Critique of Lee Strobels The Case for Faith (2001)



Critique of Lee Strobel's The Case for Faith (2001)

Paul Doland

I have read Lee Strobel's The Case for Faith. The book's stated goal is to investigate the "toughest objections to Christianity." Strobel made a list of eight objections that he considers the strongest objections to Christianity, and attempts to answer the questions by interviewing noted Christian authors and apologists. In my view, the answers provided by the Christians Strobel interviewed have serious logical faults and therefore do not adequately answer the objections Strobel raised.

About the Author of thie Critique

Problems with Strobel's Approach

Objection 1: Since Evil and Suffering Exist, A Loving God Cannot

Objection 2: Since Miracles Contradict Science, They Cannot be True

Objection 3: Evolution Explains Life, So God Isn't Needed

Objection 4: God Isn't Worthy if He Kills Innocent Children

Objection 5: It's Offensive to Claim Jesus is the Only Way to God

Objection 6: A Loving God Would Never Torture People in Hell

Sub-Objection 7: Why Didn't God Create Only Those He Knew Would Follow Him?

Sub-Objection 1: How Can God Send Children to Hell

Sub-Objection 8: Why Doesn't God Give People a Second Chance?

Sub-Objection 2: Why Does Everyone Suffer the Same in Hell

Sub-Objection 3: Why are People Punished Infinitely for Finite Crimes?

Sub-Objection 4: Couldn't God Force Everyone to go to Heaven?

Sub-Objection 5: Why Doesn't God Just Snuff People Out?

Sub-Objection 6: How Can Hell Exist Alongside Heaven?

Objection 7: Church History is Littered with Oppression and Violence

Objection 8: I Still Have Doubts, So I Can't be a Christian

Conclusion

About the Author of this Critique

I would like to provide a little information about who I am and my perspective. Everybody has a bias. I would like to share mine so that you can better judge whether my counter-arguments are valid or not. First off, I am empathetic to Christian's fears that if there is no God, then there is no absolute foundation for right and wrong, and no ultimate meaning to life. I've read some atheistic counter-arguments to these fears, but I haven't found them to be compelling. So I really want to believe there is a God and that there is more to life than what we see. On the other hand, I am not able to convince myself of that which fails my own logic. "Pascal's Wager" says that one might as well believe in God, because if you are wrong, it won't matter. And I for one would take Pascal on his wager if I could. But I cannot force myself to believe that which fails my logic any more than I could convince myself that squares are round if someone offered me a million dollars.

In my contemplation of the validity of the Christian faith, I've asked myself many of the same questions that Strobel asks. I've never heard anyone answer them in a fashion that I felt satisfies logic. I read The Case for Faith in some dim hope that perhaps he had uncovered better answers to my questions, but alas, in my view he has not. My expertise is in computer programming, a discipline based on logic. So I feel most competent in examining logical errors in the responses to the objections. Since my expertise is not in biology, I will not fully cover objections to Strobel's Creationist arguments. They are covered more thoroughly in other sources anyway. Even so, I will comment on some of the logical errors, and the misuse of probability and statistics that I see in the chapter on Creationism.

Problems with Strobel's Approach

Strobel's book would have to be classified as a "populist book," even by its supporters. What I mean is that it is written for the lay reader and does not attempt to be an exhaustive, studious apologetic work. This should not in itself be taken as a criticism of the book. For myself, I would not be qualified to  critique a more studious work. Some critics of my work here may argue that the questions I raise are simply too complex for the goals of this book. But I feel I am part of the target audience for this book, in that I am reasonably educated, if not an expert at theology, and I have been looking for answers to what have been my own questions about faith. My goal in this critique is to explain why I believe the work does not meet its intended goals.

Strobel's writing style is straightforward and easy to read. In most chapters, Strobel uses the first few pages to introduce the objection to faith and set the stage for the interview with the Christian theologist chosen for the question. To give Strobel credit, he usually does a very good job at introducing the objection. And most of the questions he asks in his interviews are valid, reasonable questions. My main complaint with Strobel is that after doing a good job at setting the stage, he invariably gets very inadequate responses to the questions and all too easily accepts them. A secondary complaint to Strobel's style is that he simply does not play the part of the critical skeptic well. Strobel portrays himself as a former atheist, and a tough reporter, and reminds us of this constantly. He seems to "try too hard" to make us believe that he isn't going to take an easy answer from whom he interviews. Does he really expect us to believe that he spoke "in a voice laden with sarcasm" to those he interviewed?

