Background - BC Forensic League Society - BC Forensic League



TOC \o "1-3" Background PAGEREF _Toc312915781 \h 4Types of Sanctions PAGEREF _Toc312915782 \h 5Sanctions on Russia Now PAGEREF _Toc312915783 \h 11Sanctions Will Continue PAGEREF _Toc312915784 \h 12Sanctions Undermine Economy PAGEREF _Toc312915785 \h 13Con PAGEREF _Toc312915786 \h 17Ukraine Not Topical – Not Part of “Western” Interests PAGEREF _Toc312915787 \h 18Sanctions Don’t Reduce the Threat PAGEREF _Toc312915788 \h 19Sanctions Don’t Reduce Russian Weapons Transfers PAGEREF _Toc312915789 \h 21Sanctions Don’t Reduce Ukraine Aggression PAGEREF _Toc312915790 \h 22Sanctions Threaten Western Interests PAGEREF _Toc312915791 \h 27Economic Downturn Won’t Produce a Behavior Change PAGEREF _Toc312915792 \h 29Russian Economic Downturn Triggers Aggression PAGEREF _Toc312915793 \h 30Sanctions Increase Putin’s Political Power PAGEREF _Toc312915794 \h 37More Pressure Won’t Change Russia’s Behavior PAGEREF _Toc312915795 \h 38Energy Sanctions Useless PAGEREF _Toc312915796 \h 39Sanctions Only Hurt the Poor PAGEREF _Toc312915797 \h 40Sanctions Undermine Russia-US Relations PAGEREF _Toc312915798 \h 41Undermining Russia-US Relations Increases the Threat from Russia PAGEREF _Toc312915799 \h 43Sanctions Russia-China Axis PAGEREF _Toc312915800 \h 45Sanctions Destroy the Economy, Triggering Aggression PAGEREF _Toc312915801 \h 47Sanctions Undermine Global Energy Security PAGEREF _Toc312915802 \h 49A2: Need Sanctions to Enforce the Minsk Agreement PAGEREF _Toc312915803 \h 50Arctic – Russia Sphere of Influence PAGEREF _Toc312915804 \h 51A2: War if We Don’t Keep Russia Out of the Arctic PAGEREF _Toc312915805 \h 56A2: Russia Military Modernization Bad PAGEREF _Toc312915806 \h 57Sanctions Generally Fail PAGEREF _Toc312915807 \h 59Sanctions Punish Innocent Civilians PAGEREF _Toc312915808 \h 60Sanctions are Genocide/Warfare PAGEREF _Toc312915809 \h 66Sanctions Unethical - Must Reject PAGEREF _Toc312915810 \h 68Sanctions Are Economic Bullying PAGEREF _Toc312915811 \h 71A2: Utilitarianism PAGEREF _Toc312915812 \h 72Sanctions Ethnocentric PAGEREF _Toc312915813 \h 75Sanctions Unethical PAGEREF _Toc312915814 \h 76Sanctions Generally Fail (Not Russia Specific) PAGEREF _Toc312915815 \h 78Resolving the Ukraine Crisis BAD PAGEREF _Toc312915816 \h 82A2: Need Sanctions to Prevent Russia from Attacking Eastern Europe/The Balkans PAGEREF _Toc312915817 \h 83A2: Sanctions Cause Economic Decline and That’s Good – Hurts Military PAGEREF _Toc312915818 \h 88A2: Bad Economy Stops Russian Power Projection PAGEREF _Toc312915819 \h 92A2: Sanctions Undermine the Russian Economy – General PAGEREF _Toc312915820 \h 93A2: Sanctions Undermine the Oil Sector PAGEREF _Toc312915821 \h 96A2: Sanctions Reduce Western Investment PAGEREF _Toc312915822 \h 99A2: Ruble Devaluation PAGEREF _Toc312915823 \h 100A2: Sanctions Undermine Putin and Putin is Bad PAGEREF _Toc312915824 \h 103A2: Russia-Europe Gas Trade Good PAGEREF _Toc312915825 \h 105A2: Sanctions Target the Elite/Force Change PAGEREF _Toc312915826 \h 106A2: Sanctions Strengthen Putin and Stabilize Russia (Putin Good) PAGEREF _Toc312915827 \h 109A2: Need Sanctions to Enforce Ceasefire/Stop Minsk Agreement Violations PAGEREF _Toc312915828 \h 110A2: Sanctions Increase Western Diplomacy PAGEREF _Toc312915829 \h 113A2: Need to Maintain Sanctions on Iran to Stop Nuclearization PAGEREF _Toc312915830 \h 114Extensions – Sanctions Stop Proliferation PAGEREF _Toc312915831 \h 117Iran War Impacts PAGEREF _Toc312915832 \h 119A2: Sanctions Mean no Drones/Missiles PAGEREF _Toc312915833 \h 120A2: Sanctions Mean Russia Can’t Get Drones PAGEREF _Toc312915834 \h 122Missiles NU PAGEREF _Toc312915835 \h 123A2: Sanctions Mean Naming and Shaming/Protect Human Rights PAGEREF _Toc312915836 \h 124A2: Sanctions Key to Enforce Budapest Memorandum/Credibility of Security Guarantees PAGEREF _Toc312915837 \h 129A2: Sanctions Strengthen NATO PAGEREF _Toc312915838 \h 132A2: Sanctions Change Russia’s Behavior PAGEREF _Toc312915839 \h 136A2: Sanctions Stop Arctic Oil Development/Arctic Oil Development Good PAGEREF _Toc312915840 \h 143A2: Sanctions Strengthen Russian Democratic Groups PAGEREF _Toc312915841 \h 146A2: Space Advantage – Link Answer PAGEREF _Toc312915842 \h 150** Terraforming Specific Answers ** PAGEREF _Toc312915843 \h 152AT Mars Colonization Solves Extinction PAGEREF _Toc312915844 \h 153Colonization Impossible PAGEREF _Toc312915845 \h 154Mars Fails PAGEREF _Toc312915846 \h 158Mars Offense—Space Diseases PAGEREF _Toc312915847 \h 160Internal link to Colonization Bad PAGEREF _Toc312915848 \h 162Colonization Bad – Extinction Ans. PAGEREF _Toc312915849 \h 163AT Must Get Off the Rock PAGEREF _Toc312915850 \h 164AT Overview Effect PAGEREF _Toc312915851 \h 165A2: Sanctions Support Multilateralism PAGEREF _Toc312915852 \h 167multilat—fails PAGEREF _Toc312915853 \h 179multilat—no public support PAGEREF _Toc312915854 \h 183multilat—regionalism checks PAGEREF _Toc312915855 \h 184xt multilateralism fails PAGEREF _Toc312915856 \h 185xt unreliable partners PAGEREF _Toc312915857 \h 188xt no public support PAGEREF _Toc312915858 \h 189Pro PAGEREF _Toc312915859 \h 197Sanctions Stop Russian Aggression in the Ukraine PAGEREF _Toc312915860 \h 198Sanctions Generally Effective PAGEREF _Toc312915861 \h 199Sanctions Establish Norms Against Russian Aggression PAGEREF _Toc312915862 \h 200Sanctions Prevent Further Russian Aggression in the Ukraine PAGEREF _Toc312915863 \h 201Sanctions Needed to Support Minsk Agreement PAGEREF _Toc312915864 \h 203Supporting Minsk Critical to US Leadership PAGEREF _Toc312915865 \h 204Need to Deter Russia PAGEREF _Toc312915866 \h 206Appeasing Putin Bad PAGEREF _Toc312915867 \h 208Ukraine Aggression Risks War PAGEREF _Toc312915868 \h 210Sanctions Undermine Russian Energy Development in the Arctic PAGEREF _Toc312915869 \h 214Russian Arctic Energy Development Bad – Military Conflict PAGEREF _Toc312915870 \h 215Russian Arctic Energy Development Bad – Environment PAGEREF _Toc312915871 \h 226A2: Better to Cooperate With Russia in the Arctic PAGEREF _Toc312915872 \h 230A2: Sanctions Fail/Don’t Impact Russia PAGEREF _Toc312915873 \h 231A2: Sanctions Hurt US Relations with the EU PAGEREF _Toc312915874 \h 233A2: Sanctions Are Weak PAGEREF _Toc312915875 \h 234A2: Sanctions Cause a Shift Away from the Dollar PAGEREF _Toc312915876 \h 235A2: Sanctions Cause Russia Pivot to Asia (Generally) PAGEREF _Toc312915877 \h 238A2: Sanctions Drive Russia to India PAGEREF _Toc312915878 \h 243A2: Sanctions Cause Russian Arms Sales PAGEREF _Toc312915879 \h 244A2: Sanctions Cause Putin Nationalism PAGEREF _Toc312915880 \h 245A2: Sanctions Russia-China Alliance PAGEREF _Toc312915881 \h 246A2: Undermining Russia’s Economy Hurts the Global Economy PAGEREF _Toc312915882 \h 252A2: Sanctions Cause Russian Cyber Attacks PAGEREF _Toc312915883 \h 253A2: Sanctions Meaning Russian Military Involvement in Syria, No Resolution of the Crisis PAGEREF _Toc312915884 \h 258A2: Sanctions Hurt European Unity PAGEREF _Toc312915885 \h 260A2: Sanctions Hurt Europe’s Economy PAGEREF _Toc312915886 \h 264A2: Russian Military Modernization Good PAGEREF _Toc312915887 \h 265Unchecked Russian Aggression Causes War PAGEREF _Toc312915888 \h 267A2: Nuclear Materials Security Cooperation Good/Sanctions Disrupt PAGEREF _Toc312915889 \h 269A2: (Russia Relations) Iran Impact PAGEREF _Toc312915890 \h 270A2: (Russia Relations) Syrian Impact PAGEREF _Toc312915891 \h 271A2: (Russia Relations) Afghanistan Impact PAGEREF _Toc312915892 \h 273A2: Sanctions Cause US-Russia War PAGEREF _Toc312915893 \h 276Extension – Nuclear Deterrence Solves PAGEREF _Toc312915894 \h 286Ext – Russia Lacks Resources to Initiate War PAGEREF _Toc312915895 \h 289No Extinction PAGEREF _Toc312915896 \h 295Extensions – Russia Won’t Initiate War PAGEREF _Toc312915897 \h 297BackgroundTypes of SanctionsThree types of sanctions – (a) threats; (b) those targeted at individuals; (c) those targeted at the socioeconomic systemXinhua General News Service, December 18, 2014, Commentary: Double-edged sanctions against Russia hurt both sides, DOA: 10-25-15 As U.S. President Barack Obama signed into law a bill aiming for tougher sanctions on Russia, the seesaw battle stalemated between Western countries and Russia over the Ukraine crisis is expected to continue. While touching Russia on the raw, the boomerang is most likely to dart back to its throwers -- the United States and its European allies. Since the crisis broke out in Ukraine, the West has adopted a three-step sanction strategy against Russia -- First, threatening with sanctions; second, imposing sanctions against individuals that "endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine"; and third, directing sanctions at Russia's whole socioeconomic system and its energy,defense and finance sectors in particular. Ukraine Freedom and Support Act of 2014Leigh Anderson, Mondaq Business Briefing, January 5, 2015, DOA: 11-25-15This alert follows our previous alerts on the Russia/Ukraine sanctions.U.S. Passes New Sanctions Authorizing Statute - Sends Russia Frigid End of Year MessagePresident Obama: U.S. will "review and calibrate" sanctions in response to Russia's actionsOn December 18, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Ukraine Freedom and Support Act of 2014 ("the Act"), the latest move in a series of sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the EU over the past year (full coverage of the Russia sanctions can be found here). While the Act gives the president authority to implement new sanctions against Russia, President Obama has declined to enforce the new provisions at this time. The strategy behind this move is unclear, though it appears to be a "wait and see" approach with the hope that even just the threat of new U.S. sanctions will curb Russia's destabilizing efforts in Ukraine and the wider Eastern Europe and Central Asia regions. It is also believed that the U.S. administration wants to continue to remain in lock-step with the EU and its imposition of sanctions against Russia. The provisions of the Act are wide-reaching, and if he chooses to enforce them, would authorize the president to provide defense articles, services, and training to Ukraine; address humanitarian relief efforts for displaced persons; and encourage increased investment in Ukraine's energy sector with decreased Ukrainian dependence on Russian energy sources. The Act also puts forth several key export controls and sanctions provisions that could be implemented against Russia.Key Sanctions and Export Control Provisions Mandated Sanctions. The Act requires the president to impose three or more enumerated sanctions against Rosoboronexport, Russia's state-owned exporter of defense articles. The Act also requires the president to impose three or more enumerated sanctions against any Russian entity that transfers or brokers the transfer to, or knowingly manufactures or sells defense articles transferred to, Syria, or into the territory of a "specified country" without its government's consent. Those that provide financial, material or technological support to such entities are also subject to the sanctions. The Act defines "specified countries" as including Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, or any other country of significant concern under the Act, such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the Central Asia republics. Lastly, the Act directs the president to impose specified sanctions on Gazprom (Russian-controlled natural gas extractor) if the president finds that it is withholding significant natural gas supplies from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries, or further withholds significant natural gas supplies from countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova.Authorized Sanctions. The Act authorizes, but does not require, the president to impose certain sanctions targeting Russia's energy sector. Under the Act, the president is authorized to impose sanctions on investors in Russian crude oil. The investor must have made a significant investment in a special Russian crude oil project to trigger the sanctions. The president is also authorized to impose additional licensing requirements on the export of items for Russia's energy sector, including equipment used for tertiary oil recovery, as enforced by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce ("BIS"), or the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury ("OFAC").Restrictions on Foreign Financial Institutions. Under the Act, the president is authorized to impose a prohibition on opening, and a prohibition or the imposition of strict conditions on maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that knowingly engages in significant transactions involving sanctioned persons; or with respect to the Ukrainian crisis, facilitated a significant financial transaction on behalf of any Russian person included on the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the OFAC.Looking Ahead: Russian Response to Authorizing Statute and New Sanctions Targeting the Crimea RegionThe Russian response after President Obama's announcement was nothing short of defiant. Russian President Vladimir Putin decried the sanctions, and a Russian ministry statement released December 20 spoke of retaliatory measures. Given Russia's reaction, it seems that enforcement of these sanctions and others may be imminent. Indeed, only one day after signing this bill into law, the President issued an Executive Order "Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine" (the "Crimea-related Executive Order"). In a letter issued by the White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama described the Crimea-related Executive Order as prohibiting: New investments by U.S. persons in the Crimea region of UkraineImportation of goods, services, or technology into the United States from the Crimea region of UkraineExportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of goods, services, or technology from the United States or by a U.S. person to the Crimea region of UkraineThe facilitation of any such transactions.The Crimea-related Executive Order expands on three previously issued Ukraine-related orders: Executive Order 13660 of March 6, 2014, Executive Order 13661 of March 16, 2014, and Executive Order 13662 of March 20, 2014. In line with previous Ukraine-related sanctions and sanctions-related executive orders of the modern era, the Crimea-related Executive Order contains an asset-blocking feature. Pursuant to this order, property and interests in property of any person may be blocked if determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, that the person is: Operating in the Crimea region of UkraineA leader of an entity operating in the Crimea region of UkraineOwned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to have acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the order, orMaterially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the orderThe Crimea-related Executive Order also blocks such a designated person's entry into the United States. Relatedly, on December 19, 2014, OFAC issued General License No. 4 "Authorizing the Exportation or Reexportation of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Supplies, and Replacement Parts" to Crimea. The general license authorizes such exports from the United States or by a U.S. person, wherever located, to Crimea, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to Crimea. Related transactions (e.g., making shipping and cargo inspections, obtaining insurance, receipt of payment, etc.) are also authorized. General License No. 4 is limited to EAR99 items, or items that would otherwise be designated as EAR99 if subject to the Department of Commerce's Commerce Control List.EU has extended sanctionsLeigh Anderson, Mondaq Business Briefing, January 5, 2015, DOA: 11-25-15EU extends sanctions against Crimea and SevastopolOn December 18, 2014, the EU extended the restrictive measures in place arising out of the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. Council Regulation (EU) No 1351/2014 of December 18, 2014 (the "Regulation") further amends Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 (as first amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 825/2014).These new restrictive measures came into effect December 20, 2014.Executive SummaryThe scope of Article 2 of Regulation 692/2014 is significantly expanded by the Regulation. The Article had originally prohibited the import into the European Union of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol, and providing financing or financial assistance, as well as insurance and reinsurance related to the import of such goods.In July, Regulation 825/2014 had extended the above to also prohibit investments in key sectors in Crimea and Sevastopol, including transport, telecommunications, energy and the exploitation of natural resources, and an export ban on key equipment and technology related to those sectors.The EU has rounded off 2014 by extending the restrictive measures to provide a ban on all foreign investment in Crimea or Sevastopol; a prohibition on services directly related to the investment ban, as well as services related to tourism activities; and restrictions on goods in the sectors of transport, telecommunications, energy, and exploration of oil, gas and minerals.Restrictions on foreign investmentArticle 2a introduces prohibitions on: Acquiring or extending any existing participation in the ownership of real estate located in Crimea or SevastopolAcquiring or extending any existing participation in the ownership of any entity in Crimea or Sevastopol, including the acquisition in full of such entity or the acquisition of shares and other securities of a participating nature of such entityGranting or being part of an arrangement to grant any loan or credit, or otherwise provide financing - including equity capital - to any entity in Crimea or Sevastopol, or for the documented purpose of financing such entityCreating any joint venture in Crimea or Sevastopol or with an entity in Crimea or SevastopolProviding investment services directly related to the activities referred to aboveThe Regulation provides an exemption for the execution of obligations arising from contracts concluded before December 20, 2014, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts, provided that the competent authority is informed at least five working days in advance.Member State authorities may grant an authorisation for otherwise prohibited activities in very limited circumstances related to consular missions, organisations with international immunity, projects in support of health institutions, or appliances and equipment for medical use.Restrictions on goods for use in the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors, and in the prospection, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resourcesArticle 2b prohibits the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods listed in Annex II of the Regulation to any natural or legal person, entity, or body in Crimea or Sevastopol, or where such goods are for use in Crimea or Sevastopol. The preamble to the Regulation gives guidance on how to determine the "place of use."The prohibition extends to the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, financing and financial assistance for the listed goods and technology.Note that these restrictions do not apply where there are no reasonable grounds to determine that the goods and technology or services in question are to be used in Crimea or Sevastopol. This highlights the importance of fully investigating proposed transactions, and obtaining sufficient end-user information.An exemption is provided for the execution until March 21, 2015 of an obligation arising from a contract concluded before December 20, 2014, or by ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts, provided that the competent authority has been informed at least five working days in advance.Again, Member States may grant an authorisation of otherwise prohibited goods or technologies in the same limited circumstances cited above.Restrictions on involvement in infrastructureArticle 2c prohibits the provision of technical assistance, or brokering, construction or engineering services directly relating to infrastructure in Crimea or Sevastopol, in the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors, and in the prospection, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources. This prohibition is independent of the origin of the goods or technology.An exception applies in the execution until March 21, 2015 of an obligation arising from a contract concluded before December 20, 2014, or by ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract.Restrictions on the provision of services related to tourism activitiesArticle 2d prohibits the provision of services directly related to tourism activities in Crimea or Sevastopol. In particular, any ship providing cruise services is prohibited to enter into or call at any port situated in the Crimean Peninsula and listed in Annex III to the Regulation. The listed ports include Kerch and Sevastopol, the commercial port authorities of which are already designated by the EU as subject to an asset freeze.The prohibition applies to any ship flying the flag of a Member State, any ship owned and under the operational control of an EU owner, or any ship over which an EU operator has assumed overall responsibility for its operation.The prohibition does not apply where a ship enters or calls at any listed port for reasons of maritime safety in cases of emergency. The competent authority must, however, be informed of the entry within five working days.Notwithstanding the above, it is be permissible to execute an obligation arising from a contract or ancillary contract concluded before December 20, 2014, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts, provided that the competent authority has been informed at least five working days in advance.EU sanctions related to Crimea and SevastopolEconomist Newswire, December 19, 2014 EU politics: New Crimea sanctions leave EU-Russia position unchanged, DOA: 11-29-15EU leaders confirmed at a summit on December 18th that the bloc is imposing further sanctions against business with Crimea, to take effect on December 20th. The new measures are aimed at addressing anomalies in-and thus strengthening-the EU's policy of non-recognition of Russia's annexation of the region. As such, they do not signal a change in the EU's position on the separate question of sectoral ("phase three") sanctions against Russia, which the bloc implemented following the downing of a Malaysian passenger plane in July this year. On this issue, EU leaders at the summit held to the bloc's harder line of recent weeks, but continued to exhibit differences of emphasis. Although the call is finely balanced, we continue to expect the EU's sectoral sanctions against Russia to be eased substantially when they come up for renewal in July 2015, owing mainly to the need for unanimity within the bloc for any rollover. The EU has banned imports from Crimea and Sevastopol (including import financing and insurance) since June 2014. Under the bloc's new measures, in Crimea and Sevastopol EU firms and individuals will be banned from investing in companies or property; providing finance; exporting goods and services in the transport, telecommunications, energy, and oil and gas exploration and production sectors; and providing tourism services, including the landing of cruise ships. Provided that the specific item of business does not involve the territory of Crimea, EU entities are not banned from working with companies outside Crimea that may separately have business there.EU, US, Norway, Japan, Australia, and Canada have sanctions on Russia due to Crimea’s accession to Russia and tension in the UkraineBanking and Stock Exchange, Finance, Economics (Russia), November 10, 2015 Today Russia is covered by economic sanctions from the EU, the USA, Norway, Japan, Australia and Canada. The restrictions apply to the banking, oil and defense sectors. International sanctions were imposed following Crimea's accession to Russia and growing geopolitical tension in Ukraine.EU sanctions were extended in JuneRIA Novosti, June 22, 2015 EU Extends Sanction Policy, Moscow Readies Response, DOA: 11-27-15The European Union (EU) on Monday extended its economic sanctions against Russia imposed over the Ukraine conflict for another half a year.The decision did not come as a surprise for Moscow. Anti-Russia sanctions have been valid for a year and the European Union warned last week about their menting on this decision, the Kremlin said it would act on the basis of reciprocity. Russia's government has already submitted a proposal to the presidential administration on extending the food import embargo it introduced in response to Western sanctions, press secretary to the prime minister Natalya Timakova said on Monday.The European Union imposed sanctions against Russia on August 1, 2014, and expanded them in September of the same year. It introduced an embargo on new import and export contracts of arms and dual-purpose equipment. Russian banks and the oil industry were also hit by sanctions.In response, Russia restricted the import of food products from Western countries.EU sanctions are extended until the end of January 2016EJ Insight, June 23, 2015, EU extends Russia sanctions until end-Jan 2016, DOA: 11-27-15The European Union has extended its economic sanctions against Russia until the end of January 2016, keeping up the pressure on Moscow to comply with a ceasefire accord signed with Ukraine. The decision came at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg on Monday, BBC reported.Ministers agreed on the extension of the sanctions due to "Russia's destabilizing role in eastern Ukraine", the EU was quoted as saying.US won’t withdraw sanctions until the Minsk agreements are fully implementedRIA Novosti, February 12, 2015 , US to Roll Back Sanctions Once Russia Implements Minsk Agreements - State Department, DOA: 11-27-15The United States stands ready to ease sanctions on Russia once the Minsk agreements that have recently been agreed upon are fully implemented, US Department of State Secretary John Kerry said in a statement on Thursday. "The United States is prepared to consider rolling back sanctions on Russia when the Minsk agreements of September 2014, and now this agreement, are fully implemented," Kerry said.Before the United States decides whether to ease sanctions on Russia, Kerry said that the United States would need to see a full ceasefire in Ukraine, the "withdrawal of all foreign troops and equipment from Ukraine," and the "full restoration of Ukrainian control of the international border."Kerry warned that the United States would judge the implementation of the Minsk agreement by actions and not by words.On Thursday, the leaders of Ukraine, Germany, Russia, and France worked out a reconciliation deal including 13 points aimed at ending the military confrontation between Kiev forces and independence supporters in eastern Ukraine.The deal includes an unconditional ceasefire coming into force at midnight on February 15, urges Kiev to undertake constitutional reform with a focus on Ukraine's decentralization, as well as stipulates the withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, equipment and mercenaries from eastern Ukraine under the observation of the OSCE.US extended the sanctions for a year in MarchGalina Dudina, RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest, March 5, 2015 Obama extends sanctions against Russia for one year more, DOA: 11-27-15U.S. President Barack Obama has issued an order to extend by one year a series of sanctions against Russia over its role in the Ukraine crisis, the White House said Tuesday. In a statement published on the White House website, Obama said he was extending U.S. sanctions imposed on Russia last March and December in light of the continuing "unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."The U.S. first imposed sanctions on Russia on March 6, 2014, when Obama signed an executive order imposing