A History of Philosophy by Frederick Copleston, S.J. A HISTORY

A History of Philosophy by Frederick Copleston, S.J.

VOLUME I: GREECE AND ROME

From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus

VOLUME II: MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

From Augustine to Duns Scotus

VOLUME III: LATE MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY

Ockham, Francis Bacon, and the Beginning of the Modern World VOLUME N: MODERN PHILOSOPHY From Descartes to Leibniz

VOLUME V: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

The British Philosophers from Hobbes to Hume

VOLUME VI: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

From the French Enlightenment to Kant

?VOLUME VII: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

From the Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche

?VOLUME VIII: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Empiricism, Idealism, and Pragmatism in Britain and America

?VOLUME IX: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

From the French Revolution to Sartre, Camus, and Levi-Strauss

?Available March 1994

A HISTORY OF

PHILOSOPHY

A HISTORY OF

PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME VI

Modern Philosophy: From the French

Enlightenment to Kant

Frederick Copleston, S.J.

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First Image Books edition of Volume VI of The History ofPhilosophy published 1964 by special arrangement with The Newman Press and Bums & Oates, Ltd.

This Image edition published January 1994

De Licentia Superiorum Ordinis: John Coventry, S.J., Praep. Provo Angliae

Nihil Obstat: J. L. Russell, S.J., Censor Deputatus Imprimatur: Franciscus, Archiepiscopus Birmingamiensis Birmingamiae die 27

Februarii 1959

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Copleston, Frederick Charles. A history of philosophy.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Contents: v. 1. Greece and Rome-[etc]-

v. 4. From Descartes to Leibniz-v. 5. The British

philosophers from Hobbes to Humes-v. 6. From the

French Enlightenment to Kant.

1. Philosophy-History. I. Title.

B72.C62 1993

190

92-34997

ISBN 0-385-47043-6

Volume VI copyright ? 1960 by Frederick Copleston

All Rights Reserved

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

Pa,'

PREFACE

xi

PART I

THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT

I. To FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT (r)

I

Introductory remarks-The scepticism of Bayle-FonteoeUeMontesquieu and his Itudy of law-Maupertuia-Voltaire and deiBm-"'Vauvenargues-Condillac and the human mindHelv6tiul on Man.

II. THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT (2)

39

The E~/ledi,,; Diderot and d'Alembert-Materialism; La Mettrie. - d'Holbach and Cabanis-Natural history; Bu1fon,

Robinet and Bonnet-The dynamism of Boacovich-The Physioerat.; Quesnay and Turgot-Final remarks.

III. ROUSSEAU (r)

59

Life and writings-The evils of civilization-The origin of inequality-The appearance of the theory of the general wiDRouueau'l philOlOphy of feeliDg.

IV. ROUSSEAU (2)

80

The social contract-SovereigDty, the general wiD and freedom -Government-Concluding remarks.

PART II

THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT

V. THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT (r) .

ror

Christian TholD&lius-ChristiaD Wolff-FoUowen and opponent. of Wol1f.

VI. THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT (2) .

121

Introductory remarks; Frederick the Great; the 'popular philosophen'-Deism: Reimanll; Mendelssobn-Lesaing-Psychology-Educational theory.

VII. THE BREAK WITH THB ENLIGHTENMENT.

135

Hamano-Herder-Jacobi-Concluding remarks.

PART III

THE RISE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

VIII. BoSSUBT AND VICO

150

Introductory remarks; the Greeks, St. Augustine-BoaauetViCO-Montesquieu.

IX. VOLTAIRE TO HERDER

164

Introductory remarks - Voltaire - Condorcet - LesaingHerder.

vii

viii

CONTENTS

Chop',..

PART IV

KANT

X. KANT (I): LIFE AND WRITINGS

ISo

Kant's life and character-Earlier writings and the Newtonian physics-Philosophical writings of the pre-critical periodThe dissertation of 1770 and its context-The conception of the

critical philosophy.

XI. KANT (2): THE PROBLEMS OF THE FIRST Critique

2II

The general problem of metaphysics'-The problem of 0 Priori knowledge-----The divisions of this problem-Kant's Copernican

revolution-Sensibility, understanding, reason, and the structure of the first C,iliq_The significance of the first C,iliq"'6 in the context of the general problem of Kant's philosophy.