Many critics of Strobel's prior work, The Case for Christ, complained that he didn't bother including the opinions of any skeptics. Perhaps in answer to this complaint, Strobel's first interview is with Charles Templeton, a former minister that is now an agnostic and has left the ministry. This is a good interview and in fact does a good job at raising some of the questions many people have about the Christian faith. A supporter of Strobel would likely use this interview with Templeton as evidence of Strobel's willingness to take a hard look at the tough questions of faith. But there is one thing of importance to note: Strobel interviews one skeptic, in the beginning of the book, and interviews eight believers to answer Templeton's questions. Essentially, eight believers are given the opportunity to rebut Templeton's questions, but no skeptic is allowed to rebut the believers. This hardly qualifies as the work of a hard-nosed reporter trying to cover all the angles, as Strobel would have us to believe.

Sometimes the people Strobel interviews seem to contradict each other. I agree it is reasonable that not all theologians will agree with each other any more than all doctors will agree with each other. This may be true, but if Strobel is to play the part of the skeptical, hard-nosed reporter, he shouldn't let contradictions pass without exploration. It is not valid to interpret theology one way to give a plausible answer to one question, and then interpret it another so as to make an answer to another question plausible. But my general concerns aside, now to specific issues.

Objection 1: Since Evil and Suffering Exist, A Loving God Cannot

Strobel spends several pages explaining why he himself struggles with this question, a very difficult question. In fact, Templeton said that was a major reason why he turned away from the Christian faith. Templeton said that he saw a photograph of an African woman holding her dead baby in her arms, having died of starvation due to severe drought. God allowed all this suffering when all the woman needed was a little rain. How can there be a loving God if He won't even send a little rain?

To discuss this issue, Strobel interviewed Peter John Kreeft, Ph.D. Kreeft offers a couple of possible explanations for the suffering experienced by the woman who lost her child. For one, Kreeft says that finite humans are not capable of understanding the plans and reasoning of an infinite God. Kreeft gives an analogy, say a bear is caught in a trap. And say a hunter decides to free the bear from the trap. The hunter may shoot the bear with tranquilizer darts so that the hunter won't be attacked while freeing the bear. The act of pulling the leg out of the trap may cause additional pain. The bear would be convinced the hunter was a threat and an attacker, not able to see the good to come from the temporary pain. The bear is simply not able to comprehend what the hunter can. Kreeft argues that we, like the bear, may not be able to comprehend what eventual good may come from our pain and suffering.

Superficially, this may seem to make sense, but this logic has several faults. For one, presumably God had the option of creating us with better understanding, better able to see and understand what God sees. Why did he not give us better understanding? However, if we are like the bear, unable to comprehend what God comprehends, then God can hardly blame us if we come to conclusions consistent with our level of comprehension any more than we can blame the bear for coming to conclusions consistent with its level of comprehension. If it looks to me that God had other options -- such as making us more aware of what He is aware of -- and that conclusion seems consistent with my ability to comprehend events, how can I be blamed for coming to this conclusion -- even if from God's perspective it is false?

Kreeft further discusses the issue of the mother's suffering and says, "Why doesn't he send the rain? God's answer is the Incarnation. He himself entered into all that agony, he himself bore all of the pain of this world, and that's unimaginable and shattering and even more impressive than the divine power of creating the world in the first place." Um, that's all fine and good Dr. Kreeft, but why didn't God send the rain? I'm aware of the fact that Christians believe that Jesus carried the weight of all of man's sins to the cross, and Jesus suffered in hell to pay for our sins. But why didn't God send the rain? The point I'm trying to make, obviously, is that Dr. Kreeft didn't answer the question. If God cares so much for our pain that He is willing to take on our pain Himself, why does God not simply decrease our pain?

Dr. Kreeft also discusses the question of the existence of evil. Kreeft provides some of the common answers most Christians give to this question, namely that good cannot exist without evil. If there was no bad, how would we know what good is? He says that life is like an old Twilight Zone episode, where a bank robber gets shot and finds himself on a fluffy cloud where he is given anything he wants. But he soon gets bored and would rather go back to Earth, or even hell. But then he finds that he is in hell. Kreeft says, "the point is that a world without suffering appears more like hell than heaven."

Superficially, this sounds reasonable, but does not stand up to scrutiny. No matter how valid this might seem, it seemingly does not apply to heaven. If Kreeft believes that an Earth without pain and suffering would be like hell, what exactly does Kreeft believe heaven is like? Do Satan, Hitler, Stalin, etc. run around heaven causing random acts of pain and suffering in heaven so that we aren't bored all the time? It seems God created a place, heaven, that does not have such limitations, so why would He then create a place that does?

Kreeft also indicates that God hates evil and did not create evil. But by creating free will, God created the opportunity for evil. This is a logical contradiction with Kreeft's previous argument that good cannot exist without evil. If God only created the opportunity for evil, then if no being to whom He gave free will chose to manifest evil, then good would exist without evil.

