“A Useful Life”



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“A Useful Life”

Address by

A. Denis Clift

President

Joint Military Intelligence College

Barrett Honors College

Arizona State University

March 4, 2004

 

 

In 1748, at the midpoint in his 84-year life, Benjamin Franklin decided to retire from his lucrative printing business to dedicate himself to reading, studying, experimenting and conversing at large with ingenious and worthy men. His mother Abiah wrote him a scolding letter, to which he replied “I would rather have it said ‘He lived usefully,’ than ‘He died rich.’”1

 

This strain of philosophy is one that has traveled well in this land of ours from colonial times to the 21st Century. The first of Walt Kelly’s Pogo cartoon strips was distributed nationally in 1949. Kelly’s artistic pen was a joy. The wit and the words of his speech and thought bubbles were as folksy as they were sharp. He was first and foremost a political commentator and satirist. Pogo the possum, Albert the alligator, the worm, and the male turtle named Churchy la Femme all played a part. In 1952, Albert the alligator was weighing the presidency. He conferred with the local authority Tammanany Tiger, who advised that the candidate had to be born in a log cabin. A student at Cornell wrote Kelly that Pogo was more qualified than any, because he had been born in a log. In the 1952 Eisenhower-Stevenson election, Pogo received the votes of 500,000 college students.2

In reflecting on his role and his life in a collection of works in 1959, Kelly would write: “It has always seemed to me that the greatest loss a human being can suffer is his chance at life. I don’t mean loss of life itself,” he wrote, “that’s a purely physical matter and impresses some people as a depressing inconvenience, others as a calamity and still others as something to be avoided both in thought and deed. The loss of the chance at living a life fully is what I’m talking about.”3

I am confident that reflections and debate on how to live a useful life, how to live a life fully, are alive and in full stride at Barrett. It is my goal today both to fuel and to direct thoughts on life after the degree and beyond the campus, to do so in addressing the question posed to me by Dean Jacobs: “What is your opinion as an intelligence expert about what undergraduates in the United States should know and think of intelligence and work in intelligence and national security today?”

The first step in understanding the work of intelligence is to demystify and deglamorize that work, to understanding that it is not the fast car, flashy dame world of James Bond and the other fictional characters dashing and ducking across the pages of novels, TV and motion picture screens. Indeed, John LeCarre, the celebrated British author of intelligence fiction told an interviewer a few years ago that “intelligence is the left hand of curiosity, that gathering, analyzing, and using information is a natural part of what we do if we are doing it well.”4

Intelligence today is a vital, sober, large part of the national security work of the nation. It has been a formal part of the work of the nation since before the Republic began. Intelligence started as an extremely secret business. This secrecy, contributing to the mystification of the work, would be maintained for two centuries. There would be a turning of a major new chapter, the beginnings of demystification, in the 1970s. While there is much that remains secret about its specific aspects, the role of intelligence, the conduct of intelligence and its oversight are part of the mainstream business of the nation.

During the Revolutionary War, General George Washington sent a letter datelined 8 Miles East of Morris Town, July 26: 1777, to one of his officers, Colonel Elias Dayton, which included the following guidance: “The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged – All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in Most Enterprizes [sic] of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned & promising a favorable issue.”5

Two years earlier, in 1775, the Second Continental Congress had created the Committee of Correspondence, soon to be renamed the Committee of Secret Correspondence, a committee which oversaw the running of secret agents abroad, the conduct of covert activities, the opening of private mail, the funding of propaganda, and the devising of codes and ciphers.6

As the nation’s first President, Washington requested and received authority from the Congress for a Contingency Fund for the Conduct of Foreign Intercourse, placed in the budget of the Department of State, to be available for intelligence purposes. In the years that followed, Presidents would reject requests from the Congress for an accounting of expenditures from the fund. In the 1840s, President James Polk turned down such a request, responding in part to the Congress: “The experience of every nation on earth has demonstrated that emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary for the public safety or the public good to make expenditures, the very subject of which would be defeated by publicity. In no nation is the application of such funds to be made public.”7

Intelligence operations of the U.S. Army and Navy would evolve through the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. There would be extraordinary successes such as the cracking of the Japanese code and the U.S. victory in the Battle of Midway, successes which could not be discussed openly until decades later. There would be devastating defeats, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which would be acted on as soon as the nation emerged from World War II. Determined never again to face such an attack, the Executive and Legislative Branches fashioned a more formal, better coordinated national security structure for the nation, a structure that emerged in the National Security Act of 1947 providing for a National Security Council chaired by the President with the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and a new Secretary of Defense as members. The Act provided in law for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it provided in law for a Central Intelligence Agency to be headed by a Director of Central Intelligence to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. With President Truman’s signature on the Act, intelligence became a formally declared, major instrument of U.S. national security, together with defense and foreign policy.

