this winter if she does not receive some type of financial compensation for her losses.
Militarization of the Tropics of Cochabamba
Since April 4, the Bolivian military has been active in the area, not only maintaining social order, but also eradicating coca fields. This constitutes a new role for the military, which previously has been constitutionally restricted to protecting borders and providing labor for community projects. On May 8, the government announced that the Armed Forces High Command would be moved to Cochabamba for geopolitical reasons. Although the government denies that its reasons are based on a desire to increase military presence in the Chapare, Guido Nayar, Minister of Government, has publicly stated that the military will remain in the zone for the next five years. This is, in fact, a clear signal of a continued role for the military in the zone.
There are an estimated 5,000 troops in the area consisting of conscripts from CIIOS II, the Seventh Division of Cochabamba and the Eighth Division of Santa Cruz. According to eye-witnesses in the area, the majority of the soldiers are young farmers (16 to 18 years of age) lacking the experience necessary for diffusing face-to-face confrontations or for the severe living conditions of the tropics. One resident of the area testified to a member of AIN that when she begged soldiers not to eradicate her coca, a number of them started to cry. Additionally, observers question whether the soldiers have sufficient rations, as they have stolen not only agricultural crops, such as oranges, but also chickens and other livestock. Many times they eat the stolen fruit right in front of the owners. It is obvious that these young soldiers are not trained or prepared for the activities they are ordered to carry out. This is a step back for human rights in the area and has led to a sharp increase in violent confrontations.
U.S. antinarcotics assistance to security forces is conditioned on human rights practices under the Leahy amendment in the law appropriating foreign aid for fiscal year 1998. This amendment stipulates that no antinarcotics assistance can be "provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence to believe such unit has committed gross violations of human rights unless the Secretary determines...that the government of such country is taking steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice."
1 "Bolivia--Human Rights Violations and the War on Drugs." Human Rights Watch/Americas. Vol.7, No. 8, p.9. July, 1995.
2. Youngers, Coletta. "The Andean Quagmire: Rethinking US Drug Congrol Efforts in the Andes." Fueling Failure: US International Drug Control Policy. Washington DC. Washington Office on Latin America. March, 1996.
3 "Bolivia Under Pressure." Human Right Watch/Americas. Vol. 8, No 4 (b), p. 9 May, 1996
COCA GROWERS PACKET
Andean Coca Grower Perspectives
"Andean coca growers are against drug consumption in the North and South and we are declared enemies of drug trafficking and its corrupting and violent effects. We ratify that for us and for millions of people in our countries coca is not cocaine, coca growers are not drug traffickers and the coca leaf consumer is not a drug addict."
-part of a statement by Andean Coca Growers to the UN Conference on Illicit Drugs, 1998
Bolivian Coca Grower Perspectives
Marcos Fernández López
“We went into alternative development with our eyes closed. Personally, I founded APIBAC (a banana producer association) with 26 affiliates, but we don´t even have roads. I have tried to get answers from officials like Walter Saravia (Minister of Agriculture), but I never got good responses. We proposed bridges four years ago. They were approved but they have never followed through, even after we offered to contribute our labor. We have no guarantee from the government to work with alternative development. I invite the press and the government officials to come where the pineapple is sold and verify the real price —6 to 7 pineapples for 1 boliviano (approximately $0.15 ), fields of palm that haven´t been harvested for up to a year because there is nowhere to sell. Pepper was initially bought at a $us 350, each year it has gotten lower until now it´s at $US 50. Some fellow producers who planted pepper had to burn their fields when they were attacked by disease. The only solution to avoid confrontation in the Chapare would be to stop the eradication of coca while no alternative development can be demonstrated.”
Martín Clemente
”In our zone, we planted peppers, banana, and palm, but it rotted there because there are no bridges or roads. That is why we plant coca, to support our families and children. Many compañeros say that it is better to die. For us the new development has been bullets and death. We are going to continue planting coca – we have no choice.”
Mario Choque
“The reality we live is more important than any law. Since the eradication of coca began we have suffered the worst crisis, alternative development has been a failure. We can use pineapples from Mariposas...as an example. Now I have four rotting hectares of pineapple—that´s the reason I´m motivated to set up a blockade with pineapples. The one time I brought my products to Cochabamba, I only made enough for my transportation, even paying from my pocket...Many of my fellow coca growers that live in unions that are far away are in a worse situation, the banana farmers are selling at credit right now.” (Note: banana farmers are forced to ship their product and wait several months to be compensated).
Delfín Olivera
“Many fellow coca growers were, in their moment, pioneers of alternative development. Now, after having confirmed the failure [of those programs] they are back on our lines and some are leaders again that defend coca. Personally, I tried to dedicate myself to alternative development by planting macadamia nuts. In order to do that, I had to sell my truck, but I have never even gotten the plant to flower. For this reason, we defend coca, because of the demands of so many poor people stomachs.”
Teofilo Blanco
“We thought that alternative development would substitute coca...They promised to build a bridge, but they haven´t done it. I also reduced the amount of coca I had and planted coffee but I haven´t been able to sell a single kilo. There are no systems of potable water, health, or education. We are demanding fair rights according to the political constitution of the state. When we have an accident like a snake bite, we have to travel four hours [for medical attention] and sometimes people die.