Kreeft uses the opportunity of the interview to discuss some issues not directly related to the issue of pain and suffering. Many skeptics will ask why does not God show himself more. Kreeft says, "Scripture describes God as a hidden God . . . If we had absolute proof instead of clues, then you could no more deny God than you could deny the sun." The question is then why does God find people believing in Him without direct evidence to be of more value than people believing in Him because He has shown Himself? God is often called our "Heavenly Father." If somebody's earthly father moved to another country and left no forwarding address, but left a few clues lying around as to where to find him, would we consider this earthly father worthy of going to go find? If this human father got mad because some of his children didn't dedicate their lives to finding this guy, would we not consider this human father rather off his proverbial rocker? Is not the love of a child for a father who does not hide, who directly cares for the child, actually more rational than loving the father that runs and hides and gets mad if you don't find him?

Kreeft also tries to dismiss atheism, saying it is "snobbish" and "elitist" as more than 90% of all human beings that have ever lived believe in God. Frankly, I found taking Kreeft seriously after this comment rather difficult. At one time, more than 90% of the world's population had believed the earth was flat, but that certainly didn't make it so. Please don't take that comment as my saying that I equate believing in God to believing the Earth is flat -- I categorically deny this. But understanding our world and its natural forces has been a quest of man throughout history. And during this quest, at times, beliefs that were held as unquestionable by the majority are proven false. And Kreeft must of course also realize that 90% of all human beings that ever lived have not believed in his God. Kreeft would likely believe followers of Buddhism, Hinduism, pagan religions and so on as totally false, but he'll be happy to accept their members just for the moment to "prove" how "snobbish" atheism is.

I am reticent to quote scripture. As soon as I do, someone will claim that I'm quoting out of context, or using a translation that doesn't accurately represent the original words, etc. And since I'm not an expert at biblical interpretation, I'm really not qualified to debate such a line of argument. So upon that qualification, I will say that there is scripture that appears to contradict Dr. Kreeft. He contends strongly that God is all good and did not create evil, but only the opportunity for evil. Yet 1 Samuel says that God creates evil spirits and sends the spirits to do His bidding:

Now the Spirit of the Lord had departed from Saul, and an evil spirit from the Lord tormented him. (1 Samuel 16:14 NIV)

By the way, many Christians often assert that simply recognizing "evil" as being "evil" in and of itself proves there is a God. If there is no God, then there is no absolute definition of what is evil and what is not evil. It is true that if there is no God, there is no ultimate definition of what is "good" and what is "evil." But the fact that we have concepts "good" and "evil" does not necessarily prove there is a God creating such definitions. For example, there is no absolute definition of "hot." And yet, from our biological perspective, we can judge what is "hot" and what is not "hot." Similarly, "pain": if there is no God, then there is no ultimate meaning as to whether "pain" is "good" or "bad." Yet we are biologically wired to interpret "pain" as "bad." This is part of the preservation-of-the-self/preservation-of-the-species mechanism. Also, we seem to have the ability to empathize. I suspect that this is also a biological preservation-of-the-species mechanism. Therefore, it seems likely that our concepts of "good" and "evil" are derived from our biological drive to avoid pain and our biological ability to empathize. So, it seems that despite the fact that many concepts don't have an ultimate meaning in a godless universe does not mean that they are without meaning to our biological nature.

In conclusion, for this objection, I do not find the response to the existence of evil and suffering to be sufficiently logical and consistent to consider it to be a satisfactory answer to the question in even the slightest degree.

Objection 2: Since Miracles Contradict Science, They Cannot be True

For this question, Strobel interviews Dr. William Lane Craig, Ph.D. Dr. Craig provides a simple answer, a God that is capable of creating the entire universe and known physical laws is surely capable of deciding to suspend them if He so chooses. This, in and of itself, is logical. If God did create all of the physical laws, He certainly could suspend them if He saw fit. However, how Dr. Craig applies this reasoning to science is faulty. Though this interview was not about Creationism, Dr. Craig did bring the subject up. Dr. Craig says that many scientists dismiss supernatural explanations to events without ever considering them. Craig contends that an honest investigator should include all options, even supernatural explanations, in the "pool of live options" to explain an event. He says that if an investigator only considers natural explanations, but "there is no natural explanation, they're simply left with ignorance."

Superficially, this again seems reasonable. But there are a number of flaws in this logic. Say someone is accused of murder, and the defendant claims that he was framed by Satan. Satan put the defendant's fingerprints on the gun, and forged all of the other incriminating evidence. Should we consider this to be a member of the "pool of live options?" If not, why not? According to Christian thought, Satan is the second most powerful being in the universe. Certainly Satan is capable of committing this crime, is he not? How can we prove that the defendant is not telling the truth? It is true that supernatural explanations cannot be disproved. The problem is that they likewise cannot be proved. This makes supernatural occurrences outside of the scope of science -- even if they do exist. Science only deals in the realm of natural law just like auto-mechanics only deal with automobiles.