travel bans and asset freezes against individuals that had "asserted governmental authority" in the Crimea peninsula without consent from the Ukrainian authorities.Later that month, Obama signed two executive orders that expanded the scope of the sanctions, stating that the "actions and policies of the government of the Russian Federation" had undermined Ukraine's territorial sovereignty.Russia in March last year annexed Crimea following the outcome of a referendum that was denounced by the West as illegitimate and unconstitutional.Additional sanctions imposed in December also prohibited new U.S. investment in Crimea and restricted the country's trade with the region.Tuesday's statement said the extension order would be transmitted to the U.S. Congress.Sanctions on Russia NowCanada has expanded sanctions to target the energy sectorShawn Neylan, Mondaq Business Briefing, January 8, 2015 Canada: Canada Expands Russia Sanctions, ? DOA: 10-25-15On December 19, the Canadian government announced expanded economic sanctions against Russia, primarily directed at the Russian energy industry (the "Expanded Russia Sanctions").As we recently discussed, the Expanded Russia Sanctions were imposed by way of an amendment to the pre-existing sanctions under the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations. In addition to adding new designated persons to the existing Regulations against Russia (and also adding new designated persons to the Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Regulations) the Expanded Russia Sanctions now prohibit any person in Canada and any Canadian outside Canada from exporting, selling, supplying or shipping any specified good, wherever situated, to Russia or to any person in Russia for use in any of (i) offshore oil exploration or production at a depth greater than 500 meters, (ii) oil exploration or production in the Arctic or (iii) shale oil exploration or production (the "Specified Activities"). Activities relating to gas exploration are not specifically covered in the Expanded Russia Sanctions.The specified goods covered by the Expanded Russia Sanctions are as follows: Seamless stainless steel line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines;Seamless iron or steel line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, other than line pipe made of stainless steel or cast iron;Seamless iron or steel drill pipe of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, other than drill pipe made of cast iron;Seamless iron or steel tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, other than tubing made of cast iron;Iron or steel line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines that has circular cross-sections and an external diameter exceeding 406.4 mm;Iron or steel casing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas that has circular cross-sections and an external diameter exceeding 406.4 mm;Welded iron or steel line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines that has an external diameter not exceeding 406.4 mm, other than line pipe made of cast iron;Welded casing and tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas that has an external diameter not exceeding 406.4 mm and is made of flat-rolled steel or iron products, other than casing and tubing made of cast iron;Interchangeable rock-drilling or earth-boring tools that have working parts made of sintered metal carbides, cermets, diamond or agglomerated diamond;Power-driven reciprocating positive displacement pumps for liquids, other than pumps with measuring devices, concrete pumps and fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps for internal combustion piston engines;Power-driven rotary positive displacement pumps for liquids, other than pumps with measuring devices and fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps for internal combustion piston engines;Liquid elevators and their parts, other than pumps;Non-hydraulic or non-self-propelled boring or sinking machinery, and their parts, for boring earth or extracting minerals or ores, other than tunnelling machinery and hand-operated tools;Parts for lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery;Parts for: derricks, cranes, mobile lifting frames and other lifting machinery;self-propelled bulldozers, scrapers, graders, levellers, shovel loaders and tamping machines; andother moving, grading, scraping, levelling, excavating and extracting machinery; Parts for hydraulic or self-propelled boring or sinking machinery;Mobile drilling derricks;Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms;Fire-floats, lightships and floating docks or cranes, other than dredgers.Sanctions Will ContinueDespite Italy’s statements, the EU won’t lift the sanctions until the Minsk agreements are honoredMark Adomanis, December 16, 2014, Forbes, Sanctions on Russia: They’ll Be Around for Awhile, DOA: 12-16-15So when Italian HYPERLINK "" \t "_self" Prime Minister Mateo Renzi said last week that the?”package of sanctions will be reviewed” over the coming months, a lot of people thought that it presaged a full-scale?shift in the EU’s policy towards Russia. Russian state media certainly enjoyed Renzi’s remarks, and such a public display of discord?inspired a fair degree of consternation among foreign policy?hawks. ? The most important voice in the debate however belongs to a certain HYPERLINK "" \t "_self" Angela Merkel, and she?isn’t changing her mind.?In what can only be seen as a quite?deliberate rebuke of Renzi’s freelancing, she pointedly noted?in an address to the Bundestag?that “a possible lifting of the sanctions against Russia is linked to the full implementation of the Minsk package. We are not there yet.” This is entirely in keeping with all of Merkel’s other words and actions over the past year and a half. Merkel’s determination, of course, does not?mean that squabbling among the Europeans will cease. There’s now an increasingly nasty squabble about a pending German-Russian gas pipeline that seems certain to draw lots of ire. But so long as the German government is firmly insistent on the need to sanction Russia (an insistence which has not ?changed and seems unlikely to) the sanctions will continue. They won’t be?enthusiastically?embraced by some of the more skeptical capitals like Athens, Rome, and Budapest, but the leaders of those respective countries aren’t going to cause a big, unnecessary fight with Germany in order to help out Russia.EU will maintain its sanctions until the cease fire agreement is enforcedVoice of America News, March 19, 2015, EU Likely to Keep Russia Sanctions After Merkel Weighs In, DOA: 11-25-15-The European Union is likely to keep economic sanctions on Russia until the Ukraine cease-fire agreements are fully implemented. Speaking to reporters before a two-day EU summit in Brussels, EU Council President Donald Tusk said Russia should be pressured through sanctions until a Ukraine cease-fire agreement would be fully observed."One of the best ways of supporting Ukraine will be through upholding the sanctions' pressure on Russia until we witness a full implementation of the Minsk agreement. This must ultimately conclude in Ukraine regaining control of its borders as foreseen in the plan brokered by [French] President [Francois] Hollande and [German] Chancellor [Angela] Merkel," Tusk said.Chancellor Angela Merkel told Germany's lower house of parliament (Bundestag), before leaving for Brussels, that she would strongly encourage EU leaders to maintain sanctions until Russia comes to terms with Minsk agreements to end the hostilities in eastern-Ukraine."We cannot and will not lift the sanctions that expire in July or September until the demands of the Minsk agreement have been fulfilled. That would be wrong," said Merkel.Sanctions Undermine EconomySanctions have undermined the economyXinhua General News Service, December 18, 2014, Commentary: Double-edged sanctions against Russia hurt both sides, DOA: 10-25-15 Rounds of sanctions, like rolling rocks, have rained down on Russia, and severely wounded the country's economy. On Dec. 16, the Russian ruble nosedived to an all-time low, hitting 80 rubles per U.S. dollar and 100 rubles per euro in Moscow trade. The ruble has lost nearly 50 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar and euro since March despite several currency interventions of the Central Bank, indicating Russia's economy has fallen into trouble. The once stubborn Russian government has finally admitted the country would fall into recession in 2015. Sanctions undermine Russia’s economyXinhua General News Service, December 19, 2014 News Analysis: New U.S. sanctions could add to Russia's economic woes, albeit indirectly, DOA: 11-27-15 Although a new round of U.S. sanctions against Russia might not have a direct impact, they could increase Russia's sense of panic and ratchet up pressure on the country's embattled economy, experts said. U.S. President Barack Obama on Thursday signed into law a new round of sanctions against Russia, but for now, does not intend to use them, saying the administration is keeping an eye on the situation in Ukraine. "My administration will continue to work closely with allies and partners in Europe and internationally to respond to developments in Ukraine and will continue to review and calibrate our sanctions to respond to Russia's actions," Obama said in a statement, adding that he was prepared to roll back sanctions should Russia take the necessary steps. Russia's economy has for months been flailing amid a falling currency and Western sanctions over the crisis in Ukraine. Energy prices have also fallen, dealing a severe blow to the Russian economy, as oil and gas industry comprises around 50 percent of its revenue. Earlier this week saw the sharpest drop in the ruble in 16 years. While it is unclear whether the new sanctions would have a direct impact on Russia, the anticipation alone is enough to give investors the jitters, and that could in turn lead to even more economic turmoil in the embattled country, experts said. Indeed, the greatest effect of sanctions has not been from the sanctions themselves but rather the broader effect of leaving investors, Russian and foreign, nervous about the Russian economy, leading to capital flight, RAND Corporation Senior International Policy Analyst Olga Oliker told Xinhua. "The limits that the sanctions have placed on Russia's access to capital markets have been very important, but general investor skittishness, over and above the sanctions, has been more important, and stands to last indefinitely," she said. The White House is keeping an eye on the situation, with White House spokesman Josh Earnest saying earlier this week that the administration has "suggested the longer the sanctions regime is in place, the more isolated the Russians would be and the greater the impact it would have on the broader Russian economy." "And every week and month that goes by that the sanctions regime is in place, we see that the toll that is being taken by the Russian economy grows," he said. From Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual press conference on Thursday, it is not clear that Russia has a plan for the beleaguered economy. Putin said that it may take a couple of years for Russia's economy to get back on track, which might mean he was betting on a rise in the price of oil, the eventual lifting of sanctions, or both. Sanctions undermine Russia’s GDP by 5%RIA Novosti, June 22, 2015 EU Extends Sanction Policy, Moscow Readies Response, DOA: 11-27-15Experts note that Russia will be affected by the extension of Western sanctions. Former Deputy Head of Russia's Central Bank Sergey Aleksashenko told RIA Novosti that Russia will lose about five percent of its GDP in 2015."The effect will be felt because the EU sanctions will prevent Russian banks and companies from getting loans in Europe and they will have to pay the external debt from domestic resources. This is the price that the Russian economy will have to pay," Aleksashenko said.In the meantime, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance will continue to proceed from the premise that anti-Russian sanctions will not be lifted in the near future. The Ministry of Economic Development predicts that Russia's GDP will fall by 2.8 percent, the Ministry of Finance predicts a 2-2.5-percent drop and the Central Bank says GDP will decrease by 3.2 percent.Sanctions will reduce the Russian economy by 9%Mark Thompson, , August 4, 2015 How badly have sanctions hit Russia?Sanctions imposed on Russia because of its support for separatists in Ukraine could shrink the economy by as much as 9% over time. That's the view of the International Monetary Fund, which published a regular report on Russia this week.Collapsing oil prices and Western sanctions on big banks and energy companies tipped Russia into a financial crisis at the end of 2014. The ruble plunged and inflation soared.Russia jacked up interest rates in response, sold dollars and euros to defend its currency, pumped money into the banks and slashed government spending.The situation has stabilized this year, although the ruble has come under pressure again recently, but the economy is already deep in recession.The IMF expects Russian GDP to shrink by 3.4% this year, as falling real wages, the higher cost of borrowing and shattered confidence hit domestic demand. And western sanctions, and Russia's retaliatory ban on imports of food and agricultural products, could be responsible for nearly half that decline.But longer term, the impact could be even more significant, as the loss of access to foreign finance and technology hurts investment and makes Russia's economy even less efficient."Prolonged sanctions could lead to a cumulative output loss over the medium term of up to 9% of GDP," the IMF said.Russians are feeling the pain. Unemployment has begun to creep up from very low levels, and millions more have fallen into poverty.Sanctions trigger inflation in Russia and undermine its access to creditRussia & CIS Military Weekly, June 11, 2015, Corridors of Power, DOA: 11-27-15Russia to extend counter-sanctions after G7's decisions - Kremlin chief of staffMoscow will not lift its counter-sanctions against Western countries anytime soon, taking into consideration the G7's decision to extend sanctions against Russia, says Russian presidential chief of staff Sergei Ivanov. "As far as we know, a G7 summit has just taken place, which has extended the effect of sanctions against Russia. Therefore, it is absolutely logical to presume that Russia will also extend its sanctions," Ivanov said at the World Congress of Russian Press currently being held in Moscow."When we announced our counter-sanctions, or any sanctions in general - this is a double-edged sword, one of the edges being negative and the other positive. Of course, the sanctions have had a negative impact on us, this is obvious. Access to credit resources has been blocked, and our inflation has accelerated," Ivanov said.Sanctions have undermined Russia’s oil sector and its economyPetroleum Economist, August 2015, Russia's oil: squeezed at both ends, Eugene M. Khartukov is professor of economics at Moscow State University for International Relations (MGIMO), CEO of Moscow-based World Energy Analysis & Forecasting Group (Gapmer) and vice-president (for Eurasia) of Petro-Logistics (Geneva), DOA: 11-27-15Russia's oil industry is under pressure from either side: on one hand, there are western sanctions affecting finance and technology; and on the other, lower oil prices are hitting the budget.Production is running at a high rate, but given the size of its contribution to the global supply situation, any threat to its existence needs to be taken seriously.Last year's sanctions against Russia, first over its involvement in Crimea's secession from Ukraine and then in the military conflict in southeastern Ukraine, were put in place by the US and then by sanctions from Canada, the EU, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.The sanctions banned companies from supplying technology and services that could be used to explore for, or produce, oil and gas from the Arctic, deep sea, shale and other challenging areas. They also limited certain Russian companies' access to western financial markets. The EU managed to keep Gazprom off the list of companies that were hit owing to their with links to the president, Vladimir Putin, but Novatek was on the list, affecting its financing for the Yamal LNG project; as was Rosneft. Other companies affected were LUKoil, Surgutneftegas, Novatek, Gazprom and Transneft.LUKoil had to trim its investment ambitions as the company's net profit in the third quarter of 2014 was half of what it had been the year before "" although this problem is common to companies outside Russia too.And although LUKoil is on a sanctions list, that is only in relation to a specific and very narrow area of activity. For example, in early August this year it managed to secure up to $1bn of finance for its stake in the Shah Deniz expansion.The package includes loans from the Asia Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which are each providing direct financing of up to $250mn each.Rosneft has applied for rubles 1.5 trillion ($23.3bn) of financial help just "to sustain the liquidity." Novatek has also approached the government for financial help if its shareholders in Yamal LNG were unable to raise the funds on time "" China is however also a major shareholder "" and Putin has offered government support.Since the imposition of sanctions, the market value of Russia's most powerful oil and gas companies has steadily eroded. Based on trade in over-the-counter shares between September 12, when both Washington and Brussels announced sanctions against Russia's petroleum companies, and December 16 last year when the dollar-ruble rate hit its nadir, Gazprom was down 32.1% in dollar terms; LUKoil was down 17.6%; Gazprom Neft was down 26.6%, and Surgutneftegaz was down 16.6%. In rubles, the world's largest oil pipeline transport company, Transneft, was up 65.8%, but the currency lost 64.8% in that same time frame.During those three months, the ruble, whose exchange rate against the US dollar is highly dependent upon the world oil price, undermined by the lesser value of oil export sales, fell from 37.78 to the dollar to 69.67 on December 16, the lowest level for the currency since the Russian currency market opened in 2000.So the impact of the sanctions was partially offset for Russia by the weaker ruble, as they earned more rubles to spend at home.Still, the sanctions could not but impact Russia's oil production. The deputy head of LUKoil Leonid Fedun told UK daily Financial Times in late November 2014 that sanctions could limit oil output in Russia by 7%, from 2015. And as the sanctions apply to offshore and tight-oil developments, they could in the longer term keep about 2mn b/d underground.Too dependent on oilAs hydrocarbons exports account for over two thirds of Russia's total exports, the country's GDP is very dependent on the world oil price.The same may be said about the Russian state budget. Late last year, when Russia reviewed and adopted this year's budget, the economy ministry and parliament assumed an average oil price of $50/barrel compared with $98/b for 2014.ConUkraine Not Topical – Not Part of “Western” InterestsWestern Europeans don’t care about the UkraineMark Adomanis, December 16, 2014, Forbes, Sanctions on Russia: They’ll Be Around for Awhile, DOA: 12-16-15Sanctions have lasted, then, because in the current environment they are?actually a perfect compromise between the various blocs within the EU. Many of the Eastern members want to aggressively invest in and subsidize Ukraine’s ongoing reforms as well as provide it with substantial military assistance: they want the “Eastern Partnership” to be dramatically expanded and scaled up. Many Western members, on the other hand, want nothing to do with Ukraine, viewing it as a needless and expensive distraction from?other far more?pressing?problems like terrorism and refugees.Sanctions Don’t Reduce the ThreatSanctions radically increase popular support for Russian nationalism and Putin and also drive Russia into alliance with ChinaBusiness News Europe, May 6, 2014, “Why western sanctions will fail” )With the violence in eastern Ukraine escalating by the day, the West’s policy of imposing sanctions on Russia is bound to fail. All this policy has done is to paint both the Kremlin and Washington into their respective corners, making the chances of military confrontation look increasingly likely. As the German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, warned in interviews published in four European newspapers on May 6, “The bloody pictures from Odessa have shown us that we are just a few steps away from a military confrontation.” Thus the time for both Washington and Moscow to cut their losses and agree to meet to thrash out a compromise is now. Each day that passes will see the body count rise and drive the proxies that are actually doing the fighting at the behest of the two Great Game players become more and more invested in the violent cycle of anger and revenge, so that if the overlords try to pull the plug they might find it is too late. Indeed, this point may already have passed with the death of over 40 pro-Russian activists in Odessa. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and US President Barack Obama warned Russia the West would scale up to phase III sanctions, those that target sectors like banking and energy, if Russia interferes in any way with the upcoming Ukrainian presidential poll, slated for May 25. But with the situation in eastern Ukraine clearly spinning out of control, it will be impossible to hold what the international community considers to be a “free and fair election”. Having drawn a line in the sand, the West will be forced to take the nuclear option of doing real economic damage to the Russian economy and so force the Russians to retaliate in kind. We will be lucky if both sides hold themselves to just attacking on the economic front and not the military one as well. The irony is the Germans have tied themselves to a policy that they clearly don’t want, or can ill afford. Of all the European countries, Germany’s economy is the most closely bound to Russia. Germany depends heavily on Russian oil and gas, which accounts for the bulk of the €40bn it imported from the country in 2012. In the other direction, German exports to Russia totalled €38bn in 2012, which was 31% of all European exports to Russia. Therefore, doing real and significant damage to the Russian economy will do similar damage to Germany’s nascent economic recovery. The idea that sanctions, especially the pathetically weak ones that have been imposed so far, will have any impact on the Kremlin’s “calculus” is to totally misjudge the situation. “The whole idea that we are going to defeat the Russians by imposing hardship on them boggles my mind,” says Clifford Gaddy, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution and the author of the “virtual economy” meme that dominated the 1990s discussion of Russia’s problems. “It’s not a matter of how much pain you can impose, but how much they can tolerate. And how much can they tolerate depends on the motivation for their behaviour. For Russia it is a question of national interest and survival. It is not just about greed.” Gaddy’s voice is one of a growing chorus questioning the wisdom of the sanctions policy. Europe is clearly split on the issue, but the US holds the trump card: if Washington imposes financial sanctions on a major Russian firm, due to the integration of the global financial system these sanctions will effectively lock the Russian company out of the international capital and banking markets. “What is less clear, however, is what these sanctions will actually achieve,” says Dmitri Trenin, the highly respected director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. “Making Putin back down and concede defeat in Ukraine is improbable. Driving wedges between the Russian leader and his close associates is equally hopeless. The Russian liberal opposition, already marginalized, will hardly get a shot in the arm thanks to the sanctions. As to the bulk of the Russian people, their instinctive reaction to massive outside pressure against their country is more likely to be a patriotic surge rather than a regime change. The Russian government will now have an excellent reason to explain away the coming economic hardships: US sanctions.” Backfire In reality, the sanctions have so far had precisely the opposite effect to what was intended. Designed to undermine Putin’s support, they have actually lifted the president’s approval rating to an all-time high of 82% – exactly at the time when his popularity was becoming vulnerable due to the woeful state of Russia’s economy – while the popularity of Obama is now at a record low of 42%. Likewise, his inner circle, which has been hardest hit by the current “sanctions-lite”, has closed ranks and mocked their effectiveness. The boost in Putin’s popularity has also handed him shiny new armour against the slings and arrows of Russia’s young opposition movement, at one of the very few junctures where it actually had a chance of finding a flaw in the president’s defences. Domestically, the Ukrainian crisis has killed the nascent opposition dead for the time being. At the same time, other polls show that public approval of the government actions is rising and Russians now regard the country as being on “the right path.” Finally, Putin is clearly digging in his heels and the transparent divisions in European support for the US line on tougher sanctions is child’s play to exploit. Not only was Putin not prepared to back down in the face of western threats, now he is reaping huge domestic political capital from his tough-talking defiance – exactly the capital he needs to weather the disapproval that was bound to follow the first fall in the standard of living in Russia since he took over 2000. The West will truly have to destroy the Russian economy before they can persuade the people that Putin is the wrong man for the job. And that nuclear blitz option would do just as much damage to the European recovery. Indeed the only country that is truly committed to imposing tougher sanctions on Russia is the US, which has virtually no economic interests in the country; those American companies there are in Russia are for the most part multinationals, which are notorious for their lack of interest in politics. “There is palpable resistance on the part of various Western business interests – from German manufacturers to US big oil – against ratcheting up sanctions. The Obama administration’s effort to talk Russia down is countered by the Kremlin’s outreach to the CEOs of the companies that are doing well in Russia,” Trenin concludes. Perhaps the biggest irony of the sanctions policy is that it is driving Moscow into Beijing’s arms. China has been one of the very few emerging market powers to openly condemn the sanctions policy. Beijing’s ambassador to Moscow told reporters on May 2 that China “strongly opposes unilateral sanctions against Russia.” “We are against imposing unilateral sanctions on Russia. They are not a way out,” Chinese Ambassador Li Hui said the day after Washington released a new sanctions list singling out Putin’s friends and other officials on April 28. If Washington’s policy is one of containment, then facilitating a closer alliance between Moscow and Beijing is clearly counter productive. If Russia is cut off from the west, the only place Moscow can go is into the open arms of the and commodity-hungry east. China is already siding with Russia and said on May 5 that it would help finance and build a bridge over Kerch Strait to permanently link the recently annexed Crimean peninsula to Russia. Boris Titov, Russia’s business ombudsman and head of the Sino-Russia business council for the last decade, has said exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), ecologically clean food, timber and wine to China will more than compensate for any losses Russia incurs if relations