THE TENSION BETWEEN ARISTOTLE_S THEORIES



THE TENSION BETWEEN ARISTOTLE'S THEORIES AND USES OF METAPHOR

[Artículo publicado en Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 28, nº 1, pp. 123-139, 1997]

Alfredo Marcos

Departamento de Filosofía, Universidad de Valladolid, Plaza de la Universidad, 1,

47002-VALLADOLID, Spain

0. Introduction

Today the philosophy of science commonly acknowledges the cognitive and scientific role of metaphor[i]. Moreover, metaphor is beginning to be treated linguistically as a cognitive phenomenon[ii], while a flourishing tradition exists in rhetorical studies advocating the cognitive and communicative relevance of metaphor and other tropes in different discursive contexts[iii].

There is still, however, an on-going debate concerning the role of tropes in scientific discourse and their compatibility with a realistic theory of science. In this regard, Aristotle's work is one of the most interesting case-studies in history from which some light might be thrown on this debate, as there is an unavoidable three-way tension between his methodological claims, rhetorical and literary theories and scientific practice in his texts. In his biological works, for example, there are many instances of explanatory resources other than definition followed by deduction, while metaphor, simile, analogy and model are used throughout. Yet Aristotle, as a natural philosopher, never abandons a realistic point of view, while it was he who developed the first explicit theory of metaphor. Despite the ubiquitous presence of metaphorical expressions in his biological texts, in some (e.g., APo[iv]) he denies the cognitive functions of metaphor. We are therefore justified in demanding a new, more consistent, interpretation of the relevant Aristotelian passages, and an explanation of their relevance to some contemporary philosophical problems.

The approach will be as follows: firstly, I shall comment on the texts where criticism is made of the use of metaphorical expressions in science (section 1). The second section deals with the actual use of metaphors, similes, analogies and models in Aristotelian biology, examples being used to bring out their extent and function. In section three I shall attempt to counter this assumed opposition by means of a new interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of metaphor and APo methodology, for which a delimitation of metaphor, simile, analogy and model is required, as is a discussion of their mutual relationships (3.1). We shall then be in a position to suggest a reading which reduces the perennial tension between different Aristotelian treatises (3.2). At that point, a comment on the role of APo in the economy of scientific explanation would seem to be in order (section 4). I shall end with a conclusive summary (5.).

1. The Assumed Refusal of Metaphor

It would be easy to establish, by means of examples, the practical significance of metaphorical images in natural history and metaphysics. Difficulties arise, however, from the theoretical and methodological points of view, owing to the puzzling nature of Aristotle's explicit statements about the cognitive value of metaphor[v].

When Empedocles took the salty ocean to be the Earth's sweat, Aristotle judged this figure as unfit for the understanding of the nature of things and suitable only as ornament[vi]. He also criticized other comparisons made by Empedocles[vii], by the other presocratic philosophers[viii] and by Plato[ix].

We can easily accommodate these texts by considering that the criticism affects only particular instances of metaphor by virtue of their lack of appropriateness or accuracy, due to their obscureness or emptiness and their merely ornamental character, but not for being metaphors, which is to say that Empedocles, for instance, is the target of Aristotle's criticism, not for using metaphors, but for using bad ones[x]. So, all that is important here is that criticism is levelled at the quality of the figures, not at their metaphorical nature.

In APo, however, we may find more explicit condemnation of metaphor in science[xi]:

"We may add that if dialectical disputation must not employ metaphors, clearly metaphors and metaphorical expressions are precluded in definition: otherwise dialectic would involve metaphors"[xii].

On the basis of these texts, subsequent tradition abolished the cognitive dimension of the Aristotelian theory of metaphor[xiii], although it might be a historical mistake to blame Aristotle himself for such a loss on the grounds of these passages alone. Aristotle was the first philosopher to assert the importance of the role of metaphor in the growth of knowledge and language[xiv]. In my opinion, the Aristotelian theory of metaphor should be placed near the current cognitive theories of metaphor (such as the formular view, intentionalism, intuitionism, contextualism and interactionism) and in opposition to such non-cognitive theories as emotivism[xv]. Let us then comment on another set of Aristotelian passages where extensive use is made of tropes, and their cognitive value is asserted.

2. The Actual Use of Metaphors, Similes, Analogies and Models in Aristotelian Biology

Metaphor, simile, analogy and model appear throughout Aristotle's biological treatises[xvi], the following occurring, for example in PA: the blood vessels and heart are compared to vases[xvii], the flow of blood is like water in an irrigation channel[xviii], the belly resembles a manger from which the body takes its nourishment[xix], the warm area of the heart is like the acropolis for a polis, or the fireplace for a home[xx]. The term "concoction" (pepsis), the centre of Aristotle's "thermodynamic" physiology, is a metaphorical one[xxi]. Some of these figures, as P. Louis[xxii] points out, are taken from Plato's Timaeus, while the origin of some others is even older[xxiii], for example, male and female in generation are compared respectively to the Sun and Earth[xxiv], a figure going back at least as far as Hesiod. He also compares the male principle in generation, as an efficient cause, to a carpenter or a potter[xxv]. For Aristotle, even the development and motion of a living being could be seen as the motion of marvellous automata[xxvi].