Here is an analogy. Some of our ancestors thought lightning to be the wrath of God. Pretend for a moment that lightning actually is the wrath of God. What could a scientist do? The only thing he could do would be to helplessly try in vain to find a natural explanation for lightning, only to fail again and again. If scientists were to just say, "God did it" every time something that at the time defied natural explanation, essentially nothing would have ever been discovered or invented. This is why supernatural explanations can never be among the "pool of live options" for a scientist. Essentially, what I am saying is Creationism is an attempt by religion to enter the realm of science, where it does not belong, regardless of the validity of the religion. But Creationism is not the first such attempt; it has been attempted frequently by the church. Everyone of course knows of Galileo being persecuted for discovering that the Earth is not the center of the solar system. But there have been many other cases. The discovery of disease being caused by germs was originally considered heresy. The discovery of matter being made of atoms was originally considered heresy. In each case, the scientists had to defy the church's claim that "God says you are wrong."

In conclusion, for this objection, I again must reject the response as usatisfactory.

Objection 3: Evolution Explains Life, So God Isn't Needed

As noted in the introduction, I am not a biologist and therefore do not feel qualified to discuss the biological arguments far or against Creationism. There are better sources than I for this information. My critique of this chapter will discuss what I perceive to be a misuse of logic and math in the arguments presented by Walter L. Bradley, Ph.D. as interviewed by Strobel.

I will borrow an analogy that I read somewhere, but I cannot remember the source. In this analogy, the person said to imagine someone driving a car, ignoring all signs and just making random turns. A few days later he calls me and tells me he is in Chicago. I explain to him that is impossible. The probability that he would have taken each and every turn necessary to end in Chicago is so small that he couldn't possibly be there. Of course he had to wind up somewhere. Yet anywhere he ends up, I could calculate the probability that he ended up there to be very small. Any probability discussion on whether life exactly as we know it could evolve faces a similar problem. Yes, the probability that life exactly as we know would evolve is very small, but it proves nothing about the probability of life as we do not know it evolving.

The second problem with attempting to use probability to prove Creationism is that probability can never do anything of the sort. Even if a Creationist could disprove evolution, that would not in and of it self prove Creationism. The Creationist presents the argument as either/or, assuming that no third or forth possibilities exist. In attempting to show the probability of evolution to be small, they hope to prove that therefore Creationism must be correct. But probability doesn't work that way. There is no way to know that perhaps some other possibility, perhaps one not yet discovered, is responsible for life.

However, for the sake of argument, let's assume there are only two choices, Evolution or Creationism. If you can for a moment, imagine that you do not know that the proverbial "life, universe and everything" exists at all. Then define some characteristics that happen to be consistent with our universe. The definition of this universe should include an outline of current laws of physics. It should include the fact that there are countless galaxies, with billions of stars each; and at least one planet with many forms of life, including one self-aware animal known as man. Calculate the following probabilities:

1. The defined universe comes into existence via purely natural means, and evolutionary processes eventually lead to the origin of the animal known as man.

2. A God powerful enough to create the defined universe and all life forms including man exists, and this God in fact decides to create this universe.

In neither case can you really find a formula to calculate the probability. And yet, one would have to conclude that if there were such formulas, either case would generate an extremely small number. Showing that the probability of option 1 being very small does not increase the probability of option 2, nor vise-versa. Now, option 1 has many sub-components, some of which may be calculable to some degree. (Though I would argue that the mathematical validity of most attempts to try to do so are highly suspect.) While option 2 has no sub-components that somebody could attempt to try to run probability on. This gives the math used to attempt to disprove option 1 a more credible appearance. But it is only because there is no method to do any math at all on the second option.

I found it not terribly surprising that Dr. Bradley did not directly comment on the age of the Earth issue. Some Creationists, known as "Young-Earth Creationists" (YECs) insist that the Genesis account is to be taken literally, and that the Earth is but a few thousand years old. Other Creationists, known as "Old-Earth Creationists" (OECs), accept at least most of the body of evidence supporting a very ancient Earth and universe. OECs believe that much of Genesis is to be taken figuratively. As a general rule, it seems that Creationists try to avoid discussions of the age of the Earth when attacking evolution as they themselves are so divided on this issue. Dr. Craig, who was actually interviewed for the prior question, uses the Big Bang as evidence for a Creator. A lot of Creationists use this line of argument. In fact it was a Catholic monsignor Georges LeMaitre who originally postulated the Big Bang Theory. Einstein himself vehemently denied the validity of the theory until eventually the evidence proved overwhelming. Dr. Stephen Hawking, famous for his book A Brief History of Time, discusses the problem of the "singularity" of the Big Bang at length in his book. Frankly, I'm not sufficiently versed in physics to argue whether there are valid naturalistic explanations for the Big Bang. I will admit that I consider the Big Bang being the result of a Creator to be possible. (Remember that I'm an agnostic.)