with the EU worsen.Sanctions won’t cause Russia to change its behavior – it adapts and develops new businessesXinhua General News Service, December 18, 2014, Commentary: Double-edged sanctions against Russia hurt both sides, DOA: 10-25-15 Yet, the "giant rocks attack" has failed to press Russia to yield. President Vladimir Putin has made clear on various occasions that Russia will stick to its stand and never live with the sanctions. Admitting Western sanctions seriously damaged Russia's economy, Putin told his 10th annual year-end press conference Thursday that the current situation can be used to offer additional conditions for production businesses, which would be a start to diversify the economy. "External conditions would urge us to be more effective and shift to more innovative development ways," he noted. Sanctions Don’t Reduce Russian Weapons TransfersSanctions have not reduced Russia’s supply of arms to the rebelsAlwz Kokharov, Jane's Intelligence Weekly, July 8, 2015 Continued ceasefire violations in eastern Ukraine increase likelihood of further Western sanctions against Russia, DOA: 11-27-15On 8 July 2015 the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly supported a draft resolution condemning Russia's "clear, gross and uncorrected violations" in Ukraine, effectively acknowledging Russia's military involvement in the conflict. The resolution, jointly introduced by Canada and Ukraine, received 97 "yes" votes and 7 "against", while 32 delegates abstained. The non-binding resolution is an indicator of renewed attempts to apply political pressure on Moscow to withdraw its support to the pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions. While the Minsk II ceasefire agreement stabilised the line of contact between Ukrainian and separatist forces at the end of February 2015, shelling and localised fighting continues on a daily basis. The number of ceasefire violations, mostly by the separatist militants, ranges from 80 per day at the end of June to 20 per day in early July, according to the OSCE monitoring mission. After 14 months of fighting, there is no evidence that separatist stocks of weapons and ammunition supplied by Russia have substantially diminished.Sanctions Don’t Reduce Ukraine AggressionSanctions have not reduce the threat from Russia at allEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15And when the sanctions are judged by the most relevant metric—whether they are producing a policy change—they have been an outright failure. Since the United States imposed the sanctions, Russia has not backed down in Ukraine, and there is no reason to believe that they will force it to do so anytime soon. In the meantime, however, the sanctions are harming U.S. economic and geopolitical interests. If Western leaders want to resolve the Ukraine crisis and meaningfully constrain Russia’s bad behavior, they should abandon their failed sanctions-centric policy and focus on other measures instead, such as efforts to aid Ukraine economically, obstruct Russia’s military modernization, and increase European energy independence. Whatever punishment the sanctions have inflicted on Russia, it has not translated into coercion. The Obama administration appears to have expected that it would have by now: in February 2015, for example, Christine Wormuth, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, admitted that the sanctions had “not changed so far what Russia has been doing on the ground, and that is the great concern.” Indeed, after the initial round of sanctions, the Kremlin’s aggression only grew: Russia formally absorbed Crimea and upped its financial and military support for pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine (including those who most likely shot down the Malaysia Airlines flight). It is possible that the sanctions may have deterred Russia from even greater aggression in Ukraine, but it is equally possible that all Russia ever wanted to do there was create a slow-burning insurgency. And at any rate, the sanctions have failed to force Russia to withdraw from Crimea and stop meddling in eastern Ukraine. This should not be surprising: as the most comprehensive study of sanctions found, they fail to achieve their goals in 66 percent of cases, and they fail 79 percent of the time when designed to discourage military misadventurism.Russia has circumvented the sanctions by turning the ChinaEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15The Kremlin has also managed to circumvent the sanctions, partly by turning to China. In May 2014, Putin visited the country to seal a 30-year, $400 billion gas deal with it, demonstrating that Russia has alternatives to European gas markets. That October, Moscow and Beijing also agreed to a 150 billion yuan currency swap, allowing companies such as Gazprom to trade commodities in rubles and yuan—and thus steer clear of U.S. financial regulations. Even in Europe, Russia has been able to find loopholes to avoid the sanctions: in order to obtain access to Arctic drilling equipment and expertise, Rosneft acquired 30 percent of the North Atlantic drilling projects belonging to the Norwegian company Statoil.Sanctions won’t work in the long-termEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15It is tempting to believe that the sanctions will eventually work—say, after a few more years—but that is wishful thinking. U.S. and European negotiations with Russia have focused on the near future, including the implementation of the Minsk II agreement, an armistice with a deadline of December 2015, and with good reason: a drawn-out insurgency is the worst-case scenario for Ukraine and its Western backers. The sanctions were intended to compel Russia to cooperate with this international diplomatic process and withdraw from Crimea; if it doesn’t do so before the Minsk deadline, it is unlikely to in the future. Indeed, as academic studies suggest, the longer sanctions are in place, the less likely they are to produce a policy change. And in the case of Russia, if the price of oil rises again in the next few years, as is likely, their impact will diminish further.Sanctions have not limited Russian aggression in the UkraineElise Labot, June 12, 2015, U.S., Europe ready new sanctions to deter Putin on Ukraine, CNN, Europe ready new sanctions to deter Putin on Ukraine, DOA: 11-27-15The sources said that while they prefer not to impose the new sanctions, they hope the knowledge that they are being prepared will deter Putin from taking further action.READ: U.S. ambassador to U.N. visits Ukraine, slams Russian 'aggression'"It is both preparation and also a degree of credible messaging," the European diplomat briefing reporters said. "One is to make very clear that if there are further acts of aggression that we can move quickly. The other is to let it be known we are serious about being ready to do that as a deterrent."The diplomat stressed, "We would rather not to have to do that, but it needs to be clear that if that is the direction Putin's Russia goes in, that we will react."U.S. officials and European diplomats insist the sanctions are taking a toll on the Russian economy, where the ruble has plummeted in value.But they admit the sanctions have done little to prevent Putin from continuing the campaign in Ukraine or curb aggression by separatists in Eastern Ukraine.In total, more than 6,000 people have died in the fighting in Eastern Ukraine since the conflict began last year, according to the United Nations.Sanctions will not change Russia’s position on the UkraineRussia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama, March 4, 2015 Sanctions won't change Russia's principled position on Ukraine, DOA: 11-27-15It is about time for Washington to understand that no sanctions can affect Russia's position on Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. "No sanctions can change Russia's principled position. It is about time for Washington to understand this," Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich said in a commentary on the U.S. decision to extend its sanctions against Russia, which is available on the ministry website.Since Crimea is an historical part of Russia, sanctions won’t force Russia to give it upStates News Service December 20, 2014, Russia has dismissed US sanctions as useless, DOA: 11-27-15The following information was released by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty:Russia has dismissed new U.S. sanctions as useless and underscored its historic right to the Crimean Peninsula. The Russian Foreign Ministry said on December 20 that the new sanctions won't push Russia to give up Crimea since it is a "historic and integral part of Russia."The ministry referred to Cuba, where it took the United States half a century to restore diplomatic relations, and said it was prepared to wait as long as necessary for Washington to relent.U.S. President Barack Obama on December 19 called on Russia to end its annexation of Crimea and announced new measures prohibiting U.S. companies and individuals from exporting or importing any goods, services, or technology to or from Crimea.Obama also authorized the Treasury Department to impose sanctions on individuals and companies operating in the region.The Treasury Department announced 17 names and seven entities blacklisted under the order.The move comes one day after the European Union banned investment in Crimea.Crimea has been under de facto Russian control since March, after Russian-backed forces took the peninsula from Ukraine.Sanctions fail for Russia Mufson 14(Steven, Washpost contributor, April 29, 2014, “Why the sanctions against Russia probably won’t work” )Correction: An earlier version of this story contained incorrect figures for Russia's daily oil exports and the annual revenue they generated. This version has been corrected. Do economic sanctions work? In Russia, maybe not. Russia is sitting on roughly half a trillion dollars in foreign exchange, and it exports about 7.5 million barrels a day of crude oil bringing in about $300 billion a year — not including its sales of natural gas. It has will as well as means. Russian President Vladi?mir Putin seems content to suffer some economic damage for the sake of correcting what he sees as a historical wrong and bringing Crimea and perhaps more of Ukraine back into the Russian fold. “The whole idea that we are going to defeat Russians by imposing hardship on them boggles my mind,” said Clifford Gaddy, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution, noting that the Russian economy contracted 40 percent after the fall of the Soviet Union. “It’s not a matter of how much pain you can impose, but how much they can tolerate. And how much they can tolerate depends on the motivation for behavior,” he said, adding that Russia’s dispute with the United States and Europe was a “matter of national interest and survival” and not just greed. This is bad news for foreign companies operating in Russia for whom the gradual tightening of sanctions on Monday by the United States and Europe is worrisome. So far the Obama administration has tried to zero in on top officials and advisers to Putin. And trade with Russia outside the energy sector is relatively small; U.S. trade with Russia accounts for less than 1 percent of U.S. overall trade. Still, some international companies have big stakes there. The biggest U.S. investor in Russia is Exxon Mobil, which has an oil and gas production facility off Sakhalin Island in northeastern Russia and which has joined with Russian oil giant Rosneft to explore the country’s Arctic region. It also has an operation extracting natural gas from complex geological formations. Russia accounts for about 6 percent of Exxon Mobil’s global production, according to oil analyst Pavel Molchanov at the investment firm Raymond James. London-based oil giant BP is even more exposed to Russia. It owns a 19.75 percent stake in Rosneft, whose chief executive Igor Sechin was just added to the U.S. sanctions list. The stake is valued at about $13 billion, about 9 percent of BP’s total market capitalization. The Rosneft holding also accounts for about 30 percent of BP’s production, 36 percent of its reserves and contributes about 15 percent to the firm’s net income, Molchanov says. Royal Dutch Shell has a stake in a Gazprom oil and gas field in Siberia and is a partner in Sakhalin 2, which has a liquefied natural gas terminal that in 2012 supplied a tenth of Japan’s gas needs. The company’s chief executive, Ben van Beurden, in Russia for the 20th anniversary of the project, met Putin on April 18 to discuss expanding the facility. “We also know that this is going to be a project that will need strong support to succeed,” he said, according to Russian media. “So one of my purposes of meeting with you, Mr. President, is to also secure support for the way forward on this project.” Weatherford, a U.S. oil services company, is also deeply involved in Russia. As of March 2014, Weatherford had 346 rigs, 74 percent of its international rig count, operating in Russia, Molchanov said. Outside the energy sector, international companies with investments in Russia range from those selling luxury consumer goods to those investing in other natural resources. Putin, like other countries’ leaders, has insisted that automakers have certain levels of domestic content if they are selling in Russia. Ford and General Motors both have plants in Russia. But so far, the United States and European Union have targeted Russian individuals and companies. The intention is to make clear to Russians that the target is Putin and his close allies, not the Russian people overall. Gaddy doubts that will work either. “We are targeting the very best of Russia, the part that’s most modern, most eager to integrate into the global economy, most progressive,” he said. “Sanctions will tend to hurt them.” Russia joins a long list of countries that have been subjected to international sanctions, and the track record is mixed, at best. Even where effective, they work slowly. The U.S. embargo of Cuba has lasted more than half a century, and the Castros still rule there. The embargo of North Korea has inflicted suffering and starvation on the populace, but the Kim family remains in power. Both countries received oil and economic support from Russia and China respectively. The U.S. Congress imposed sanctions on South Africa over President Ronald Reagan’s veto in October 1986, prompting many U.S. companies, such as General Motors and Mobil Oil, to withdraw. The sanctions contributed to ending apartheid, but domestic foes of apartheid had already shaken the country for two years with demonstrations, consumer boycotts and strikes, sparking a flight of capital, no-shows for military service and a reassessment by influential members of the ruling National Party. The United States and European nations are currently negotiating with Iran, which is widely seen to have been brought to the bargaining table by tight sanctions on oil exports and transactions by Iran’s central bank. But the United States imposed sanctions on Iran after the 1979 hostage-taking, and other countries added sanctions after Iran resumed its uranium-enrichment program in 2005. Sanctions were tightened again in 2012, leading to a sharp drop in Iranian oil exports that provide the bulk of government revenue. But Molchanov argues that Russia is different. “Even if Russia were to cross the border into eastern Ukraine , it would be hard to imagine a full embargo on Russian exports because the world needs the oil,” he said. Iran at its peak was exporting about 2.5 million barrels a day, and the embargo eventually cut that to about 1 to 1.5 million barrels a day. “The world can lose a million barrels a day from Iran, and it’s not especially painful,” Molchanov added. “But if it lost 9 million barrels a day from Russia, there is no supply elsewhere that could fully compensate for that loss immediately. If Russian exports went to zero tomorrow, there would be a global oil crisis.” One argument in favor of imposing economic sanctions on Russia is the theory that Putin has made a bargain with the Russian people (similar to the implicit bargain made by China’s Communist Party): The Russian people give him power, and he will give them better living standards. But Russian living standards weren’t that great before the Ukraine crisis. Moreover, many Russia experts think that is the wrong way to look at Russia. Gaddy says that Russians want a better standard of living, but not if it means they aren’t treated as a great power. He said that given a choice of being Sweden or Russia, most Russians would sacrifice Sweden’s comforts and choose Russia for its great-power status. Mark Medish, a National Security Council adviser on Russia and Ukraine under President Bill Clinton, believes Putin’s behavior has been reckless, but he also doubts the effectiveness of economic sanctions. “Sanctions may cause economic inconvenience and reputational pain for the targets, and imposing sanctions may also make us feel correct, that we have done the right thing,” he said. But he warned that “the stated objective of sanctions is to get Russia to change its behavior, and this is unlikely to work. Sanctions are more likely to galvanize the will of the other side.” He added that “great powers, especially nuclear superpowers, do not allow themselves to be extorted.”Sanctions have not altered Russia’s foreign policyAssociated Press International, April 1, 2015 American farmer among the winners in sanctions-hit Russia, DOA: 11-27-15U.S. and EU sanctions were meant to force Russia to back down in the Ukraine crisis - first over Crimea, then over its support for separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine.That has not happened."The sanctions did not produce a change in Putin's foreign policy," said Brookings Institute fellow Lilia Shevtsova, although she added that the threat of further sanctions may have prevented open Russian military intervention in Ukraine.Sanctions have not reduced Russian aggressionHoward Lafranchi, The Christian Science Monitor January 30, 2015, West eyes new Russian sanctions amid renewed fighting in eastern Ukraine, Sanctions don’t threaten Russia, DOA: 11-27-15As fighting once again rages in eastern Ukraine between government forces and Russian-backed separatists, charges and counter-charges between the principal geopolitical backers on each side are spiraling to new heights.Yet even as the United States and European Union prepare another round of sanctions on Russia, and Russia warns of "catastrophe" if the West pursues its support of what it considers to be the aggressor government in Kiev, there are no signs of either side heeding the dire warnings of the other.After President Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed in a phone conversation earlier this week on the need to "hold Russia accountable" for stoking a return to violence in eastern Ukraine, the European Union (EU) moved Thursday to expand the list of mostly Russian individuals hit with sanctions over Ukraine. EU foreign ministers also moved to prepare "further action" to pressure the sides to halt the fighting, signaling that EU leaders could adopt new sanctions against Russia when they hold a summit Feb. 12.Such action could be the moment for the US to proceed with the additional sanctions it has been threatening against Russia, since the two Western powers have moved in tandem at each step of the gradual ratcheting-up of Western sanctions targeting Russia. This week Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said the US is ready to turn the sanctions screw if Mr. Obama issues the order. The ratcheting up of tensions occurred as the State Department announced Friday that Secretary of State John Kerry would visit the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, next week to "highlight the United States' steadfast support for Ukraine and its people."Even Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledges the impact Western sanctions are having on Russia's increasingly fragile economy. On Friday, the Russian Central Bank unexpectedly cut the interest rate, shocking markets and potentially causing more volatility for the ruble. But there are no signs the sanctions are succeeding with the intended objective of altering Russia's support for the separatists.If anything, Mr. Putin is lionizing the separatists before the Russian public as a kind of defensive wall holding back a NATO reach into Russia's historical sphere of political and economic influence.Reports from the conflict zone indicate the separatists are fighting with fresh supplies of heavy weaponry that could have only come from across the border in Russia.Russia has a very different perspective on the conflict, however, labeling the Ukrainian forces fighting in the east as the aggressor.Sanctions Threaten Western InterestsSanctions threaten Western interestsEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15It is true that the sanctions have allowed the Obama administration to claim that it is doing something about Russian aggression. From the White House’s perspective, that might be an acceptable rationale for the policy, so long as there were no downsides. In fact, however, the sanctions carry major economic and political costs for the United States and its European allies.The brunt is being borne by Europe, where the European Commission has estimated that the sanctions cut growth by 0.3 percent of GDP in 2015. According to the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, continuing the sanctions on Russia could cost over 90 billion euros in export revenue and more than two million jobs over the next few years. The sanctions are proving especially painful for countries with strong trade ties to Russia. Germany, Russia’s largest European partner, stands to lose almost 400,000 jobs. Meanwhile, a number of European banks, including Société Générale in France and Raiffeisen Zentralbank in Austria, have made large loans to Russian companies, raising the worrying possibility that the banks may become unstable, or even require bailouts if the borrowers default.In the United States, banks are taking much of the impact. U.S. financial institutions have been required by law to freeze and manage tens of millions of dollars in assets of sanctioned individuals. As a result, the banks have had to hire additional legal and technical staff to not only monitor their own accounts but also review any financing arrangements with Russian entities. Failure to comply with the sanctions can be extremely costly: just one error, such as processing a single payment from an interdicted individual, can carry a penalty of up to $250,000, and the penalties can quickly multiply. In 2010, the Dutch bank ABN AMRO was fined $500 million for violating U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Sudan.U.S. energy companies, for their part, have had to abandon various joint ventures in Russia, losing access to billions of dollars of investments. Thanks to prohibitions on the provision of technology and services to Russian companies, Western firms have been kept out of unconventional drilling projects in the Arctic and elsewhere. ExxonMobil, for example, has been forced to withdraw from all ten of its joint ventures with Rosneft, including a $3.2 billion project in the Kara Sea. Because that project was in its early stages, the cancellation will not cost ExxonMobil in immediate profits. But it will cut access to upstream development projects inside Russia, putting the company’s future profits and stock valuation at risk and raising the possibility that the money already invested will be permanently lost.A similar dynamic may harm European energy security, too. Because the sanctions prohibit Western companies from financing Russia’s largest energy firms, the Russian companies have cut back on upstream exploration and development. In this, the sanctions may achieve their intended goal of reducing state revenue, but that will come as a result of shortfalls in supply. The energy consultancy IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates has predicted that if the sanctions persist, Russian oil production could decrease from 10.5 million barrels per day now to 7.6 million barrels per day by 2025—bad news for European states, which receive one-third of their oil from Russia. They are even more dependent on Russian gas, which, since it relies more on fixed pipelines, is harder to replace.Sanctions have caused Russia to create its own economic institutions, undermining US economic powerEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15The sanctions have also encouraged Russia to create its own financial institutions, which, in the long run, will chip away at the United States’ economic influence. After U.S. senators and some European governments suggested that the United States might cut off Russia’s access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) payment system, the Russian Central Bank announced that it was going to start negotiations with the other BRICS states—Brazil, India, China, and South Africa—to create an alternative. To lessen its dependence on Visa and MasterCard, Russia has made moves toward setting up its own credit-card clearing-house. And it has moved ahead with the proposed BRICS development bank, which is designed to replicate the functions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.Economic Downturn Won’t Produce a Behavior ChangeEconomic downturn won’t force Russia to change its behaviorEconomist Newswire, December 19, 2014 EU politics: New Crimea sanctions leave EU-Russia position unchanged, DOA: 11-29-15The divergence between the two positions partly reflects different 'stick or carrot' assumptions about the most effective way of encouraging Russian compliance with Western demands and its commitments under the Minsk agreement. Although a full-blown financial crisis in Russia might alter the call, we do not currently expect Russia to shift fundamentally its position on eastern Ukraine, despite its worsening economic outlook: rather than abandoning the region's pro-Russian rebels and implementing the Minsk agreement, we continue to expect Russia to try to win relief from EU sanctions in July 2015 by maintaining the conflict in eastern Ukraine at a low intensity, relying-correctly, in our view-on the EU's divisions, and the scope for ambiguity in the bloc's conditions for sanctions relief.Russian Economic Downturn Triggers AggressionEconomic decline is the largest internal link to Russian aggression. Peters 8 (Ralph, Retired United States Army Lieutenant Colonel and Degree in International Relations from St. Mary’s University, Bankrupt Rogues: Beware Failing Foes, NY Post, November 29th, )FEELING gleeful at the misfortunes of others is an ugly-but-common human characteristic. The world delighted in our crashing economy, then we got our own back as Euro-bankers and Russian billionaires proved at least as greedy as our own money-thugs. Of all the pleasures to be found in the pain of others, though, none seems more justified than smugness over the panic in Moscow, Caracas and Tehran as oil prices plummet. We may need to be careful what we wish for. Successful states may generate trouble, but failures produce catastrophes: Nazi Germany erupted from the bankrupt Weimar Republic; Soviet Communism's economic disasters swelled the Gulag; a feckless state with unpaid armies enabled Mao's rise. Economic competition killed a million Tutsis in Rwanda. The deadliest conflict of our time, the multi-sided civil war in Congo, exploded into the power vacuum left by a bankrupt government. A resource-starved Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The crucial point: The more a state has to lose, the less likely it is to risk losing it. "Dizzy with success," Russia's Vladimir Putin may have dismembered Georgia, but Russian tanks stopped short of Tbilisi as he calculated exactly how much he could get away with. But now, while our retirement plans have suffered a setback, Russia's stock market has crashed to a fifth of its value last May. Foreign investment has begun to shun Russia as though the ship of state has plague aboard. The