Many compañeros have taken their kids out of school because they no longer have the economic means, and they´re planting coca again. If you think that I am lying, I invite a high level commission to come to my farm to verify if there are any roads or development. We are isolated like animals in our zone.”
Martín Serrudo
“In order to follow the Law, I didn’t plant coca, but now I am very poor... We asked to be able to plant a small amount of coca. We don’t have anything to lose anymore so we’ve decided to defend the coca, pushed by extreme poverty to do so.”
Rimer Ágreda Claros
“I am an ex-producer of pineapple and I know the limits of alternative development. The minister speaks of 12, 000 people who are in the alternative development program. I´m sure that I´m on that list, but now I have coca again. I have worked with pineapple for twelve years. I´m one of the people who invested $2,500 in alternative development. The officials say that at least 30 percent of the pineapple that we produce should be exported, the government minister in charge knows about this. Up to now, the market for alternative development hasn´t functioned—I am personally familiar with this issue.”
(Note: The $2,500 that he refers to was compensation he received from the government. Originally, coca growers were given this amount of compensation for each hectare of coca that was eradicated. In 1998, under Plan Dignity, the government transferred all individual compensation to community compensation over a period of a year. At this time, there is no longer any community compensation because Plan Dignity aimed to have eliminated all coca, save that designated for traditional use, by 2002.
Aniceto Zurita
“We received compensation, but that money hasn´t produced anything and there haven´t been any markets. The government has said that there has been alternative development. We planted oranges but because of disease they made us burn our field with the participation of the soldiers from Rio Blanco. I wonder if that is alternative development. Necessity obliges us to plant coca... We are not afraid of going to jail.”
Jorge Cala Tito
“I was one of the first presidents of association of pineapple producers in Mariposas. We know that we have a white elephant that doesn’t function. I am enthusiastic that we have come here to offer solutions. [But,] the plan of the government is theoretical. In practice things are very different. Alternative development hasn´t worked and it´s not going to work... I can tell you that I still have coca because that is our only source of survival. I propose that while no true alternative development exists, coca continues to exist.”
Bertho Bautista
“I was one of the first producers in alternative development beginning in 1988. During that time, I started planting macadamia from Costa Rica, pepper, and palm. I´m going to tell the truth because I speak with knowledge of the situation—I have become poorer. I invested the compensation of $2,500 in a hectare of crops... I almost lost my house and I was almost separated from my family. I continue to have macadamia nuts and coconut as well, but I continue to plant coca in the middle of my crops.
As a promoter (of alternative development), I have deceived many of my neighbors. I formed the first producer association in my zone and four other associations. After forming those five associations, I continued forming more associations. I even traveled to Costa Rica for a month, but in Costa Rica the land was very different. When I returned I realized that I had invested money and deceived my people in vain. I even continued looking for markets and opportunities to export.
…
That is why we ask to be able to grow a small amount of coca, for the subsistence of our families. We ask for only that small amount of coca and the ministers are conscious of that, but they are afraid of the United States.”
Feliciano Mamani
“The minister says we’re going to get a fair price for [alternative] products, surely with the help that has benefited the engineers. With privatization) the external debt has gone up, there is no work, the workers who went to Santa Cruz when there was work have come back. They talk about Quqachacas and Laimes (Altiplano ayllus). I come from there and there is poverty, that´s why we came to Chapare. Instead of paying the military, why don´t we solve the problem in the Chapare.”
Rolando Vargas
“The amounts given to the coca growers are not enough to dedicate ourselves to other activities. None of the governments take into account the internal markets, and much less the external ones. If the government can´t guarantee markets for the alternative products, the problem will continue. The actual cost in the market hasn´t allowed for the elimination of the coca leaf.”
Mario Inturias
“Culture isn’t something you sell, it’s something you respect. For that reason we are obligated to make them respect it...Coca is ours and has existed for thousands of years.”
Luis Cutipa
“If we want to talk about pacification, we should be clear. There is no other way than to accept coca and stop eradicating until alternative development demonstrates its success.”
(Sources: Andean Information Network)
Colombia Coca Grower Perspectives
Taken from a statement by Omayra Morales, Colombian coca to the United Nations in New York in 1998. (provided by ENCOD – the European Non-governmental Organization Council on Drugs and Development)
Up to now, the "war to the drugs" has been ineffective, unbalanced and unjust. The “alternative development” offered to us has not had good results. The war on drugs has become a war against the leaf of coca and coca growers…
In Colombia aerial fumigation of crops has been intensified with a grave negative effect on the environment of the Amazon region. This has happened at the same time that the armed conflict has worsened. The Colombian government promotes the existence of paramilitary groups that are responsible for hundreds of deaths every day among the civilian population. Nevertheless the cultivation of coca has increased in my country reaching 100 thousand hectares (245,000 acres) and alternative development does not reach those who truly need it.
It is not the first time that we Colombian coca growers have attended UN meetings. We come once again to state that we don't agree with the content of the resolution proposals presented to this Assembly. We want to reiterate that we reject drug trafficking and drug abuse, as much in northern countries as in those of the South. In this sense, we are an ally of the UN in combating and reducing the damage that these substances cause humanity.
We reject the call to a "war against drugs" and the militarization of the Andean countries because this is an ineffective way to combat drug trafficking and has destructive effects on society, democratic institutions and the environment.
We reject the system of unilateral or multilateral certification because it violates the sovereignty of Andean countries, undermining democracy because it doesn't take into account the opinion and proposals of our societies.