However, anyone that uses the argument that the Big Bang is indicative of a creative action by God must also accept some of the other implications of the Big Bang. If you accept the Big Bang, then you must be an OEC. Nobody could rationally argue that the Big Bang happened only a few thousand years ago. OECs must accept that the universe and the Earth are billions of years old, spanning countless light-years of space. OECs, by accepting the science that the Big Bang theory is predicated on, must also accept at least the bulk of the body of scientific knowledge. OECs must accept at least most of the fossil record as to various creatures existing on Earth over the span of billions of years, even if they believe that each of these creatures were individually created instead of evolved.

So now lets compare what an OEC must believe compared to what are biblical teachings about creation. A fundamental teaching of Christianity (and Judaism as well) is that man was created in the Garden of Eden and that man was cast out of the garden by eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Genesis 1:28 and 1:29 indicates man and all the beasts in the Garden of Eden were vegetarian, and never die. (This theology is discussed further by Dr. Geisler in Objection 4.) But the implications of an old Earth is that death and carnivorous animals existed for billions of years before God decided to create man.

OEC presents a very peculiar Creation story. In OEC, God seems to have spent billions of years creating untold life forms for no apparent purpose except for us to find fossils of them. Though God frequently creates new simple creatures, God seems to choose a general pattern of creating more complex creatures as time progresses. He even created close-kin hominoids to man, such as Neanderthal Man, not much before man (cosmologically speaking,) only to let Neanderthal Man become extinct. While I'm aware that OECs admit some of Genesis is figurative, there seems to be no correlation what-so-ever between the implications of an old Earth and the Genesis account.

As far as YEC, and the belief that the Earth is but a few thousand years old, this is simply not believable. Even OECs admit that the evidence for a young Earth to be laughable. Surprisingly, there is even some YECs that agree that the scientific evidence clearly points to an old Earth, but these OECs believe that God purposefully made it look old. This is known as the "Age of Appearance" theory. Let's see, God goes to extraordinary efforts to make the Earth look old, and to make it look like evolution took place, but gets mad at you if you actually believe it is old? What kind of God is this?

Essentially, it seems that the OECs and YECs disprove each other. The OECs are correct that there is just too much evidence against a young Earth. And the YECs are correct that the implications of an old-earth are just not reconcilable at all with the Genesis account, even if some of it is figurative. It is my (perhaps biased) opinion that the reason why many Creationists seem reticent to discuss the age of the Earth is because as soon as they take a stand one way or the other, their ability to defend that stand evaporates. It seems that both OECs and YECs would have to begrudgingly admit that whether the Earth is young or old, God seems to have spent an inordinate amount of effort making Creation "look like" evolution. And then God is going to get angry with us if we believe evolution? This is a most strange God. As I already noted, it seems that OECs and YECs effectively disprove each other, irrespective of any evidence for or against evolution.

Objection 4: God Isn't Worthy if He Kills Innocent Children

For this question, Dr. Norman L. Geisler, Ph.D. was interviewed. Strobel questions Geisler about how a "merciful" God could order genocide of the Canaanites, "put to death men and women, children and infants, cattle and sheep, camels and donkeys." Geisler responds that the mission of the Canaanite was genocide of the Jews; and "the destruction of their nation was necessitated by the gravity of their sin." He argues that the Canaanites were simply beyond salvation. This seems to contradict what I understand to be a fundamental tenant of Christianity that everyone is loved by God, even if He hates their sin; and that everyone has the potential to see their sins, repent, and be saved. I don't see how Geisler's view can be reconciled with the Christian view.

Strobel presses on with the question of the children, how could they deserve to die? Geisler explains this was actually an act of mercy. He says that Isaiah 7:16 shows that if a child dies before the "age of accountability," he or she goes to heaven. I was glad to see Strobel ask, "if ultimately it was best for those children to die before the age of accountability because they would go to heaven, why can't the same be said about unborn children who are aborted today?" I was very happy to see the question asked, as I've asked it myself many times. Geisler response was, "First, God doesn't command anyone today to have an abortion; in fact, it's contrary to the teachings of the bible. Remember, he's the only one who can decide to take a life, because he's the ultimate author of life. Second, today we don't have a culture that's as thoroughly corrupt as the Amalekite society. In that society, there was no hope; today, there is hope."

