INTRODUCTION .gov

?Decision 20-12-015December 3, 2020 ASK AgendaNo "Enter the agenda item number (e.g. CA-4)" [/d "Agenda Item No."] \* MERGEFORMAT Before The Public Utilities Commission Of The State Of CaliforniaOrder Instituting Investigation on the Commission’s Own Motion into the Maintenance, Operations and Practices of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (U39E) with Respect to its Electric Facilities; and Order to Show Cause Why the Commission Should not Impose Penalties and/or Other Remedies for the Role PG&E’s Electrical Facilities had in Igniting Fires in its Service Territory in 2017.Investigation 19-06-015ORDER MODIFYING DECISION 20-05-019 AND DENYING REHEARING OF DECISION, AS MODIFIEDINTRODUCTIONOn June 8, 2020, Thomas Del Monte and Wild Tree Foundation filed timely applications for rehearing of Decision (D.) 20-05-019. In D.20-05-019 (Decision), we approved a modified settlement resolving Investigation and Order to Show Cause (I.) 19-06-015 (Investigation or OII). The OII concerns penalties and/or other remedies to address the role of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) in wildfires in its service territory in 2017 and 2018, prior to PG&E filing its petition for bankruptcy protection in January 2019. The proceeding examined alleged PG&E violations of Commission decisions, rules, and statutes “pertaining to the maintenance and operation its electric facilities that were involved in igniting fires in its service territory….” (OII, at pp. 1-2.) In addition to the 15 fire events originally listed in the OII, the Lobo, McCourtney and Camp Fires were added to the proceeding. D.20-05-019 approves a modified settlement of the OII (settlement) between the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED), the Office of Safety Advocates (OSA), the Coalition of California Utility Employees (CUE), and PG&E (collectively Settling Parties). With the modifications to the settlement, the Commission-imposed penalties total $2.137 billion in the form of disallowances for wildfire-related expenditures, System Enhancement Initiatives and other corrective actions. As part of this modified settlement, we also imposed a $200 million suspended fine.In his application for rehearing, Del Monte alleges: (1) we erred in issuing a suspended fine, (2) we approved a settlement that violates requirements for settlements, (3) the settlement includes matters outside the scope of the proceeding, (4) we failed to properly investigate the incidents, (5) we violated due process by failing to hold evidentiary hearings, and not following the scoping memo, and (5) the presiding officer demonstrated bias in taking evidence. Wild Tree’s application for rehearing alleges that we committed legal error in approving the use of a suspended fine, in approving a modified settlement that fails to meet the requirements for settlements, and in allowing PG&E’s shareholders to benefit financially from imposition of penalties. PG&E and the Official Committee of Tort Claimants of PG&E (Tort Claimants) filed timely responses to the applications for rehearing. We have carefully considered the arguments presented by Del Monte and Wild Tree and are of the opinion that grounds for rehearing have not been demonstrated. We will, however, make one minor modification for clarification. Accordingly, we deny Del Monte and Wild Tree’s applications for rehearing of the Decision, as modified.DISCUSSIONSuspended FinesBoth Del Monte and Wild Tree challenge our authority to suspend the $200 million fine that we imposed on PG&E. According to rehearing applicants, the Commission has no authority to suspend an enforcement fine against a utility. They argue that we are required to enforce our requirements for each utility violation with a penalty and that penalty must go to California’s General Fund. (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 32; Del Monte App. Rhrg., at pp. 26-27.) Del Monte adds that the suspension is inconsistent with Public Utilities Code section 1701.2 which provides that large utilities are presumed to be able to pay penalties. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at pp. 28-29.) Wild Tree also argues that the penalty suspension: (1) demonstrates Commission bias, (2) is not based on sufficient evidence, (3) was manipulated by PG&E, and (4) is contrary to section 2106. These arguments misconstrue our actions and our enforcement authority. In the Decision, we explained why we determined that assessment of a fine is appropriate:In recognition of the number and severity of the allegations that are at issue in this investigation, the lives lost, PG&E’s size, and the Commission’s long-standing policy and practice of imposing fines on utilities as a means of penalizing and deterring future misconduct, the Commission finds that, of the $2.137 billion in penalties, it is reasonable to impose a fine of $200 million. (Decision, at p. 49.) Despite assessment of the fine, however, we also concluded that permanent suspension of the fine is warranted due to “‘the unique situation of PG&E’s bankruptcy, its indebtedness to hundreds of wildfire claimants for loss of life and property, and the current upheaval in the financial markets.’ [Citation].” (Decision, at p. 50.) We have ample authority to suspend a fine that we impose. The Commission has plenary jurisdiction over electric utilities, the safety of utility facilities, and the enforcement of those standards. (See §§ 451, 701, 2100 et seq.) In addition to requiring that all utility charges be reasonable, section 451 requires that, “Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities … as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of … the public.” The Commission also has the authority to enforce its rules and other laws pertaining to utility safety and may prosecute the violations and impose penalties. (See § 2100 et seq.) In addition, section 701 provides:The commission may supervise and regulate every public utility in the State and may do all things, whether specifically designated in this part or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.Given our clear statutory jurisdiction over utility safety and enforcement, we have authority to do “all things… necessary and convenient” in our utility safety enforcement efforts. Courts have also affirmed that the Commission’s authority pursuant to section 701 is broadly construed. “The primary?limiting factor on PUC jurisdiction is that the PUC's action must be cognate and germane to utility?regulation.” (PG&E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1198.) “The other important limitation on the authority conferred by section 701 is a specific statutory directive that?prohibits?the PUC's action. (PG&E Corp., at p. 1201 …).” (Southern California Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Com.?(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 172, 187.) The Commission has authority to suspend the fine, because the fine suspension is cognate and germane to our safety enforcement authority and is not contrary to any other legal directive, as discussed below. Public Utilities Code Provisions Del Monte and Wild Tree argue that sections 2101, 2104, and 2106, as well as section 1701.2, prohibit the Commission from suspending fines. These arguments lack merit.Sections 2101 and 2104Rehearing applicants claim that because the Public Utilities Code provides that the Commission should enforce state law and recover penalties, penalty suspension is forbidden. Section 2101 provides that the Commission shall enforce state statutes and the Constitution. Section 2104 describes collection of penalties and requires that fines recovered be paid to the State Treasury. The rehearing applicants’ reading of sections 2101 and 2104 is not supported by the statutory language or other legal authority.Del Monte and Wild Tree argue that these statutory provisions require the Commission to assess and collect penalties against utilities whenever violations may have occurred, and that we lack discretion to decide not to impose or collect penalties. According to Del Monte, “the legislature intended to limit the authority and discretion of the Commission from being too lenient” by assessing less than the recommended penalty amount. