La Porte Educators v. La Porte ISD



DOCKET NO. 030-R8-1093

LA PORTE EDUCATION ASS’N./ § BEFORE THE STATE

TSTA/NEA, ET AL. §

§

V. § COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION

§

LA PORTE INDEPENDENT §

SCHOOL DISTRICT § THE STATE OF TEXAS

DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER

Statement of the Case

Petitioners La Porte Education Association/TSTA/NEA, La Beth Pondish, Cary Haskell, George Land, Erma Nolan and Kathleen Anderson, appeal the decision of the board of trustees of La Porte Independent School district, Respondent, to deny their grievance concerning the participation of campus and district level advisory committees in the decision to reorganize the district’s junior high schools.

Joan Howard Allen is the Administrative Law Judge appointed by the State Commissioner of Education. Petitioners are represented by Dianne E. Doggett, Attorney at Law, Austin, Texas. Respondent is represented by Christopher Gilbert, Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

On October 25, 1994, the Administrative Law Judge issued a Proposal for Decision recommending that Petitioners’ appeal be denied. Exceptions and replies were timely filed and considered. Petitioners’ exceptions are overruled.

Findings of Fact

After due consideration of the evidence and matters officially noticed, in my capacity as State Commissioner of Education, I make the following Findings of Fact:

1. Respondent was faced with the need to cut its budget by $3 million for the 1193-94 school year. As part of this budget reduction, Respondent received a recommendation by junior high school principals to restructure the junior high school system, creating one sixth-grade campus and two seventh/eighth grade campuses and reducing the number of teaching positions by fourteen.

2. The plan was presented to the board of trustees on March 1, 1993 and was adopted.

3. Neither the Districtwide Educational Improvement Council nor the Campus Performance Objectives Committee provided advice or input prior to the board vote.

4. Petitioners Pondish, Haskell and Land are members of the DEIC. Petitioners Pondish, Nolan and Anderson were members of the Baker Junior High School CPOC.

5. Following the restructuring of the junior high schools, the assignments of individual Petitioners were not changed. Only the location of the instruction was modified under the restructuring.

6. Respondent filed a site-based management plan with the commissioner of education as required by statute.

Discussion

JURISDICTION

Respondent asserts that because both Tex. Educ. Code §21.930 and §21.931 provide that no new cause of action is created by either of these statutes, Petitioners have no right to appeal to the commissioner. Petitioners respond that Section 11.13 permits appeals “arising under the school laws of Texas.” Respondent replies that if a cause of action does not exist, there can be no “appeal” to the commissioner. Respondent further contends that in order to harmonize the provisions, the exclusions in Sections 21.930 and 21.931 were intended to remove these advisory committees from Section 11.13 jurisdiction. Curiously, neither side cites any legislative history to support their theories.

I find that the interplay of Tex. Educ. Code §§21.930 and 21.931 with Section 11.13 is ambiguous. Further, I find that while these sections do not create a new legal cause of action, they are “school laws of Texas” and thus, persons aggrieved under these laws may appeal to the commissioner.

LOCAL POLICY EA (LOCAL)

In their Amended Petition for Review, Petitioners abandoned their claims under the local district policy.

STANDING

Respondent asserts that the individual Petitioners and the organizational Petitioner do not have standing to present this appeal. Petitioners contend that Respondent has waived this issue because it failed to assert this issue at the local level. The recent case of Texas Ass’n. of Business v. Tex. Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (hereinafter “TAB”) is instructive. TAB stands for the proposition that the issue of standing is jurisdictional and as such can never be waived. Petitioner cites Josh et al. v. Beaumont ISD, No. 240-R2-492 (Comm’r. Educ. 1993) for the proposition that standing issues can be waived if not properly presented at the local level. To the extent that Josh conflicts with TAB, it is disapproved. Respondent may therefore raise an issue of standing for the first time before the commissioner.

Individual Standing

Respondent contends that the individual Petitioners do not have standing to bring the appeal. In order to have standing, Petitioners must demonstrate that they meet one of the five characteristics set forth in City of Bells v. Greater Texoma Util. Auth., 744 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ). A person has standing to bring suit if:

(1) the person has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of which the person complains;

(2) a direct relationship between the alleged injury and the claim sought;

(3) a personal stake in the controversy;

(4) the challenged action has caused injury in fact; or

(5) the person is an appropriate party to assert the public’s interest in the matter as well as the person’s own interest.