The Cold War had begun, and the nuclear superpower race was underway. U.S. intelligence capabilities grew to meet the scope of the challenge. Here I would note a point I will return to later. U.S. intelligence capabilities flow from the dedication, the patriotism, and the incredible contributions that men and women from every walk of life from across the nation have made and are making.

With the Cold War in full sway, the National Security Agency would be formed in 1952 – responsible for the nation’s signals intelligence – shaped initially from the merger of the Army and the Navy’s signals intelligence organizations. In 1939, Army signals intelligence had started collecting and attempting to decode Soviet diplomatic communications. A young woman, Miss Gene Grabeel, who had been a school teacher just weeks before, started the project.  In 1943, Lieutenant Richard Hallock, who had left his archeological research at the University of Chicago, for reserve active duty, joined the project and discovered a weakness in the Soviet trade organization code, leading to further progress in decrypting the Soviet systems.8 By 1946, as the decoding progressed, it became clear that the Soviets had the names of U.S. scientists working on the MANHATTAN PROJECT, the U.S. nuclear weapons program.

With the USSR developing its own nuclear weapons capabilities, U.S. leaders attached increasing urgency in the 1950s to acquiring hard facts about Soviet strategic and conventional military force capabilities – a tall order when dealing with a closed society covering one-sixth of the earth’s land surface. The U-2 manned reconnaissance aircraft was developed providing a very limited high-altitude photographic capability, and equally secret work was begun on a photographic reconnaissance satellite – the CORONA program. There would be four years of flat-out work, a dozen mission failures before the first satellite film was successfully recovered and developed, just 110 days after Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union.

 

In realizing this initial satellite reconnaissance success, the CORONA team had had to solve the problem of having the cameras’ film tear, jam and break in the vacuum of space. Here, film experts and chemists, dedicated Americans working at Eastman Kodak revolutionized film technology providing the satellite program with a new, polyester-based film able to produce high resolution photography while withstanding the rigors of space.9

In the mid-1970s, against this background of the early organization and achievements of the intelligence community, there was concern in the nation that the agencies and organizations responsible for foreign intelligence had been spying on U.S. citizens – infiltrating student organizations opposed to the war in Vietnam – and committing other violations of the law. Both the House and the Senate established committees to investigate the intelligence community. This was a period of pronounced confrontation between the Executive and Legislative branches of government. The recommendations of each committee would lead to the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1975 and the House Permanent Select Committee in 1977. In 1978, the oversight committees enacted the first Intelligence Authorization Act, giving them the control they sought of the Intelligence Community’s budget.10

In 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act extended the government’s checks and balances over intelligence to the Judicial Branch. The Act created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court “made up of seven U.S. district justices from around the country who hear in camera ex parte requests for surveillance orders from the Justice Department, acting on behalf of NSA, the FBI and, occasionally, other intelligence agencies.11

In 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued Presidential Executive Order 12333, the executive order that governs the work of U.S. intelligence as we meet today. The order spells out in remarkable clarity and detail the Intelligence Community’s responsibilities to the President and the National Security Council, including the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the intelligence arms of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine

Corps, the Department of Energy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The order provides guidelines for coordination of intelligence operations with the Attorney General and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.12 The point I would again underscore is that there is very little mystery about the organization and role of United States intelligence and its oversight. They are spelled out in formal documents of the land.

Today, U.S. intelligence is growing in strength at the same time that it is rejuvenating its workforce. A new generation of young Americans is entering the community as analysts, as collection managers and clandestine service operations officers, as scientists, engineers, and technologists.  The technological march of  U.S. intelligence continues with unmanned aerial vehicles able to provide not just a photograph but multi-hour electro-optical video and infrared surveillance of designated geographic sites, installations and activity, and able to transmit their images instantly from the area being surveilled to consumers of the data at near-by ground stations and half a world away.  Scientists and flight engineers in laboratories and wind tunnels here and aboard are studying the free flight of butterflies and other insects analyzing the wing beats, the wing strokes producing flight, as part of research and development aimed at future unmanned aerial vehicles little larger than insects able to surveil the interiors of buildings and other areas currently inaccessible to our aerial and space eyes.13

What is the purpose, what is the value, what is the need for such incredible technological advances? What is the purpose of rejuvenating and building on an already highly capable workforce? Simply stated, the United States has entered a new era of national security. The information age, the cyber era, the global economy, new non-state political entities and structures challenging existing nation states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and virulence of international terrorism drive our fresh look at national security and processes.