Aristotle often uses elements taken from everyday life and work, especially from fishing and sailing, such activities obviously being familiar to the Greek people, so a quadruped's legs are seen as the supports of a ship in dry dock[xxvii], the back legs of a grasshopper are like the rudder of a boat[xxviii], and a lobster's tail is like an oar[xxix]. The elephant's trunk is likened to a diver's breathing tube[xxx], and the neck and beak of certain long-legged birds are seen as a fishing-rod with line and hook[xxxi].

It is worth noting that all of them refer to the functions of organs or tissues and they seek to explain these functions by means of an analogy with artificial objects and their well-known goals[xxxii].

The treatise De Anima is built upon a broad set of similes and metaphors, all used to explain the most difficult doctrinal points[xxxiii]: the unity of body and soul is conceived as the unity of a circle and its tangent at a point[xxxiv], and as the unity of a wax tablet and the image stamped upon it[xxxv]. Concerning the body's instrumental relationship to the soul, Aristotle says that the body is to the soul as the eye is to sight, as the axe is to cutting[xxxvi]. The active nous is like light[xxxvii], while the passive nous is compared to a blank board[xxxviii]. Other comparisons are called upon for vegetative and sensitive faculties, memory, imagination and will, the principle of movement, and practical understanding. In conclusion, without metaphor, there would be no De Anima at all.

Even notions so central to Aristotelian theories as nature, soul or act are explained by means of analogies, similes or metaphors: nature is thought of as a potter[xxxix], as a house builder[xl] or a painter[xli], and so on. Regarding the concept of act, so important throughout Aristotle's works, the author states that only by analogy shall we be able to grasp its meaning[xlii].

The use of models is also noticeable as an explanatory resource in Aristotelian biology, for example, the human body is taken as a model for the study of other living things[xliii]. Generally speaking, the conformation of a domain following the structure of a phenomenon already understood, i.e., the use of a familiar template, is an important step in the explanation of anything belonging to it. This procedure implies a flow of meaning from the familiar to the new and strange. A flux of affections also occurs, for, at least in Aristotelian biology, as well as a deep knowledge, there is a very clear and profound esteem for living beings[xliv].

3. The Aristotelian Theory of Metaphor

3.1. Differences and Relationships between Metaphor, Simile, Analogy and Model

In Aristotle's opinion, metaphor and simile are very similar:

"The simile (eikòn) also is a metaphor (metaphorá); the difference is but slight. When the poet says of Achilles that he

Leapt on the foe as a lion,

this is a simile; when he says of him 'The lion leapt', it is a metaphor."[xlv]

Simile, or comparison, establishes a relationship between two explicit terms by means of an explicit grammatical connection, such as "like", while in metaphor this grammatical connection is omitted, as often is one of the two terms:

"[Simile] is a metaphor, differing from it only in the way it is put; and just because it is longer it is less attractive. Besides, it does not say outright that 'this' is 'that', and therefore the hearer is less interested in the idea."[xlvi]

Despite their similarity, there are relevant æsthetic and functional differences between these figures. Metaphor poses a question, it surprises us, it triggers off a heuristic process, it forces an interpretative task onto us. Simile, on the other hand, does part of the work for us, as we need a shorter interpretative run, the effort probably yielding a lesser intellectual reward than the metaphor. Aristotle consequently prefers metaphor to simile, which he considers as a developed metaphor.

It should, by the way, be noted that this development is not always automatic, for we compare certain aspects of two objects, so a decision is required as to which aspects, among all those possible, are relevant.

We should add to this that if we use a metaphor to obscure our discourse, then it will lack any justification in scientific texts. It should not be a means of expressing obscurely what can be said plainly, but rather a way of expressing difficult matters as clearly as possible, a manner of stretching language into new areas of reality, which is, furthermore, why Aristotle said that "[m]etaphor, moreover, gives style clearness (saphès), charm, and distinction as nothing else can"[xlvii].

Analogy would seem to be another step in the development of metaphor, so "the evening of the life..." is a metaphor, "the old age is like the evening" is a simile and "As old age is to life, so evening is to day" is an analogy.

Aristotle discovered various ways of transferring names, which enabled him to draft a taxonomy of metaphorical expressions, whereby it is possible to use the name of the kind (génos) to name the species (eîdos), the name of species to refer to the kind, the name of one species may be applied to another or, finally, the name may be transferred "on grounds of analogy"[xlviii]. We commonly associate the last mentioned with metaphor in a narrow sense, the others being more like our synecdoche or metonymy[xlix].

Aristotle holds that there is proportional analogy whenever "the second (B) is to the first (A) as the fourth (D) to the third (C)"[l]. Originally proportion referred mainly to quantitative ideas, but qualitative ones were included early on: "Thus a cup (B) is in relation to Dionysus (A) what a shield (D) is to Ares (C) [...] As old age (D) is to life (C), so is evening (B) to day (A)"[li].

With regard to the cognitive relevance of figures and their explanatory power, Aristotle wrote that "[o]f the four kinds of metaphor the most taking is the proportional kind (kat' analogían)"[lii], a doctrine which does not mean, however, that a paraphrase from metaphor to analogy could always be easily attained only by making the concealed analogies explicit. We would stress once more that understanding new metaphors often requires an interpretative effort. This heuristic task yields the poietic discovery of new analogic relationships. Every good metaphor is followed by what might be called a heuristic inertia. The development of metaphor into analogies, then, requires the concurrence of all the general intelligence.