It is also necessary to change the vision of drugs, and clearly distinguish coca from cocaine.
As current macroeconomic policies have favored the proliferation of the illegal traffic of narcotics, the consumption of drugs and the pauperization of consumers, we demand substantial changes in these policies and in the rules of game of the international trade.
It is necessary that affected communities participate in the elaboration of development programs at the local and regional level and that our proposals are taken seriously by the government and by the international cooperation.
As representatives of the weakest and criminalized subjects in the world problem of the drugs, the consumers and the farmers, we are united in the fight to cease the suffering of our communities and to build a better world.
GOVERNMENTS OF COLOMBIA AND BOLIVIA PACKET
Plan Colombia: The Roadmap for Peace (from the Colombian Embassy to the United States)
The Government of Colombia has developed a multi-year, comprehensive strategy designed to bring about lasting peace by reducing the production of illegal drugs, revitalizing the economy and strengthening government institutions. This is known as Plan Colombia.
The international press tends to refer to Plan Colombia as only a military operation, but this is inaccurate. Because Plan Colombia is a social and political strategy to bring government presence to the country’s frontier territories and re-unite them with the rest of the country. In other words, it seeks to strengthen public institutions and the rule of law in an area overwhelmed by lawlessness. And at the same time, bring about economic reform and sustained growth to an ailing economy, which in 1999 had negative GDP growth of 4.3%.
Of course, Plan Colombia also seeks to fight against the drug trade, because a significant portion of the multi-billion dollar profits from drug-trafficking are funding the activities of guerrillas and paramilitaries, while thousands of innocent civilians are caught in the crossfire. A final peace agreement, probably the most important of the four main objectives of Plan Colombia, will remain illusive as long as the rebel groups maintain an unlimited source of funding from drug trafficking. So it is in Colombia’s national interest to crack-down on this illegal industry.
But there is a two-track approach to counter-narcotics in Plan Colombia. For the first time in Colombian history, a voluntary eradication program is being offered to all farmers who grow coca on small individual plots. If they agree to eradicate their coca crop, the government will provide them with cash compensation and the tools they need to move into legitimate farming – such as seed, equipment and technical support.
At the same time the Colombian National Police is spraying large industrial coca plantations. In reality, the so-called "military" part of Plan Colombia, is really no more than an escort service for the Colombian National Police’s activities of spraying industrial coca plantations and destroying cocaine laboratories. The only reason why this is needed is because both guerrillas and paramilitaries will fire from the ground at the spraying aircraft, and fire at the Police when they enter these areas in order to destroy a drug laboratory. So 14 Black Hawks and 45 Huey transport helicopters will provide the necessary protection and transportation requirements for three battalions of 900 men each. That is all the U.S. trained and funded counter-narcotics units are and will be doing. Counter-guerrilla or counter-paramilitary operations are forbidden.
But most importantly, Plan Colombia is a massive government strategy to bring social development and create a social safety net for Colombia’s population. The Government of Colombia is investing $900 million dollars in four distinctive social strategies:
Employment in Action, which consists of hiring unqualified workers to boost employment levels in local infrastructure projects throughout the country. More than 1.502 projects, fully funded, are under way, in 237 municipalities.
Families in Action, subsidies to poor families in exchange for a commitment to keep their children in school.
Youth in Action, a national program to train young unemployed men and women in private sector companies with government subsidies. It will reach a total of 104.000 youths.
Roads for Peace, which includes 14 major roads, local roads, river infrastructure and bridges, 4 times more roads than all those built in the last 20 years.
So what are Plan Colombia’s chances of success?
So far, the results on the ground are very encouraging. A total of 33.585 peasant families in Putumayo have already signed voluntary eradication agreements, and receiving alternative development aid from the government. This is a huge effort, and it means that by the end of July 2002, 49.000 acres of coca will be manually eradicated, about one third of all the coca in the Putumayo province, and about 16% of all the coca in Colombia.
The spraying campaign has also been very successful so far. In only six months, we have sprayed 65.000 hectares (161.000 acres) of coca, 140% of the eradication goal for this year in the whole country. An area twice the size of Washington DC. Colombian authorities have destroyed enough coca to produce 300 tons of cocaine, or roughly one third of the annual world supply. And this was done before most of the U.S. aid has reached Colombia, including the Black Hawk helicopters, which will begin to arrive in July.
These results are even more outstanding if you consider that in 1995, the previous government made a similar attempt to eradicate coca fields in Putumayo. But local farmers rose up in unison and battled security forces, forcing them out of the area. That has not happened this year, there are no protests or demonstrations, because today the government is offering a positive government presence. It is also making significant investments in Putumayo in the form of schools, health clinics, social services and local infrastructure. A total of 14 major roads will be built, 4 of which are already under construction, particularly the crucial Mocoa-Pitalito road that links Putumayo to the rest of the country and makes alternative development economically feasible for the whole region.
What does Plan Colombia aim to achieve?
• Build and strengthen public institutions throughout Colombia. This includes reforming the judicial system and combating corruption, as well as the restructuring and modernizing Colombia’s Armed Forces and National Police. It also includes training local government officials and strengthening the Government’s ability to protect and defend the human rights of all its citizens. Significant social investments are being made in areas that have been traditionally neglected by the Government, especially in the Putumayo region in southern Colombia, where half the country’s coca is grown. Plan Colombia will make investments in alternative economic development for the farmers who grow coca. It will also fund the development of infrastructure, education and health care.