The National Security Act of 1947 that brought the CIA into being has now been joined by the Homeland Security Act and the creation of the Homeland Security Department. The need to provide strategic warning against attack, for a government shaped and harnessed to provide effective deterrence and defense – to avoid another Pearl Harbor – has now been joined by the need to provide warning, deterrence, and defense against terrorist attack – to avoid another September 11.

This new era of the early 21st century has brought with it the need correctly to join the work of foreign intelligence and the work of domestic law enforcement. This poses an incredibly difficult and contentious challenge. Foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement have been deliberately kept separated by the White House, the Congress and the courts since the time of the Civil War. That said, the Forefathers anticipated the need for them to flow together in the single sentence that is the Preamble to the Constitution: “We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”14 The challenge comes in safeguarding individual liberties at the same time that we safeguard security. The two are not compatible. A tension is created, and if we are to succeed as a democracy we must maintain that tension.

At the same time that today’s citizens vigorously protest the increased surveillance authorities given to the government by the Patriot Act, they demand to know – they establish committees and commissions to learn -- why foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement did not work smoothly, seamlessly and effectively to prevent the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the failed attack that ended in a crash of a jetliner and the loss of all aboard in a field in Pennsylvania. The late Dame Rebecca West examined the balancing of individual rights and national security in her book The Meaning of Treason. “Our task is equivalent to walking a tightrope over an abyss. But history proves,” she wrote, “that, if man has a talent, it is for tightrope walking.”15  In the walking of this tightrope, the late American diplomat George Kennan reminds that “Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience.”16

Intelligence professionals in this new era understand as never before that intelligence is the air the nation breathes, that they are on the front line, that their work must be relevant, with an underlined emphasis on the importance of warning, that it must be accessible when and where needed – enabling the consumer, be that consumer a policy-maker, a military commander, or the Mayor of Phoenix, to take action if required.

Knowing where to look for the terrorist and knowing how best to catch the terrorist are central to the shaping of an element of the partnership crucial to the survival and wellbeing of the nation in early 21st century – the fragile, evolving partnership joining intelligence, the policy-maker, the military commander, and law enforcement. It is a work in progress that impacts on each of us each time we drive to an airport and board a plane for our personal travel.

During World War II, when the late Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles was Director of the Office of Strategic Services’ operations in Switzerland, he came to admire the Swiss officials who inspected travelers’ papers at border stations on trains bound for the Swiss interior. He noted that they paid special attention to each traveler’s shoes, that the law-abiding Swiss were meticulous about clean footwear, and that dirty shoes were an indicator that the individual in those shoes might be entering the country illegally. Reflecting on this Swiss practice, Dulles offered a broader observation: “In a free society, counterespionage is based on the practice most useful in hunting rabbits. Rather than look for the rabbit one posts oneself in a spot where the rabbit is likely to pass.”17   We can each of us cite at least one counterpart practice today.

The terrorist presents the intelligence expert with long odds. A few years ago, after a failed attempt on the life of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a member of the Irish Republican Army said, “You know, Maggie has to be lucky every day. We only have to be lucky once.”

Three and one-half years ago, a 180-page manual with the title “Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants” was seized at the home of an Usama Bin Laden follower in Manchester, England, an individual who was a suspect in the bombing of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It is a manual that speaks in its introduction of the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and the machine gun. It is a manual that is steeped in the necessity for secrecy and pragmatism with 18 chapters of hard detail ranging across the qualifications, the recruiting, the resources and the modus operandi of those who will do the killing: the terrorists’ bases, apartments, and hiding places, their communications and transport; counterfeit currency and forged documents; the buying, transporting and training in different weapons; espionage; codes and ciphers; explosives; security plans; kidnappings and assassinations – using rifles, revolvers, automatic pistols, poison and cold steel.18

U.S. law enforcement extends from its pyramidal tip at the Federal level down through its expanding base at the state, county, township, and municipality levels. Today, the nation is giving priority attention on how best to move intelligence down through these levels in a manner that is legal, that respects the rights of Americans, that is timely enough to allow for both deterrence and apprehension, and that does not reveal either the intelligence source or the intelligence method. In this new era, there are innovative, path-finding case studies.