I do not find Geisler's response satisfactory. First, regardless of whether or not God commands abortion, according to Geisler's stated theology, aborted children do go to heaven. Period. So how could it possibly be a "bad" thing for an abortion doctor to send children to heaven? If an abortion doctor would stand before God and say, "Everybody I aborted is here, right? And if I didn't do it, some of them would be in hell, right? So, now explain to me exactly what it is that I did wrong?" How could God answer this doctor? Or, what if Andrea Yates, the Houston mother that drowned her five children were to say, "I knew I would go to hell if I did this, but I couldn't bear the thought that maybe some of my children might not go to heaven. So, like Jesus, I sacrificed myself and opted to go to hell so that my children will be sure to live forever in the company of God." How could a Christian argue against this logic?

And I have to ask one more question. Presumably X percent of people go to heaven, and Y percent go to hell where both X and Y are greater than 0 and less than 100. As long as Y is greater than 0, the moment a person reaches the Age of Accountability, statistically speaking, they have just lost Y percent chance of going to heaven. So what possible value is living beyond the Age of Accountability? Of what use is life on Earth if all that life on Earth means is a possible chance to throw away salvation? In my own personal case, as can be seen, I find it impossible to have faith in a God that chooses such a bizarre method of choosing who goes to heaven and who goes to hell. But if it turns out in fact that these are God's rules -- whether I like it or not -- and God decides to send me to hell for not liking His rules, then clearly I would have been better off dying before I had the chance to conclude His rules are inane. Christians reading this are probably horrified at my words. Okay, but show me the fault in my logic.

Strobel then asks Geisler about the existence of carnivorous animals. "Why did [God] create a world where predators constantly stalk prey and where violent death is an integral part of life?" Geisler responds that Genesis 1:28-29 shows that man and all animals were created as herbivores. He says that Romans 8 shows that the fall of man is responsible for the change of Creation. Okay, but why would God punish and/or distort every form of life He created on Earth because man erred? Also, as I noted in the previous objection, this type of theology is really only consistent with YEC. OEC accepts that many forms of beasts roamed the Earth before man. So here, we have a theologian using YEC to attempt to give a rational answer to one of Strobel's questions, while other questions are answered via OEC theology. And Strobel, unsurprisingly, says nothing. Strobel seems to accept the "theology of the moment" to try to answer a question and completely ignore the fact that the theologies are incompatible.

At this point, I would like to ask the reader to indulge me on a subject that is only distantly related to my critique of this book, but happens to be related to Geisler's discussion about man (and beast) being originally created herbivorous. I have spent many years trying to figure out what I believe. Do I believe in Christianity? Buddhism? Atheism? For a number of years, I tried to be a Christian, but the illogic of it made it very difficult for me. But during the period I was trying to be a Christian, I was influenced by some vegetarian speakers on the subject of animal abuse in factory farms. I didn't know if there was a God or not, but I concluded that if there is one, He must find the factory farm system to be abhorrent. I found some literature speaking about biblical support of such a position, so I was comforted that at least some Christians and Jews agreed with what I had learned. But yet, I knew that most Christians and Jews think that either God doesn't care what we do to animals, or even encourages us to use them however we see fit. This incongruence was probably one of the more influential reasons to stop attempting to be a Christian.

Even so, there is a small, but growing number of Christians and Jews that do see man as caretaker of creation, not its exploiter. Christians and Jews probably would not accept anything I would say on the matter, so I would like to encourage Christians to read, Is God a Vegetarian? by Richard Young and Carol Adams. Note that the authors conclude that Jesus was not a vegetarian (despite some recent attempts to reinvent him as such). But the authors also conclude that vegetarianism is preferable and God would have to find factory farms contemptible. Likewise, for Jews, I would like to recommend Judaism and Vegetarianism by Richard H. Schwartz, Ph.D.

I would like to end this section with a biblical quote:

Whenever the rainbow appears in the clouds I will see it and remember the everlasting covenant between God and all living creatures of every kind on the earth. (Gen 9:16)

Objection 5: It's Offensive to Claim Jesus is the Only Way to God

Strobel notes that many people assert that all religions, in essence, "teach the universal fatherhood of God and the universal brotherhood of humankind." Strobel interviewed Ravi Zacharias, D.D., LL.D. to discuss this question. Zacharias responds in several ways. First, he asserts that most religions claim exclusivity of truth, so it is unfair to single out Christianity and criticize it for this. Second, he contends that just because almost all religions claim they are right doesn't mean that there isn't one that in fact is true and the others are not true.

A common objection of skeptics is to ask, "What about the people who have never heard the gospel?" Zacharias responds, "God knows where we will be born and raised, and he puts us in a position where we might seek him. We are clearly told that wherever we live in whatever culture, in whatever nation -- he is within reach of every one of us." The question then becomes exactly what must one think and do to be forgiven by God? If you have an equal chance to see and follow God no matter what your culture, then specifically believing in Christianity isn't the specific requirement. So what is? Some of the other Christians interviewed argue that the requirement is more of a decision to follow God rather than follow yourself. I gather Zacharias would agree with this. But the point is, if no matter what your religious upbringing, you have an equal opportunity to choose to follow God, then the consequence of this is either: (a) any religion is an equally valid way to learn to follow God; or (b) all religious upbringings, including Christianity, are totally irrelevant and have no bearing on salvation.