murk of Russia's economy is ultimately impenetrable, but analysts take Moscow's word that it entered this crisis with over $500 billion in foreign-exchange reserves. At least $200 billion of that is now gone, while Russian markets still hemorrhage. And the price of oil - Russia's lifeblood - has fallen by nearly two-thirds. If oil climbs to $70 a barrel, the Russian economy may eke by. But the Kremlin can kiss off its military-modernization plans. Urgent infrastructure upgrades won't happen, either. And the population trapped outside the few garish city centers will continue to live lives that are nasty, brutish and short - on a good day. Should oil prices and shares keep tumbling, Russia will slip into polni bardak mode - politely translated as "resembling a dockside brothel on the skids." And that assumes that other aspects of the economy hold up - a fragile hope, given Russia's overleveraged concentration of wealth, fudged numbers and state lawlessness. Should we rejoice if the ruble continues to drop? Perhaps. But what incentive would Czar Vladimir have to halt his tanks short of Kiev, if his economy were a basket case shunned by the rest of the world? Leaders with failures in their laps like the distraction wars provide. (If religion is the opium of the people, nationalism is their methamphetamine.) The least we might expect would be an increased willingness on Moscow's part to sell advanced weapons to fellow rogue regimes. Of course, those rogues would need money to pay for the weapons (or for nuclear secrets sold by grasping officials). A positive side of the global downturn is that mischief-makers such as Iran and Venezuela are going to have a great deal less money with which to annoy civilization.Economic weakness will cause Russia to engage in local diversionary warsSmith ’11 – Director of the Potomac Institute Cyber Center(David J., former Ambassador and Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute, “Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin:? The Once and Future Czar”, Georgian Security Analysis Center, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 10/3/2011, )How Putin—with his man, Medvedev—manages the Russian economy will be a major determinant in the ? success or failure of his second presidency.? The other—and not unrelated—challenge is growing unrest in the North Caucasus. If the Second Chechen ? War of 1999-2000 consolidated Putin?s power in Russia, what effect will a third, broader North Caucasus ? war have? And recall that any analysis of this question must take into account the looming 2014 Winter ? Olympics in nearby Sochi.? The danger for Russia?s neighbors is that if the Russian economy sours, Putin could follow the time-honored ? Russian tradition of lashing out at imagined enemies such as Georgia or the Baltic countries. And a conflict ? in the North Caucasus could easily spill—accidentally or purposefully—into Georgia.? Nor should the west discount the possibility of diversionary Russian obstreperousness in the Middle East or? polemics with NATO. Moscow is skillfully setting the stage for either.? Regrettably, aggression will likely be Putin?s default instinctRussian econ decline outweighs – Econ decline causes political upheaval which causes loose nukes and preemptionAnd- It’s most likely scenario for nuclear war and causes US draw inSteven David, Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, “Saving America From the Coming Civil Wars,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS, v 78 n 1, Jan/Feb 1999, LN.Only three countries, in fact, meet both criteria: Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Civil conflict in Mexico would produce waves of disorder that would spill into the United States, endangering the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans, destroying a valuable export market, and sending a torrent of refugees northward. A rebellion in Saudi Arabia could destroy its ability to export oil, the oil on which the industrialized world depends. And internal war in Russia could devastate Europe and trigger the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, civil war in a cluster of other states could seriously harm American interests. These countries include Indonesia, Venezuela, the Philippines, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and China. In none, however, are the stakes as high or the threat of war as imminent.Russian instability leads to nuclear conflictSchorr, NPR Senior News Analyst, 4[Daniel, an American journalist who covered world news for more than 60 years. He was most recently a Senior News Analyst for National Public Radio (NPR). Schorr won three Emmy Awards for his television journalism, September 10, The Christian Science Monitor, “Loose nukes, Russian instability,” , accessed July 12, 2014, EK]WASHINGTON — One thing that hasn't changed much in Russia since Soviet days is the tendency of high officials to cover up when disaster strikes.So it was with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. So it was with President Vladimir Putin and the loss of the submarine Kursk in 2000. So it was in the first days after the schoolhouse massacre in southern Russia.While Russian television was told to go easy on the grim footage from Beslan, officials were understating the death toll and overstating the effectiveness of the special forces deployed to end the confrontation.When President Putin finally came out of his shell on Saturday to deal with rapidly growing popular anger, he went on television to say, "This crime of the terrorists, inhuman, unprecedented in terms of its cruelty" represents the "direct intervention of international terrorism against Russia."He did not acknowledge that the hostage-takers had demanded an end to the war in Chechnya. It was clearly in Putin's interest to represent the assault as connected with international terrorism rather than a homegrown liberation movement.With his regime as close to destabilization as it has been in his five years in office, Putin was reaching out to the West, and especially the United States, for support in his crisis. In his television speech, Putin alluded to fears abroad of a Russian nuclear threat that "must be removed."The US has reason to worry about an unstable Russia. According to Harvard professor Graham Allison in a new book, "Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe," 90 percent of all fissile material outside the US is stored in the former Soviet Union. And, because of its huge supplies, its shaky safeguards, and its extensive corruption, Russia poses the greatest threat of loose nukes.The Nunn-Lugar program designed to help finance the removal of Russian nuclear weapons has not been faring well under the Bush administration. But Bush officials might want to have another look at the danger of Russia's loose nukes in an unstable country.Russian econ collapse causes extinctionFilger 9 (Sheldon, Columnist and Founder – Global , “Russian Economy Faces Disasterous Free Fall Contraction”, HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" )In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.Collapse leads to global nuclear war, spills over, and leads to loose nukes – comparatively the largest impactDavid 99 Steven R., professor of political science @ the john Hopkins U, Foreign Affairs, January/February, LNAT NO TIME since the civil war of 1918 -- 20 has Russia been closer to bloody conflict than it is today. The fledgling government confronts a vast array of problems without the power to take effective action. For 70 years, the Soviet Union operated a strong state apparatus, anchored by the KGB and the Communist Party. Now its disintegration has created a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. Unable to rely on popular ideology or coercion to establish control, the government must prove itself to the people and establish its authority on the basis of its performance. But the Yeltsin administration has abjectly failed to do so, and it cannot meet the most basic needs of the Russian people. Russians know they can no longer look to the state for personal security, law enforcement, education, sanitation, health care, or even electrical power. In the place of government authority, criminal groups -- the Russian Mafia -- increasingly hold sway. Expectations raised by the collapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed, and Moscow's inability to govern coherently raises the specter of civil unrest. If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war. Secession leads to loose nukes – chechens will use them against moscowAllison 4Graham, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, September/October. “Nuclear Terrorism: How Serious a Threat to Russia?” Russia in Global Affairs, careful reader of the discussion in the Russian and American national security community could conclude that Americans are more concerned about the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack than are Russians. Specifically, American experts have described more vividly potential nuclear terrorist attacks on U.S. soil than have Russians, at least in the writings and conversations that are publicly accessible. Why this is the case is a puzzle. No one doubts that in Chechen fighters Russia faces serious, capable, determined adversaries. Moreover, if Chechnya succeeded in capturing, stealing, or buying a nuclear weapon (or material from which they could make a nuclear weapon), their first target would surely be Moscow, not New York or Washington DC.Leads to global access to nuclear weapons – will undoubtedly be used on russiaAllison 5Graham, The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Google BookChechen separatists have a long-standing interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and material to use in their campaign against Russia. Aside from the submarine plot, Chechen militants made off with radioactive materials from a Grozny nuclear waste plant in January 2000; stole radioactive metals- possibly including some plutonium- from the Volgodonskaya nuclear power station in the southern region of Rostov between July 2001 and July 2002; and cased the railway system and special trains designed for shipping nuclear weapons across Russia. Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist organizations are among their largest sources of financial support. While the Chechens’ target of choice for their first nuclear terrorist attack will surely be Moscow, that fact provides little comfort for Americas. If the Chechens are successful in acquiring several nuclear bombs, their Al Qaeda brethren could well find themselves the means to match their motivation. Nuclear terrorism on Russia means extinction—Russia has a “dead hand” device that will set off in response to a nuclear attack—this isn’t a myth and the most qualified expert in the field says it existsRosenbaum 7Ron Rosenbaum, award winning journalist and author, 8/31/2007. “The Return of the Doomsday Machine?” Slate, "The nuclear doomsday machine." It's a Cold War term that has long seemed obsolete. And even back then, the "doomsday machine" was regarded as a scary conjectural fiction. Not impossible to create—the physics and mechanics of it were first spelled out by U.S. nuclear scientist Leo Szilard—but never actually created, having a real existence only in such apocalyptic nightmares as Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove. In Strangelove, the doomsday machine was a Soviet system that automatically detonated some 50 cobalt-jacketed hydrogen bombs pre-positioned around the planet if the doomsday system's sensors detected a nuclear attack on Russian soil. Thus, even an accidental or (as in Strangelove) an unauthorized U.S. nuclear bomb could set off the doomsday machine bombs, releasing enough deadly cobalt fallout to make the Earth uninhabitable for the human species for 93 years. No human hand could stop the fully automated apocalypse. An extreme fantasy, yes. But according to a new book called Doomsday Men and several papers on the subject by U.S. analysts, it may not have been merely a fantasy. According to these accounts, the Soviets built and activated a variation of a doomsday machine in the mid-'80s. And there is no evidence Putin's Russia has deactivated the system. Instead, something was reactivated in Russia last week. I'm referring to the ominous announcement—given insufficient attention by most U.S. media (the Economist made it the opening of a lead editorial on Putin's Russia)—by Vladimir Putin that Russia has resumed regular "strategic flights" of nuclear bombers. (They may or may not be carrying nuclear bombs, but you can practically hear Putin's smirking tone as he says, "Our [nuclear bomber] pilots have been grounded for too long. They are happy to start a new life.") These twin developments raise a troubling question: What are the United States' and Russia's current nuclear policies with regard to how and when they will respond to a perceived nuclear attack? In most accounts, once the president or Russian premier receives radar warning of an attack, they have less than 15 minutes to decide whether the warning is valid. The pressure is on to "use it or lose it"—launch our missiles before they can be destroyed in their silos. Pressure that makes the wrong decision more likely. Pressure that makes accidental nuclear war a real possibility. Once you start to poke into this matter, you discover a disturbing level of uncertainty, which leads me to believe we should be demanding that the United States and Russia define and defend their nuclear postures. Bush and Putin should be compelled to tell us just what "failsafe" provisions are installed on their respective nuclear bombers, missiles, and submarines—what the current provisions against warning malfunctions are and what kinds of controls there are over the ability of lone madman nuclear bombers to bring on the unhappy end of history. As for the former Soviet Union, the possible existence of a version of a doomsday machine is both relevant and disturbing. In the Strangelove film, the Soviet ambassador tells the president and generals in the U.S. war room that the device was designed to deter a surprise attack, the kind of attack that might otherwise prevent retaliation by "decapitating" the Soviet command structure. The automated system would insure massive world-destroying retaliation even if the entire Soviet leadership were wiped out—or had second thoughts. As a result, some referred to it as the "dead hand" doomsday device. It is Dr. Strangelove himself, the madman U.S. nuclear strategist played by Peter Sellers, who detects the flaw in this plan. After being apprised of the system's existence by the Soviet ambassador, and the likelihood of its being triggered by a U.S. bomber on an unauthorized mission to nuke its Soviet target, Dr. Strangelove exclaims: Yes, but the ... whole point of the doomsday machine ... is lost ... if you keep it a secret! Why didn't you tell the world, eh? In other words, a doomsday machine kept secret is no good for deterrence, only for retaliation by extinction. Did the Soviets actually design a variation on a doomsday device and not tell us about it? And could an accidental or terrorist nuclear attack on Putin's Russia (by Chechens, for instance) trigger an antiquated automated dead-hand system and launch missiles capable of killing tens, maybe hundreds, of millions at unknown targets that might include the United States? Up until Aug. 10 of this year, I would have thought these questions were best consigned to the realm of apocalyptic film fantasy. But on that day I came upon a startling essay in the London Times Literary Supplement. It was a review (titled "Deadly Devices") of a book recently published in the United Kingdom: Doomsday Men: The Real Dr. Strangelove and the Dream of the Superweapon by nuclear-age historian P.D. Smith of University College London. (It will be out in the United States in December.) The TLS reviewer, Christopher Coker (who is on the faculty of the London School of Economics), asserted that the book demonstrates that "only after the Berlin Wall had been breached and ... the Cold War began to thaw did military analysts realize the Russians had actually built a version of the [doomsday] device. The details of this top-secret Soviet system were first revealed in 1993 by Bruce G. Blair, a former American ICBM launch control officer, now one of the country's foremost experts on Russian arms. Fearing that a sneak attack by American submarine-launched missiles might take Moscow out in 13 minutes, the Soviet leadership had authorized the construction of an automated communication network, reinforced to withstand a nuclear strike. At its heart was a computer system similar to the one in Dr. Strangelove. Its code name was Perimetr. It went fully operational in January 1985. It is still in place." Even if chechens won’t use nukes, russians will Pandita 1 Dr. K.N., obtained his M.A. in Persian from the Panjab U and Ph.D. in Iranian from Teheran U, He served as a long time as professor in the Persian Department and the Centre of Central Asian Studies @ the Jammu and Kashmir U, decision of the Taliban came on the heels of a significant development in Moscow. Only two days ago, Moscow announced that Russian Federation had formulated a new security doctrine that was an improvement on the one announced in 1996. The Acting President, Vladimir Putin approved the 21-page doctrine. Among other things, it says that Russia would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if the insurgents and other destabilizing forces out to work towards disintegration of Russia, threatened its integrity and sovereignty. Some political analysts think that this step has been taken in the background of intensified fighting in Chechnya and the possibility of its escalation. But others think that for some time, Moscow has been uneasy with what it has called the steady encroachment of NATO in Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. As a matter of fact, Russian disapproval of NATO’s role began with the latter’s air attacks on Yugoslavia, once a strong East European ally of the erstwhile Soviet Union. That marked the determination of Russia not to allow the Western powers to sideline her in European and global strategies as a power and make her irrelevant. In another development, the 41-member European community is sending its delegation to Moscow to discuss Chechnyan situation. The British representative, John Russell, heading the delegation, has made no bones of what the delegation intends to convey to Moscow. He said that the European community might consider expulsion of Russia from its membership if it does not halt what it calls violation of human rights in Chechnya by the Russian troops. Nobody doubts the double standards employed by the European community and the US in regard to the violation of human rights. The imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq depriving millions of infants from milk and essential medicines are not considered violation of human rights by them. Likewise, the heavy bombardment of Yugoslavia destroying the vital infrastructure in that country and crippling civilian administration with disastrous consequences for the populace are not violation of human rights in their lexicon. Chechnyan affair is much more complicated than what may appear at the surface. If it were just a separatist movement, perhaps its resolution could be envisioned in terms of negotiations. But Chechnya is the hotbed of Islamic fundamentalist activities aimed at disintegration of Russian Federation by fanning religious frenzy among the local Muslim population. The Wahhabi ideology emanating from Saudi Arabia with strong and effective disseminating centres in Pakistan and Taliban Afghanistan, is entrenched in? Chechnyan Muslim segment. Apart from ideological subversion, the Chechyn fighting men are provided with an inventory of latest automatic and other lethal weapons forming part of the supplies made earlier by the Americans to the Afghan mujahideen during the war with Soviet Union. Now the Chechyn separatist cadres receive enormous arms, ammunition and funding directly from a number of Islamic organizations world over, and indirectly from some of the theocratic Islamic States with an agenda of boosting Wahhabi ideology in the Caucasus and Central Asian region. The role of Osama Bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi Islamic warlord responsible for the bomb attacks on two American embassies in Africa in August 1998 resulting in the killing of several hundred innocent people, cannot be overlooked. Osma is reported to be hiding in Afghanistan and is protected by the Taliban. Talks between Taliban and American authorities for the extradition of Osma have not yielded any result, The Taliban proudly say that Afghans don’t betray a guest. But there is something more than that in the story. There are rumours that the 15-year old daughter of Osama Bin Laden is married to Mull Omar, the Taliban chief. Though some Taliban official sources have tried to contradict this rumour, yet it is getting rounds again. As such, extradition of Osama, as demanded by the Americans, may never materialize. This must have been one of the factors that made the Taliban decide to grant recognition to Chechyn Republic. The Afghan fighting force - Taliban - have, evidently, become the strong muscle for propagation and dissemination of Wahhabi ideology. This means that the Taliban and their cohorts among known extremist organizations would be taking on Russia even if the Chechyn crisis is somehow resoloved. This is the agenda of these organizations. Significantly, the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami chief has recently pronounced that they would not allow Pakistan’s military regime to sign CTBT under the US pressure because the nuclear bomb produced by Pakistan belonged not only to Pakistan but also to the entire Muslim ummah. In other words, it means that in the context of Chechyn crisis, it is not only the separatists, but the entire Islamic ummah that is pitted against the Russians. Pakistan (its extremist religious organizations or the regimes) would undoubtedly give a befitting response to Russia if the latter decides to use nuclear weapons in Chechyn war. Do we have the real nucler flash point in Kashmir or in the Caucasus?Sanctions Increase Putin’s Political PowerSanctions enable Putin to consolidate his powerEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15But it is in the realm of Russian politics that the sanctions have been most counterproductive. The sanctions have had a “rally round the flag” effect as the Russian people blame their ills on the West. According to the Levada Center, a Russian research organization, HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Putin’s approval rating increased from 63 percent during the invasion of Crimea to 88 percent by October 2015. In another poll, more than two-thirds of respondents said they thought the primary goal of the sanctions was to weaken and humiliate Russia. State propaganda is of course playing a role, but the sanctions have made it easier for Putin to sell his anti-Western narrative. They allow him to deflect blame away from his own economic mismanagement and toward what he has called “external factors.”The sanctions are also having the perverse effect of enabling Putin to further consolidate his power, because he has rewarded his closest cronies at the expense of other elites. According to data from Forbes’ list of billionaires, Russia’s 15 richest citizens lost an average of 20 percent of their wealth in 2014, before regaining 12 percent in the next six months as the market stabilized. These fluctuations track the broader Russian economy, but after one breaks down the data, some telling disparities emerge. On average, those billionaires who held stakes in sanctioned companies lost less than three percent of their wealth between January 2014 and June 2015, whereas those who did not lost nine percent. It requires no great leap of logic to see that the Kremlin has shielded those with connections to the ruling circle from the pain of the sanctions, thereby shifting the burden to those without such ties.More Pressure Won’t Change Russia’s BehaviorRussia has already absorbed the impact of the sanctionsRussia & CIS General Newswire November 10, 2015 Russia not planning to retaliate if EU sanctions extended Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev does not see any sense in taking any additional retaliatory action in the event EU sanctions against Russia are extended. "Why do we need retaliatory measures? This is the status quo. The longer the sanctions regime is in place, the less effect it will have. As a matter of fact, the adaptation to it in the economy is a done deal. Therefore, there will be no retaliatory measures," Ulyukayev told journalists in Beijing on Tuesday, when asked how Russia would respond to an extension of sanctions. On Monday, the German newspaper Handelsblatt reported that the leaders of the EU countries planned to extend sanctions against Russia for another six months at their summit in December. The sanctions will only be eased in the event the Minsk Agreements are upheld and after international observers have been deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border, Handelsblatt reported, citing unnamed German government and EU officials.Energy Sanctions UselessRussia would have reduced energy production anyhow due to falling oil pricesShawn Neylan, Mondaq Business Briefing, January 8, 2015 Canada: Canada Expands Russia Sanctions, ? DOA: 10-25-15The intent behind the Expanded Russia Sanctions is apparently to apply more pressure to Russia in relation to its activities in the Ukraine by limiting its ability to explore for future resources and to maintain production. The effect on overall Russian production is not likely to be immediate. Further, in light of the current collapse of global oil prices, it could well be that Russian oil companies would have been reducing exploration activities in any event, much as oil producers around the world are already doing. Sanctions Only Hurt the PoorSanctions hurt the poor, not wealthy Russian individualsAssociated Press International, April 1, 2015 American farmer among the winners in sanctions-hit Russia, DOA: 11-27-15Sanctions aimed at individuals failed to change Kremlin behavior and the broader economic punishment introduced later is mostly hurting ordinary people this year, according to Evgeny Gontmakher, an economics professor and former deputy minister of social affairs. Government estimates say inflation could hit 12 percent this year, hurting workers whose jobs are already under pressure. "If the sanctions continue, they mostly hit the ordinary population, not the elite," he said. "Inflation is a tax on the poor, most of all." He said the oligarchs have not yet become restive. "Among the business elite, there's a certain discontent, because the channels for economic cooperation with the West are blocked now, that's clear. But there's absolutely no sign yet of any open discontent or pressure on the president."Sanctions Undermine Russia-US RelationsSanctions undermine relations with RussiaAgence France Presse, December 19, New US sanctions law could undermine relations with Russia: Lavrov, DOA: 11-27-15New US legislation authorising sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine crisis could undermine relations between Moscow and Washington for a long time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was quoted as saying on Friday. In a phone call with US Secretary of State John Kerry, Lavrov said that the new legislation "threatening new sanctions against Russia could undermine the possibility of normal cooperation between our countries for a long time," said a foreign ministry statement. President Barack Obama on Thursday signed a law giving him the authority to impose new sanctions on Russia over Ukraine. He said he was not about to change the sanctions regime on Russia, which is experiencing a dire economic crisis, but that his administration would "continue to review and calibrate our sanctions