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 27.) The starting point of statutory interpretation is to look to the plain language of the statute, which “generally provide[s] the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.) “[I]f the statutory language is clear and unambiguous our inquiry ends. If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.” (Ibid.) “Where the statutory language is ambiguous or permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” (Joyce v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1490.) “In reading statutes, we are mindful that words are to be given their plain and commonsense meaning.” (Murphy, supra, at p. 1103.) Additionally, words and sentences are not to be viewed in isolation, but rather read “with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.” (Smith v. Super. Ct. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.) Furthermore, California courts have given the Commission’s interpretation of the Public Utilities Code great deference. (Southern California Edison Co. v. Peevey, (2003) 31 Cal.4th 781, 796.)Section 2101 requires the Commission “to see that” State laws affecting public utilities, “are enforced and obeyed, and that violations thereof are promptly prosecuted and penalties due the State therefore recovered and collected….” While Del Monte and Wild Tree interpret this as requiring that a fine be assessed and collected for every single utility violation, the wording of the statute is far more general than that. If, as rehearing applicants suggest, it is mandatory for the Commission to fully prosecute and recover fines for each and every violation, the statute would have said “each and every,” but it does not include either word. Moreover, rehearing applicants’ extreme interpretation of section 2101 is unworkable and inconsistent with Commission practice. Such an interpretation would hobble our ability to settle or informally investigate and resolve violations. Section 2101 has never been interpreted in this manner and rehearing applicants provide no legal support for their interpretation. On the contrary, our investigations and enforcement are often outside of formal proceedings, and it has been up to the Commission to determine whether a particular utility violation requires formal enforcement proceedings. Even where we have pursued formal enforcement and find a violation, we have discretion to determine that no fine or penalty is warranted. (See Brown v. So. Cal Gas Co. (1996) 66 Cal.P.U.C.2d 764.) Since 1998, the Commission has generally considered the penalty factors when it exercises its discretion to determine whether to impose a fine (see Decision, at p. 19), but it has not always imposed a large fine or a fine at all. (See Re Alliance Group [D.09-09-005].) In addition to the fact that the statute delegates authority to the Commission to “see that” laws are enforced, courts have afforded the Commission a great deal of deference regarding implementation of its enforcement program. (See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (PSEP Penalties) (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 812, 853 [deference to the Commission’s intent interpretation and notice regarding continuing violations].) Accordingly, the Commission’s authority to craft enforcement measures pursuant to section 2101 must be interpreted broadly. Considering the above discussion, the section 2101 language is most appropriately understood as general instructions to the Commission to ensure that utilities follow the law, which we do. We have a robust utility enforcement program, and often impose heavy penalties. (See Decision, at pp. 29-30; PG&E, San Bruno, D.15-04-024.) In the wildfire context specifically, this Decision and others have laid out a strong enforcement program, which has incorporated different types of penalties. (Decision, p. 15; see Malibu Canyon Fire OII, D.12-09-019, D.13-09-026, D.13-09-028.) Similarly, the plain language of sections 2101 and 2104, concerning fines being paid to the California general fund, does not prohibit suspended fines. Section 2101 requires that, “penalties due the State [for violations be] recovered and collected.” (Emphasis added.) Money would only be due the State when penalties are imposed and are not suspended. Section 2101 does not address whether the Commission can suspend penalties. Clearly penalties that are suspended are not due the State, and thus the section 2101 provision would not apply. Likewise, by its terms, section 2104 only applies to penalties recovered, which means they were imposed, were not suspended and were collected. Section 2014 provides that, “All fines and penalties recovered by the state in any action … shall be paid into the State Treasury.…” (Emphasis added.) Again, by its plain language section 2104 does not address whether the Commission may suspend a penalty, because when a penalty is suspended no penalty has been recovered. Therefore, the sections 2101 and 2104 provisions regarding remittance of penalties to the general fund do not prohibit suspended fines. Contrary to Wild Tree’s assertions (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 12), suspension of a fine is not novel or unprecedented in our enforcement efforts. In fact, the Commission has suspended fines in several different types of enforcement actions. (See, e.g., Re Best Movers, D.02-05-028, at p. 15 [suspending $12000 of $17000 fine conditioned on fulfilling requirements]; Re Coleman Enterprises Inc., D.00-12-050 [settlement suspending $800,000 fine in part due to restitution provided by company].) We have even adopted a fine suspension protocol in one of our General Orders. (See General Order (GO) 133-D, § 9.7 [fine suspended if carrier invests to cure deficiencies].) Because the Commission has long interpreted the Public Utilities Code enforcement provisions as allowing it to suspend fines, the Commission’s position on fine suspensions is accorded even greater deference. (See PSEP Penalties, supra, at p. 852.) Section 2106Wild Tree also argues that section 2106 bars “use of a suspended fine in these circumstances.” (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 33.) Section 2106 provides in part, “No [civil damage] recovery as provided in this section shall in any manner affect a recovery by the State of the penalties provided in this part….” Wild Tree claims that in seeking bankruptcy protection PG&E planned it so the tort damages it is facing would impact the Commission’s recovery of a fine, in violation of section 2106. (Id., at p. 34.)Wild Tree’s attenuated argument fails for a few reasons. First, as with the other sections, from the plain language of the statute there is no recovery at issue here because the fine was suspended. Section 2106 does not address whether a fine can be suspended and is therefore inapposite to the situation at hand. Second, Wild Tree’s allegations about PG&E’s motives and actions do not allege any legal error in the Decision, which is the purpose of an application for rehearing. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 20, (Commission Rules) Rule 16.1.) Third, Wild Tree’s complaint is that PG&E “forced wildfire victims under the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court … [to] preempt any recovery by the State of the penalties assessed under the Public Utilities Code.” (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 33.) To the extent Wild Tree argues that these matters are preempted by some degree by the bankruptcy court, Wild Tree has not identified any error on the part of the Commission.Wild Tree unsuccessfully attempts to rely on Goncharov v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1157 to support its section 2106 argument. The Court in Goncharov held that plaintiffs could not proceed with their lawsuit for damages against Uber because plaintiffs’ theory of relief would directly interfere with the Commission’s regulatory efforts. (Goncharov, at p. 1174.) As Wild Tree acknowledges, the Court interpreted section 2016 as only barring actions for damages, that would “hinder or frustrate the commission’s declared supervisory and regulatory policies.” (Id., at p. 1169.) Since Goncharov cites the need to allow the Commission’s policies to proceed unobstructed, it cannot be cited to challenge our efforts as Wild Tree does here. Briefly stated, the section 2106 limitations on damage recovery actions apply to civil courts and not the Commission. Wild Tree’s tortured argument posits that the Commission is interfering with itself. To the contrary, in this case our “declared supervisory and regulatory policies,” are indeed that PG&E’s fine be suspended. The Commission cannot be understood to have interfered with its own policies, or to have violated section 2106.Section 1701.2Rehearing applicants also argue that section 1701.2 bars the suspended fines in this case, because the suspension was incorrectly based on doubts about whether PG&E could pay the fine. (See Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 21; Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 28.) These arguments misconstrue the Decision, as well as the nature of the proceeding.Section 1701.2 concerns procedural requirements for Commission adjudicatory cases. That section specifies processes for determining whether a respondent can pay potential penalties in cases where we have determined that the “respondent lacks or may lack, the ability to pay potential penalties….” In relevant part, section 1701.2 (j)(4) provides that: A respondent that is a public utility regulated under a rate of return or rate of margin regulatory structure or that has gross annual revenues of more than one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000) generated within California is presumed to be able to pay potential penalties, fines, or restitution that may be ordered by the commission, and, therefore, paragraphs (1) to (3) inclusive [regarding the process for demonstrating inability to pay] do not apply to that respondent. (Emphasis added.) Rehearing applicants argue that this statute prohibits the Commission from suspending the fine on the basis that PG&E’s ability to pay “is not clear.” (Decision, at p. 26.) They argue, “the Decision does not properly address failure to pay, much less that PG&E has overcome the statutory presumption established in 1701.2 that PG&E can afford to pay fines.” (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 20.) The section 1701.2 provisions regarding respondent’s ability to pay penalties are not relevant to this Decision. Section 1701.2 (j) outlines a process for smaller utilities in cases where we determine they may lack the ability to pay a fine ordered by the Commission. (§ 1701.2 (j)(1).) Section 1701.2 (j)(4), relied upon by rehearing applicants, simply provides that, because larger utilities are presumed to be able to pay, they are exempt from the section 1701.2 (j) processes.Those provisions do not apply here because the suspended fine is part of a settled outcome being evaluated pursuant to Rule 12.1 and is not a fine that is being imposed after adjudication, which is the subject of section 1701.2 (j). Moreover, section 1701.2 (j) imposes no requirements on larger utilities, such as PG&E, but simply exempts them from the process outlined in subsection (j). There is no consequence of the presumption in the statute, and the statute provides no limitations on means to rebut it. Even if the provision applied in this case, rehearing applicants fail to explain how a Commission determination disagreeing with a non-binding presumption based on uncertainty surrounding PG&E’s liabilities and bankruptcy reorganization, would in any way violate the terms of section 1701.2 (j)(4).Moreover, Wild Tree’s statement that, “the Decision relies upon an inability to pay as grounds to suspend the fine,” (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 21), is incorrect. Contrary to rehearing applicants’ arguments, we did not make any factual determination concerning whether PG&E was able to pay the $200 million fine. Rather, we based the decision to suspend the fine on “the unique situation of PG&E’s bankruptcy, its indebtedness to hundreds of wildfire claimants for loss of life and property, and the current upheaval in the financial markets.” (Decision, at p. 50.) In other words, we cited the uncertainty caused by numerous financial pressures. To characterize these conclusions as holding that PG&E is “unable” to pay is inaccurate. For this reason, as well, section 1701.2 (j) has no application to the Decision.Based on the above discussion, rehearing applicants have not demonstrated that we acted in excess of our authority, or violated any statute when we decided to suspend the fine against PG&E. Other Challenges To The Fine SuspensionIn addition to arguing that the Commission’s suspension of the fine violates the Public Utilities Code, Wild Tree also claims that the fine suspension: (1) is the result of bias; (2) is not based on adequate evidence; and (3) is otherwise not adequately supported. (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at pp. 12-31.) None of these arguments have merit.Wild Tree argues:In relying upon unproven speculations of PG&E never made part of the record in the proceeding in issuing a decision that does not asses[s] a collectable fine and /or shareholders tax benefits from penalties assessed, the Commission demonstrated actual bias in favor of PG&E. (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 18.) Wild Tree incorrectly asserts that the suspension is based on extra-record material. Although PG&E cites the testimony it submitted (see PG&E Resp., at p. 19), the Decision did not rely upon this testimony, which was not entered into the record because parties settled before hearings were held. The Decision’s findings that PG&E faced financially uncertainty is not in dispute and is based upon the whole record including PG&E filings and joint SED/PG&E filings. (See Decision, at p. 50.) Contrary to Wild Tree’s assertions, we did not conclude “somehow PG&E can’t pay a $200 million fine….” (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 21.) Rather, we cited PG&E’s bankruptcy and large liability to wildfire victims, both undisputed facts that are based on filings in the record (Decision, at p. 50; Joint Motion), to determine that PG&E’s finances are uncertain. We may rely upon less formal filings because neither the fact of PG&E’s bankruptcy nor PG&E’s looming liabilities is subject to dispute. Contrary to Wild Tree’s argument, we did not need to have exact figures about PG&E’s future finances in order to determine whether a penalty suspension was appropriate. In addition, Wild Tree’s contention that any of its alleged defects in the fine suspension are the result of bias on our part is baseless. Wild Tree selectively cites Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd.?(2009) 45 Cal.4th 731 for general statements that administrative tribunals cannot be biased, but Morongo does not support Wild Tree’s claim. Morongo concerns a type of potential bias that can exist in the absence of an internal separation between advocates and decisionmakers within an agency. (See Morongo, at p. 737.) There is no allegation or indication that has occurred here. More generally on the topic of bias, Morongo notes, “Unless they have a financial interest in the outcome [citation], adjudicators are presumed to be impartial [citation].” (Ibid.) Wild Tree provides no argument that would rebut the presumption of impartiality on the part of the Commission. Wild Tree’s basis for its bias claim is its allegation that we failed to base its fine suspension on an adequate record or reasoning. (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 18.) That Wild Tree disagrees with our holdings, or even alleges that the Decision is illegal, does not demonstrate bias. Moreover, the Commission bears regulatory responsibility over the operations of PG&E and is responsible for overseeing the provision of utility service within the state. (See, e.g., § 451.) That those responsibilities influence our regulatory decisions cannot be considered bias, but rather are part of our Constitutional mandate. Although Wild Tree disagrees with our conclusion that the totality of the circumstances warrants suspension of the fine, it has not demonstrated that the fine suspension