• Reduce the illegal drug trade. The Government is committed to reducing narco-trafficking and illegal drugs by 50% over the next five years. This will be achieved by destroying illegal coca crops through aerial spraying and providing alternative development for farmers and peasants currently engaged in growing small amounts of coca. It also means seizing a greater number of illegal drugs and destroying the infrastructure of the drug traffickers, including their coca laboratories, and transportation, communications and distribution networks.
• Revitalize the economy. A strong, growing economy with opportunity for all Colombians is the key to building peace and making progress in the war against illegal drugs. This means creating new employment, expanding international trade and increasing foreign investment in the country. The Government cannot ask poor farmers in coca growing areas to destroy their illegal crops without providing them with assistance – in the form of cash payments, equipment and technical support – to grow legal crops. Plan Colombia also aims to fund a "social safety net" for the poorest members of Colombian society.
• Advance peace talks between the Government and guerrilla organizations, to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement with armed insurgents. Success in reducing Colombia’s drug trade will cut off funds used by all violent actors in the country, thereby making a peace agreement more possible.
How is Plan Colombia funded?
The implementation of Plan Colombia is worth $7.5 billion over a five-year period. Colombia is providing the vast majority of those funds – a total of $4.9 billion will be provided by Colombian taxpayers.
President Pastrana’s administration has raised an additional $2.1 billion from external sources: the United States has committed $1.5 billion; Europe, to date, has committee $355 million; Japan has pledged $175 million; Canada is investing $40 million and the United Nations has offered $30 million. An additional $400 million has been secured through credit lines from individual countries and multilateral organizations, which will be repaid as part of Colombia’s future public debt payments.
President Pastrana has asked the international community to contribute to Plan Colombia, because drug trafficking is a global problem that requires a sharing of the burden to combat it among many countries.
Other Plan Colombia: Results to date
Less than one year into the implementation of the plan, these are just a few of the results there are to show:
• Reducing illegal drugs. More than 550 drug laboratories have been destroyed since January 1, 2001.
• Fighting unemployment. A total of 4,500 unemployed young men and women are undergoing training as part of a program that will help over 100,000 youths between 18-25 years to gain employment in Colombia’s legal economy. The Government is looking to increase market access for Colombian exports around the world, which can create thousands of new jobs for the unemployed.
• Infrastructure. Roads, schools, hospitals, electricity lines, water sewage projects and even an airports have had funds allocated in the budget and are either in their final contracting stages or have begun construction or renovation. Many of the infrastructure projects have already been started, including the highway that will connect Putumayo with the rest of the country.
• Human rights. The protection of human rights has been placed in the forefront of national policy and attention by the Pastrana Administration. An "early warning system" aimed at notifying authorities preemptively about human rights violations has been put into place. Tens of thousands of members of the Colombian armed forces have undergone international human rights training, and those military and police forces that will undertake anti-narcotics operations supported by funding from the United States have undergone extensive vetting processes, to ensure that none of these soldiers or police have been involved in human rights violations. Colombia’s new Minister of Defense, Vice President Gustavo Bell, also heads up the Government’s human right policy team.
• A more professional military force. The Colombia armed forces are increasing the number of "professional soldiers" from 15,000 to approximately 60,000 troops by the end of the Pastrana Administration. Colombia’s military is very respected by the population. In public opinion polls, the military ranks just below the Catholic Church as the most admired institution in the country. As part of Plan Colombia, they will receive training and equipment to help them be a more effective and professional institution, better capable of protecting citizens and ensuring peace. They are being given the necessary tools – in the form of better training and more equipment – to fight traffickers, guerrillas and other violence actors in Colombia.
• On the peace front. The guerrilla organizations have joined the Government at the peace table. Negotiations are advancing, and an agenda has been agreed to. The FARC have liberated 363 members of the Armed Forces under captivity and both parties have agreed to soon begin cease-fire talks.
[pic]
DRUGS TRAFFICKING IN COLOMBIA - A BALANCE (from the Colombian Embassy to the United States)
Last update: August 2003
The Problem
Few countries in the world have suffered the adverse effects of illicit drugs trafficking as Colombia.
Between 1980 and 2001 the area with coca cultivation went from 3,500 to 144,807 hectares, a figure that amounts to a yearly growth rate of 25,6 %. This huge increase has been in parallel with the reduction of coca crops in Peru and Bolivia. Colombia is today the net producer of more than 70% of coca leave and cocaine and also produces, to a lesser extent, marihuana and heroine. Colombia has become the 4th largest world producer of opium with a total cultivated area of poppy of 4.273 hectares.
The largest portion of coca crops is located in the regions of Putumayo (37 %), Guaviare (15 %), Caqueta (14%), Meta (7 %) and Norte de Santander (7 %). As for poppy, crops are located mainly in Cauca (26 %), Nariño (25 %), Tolima (18 %), Huila (16 %) and Cesar (8 %).
The Effects
In economic terms, production of coca leaves equals 327,000 tons a year which are transformed in 634 tons of coca paste, which in turn can generate as much as 604.2 tons of cocaine, with a net value of about US $ 1,758 million. As for poppy crops, they generate 57.1 tons of latex, out of which 4.9 tons of heroine are extracted, with a net value of US $ 176 million a year.