to respond to Russia's actions." The United States is calling for Russia to pull out of Crimea, Ukraine's Black Sea peninsula that it annexed in March, and to stop aiding pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. Russia says it has the historic right to Crimea and that its troops are not in eastern Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin at his end-of-year news conference on Thursday made it clear he was not willing to compromise on Russia's position on Ukraine.Sanctions on Russia have triggered countermeasures and wrecked US-Russian relationsRussia Today, December 22, 2015, Moscow to Consider Countermeasures after US extends anti-Russia sanctions, DOA: 12-23-2015Moscow says it will consider countermeasures after the US announced an updated sanctions list targeting 34 individuals and entities in order to “pressure Russia” over the Ukraine crisis. "Today's steps support the US commitment to seek a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in Ukraine by maintaining our sanctions on Russia," the US Treasury Department said in a statement?on Tuesday. The Kremlin, in turn, said it will analyze Washington’s decision and may develop countermeasures. The sanctions imposed on Tuesday are “a continuation of this unfriendly stance towards Russia, a continuation of the stance which has a devastating impact on bilateral relations,” said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov. "Certainly, based on the reciprocity principle, the Russian side will initially review these decisions taken [by the US] and then pool proposals on possible countermeasures," Peskov said. He expressed regret that “despite common sense” and the “need to develop cooperation,” Washington is following a policy “contrary to [current] demands.” The Russian Foreign Ministry said that Washington’s attempts to manipulate Russia via sanctions are ineffective. “This is like shooting yourself in the foot in terms of currents state of Russian-American relations, which were stalled by Washington,” Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said. "Being aware that all their attempts to influence us through sanctions are doomed to failure, colleagues from Washington nevertheless stick to their delusions,” he said. Moscow will respond with appropriate measures, he added.Relations can’t improve while the sanctions are in placeENCA World, December 10, 2015, US Sanctions Drive Hurting Relations: Russia, DOA: 12-24-15ROME – Russia wants to mend ties with the US but cannot do so while Barack Obama's administration backs economic sanctions against Moscow for its role in the conflict in Ukraine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was quoted on Thursday as saying.The US and EU imposed sanctions after Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimea peninsula last year. They also accuse Moscow of supporting a separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine in which more than 9,000 people have been killed."As long as Obama's deputy Joe Biden goes around Europe recommending continued sanctions against us without taking into account how Kiev is behaving under Western pressure, we will not be able to reach any understanding," Lavrov told Thursday's edition of the Italian newspaper La Repubblica in an interview.Lavrov and Russian President Vladimir Putin are due to meet US Secretary of State John Kerry next week to discuss the HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" conflicts in Ukraine and in Syria.Russia, the US and UN will meet in Geneva on Friday to hold talks on Syria's nearly five-year civil war and the Islamic State insurgency there. HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Russia began bombing rebel targets in Syria in late September in support of its ally President Bashar al-Assad.Lavrov told La Repubblica that combined HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Russian, US and Arab forces currently in Syria were enough to defeat Islamic State militants, but a coalition was not possible without agreement on the future of Assad.The US and its Sunni Muslim Arab allies say Assad must step down."If the partners in the potential coalition keep asking for a set date for Assad to leave the scene, we will reply that this is against the law and against democracy," Lavrov said.Lavrov said he did not know where Islamic State leader HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was but that he had information about the militant group's cells infiltrating the military in Libya.He said a Western decision to remove veteran Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had been an error and that Russia supported a UN plan to return Libya to stability "even though it is risky".A December 13 meeting in Rome to promote a deal in Libya is important but will not resolve the whole problem, Lavrov added.?Undermining Russia-US Relations Increases the Threat from RussiaUS-Russian relations key to prevent Iran proliferation, nuclear war, nuclear terrorismAllison, Former Secretary of Defense, and Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 11[Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School and a former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, Robert D., is Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and served as U.S. ambassador to India and as deputy national security adviser for strategic planning in the Bush administration. They are co-chairmen of the Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests, co-sponsored by the Belfer Center and the Center for the National Interest, October 30, PoliticoPro, “10 reasons why Russia still matters,” , accessed July 7, 2014, EK]That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies.No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow.First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war.Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose.Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success.Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries.Lack of cooperation between US-Russia leads to an arms raceWittner, SUNY History Professor, 7/6/14[Lawrence S., A former president of the Council on Peace Research in History (now the Peace History Society), an affiliate of the American Historical Association, Professor Wittner also chaired the Peace History Commission of the International Peace Research Association.He has received major fellowships or grants from the American Council of Learned Societies, the Aspen Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the United States Institute of Peace., George Mason History News Network, “Do We Really Want a New Generation of Nuclear-Armed Submarines?,” , accessed July 6, 2014, EK]In arguing for the new Trident submarine fleet, U.S. military leaders have pointed to the fact that other nations are maintaining or building nuclear-armed submarines. And they are correct about that. France and Britain are maintaining their current fleets, although Britain is on the verge of beginning the construction of a new one with U.S. assistance; Israel reportedly possesses one; China is apparently ready to launch one in 2014; India is set to launch its own in 2015; and Pakistan might be working to develop one. Meanwhile, Russia is modernizing its own submarine ballistic missile fleet.Even so, the current U.S. nuclear-armed submarine fleet is considerably larger than any developed or being developed by other nations. Also, the U.S. government’s new Trident fleet, now on the drawing boards, is slated to be 50 percent larger than the new, modernized Russian fleet and, in addition, far superior technologically. Indeed, other nations currently turning out nuclear-armed submarines – like China and Russia -- are reportedly launching clunkers.In this context, there is an obvious alternative to the current race to deploy the world’s deadliest weapons in the ocean depths. The nuclear powers could halt their building of nuclear-armed submarines and eliminate their present nuclear-armed submarine fleets. This action would not only honor their professed commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world, but would save their nations from making enormous expenditures and from the possibility of experiencing a catastrophe of unparalleled magnitude.Sanctions Russia-China AxisSanctions fail to change leaders behavior and drive Russia into an alliance with ChinaStates News Service, December 3, 2014, Barry Bosworth on the Effect of Sanctions on Russia’s Economic Slide, DOA: 11-27-15The following information was released by the Brookings Institution:Russian officials are saying that falling energy prices will push their nation's economy into recession in 2015. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who earlier this week canceled a new natural gas pipeline to Europe, is expected to unveil his economic agenda later this week. These developments occur in the context of continued Western sanctions against some areas of the Russian economy. Brookings Senior Fellow Barry Bosworth, the Robert V. Roosa Chair in International Economics, gave the following comment to ABC about the effects of the sanctions on Russia, Europe, and the U.S.:The sanctions have no economic effect on the United States because we do not trade with Russia to any significant degree. Thus, they are a painless, feel-good action for the United States. They are, however, a bigger issue for Europe because of extensive trade relationshipsenergy, agriculture, and a wide range of consumer goods that Europe exports to Russia. Plus, a lot of [Russian] oligarchs have residences and money in Europe. It is more disruptive for Europe. Still, Germany has been very tough on Russia because of the invasion of Ukraine.The sanctions do have a big impact on Russia, largely through its financial system. The United States exercises a great deal of control over international finance, and has disrupted Russian bank finances. Plus, foreign direct investment from Europe is very important to Russia, both because of the money and the technical know how.The sanctions do have a negative effect, but the bigger short-run impact is from the collapse of oil prices. The energy price declines are more important than the sanctions for the immediate future, but the long-run costs of both to Russia are considerable.I think sanctions have a significant economic impact, but they seldom if ever lead political leaders to change course. In that sense, they do not work, and their economic impact is gradually eroded as countries find ways around them. For example, the sanctions are a big plus for China, which will be an energy market of greater interest to Russia going forward. That, bilateral relationship makes a lot of sense for everyone.Sanctions strengthen Russia-Asia tiesRIA Novosti, April 15, 2015 , Anti-Russia Sanctions Unjust, Should Be Eliminated - US Investor Rogers, DOA: 11-27-15Anti-Russia sanctions over Moscow's alleged involvement in the Ukraine conflict should be removed because they are unfair, legendary US investor Jim Rogers told Sputnik. "The sanctions are unjust and an injustice," Rogers said in an interview. "Russia should not have been affected by sanctions at all because it was America that started that coup and then turned around and blamed it on Russia."He added that economic sanctions currently in place against Russia hurt common people more than the government.The veteran US investor stressed that US companies are not as affected as European firms, because the United States is not as economically tied to Russia as is Europe.The investor said that anti-Russia sanctions will lead to closer ties between Moscow and Asian countries."It is forcing Russia and Asia closer and closer together, which is going to hurt America and Europe in the long term. It is going to be good for Russia and for Asia," Rogers concluded.Jim Rogers is a prominent investor and international financial commentator. In the 1970s he founded the Quantum Fund with billionaire George Soros. Currently based in Singapore, he is the chairman of Rogers Holdings and Beeland Interests, Inc.Sanctions drive Russia to cooperate with Brazil, India, China, and South AfricaRIA Novosti, July 10, 2015 BRICS Countries Not to Impose Sanctions Against Russia - Chinese Official, DOA: 11-27-15UFA, July 10 (Sputnik) - BRICS member states will not join unilateral Western sanctions imposed against Russia, the director general at the Department of International Economic Cooperation of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Friday. "Unilateral sanctions imposed against Russia do not apply to other BRICS countries," Zhang Jun told journalists in Ufa when asked whether anti-Russian sanctions would hamper business and trade ties between Russia and China.He said that all of the leaders in BRICS had reached a consensus in regard to sanctions against Russia."The opposition to the unilateral sanctions is the consensus reached by the leaders of the BRICS countries in the Ufa Declaration and it represents their political stance," Zhang said.The West has imposed several rounds of sanctions against Russia since 2014 over Moscow's alleged participation in the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. Moscow has denied the accusations, calling the language of sanctions counterproductive.Following the deterioration of relations with the West, Moscow enhanced cooperation with Arab, Latin American and Asian countries, including with its BRICS partners - Brazil, India, China and South Africa.Sanctions Destroy the Economy, Triggering AggressionSanctions undermine Russia’s global economic integration and wreck its economy, triggering aggressionSamuel Charap & Bernard Sucher, March 6, 2015, The New York Times, Why Sanctions on Russia Will Backfire, Samuel Charap is senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.Bernard Sucher is a member of the board of UFG Asset Management. DOA: 11-20-15The American government tends to see sanctions against Russia as a low-cost policy that will eventually force Vladimir Putin to change course in Ukraine.But this conventional wisdom obscures significant costs. Just as using drones to target suspected terrorists in Pakistan may have created more converts to Islamic militancy than it has eliminated, sanctions advocates haven't reckoned with the unintended consequences of the policy -- consequences that could prove far more damaging to American interests than the Kremlin's aggression in Ukraine. First, by employing commercial and financial sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine, the United States -- the architect and largest beneficiary of the globalized system of trade and finance -- is exploiting post-Soviet Russia's integration into that system. Years of mutually beneficial progress that brought 140 million Russians into the orbit of global economic governance are now in doubt. Even if sanctions succeed in changing the Kremlin's behavior and are then lifted, the American objective of integrating Russia into the global economy has been fundamentally undermined. Second, the use of sanctions broadcasts to others the strategic hazard of integrating into the American-led global financial system. Whatever the outcome of Russia's intervention in Ukraine and whatever Mr. Putin's ultimate fate, other non-allies of the United States have now learned the lesson that hard-won institutional integration can be turned against those states that achieve it. Third, while there is no question that sanctions have inflicted real costs on the leading state-owned and state-affiliated companies and harmed Mr. Putin's cronies, the collateral damage to independent, private enterprise in Russia is incomparably worse. Businesses without political protection will see atrophied sales, no access to finance and an indefinite postponement of investment. Those enterprises that put the greatest store on Russia's integration with the European Union and the United States are being hit hardest. (One of us is an American investor and entrepreneur who has long been active in Russia and is witnessing this first-hand.) The most daring Westernizers among Russia's small entrepreneurial class now find themselves without protection while state banks and energy companies continue to be shielded by their access to government credit obtained on favorable terms. Fourth, by imposing sanctions on Russia when it was already falling into a downward economic spiral, Washington has given Mr. Putin a powerful political instrument to deflect blame for the consequences of his own baleful decisions in Ukraine. The Kremlin's model of ''state capitalism'' was already struggling and its performance would have been poor without the geopolitical upheaval that Mr. Putin has created. American sanctions arrived with perfect timing, providing him an alibi that he has skillfully used to confuse the Russian people about the cause of their economic woes. Fifth, even if sanctions are carefully crafted to punish specific actors, ordinary Russians perceive the West's sanctions to be directed against them and it is they who are being forced to bear the real costs of soaring inflation, the ruble's collapse and slowing growth. Russians' sense that they are under attack has generated an understandable ''rallying around the flag'' phenomenon. Mr. Putin's all-time-high approval ratings are one result; the other is the near-complete marginalization of dissenting voices. Sadly, Sunday's march to memorialize the slain opposition leader, Boris Nemtsov, will not change this. If Russia faces greater economic turbulence in the coming months and years, America could face far more intractable problems than those that exist today. Russia is likely to become more belligerent if externally inflicted economic blows deepen the country's crisis. Moreover, a deeper downturn in Russia would worsen the economic woes of the European Union, with potential knock-on effects globally. More sanctions undermine Russia’s economic integrationSamuel Charap & Bernard Sucher, March 6, 2015, The New York Times, Why Sanctions on Russia Will Backfire, Samuel Charap is senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.Bernard Sucher is a member of the board of UFG Asset Management. DOA: 11-20-15 The alternative would be open-ended sanctions that escalate conflict between Washington and Moscow while influencing Russia's economy and politics in ways that contradict American interests. Mr. Putin would gain greater control over the economy and rally the public around him, and Russia's evolution as a modern, globally integrated country would be halted. Recognizing these risks is not an endorsement of Russia's aggressive behavior. Just as opposing drone strikes doesn't imply support for terrorism, highlighting the strategic costs of sanctions is about crafting an effective policy, not appeasing Mr. Putin. It is worth recalling that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States faced a nightmare scenario of Russia in chaos. The government was bankrupt, and its ability to control its territory and large nuclear arsenal was threatened. At that time, Washington concluded that such a weak Russia would pose a grave threat to American national security. Why should that calculation be any different today?Sanctions Undermine Global Energy SecurityUndermining the Russian oil industry undermines oil production and global energy securityEnergy Monitor Worldwide, February 16, 2015, West bans on Iran, Russia endangering world energy: Rosneft, DOA: 11-27-15The head of Rosneft, the world's biggest publicly traded oil company, says the sanctions the West has imposed on Russia jeopardizes Europe's energy security and the world oil supplies. In recent months, Western states have imposed bans on Moscow's financial and energy sectors along with a number of Russian nationals close to President Vladimir Putin. "In the long term, sanctions against Russia endanger Europe's security of supply," Igor Sechin wrote in an article published by Financial Times on February 15.A2: Need Sanctions to Enforce the Minsk AgreementArctic – Russia Sphere of InfluenceRussia sees the Arctic as critical to protection of its sphere of influence. Federation of American Scientists, 97[No author (approved by Decree #11 of the President of the Russian Federation), January 11, Federation of American Scientists, “THE WORLD OCEAN CONCEPT of the Purpose-Oriented Federal Program I. General,” , accessed July 7, 2014,]The World Ocean is a very promising region for economic activity on one side, and the most important factor in geopolitics, as well as a region of inevitable rivalry and potential division into spheres of influence.Traditionally, Russia is considered to be one of the great maritime powers that play an important role in the exploration and use of the World Ocean. For the economic and social life of Russia, the World Ocean, and the seas surrounding the country in the first instance, is of paramount importance. There are objective considerations for that: the length of the sea border of Russia is 38800 km (the length of the land border is 14500 km); the shelf area is 4.2 million square kilometers, of which 3.9 million square kilometers are prospective for hydrocarbons (at least 80% of Russia's oil and gas reserves are in the shelf of its northern seas); the vital activity of Russia, especially of its coastal regions, depends on uninterrupted operation of the sea transport and the proper support of cargo and passenger traffic.Currently Russia is in a completely new situation in terms of the establishment of the bases for sea policy as well as the realisation and protection of its interests in the World Ocean. The crisis in the national economy has seriously deteriorated the opportunities for Russia to keep its presence in the World Ocean at its former level. Forced curtailment of activities in the World Ocean goes without any order, which aggravates the negative consequences of this process, and decreases the efficiency of the use of allocated resources. Restoration of Russia's position in the World Ocean is a task of national importance. Activities of state, economic, scientific and defense-oriented organizations in exploration and use of the World Ocean shall be performed as an essential part of the integrated national policy in the economy, finance, defense, ecology, science and technology, international relations and utilization of natural resources.Blocking Russia from accessing energy resources in the Arctic risks warCohen 10 Ariel [Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies] “From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy” The Heritage Foundation 6/15/10 DR accessed: 6/25/12To advance its position, Russia has undertaken a three-year mission to map the Arctic.[26] The Kremlin is also moving rapidly to establish a comprehensive sea, ground, and air presence. Under Putin, Russia focused on the Arctic as a major natural resources base. The Russian national leadership insists that the state, not the private sector, must take the lead in developing the vast region. The Kremlin published its Arctic doctrine in March 2009.[27] The main goal is to transform the Arctic into Russia’s strategic resource base and make Russia a leading Arctic power by 2020. Russian Militarization of the Arctic. The military is an important dimension of Moscow’s Arctic push. The policy calls for creating “general purpose military formations drawn from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” as well as “other troops and military formations [most importantly, border units] in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, capable of ensuring security under various military and political circumstances.”[28] These formations will be drawn from the armed forces and from the “power ministries” (e.g., the Federal Security Service, Border Guard Service, and Internal Ministry). Above all, the policy calls for a coast guard to patrol Russia’s Arctic waters and estuaries. Russia views the High North as a major staging area for a potential nuclear confrontation with the United States and has steadily expanded its military presence in the Arctic since 2007. This has included resuming air patrols over the Arctic, including strategic bomber flights.[29] During 2007 alone, Russian bombers penetrated Alaska’s 12-mile air defense zone 18 times.[30] The Russian Navy is expanding its presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War, increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleet’s submarines. Russia is also reorienting its military strategy to meet threats to the country’s interests in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf.[31] Russia is also modernizing its Northern Fleet. During 2008 and 2009, Russian icebreakers regularly patrolled in the Arctic. Russia has the world’s largest polar-capable icebreaker flotilla, with 24 icebreakers. Seven are nuclear, including the 50 Years of Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world.[32] Russia plans to build new nuclear-powered icebreakers starting in 2015.[33] Moscow clearly views a strong icebreaker fleet as a key to the region’s economic development. Russia ’s Commercial Presence. Russia’s energy rush to the Arctic continues apace. On May 12, 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev approved Russia’s security strategy.[34] This document views Russia’s natural resources in the Arctic as a base for both economic development and geopolitical influence. Paragraph 11 identifies potential battlegrounds where conflicts over energy may occur: “The attention of international politics in the long-term will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia.” The document seriously considers the use of military force to resolve competition for energy near Russia’s borders or those of its allies: “In case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might. The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be changed.”[35] In August 2008, Medvedev signed a law that allows “the government to allocate strategic oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf without auctions.” The law restricts participation to companies with five years’ experience in a region’s continental shelf and in which the government controls at least a 50 percent stake. This effectively allows only state-controlled Gazprom and Rosneft to participate.[36] However, when the global financial crisis ensued, Russia backtracked and began to seek foreign investors for Arctic gas development.Loss of Russia’s sphere of influence means warYuferov, MGIMO University's School of Political Science Graduate, 2013 [Ivan, Nov 28, 2013, Russian Direct, “Is a real cold war possible in the Arctic?,” ]Military conflict can be provoked because of significant economic and strategic stakes in an area where boundaries of maritime jurisdiction remain to be settled. Diplomatic gridlock may lead the region to erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources. There are a number of driving factors of this scenario: growing military activity, inflammatory rhetoric, and closer security coordination among the Western powers. Moreover, the Arctic countries are likely to grab territory unilaterally and exert sovereign control over sea lanes by arming icebreakers and military troops to guard their claims. This scenario of a real cold war is substantiated by some recent facts. The Russians recently ordered strategic bomber flights over the Arctic Ocean for the first time since the Cold War. Moreover, Russian armed forces have regularly tested air and sea defenses of NATO in the region. Finally, the NATO alliance often organizes military exercises with warships and strategic bombers, supported by tankers, reconnaissance aircraft and escort fighters.US Encroachment on Russian Sphere of Influence collapses relationsMerry, American Foreign Policy Council, 9[E. Wayne, E. Wayne Merry is Senior Fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. He is widely published and a frequent speaker on topics relating to Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Balkans, European security and trans-Atlantic relations. In twenty-six years in the United States Foreign Service, he worked as a diplomat and political analyst specializing in Soviet and post-Soviet political issues, including six years at the American Embassy in Moscow, where he was in charge of political analysis on the breakup of the Soviet Union and the early years of post-Soviet Russia. He also served at the embassies in Tunis, East Berlin, and Athens and at the US Mission to the United Nations in New York. In Washington he served in the Treasury, State, and Defense Departments. In the Pentagon he was Regional Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia during the mid-Nineties. He also served at the Headquarters of the US Marine Corps and on Capitol Hill with the staff of the US Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He was later a program director at the Atlantic Council of the United States., May 22, New York Times, “A ‘Reset’ Is Not Enough,” , accessed July 7, 2014, EK]A reset seeks to restore a previous relationship, which for former officials of the Clinton administration now back in office means the Yeltsin years. This will fail because Moscow views that period as emblematic of Russian weakness and exploitation by the West, and especially by the United States.Relations with Moscow deteriorated under both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The U.S. neo-liberal project of the ’90s not only failed but deeply alienated Russians. The bilateral nadir was the Kosovo war, a worse episode than last year’s Georgia conflict. A new opportunity after 9/11 was frankly squandered.Washington regarded Russia as a loser and treated it as such. It forgot that Russia would not be weak forever, and would remember.Two structural problems limit the relationship and its improvement. First, it is very narrow, with few automatic stabilizers. Unlike Russian-European or U.S.