Aristotelian texts have been very useful for understanding the mutual differences and relations of metaphor, simile and analogy and, to this end, I have kept close to them. We cannot dismiss the fact, however, that Aristotle used some models in his biological treatises, using for example the human body as a model to explain other living things, as we have seen above, or artifacts in the explanation of natural things. Nevertheless, he does not theorize about models, which means that his texts are of no help to the understanding of the role of models and their relationships with other explanatory resources. We therefore have to look elsewhere to throw light on models, even at the risk of temporarily abandoning the historical context we are dealing with. In my opinion, some of the ideas put forward by Lakoff and Indukhya may be extremely useful in the comprehension of the functions of models and their relationships with other figures[liii].

In his "Cognitive Semantics", Lakoff states that we elaborate abstract models by means of schematization, categorization, metaphor and metonymy. He believes that these processes all require the use of a projective imagination based on our structured experience (through bodily, social and cultural factors) and our innate sensorimotor faculties and activities, and notes some general schemes based on our experience, which, owing to their experiential basis, bring us meaning in a direct way: the container, part-whole, link, source-path-goal, up-down and linear order schemata.

When faced with the unfamiliar, we react - perhaps without full awareness - by trying to reduce it to the basic experiential schemes that we know how to handle. Indeed, it is an essential factor of our everyday understanding and communication[liv] and, of course, of scientific enquiry. We can thus grasp the explicative power of the very structure of biological treatises insofar as it fits some of these schemes. PA and HA were written in a top-downwards order, based on the opposition between internal and external organs, on the container model, in such a way that the very arrangement of data has an explanatory effect. This is how we begin to assimilate the nature of living things.

Other models have an even more important role regarding the explanatory economy of biological treatises, for Aristotle adds a profuse philosophical reflection to their direct understanding as based on experience. Such is the case of the source-path-goal schema, which has an evident relationship with the philosophical topic of telos, and of the part-whole schema, which concerns the hylemorphic structure attributed by Aristotle to living beings, as well as the careful study of their parts (meros)[lv]. It should come as no surprise, then, that Aristotle should find these models so useful and powerful in explaining living things.

It should be noted that these schemes, when applied, are not entirely determined by their bases, but rather are submitted to criticism. Thus, for example, the final cause in biology does not involve awareness of the purpose, or deliberation, despite being drawn from our everyday intentional experience.

Indurkhya[lvi] suggests a gradation ranging from pure metaphor, through simile and analogy, to models, for, in his view, models are already outside the domain of metaphors because their interpretation is entirely conventional. Following on from Indurkhya, we can appreciate other gradations, whereby metaphor is less symmetrical than simile, simile less than analogy, and analogy less than model, besides which metaphor is more emotionally charged than the other figures.

Indurkhya uses the notion of metaphor in an intermediate way between the narrow and broad senses. In the narrow sense, metaphor "refers to a specific way of using the words and phrases of a language", while in the broad sense "it is applied to the process of conceptualization itself, leading to the aphorism 'all thought is metaphorical'"[lvii].

We are interested in a very broad meaning of metaphor, including models and even any general concept, for, in Aristotle, metaphor is equal to transfer, which is involved by pure metaphor, as it is by simile, analogy, model and even general concepts, despite their gradual differences, which are secondary in epistemological discussion to common traits. In particular, it is possible to detect a genetic relationship between those figures requiring a more metaphorical reading and the more conventional ones, that is, there are expressions born as pure metaphors which later become plain conventions. On the other hand, even the most established convention requires interpretation to some extent, a metaphor still lingers even in the most literal concept. With regard to this idea, Aristotle wrote: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else"[lviii], and "[i]nevitably, then, the same formulæ, and a single name, have a number of meanings"[lix]. The only way a common name can reach this plural signification is by becoming transferable itself.

3.2. Metaphorical Figures as Creative Discoveries[lx]

In his Rhetorics, Aristotle states:

"[...] we all naturally find it agreeable to get hold of new ideas easily: words express ideas and therefore those words are the most agreeable that enable us to get hold of new ideas. Now strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh (he dè metaphorá poieî toûto málista). When the poet calls old age 'a withered stalk', he conveys a new idea, a new fact, to us by means of the general notion (dià toû génous) of 'lost bloom', which is common to both things. The similes of the poets do the same, and therefore, if they are good similes, give an effect of brilliance"[lxi].

Let us comment on some salient features of this passage. After this text, no doubt could remain about the cognitive purport of metaphor and simile, although Aristotle does stress that in order to be cognitive, they must fulfil certain requirements, that is, they must be proper.

Secondly, we are informed that teaching is accomplished by means of the kind (dià toû génous), when an objective similarity hits one in the eye. The kind is but a means of gaining knowledge - it is not the final purpose of knowledge. Showing that two entities are similar in some way, that they belong to the same kind, enables us to transfer our knowledge of the more familiar one to the other, thus affording us a better understanding of the new or inexperienced. This transfer must, however, be subject to the filter of critical scrutiny to avoid improper uses.

Thirdly, Aristotle unites the æsthetic and cognitive aspects of an expression. In his Rhetorics[lxii], he also asserts that learning and admiring are sources of pleasure[lxiii].

What does Aristotle mean by a proper metaphor or comparison? We may recall here the passage from Poetics[lxiv] defining four types of metaphorical expression bearing in mind that he goes on to say that "of the four kinds of metaphor the most taking is the proportional kind". It is therefore clear that an image is proper insofar as it is based upon an objective proportional analogy and expresses a real similarity allowing us the information transfer from one pole to the other.

What, then, became of the creative aspect of metaphor? Did it turn out to be a mere discovery? Is this kind of knowledge not simply a mirror of nature?