XII. KANT (3): SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE ?

235

Space and time-Mathematics-The pure concepts or cate-

gories of the understanding-The justification of the applica-

tion of the categories--The schematism of the categoriesSynthetic 0 priori principles-The possibility of the pure science of Nature-Phenomena and noumena-The refutation

of idealism-Concluding remarks.

XIII. KANT (4): METAPHYSICS UNDER FIRE

277

Introductory remarks-The transcendental Ideas of pure reason-The paralogisms of rational psychology-The antinomies of speculative cosmology-The impossibility of proving the existence of God-The regulative use of the transcendental Ideas of pure reason-Metaphysics and meaning.

XIV. KANT (5): MORALITY AND RELIGION

308

Kant's aim-The good will-Duty and inclination-Duty and law-The categorical imperative-The rational being as an end in itself-The autonomy of the will-The kingdom of endsFreedom as the condition of the possibility of a categorical imperative-The postulates of practical reason; freedom, Kant's idea of the pedect good, immortality, God, the general theory of the postulates--Kant on religion-Conc1uding remarks.

XV. KANT (6): AESTHETICS AND TELEOLOGY.

349

The mediating function of judgment-The analytic of the beautiful-The analytic of the sublime-The deduction of pure

aesthetic judgments-Fine art and genius-The dialectic of the

aesthetic judgment-The beautiful as a symbol of the morally

good-The teleobgical judgment-Teleology and mechanism -Physico-theology and ethico-theology.

XVI. KANT (7): REMARKS ON THE Opus Postumum

380

The transition from the metaphysics of Nature to physicsTranscendental philosophy and the construction of experience -The objectivity of the Idea of God-Man as person and as microcosm.

CONTENTS

ix

Cllap''''

XVII. CoNCLUDING REVIEW

393

Introductory reInarks-Continental rationalism-British em-

riricism-The Enlightenment and the science of man-The

philosophy of history-Immanuel Kant-Final remarks.

ApPENDIX: A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

441

INDEX.

472

PREFACE

IT was my original intention to cover the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in one volume, Descartes to Kant. But this did not prove to be possible. And I have divided the material between three volumes. Volume IV, Descartes to Leibniz, treats of the great rationalist systems on the Continent, while in Volume V, Hobbes to Hume, I have outlined the development of British philosophical thought up to and including the Scottish philosophy of common sense. In the present volume I consider the French and German Enlightenments, the rise of the philosophy of history, and the system of Kant.

However, though three volumr.s have been devoted to the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, my original plan has been preserved to the extent that there is a common introductory chapter and a common Concluding Review. The former will be found, of course, at the beginning of the fourth volume. And the introductory remarks which relate to the subjectmatter of the present volume will not be repeated here. As for the Concluding Review, it forms the final chapter of this book. In it I have attempted to discuss, not only from the historical but also from a more philosophical point of view, the nature, importance and value of the various styles of philosophizing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus the fourth, fifth and sixth volumes of this History oj Philosophy form a trilogy.

xi

PART I

THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT

CHAPTER I

THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT (1)

Introductory remarks-The scepticism of Bayle-FonteneUeMontesquieu and his study of law-Maupertuis-Voltaire and deism-Vauvenargues-CondiUac and the human mindHelvetius on Man.

I. THERE is perhaps a natural tendency in many minds to think of the French Enlightenment primarily in terms of destructive criticism and of an outspoken hostility towards Christianity, or at any rate towards the Catholic Church. If we exclude Rousseau, the best-known name among the French philosophers of the eighteenth century is probably that of Voltaire. And this name conjures up in the mind the picture of a brilliant and witty literary man who was never tired of denouncing the Church as an enemy of reason and a friend of intolerance. Further, if one knows anything about the materialism of writers such as La Mettrie and d'Holbach, one may be inclined to regard the Enlightenment in France as an antireligious movement which passed from the deism of Voltaire and of Diderot in his earlier years to the atheism of d'Holbach and the crudely materialistic outlook of a Cabanis. Given this interpretation of the Enlightenment, one's evaluation of it will depend very largely upon one's religious convictions or lack of them. One man will regard eighteenth-century French philosophy as a movement which progressed ever further into impiety and which bore its fruit in the profanation of the cathedral of Notre Dame at the Revolution. Another man will regard it as a progressive liberation of mind from religious superstition and from ecclesiastical tyranny.