In spite of being located in marginal areas of limited agrarian capability, illicit crops subsist due to two main reasons: first, the high profits that the business of coca production bring to those engaged in it, specially in the phases of trading and distributing; secondly, these are non perishable crops, which makes it easier to harvest, to transport and to trade them.
While the drug business does not offer a high margin of profit during the initial steps of the process - for peasants or collectors - there is a powerful structure of chain production in place, which assures the availability of means to harvest, process and distribute the drug on a permanent basis.
Drug trafficking in Colombia has also supplied a generous and stable source of financing to illegal armed groups, which has made it possible for them to increase its ranks, to gain access to the illegal arms market and to expand the reach of their armed activities. Initially the illegal armed organizations’ involvement in the drugs business was limited to granting protection to major areas of illicit crops owned by drug barons, but gradually they went on taking over the local trade of cocaine and heroine, which helped increase the net production of drugs. Therefore, this illegal activity became a major source of funding for these groups. An estimate shows that between 1991 and 1996, the largest of these groups, the FARC, obtained some US $ 470 million out of the drug business, which represents 41 % of their net income.
The so-called "Autodefensa" (Self-defense) groups also get some US $ 200 million, a 70 % of their income, out of drug-related activities.
The expansion of illegal drug traffic has prompted an increase in the activities of these groups. Their active presence, as measured according to the number of municipalities that are affected by attacks and other armed actions, increased by 60 % during the last decade, going from 223 localities during the period 1990-1994, to 393 between 1995 and 2001.
The Costs
The burden Colombia has carried in the fight against drugs is bigger than that of any other nation in the world. Only since 1995 the drugs problem has generated for Colombia costs of about 11.38 billion pesos, a sum amounting to more than a 1% of 2000 GDP. Included in this cost calculation are factors like spending by the government in carrying out policies of contention, loss of productivity of consumers, loss of human capital due to drug-related premature deaths and economical factors used in the production of illicit drugs. The cost in human lives lost in the fight against drug trafficking and related offences, including those of Government officials, political and community leaders, judges, journalists and countless ordinary citizens is beyond calculation.
The problem of illicit drugs has damaging effects on democratic governance in so far as it adds to the intensification of armed violence, the deterioration of the economy and the weakening of Government institutions and of societal values and confidence.
The Response
The Government of Colombia is committed to an aggressive program of eradication of illicit crops. Between 1998 and 2001, a total of 254,783 hectares were sprayed, totaling an average of more than 60,000 hectares a year. This is indicative of a growth rate of sprayed hectares of 32.62 % during the same period. If this figure is contrasted with reduction on the number of cultivated hectares, it is apparent that this vigorous policy is beginning to show positive results: the pace at which cultivated hectares are destroyed is now higher than that at which they are sown.
As for interdiction, thanks to actions by the public force, between 1998 and 2001 a total of 1,796 tons of coca (449 a year) never reached the international drugs markets. The seizing of coca leaf, coca paste and the drug itself shows a growth rate of interdiction actions at 22.63 % during the said period. On the other hand, detentions rose in a 714 % while the destruction of labs and facilities grew by 424.6 %, and that of air tracks by 41 %.
The Strategy
The Government of Colombia intends to combat this problem and crimes associated with it by adopting a comprehensive approach that leads to thwart the different steps of the business - cultivation, harvesting, processing, trading.
Faced with an alarming increase in illicit crops and drug production, this strategy seeks to reinforce existing mechanisms of systematic interdiction, including money laundering and illegal arms traffic control. Actions directed to control and reduce crops trough eradication, both manual and forced, will be strengthened as well as measures aimed at improving assets forfeiture mechanisms.
This policy will be reinforced with programs of alternative development aimed at supplying small growers with legitimate options, so they remain outside the drug business. Emphasis will be placed in productive investment projects, as a component of the larger strategy of institutional building and development in conflict zones.
On these foundations a comprehensive strategy to combat illicit drugs has been put in place in order to deal with all aspects of the problem, namely a) control of crops; b) interdiction and c) government asset forfeiture.
Bolivian Government
(translated from the Bolivian vice-ministry of Alternative Development- 2005)
In the last few years, Bolivia has achieved great advances in the struggle against drug trafficking but with a high social cost. Since 1999, approximately 80% of the illegal production of coca designed for cocaine production has been destroyed, improving Bolivia’s image in the international community and leaving it free of the stigma attached to the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.
Alternative Development, along with interdiction, eradication and crop substitution and prevention of drug use are the principal components of the National Strategy against Drug Trafficking in Bolivia.
The Bolivian government recognizes that Alternative Development is an instrument that limits the expansion of coca destined for cocaine production while providing work, income and basic services to thousand of peasant families in coca growing regions. Alternative Development, which is a principal component of the 2004-2008 National Bolivian Plan for the Reduction of Poverty and National strategy for Agricultural and Rural development, contributes to the economic and human development of thousands of families in the coca production zones and the areas that people migrate to the coca growing regions from.
DRUG TREATMENT AND PREVENTION PROVIDERS PACKET
Nationwide Trends (Revised September 2004)
This fact sheet highlights information from the latest published proceedings of NIDA’s Community Epidemiology Work Group* (CEWG). The information covers current and emerging trends in drug abuse for 21 major U.S. metropolitan areas, as shared at CEWG's June 2003 meeting.