 

In New York City, the Office of Police Commissioner today includes two new Deputy Commissioners, one for intelligence, one for counterterrorism. In an interview early in 2002, David Cohen – former head of CIA’s clandestine service – and new Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence said that “his new responsibilities would range from keeping track of foreign intelligence on terrorists to keeping officers on the street better informed so that the department can take advantage of its 40,000 sets of eyes and ears to watch and listen for new threats.” Retired Marine Lieutenant General Frank Libutti, the city’s first Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism said that he wanted to make New York “'a hard target' – without making it unpleasant for others. 'When the bad guy drives up to the border of New York City,' he said he wants that person to think 'New York is too difficult.'”19

Last June, the U.S. Attorney General announced the arrest of a Kashmiri-born naturalized American citizen – an Ohio truck driver alleged at the time of arrest to have al Qaeda ties, to have trained in Afghanistan, to have met with Usama bin Laden, to have plotted the destruction of New York City’s Brooklyn Bridge and the launching of other attacks on the nation that had given him citizenship. In keeping with al Qaeda training – the manual I mentioned earlier – the truck driver was instructed to communicate in code. He did so. “After scouting the Brooklyn Bridge … and concluding that the plot would fail because of the bridge’s security and structure, he sent a coded message to his unnamed friend that “the weather is too hot.”20 The terrorist would be sentenced to 20 years in prison. Those responsible for this successful arrest and conviction could take satisfaction that at least one bad guy, to use Libutti’s term, had cased New York, decided it was too difficult, and paid the price.

This new era goes beyond intelligence and domestic law enforcement to the extraordinarily complex international challenge of denying and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – radioactive materials, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This is a world of smuggling, secret deals, and clandestine operations, a world of international land, air, and ocean shipping, the world of licit and illicit international commerce with orders flowing electronically across the web through governments, through companies, front companies, their cut-outs and their agents. In this work, intelligence collection and analysis range across international political and military intentions and capabilities, the disciplines of science, advanced technology, missiles, space, the business of dual-use components, medical intelligence, and the fields of banking, commerce, and transportation. In this business, U.S. intelligence collectors and analysts work cooperatively with foreign intelligence counterparts, with foreign governments, with U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials. It is work that draws on the talents and expertise of a broad range of Americans both inside and outside intelligence.

In 2002, U.S. and Western European intelligence organizations had multiple indications that North Korea was seeking to acquire special, ultra-strength aluminum tubing for nuclear centrifuges. International warning orders were posted for customs and other officials to be on the lookout. In April 2003, the French cargo ship Ville de Virgo was in the German port of Hamburg loading containers that included fertilizer, bulk chemicals, cheeses, and a shipment of 214 aluminum pipes with the manifests showing a purchase by China’s Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. The ship headed to sea. German intelligence officials unraveled the manifests and found that the pipes were headed for North Korea. French and German authorities tracked the ship to the Eastern Mediterranean and seized the pipes. German police arrested the owner of an export company that was found to be involved in a far-broader scheme to acquire such materials for North Korea.21

In September 2003, U.S. and British intelligence organizations working together as part of the U.S.-led proliferation security initiative, ascertained that the German-owned freighter BBC China was sailing from a Persian Gulf port with centrifuge equipment bound for Libya. The ship passed through the Suez Canal, the German owners were alerted and ordered the ship’s captain to divert to an Italian port where the shipment was seized. A U.S. warship had shadowed the freighter in the Mediterranean. It can be argued – indeed it is being argued – that this intelligence coup and seizure, with the ship only two days from its Libyan destination, played prominently in the calculus of Moammar Gaddafi’s end-of-year decision to abandon his weapons of mass destruction program and open his country to international inspection.22

In this new era of challenges and opportunities for U.S. intelligence, we have to guard against the image of the drunk looking under a street lamp for his lost keys. “Is this where you dropped them?” asked a passer-by. “No,” the drunk replied. I dropped them over there but the light is better here.” Analytic work in this new era takes us beyond the lamp light of past practice to newer techniques and practices. At the same time, there are underlying fundamentals of intelligence analysis that remain constant.