The concept of creative, or poietic, discovery is used by Haley[lxv] as an intermediate between the traditional and interactionist views of metaphor. According to the former, true metaphor is just a discovery of underlying similarities, where the cognitive subject has a rather passive function - it is a mirror of nature. Interactionism, on the other hand, proclaims metaphoric creativity, with a subject that creates a web of connections, organizing reality in an active way. Nevertheless, this view fails to provide a clear account of the constraints affecting the creation, interpretation and evaluation of figures. Indurkhya is also aware of this shortcoming and seeks to solve it. In my opinion, however, finding a solution to this problem depends on the acknowledgement of the objective pole, that is, real similarities that one can either discover or fail to discover. Yet nothing in the expression itself allows for mechanical decoding, for a metaphor works or not according to the interpreter, to his background, and his creativity in building conjectures. It also depends on the world itself, on the potential (but real) similarities between entities dwelling in it. What then, could possibly constitute a creative discovery?

We shall see. Similarities uncovered by true metaphorical expressions are real. There are objective constraints existing as possibilities in entities - any two entities either have or do not have the potential to be seen as similar in some respect by a given cognitive subject. We cannot, however, rest on any special intuitive faculty for similarities. The potential for objects to be seen as similar cannot be actualized or communicated without an active subject[lxvi]. In the first place, we need to invent conjectures or hypotheses and set them up against the facts. In this way, we are able to descry new resemblances between objects. On the other hand we can also try to communicate them by means of a metaphorical expression, that is, by building new language or stretching the semantic range of existing language. To construe a metaphor, however, the receiver needs to display the same creative attitude as we have before nature. It is in this sense that metaphor is just as much a discovery as a creation. It may rightly be called, then, a creative, or poietic, discovery.

The expression "creative discovery" is not explicitly mentioned in Aristotle's works, though I would not consider it anachronistic to say that its meaning may be inferred from several passages, for example:

"Metaphors must be drawn, as has been said already, from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously related - just as in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart"[lxvii].

Therefore,

"the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius [...]"[lxviii].

Spotting resemblances for the first time requires the invention of new points of view, of new interpretative hypotheses, of new and fallible conjectures. Similarity is not that which is at the same time in two different places or substances, but that which can be abstracted from both by a cognitive agent. Consequently, similarity is not a direct or ontic relationship between two or more objects, as all dynamic actions are, but one established by means of a subject[lxix]. In spite of the objective character of potential similarities, there are no actual ones unless they are established by a cognitive subject.

We very often find that a good metaphor, because of its creative nature, seems unpredictable yet, owing to its character of objective discovery, it appear obvious to nearly everybody once enunciated. Thus, Aristotle said that metaphor gave greater clarity than anything else could[lxx] and makes us see[lxxi]. Metaphor, Aristotle states, brings our senses face to face with reality: "I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity (ósa energoûnta semaínei)"[lxxii].

Nevertheless, the fact remains that passages in favour of a cognitive view of metaphor are found in contexts far removed from the methodology of science, while it is precisely in APo that we find the most explicit refusal. On this point, some remarks will be necessary.

4. APo and Aristotelian Science

To begin with, we should not carelessly equate poetics with rhetorics, for the latter deals with discourse aimed purely at convincing, while the former has to do with paradigmatically creative discourse[lxxiii]. In his Poetics, Aristotle clearly states the philosophical nature of poetry[lxxiv].

Secondly, it should be remembered at this point that the taxonomy of metaphor is coined in terms of "species", "kind", "proportion", all of them belonging to the very core of philosophy, biology and even Aristotelian science in general[lxxv].

In the third place, there is some evidence to show that Aristotle does not confer such great importance on the methodological rules of the APo while doing empirical science, so he never took it as a rigid set of constraints for scientific practice. We have already seen that in DA he uses more comparisons than definitions whenever he finds a problematic node, the same being the case for the other biological treatises, where functional aspects of organisms are systematically explained by means of metaphors, similes and analogies, even the very structure of treatises being thought out on the basis of models. In addition, however, in his Metaphysics, Aristotle states that the important concept of act lacks a proper definition[lxxvi], while individual substances lack both definition and demonstration[lxxvii], as well as essence[lxxviii]. We are informed in GA that we cannot expect a demonstration of principles, so they require "another method (álle gnôsis)"[lxxix].

Let us now examine two less-known passages, where Aristotle rules out explanations precisely on the grounds of their logical character, that is, because, being too general, they are closer to the logos than to the particular object of research:

"Perhaps an abstract proof (apódeixis logikè) might appear to be more plausible than those already given; I call it abstract because the more general it is the further is it removed from the special principles involved. [...] For all theories not based on the special principles involved are empty; they only appear to be connected with the facts without being so really. [...] that which is empty may seem to be something, but is really nothing."[lxxx]

"And we must grasp this not only generally in theory, but also by reference to individuals in the world of sense, for with these in view we seek general theories, and with these we believe that general theories ought to harmonize"[lxxxi].

The logical apparatus of definition and demonstration does not work properly unless a connection is provided between theoretical terms and our experience of concrete reality. The judgement about truth of principles used as premises in deduction, the ascription of reference to the terms, the knowledge of causal connections concealed behind logical ones, all remain outside the logical apparatus of APo. This set of methodological rules acquires its full meaning once the above operations have been carried out and, even then, the outcome of deductive machinery is subject to common-sense scrutiny and personal experience.