What value is going to church? What value is being taught Christianity? Zacharias has to say either that being taught Christianity helps one to choose the right path, or it doesn't. Pick one. If it does help, then clearly those that aren't taught Christianity are NOT given the same opportunity to follow God as those that aren't taught Christianity. Or if it doesn't help at all, then what value is it to be taught Christianity? I attended a Lutheran church whose minister I spoke with many times when I was trying to be a Christian. He said that he used to be more fundamentalist, but now he is totally against the traditional Christian tenet that salvation depends on faith in God. In his view, this theology does exactly what it claims not to do. It claims that it takes salvation out of man's hands and puts it in God's hand. But in reality, it does the opposite. It puts salvation in the hands of the individual, and in the hands of those that teach Christianity. So this minister says that he would now turn away from a God that simply "throws away souls." If there is a God, I feel fairly confident that He must be more like the God my Lutheran minister believes in than the one that Strobel and Zacharias believe in.

Objection 6: A Loving God Would Never Torture People in Hell

Like many chapters, this one started out promising. Strobel, when introducing his objections, is often very candid at how troublesome the objection is. Ultimately, however, I found this chapter a maddening read, so fraught with logical errors too numerous to completely detail. Strobel chose to interview Dr. J. P. Moreland, Ph.D. Dr. Moreland believes that hell is not quite what some "fire and brimstone" preachers teach. Moreland says that the use of the word fire in the Bible is figurative. There is no fire and burning or torturing. He says, "the punishment of hell is separation from God, bringing shame, anguish and regret . . . The pain that's suffered will be due to the sorrow from the final, ultimate, unending banishment from God, his kingdom, and the good life for which we were created in the first place." Strobel interjected that some might see Moreland as "soft-pedaling" hell. But Moreland insisted that was not so, saying, "hell is the worst possible situation that could ever happen to a person."

So how does a person get himself or herself sent to hell? For one, Moreland argues that it is actually an act of compassion on God's part to send people to hell! Moreland says that people in their lives make "thousands of little choices each day without even knowing about it. Each day we're preparing ourselves for either being with God and his people and valuing the things he values, or choosing not to engage with those things . . . If people do not fall passionately in love with him, then to force them to have to be around him forever -- doing the kinds of things that people who love him would want to do -- would be utterly uncomfortable." I find many, many problems with this theology. For starters, if God is being compassionate by sending people who don't want to be around Him to hell, why are the people in hell not exercising their free will to do the things that they do want to do? If God is not actively punishing the people in hell, why is it "the worst possible situation?" Moreland makes it sound like hell would be a great place to go and "do your thing." Secondly, if the people in hell are full of regret for throwing away the good life they were meant for, it seems to me that they probably would like to be with God. How can somebody who has proven to God's satisfaction that they don't want to be around God be unhappy not being around God? This doesn't make any sense.

The question of hell was so important to Strobel, he made a separate set of sub-objections to hell. I wish to cover these sub-objections, out of order from Strobel's sequence.

Sub-Objection 7: Why Didn't God Create Only Those He Knew Would Follow Him?

Moreland's response to this sub-objection, in my view, is incredibly strange. First, Moreland agrees that God could have probably done this had He only wanted to create a few people to go to heaven. He could have created maybe ten people He knew would follow Him. (Does Moreland not know that God seems to have failed to be able to predict what two people, Adam and Eve, would do?) But then Moreland goes on to say that if God wanted to create millions or billions of people to go to heaven, God would have to create many more that would sadly go to hell due to the interactions of all the people. Moreland uses the movie Back to the Future as an analogy that, as best as I can determine, shows that God Himself is subject to chaos theory and cannot predict every reaction to every action. (Actually, I'm not 100% certain this is what Moreland is trying to say, this is only my best guess at his incoherent answer.)

God cannot predict every reaction to every action? I thought God was omniscient? How could God not be able to fully predict ramifications of interactions once there are more than about ten people in the world? Does the math just eventually get to be too much for God? It seems to me that Moreland would have been better off just sticking to the more common theology that free will prevents God from knowing who would follow Him. Instead, Moreland's allusions to chaos theory come off as preposterous.

Sub-Objection 1: How Can God Send Children to Hell

Moreland denies God sends children to hell. He does not specify how salvation of children is handled however. I can only guess he believes in the "Age of Accountability" theology, where those who die too young are automatically sent to heaven. I've already covered my objections to the "Age of Accountability" theology in main Objection 4. If Moreland believes a different mechanism is at work, he doesn't specify, so I can't judge if it is valid or not.