Again, the impression is not uncommon that the French philosophers of the eighteenth century were all enemies of the existing political system and that they prepared the way for the Revolution. Given this political interpretation, different evaluations of the work of the philosophers are obviously possible. One may

I

2

THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT

regard them as irresponsible fomenters of revolution whose writings had practical effect in the Jacobin terror. Or one may regard them as representing a stage in an inevitable social-political development, as helping to initiate, that is to say, the stage of bourgeois democracy, which was fated in its turn to be replaced by the rule of the proletariat.

Both interpretations of the French Enlightenment, the interpretation in terms of an attitude towards religious institutions and towards religion itself and the interpretation in terms of an attitude towards political systems and towards political and social developments, have, of course, their foundations in fact. They are not perhaps equally well founded. On the one hand, though some philosophers certainly disliked the ancien regime, it would be a great mistake to regard all the typical philosophers of the Enlightenment as conscious fomenters of revolution. Voltaire, for example, though he desired certain reforms, was not really concerned with the promotion of democracy. He was concerned with freedom of expression for himself and his friends; but he could hardly be called a democrat. Benevolent despotism, especially if the benevolence was directed towards les philosophes, was more to his taste than popular rule. It was certainly not his intention to promote a revolution on the part of what he regarded as 'the rabble'. On the other hand, it is true that all the philosophers who are regarded as typical representatives of the French Enlightenment were opposed, in varying degrees, to the domination of the Church. Many of them were opposed to Christianity, and some at least were dogmatic atheists, strongly opposed to all religion, which they regarded as the product of ignorance and fear, as the enemy of intellectual progress and as prejudicial to true morality.

But though both the interpretation in terms of an attitude towards religion and also, though to a lesser extent, the interpretation in terms of political convictions have foundations in fact, it would give a thoroughly inadequate picture of eighteenth-century French philosophy, were one to describe it as a prolonged attack on throne and altar. Obviously, attacks on the Catholic Church, on revealed religion and, in certain cases, on religion in any form, were made in the name of reason. But the exercise of reason meant much more to the philosophers of the French Enlightenment than simply destructive criticism in the religious sphere. Destructive criticism was, so to speak, the negative side of the Enlightenment. The positive aspect consisted in the attempt to understand the

THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT (1)

3

world and especially man himself in his psychological, moral and

social life. By saying this I do not intend to minimize the philosophers'

views on religious topics or to dismiss them as unimportant. To anyone, indeed, who shares the religious convictions of the present writer their attitude can hardly be a matter of indifference. But, quite apart from one's own beliefs, the attitude of les philosop1tes towards religion was clearly of cultural significance and importance. For it expresses a marked change from the outlook of the mediaeval culture, and it represents a different cultural stage. At the same time we have to remember that what we are witnessing is the growth and extension of the scientific outlook. The eighteenthcentury French philosophers believed strongly in progress, that is, in the extension of the scientific outlook from physics to psychology, morality and man's social life. If they tended to reject revealed religion and sometimes all religion, this was partly due to their conviction that religion, either revealed religion in particular or religion in general, is an enemy of intellectual progress and of the unimpeded and clear use of reason. I certainly do not mean to imply that they were right in thinking this. There is no inherent incompatibility between religion and science. But my point is that if we dwell too exclusively on their destructive criticism in the religious sphere, we tend to lose sight of the philosopher's positive aims. And then we get only a one-sided view of the picture.