We must now address the problem of determining whether or not APo still plays a role in the economy of scientific explanation.

Aristotle often uses terms in a non-univocal sense, subjecting them to semantic stretch[lxxxii], whereby they acquire new meanings. He starts with a focal familiar meaning and applies the terms analogically. Important notions are said in "many ways" (pollakôs legômenon), so we are justified in suspecting that the ideal of strict univocity of APo soon became unfit for actual science in Aristotle's view[lxxxiii].

Indeed, univocity could only be reached either by increasing the complexity of language or by decreasing the complexity of the world. The first solution would make language a useless point-by-point reproduction of the world - one object, one word, like a map drawn to a scale of 1:1[lxxxiv], while in the second hypothesis, the world would include but few entities, one for each concept, that is, the real world would be like Plato's ideal world. Nevertheless, in Aristotle's view, language is inexact because of the very nature of things - there are more entities than terms[lxxxv]. I consider this passage ontologically revealing, because the problem arises only when the ontological load is born more by concrete substances (as in Aristotle) than by ideal forms. In such cases, name transfer seems unavoidable.

Furthermore, methodological terms like "demonstration" or "definition" are also subject to semantic stretch, so they do not mean exactly the same in different research contexts[lxxxvi].

Nevertheless, the methodology of APo still retains a relevant role (paradoxically) as a rhetorical device. It is an important part of the process of legitimizing new wisdom, opposed to traditional wisdom, which rested on story-telling, poetry and myth. The new wisdom, on the other hand, sought for accuracy and stability in the meaning of words, univocity as an ideal, and deductive inference:

"The polemic against metaphor and myth - as G.E.R. Lloyd writes - is thus part of the campaign waged by philosophy and science against poetry and religion"[lxxxvii].

This demarcation is not only sociological, however. Nor is it only a dispute between groups aiming at social control or intellectual prestige. There is more to it than that. The methodological prescriptions of APo may never have been strictly followed, metaphorical resources - against prohibition - may actually have been used in scientific practice and methodological constraints may have been softened in various treatises, but something did change: once Aristotle had established the desideratum of stability and univocity in the meaning of terms, together with the ideals of exactitude, definition and deductive control of inference, the philosopher and the scientist were affected by them in a way that the poet or story-teller never had been before. Scientists and philosophers must submit their metaphors, similes, analogies and models to criticism or empirical control, and must follow the heuristic inertia of images and test their implications. They must set them up against reality. Once the will of truth, the ideal of precision, the necessity of exploring implication as well as a self-critical mind were accepted as values, the particular formalist devices and methodological constraints of APo became secondary to actual scientific practice.

All these values are acknowledged and pursued in Aristotle's works. His De Caelo explicitly states:

"To give a satisfactory decision as to the truth it is necessary to be rather an arbitrator than a party to the dispute"[lxxxviii].

5. Conclusion

Metaphor is not a superfluous ornament nor is it mechanically reducible, no universal rules existing for its translation into literal language. Understanding metaphor does not, however, depend on any special intuitive faculty. I have suggested reading Aristotelian texts with what may be termed an interpretative view of metaphor, for understanding a metaphor involves an interpretative task very similar to understanding the world. Every good metaphor has its own heuristic inertia. We need to create conjectures and challenge their functionality, a process which depends on the interpreter's creativity, on his ability to recognize their limits and on his previous experience and knowledge. No automatic rules, no special faculties.

Moreover, the very notion of literal meaning is problematic. Aristotle refers to conventional (usual) rather than to literal meaning in is study on different kinds of names[lxxxix]. In short, metaphoric meaning is not opposed to literal meaning, although it does gradually differ from conventional meaning[xc]. An expression conceived as a metaphor could be developed into a simile or analogy, indeed it might even become conventional, while, conversely any conventional expression could be hiding a lethargic metaphor. It may therefore be useful to look on metaphorical expressions as living things: during their lifetime; they can remain detached from any cognitive discourse or become integrated as conventional language into science or philosophy. Another consideration should be added with regard to the importance of the topic we are dealing with: both the increase in our knowledge and the enlargement of our linguistic resources depend on our ability to grasp new similarities and express them in a metaphorical way. Today's conventional language and knowledge were metaphorical yesterday, and even conventional language requires interpretation each time it is used pragmatically. As Nietzsche reminded us[xci], convention is no more than lethargic metaphor, so each concept has to be understood in its context, from a concrete subject's experience, and referred to the world by him. Only in this way does language leave the domain of the general to enter the terrain of concrete substances.

A good metaphor gives us more than emotional content - it can transmit to us genuine information about the world. The radical distinction between the genesis of emotion and objective information transfer is artificial, for metaphor explains by bringing in the unusual, new or unknown to what is familiar or already experienced. Owing to the fact that our experience is not emotionally neutral, however, the flow of information runs together with emotional connotations. Aristotle, for instance, in his biological treatises, displays as much knowledge as esteem regarding living things[xcii].

Metaphorical expressions, apart from their communicative or emotional virtues, can be either true or false[xciii] - a good metaphor uncovers objective potential similarities existing between entities in the world, a discovery which is, however, a creative one.

Between the claim that biological works (and natural history treatises in general) strictly follow the methodological constraints of APo, and the assumption that it has nothing to do with them, we would suggest an intermediate position: expressive resources such as metaphors rejected in APo are often used in scientific practice, although the way in which they are used is determined by desiderata of precision, clear meaning of terms, empirical tests and deductive control of inferences.