When I was an undergraduate at Stanford University, I had a splendid teacher of journalism, the late Chilton R. Bush, whose textbook Newspaper Reporting of Public Affairs was the standard in its field. At the beginning of Chapter One, Bush identified three basic rules “1. Know news. 2. Know where to get it. 3. Go get it.” He wrote of the skills and the attitude needed by a good reporter of public affairs: the need to be gregarious, to develop a good working relationship with the stenographers, the clerks, as well as the officials in high places; the need to have curiosity, the need to be enthusiastic, searching for something important however dull the day or the task at hand; the need to answer for the reader those significant questions about the event that naturally arise in the reader’s mind; the need to have a critical sense, to develop a habit of verifying information given him by checking it against his own sense of the probabilities; the need to be resourceful, to locate another source or sources when information is denied from the most obvious source; the need to respect confidences; and the need to be a literary craftsman, to be able to write well in the idiom.”23

These same rules and skills fit quite elegantly and comfortably on the frame and the work of the skilled intelligence analyst. However, such skills are not a birthright for most in the business.  As the Provost of my College, Dr. Ron Garst, an Arizona State alumnus, has written, they must be forged; they must be honed. If they are not, an unskilled analyst too often will think of an explanation for the issue in question, then look for information that supports that explanation, and stop when that information has been found.24

Students studying intelligence analysis are taught to develop competing hypotheses covering a wide range of outcomes as they analyze a situation or issue. They are taught to

gather and list the information, the evidence, the data – the collection take – assessing the impact of such evidence – or absence thereof – on each hypothesis, to create an evidence/hypothesis matrix, to refine the matrix determining where information needs have and have not been met, and how the evidence at hand points to the most likely and least likely of the hypotheses. In exercising this process, the analyst has introduced a range of data and possibilities that otherwise would not have been considered. The analyst is then taught to draw a tentative conclusion, and then, to challenge that conclusion. Did individual, national, or cultural mindset or bias cause him to favor his interpretation of the data? Could deception have been involved in the data available for analysis?

In the work of analysis, strategic warning is the most important component of effective intelligence. Such warning – addressing both threats and opportunities – is what policy-makers look to intelligence to provide for the security and wellbeing of the Nation. Such strategic warning often flows from mists and vapors. Such warning involves gifted, dedicated analysts using indications methodologies and related techniques. It involves the perception of emerging threats of seemingly low probability. It involves exhaustive research. It involves dedicated collection against such threats, including the ability to penetrate those who would deny and those who would deceive. It involves hearing out analysts whose voices are in the minority. In turn, it involves responsibility on the part of the policy-maker to pay attention to those providing such warning however much it may run counter to the mindset, the cultural bias, the current favorite view of the likely course of events.25

We have been discussing the history of U.S. intelligence, the evolving structure of the intelligence community, some of the priority intelligence challenges in the early 21st century, and some of the techniques used to address those challenges. As we head into the home stretch of these remarks, let us return to Dean Jacob’s question: “What should undergraduates in the United States know and think of intelligence and work in intelligence and national security today?” There are two points I would make, the first addressing the evolving relationship between intelligence and the academic community, and the second, the expanding opportunities for careers in intelligence to undergraduates across the United States.

The growing importance of intelligence to the nation and the recognition that intelligence is part of the mainstream work of the nation are influencing the relationship between U.S. intelligence and the nation’s colleges and universities. The 1970s era of campus protests against the CIA and the burning of effigies of the Director of Central Intelligence has passed. Today, hundreds of colleges and universities have courses in intelligence. New Mexico State University, for example, has an intelligence studies program with an undergraduate minor and dual major in security technology and intelligence studies, and a Master of Arts in History/Intelligence Studies. Institutions such as Georgetown, George Washington, Yale, Marquette and Texas A&M have CIA officers in residence teaching intelligence on their faculties. I have the privilege of serving on the Steering Committee of the Intelligence and Policy Project at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.  Fifty colleges and universities across the nation – including institutions such as Stanford, Purdue, and the University of Pennsylvania – have been designated by the National Security Agency, the nation’s signals intelligence agency, as centers of excellence for the teaching of information assurance, and the Department of Defense is offering full scholarships to undergraduate and graduate students who are pursuing information assurance programs.

As the study of intelligence grows across the nation, so research in the field of intelligence is beginning to grow. This, to me, is of great importance. The nation from its beginnings has continued to benefit, to grow ever outward and upward thanks to the research, the findings, and the publishing of those findings by its scholars. Intelligence has been a formal national instrument of government since 1947. The intelligence community has continued to evolve since 1947.  More real scholarship on the place, the role and the workings of intelligence in our democracy should be part of the work of this new century.