-Chinese relations, the scant economic and human ties between the U.S. and Russia provide inadequate ballast when problems arise. Relations are highly vulnerable to outside events and defined more by disputes than cooperation. When malice is added to the mix, the result is dangerous.Second, for Moscow the relationship is largely zero sum, in that Russian diplomacy succeeds where America’s fails, as in Iran and Venezuela. This is the consequence both of the huge asymmetry in real power and influence of the two countries and an asymmetry of geography in that almost anything the United States does in Eurasia affects Russia’s interests, often adversely. Thus Moscow worries that a successful Obama presidency will come at their expense with other countries. Russian commentators especially fear this may be the case with Iran, seeing the potential for a shift comparable to Mao’s China or Sadat’s Egypt.The current Russian leadership bears a disproportionate share of the blame for our poisonous relations. But Washington needs to adopt new rules of engagement to not repeat mistakes of the previous 16 years:One, minimize deliberate challenges to Russian interests and know that none will come free. If we push NATO, they will push back. When we sponsored an independent Kosovo, Moscow declared it would do the same in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Reciprocity is real.Infringement on Russia’s Sphere of Influence will result in nuclear warKeck, Diplomat Associate Editor, 14[Zachary, Zachary Keck is Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authors The Pacific Realist blog. He also writes a monthly column for The National Interest. Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues, July 11, The Diplomat, “Russia Threatens Nuclear Strikes Over Crimea,” , accessed July 12, 2014, EK]When asked about these comments at a press conference on Wednesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov responded, “If it comes to aggression against Russian territory, which Crimea and Sevastopol are parts of, I would not advise anyone to do this.” He then added, “We have the doctrine of national security, and it very clearly regulates the actions, which will be taken in this case.”This is a not-so-subtle threat to use nuclear weapons to retain Crimea. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s conventional military capabilities have deteriorated significantly. As a result, it has come to be increasingly reliant on nuclear weapons to protect its national security. This has been reflected in its post-Cold War military doctrines, particularly the ones since 2000. These military doctrines have greatly reduced the threshold that would needed to be crossed before Russia would resort to the use of nuclear weapons.Most notably, Russia’s military doctrines starting in 2000 introduced the concept of de-escalation, which is “a strategy envisioning the threat of a limited nuclear strike that would force an opponent to accept a return to the status quo ante.” In other words, Russian military doctrines have said that Moscow will use limited nuclear strikes in response to conventional military attacks against it. The most recent military doctrine issued in 2010, for example, states:“The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.”It was this military doctrine that Lavrov was referring to at the press conference this week. As quoted above, Lavrov began by emphasizing that Moscow sees Crimea as an integral part of Russian territory. He then stated that Moscow has a military doctrine that “very clearly” outlines how Moscow would respond to threats to its territorial integrity. The military doctrine “very clearly” states that the “Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons” in these situations.This is not the first time a Russian official has issued a nuclear threat against its neighboring states. For example, as tensions rose between Russian and several former Soviet Union and Warsaw states in 2011, General Staff Chief Gen. Nikolai Makarov warned a Russian legislative body that:“The possibility of local armed conflicts virtually along the entire perimeter of the border has grown dramatically. I cannot rule out that, in certain circumstances, local and regional armed conflicts could grow into a large-scale war, possibly even with nuclear weapons.”A2: War if We Don’t Keep Russia Out of the ArcticRisk lowRear Admiral Jonathan White, Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy, July 23, 2014, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION HOLDS A HEARING ON IMPLEMENTING U.S. POLICY IN THE ARCTICWe acknowledge that the risk of conflict in the region is currently low. The Arctic Council and other diplomatic venues provide effective means to resolve disputes between nations. However, the US Navy must be ready to operate in this challenging environment just as it does routinely on, under, and above every other ocean.Russia playing by the Arctic rulesRIA Novosti, May 22, 2014, Arctic Cooperation May Ease Russia-US Tensions - AnalystHowever, US assets in the region are limited and they rely on dated technology and borrowed equipment from other Arctic nations. Russia is currently the only country employing nuclear-powered icebreakers."The securitization trend we see in the Arctic from the Russian side is mostly not an issue of military aggressiveness, but it is a business issue," Laruelle said.Concerning Russia's delimitation of its continental shelf and control over the North Sea Pass, Laruelle said "Russia is playing by the rules." The demarcation of national and international waterways is contested within the Arctic Council, but the first voyage of a Chinese merchant ship, Hong Xing, through the North Sea Pass last year set a precedent when the ship adhered to all Russian requirements for passage.A2: Russia Military Modernization BadResource problems and corruption kill modernizationChase et al., senior political scientist at RAND, a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, and an adjunct professor in the China Studies and Strategic Studies Departments at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and, ‘15(Michael S., Jeffrey Engstrom specializes in Asia-Pacific security issues and foreign policy, Tai Ming Cheung, director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) located at UC San Diego, Kristen A. Gunness, China advisor for the Department of the Navy, Scott Warren Harold, Deputy Director, Center for Asia Pacific Policy; Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, Susan Puska, former U.S. Army Attache. works for Defense Group, Inc., and, Samuel K. Berkowitz, China analyst based in Washington, D.C., “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation,” ) The PLA also faces shortfalls in terms of its combat capabilities. Many Chinese strategists identify the inability to conduct integrated joint operations at the desired level of competence as the central problem China faces as it aspires to project combat power beyond its land borders. Indeed, Chinese sources highlight several problems that contribute to the PLA’s shortcomings in the area of joint operations and suggest that there is still a large gap between China and developed countries’ militaries, especially the United States. PLA publications also highlight continuing shortfalls in training, despite years of effort to make training more realistic and more valuable in terms of addressing shortcomings and improving the PLA’s operational capabilities. In addition, the publications point to persistent challenges in combat support and combat service support functions and forces, as reflected by frequent discussions of shortcomings in logistics and maintenance capabilities that appear in PLA newspaper reports and journal articles. Many shortfalls specific to China’s naval and air forces remain despite major advances in their capabilities in recent years. While the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) new surface combatants and submarines boast impressive capabilities comparable with those of a modern world-class navy, the PLAN still faces a number of challenges. These exist in such areas as the integration of increasingly complex modern weapons and equipment platforms; the training of PLAN personnel, who currently are not fully equipped to operate or maintain them; and the mastery of such capabilities as antisubmarine warfare and amphibious operations. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force has similarly made enormous strides but must still cope with such challenges as a large force comprising multiple generations of aircraft, a shortage of key special-mission aircraft, unrealistic training, and insufficient strategic transport capability.The PLA also faces potential weaknesses in its ability to protect Chinese interests in space and the electromagnetic spectrum and to operate successfully in these areas to support military campaigns requiring information dominance. Indeed, as China places more and more satellites in orbit, the PLA is becoming more dependent on space capabilities for such important functions as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; navigation and positioning; and communications. Chinese military publications suggest that the PLA still sees itself as less dependent on space than the U.S. military but also appear to recognize, albeit largely implicitly, that increasing reliance on space brings greater vulnerability. China also sees itself as potentially vulnerable in the electromagnetic spectrum. One area in which this concern has been particularly pronounced is Chinese concern about cybersecurity weaknesses. Indeed, the PLA clearly views itself as occupying a relatively disadvantageous position due to its perceived inferiority in the key aspects of “network military struggle.” This problem may become more pressing as the PLA increases its reliance on technology that is potentially vulnerable to disruption, thus creating a weakness an adversary could exploit.Although China’s defense industry has made tremendous progress in terms of its ability to deliver advanced weaponry and equipment to the PLA over the past two decades, it also suffers from a number of problems that have yet to be resolved. Indeed, China’s defense industry is still in transition from central planning to a more market-oriented system, and many major obstacles remain to be tackled. The main problems the defense industry faces include widespread corruption, lack of competition, entrenched monopolies, delays and cost overruns, quality control problems, bureaucratic fragmentation, an outdated acquisition system, and restricted access to external sources of technology and expertise.Equipment and funding problems kill modernization RAND, “China's Military Modernization Efforts Fall Short; Significant Weaknesses Remain,” February 16, 2015, Although the drive by the People's Republic of China to modernize its military has been underway for more than two decades, significant weaknesses remain, according to a new RAND Corporation report.In the 1980s and 1990s, the People's Liberation Army was saddled with outdated equipment and poorly trained personnel, as well as the distraction and corruption associated with its involvement in an array of commercial activities. China reacted by pouring money into its military, resulting in double-digit increases in military spending in most years, but many issues remain unresolved.“Our research found that China's weaknesses fall in two broad categories: institutional and combat capabilities,” said Michael Chase, co-lead author of the study and a senior political scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “The army faces shortcomings from outdated command structures, quality of personnel, professionalism and corruption.”In terms of combat capabilities, China has problems with logistical weaknesses, insufficient strategic airlift capabilities, limited numbers of special mission aircraft and deficiencies in fleet air defense and anti-submarine warfare, said Jeffrey Engstrom, co-lead author of the report and a RAND senior project associate.Sanctions Generally FailCoercive economic diplomacy generally failsKa Zeng, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Arkansas, 2004(Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Bargaining, Retaliation, & American Coercive Diplomacy, p. 2-3)The record of these commercial rivalries presents us with two puzzles. First, even though the United States has always been the country with greater aggregate power and bargaining resources in bilateral trade disputes, it has had uneven success in extracting concessions from its trading partners through the use of coercive strategies. As my survey in chapter 3 of Washington's attempt to unilaterally open foreign markets under Section 301 of U.S. trade law indicates, the degree to which the target countries yield to American demands often varies in ways that cannot be neatly explained by their dependence on the American export market. For instance, although Japan is less dependent on the American market for exports than many U.S. trading partners, it has given in most frequently to U.S. pressure.2 Interestingly, countries that are more heavily dependent on the U.S. export market (such as China, Brazil, and India) have turned out to be more resistant to American demands.3 Despite having fewer power resources, they have frequently been able to negotiate better dispute settlements than gross measures of power would predict. Clearly, traditional realist theory, with its emphasis on nations' underlying raw power balances, cannot explain why, on average, American coercive diplomacy works less well with countries whose raw material power should have put them in a more disadvantaged position vis-a-vis the United States. It seems necessary for us to look at factors other than raw power to understand the variations in the effectiveness of America's pressure tactics. Sanctions Punish Innocent CiviliansSanctions are modern siege warfare—they systematically deprive the innocents of basic lifeGordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 126-127 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]Thus, the argument can be made that siege is a form of warfare that itself constitutes a war crime. In just war doctrine we could demand a justification for a military strategy in terms of the obligation to minimize harm to civilians: the ammunition factory was a legitimate target, and there was no way to bomb it without collateral damage to nearby residential areas. But siege is peculiar in that it resists such an analysis: the immediate goal is precisely to cause suffering to civilians. In the case of the ammunitions factory, we can answer the question, how is this act consistent with the moral requirement to discriminate? In the case of siege, we cannot. Sanctions are subject to many of the same moral objections as siege. They intentionally, or at least predictably, harm the most vulnerable and the least political, and this is something the party imposing sanctions either knows or should know. To the extent that economic sanctions seek to undermine the economy of a society and thereby prevent the production or importation of necessities, they are functioning as the modern equivalent of siege. To the extent that sanctions deprive the most vulnerable and least political sectors of society of the food, potable water, medical care, and fuel necessary for survival and basic human needs, sanctions should be subject to the same moral objections as siege warfare. Drew Christiansen and Gerard Powers argue that the just war doctrine does not apply to peacetime sanctions in the same way that this doctrine applies to sieges and blockades imposed as part of a war effort. The fundamental difference, they hold, is that the use of economic sanctions is rooted in the intention to avoid the use of armed force, as opposed to the intent to multiply the effects of wars The distinction between sanctions-as-war and sanctions-as-nonviolent-alternative-to war goes back to the fundamental question, what kind of “things” are economic sanctions? Are sanctions “a stern but peaceful act”-a punishment that inconveniences or embarrasses, but does no damage of the sort that raises moral issues? Or are they a form of slow-acting but lethal warfare, which targets the innocent and helpless in a way that would constitute a war crime in a military context? The implications of this ontological issue are enormous: in one view, economic sanctions are attractive and can be ethically justified easily and often; in the other view, sanctions do gratuitous, direct human damage that is ethically indefensible. Christiansen and Powers suggest that warfare is akin to the death penalty, whereas sanctions are more like attaching someone’s assets in a civil proceeding. In this analogy, the economic domain is seen as fully separate, and of a different nature altogether, from the domain of power and violence. But economic harm, while it is not directly physical, can also be a form of violence. The sanctions-asmere- seizure-of-assets theory, whether on the level of the individual or an entire economy, implicitly assumes a starting point of relative abundance. Whether the seizure of someone’s assets is inconvenient or devastating depends entirely on what those assets are and how much is left after the seizure. “Economic deprivation” is not a uniform phenomenon; the loss of conveniences constitutes a different experience from the loss of the means to meet basic needs. I do not deny that the contexts in which sanctions and sieges occur maybe different. The intent of each may differ the nature of the demands maybe different, and the options of the besieged or sanctioned states may be different. But the moral objection to sanctions does not rest on the analogy; sanctions do not have to be identical to siege warfare in order to be subject to condemnation under just war principles. Indeed, if the intent of sanctions is peaceful rather than belligerent, then the usual justifications in warfare are unavailable. I am morally permitted to kill where my survival is at stake, and in war, I am morally permitted to kill even innocents, in some circumstances. But if one’s goal is to see that international law is enforced or that human rights are respected, then the stakes and the justificatory context are quite different. Lori Fisler Damrosch has argued that sanctions warrant a particularly high degree of tolerance because of the importance of the international norms they are intended to protect: Especially in the case of norms such as the prohibitions against aggression and genocide, which are themselves devoted to the preservation of human life, it may be necessary to tolerate a high level of civilian hardship in order to prevent or at least discourage future violations.7 Yet it is hard to make sense of the claim that “collateral damage” can be justified in the name of protecting human rights; or that international law might be enforced by means that stand in violation of international laws, including the just war principle of discrimination. Thus, if sanctions are analogous to siege warfare, then they are problematic for the same reasons—both effectively violate the principle of discrimination. But if sanctions are not analogous to siege, then they are even more difficult to justify. If the goals of sanctions are the enforcement of humanitarian standards or compliance with legal and ethical norms, then extensive and predictable harm to civilians cannot be justified even by reference to survival or military advantage. Insofar as this is the case, sanctions are simply adevice of cruelty garbed in self-righteousness.Smart sanctions only mask civilian suffering—sanctions are inherently unethicalGordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 141-142, Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]Many of those who defend sanctions do not argue that damage to innocents is morally acceptable, but rather that this damage is not inherent in sanctions and could in principle be mitigated or avoided altogether. Where measures are taken to minimize civilian harm, the argument goes, sanctions are ethically defensible. But this optimism is inconsistent with the nature of economic sanctions, as well as with the history of sanctions and the logic of the vested interests created by sanctions. If economic sanctions are motivated by an intent to do economic damage, then partial sanctions and humanitarian exemptions will allow the target nation to adjust its economy to minimize the overall damage, undermining the intentions of the political actors imposing the sanctions. The more complete the sanctions, the more effective they will be, in terms of economic damage; but that in turn means that the economy as a whole will be undermined. The greater the degree to which the economy is generally undermined, the greater the damage to the civilian population, outside the military and political leadership. The greater the damage to the civilian population, the more serious the harm will be to the most vulnerable sectors—infants, the elderly, the sick, the handicapped, pregnant women, widows with children. Sanctions that are economically effective necessarily entail the greatest harm to those who are the most vulnerable and the most disenfranchised from power. The ethical dilemma is not resolved by placing blame on the target state for its initial wrongdoing or for its response to economic crisis. We know from the history of sanctions, and of sieges and blockades in wartime, that the state will generally increase the proportion of the economy that goes to the support of the political leadership and to the military, for any of a number of reasons: because national security is legitimately seen as the highest priority, or because the nature of the “siege mentality” is that the leadership will first protect itself, or because desperate need for basic goods creates opportunities for black marketeering. This may shift part of the moral responsibility to the target state, but it does not vitiate the moral agency that resides in the state that initiated the crisis by imposing sanctions in the first place, particularly in light of the predictability of the outcome. The use of sanctions is even more troubling if we acknowledge that the odds are not good that any political ends will be achieved by sanctions. Even if the end is one that could justify the human cost of sanctions—such as stopping military aggression— the one thing we know about sanctions is that they are generally unlikely to achieve their goal. Alternatively, we could frame the “goals” of sanctions not in terms of political ends, but in terms of punishment or symbolic expression. However, these cannot claim the ethical justification that was invoked when sanctions were seen as the means of stopping war—that harm to innocents may be justified when it is for the purpose of preventing a far greater harm. Establishing criteria for the ethical use of sanctions does not resolve these contradictions, but instead masks them. To say that sanctions are ethical as long as we make sure to minimize civilian harm is to mask the fact that sanctions by their nature cause harm to civilians directly and primarily. It is like using a pickaxe for brain surgery the nature of the instrument suggests that targeting certain areas with precision and effectiveness, without killing the patient in the process, is not going to happen. It is disingenuous to be surprised or apologetic when sanctions turn out to do no harm to a ruling elite, to achieve none of the ostensible goals of the sanctions regarding “unacceptable behavior” or “punishment of international outlaws, ” and to be generally ineffectual for much of anything besides rhetorical posturing and the psychological gratification of having done something.Sanctions take civilian populations hostage—the sacrifice of whole people for strategic interests is ethically indefensible Kochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94[Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”, , accessed 7/8/13, VJ]We don’t endorse ableist languageComprehensive economic sanctions, then – continuing with the comparison above – have the ethical quality of terror bombings: the civilian population is explicitly taken hostage in the framework of a security strategy of power politics. It is self-evident that this kind of political instrumentalization of the human being – as the citizen of a community that is a subject in international law – is not compatible with his status as an autonomous subject, i.e. with human dignity.23 People have a natural right not to be sacrificed for a strategic purpose over whose formulation and realization they exercise no influence. As Quinn says, "They have a right not to be pressed, in apparent violation of their prior rights, into the service of other people's purposes."24 In the area of ethics, the so-called "Doctrine of Double Effect" secures every person's right to veto "a certain kind of attempt to make the world a better place at his expense."25 It attacks the purely utilitarian approach (the maximization of usefulness) which, in the case of sanctions, could sacrifice the health and prosperity of a whole people for the sake of the external political purposes of member states in the Security Council or of another state coalition. (This could be clarified case by case in such measures as the sanctions placed against Iraq, Former Yugoslavia, Haiti, etc.) The sacrifice of a whole people for the sake of the strategic interests of a superpower or of a coalition of states (as may be formed within the Security Council) would appear to be in no way ethically justifiable.26 Assertions to this effect have already been made in connection with the sanctions against South Africa: if there are no general criteria for morally evaluating a particular political strategy, then those who have to bear the primary costs of measures such as sanctions should be able to decide whether they are to be imposed.27 The general ethical principle guiding the use of sanctions should thus be that consideration be taken of the affected population in the formulation of such measures. Precisely this principle, however, is excluded by the nature of the coercive measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As American authors have illustrated in an evaluation of the sanctions policy in the wake of the Gulf War, economic sanctions cause the civilian population to be held hostage in its own country.28 Measures such as those which explicitly intend to harm the population are to be judged as amoral,29 for "one cannot intentionally cripple an economy without intentionally affecting the people whose working and consuming lives are partially constitutive of that economy."30Sanctions fail and disproportionally and intentionally target the most vulnerable and least political Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99[Joy, Fall, Cross Currents, Volume 49, Issue 3, “ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, JUST WAR DOCTRINE, AND THE "FEARFUL SPECTACLE OF THE CIVILIAN DEAD"”, , accessed 7/9/13, VJ]To some extent, their reasons reiterate the same arguments made by others -- that sanctions are less harsh than warfare; that the population consented to, or for other reasons can properly be held responsible for, the acts of the leadership; that structuring in humanitarian exceptions will prevent sanctions from causing death or great suffering. I have addressed these issues elsewhere.