The findings are intended to alert the general public, policymakers, and authorities at the local, State, regional, and national levels to the latest trends in drug abuse.** The CEWG is a network of researchers from Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Newark, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, St. Louis, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, Texas, and Washington, DC.
CEWG members (epidemiologists and researchers) assess drug abuse patterns and trends from the health and other drug abuse indicator sources below. These data are enhanced with qualitative information from ethnographic research, focus groups, and other community-based
sources:
• the Treatment Episode Data Set (data from treatment facilities) and the Drug Abuse Warning Network (emergency department—ED—mentions and medical examiner death mentions involving illicit drugs), both funded by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration;
• the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program, funded by the National Institute of Justice;
• the System to Retrieve Information on Drug Evidence and other information on drug seizures, price, and purity, from the Drug Enforcement Administration;
• drug seizure data from the United States Customs Service; and
• the Uniform Crime Reports, maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Trends of Use
Cocaine/Crack
Cocaine/crack abuse was endemic in almost all CEWG areas in 2002. Rates of ED mentions per 100,000 population were higher for cocaine than for any other drug in 17 CEWG areas. Rates increased significantly between the second half of 2001 and the first half of 2002 in Baltimore, Denver, Newark, and San Diego, while decreasing in San Francisco and Seattle. ED rates were highest in Chicago, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Baltimore, and Miami in the first half of 2002. Rates for cocaine were much higher than those for methamphetamine in west coast areas. Trends in treatment admissions from 2000 to 2002 showed little change in most CEWG areas. Primary cocaine admissions constituted more than 40 percent of illicit drug admissions (excluding alcohol) in seven areas, with the majority being for crack. Additionally, poly-drug use was common among powder and crack cocaine abusers. Cocaine was reported frequently as a secondary drug by heroin abusers admitted to treatment. Between 27 and 49 percent of male arrestees tested positive for cocaine in 14 CEWG areas. Nationwide in 2002, 61,594 kilograms of cocaine were seized by the DEA—3.6 percent more than in 2001 and 35.9 percent more than in 1995.
Heroin
Heroin indicators were relatively stable in 2002, but continued at high levels in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Newark, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. Primary heroin treatment admissions ranged from 62 to 82 percent of all illicit drug admissions (excluding alcohol) in Baltimore, Boston, and Newark. Rates of heroin ED mentions exceeded 100 per 100,000 population in Chicago and Newark, and heroin/morphine-involved death mentions reported by DAWN ranged from 195 to 352 in Boston, Baltimore, and Chicago. Conversely, significant decreases in ED rates were observed between the first half of 2001 and the first half of 2002 in six CEWG areas: Baltimore, Dallas, Detroit, Phoenix, San Diego, and Washington, DC. Of the eight CEWG areas reporting local medical examiner data on heroin/morphine-related drug mortality in 2002, figures were highest in Detroit, Philadelphia, southern Florida counties, and Phoenix. DEA data showed that heroin purity in 2001 was highest in Philadelphia (73 percent pure), and ranged from 56 to 68 percent in New York, Boston, and Newark—all areas where South American and Southwest Asian heroin are widely available.
Misuse of Prescription Opiates
Opiates/narcotics (excluding heroin) appear increasingly in drug indicator data, particularly hydrocodone and oxycodone products. Increases in oxycodone ED mentions were reported in 12 CEWG areas from the first half of 2001 to the first half of 2002, and 7 of these were statistically significant. In San Francisco, oxycodone ED mentions increased 110 percent during the same time period. Other CEWG members reported an increase in oxycodone medical sales, diversion of the drug from clinics, and increased arrests. Hydrocodone, which is often used in combination with alcohol and other drugs, was cited as a problem in several CEWG areas including Phoenix, Texas, Minneapolis/St. Paul, and South Florida. Preliminary ED data for the first half of 2002 show that the rate of narcotic analgesics/combinations mentions per 100,000 population was 2 to 7 times higher in Baltimore than other CEWG areas. In 11 of the 20 CEWG areas included in the DAWN mortality system in 2001, the number of narcotic analgesic-related death mentions exceeded those for cocaine, heroin/morphine, marijuana, and methamphetamine.
Marijuana
Marijuana is the most frequently used illicit drug in CEWG areas, and levels of use and abuse are high among adolescents and young adults. Rates of marijuana ED mentions per 100,000 population increased significantly between the first half of 2001 and the first half of 2002 in Miami, Newark, Phoenix, and San Diego, but decreased in Chicago, San Francisco, and Seattle. Primary marijuana admissions (excluding alcohol) accounted for approximately one-quarter to one-half of admissions for illicit drug use in 12 of the 20 CEWG areas reporting 2002 treatment data. The proportions were highest in Minneapolis/St. Paul, Miami, Colorado, New Orleans, and Seattle. The percentages of adult male arrestees testing marijuana-positive in 2002 exceeded the percentages testing positive for other drugs in 12 of 16 CEWG areas. The same was true of female arrestees in only three of nine CEWG sites. The DEA reported seizures of 195,644 kilograms of marijuana in 2002, the lowest amount since 1996.