Acknowledgements

This text is part of a research project developed at Valladolid University. A short version was read at the Tenth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Florence, 1995. I thank Professor G.E.R. Lloyd very much for his insightful commentaries during my stay at Cambridge University. I am also indebted to an anonymous referee.

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[i]See, for instance, E. Bustos, 'Las metáforas científicas y el realismo semántico', Arbor 542 (1991), 69-82; G. Corradi, The Metaphoric Process (London: Routledge, 1995); F. Fernández Buey, La ilusión del método (Barcelona: Crítica, 1992), pp. 152-179; M. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Nôtre Dame: Nôtre Dame University Press, 1965); M. Hesse, 'The Cognitive Claims of Metaphor', Journal of Speculatice Philosphy (1988), 1-16.; M. Hesse, 'Theories, Family-Resemblance and Analogy', in Helman (ed.), Analogical Reasoning (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 317-340; M. Hesse, 'Models, Metaphors and Truth', in Z. Radman (ed.), From a Metaphoric Point of View. A Multidisciplinary Approach To the Cognitive Content of Metaphor (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995), pp. 351-372; J. Hintikka (ed.), Aspects of Metaphor (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994); G. Holton, 'Metaphors in Science and Education', in Z. Radman (ed.), op. cit., pp. 259-288; K. Knorr Cetina, 'Metaphors in the Scientific Laboratory: Why are they there and what do they do?', in Z. Radman (ed.), op. cit., pp. 329-349; S. Maasen, P. Weingart, E. Mendelsohn (eds.), Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995); A. Marcos, 'Biología, realismo y metáfora', Agora (forthcoming); J. Martin Soskice and R. Harré, 'Metaphor in Science', in Z. Radman (ed.), op. cit., pp. 289-307; E. Montuschi, 'What is Wrong with Talking of Metaphors in Science', in Z. Radman (ed.), op. cit., pp. 309-327; A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); E.C. Way, Knowledge, Representation and Metaphor (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991); and F. Suppe, The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scienfic Realism (Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1989). This author thinks that the language of science is not literal, but that science does aim at objective truth (see op. cit. pg. 23).

[ii] From the field of linguistics see B. Indukhya, Metaphor and Cognition (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992); M. Johnson, The Body in the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); G. Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories reveal about the mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); E.R. Mac Cormac, A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1985).

[iii]See, for instance, R. Bathes, Le degré zéro de l'écriture (Paris: du Seuil, 1953); G. Genette, Figures III (Paris: du Seuil, 1972); Groupe µ, Rhétorique générale (Paris: Laruosse, 1970); P. Ricoeur, La Métaphore vive (Paris: du Seuil, 1975); H. White, Tropics of Discourse: Essay in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); H. White, The Content of the Form (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); and specially on rhetoric and science see B. Roland, 'Science versus literature', in M. Lane (ed.), Introduction to Structuralism (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 410-416; O. Gal, 'Tropes and Topics in Scientific Discourse: Galileo's De Motu', Science in Context 7 (1994), pp. 25-52; A. Gross, The Rhetoric of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); D. Locke, Science as Writing (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

[iv] From now on, I will quote Aristotelian works using the following abbreviations: HA:Historia Animalium; PA:De Partibus Animalium; GA:De Generatione Animalium; DA:De Anima; MA:De Motu Animalium; PN:Parva Naturalia; D Cael:De Caelo; Meta:Metaphysica; Mete:Meteorologica; APo:Analitica Posteriora; EN:Ethica Nichomachea; EE:Ethica Eudemia; Pol:Politica; SE:Sophistichi Elenchi; Rhet:Rhetorica; Poet:Poetica; Top:Topica. I take aristotelian texts in their english translation from W.D. Ross and J.A. Smith (eds.), The Works of Aristotle Translated into English (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908-1952).

[v]However, some authors have reduced the cognitive value of metaphorical language in Aristotelian science on theoretical as well as on practical grounds. So, for instance, Pierre Louis downgrades the scope of metaphors in biology acknowledging only a secondary role in explanation (P. Louis, 'Introduction', in Aristote, Les parties des animaux (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1956), pp. V-XL, see pp. XXIX and XXX). He exhibits a position very similar to the post-positivism of his age (see Bustos, op. cit., note 1, pp. 69-72). M. Vegetti, in his turn, stresses the rhetoric function of metaphorical figures in Aristotelian biology (M. Vegetti, 'Quand la science parle à vide: procédés dialectiques et métaphoriques chez Aristote', in V. Coorebyter, Rhétoriques de la science (Paris: P.U.F., 1994), pp. 7-32, see pp. 18 and ff.).

[vi]Mete 357a 24 and ff..

[vii]For example in GA 777a 7 and ff..

[viii]Top 127a 17 and ff.; GA 747a 34 and ff.; PN 347b 9 and ff.; PA 652b 7.

[ix]Meta 991a 20, 1079b 24; Pol 1264b 4 and ff., 1265b 18 and ff..

[x]G.E.R. Lloyd, The Revolution of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), see pp. 183-187.

[xi]We can find another unqualified refusal of metaphoric figures in Top: "for a metaphorical expression is always obscure" (139b 32 and ff.).

[xii]APo 97b 37-39.

[xiii]See, as an explanation of this process, P. Ricoeur, op. cit., note 3, pp. 63-86; see, specially, pp. 66-67.