(emphasis added). As members of the DEIC and the CPOC at Baker Junior High School, the individual Petitioners have a personal stake in the controversy of whether the district was required to submit the junior high school restructuring plan to either the DEIC or the CPOC. Thus, I find that the individual Petitioners have standing to present this appeal.

Organizational Standing

An organization has standing to sue on behalf of its members if:

(1) its members would otherwise standing to sue in their own right;

(2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and

(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members.

TAB at 447. Petitioners have standing to sue in their own right (supra). The parties agree that the interests that LPEA/TSTA/NEA seek to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose. Since Petitioners have deleted their cause of action for damages, individual participation of members is not required.

VIOLATION OF §21.930

Tex. Educ. Code §21.930 provides in relevant part:

(a) The board of trustees of each school district shall adopt a policy to involve the professional staff of the district in establishing and reviewing the district’s educational goals, objectives, and major district-wide classroom instructional programs.

Petitioners contend that under Section 21.930, Respondent was required to involve the Districtwide Educational Improvement Council (hereinafter “DEIC”) in the decision to restructure the junior high schools, relying upon the language, “major district-wide classroom instructional programs.” Respondent replies that because the statute reserves to the district’s board of trustees the exclusive power to manage and govern the district, the board has the authority to specify the topics for the DEIC to consider. This is true so long as the topics selected by the board exceed the scope of the statute. Here, however, it must first be determined whether the restructuring of the junior high schools constituted a topic required by Section 21.930 to be submitted to the DEIC for input.

Although a better process would have been to involve stakeholders on the front end of the decision making process, I find that Section 21.930 does not require that a districtwide committee provide input in the restructuring of junior high schools when it solely concerns the location of instruction and that this issue does not constitute a “major classroom instructional program”. Rather, this decision involved where instruction was to be delivered, not the methodology, the curriculum or the assessment of instruction.

VIOLATION OF §21.931

Tex. Educ. Code §21.931 provides in relevant part:

(a) Each school district shall develop and implement a plan for site-based decision making not later than September 1, 1992. Each district shall submit its plan to the commissioner of education for approval.

(b) Each district’s plan:

(1) shall establish school committees;

(...)

(3) shall outline the role of the school committees regarding decision making related to goal setting, curriculum, budgeting, staffing patterns and school organization.

The campus committees are called Campus Performance Objectives Committees (hereinafter “CPOCs”). The committees participate in the specified activities for the individual campus. The issue of restructuring the all junior high schools exceed the campus boundaries over which the CPOC has an interest. The board determines the organization of the district; once the district organization is established, the CPOCs then consider staffing patterns and school organization for the individual schools.

Conclusions of Law

After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed, and the foregoing Findings of Fact, in my capacity as State Commissioner of Education, I make the following Conclusions of Law:

1. The Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction over the instant matter pursuant to Tex. Educ. Code Section 11.13.

2. The individual Petitioners have standing to bring this appeal because as members of the DEIC and/or CPOC, they have a personal stake in the outcome of this appeal.

3. The organizational Petitioner has standing to bring this appeal because its members would otherwise standing to sue in their own right; the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members.

4. Tex. Educ. Code §21.930 was not violated when the topic of restructuring the grade levels and attendance characteristics of the junior high schools was not discussed in the DEIC, as that topic does not relate to the district’s educational goals, objectives, and major district-wide classroom instructional programs.

5. Tex. Educ. Code §21.931 was not violated when the topic of restructuring the grade levels and attendance characteristics of the junior high schools was not discussed by the CPOC of each junior high school, as the topic does not relate to goal setting, curriculum, budgeting, staffing patterns and school organization for individual campuses.

6. Petitioners’ appeal should be denied.

ORDER

After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed, and the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in my capacity as State Commissioner of Education, it is hereby

ORDERED that Petitioners’ appeal be, and is hereby, DENIED.

SIGNED AND ISSUED this ______ day of ____________________________, 1995.

_______________________________________

MIKE MOSES

COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION

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