As we meet, the Congress of the United States acting on legislation sponsored by Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas has just passed the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, establishing a pilot program that directs the Director of Central Intelligence to “carry out a pilot program to ensure that selected students or former students are provided funds to continue academic training, or are reimbursed for academic training previously obtained, in areas of specialization that the Director, in consultation with the other heads of the elements of the intelligence community, identifies as areas in which the current analytic capabilities of the intelligence community are deficient or in which future analytic capabilities of the intelligence community are likely to be deficient.” Four million dollars are provided for the first year’s pilot.26

As we meet, every major U.S. intelligence agency – the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency – is recruiting talented men and women from colleges and universities across the land. The CIA asks “Why work for a company when you can serve a nation,” and describes in great detail the career opportunities it offers for analysts, language instructors, scientists and engineers and those who would like to train and serve in clandestine operations. The Defense Intelligence Agency says that it is looking for exceptional people for an extraordinary mission, and specifically identifies in its literature more than 100 different applicant skills, backgrounds and disciplines of priority interest.

The Joint Military Intelligence College, which I have the pleasure of leading, working in partnership with the Defense Intelligence Agency, offers a scholarship program that is bringing some incredibly talented and enthusiastic young people into the field. My College is the nation’s only accredited academic institution awarding the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree and the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence degree, with both degrees authorized by the Congress, and with both teaching and research conducted up to highest levels of national security classification. If a scholarship candidate is selected for employment by DIA and, in parallel, selected for admission to the College, he or she enters DIA as a salaried federal employee with all benefits and spends the first year earning the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree – a very nice career proposition, a very nice financial deal.

This brings us full circle to Walt Kelly’s words on the importance of living a life fully. It brings us full circle to Ben Franklin’s reply to his mother that he would rather have it said that he lived usefully than that he had died rich.

Thank you.

Footnotes

1. Walter Isaacson, Benjamin Franklin an American Life, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2003, p. 127.

2. Walt Kelly, Ten Ever-Lovin Blue-Eyed Years with Pogo, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1959, p.49.

3. Ibid, p. 189.

4. John LeCarre, C-SPAN Interview with George Plimpton, 1997.

5. Washington to Col. Elias Dayton, July 26, 1777, original of letter in the Walter L. Pforzheimer Collection on Intelligence Service, copy in the outer office, President, Joint Military Intelligence College.

6. “Intelligence in the War of Independence,”

7. James Van Wagenen, “Congressional Oversight: A Look Back,” Joint Military Intelligence College faculty paper, 1996.

8. “Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,” National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Fort George Meade, 1996, pp. 1-3.

9. Kevin C. Ruffner, “CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program”, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 19.

10. Van Wagenen, op cit, p.9.

11. Benjamin Wittes, “Inside America’s Most Secretive Court,” Legal Times, Washington, D.C. 19 February 1996, p.21.

12. U.S. President, Executive Order 12333, Washington, D.C., December 1981.

13. “Butterflies’ Flights Disclose Free Spirits,” James Gorman, The New York Times, December 12, 2002.

14. Constitution of the United States, published by the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, Washington, D.C., 1992, p.1.

15. The Meaning of Treason, Rebecca West, Phoenix Press, London, 2000, p. 420.

16. George Kennan, “Morality in Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 1985, as reprinted in The Best American Essays 1986, edited by Elizabeth Hardwick, Ticknor and Fields, New York, 1986, p.189.

17. Great True Spy Stories, Edited by Allen Dulles, Harper & Row, New York, 1968, pp. 130-131.

18. wtc.jihad.terrorist.manual.single.file. ntml#Introduction

19. William K. Rashbaum, The New York Times, January 28, 2002.

20. Susan Schmidt, The Washington Post, June 20, 2003.

21. Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, August 15, 2003.

22. Carla Anne Robbins, The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2003.

23. Chilton R. Bush, "Newspaper Reporting of Public Affairs," Appleton-Century-Croft, New York, 1951, pp. 1-3.

24. Ronald D. Garst, A Handbook of Intelligence Analysis, Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., 1989, pp. 93-116.

25. Cynthia Grabo, Anticipating Surprise, Analysis for Strategic Warning, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., 2002.

26. Sec, 318 Pilot Program on Recruitment and Training of Intelligence Analysts, H.R. 2417, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate), Washington, D.C., 2004.

 

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