is in error. We based on the fine suspension on uncontested facts in the record (the bankruptcy, PG&E’s extensive liability, and ensuring that payment of the fine did not reduce the funds available to satisfy the claims of wildfire victims) and chose a course of action within our discretion based on that information. “The weighing of whatever factors may have tended [to support an implied finding by the PUC] was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission.” (California Portland Cement Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 171, 175.) Accordingly, our decision to suspend PG&E’s fine is not legal error.Settlement Approval ProcessBeyond the fine suspension arguments, rehearing applicants assert that the our approval of the proposed settlement is in error because we did not use the correct standard in reviewing the settlement, did not have sufficient findings and evidence to support the settlement approval, and failed to hold hearings before adopting the modified settlement. Wild Tree and Del Monte fail to understand the role of the settlement in this proceeding or the applicable procedural requirements. Standards For Settlement ApprovalDel Monte and Wild Tree argue that in considering whether to approve the modified settlement we failed to use the correct standard and, therefore, failed to evaluate the settlement properly. Both rehearing applicants suggest that we should have evaluated the settlement using certain class-action factors that the Commission has used in some previous settlement decisions. (Del Monte App. Rhrg, at pp. 30-31; Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 36.) Contrary to rehearing applicants’ arguments, the class-action factors are not the mandated or appropriate standard to evaluate this settlement. Moreover, even if the class-action standards were applied here, the settlement approval still would be justified. In evaluating a proposed settlement, we are guided by Rule 12.1 (d), which provides that in order to be approved a settlement must be “reasonable in light of the whole record, consistent with the law, and in the public interest.” (Rule 12.1 (d); Decision, at pp. 18-19.) Beyond this basic standard, we have incorporated other standards into its analysis, which have largely depended on situational factors, such as the type of proceeding at issue, the interests of the settling parties, and whether the settlement is contested. (See Re Diablo Canyon Settlement (1988) [D.88-12-083] 30 Cal.P.U.C.2d 189, 223.) Because this is an enforcement proceeding, specific considerations apply. Where there is a penalty involved, we generally consider the D.98-12-075 penalty factors. (See, e.g., Re Acacia Avenue Electrocution, D.14-08-009, at pp. 8-18.) We also have emphasized that SED’s position, as the prosecutor and the party primarily responsible for the public interest in enforcement cases, should be given great weight. (Malibu Canyon Fire OII, D.13-09-028 at 39-40.) While contested settlements receive greater scrutiny than all-party settlements, we afford a settlement in which SED, acting as prosecutor, has settled with the respondent, particular deference. (See Re Anti-Smart Meter OII, D.14-01-038.) In reliance on our settlement standards, we found that this settlement, as modified, is “reasonable in light of the whole record, consistent with the law, and in the public interest.” (Decision, at pp. 18 et seq., 68; Rule 12.1 (d).) We considered the totality of the modified settlement, which consists of total penalties of $2.137 billion, which includes disallowances, System Enhancement Initiatives, and a $200 million suspended fine. After a review of the penalty factors and the record, we cited the financial and litigation uncertainties underpinning the modified settlement. (Decision, at pp. 66-69.) Accordingly, we held:[T]he provision for penalties set forth in the settlement agreement, as modified by this decision, is within a reasonable range of potentially litigated outcomes and in the public interest. Rather than continued litigation regarding the amount of monetary penalties to be imposed on PG&E, the Commission finds that the public interest is best served by focusing efforts on appropriate corrective actions to help reduce the risk of such catastrophic wildfires in the future.(Decision, at pp. 69-70.)The class-action factors cited by rehearing applicants are not a mandatory test and have little application to the current case. Rehearing applicants cite a few cases where we have used these class-action factors to evaluate settlements, but neglect to mention that we have specifically held that evaluation of such factors may be appropriate only in ratemaking proceedings, which are most analogous to class actions. In Re Diablo Canyon Settlement (1988) [D.88-12-083] 30 Cal.P.U.C.2d 189, cited by rehearing applicants, we stated that class actions are analogous to “utility rate case[s]” when evaluating potential settlements. (Diablo Canyon, at p. 222, emphasis added.) The other decisions rehearing applicants cite which consider the class-action factors, D.09-12-045 and D.16-12-065, also arose in ratesetting, as opposed to adjudicatory proceedings. (See R.09-19-045 and A.15-02-009 respectively.) Del Monte’s attempt to argue that bankruptcy factors should be applied is similarly unconvincing, since those proceedings also have little application in an enforcement context. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at pp. 34-45.) Rehearing applicants fail to point to any enforcement settlement the Commission has evaluated using class-action or bankruptcy factors.Moreover, although there are a few utility ratemaking proceedings cases where we have found it useful to apply the class-action factors, even in the context of utility rate and related cases we usually do not analyze proposed settlements using those factors. (See, e.g., SDG&E/SoCalGas Incentives, D.17-03-003 at pp. 9-13; Re 2020 Cal-Am Rate Increase, D.18-12-021.) All the above cited cases make clear that we have discretion to determine how we will evaluate whether a settlement is reasonable and in the public interest. Therefore, any suggestion that the class-action factors provide a mandatory test for Commission approval of a settlement has no basis. Although we did not utilize the class-action factors in its analysis, and were not required to do so, rehearing applicants’ claim that those factors would lead to rejection of the settlement is incorrect. Wild Tree argues that the settlement should not have been approved pursuant to the class-action factors because discovery was not complete, the settlement was the product of collusion, and it was only the consensus of like-minded thinkers. (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at pp. 36-38.) None of these arguments support the claim that approval of the settlement is in error. First, all of the class-action factors, are just that, and even if applied it would still be up to the Commission to exercise its discretion to balance them. For example, we considered the extent to which discovery was complete. Although Wild Tree and Del Monte argue that they lacked a full opportunity to participate, the fact that the settlement could streamline the proceeding and avoid a lengthy uncertain undertaking were benefits we cited in approving the settlement. (See Decision, at pp. 67-68.) Furthermore, there is no support for Wild Tree’s claim that the settlement is the product of collusion or just an agreement between like-minded parties. The Settling Parties include SED, in the role of the prosecutor, as well as the respondent PG&E. By definition, these are not like-minded parties. OSA, who by statute advocated on safety issues on behalf of utility customers, also signed on. (See § 309.8 (b), repealed January 1, 2020.) Notwithstanding Wild Tree’s own disagreement with the settlement, it provides no support for its argument that the settlement is the product of collusion between like-minded parties.Del Monte suggests that SED’s earlier argument that the class-action factors do not apply in enforcement settlements is not correct. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 33; SED Resp. to Appeal, at pp. 8-9.) That enforcement settlements carry a unique set of considerations is the Commission’s position, and not just SED’s. (Re Anti-Smart Meter OII, D.14-01-038; Malibu Canyon Fire OII, D.13-09-028, supra, at pp. 39-40.) Contrary to Del Monte’s argument, neither SED nor the Commission ever claimed that there is no public interest in an enforcement proceeding. (See Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 33.) Rather, as SED argued, an enforcement proceeding does not involve the types of broad policy determinations that a ratemaking proceeding would. (SED Resp. to Appeal, at pp. 8-9.) Although there is public interest in an enforcement action, the primary nature of the proceeding concerns the prosecution of a respondent to determine the appropriate penalties for a particular utility violation. For this reason, Commission evaluations of enforcement settlements have given great weight to SED’s positions, as the prosecuting party. (See Malibu Canyon Fire OII.) The Commission has evaluated whether such settlements are reasonable largely in terms of the penalty factors, and other relevant aspects of the public interest. Need For Hearings Both Del Monte and Wild Tree argue that in addition to using an incorrect standard for evaluating the settlement, we were required to hold hearings prior to adopting the settlement. They argue that there are disputed issues of material fact that require hearings, and that due process requires a more developed record to support adoption of the settlement, as well as an opportunity to be heard. (See Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at pp. 8-11, 38-49; Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 39 et seq.) Rehearing applicants fail to demonstrate that hearings were necessary.Parties do not have an absolute right to formal evidentiary hearings in Commission proceedings, and whether evidentiary hearings are required depends on the nature of the proceeding and the dispute at issue. (See Wood v. Public Utilities Com. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 288, 292; § 1701.1 (b)(1).) Pursuant to Rule 12.3, “if there are no material contested issues of fact,” we do not need to hold hearings prior to adopting a contested settlement. When determining whether to approve a settlement, we are guided by Rule 12.1 (d) and whether a settlement is reasonable and in the public interest. We have often emphasized the strong public policy favoring the settlement of disputes in lieu of litigation.The Commission has long favored the?settlement?of disputes. This policy supports many worthwhile goals, including reducing the expense of litigation, conserving scarce Commission resources, and allowing parties to reduce the risk that litigation will produce unacceptable results.(Re Malibu Canyon Fire OII, D.12-09-019, at p. 26.) By its nature, a proceeding to determine whether a settlement is reasonable is not fully litigated and does not necessarily resolve all underlying factual disputes. (Diablo Canyon, supra, at p. 222.) As we have explained, “we recognize that?settlements?typically are compromises and that compromises indeed may be in the public interest.” (Re Acacia Avenue Electrocution, D.14-08-009, at p. 16.) The trade-off for expeditious resolution of the dispute underlying a settlement is, “acceptance of the judgment of the settling parties on the appropriateness of some details of the settlement in the absence of evidentiary hearings or specific substantiation of those details.” (Re 1992 SDG&E Rate Settlement (1992) [D.92-12-019] 46 Cal.P.U.C.2d 538, 552.) It is incumbent on the Commission to determine whether that trade-off is in the public interest.Moreover, it is well settled that, “It is within the PUC's discretion to determine what factors are material to its decision based on the issues before it.”? (Clean Energy Fuels Corp. v. Public Utilities Com.?(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 641, 659; see also California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 270, 275.) For that reason, it is the Commission, and not the parties, that decides whether a contested issue of fact is material to its evaluation of a settlement pursuant to Rule 12.3. Here, we evaluated the entirety of the modified settlement, which consists of $1.823 billion in disallowances, $114 million in System Enhancement Initiatives and corrective actions, a $200 million suspended fine, and any tax savings resulting from the settlement agreement provisions to be returned to the benefit of ratepayers. (Decision, at p. 2.) In determining that the settlement is “reasonable in light of the whole record, consistent with law, and in the public interest,” we did not rely on any disputed factual conclusions, but rather relied on undisputed facts which were clear from the record. The Commission relied on the record of the proceeding to hold:CAL FIRE determined that PG&E’s facilities ignited all but one of the fire incidents at issue in the OII (Decision, Finding of Fact (FF) 2);SED found numerous violations of GO 95, Resolution E-4184 and Public Utilities Code section 451 with respect to the 2017 and 2018 wildfires, and there are ongoing concerns about PG&E’s compliance with directives (Decision, FFs 3,4, 8, 9);The 2017 and 2018 fires caused an unprecedented level of harm (Decision, FF 7);PG&E disagrees with some of SED’s findings (Decision, FF 5);PG&E is in bankruptcy proceedings and is facing large wildfire related liabilities (Decision, at pp. 49-50, 75, FF 10);PG&E’s ability to raise capital is not unlimited, and PG&E’s financial outlook is uncertain (Decision, at pp. 50, 78, FF 30, 31);Timely resolution of the enforcement proceeding is in the public interest (Decision, at pp. 40, 79, FF 47); andThe modified settlement falls within the range of possible litigation outcomes. (Decision, at p. 68.) None of these holdings are in dispute. Based on these and other undisputed factual findings, we found that the modified settlement is reasonable and in the public interestin light of the whole record. In addition, we found that certain compromises, such as not fully litigating the underlying factual disputes, are in the public interest due to the need for a timely resolution of the enforcement proceeding, and PG&E’s status in bankruptcy. (See Decision, at pp. 40, 68-70.) As we explained:Given that a settlement agreement was reached before this proceeding was fully adjudicated and several legal and factual issues remain in dispute, the Commission evaluates the reasonableness of the Settling Parties’ proposed outcome based on the record to date and in light of the potential range of outcomes that could result if this proceeding was fully adjudicated and the litigation risk facing the parties.(Decision, at p. 20.) Accordingly, by evaluating the range of possible outcomes in light of the public interest, the Commission determined that a settlement could be approved accepting the uncertainty that resulted because the underlying factual disputes were not litigated.Del Monte raises questions and arguments about the factual underpinningsof PG&E’s alleged violations which were not resolved. (See Del Monte App. Rhrg., at pp. 39-58.) He argues that we did not “give notice that Rule 12.3 will no longer apply.” (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 60.) What Del Monte misunderstands is that, given the Commission’s established standards for reviewing settlements, these underlying factual questions about the violations are not material to the Decision. Therefore, his argument that all these factual issues needed to be resolved for the settlement to be adopted is mistaken. The fact that there are unresolved factual issues that rehearing applicants want to resolve does not make those issues “material” to our holdings, since we relied on other reasoning in approving the settlement.Based on the undisputed information in the record, it was reasonable for the Commission to conclude that, based on the range of possible litigated outcomes, the settlement is reasonable and in the public interest. There is no requirement that every underlying factual issue be resolved prior to approving a settlement. Clearly, if every underlying factual contention had to be fully litigated, parties would be unable to settle