[xiv]E. Bustos, 'La teoría aristotélica sobre la metáfora', in D. Sánchez Meca y J. Domínguez Caparrós (eds.), Historia de la relación filosofía-literatura en sus textos, Suplementos de Anthropos, vol. 32 (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1992), pp. 17-21, see pp. 19-21.

[xv]For a clear characterization of these theories see I. Scheffler, Beyond the Letter (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).

[xvi]See G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); E. Montuschi, Le Metafore Scientifiche (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1993); E. Martino, Aristóteles, el alma y la comparación, (Madrid: Gredos, 1975); M. Vegetti, op. cit., note 5, pp. 7-32; G.A. Luccheta, Scienza e Retorica in Aristotele (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990); S. Gastaldi, 'Teoria e Funzioni della Metafore in Aristotele' in Dimostrazione, Argumentazione dialetica e argomentazione retorica nel pensiero antico (Génova: 1993); G. S. Bordoni, Linguaggio e Realtá in Aristotele (Bari: Laterza, 1994).

[xvii]PA 650a 32, 650b 8, 665b 12, 666a 18, 667a 26; cf. Timaeus 73d.

[xviii]PA 668a 13, 27, 35; cf. Timaeus 77cd, 79a.

[xix]PA 650a 19; cf. Timaeus 70e.

[xx]PA 670a 25-26; cf. Timaeus 70a. Mario Vegetti analyzes the functions of some of these similes. For example, a broad analysis of the heard-acropolis-fireplace and body-polis-home comparisons can be seen in Vegetti, op. cit. note 5, pp. 19 and ff..

[xxi]"Originally used of the ripening of fruit, then of cooking and digestion it came to be applied to a wide range of physiological processes", G.E.R. Lloyd, op.cit, note 10, pp. 204-205.

[xxii]P. Louis, op. cit., note 5, see pp. XXIX and XXX.

[xxiii]See, in this sense, Luccheta, op. cit., note 16.

[xxiv]GA 716a 15 and ff..

[xxv]GA 730b 5 and ff..

[xxvi]See GA 743b 11 and ff.; MA 701b 2 and ff..

[xxvii]PA, 655a 11, 23, 25.

[xxviii]PA 683b 1 and HA 535b 12.

[xxix]PA 684a 3.

[xxx]PA 659a 2.

[xxxi]PA 693a 23.

[xxxii]In fact, we can find more intersting comparisons throughout Aristotelian treatises. See, for instance, in PA 653a 3 and ff., 653a 21 and ff., 654a 7 and ff.. We could also quote, mainly in virtue of its evocative force, the resemblance supposed to exist between plants and little babes sleeping all the time (EE, 1216a 3-9 and EN, 1176a 34-35).

[xxxiii]See Martino, op. cit., note 16.

[xxxiv]DA 403a 11-16.

[xxxv]DA 412b 6-9.

[xxxvi]DA 412b 9 and ff..

[xxxvii]DA 430a 10 and ff..

[xxxviii]DA 429b 29 and ff..

[xxxix]PA 654b 29 and ff.; GA 730b 27 and ff..

[xl]PA 668a 16.

[xli]GA 743b 20 and ff.; 764b 30 and ff..

[xlii]Meta 1048a 35 and ff..

[xliii]HA, I, 6, 491a 19-23.

[xliv]See PA, I, 5, 644b 22-645a 36.

[xlv]Rhet, 1406b 20 and ff..

[xlvi]Rhet, 1410b 17-19.

[xlvii]Rhet, 1405a 8.

[xlviii]Poet, 1457b 6-9.

[xlix]See Bustos, op. cit., note 14, pp. 19-20.

[l]Poet, 1457b 16 and ff..

[li]Poet, 1457b 20-25; see also EN 1131a 29-30.

[lii]Rhet, 1410b 36 and f.; see also Montuschi, op. cit., note 16, p. 31.

[liii]G. Lakkof, 'Cognitive Semantics', in U. Eco et al. (eds.), Meaning and Mental Representation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 119-154; B. Indukhya, op. cit., note 2.

[liv]See M. Johnson, The Body in the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); G. Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories reveal about the mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[lv]See G.E.R. Lloyd, 'Aristotle's Zoology and his Metaphysics. The status quaestionis. A Critical Review of some Recent Theories', in D. Devereux y P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote, (Paris: Éditions du C.N.R.S., 1990), pp. 7-35; P. Pellegrin, 'Taxinomie, moriologie, division: réponses à G.E.R.Lloyd', in D. Devereux y P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote, (Paris: Éditions du C.N.R.S., 1990), pp. 37-47.

[lvi]Indurkhya, op. cit., note 2, pp. 26 and ff..

[lvii]Indurkhya, op. cit., note 2, p. 13.

[lviii]Poet, 1457b 7.

[lix]SE 165a 13 and f..

[lx]Let me sketch out a remark here, mainly in the light of an acute observation made by an anonymous referee: I am not trying even to suggest that metaphorical figures belong to the "context of discovery", while APo is the correct methodology in relation to the "context of justification". In APo, and generally in traditional methodology (there are traces even in Mill or in the first Carnap), justification comes hand in hand with some assumed method of discovery, the "right" one for each author. I think, of course, that no particular method of discovery is sufficient to guarantee justification. My concern here is to explain how some metaphors are the expression of a creative discovery, and how they could help, with a new point of view or new heuristic trends, to obtain new discoveries. But we can only obtain a provisional and pragmatical justification by following the suggestions of metaphor and contrasting them with experience. This is not, of course, the tenor of APo.