Sub-Objection 8: Why Doesn't God Give People a Second Chance?

Moreland responds, "this question assumes God didn't do everything he could do before people died, and I reject that. God does everything he can to give people a chance and there will not be a single person who will be able to say to God, 'if you had just not allowed me to die prematurely, if you'd have given me another twelve months, I know I would have made that decision.'" But this contradicts what he said in Sub-objection 7, where he claimed God Himself doesn't even know what will come of every human interaction. So how can Moreland now say that there would be no chance that a person could die before they would have made the right choice? People every day accept Christianity, right? And if those that accepted it today had died yesterday, they'd be in hell, right? So how can God say for sure that someone didn't die prematurely?

Moreland also says that if God gave people another chance, then what would be the point of life on Earth? Good question. What is the point of life on Earth? A billion years from now, are you going to be sitting in heaven talking about the time your aunt died? How could any experience as a mortal human on Earth be in any way useful to an immortal being in heaven? After all, those who do die as children, for whatever reason, seem to do just fine without experiencing a full mortal experience. As near as I can tell, everybody should just be killed before the "Age of Accountability" so that they can live forever in heaven.

Sub-Objection 2: Why Does Everyone Suffer the Same in Hell

Moreland contends that there are different levels of suffering in hell. But he also contends that all suffer mightily, so it seems to be a pointless discussion.

Sub-Objection 3: Why are People Punished Infinitely for Finite Crimes?

Moreland says that the length of time one takes to commit a crime is not a function of the severity of the crime. So length of punishment is not related to length of the crime. Okay, but the severity of a punishment clearly should be related to the severity of the crime. I don't know the proper scriptural references, but I'm fairly certain that a Christian tenet is that punishment should be commensurate with the crime; and an infinite punishment could not possibly be commensurate with a finite crime.

Sub-Objection 4: Couldn't God Force Everyone to go to Heaven?

Moreland goes back to saying that God doesn't want to force people to be with Him if they don't want to be with Him. But the fact that people in hell are unhappy about being separated from God clearly disproves this. Moreland seems to keep picking a "theology of the moment" that changes with every question.

Sub-Objection 5: Why Doesn't God Just Snuff People Out?

Moreland discusses his concept of "intrinsic value" and says people have "intrinsic value." He says that based on the intrinsic value of people, God "refuses to snuff out a creature made in his own image." So, instead, God punishes forever beings of "intrinsic value?" He sends to hell creatures "made in his own image?" How is that "morally superior," as Moreland claims? What school of "morality" is this?

Sub-Objection 6: How Can Hell Exist Alongside Heaven?

If heaven is a place with "no more tears," Strobel asks, "why are there no tears for those in hell?" Moreland says that the people in heaven will realize that hell is protecting their "intrinsic value." What if some of the people in heaven don't agree? How can God know they won't have sadness and appeal to Him on the damned's behalf for all eternity?

In conclusion to Objection 6, I found Morland's responses to every question, and to every sub-objection, to be weak at best and preposterous at worst.

Objection 7: Church History is Littered with Oppression and Violence

Strobel interviews Dr. John D. Woodbridge, Ph.D. for this question. I have no notable complaints to this chapter. I accept that the violence and oppression done in the name of God are not because of God. Some of the warmest, kindest people I know are Christians. I do not blame them for the faults of those who claim to follow the same religion.

Objection 8: I Still Have Doubts, So I Can't be a Christian

Strobel interviews Lynn Anderson, D.Min. for this question. Essentially, this chapter says that essentially all Christians have doubts from time to time, and it is natural. The only real question I have to this is then how much doubt is okay? I would gather that probably Strobel and those he interviewed would generally say something to the effect that God is able to determine whether any specific individual is more on the path toward faith or against faith. So God might accept you even if you have a lot of doubt, just so long as your "spiritual pendulum" is swinging toward faith. I'm not an atheist, although some might claim me to be so after reading this. At times I've really tried to have faith, but the questions such as those in this review kept me from really being able to have much faith. Perhaps God Himself might view this entire critique as an attempt on my part to try to find somebody that might be able to give me answers that I find more logically acceptable. Perhaps He might therefore conclude that I'm more on the path toward faith than against faith. I honestly don't know.

Conclusion

As I noted earlier, in the past I have tried, to the best of my ability, to convince myself to have faith. In Strobel's conclusion, he argues that even if you can't find a satisfying answer to every question you have, you should base your faith on that which you do feel is valid. You should have faith that those questions that you do have left will eventually be answered in the fullness of time. But for myself, where I don't find very many satisfactory answers to any of my questions, I find very little of a case for faith.

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