contrary to our long-established policy. Wild Tree and Del Monte claim that because we did not hold hearings, we based our conclusions about PG&E’s inability to pay on extra-record evidence. (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 16.) In fact, as discussed, we never determined that PG&E was unable to pay a fine. Rather, we held that based on the undisputed facts in the record about the bankruptcy proceeding and PG&E’s extensive liability, PG&E’s financial outlook was uncertain. (Decision, at p. 50.) Moreover, as explained earlier, contrary to rehearing applicants’ allegations, there are no holdings in the Decision that rely on extra-record evidence. Wild Tree and Del Monte also argue that they have due process rights to have a hearing on the wildfire enforcement issues. (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at pp. 11, 21; Del Monte Rhrg., at pp. 7-10.) They claim that they were deprived of an opportunity to be heard in violation of the 14th amendment. (See Del Monte Rhrg., at p. 7.) Contrary to these arguments, constitutional due process interests do not apply to rehearing applicants in the current proceeding.As rehearing applicants state, “pursuant to the 14th amendment, ‘No state shall…deprive any person of life liberty or property without due process of law.’ (U.S. Const. 14th Amend.)” (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 8.) “Under the federal Constitution, ‘Procedural?due?process?imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the?Due?Process?Clause of the Fifth?or?Fourteenth Amendment.’ (Mathews v. Eldridge?(1976) 424 U.S. 319, 332 …)” (Burt v. County of Orange?(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 273, 283.) In Wood, supra, the California Supreme Court held that general ratepayer interests did not constitute the life or liberty interests that fell within the constitutional due process protections. (Wood, supra, 4 Cal.3d, at p. 292.) Although Wood specifically ruled on rate proceedings, the nature of the customer interests here is the same - rehearing applicants are generally impacted as utility customers, but their specific utility service is not at issue. Accordingly, Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft (1978) 436 U.S. 1, does not support Del Monte’s contention that due process rights attach to their utility service interests. In Memphis Light, unlike here, actual disconnection of service was at issue. This case is an enforcement action against PG&E, which is the party that has property interests at stake - the disconnection of rehearing applicants’ utility service is not at issue. Although as parties in a Commission proceeding intervenors have statutory and administrative rights, they do not have constitutional due process rights when intervening in an enforcement action that is not aimed at them. Rehearing applicants fail to show that they were deprived of any statutory or regulatory process requirement. It is up to the Commission to determine whether a hearing is necessary in any particular proceeding. (§ 1701.1 (b)(1).) As discussed above, in the case of a settlement approval, “if there are no material contested issues of fact … the Commission may decline to set a hearing.” (Rule 12.3.) Therefore, because our approval was based on undisputed facts, Wild Tree and Del Monte did not have a right to an evidentiary hearing. Rehearing applicants have no right to litigate issues that are not material to the resolution of the proceeding. Wild Tree and Del Monte argue that there are material facts in dispute, because the magnitude of the harm is a factual question that materially affects the reasonableness of the settlement. (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at pp. 45-46.) Again, in approving the settlement, we did not rule on the factual details underlying PG&E’s violations. Once a settlement is reached by the primary parties the issue becomes the reasonableness and public interest value of that settlement, and whether it is within a range of possible outcomes. Requiring all factual issues to be litigated is contrary to the Commission’s strong interest in encouraging settlements. Del Monte and Wild Tree also claim we needed to hold hearings on PG&E’s wildfire violations to fulfill our investigatory responsibilities pursuant to section 2101. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at pp. 51.) Rehearing applicants fail to understand how the Commission’s enforcement program works. Indeed, SED’s investigations of utility conduct occur primarily outside of any formal proceedings and without intervenor-input. Simply because a matter is not litigated in a formal enforcement action does not mean that it was not investigated. Notably, the Decision specifically calls for the analysis of root causes to continue outside the confines of the enforcement action. (Decision, at pp. 64-66.) Accordingly, investigation of PG&E’s conduct has occurred before and will occur after the adoption of the settlement. That Del Monte and Wild Tree are not able to participate in all the stages of our investigation is not legal error. In this case, SED investigated PG&E’s conduct concerning all the wildfires in the scope of the proceeding before issuing reports, SED alleged a number of violations of a number of Commission orders, and SED will continue to investigate. Accordingly, we are carrying out our investigatory responsibilities.Del Monte takes issue with the fact that the Decision did not reach any firm conclusions about PG&E violations, and PG&E did not stipulate to any violations on its part as part of the settlement. (See Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 50.) As discussed, to the extent rehearing applicants suggest that each violation needs to be labeled and enforced individually to comply with the Public Utilities Code, that simply is not the case. Despite no definitive conclusion about specific violations, we approved a settlement that provides for $2.137 billion in penalties, including a suspended fine. Again, the settlement represents a compromise that we found was in the public interest, and we have determined that there is a strong public interest in settling disputes. Del Monte fails to demonstrate that it is illegal for the Commission to accept this compromise. Because the compromise includes $2.137 billion in penalties, Del Monte cannot claim that we have not performed our enforcement duties. Rehearing applicants fail to demonstrate that any material contested issues of fact exist requiring that we hold hearings prior to approving the settlement. As outlined above, none of the factual points we relied upon to approve the modified settlement are in dispute, and no hearing was required.?Scoping IssuesDel Monte and Wild Tree both challenge our inclusion of the Camp Fire in the scope of the proceeding. They also take issue with the fact that we did not include ignition of the Tubbs Fire, while otherwise including that fire. Rehearing applicants fail to demonstrate legal error in our handling of the scope of the proceeding.The OII as originally issued included 15 of the 17 2017 fires in PG&E territory that SED investigated. (Decision, at p. 4.) The OII is predicated on SED’s report, which, alleges violations for all these fires, except the Tubbs fire. The Lobo, McCourtney and 2018 Camp Fires were added to the proceeding in subsequent scoping memos. Tubbs FireDel Monte claims that we “flip-flopp[ed]” about whether the Tubbs Fire is in the scope of the proceeding, depriving him of a meaningful opportunity to participate. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 75.) We have been clear from the outset that no violations connected to the Tubbs Fire were at issue in this proceeding. (See August 23, 2019 Scoping Memo, Attach. A.) As PG&E explains, issues relating to the cause of the Tubbs Fire are not at issue, but the fact that SED did not pursue any violations against PG&E concerning the Tubbs Fire is within the scope of the proceeding. (PG&E Response, at p. 9-10.) Since no Tubbs Fire violations are at issue in the proceeding, Del Monte cannot make any claims that rulings deprived him of any opportunity to participate.Although the OII includes the Tubbs Fire as one of the listed fires in the proceeding (OII, at p. 20), ignition of that fire was never in the scope of the proceeding because SED relied on CAL FIRE’s conclusion that PG&E did not cause that fire. As the Decision explains: SED relies on CAL FIRE as the agency qualified to determine the source of the ignition. As SED explains, it does not make a determination as to the ignition source of the fire, rather it conducts an investigation and reviews relevant evidence to determine whether there were violations of law. SED conducted its own investigation and reviewed the evidence provided by CAL FIRE and found no violations with respect to the Tubbs Fire. No alleged violations with respect to the Tubbs Fire were identified in the OII or in the scoping memos issued in this proceeding. Therefore, the settlement’s exclusion of any violations with respect to the Tubbs Fire does not render it unreasonable.(Decision, at pp. 60-61 [citations omitted].) It is SED, acting as prosecutor, which directs the scope of the enforcement action. SED had already reviewed CAL FIRE’s analysis of the cause of the Tubbs Fire, and therefore, no alleged PG&E violations concerning the Tubbs Fire were ever within the scope of the proceeding. (See OII, at p. 9.) Del Monte claims that it was error to include the Tubbs Fire in the settlement when the cause is not in the scope of the proceeding. Again, other than the cause of ignition, the Tubbs Fire is within the scope of the proceeding because it is a 2017 fire in PG&E territory that CAL FIRE and SED had reviewed. Moreover, the Tubbs Fireis one of the fires that preceded PG&E’s bankruptcy filing – the subject of the OII. Notwithstanding the fact that the Tubbs Fire is included in the proceeding, it was clear that SED was not pursuing violations and had accepted the CAL FIRE conclusion that PG&E did not cause that fire. In challenging the settlement’s inclusion of the Tubbs Fire, Del Monte incorrectly claims that the settlement relieves PG&E of all liability for the Tubbs Fire. The settlement provisions that included the Tubbs Fire are limited to SED’s prosecution of what SED knew or could have known at the time of the settlement. (Settlement Agreement, at p. 6.) We are not prevented from investigating if new facts about the Tubbs Fire arise, nor does the settlement protect PG&E from liability in non-Commission actions. Moreover, we have acknowledged that approved settlements are not set in concrete and cannot bind future Commissions. (Diablo Canyon, supra, at p. 225.) Furthermore, because the proceeding resulted in a settlement, Del Monte ultimately would not have been prejudiced by any adverse ruling on discovery. No testimony was admitted, and no factual conclusions were reached about any violations. The Tubbs Fire incident was included in the total settlement, and because SED and PG&E settled, Del Monte’s factual arguments were ultimately not relevant to the final disposition. Since SED is the entity responsible for determining the charges, they are within their discretion not to assert charges for a particular incident. Therefore, even if Del Monte were correct in his claim that he was misled, no harm would have resulted. Camp FireWild Tree alleges that our decision to add the Camp Fire to the proceeding is “prejudicial reversible error.” (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 48.) Citing Edison v. Public Utilities Com. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1085, Wild Tree argues that it was error to add the Camp Fire at a late stage of the proceeding without providing sufficient opportunity for intervenors to comment on the underlying factual issues. Wild Tree is incorrect.Pursuant to Rule 7.3:The assigned Commissioner shall issue the scoping memo for the proceeding, which shall determine the schedule (with projected submission date) and issues to be addressed.…It is common for scoping memos to be modified as new issues arise in a proceeding.The OII did not include the Camp Fire when the Investigation was originally opened on June 27, 2019. However, from the first status conference and prehearing conference, less than two months later in August 2019, SED communicated that it may seek to add the Camp Fire, along with two other fires, to the scope of the proceeding. This possibility was described in the initial scoping memo. (August 23, 2019 Scoping Memo, at p. 5.) SED updated parties about the possible addition of the Camp Fire in October and November 2019, and on November 26, 2019 SED formally moved to add the Camp Fire to the proceeding. (See SED Response to Del Monte and Wild Tree Appeal, at p. 5.) A second amended scoping memo officially added the Camp Fire to the proceeding on December 5, 2019. Afterwards, the Settling Parties filed a motion for Commission approval of the settlement on December 17, 2019. Parties were able to file comments and reply comments on the settlement in January and February 2020. The ALJ issued a POD proposing to approve the settlement with modifications on February 27, 2020.Wild Tree argues that the timeline after we added the Camp Fire to the proceeding deprived it of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and that we failed to follow our own requirements, as in Edison. supra. The situation in Edison, however, is entirely different. In Edison, the Commission added an entirely new topic, prevailing wage, to a rulemaking about bid shopping and reverse auctions in utility contracting. (Edison, supra, at pp. 1091-1092.) The prevailing wage topic was outside the scoping memo topics and added over a year after the rulemaking opened, with the utilities having three business days to respond. (Id., at p. 1106.) The due date for comments on the prevailing wage proposal was days before the draft decision issued. Because the Commission added a topic to the proceeding on such extremely short notice without giving an adequate time for the utilities to respond, the Court held that the Commission violated due process by failing to follow its own rules. (Ibid.)Our addition of the Camp Fire to this proceeding has none of the flaws that occurred in Edison. The timing, one of the primary bases of the Court decision in Edison, is far more reasonable here. The Camp Fire was added six months into the proceeding as opposed to over a year in Edison, and the POD issued over two months later, as opposed to a week in Edison. Also, unlike the new issue added in Edison, the Camp Fire was not a departure from the subject matter of the investigation, it was simply the addition of another pre-bankruptcy fire event. And, unlike in Edison, all parties were aware from the start of the proceeding that the Camp Fire might be added. In the current case as well, we issued a conforming scoping memo which included the Camp Fire, unlike in Edison. Accordingly, we did not fail to follow our own rules, as the Court ruled we had in Edison.Moreover, unlike in Edison, rehearing applicants were not harmed by the addition of the Camp Fire issues to the proceeding. In Edison, the petitioner had property rights at stake, its contracting terms, and the Court held that the Commission’s addition of the prevailing wage issue was “prejudicial,” to their opportunity to be heard. (Edison, supra, at p. 1106.) Here, Wild Tree and Del Monte do not have property or liberty at stake, and the only reason they did not have the opportunity to litigate or do lengthier discovery on the Camp Fire is because the Settling Parties entered a settlement. A settlement shortcutting the litigation could have occurred no matter when the Camp Fire was added to the proceeding and was not the result of a faulty scoping memo process. As discussed, rehearing applicants fail to demonstrate that we were required to litigate the Camp Fire violations after SED and PG&E were able to settle. For these reasons, Wild Tree fails to demonstrate that the way the Camp Fire was added to the proceeding violates any law. Following Scoping MemoDel Monte also argues that we erred in failing to follow the dictates of the scoping memos. Although he acknowledges that the scoping memos note that the hearing requirement may change if settlement is reached, as it was, he claims that the contested settlement did not change the fact that there were contested issues of fact that needed to be resolved. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 60.)Again, Del Monte fails to understand the impact of the settlement on the proceeding. The scoping memos clearly contemplate that a settlement may curtail the litigation of the substantive issues, as the first scoping memo mentions narrowing the range of issues to be litigated “if this case is not settled.” (August 23, 2019 Scoping Memo, at p. 5.) The fact that SED and PG&E requested a stay of discovery due to the possibility of settlement should have made it abundantly clear the proceeding’s factual investigation would be curtailed in the event of the settlement. (See ibid.)Del Monte again argues that since there was a contested settlement, there were still material factual disputes. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 60.) As explained above, the Commission determines which issues and facts are material to its determination. (See § II.B.) The Commission was able to decide whether the settlement was in the public interest pursuant to Rule 12.3 without litigating the underlying factual disputes. The scoping memos acknowledge this possibility and do not require any different actions. OTHER ISSUESRehearing applicants also raise a number of other arguments, challengingthe Commission’s handling of the proceeding. Wild Tree suggests that PG&E manipulated the process in order to pay less in fines (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at pp. 27-30), and that shareholders will benefit financially from the penalty. (Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at pp. 49-51.) Del Monte argues the Commission mistakenly limited his discovery and factual arguments (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 33, 40, 42), and the Commission wrongly seeks to bind future Commissions. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at p. 36.) Del Monte also claims that the ALJ demonstrated bias in her rulings on Tubbs Fire evidence and discovery, and the Commission erred in its handling of PG&E evidence. (Del Monte App. Rhrg., at pp. 62, 66 -70.) Both parties make specific factual arguments relating to the underlying alleged PG&E violations. (See, e.g., Del Monte App. Rhrg., at pp. 50-58; Wild Tree App. Rhrg., at p. 43.) These claims lack merit. Expressing disagreement with one portion or provision in a settlement does not demonstrate legal error. A settlement represents a compromise of the entire matter being settled. For that reason, alleging that one provision is unfavorable does not indicate that the settlement as a whole is not reasonable or in the public interest. “‘[T]he Commission's role in reviewing an agreement such as this Stipulation is to “ensure the overall reasonableness of the agreement, without necessarily coming to an express conclusion about each element of the agreement.”' [Citation.]” (Re 1992 SDG&E Rate Settlement, supra, [D.92-12-019] 46 Cal.P.U.C.2d 538, 553.) For that reason, arguments that simply take issue with any particular portion of the settlement do not indicate legal error. Moreover, at the application for rehearing stage, we do not reweigh the considerations that led to the conclusion that the settlement as a whole is in the public interest. (SDG&E SOCRE CPCN Rehearing, D.17-09-040, at p. 6.) Review is limited to whether the Decision’s conclusion that the settlement is reasonable and in the public interest is adequately supported. As discussed above, there is adequate support for that conclusion.Wild Tree’s allegations about PG&E’s conduct prior to the settlement similarly do not identify any legal error on the part of the Commission. The Commission evaluated whether the proposed settlement brought before it for approval was reasonable in light of the whole record, consistent with the law, and in the public interest. PG&E’s bankruptcy and liability efforts have no bearing on whether the terms of the settlement as presented to the Commission are a reasonable resolution of the allegations set forth by SED. Wild Tree’s argument does not demonstrate that the Commission’s conclusions are in error.Del Monte is also incorrect in his assertion that the settlement attempts to bind future Commissions. Del Monte has raised this concern a few times and has been repeatedly informed that the settlement is not precedential and does not bind future Commissions. (See SED Resp. to Appeal, at p. 10.) This is consistent with long-established principles that Commission-approved settlements, are not set in “concrete.” (Diablo Canyon, supra, at p. 225.) That SED agrees to release PG&E from the further action regarding concerning the fires at issue based on information known or knowable at the time of the settlement, is consistent with Rule 12.1 limiting settlements to the issues in the proceeding. None of the substantive holdings of the settlement bind future Commissions.As discussed earlier, rehearing applicants’ claim of bias also lacks any support. A government tribunal is presumed to be unbiased, absent a financial incentive. (See Morongo, supra, at p. 737.) Ruling against one party does not indicate bias, and Del Monte and Wild Tree fail to show any bias in this proceeding. Del Monte doesnot explain how PG&E was accorded any preferential treatment. As discussed, Del Monte’s motions were denied because the cause of the Tubbs fire was not in the scope of the proceeding, not because of bias. At the same time, any extra-record PG&E testimony was not relied upon. There is no indication that PG&E was treated differently than rehearing applicants with respect to evidence.Even if PG&E had been afforded additional procedural opportunities, it would not be error because rehearing applicants and PG&E are not similarly situated as parties in this enforcement action. As discussed, the Commission regulates PG&E and is responsible for the safe and reasonable provision of electric service. (See §§ 451, 701.) It is required to take those considerations into account. Moreover PG&E is the only party that is a respondent in this proceeding and subject to penalties. For that reason, PG&E has due process rights in addition to the statutory and administrative process rights that apply to all parties in a proceeding. It is not bias to recognize the public interest in resolving the proceeding to allow PG&E to continue to be able to provide electricity and meet its commitments. (See Decision, at p. 79, FF 47.) Furthermore, rehearing applicants’ factual arguments and challenges to discovery rulings are misplaced. Because a number of parties, including SED and PG&E, ultimately settled, any ruling restricting discovery had little import. Similarly, we reached few factual conclusions, as discussed above, and those factual conclusions are not in dispute. As discussed, no testimony was entered into the proceeding, and the factual underpinnings of the violations were not litigated. Accordingly, we judged the settlement to be reasonable in context of the range of possible outcomes which may have occurred if the case was litigated. For this reason, discovery disputes and factual arguments are not relevant to the ultimate disposition of the case. Rehearing applicants cannot try a settled proceeding at the application for rehearing stage.CONCLUSIONBased on above discussion, we will make one small modification to the discussion in D.20-05-019 for clarification, as set forth below. Because no legal error has been demonstrated, we deny the applications for rehearing of the Decision, as modified.THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:After the first full paragraph on p. 16 of D.20-05-019, the following sentence is added:At the same time, Commission evaluations of enforcement settlements have given great weight to SED’s position, as the prosecuting party. (See Malibu Canyon Fire OII, D.13-09-028, at pp. 39-40.)Rehearing of D.20-05-019, as modified, is denied.This proceeding is closed.Dated December 3, 2020, at San Francisco, California.MARYBEL BATJER PresidentLIANE M. RANDOLPHMARTHA GUZMAN ACEVESCLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFENGENEVIEVE SHIROMA Commissioners ................
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