The French philosophers of the eighteenth century were considerably influenced by English thought, especially by Locke and Newton. Generally speaking, they were in agreement with the former's empiricism. The exercise of reason in philosophy did not mean for them the construction of great systems deduced from innate ideas or self-evident first principles. And in this sense they turned their backs on the speculative metaphysics of the preceding century. This is not to say that they had no concern at all with synthesis and were purely analytic thinkers in the sense of giving their attention to different particular problems and questions without any attempt to synthesize their various conclusions. But they were convinced that the right way of approach is to go to the phenomena themselves and by observation to learn their laws and causes. We can then go on to synthesize, forming universal principles and seeing particular facts in the light of universal truths. In other words, it came to be understood that it is a mistake

4

THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT

to suppose that there is one ideal method, the deductive method of mathematics, which is applicable in all branches of study. Buffon, for example, saw this clearly; and his ideas had some influence on the mind of Diderot.

This empiricist approach to knowledge led in some cases, as in that of d'Alembert, to a position which can be described as positivistic. Metaphysics, if one means by this the study of transphenomenal reality, is the sphere of the unknowable. We cannot have certain knowledge in this field, and it is waste of time to look for it. The only sense in which we can have a rational metaphysics is by synthesizing the results of the empirical sciences. And in empirical science itself we are not concerned with 'essences' but with phenomena. In one sense, of course, we can talk about essences, but these are simply what Locke called 'nominal' essences. The word is not being used in a metaphysical sense.

It would, indeed, be a serious error were one to say that all the philosophers of the French Enlightenment were 'positivists'. Voltaire, for example, thought that we can prove the existence of God. So did Maupertuis. But we can discern an obvious approximation to positivism in certain thinkers of the period. And so we can say that the philosophy of the eighteenth century helped to prepare the way for the positivism of the following century.

At the same time this interpretation of the French Enlightenment is one-sided: it is in a sense too philosophical. To illustrate what I mean, I take the example of Condillac. This philosopher was much influenced by Locke. And he set out to apply Locke's empiricism, as he understood it, to man's psychical faculties and operations, trying to show how they can all be explained in terms of 'transformed sensations'. Now, Condillac himself was not exactly what we would call a positivist. But it is doubtless possible to interpret his Treatise on Sensations as a move in the direction of positivism, as a stage in its development. It is also possible, however, to interpret it simply as a stage in the development of psychology. And psychology, considered in itself, is not necessarily connected with philosophical positivism.

Again, several philosophers of the French Enlightenment reflected on the connections between man's psychical life and its physiological conditions. And in certain cases, as in that of Cabanis, this resulted in the statement of a crude materialism. One may be tempted, therefore, to interpret the whole investigation in terms of this result. At the same time it is possible

THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT (1)

5

to regard the dogmatic materialism of certain philosophers as a temporary aberration in the course of the development of a valuable line of study. In other words, if one looks on the psychological studies of the eighteenth-century philosophers as tentative experiments in the early stages of the development of this line of research, one may be inclined to attach less weight to exaggerations and crudities than if one restricts one's mental horizon simply to the French Enlightenment considered in itself. Of course, when one is concerned as in these chapters, with the thought of a particular period and of a particular group of men, one has to draw attention to these exaggerations and crudities. But it is as well to keep at the back of one's mind an over-all picture and to remind oneself that these features belong to a certain stage in a line of development which stretches forward into the future and which is capable of supplying at a later date criticism and correction of earlier aberrations.

In general, therefore, we may look on the philosophy of the French Enlightenment as an attempt to develop what Hume called 'the science of man'. True, this description does not fit all the facts. We find, for example, cosmological theories. But it draws attention to the interest of eighteenth-century philosophers in doing for human psychical and social life what Newton had done for the physical universe. And in endeavouring to accomplish this aim they adopted an approach which was inspired by the empiricism of Locke rather than by the speculative systems of the preceding century.

It is worth noting also that the philosophers of the French Enlightenment, like a number of English moralists, endeavoured to separate ethics from metaphysics and theology. Their moral ideas certainly differed considerably, ranging, for instance, from the ethical idealism of Diderot" to the low-grade utilitarianism of La Mettrie. But they were more or less at one in attempting to set morality on its own feet, so to speak. This is really the significance of Bayle's assertion that a State composed of atheists was quite possible and of La Mettrle's addition that it was not only possible but desirable. It would, however, be incorrect to say that allles philosophes agreed with this point of view. In Voltaire's opinion, for instance, if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him, precisely for the moral welfare of society. But, generally speaking, the philosophy of the Enlightenment included a separation of ethics from metaphysical and theological considerations.

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