Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms …

[Pages:86]Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June-31 July 1944

by Captain Michael D. Doubler

-I FOREWORD

The hedgerow country of northwestern France-the Bocagepresented a trying challenge to the U.S. Army in 1944. During the Normandy invasion, U.S. forces faced a stubborn German Army defending from an extensive network of small fields surrounded by living banks of hedges bordered by sunken dirt lanes. German forces fighting from these ready-made defensive positions were, at first, able to curb most of the American advances and make the attempts very costly. For the U.S. Army, busting through the difficult Bocage country required tactical, doctrinal, and organizational ingenuity.

Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June-31 July 1944 shows how the U.S. Army identified and overcame the problems of fighting in difficult terrain. The adoption of new tactics combined with technical innovations and good small-unit leadership enabled American forces to defeat a well-prepared and skillful enemy. In the hedgerow country, the U.S. Army eventually brought the separate components of the combined arms team-infantry, armor, and artillery-to bear on the enemy simultaneously. The resulting successes were costly but effective. Combat in the Bocage demonstrated the U.S. Army's capability to fight and win in a new and hostile environment.

November 1988

RICHARD M. SWAIN Colonel, Field Artillery Director, Combat Studies Institute

CSI publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June-31 July 1944

by Captain Michael D. Doubler

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data

Doubler, Michael D. (Michael Dale), 1955Busting the Bocage.

Bibliography: p.

1. World War, 1939-1945-Campaigns-France-Bocage

2. Bocage normand (France)-History.

I. Title.

D756.5.N6D68 1988 940.54'21

88-23757

normand.

CONTENTS

Illustrations ............................................

v

I. Normandy: The Context of the Battle .................

1

Introduction ........................................

1

U.S. Army Organization and Doctrine................ 2

Combat Experience Before D-Day ....................

9

The Operational Setting............................

11

II. The Battle ....................

....... ...........

21

Tactical Problems.................................. 21

The Solution ......................................

30

III. Conclusions .......................................

61

Notes .................................................

67

Bibliography........................................... 73

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

Triangular infantry division, 1943 ............

.......

.. 5

German hedgerow defense ............

..... .......... 24

The 29th Infantry Division's hedgerow tactics .......... 41

The 83d Infantry Division's hedgerow tactics ......... 48

The 3d Armored Division's hedgerow tactics .......... 52

Maps

The advance inland, 6 June-1 July 1944 ...... The 29th Division's attack, 11 July 1944 ....... The attack on Hill 192, 11 July 1944 ........... Breakthrough, 25-27 July 1944 .................

12,13 ... 44 ... 46 56,57

I. NORMANDY: THE CONTEXT OF THE BATTLE

Introduction

Over forty years have passed since Allied armies landed in Normandy with the purpose of liberating western Europe and destroying Hitler's Third Reich. Despite this passage of time and extensive writings on the landings in France, officers and historians are still intensely interested in D-Day and the Normandy campaign. Indeed, a great deal remains to be learned about the U.S. Army's participation in the Normandy campaign, and a detailed examination of the fighting yields a fruitful case study for America's professional officer corps concerning how American soldiers performed in combat, how squads and platoons closed with and destroyed the enemy, and how the Army adapted methods to overcome a whole host of problems that it encountered in combat.

The broad conceptual framework for this study of the U.S. Army's efforts in France in 1944 originated with an idea borrowed from the eminent British military historian Michael Howard. In a speech to the Royal United Services Institute in October 1973, Howard examined the difficulties military establishments encounter in creating doctrine for the employment of their combat forces. Unlike other professionals, military leaders have no sure method of testing or verifying their doctrines and practices short of combat. Due to this drawback, Howard thought that peacetime military doctrine is usually faulty. Such weaknesses in doctrine, however, are not irresoluble. Once in combat, the military can recognize flaws in its doctrine and combat techniques and remedy them as quickly as possible. Ultimately, the advantage will go to the army that learns quickly from its mistakes and adapts promptly to a new and unfamiliar environment.'

This study attempts to identify the problems that hampered the operations of the U.S. First Army during the weeks immediately following the D-Day landings. In Normandy, inexperienced American combat units struggled with veteran German defenders on terrain specially suited for the defense. The U.S. Army was faced with the problem of conducting offensive operations in the Normandy hedgerow country-known as the Bocage. Shortcomings in preinvasion training and preparation resulted initially in uncoordinated efforts whenever American infantry, tanks, and artillery tried to combine forces during attacks. Technical deficiencies also hampered efforts.

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