Methamphetamine
Methamphetamine abuse continues to spread geographically and to different populations. In addition to the large “super labs” in California and trafficking from Mexico, there has been a proliferation of small “mom and pop” laboratories throughout the country, especially in rural areas. Methamphetamine abuse and production continue at high levels in Hawaii, west coast areas, and some southwestern areas, and abuse and manufacture continues to move eastward. Several CEWG areas report new populations of methamphetamine users, including Hispanics and young people in Denver, club goers in Boston, and African-Americans in Texas. Primary admissions for amphetamines/methamphetamine (excluding alcohol) represented a sizable minority of treatment admissions in eight CEWG areas in 2002. Most admissions were primary methamphetamine users. The percentages of adult male arrestees testing positive for methamphetamine use trended upward in nine CEWG areas between 2000 and 2002. Additionally, one-half of adult female arrestees in Honolulu tested positive in 2002, as did nearly 42 percent in Phoenix and 37 percent in San Diego. Not only methamphetamine users, but also children exposed to and agencies that seize and clean up methamphetamine labs are also in danger of serious health consequences.
MDMA
MDMA (methylenedioxymethamphetamine; often called ecstasy) indicators suggest that use of this drug has spread to populations outside the club scene. MDMA is often used in combination with alcohol and other drugs, and pills sold in clubs as ecstasy often contain substances other than, or in addition to, MDMA. The number of MDMA ED mentions decreased in 11 CEWG areas from the first and/or second half of 2001 to the first half of 2002, with a significant increase reported only in New Orleans. The highest numbers of ED mentions in 2002 were in Philadelphia, Miami, San Francisco, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and New York. Two CEWG members reported statewide treatment admissions data for 2002: for Illinois, 2002 was the first year that “club drug” treatment admissions were tracked and a majority of those admitted were male (68 percent) and White (75 percent); in Texas, treatment admissions with a primary, secondary, or tertiary MDMA problem rose from 63 in 1998 to 521 in 2002.
Emerging Drugs: PCP
PCP indicators increased in five CEWG areas—Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Washington, DC, and Texas—and remained steady in Chicago communities. Los Angeles reported an 11 percent increase in PCP-related arrests since 2001. In Phoenix, PCP ED mentions increased significantly between the first half of 2001 and the first half of 2002— from 27 to 42 mentions. In Texas, ED mentions increased significantly from 46 to 74 during the same time period. In the first half of 2001, 6 CEWG areas had more than 73 PCP ED mentions, ranging from 74 in Dallas to 542 in Philadelphia. In 2002, both primary PCP treatment admissions and ED mentions were highest in Washington, DC. DC also reported increases in both adult and juvenile arrestees who tested positive for PCP.
National Institute of Drug Abuse: Treatment Trends (Revised March 2005)
In 2003,* there were nearly 1.7 million admissions to publicly funded substance abuse treatment programs. Most admissions (23.2 percent) were for alcohol treatment. Marijuana accounted for the largest percentage of illicit drug admissions (15.4 percent), followed by heroin (14.4 percent).
By Drug: Admissions to Publicly Funded
Substance Abuse Treatment Programs, 2003
|Percentage |
|of Admissions |
|Substance |
|or Drug |
| |
|23.2 |
|alcohol |
| |
|18.7 |
|alcohol + another drug |
| |
|15.4 |
|marijuana |
| |
|14.4 |
|heroin |
| |
|9.9 |
|smoked cocaine (crack) |
| |
|7.7 |
|amphetamines |
| |
|3.5 |
|other-than-smoked cocaine (e.g., cocaine powder) |
| |
|3.1 |
|unknown substances |
| |
|2.9 |
|opiates other than heroin |
| |
|0.4 |
|tranquilizers |
| |
|0.2 |
|PCP |
| |
|0.2 |
|sedatives |
| |
|0.1 |
|hallucinogens |
| |
|0.1 |
|inhalants |
| |
Nearly 62 percent of admissions were White, 23.6 percent were African-American, and 13.3 percent were Hispanic or Latino.
By Race: Admissions to Publicly Funded
Substance Abuse Treatment Programs, 2003
|Percentage |
|of Admissions |
|Race/Ethinicity |
| |
|61.8 |
|White |
| |
|23.6 |
|African-American |
| |
|13.3 |
|Hispanic or Latino |
| |
|10.1 |
|Other |
| |
|2.3 |
|American Indian or Alaska Native |
| |
|1.1 |
|Asian American, |
|Native Hawaiian, or |
|Other Pacific Islander |
| |
|1.1 |
|Unknown |
| |
The largest age group entering treatment facilities were 36 to 40 years old (15.6 percent), followed by those 41 to 45 (14.2 percent) and 31 to 35 (13.6 percent).
By Age Group: Admissions to Publicly Funded
Substance Abuse Treatment Programs, 2003
|Percentage |
|of Admissions |
|Age Group |
| |
|15.6 |
|36 – 40 |
| |
|14.2 |
|41 – 45 |
| |
|13.6 |
|31 – 35 |
| |
|13.3 |
|21 – 25 |
| |
|11.3 |
|26 – 30 |
| |
|9.0 |
|46 – 50 |
| |
|8.5 |
|12 – 17 |
| |
|6.5 |
|18 – 20 |
| |
|4.5 |
|51 – 55 |
| |
|1.8 |
|56 – 60 |
| |
|0.7 |
|61 – 65 |
| |
|0.5 |
|66 or older |
| |
|0.2 |
|11 or younger |
| |
|0.2 |
|unknown age |
| |
For other information on treatment trends, visit the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies Web site at oas. or visit the National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information at .