[lxi]Rhet 1410b 10-19.

[lxii]Rhet 1371b 4 and f..

[lxiii]S. Mas Torres, 'Platón y Aristóteles: sobre filosofía y poesía', in D. Sánchez Meca y J. Domínguez Caparrós (eds.), Historia de la relación filosofía-literatura en sus textos, Suplementos de Anthropos, nº 32 (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1992), pp. 5-10, see p. 8.

[lxiv]Poet, 1457b 6 and ff..

[lxv]I take the expression "creative discovery" from M.C. Haley, The Semiosis of Poetic Metaphor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), where a Peircian theory of poetic metaphor is explained.

[lxvi]Even our natural ability to catch surface similarities has phylogenetically evolved by means of creative activity and corrections, as authors like Popper or Quine have pointed out. See, for instance, K. Popper, A World of Propensities (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990); W.V. Quine, 'Natural Kinds', in W.V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 114-138.

[lxvii]Rhet 1412a 10 and ff..

[lxviii]Poet 1459a 5 and ff.. See also PN (464b 5 and ff.), where Aristotle wrote a beautiful passage on resemblance in dreams in the same purport as the previously quoted ones (it even contains a metaphor full of suggestions).

[lxix]In this sense, Scaltsas affirms that "similarity between substances cannot consist in the presence of a distinct (abstract) component in different substances. Rather, it consists in the derivation of the same distinct entity out of different substances", in Th. Scaltsas, Substances & Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 197-8.

[lxx]See Rhet 1405a 8 and ff..

[lxxi]See Rhet 1411a 25 and ff..

[lxxii]Rhet 1411b 24-26. The author is stressing the sensitive aspects of understanding in this passage. Others exist in the same direction, for instance, those that establish the cognitive relevance of images: Aristotle affirms that we take delight in our senses, "and above all others the sense of sight" (Meta 980a 21 and f.), and that never does the soul think without an image (DA 431a 14-17; PN 450a 1 and f.). Understanding is compared to the soul's sight (EN 1096b 29), and, specially, active understanding to the light (DA 430a 14-17). With regard to wise and prudent persons (phrónimos) we can read: "for because experience has given them an eye they see upright" (EN 1143b 11-13). On cognitive functions of imagination for Aristotle, see also M.V. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (London: Yale University Press, 1988); on perception, D.K.W. Modrak, Aristotle: The Power of Perception, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[lxxiii]See P. Ricoeur, op, cit., note 3, pp. 13-61 and 310-311.

[lxxiv]Poet 1451a 37.

[lxxv]According to E. Montuschi, metaphor "institutes a sort of symbiosis between the logical and categorial apparatus of philosophy, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the transgressing effects that analogy systematically pursues", Montuschi, op. cit., note 16, p. 30.

[lxxvi]Meta 1048a 35 - 1048b 1. See also P. Ricoeur, op. cit., note 3, pp. 325-399.

[lxxvii]Meta 1039b 28-30.

[lxxviii]Meta 997a 31-33.

[lxxix]GA 742b 32 and f..

[lxxx]GA 747b 27 - 748a 10. M. Vegetti (op. cit, note 5, p. 8) has recently commented on this passage in a different sense. This author believes that "apódeixis logikè" is criticized because of its dialectic character. However, in my opinion, this text has nothing to do with the dialectics vs. science distinction. Logical demonstration or explanation is criticized precisely for its generality, for its lack of empiric charge, for its emptiness, i.e., for an excess of abstraction (as the aforementioned text on MA confirms). But all that relates it more to strict episteme than to dialectics. In addition, the commonly acknowledged opinions (éndoxa) are not necessarily very abstract or general; there exist also reputed views on concrete subjects.

[lxxxi]MA 698a 11-14.

[lxxxii]See Lloyd, op. cit., note 10, p. 198.

[lxxxiii]See Lloyd, op. cit., note 10, p. 191.

[lxxxiv]Not to mention the insoluble metalinguistic issue, because words, of course, are objects.

[lxxxv]See SE 165a 6-14 (see above in note 59).

[lxxxvi]See G.E.R. Lloyd, 'The Theories and Practices of Demonstration in Aristotle', in J.J. Clearly and D.C. Shartin (eds.), The Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. VI. (Lauham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1990), pp. 371-401.

[lxxxvii]Lloyd, op. cit., note 10, p. 210.

[lxxxviii]De Cael 279b 9-12. See also P. Aubenque, La Prudence chez Aristote (Paris: P.U.F., 1963 [reprint 1993]), p. 39.

[lxxxix]See Poet cap. 21.

[xc]See E. Bustos, 'La polémica del significado literal', in E. Bustos, J. Echeverría, E. Pérez sedeño, E. Sánchez and M.I. Balmaseda (eds.), Actas del I Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España (Madrid: U.N.E.D., 1993), pp. 160-163.

[xci]See F. Nietzsche, 'Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne', in G. Colli and M. Montinari, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe (München: de Gruyter, 1980), vol. 1, pp. 873-890.

[xcii]See PA I 5.

[xciii]And this despite the fact that we never can reach a full certainty about that, as Peirce stated. With regard to Peircean fallibilism see C. S. Peirce, 'The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilims' in J. Buchler (ed.), Philosophical Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 42-59.; on Popperian fallibilism see, for instance, K. Popper, op. cit. note 66, pp. 29-51.

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