For information on treatment research findings, visit the NIDA web site at nida.DrugPages/Treatment.html.
*Source: 2003 Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS). Office of Applied Studies, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
National Institute of Drug Abuse: Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction
Many people view drug abuse and addiction as strictly a social problem. Parents, teens, older adults, and other members of the community tend to characterize people who take drugs as morally weak or as having criminal tendencies. They believe that drug abusers and addicts should be able to stop taking drugs if they are willing to change their behavior.
These myths have not only stereotyped those with drug-related problems, but also their families, their communities, and the health care professionals who work with them. Drug abuse and addiction comprise a public health problem that affects many people and has wide-ranging social consequences. It is NIDA's goal to help the public replace its myths and long-held mistaken beliefs about drug abuse and addiction with scientific evidence that addiction is a chronic, relapsing, and treatable disease.
Addiction does begin with drug abuse when an individual makes a conscious choice to use drugs, but addiction is not just "a lot of drug use." Recent scientific research provides overwhelming evidence that not only do drugs interfere with normal brain functioning creating powerful feelings of pleasure, but they also have long-term effects on brain metabolism and activity. At some point, changes occur in the brain that can turn drug abuse into addiction, a chronic, relapsing illness. Those addicted to drugs suffer from a compulsive drug craving and usage and cannot quit by themselves. Treatment is necessary to end this compulsive behavior.
A variety of approaches are used in treatment programs to help patients deal with these cravings and possibly avoid drug relapse. NIDA research shows that addiction is clearly treatable. Through treatment that is tailored to individual needs, patients can learn to control their condition and live relatively normal lives.
Treatment can have a profound effect not only on drug abusers, but on society as a whole by significantly improving social and psychological functioning, decreasing related criminality and violence, and reducing the spread of AIDS. It can also dramatically reduce the costs to society of drug abuse.
Understanding drug abuse also helps in understanding how to prevent use in the first place. Results from NIDA-funded prevention research have shown that comprehensive prevention programs that involve the family, schools, communities, and the media are effective in reducing drug abuse. It is necessary to keep sending the message that it is better to not start at all than to enter rehabilitation if addiction occurs.
A tremendous opportunity exists to effectively change the ways in which the public understands drug abuse and addiction because of the wealth of scientific data NIDA has amassed. Overcoming misconceptions and replacing ideology with scientific knowledge is the best hope for bridging the "great disconnect" - the gap between the public perception of drug abuse and addiction and the scientific facts.
NIDA: Costs to Society of Drug Addiction
A study prepared by The Lewin Group for the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism estimated the total economic cost of alcohol and drug abuse to be $245.7 billion for 1992. Of this cost, $97.7 billion* was due to drug abuse. This estimate includes substance abuse treatment and prevention costs as well as other healthcare costs, costs associated with reduced job productivity or lost earnings, and other costs to society such as crime and social welfare. The study also determined that these costs are borne primarily by governments (46 percent), followed by those who abuse drugs and members of their households (44 percent).
The 1992 cost estimate has increased 50 percent over the cost estimate from 1985 data. The four primary contributors to this increase were (1) the epidemic of heavy cocaine use (2) the HIV epidemic (3) an eightfold increase in state and Federal incarcerations for drug offenses, and (4) a threefold increase in crimes attributed to drugs.
More than half of the estimated costs of drug abuse were associated with drug-related crime. These costs included lost productivity of victims and incarcerated perpetrators of drug- related crime (20.4 percent); lost legitimate production due to drug-related crime careers (19.7 percent); and other costs of drug-related crime, including Federal drug traffic control, property damage, and police, legal, and corrections services (18.4 percent). Most of the remaining costs resulted from premature deaths (14.9 percent), lost productivity due to drug-related illness (14.5 percent), and healthcare expenditures (10.2 percent).
The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)** conducted a study to determine how much money is spent on illegal drugs that otherwise would support legitimate spending or savings by the user in the overall economy. ONDCP found that, between 1988 and 1995, Americans spent $57.3 billion on drugs, broken down as follows: $38 billion on cocaine, $9.6 billion on heroin, $7 billion on marijuana, and $2.7 billion on other illegal drugs and on the misuse of legal drugs
* This estimate includes illicit drugs and other drugs taken for non-medical purposes. It does not include nicotine.
-----------------------
[1] The term “War on Drugs” is used throughout as it is commonly used by policymakers and the press in the United States. However, it should be noted that many critical observers challenge the appropriateness of a war metaphor to deal with the issue of illegal drugs because they contend that controlling illegal drug use is not a war at all, but rather a public health issue. For that reason, it is put in quotes here.
-----------------------
U.S. Drug War in the Andes:
Group information Packets*
[pic]
[pic]
[pic]
Name ______________________________ Date ___________
Name ______________________________ Date ___________
Name ______________________________ Date ___________
................
................
In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.
To fulfill the demand for quickly locating and searching documents.
It is intelligent file search solution for home and business.
Related searches
- homecomings financial network inc
- acura interactive network log in
- windows 10 network credentials reset
- homecomings financial network phone number
- homecomings financial network merger
- honda interactive network dealer site
- interactive network acura dealers
- interactive network honda
- american financial network inc complaints
- american financial network inc scam
- american financial network reviews
- how do i find my network credentials