(24) Here I want to look at Christiansen and Powers to draw a distinction between sanctions-as-war and sanctions-without-war. The distinction does not resolve the underlying question: Are sanctions a device that keeps the peace and enforces international law, or are they intrinsically a form of violence, which in fact violates the laws of warfare? Woodrow Wilson, in urging the adoption of sanctions as a method by which the League of Nations would keep the world free of war, described them as a "peaceful, silent, deadly remedy." And indeed, before the Iraq situation showed us how extensive and extreme the human damage from sanctions can be, economic sanctions were most commonly portrayed in the U.S. as a kind of stern but peaceful act -- a punishment which inconveniences or embarrasses, but does no damage of the sort that raises moral issues. In fact, it was the peace activists who, in 1990, were in the forefront arguing that sanctions be used in the case of Iraq rather than military undertakings. Like many other commentators, Christiansen and Powers are partly basing their claim on two sets of empirical assumptions regarding the speed and degree of damage done by sanctions: "Whereas war's impact is speedy and frequently lethal, the impact of sanctions grows over time and allows more easily for mitigation of these harmful effects and for a negotiated solution than acts of war."(25) Christiansen and Powers suggest that the way to conceptualize sanctions is that warfare is akin to the death penalty, whereas sanctions are more like attaching someone's assets in a civil proceeding.(26) In this analogy, the economic domain is seen as fully separate, and of a different nature altogether, than the domain of power and of violence. But economic harm, while it is not directly physical, can also be a form of violence. The sanctions-as-mere-seizure-of-assets theory, whether on the level of the individual or an entire economy, implicitly assumes a starting point of relative abundance. Whether the seizure of someone's assets is inconvenient or devastating depends entirely on what their assets are, and how much is left after the seizure. For an upper-middle-class person with, say, $50,000 in stocks and an annual income of $80,000, seizing $1000 from a checking account would at most cause inconvenience, annoyance, perhaps some slight reduction in luxuries or indulgences. For someone living at poverty level, seizing $1000 may mean that a family has lost irreplaceably the ability to pay for fuel oil for a winter's heating season, or lost their car in a rural area with no other transportation, or lost the security deposit and first month's rent on an apartment that would have given them a way out of a homeless shelter. Living in a home with a temperature of 40 degrees in the winter does not kill quickly, in the way that a bullet does, and may not kill at all. It may only make someone sick, or over some time, worsen an illness until death occurs. Living in a shelter or on the street for a night or for a week or for a month doesn't kill in the way that a bullet does, but it exposes someone to a risk of considerable random violence, including killings. To conceptualize economic deprivation in terms of mild punishment whose effects are reversible with no permanent damage -- inconvenience, embarrassment, living on a budget -- is to misunderstand the nature of the economic. "Economic deprivation" is not a uniform phenomenon; the loss of conveniences constitutes a different experience than the loss of the means to meet basic needs. There is a reason that infant mortality rates and life expectancy rates are used as measures of economic development: poverty manifests itself in malnutrition, sickness, exposure to the elements, exhaustion, dirty drinking water, the lack of means to leave a violent country or neighborhood -- the shortening of one's life. It is for this reason that liberation theologians and others have argued that poverty is indeed a form of violence, although it doesn't kill in the way that a bullet does. Christiansen and Powers argue that sanctions differ from siege partly on the grounds that the intent of sanctions is to prevent violence rather than exacerbate it. Under the doctrine of double effect, however, this does not seem to hold. The doctrine of double effect provides that the foreseen evil effect of a man's action is not morally imputable to him, provided that (1) the action in itself is directed immediately to some other result, (2) the evil effect is not willed either in itself or as a means to the other result, (3) the permitting of the evil effect is justified by reasons of proportionate weight.(27) Although the doctrine of double effect would seem to justify "collateral damage," it does not offer a justification of sanctions. "Collateral damage" entails the unintended secondary harm to civilians. If a bombing raid is conducted against a military base, the collateral damage would be that the schoolhouse half a mile away was destroyed by a bomb that missed its intended target, which was the military base. In that case, the bombing raid would be equally successful if the base were hit, and the schoolhouse were undamaged. But the damage done by indirect sanctions is not in fact "collateral," in that the damage to the civilian population is necessary and instrumental. The direct damage to the economy is intended to indirectly influence the leadership, by triggering political pressure or uprisings of the civilians, or by generating moral guilt from the "fearful spectacle of the civilian dead." Sanctions directed against an economy would in fact be considered unsuccessful if no disruption of the economy took place. We often hear commentators objecting that "sanctions didn't work" in one situation or another because they weren't "tight" enough -- they did not succeed in disrupting the economy. Thus, sanctions are not defensible under the doctrine of double effect. Although the end may indeed be legitimate, the intended intermediate means consists of the generalized damage to the economy, which violates both the first and second requirements of the doctrine. But there is a second reason why good intent can not available as a justification for sanctions: the intent cannot in good faith be reconciled with the history and the logic of sanctions, and with the likely outcome. We know from the history of siege warfare that, legitimately or not, in the face of economic strangulation, the military and political leadership will insulate themselves from its consequences, and place a disproportionate burden on the civilian population. We also know from history that economic strangulation will consolidate the state's power rather than undermine it; we know that sanctions are, for the most part, unlikely to prevent military aggression, or stop human rights violations, or achieve compliance with any political or military demand, even when sanctions drag on for decades. It is hard to reconcile the claimed "good intent" of sanctions with a history that makes it easy to foresee that those intentions are not likely to be realized. Thus, I would suggest that while sanctions may have very different goals than siege warfare -- including goals such as international governance -- they are nevertheless subject to many of the same moral objections: that they intentionally, or at least predictably, harm the most vulnerable and the least political; and that this is something which the party imposing sanctions either knows, or should know. To the extent that economic sanctions seek to undermine the economy of a society, and thereby prevent the production or importation of necessities, they are functioning as the modern equivalent of siege. To the extent that sanctions deprive the most vulnerable and least political sectors of society of the food, potable water, medical care, and fuel necessary for survival and basic human needs, sanctions should be subject to the same moral objections as siege warfare.Sanctions are Genocide/WarfareViolent sanctions outweigh warDalecki, writer, 12[Maggie, October 1st, The Ethics Blog, “Are Economic Sanctions Ethical?”, , accessed 7/6/13, VJ]Economic sanctions are often seen as a way to change the way a government behaves that is easier and more humane than war. However, Professor Emily Muller (University of Manitoba) argues that our faith in them is based on a misperception. When we look more closely at their effects on civilian populations, and at their effectiveness in actually bringing change, we can see that they are often a bad idea. Those in favour of sanctions argue that because they avoid military action, they are an important tool to promote change internationally without bringing on the horrors of war. But economic sanctions can be brutal. They often create levels of civilian suffering and hardship as great as or even greater than those resulting from war. If their imposition is to be ethically defensible, the harm done to civilians should be offset or outweighed by a reasonable chance of securing victory. Another problem with economic sanctions, however, is that they are imprecise and their effects are unpredictable. Generally it is extremely difficult to know whom they will hurt most, or whether they will affect those in power at all. Further, if sanctions are to work, there must be a reliable connection between subjecting civilian populations to economic hardship and those populations pressuring their governments to change. And if the people do bring such pressure, it must be effective. Professor Muller thinks that in many cases, the sanctions will either rally support for the enemy regime, or rob the population of its ability to bring about change. There is a strong connection between a thriving middle class and accountable governments, says Professor Muller. She argues that when societies are placed under economic sanctions, it often disempowers the middle class by reducing them to poverty. This in turn robs them of their capacity to deal with political oppression. It is also important to consider, when contemplating sanctions, who takes responsibility. Because sanctions seem like an easy and bloodless alternative to war, and because the harms are indirect and hard to calculate, governments are often quick to impose them, without thinking seriously about the true costs or about the prospects for success. And the governments responsible for sanctions often fail to accept any blame for the suffering they cause. Whoever imposes economic sanctions must take their decision seriously, and must be prepared to bear responsibility for the effects – especially harmful ones – of this decision.Sanctions are genocidalAnderson, senior editor, 10[David E., September 13, Religion & Ethics Weekly, “The Ethics of Sanctions”, , accessed 7/6/13, VJ] Sanctions are attractive to policy makers—and the public—for a number of reasons. They seem more substantial than diplomatic finger-wagging, less costly to impose than military action, and morally preferable to war. “They are often discussed as though they were a mild sort of punishment, not an act of aggression of the kind that has actual human costs,’’ Gordon wrote in a 1999 issue of CrossCurrents, the journal of Association for Religion and Intellectual Life. Over the years, as the humanitarian consequences and punitive social impact of comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on Iraq and other countries such as Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Yugoslavia became apparent, ethicists began debating more urgently how this tool should be understood. Albert C. Pierce, professor of ethics and national security at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, writing in a 1996 issue of Ethics & International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, argued that economic sanctions “are intended to inflict great human suffering, pain, harm, and even death and thus should be subject to the same kind of careful moral and ethical scrutiny given to the use of military force before it is chosen as a means to achieve national political objectives.’’ According to Gordon, “because sanctions are themselves a form of violence, they cannot legitimately be seen merely as a peacekeeping device, or as a tool for enforcing international law.…They require the same level of justification as other acts of warfare.’’ Pierce, Gordon, and others say sanctions should be evaluated in much the same way and with similar principles as force is evaluated, that is, with the just war doctrine. Gordon, for example, argues the sanctions imposed on Iraq violated both the criteria that must be met before going to war, such as just cause and the probability of success, and the criteria for how the war is conducted, employing such norms as proportionality and discrimination,’ which bars directly intended attacks on noncombatants and noncombatant targets. Comprehensive economic sanctions as employed against nations such as Iraq in 1990, Haiti in 1991, and Cuba since the 1960s, have failed to achieve their goals while at the same imposing devastating hardships on the civilian population. Gordon cites studies that found the economic sanctions leveled against Iraq were responsible for the death of some 237,000 Iraqi children under age five. At best, sanctions have been successful in just a third of the cases where they have been employed. US sanctions in Iraq “systemically overrode many of the basic principles of international humanitarian law,” she writes, adding that “many have maintained that the magnitude of the suffering was such that the sanctions regime could properly be termed genocidal.”Sanctions Unethical - Must RejectSanctions are ethically unacceptableGordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 128-129 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]In addition to viewing sanctions within the ethical framework offered by the just war doctrine, we should also examine them from a deontological perspective. I refer here to Kant’s ethical theory, which holds that all rational beings are characterized by “dignity,” the inherent worth of a person that makes him or her irreplaceable and that stands in contrast to those material things with a price, which can be exchanged for other things of equal or greater price without loss. This is the basis for Kant’s claim that all rational beings have autonomy, the right and the capacity to rule themselves. In Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that it is a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral mandate binding on all rational beings, to “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end and never simply as a means.”8 This ethical framework would arguably have had little to offer in the debate over sanctions at the time that Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was being set forth as a mechanism of enforcement. The articulated purpose of sanctions was quite narrow: it was to stop military aggression. In that context, there were two innocent populations involved—the nonpolitical/nonmilitary population of the aggressor nation and the entire population of the nation under attack. Because deontological ethics enjoins us to treat all human beings as ends in themselves and not solely as means, it would not offer much guidance in the situation where some innocent population (or at least a sector of the population) will be harmed, and where the issue is whether the innocents who are harmed will be the civilian population of the aggressor nation upon whom sanctions are imposed, or the civilian population of the attacked nations who are the objects of military aggression. In this case, either one population is the means to the military victory of the aggressor, or the other population is the means to interdict the aggressor. But deontological arguments do offer guidance in situations where military aggression is not at issue, and where the choice therefore is not which innocent population suffers harm, but whether an innocent population may be harmed in the service of the political interests of a foreign state, or for the interest of the international community in enforcing norms. Where sanctions impose suffering on innocent sectors of the target country population for an objective other than preventing the deaths of other innocent persons, this is clearly incompatible with deontological ethics, since in these situations, to use Kantian language, human beings are reduced to nothing more than a means to an end, where that end is something less than the lives of other human beings.Sanctions fail and are only ethical if they result in changeRarick, Professor at Purdue, and Duchatelet, Dean at Purdue, 08[Charles A, Martine, June 1st, Economic Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 2, “AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY”, page 49, EBSCO, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]When we look at the consequences of sanctions, in most cases the outcome has been to lower the economic, educational and healthcare systems of the sanctioned countries. While one could argue that higher pleasures such as virtue and moral principle could override the negative consequences of sanctions, it is questionable that most people in sanctioned countries would agree with that argument. In some cases the citizens of sanctioned countries may. through state propaganda, take a different view. However, factual data concerning quality-of-life issues is a better indicator of negative consequences. The longest-running case of economic sanctions, the embargo against Cuba, has harmed the healthcare industry of that country. A study by the American Association for World Health concluded that economic sanctions haw had a devastating impact on the quality of healthcare in Cuba. The trade embargo is responsible, at least in part, for increases in certain diseases such as waterbome illness, the lack of surgical supplies and equipment, and the unavailability of medicine (Williams, 191")- While the socialist policies of Fidel Castro have made medical services available to all citizens of Cuba, the lack of medicine, medical supplies and equipment have decreased the effectiveness of healthcare providers. The dire economic conditions in Cuba, of course, cannot entirely be blamed on US economic sanctions. Castro has been a less than effective economic planner. He has, however, been able to blame his failed policies on US-imposed sanctions (Katz, 2005) and has gained some sympathy with other political leaders in the region. There are both short- and long-term consequences of US sanctions against Cuba, and the results of this policy may be felt for some time past the eventual lifting of the sanctions. If sanctions were effective most of the time, it could be argued that the positive results gained by the people of the sanctioned country justify* the necessary pain they experience in the application of the sanctions. This is not, however, the case because economic sanctions seldom achieve their desired aims. In most cases, they therefore result in a net loss in happiness for sanctioned-country citizens, both in terms of lower and higher forms of pleasure.Sanctions are unethical instruments of mass destructionRarick, Professor at Purdue, and Duchatelet, Dean at Purdue, 08[Charles A, Martine, June 1st, Economic Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 2, “AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY”, page 50, EBSCO, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]The main deontologist. eighteenth-century Germanphilosopher Immanuel Kant, discounted the consequences of behaviour in assessing ethics, and instead focused on human reasoning and logic. Kant developed the categorical imperative as his framework for ethical behaviour. The categorical imperative has two formulations; the first being universalism. In order to act in an ethical manner a person has to want the behaviour they are engaging in to be universally applied. For example, if you want the act of murder to be ethical, you would have to accept that everyone is entitled to murder others. The second formulation of the categorical imperative - 'So act that you use humanity, whether in your person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an ends, never as a means' (Kant. can be used to argue against the use of sanctions. Sanctions are a means to an end. The theory operating behind sanctions is to cause as much pain as possible to the people of the receiving country in order for pressure to be brought on the government. The citizens of the sanctioned country are used as a means to achieve the foreign policy objectives of the sanctioning country. Using people as a means represents an inhumane form of public policy. Dennis Halliday. former co-ordinator of United Nations Resolution 986 (Food-for-Oil in Iraq), describes economic sanctions as a 'totally bankrupt concept'. Sanctions in Iraq caused the price of basic food products to greatly increase, resulted in inadequate nutrition, caused a decline of healthcare, and led to the collapse of the national currency (BBC, 1998). According to UN1CEF, economic sanctions against Iraq resulted in a doubling of the death rate for children less than five years of age. The organisation reports that the sanctions made it wry difficult for parents to provide needed medicine, food and safe drinking water for their children, and estimates that they resulted in the deaths of 500,000 children under the age of five between 1991 and 199s (Pigler, 2004)- Economic sanctions themselves can be called instruments of mass destruction (Mueller and Mueller, 1999) when one considers the human toll inflicted on the innocent people ofsanctioned countries.Sanctions Are Economic BullyingSanctions are economic bullying—only the superpowers have the ability to hurt growing nations to maintain their leadGordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 136-137 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]Large and diversified economies are virtually immune to sanctions, since they have the economic flexibility to pay higher costs in the short run, and to make structural changes in the long run.sq Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott note that nations with weak or unstable economies therefore make the best targets for economic sanctions. In a section entitled “The Weakest Go to the Wall,” they argue that “there seems to be a direct correlation between the political and economic health of the target country and its susceptibility to economic pressure,” and suggest that their data “demonstrate that countries in distress or experiencing significant problems are far more likely to succumb to coercion by the sender country. “3s They conclude with a list of “dos and don’ts” for those imposing sanctions, including “Do pick on the weak and helpless. “3s Their analysis of the cases indicates that sanctions are most effective when the target is much smaller than the country imposing sanctions, and economically weak and politically unstable. In successful cases, the average sender’s economy was 187 times larger than that of the average target.37 Thus, sanctions offer themselves solely as mechanisms that strong nations with large economies, or international alliances including strong nations with large economies, can effectively use against countries with weak or import-dependent economies, or countries with unstable governments. The reverse is not true— sanctions are not a device realistically available to small or poor nations that can be used with any significant impact against large or economically dominant nations, even if the latter were to, say, engage in aggression or human rights violations, or otherwise offend the international community. This has been obvious since the reformulation of sanctions as a tool of international law.38 Therefore, there is a danger that sanctions will be used “opportunistically” by powerful nations39 —for example, as a response by a superpower to its declining economic hegemony. Here we can understand the particular enthusiasm the United States holds for sanctions; the sheer size of the U.S. economy means that sanctions can be imposed at little cost to itself, and with no likelihood that any other nation could retaliate in kind. It would seem that we have lost altogether the rationale for sanctions that was articulated in the formation of the League of Nations, It may be that sanctions, and the attendant harm to innocents, can be justified as an alternative to actual warfare; but in order to justify this choice on utilitarian grounds, we would have to have reason to believe that sanctions in fact obtain compliance by the target state. If not, then they simply constitute the gratuitous imposition of suffering on a helpless population, for no ethically defensible reason.A2: UtilitarianismUtilitarianism a bad way to weigh unethical sanctionsMcGee, president of the Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research, 03[Robert W., December 1, Economic Affairs, pg 43, “THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS”, EBSCO, accessed 7/6/13, VJ]Sanctions generally cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds because the losers exceed the winners. However, utilitarian ethics is not a precise tool because it is not possible to precisely measure gains and losses, especially when some of the gains and losses cannot be reduced to monetary units. Psychic gains are only one example. Many other gains and losses are of a non-monetary nature. If sanctions kill, which they sometimes do, how can total gains and losses be measured and compared? Another major problem with applying utilitarian ethics is that utilitarians ignore rights violations. All that matters to a utilitarian is whether the gains exceed the losses. The ends justify the means. For a utilitarian, killing a few (or a few million) innocent people might be justified as long as the result is a good one. That is one of the major problems with utilitarian ethics and it is one of the major strengths of rights-based ethics. A rights-based ethic takes the position that an action is bad if someone’s rights are violated, regardless of whether the good outweighs the bad. What is wrong prima facie does not become right just because some majority ultimately benefits. A major advantage of a rights-based ethic is that there is no need to calculate total gains and compare them with total losses. It is impossible to precisely measure gains and losses anyway. A rights-based ethic removes this problem. The only thing that needs to be determined is whether someone’s rights would be violated. The matter is further complicated, however, because there are two different kinds of rights, negative rights and positive rights. Negative rights include the right not to have your property taken from you without your consent and the right not to be killed. One attribute of negative rights is that they do not conflict. My right to property does not conflict with your right to property. My right to life does not conflict with your right to life. Positive rights have different attributes from negative rights. Examples of positive rights include the right to free or low-cost medical care and the right to subsidised housing. One attribute of positive rights is that they always involve the violation of someone’s negative rights. My right to free or low-cost medical care comes at the expense of the taxpayers who must pay something to make up the difference between the market price of the service and the price I have to pay. My right to lowcost housing comes at the expense of the landlord, who is prohibited from charging the market rate for the rental of his property. In a sense, positive rights are not rights at all. They are a licence to expropriate the property of others with legal sanction. The kind of rights we need to look at when we are trying to determine whether a particular sanction is justified is negative rights. We must ask ourselves the question: ‘Are anyone’s negative rights to life, property, contract, etc. violated by this sanction?’ If the answer is ‘yes,’ then the sanction cannot be justified. That being the case, one can easily conclude that the vast majority of sanctions cannot be justified on ethical grounds because someone’s rights are almost certainly violated. If even one willing buyer is prevented from buying what he wants from whomever he wants, rights are violated. But what is more likely is that the rights of thousands, or even millions, are violated by economic sanctions. The two case studies examined in this article are the sanctions that have been imposed against Iraq and Cuba. Although they are both good examples, because they illustrate the point, they are by no means the only examples that could be given. They have been chosen because they are cases the average reader is most likely to be familiar with because they have been reported frequently in the popular press.Sanctions unethical and utilitarianism can’t be appliedKochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94[Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”, , accessed 7/8/13, VJ]Comprehensive economic sanctions which heavily impact the life and health of the civilian population need to be analyzed from an ethical standpoint before a normative evaluation of the current practice in international law can be undertaken. Indeed, comprehensive economic sanctions seem to be the "classical" instruments for inducing submission in the power politics of the so-called "New World Order"14 – and instruments whose permissibility must be critically examined from the standpoint of ethics as well as of international law. It does not of necessity follow that a measure praised as the panacea of power politics fulfills the requirements placed on a legitimate international order. In the first place, coercive measures like economic sanctions represent a form of collective punishment15 and thus do not comply with the ethical principle of individual responsibility, i. e. with the ability to attribute behaviour to an individual. The punishment of people not responsible for political decisions is most akin to a terrorist measure; the aim of such a measure is to influence the government's course of action by deliberately assaulting the civilian population.16 Purposefully injuring the innocent is, however, an immoral act per se, one which cannot be justified by any construction of utilitarian ethics. In accordance with the conception of Thomas Aquinas, inquiring into the intention behind a particular decision is of decisive value for an ethical evaluation.17 In the present context, several conditions govern the moral permissibility of acts in which a morally questionable bad upshot is foreseen: (a) the intended final end must be good, (b) the intended means to it must be morally acceptable; (c) the foreseen bad upshot must not itself be willed (that is, must not be, in some sense, intended); and (d) the good end must be proportionate to the bad upshot18, (that is, must be important enough to justify the bad upshot).19 The problematic nature of this utilitarian context of evaluation is plain to view. Are those who suffer under a certain measure to be viewed sympathetically as the victims of the pursuit of a good intention, or is their suffering to be regarded as the deliberate component of a strategy? This debate seems merely to invite hypocritical casuistry. The outcome for the affected population is one and the same. A "superficial" difference may only be discerned by an ethics of attitude from the viewpoint of the perpetrator. The latter appeases his conscience with reference to the unintentional but "inevitable" side effects. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the so-called "Doctrine of Double Effect" was developed, following a distinction made by Thomas Aquinas.20 It was designed to help clarify ethical questions that arise when a morally good end can only be reached through inflicting harm upon other people.21 In the concrete instance of comprehensive economic sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the moral good that is aspired is the maintenance or restoration of international peace; the wrong that is thereby effected is the suffering of the civilian population (including sickness and death as results of the mass suffering that accompanies the breakdown in the distribution of essential commodities). According to Quinn's ethical analysis, it is necessary to take into account the relation which the aspired goal has to the foreseen wrong that results from it.22 In this context, Quinn refers to the difference between "terror bombing" and "strategic" bombing in war: in the first instance, the suffering of the civilian population is deliberately intended; in the second, the possibility that the population will suffer is merely tolerated. In the first instance, harm is directly inflicted, in the second case indirectly. (In accordance with the currently valid rules of international humanitarian law, which we will later examine more closely, terror bombings are strictly prohibited, for the civilian population is never allowed to be the direct target in a military conflict.) Economic sanctions, however, are in line with the first case mentioned above: harm is directly and deliberately inflicted so as to force the government to alter its course of action.Sanctions EthnocentricSanctions are a form of corrupt ethnocentrismRarick, Professor at Purdue, and Duchatelet, Dean at Purdue, 08[Charles A, Martine, June 1st, Economic Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 2, “AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY”, page 49, EBSCO, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]A number of economic sanctions have been imposed based upon a lack of democracy in a country. While democracy is generally viewed as the preferred form of government, even democracies can be ineffective in advancing the interests of all citizens, and democracy will not solve every country's problems. Reich (2007) has argued that even in democratic countries such as the USA. citizen interest has been overtaken by special-interest groups lobbying law-makers for policies favourable to their interests. Brittan (2007) warns against viewing democracy as everything that is politically desirable. While this paper does not argue against the desirability of a democratic form of government, it does propose that economic sanctions cannot be relied upon to produce democratic forms of government, or to ease the suffering of people under totalitarian regimes. It is an ethnocentric viewpoint to assume that people strongly desire democracy over economic freedom and development. Economic sanctions aimed at producing political change can have the opposite effect and harden dictatorial rule, increasing the suffering of people in the sanctioned countries. In the case of Myanma r. recent civil unrest over the military regime's policies and worsening economic situation has produced an even harsher response from the government (Kazmin, 2007) including a crackdown even on the monastic community of the country. Government leaders have a fiduciary duty to represent all people, not just those with special interests. Young (2007) has proposed that leaders should use this fiduciary duty, which has evolved from the Judaeo-Chrtstian tradition and Roman law, to represent all stakeholders. Often sanctions are imposed because of pressure brought by special-interest groups, such as Burmese or Cuban refugees living in the USA. who are successful in getting sanctions imposed in order to advance their own agendas. Economic sanctions imposed for a special interest, even with good intentions, can be questioned on the basis of their ethical legitimacy. Using the three major frameworks of ethics the morality of economic sanctions can be explored, and conclusions drawn concerning the ethical nature of this type of public policy.Sanctions UnethicalSanctions fail all ethical frameworks – responsibility to subject them to rigorous ethical analysis before endorsementWilliam Seuffert, Grad Student @ School of International Service, 2000, The Morality of UN Economic Sanctions: Emerging from the Shadow of Iraq, ., p. 86Economic sanctions must bear some moral accountability to maintain their political legitimacy. In response to questions concerning the ethics of military force, frameworks were established to determine when force is acceptable. This theory of “just war” established conditions that would justify involvement in a war and the appropriate actions within that war. Economic sanctions must go through a similar ethical evaluation to determine when this coercive tool may be used justly. If economic sanctions are to be justified during peacetime under a preventive pretense, they must retain the moral high ground to ensure adherence to international norms. This ethical analysis should attempt to stay within the perspective of economic sanctions as a preventive tool. An ethical analysis must first refute the claim that economic sanctions are a nonviolent alternative to military force and therefore always ethically acceptable as an act of coercion. Experience from the “sanctions decade” proves the disastrous results of economic warfare. The humanitarian consequences can often evoke greater suffering on a population than military force, and they are often felt for a much greater period of time. The lack of military violence does not exonerate the sanctioning country of moral responsibility for the effects of economic sanctions. Jay Gordon argues that from the ethical perspective of just-war-doctrine, Kantianism and utilitarianism, economic sanctions are ultimately immoral: ”Sanctions are inconsistent with the principle of discrimination from just-war doctrine; sanctions reduce individuals to nothing more than means to an end by using the suffering of innocents as a means of persuasion, themselves’; and sanctions are unacceptable from a utilitarian perspective because their economic effectiveness necessarily entails considerable human damage, while their likelihood of achieving political objectives is low.” Sanctions unethical – impose suffering on individuals to punish their governmentWilliam Seuffert, Grad Student @ School of International Service, 2000, The Morality of UN Economic Sanctions: Emerging from the Shadow of Iraq, ., p. 79Economic sanctions are typically employed to coerce governments to comply with the demands of the issuing entity. While sanctions lack the direct violence of military coercion, they often result in situations of expanded and heightened suffering through indirect and unintended means. While the sanctions target governments, they typically victimize civil society and civil society and can often strengthen the regime. This apparent incongruence of intention and results requires a re-evaluation. The ethical and legal limitations of economic sanctions, supplemented by their tarnished history threaten their legitimacy and viability as a political tool. However, economic sanctions, as part of a greater framework of economic diplomacy, offer promise in the field of preventive diplomacy.Sanctions Generally Fail (Not Russia Specific)Sanctions fail – historical examples prove. Ken Blackwell, 10-15-2012, , “Sanctions Don't Work Because Despots Don't Care,” During last week's vice presidential debate, the candidates clashed over whose team would be better able to impose "crippling" sanctions on Iran. The problem with sanctions is an old one. President Jefferson tried to impose a trade embargo on Britain in 1807 to stop the Royal Navy from seizing our sailors on the high seas. This Embargo was an attempt to use peaceful coercion to bring about a change in policy by the British. It failed. It was Jefferson's greatest failure as president. We have a Bicentennial Walking Tour of the War of 1812 at the U.S. Naval Academy. I'd be happy to take you on that tour. The War of 1812 was the direct result of the failure of Jefferson's sanctions to make Britain changer her behavior. At the outset of the Civil War, Confederate President Jefferson Davis imposed a cotton embargo. Millions of bales of cotton were left to rot on Southern wharves because Davis and his Cabinet were convinced they could force Britain to break the Union blockade of Southern ports. The British, so this reasoning went, would become so desperate for cotton for their textile mills that they would have use force against the U.S. Navy and enter the war as a belligerent on the side of the Confederacy. Britain was unwilling to risk war with the Yankees and, besides, they found other sources of cheaper cotton--in Egypt, in India. Jeff Davis's cotton embargo failed--spectacularly. Prior to World War II, the U.S. imposed an oil embargo on Japan. The theory was that the Japanese military rulers, lacking any domestic sources of petroleum, would cease their aggression against China and be forced by economic sanctions to come to the negotiating table. You've heard of Pearl Harbor. That was the Japanese Imperialists' answer to the U.S. economic sanctions. The rulers of these countries, especially if they are dictatorships, always have enough stuff. The gaudy and glittering gangster palaces of the late unlamented Saddam Hussein and Muammar Khaddafi attest to the fact that despots always take care of their own creature comforts. These two got all the Western stuff--even pornography and Viagra--that they wanted. And yet, we are assured that sanctions will work with the Iranian mullahs. Why do we think this? These are men who willingly sent thousands of ten-year old boys through Iraqi minefields during the 10-year war between the mullahs and Saddam Hussein. These despots get all the stuff they want. And they don't care if their people suffer from crippling sanctions. Economic sanctions fail – bad actors perceive them as weak.Carla A. Robbins, 5-23-2013, is an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Bloomberg Businessweek, “Why Economic Sanctions Rarely Work,” Sanctions, particularly economic sanctions, have long been a tool of U.S. foreign policy, and few presidents have leaned on them as much as Barack Obama or been as successful at rallying others to do the same. To thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the U.S. has cajoled and bullied much of the world to slash imports of Iranian oil and freeze out Iranian banks. Most of the world has similarly choked off trade with North Korea. And for almost two years after the outbreak of Syria’s civil war, the U.S., Europe, and the Arab League hoped that asset freezes, banking and visa sanctions, and a Western ban on Syrian oil purchases would pressure Bashar al-Assad to step down or persuade his cronies to oust him. In a world bristling with bad actors, and especially at a time when the country is wary of another war, sanctions have an obvious appeal—and limited impact. Sanctions have failed to dissuade Iran from continuing to enrich uranium. They haven’t dislodged North Korea’s repressive and erratic leaders or forced a rollback of their nuclear and missile programs. For all the international pressure on Syria’s Assad, the regime is getting more ruthless, not less, and the policy debate in Washington has moved on to how much military support to provide the rebels. That record hasn’t stopped Congress from seeking to pile even more sanctions on the U.S.’s adversaries. In the House, more than 300 members from both parties are pushing a bill that would target Iran’s commercial trade and punish countries that buy even reduced amounts of oil from Iran. Several senators have proposed bills intended to choke off Iran’s access to foreign reserves and trade. Lawmakers are working on similar legislation to tighten the economic noose around North Korea. It’s an open question whether more punishment will actually change the behavior of Iran and North Korea—or instead make their leaders more defiant. Veteran U.S. diplomat Thomas Pickering says policymakers must understand that sanctions are only a tool and not a strategy. In the case of Iran, the U.S. has “spent a huge amount of time and attention developing a sanctions regime and far less on trying to work out a negotiating approach to take advantage” of that pressure, he says. “There has to be a rebalancing.” The U.S. has punishing restrictions on a half-dozen countries, including Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. A U.S. Department of the Treasury list of sanctioned individuals, businesses, and government programs worldwide runs to more than 550 pages. Daniel Drezner, a professor at Tufts University’s Fletcher School, says sanctions “tend to work when the demand is incredibly well-defined,” like resolving a trade dispute, “and there is some sort of decent relationship with the target state.” Those governments can compromise without worrying that the country imposing sanctions will keep demanding more. Drezner says that broad sanctions targeted at adversaries have far lower odds of success. “Put yourself in Iran’s shoes or North Korea’s shoes, when administration after administration has imposed sanctions”—they question whether what Washington is really pushing for is regime change. Dictators only respond to military force – economic action is weak. Jacob Weisberg, 8-2-2006, is chairman and editor-in-chief of the Slate Group and author of The Bush Tragedy, Slate, “Thanks for the Sanctions,” prompts economic growth and human interaction, which raises a society's expectations, which in turn prompts political dissatisfaction and opposition. Trade, tourism, cultural exchange, and participation in international institutions all serve to erode the legitimacy of repressive regimes. Though each is a separate case, these forces contributed greatly to undermining dictatorships and fostering democracy in the Philippines, South Korea, Argentina, Chile, and Eastern Europe in the 1980s. The same process is arguably under way in China. Contact also makes us less clueless about the countries we want to change. It is hard to imagine we would have misunderstood the religious and ethnic conflicts in Iraq the way we have if our embassy had been open and American companies had been doing business there for the past 15 years As another illustration, take Iran, which is currently the focus of a huge how-do-we-get-them-to-change conversation. Despite decades of sanctions, Iran is full of young people who are culturally attuned to the United States. One day, social discontent there will lead to the reform or overthrow of the ruling theocracy. But there is little reason to think that more sanctions will bring that day any closer. The more likely effect of a comprehensive sanctions regime is that it will push dissatisfied and potentially rebellious Iranians back into the arms of the nuke-building mullahs. The counterexample always cited is South Africa, where economic and cultural sanctions do seem to have contributed not only to the fall of a terrible regime but to a successful democratic transition. In his new book The J Curve, Ian Bremmer argues that South Africa was unusually amenable to this kind of pressure because it retained a functioning multiparty democracy and because, unlike many other pariah states, it didn't actually like being a pariah. Even so, sanctions took a very long time to have any impact. It was nearly three decades from the passage of the first U.N. resolution urging sanctions in 1962 to Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990. If they are so rarely effective, why are Western governments pressing for sanctions more and more often? In a world of trouble, it is partly an exercise in frustration. We often have no good options and need to feel that we're doing something. Sanctions are a palatable alternative to military action and often serve to appease domestic constituencies as well. But we need to learn that tyrants respond more to a deep survival instinct than to economic incentives. To understand their behavior, you can't just read Adam Smith. You need Charles Darwin.Sanctions are just used to score political points – no real enforcement mechanism. Haider Rizvi, 5-21-2013, is an award-winning journalist who is based at the UN in New York, GLOBAL TIMES, “US sanctions policy hurts ordinary people on all sides of dispute,” Nadeem Mirza is not from Iran, nor does he have anything to do with Tehran's alleged plans to develop a nuclear bomb. But he is suffering a huge financial loss due to US sanctions. "Oriental rugs have been in the US for more than 100 years," says Mirza, 51, a Pakistani businessman who specializes in repairing antique Central Asian rugs for affluent Americans. Last year, he lost hundreds of thousands of dollars because the US authorities refused to release the shipment of old carpets that he had repaired in Pakistan for his clients in northeastern US. "It took me 20 years to build credibility in this business, but it seems I am going to be one more addition to the 27 million unemployed US citizens," Mirza told me in a tone filled with frustration and anger. Mirza says he has suffered a lot from sanctions. But he is not the only one. In fact, there are tens of thousands of small business owners in and outside Iran who have lost their livelihood as a result of US trade embargo. The US sanctions are meant to press Tehran to halt its nuclear program suspected of nuclear weapon manufacturing, but they have failed to bring about any change in Tehran's policy. Iran, for its part, has consistently held that, as a signatory to the United Nations Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it has a legitimate right to produce nuclear energy and thus it would not abandon its nuclear projects. Like Iran, North Korea is also facing a tough regime of sanctions aimed at reversing its nuclear program. Though condemned by the international community in recent weeks for conducting nuclear weapon tests, North Korea seems to be in no mood to bow down to the US and its allies. Why? North Korea has a long history of struggle against foreign occupation. So does Iran, a nation which abhors foreign dictates and takes pride in being one of the cradles of world civilization. In both cases, it should be no surprise that these nations are obsessed with what some scholars of world history might describe as "national pride" and "collective self-esteem." It seems that Washington is either unwilling or unable to understand that it need not take punitive measures against these countries and its other perceived adversaries, but instead rely on diplomatic means to settle disputes. Nevertheless, those obsessed with the notion that sanctions could subdue other nations don't seem to understand that history and memory in many parts of the world play a significant role in shaping a political mind-set that might be more focused on collective self-esteem than economic concerns. If Iran is trying to develop a nuclear bomb for real, it must be condemned. But the US has never imposed sanctions against India, Pakistan, and Israel, which remain outside the fold of the NPT while possessing dozens, or perhaps hundreds, of nuclear weapons. These three countries have no fear of sanctions because they are close economic and military partners of the US. And Cuba, a small island nation that has no nuclear weapons, has had sanctions imposed by the US for well over half a century to no effect. On the other hand, many in the US believe the sanction policy is simply absurd because it hurts working people at home and abroad. "There is little empirical evidence that sanctions can achieve ambitious foreign policy goals," argues Robert Pape, a US political scientist who has done extensive research on the impact of sanctions. He thinks that in most cases sanctions are used by policymakers "to rescue their own prestige or their state's international reputation and rhetoric to […] demonize the target regime." He calls it the "American way of war," which "democratic leaders may sometimes adopt in order to give peace a chance and thus disarm criticism of the use of force later." Mirza cannot stomach any more. "What is going on? Who is going to benefit from this kind of policy?" he asks. The Iranian rugs he took from the US and brought back from Pakistan were confiscated by the authorities for months. "It's just going to hit the US citizens. We are just shooting our own feet without aiming properly," he says.Economic sanctions don’t workHenderson 98 (“Why Economic Sanctions Don’t Work”, David R. Henderson , David R. Henderson is a research fellow with the Hoover Institution. He is also an associate professor of economics at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He wrote this article for the Hoover Institution at Stanford University)Congress has gotten in the habit of imposing economic sanctions in order to punish foreign governments. It is a habit Congress should break. By Hoover fellow David R. Henderson. When I was a kid, the boy next door once played a nasty trick on my brother Paul: our neighbor held his cat in his arms, brought it within a few inches of Paul’s face, and pulled its tail. The suddenly angry cat bit Paul’s face. My brother and I were upset; the cat, we thought, should have bitten the perpetrator’s face. I think of that incident whenever I hear people call for economic sanctions against a whole country. When governments impose sanctions, the officials implementing the policy want to harm the dictator or bad guy heading the other country’s government. That’s the goal. What they do to achieve it is intentionally harm many innocent people in those countries by cutting them off—if the sanctions are effective—from food, medicine, and other goods that they need or value. The sanctions almost always work in a limited sense: they impose some harm on innocent people in the target country. But that’s not the goal. Nor is the goal to cut off the dictator from food, medicine, et cetera. You can be sure that Saddam Hussein and Fidel Castro are not hurting for antibiotics or high-quality food. No. The harm that the advocates of sanctions want to inflict on the bad guys is indirect. They are yanking innocent people’s tails so that those people, like our neighbor’s cat, will lash out at whoever’s face is right in front of them. They want those people to see their own government as the enemy and to try to overthrow it. But people are smarter than cats. When people suddenly find food, clothing, medicine, and other goods in short supply, when they find themselves a lot poorer and focusing desperately on day-to-day survival, they will take the time to find out who is responsible. And guess what? They do find out. Although governments in embargoed countries like Iran, Iraq, and Cuba strictly control what newspapers, radio, and television report, one piece of information that is sure not to be censored is the role of outside governments in the country’s economic distress. Of course, those governments will exaggerate the harm done by the sanctions. Although socialism is what’s killing poor people in Cuba, for example, Fidel Castro has, for almost forty years, blamed Cuba’s economic problems on the “blockade,” his word for the embargo imposed by the U.S. government in the early 1960s. But he can plausibly make this claim because the embargo exists. Likewise, although much of the Iraqis’ pain is caused by Saddam Hussein’s diversion of resources to his war machine, the pain caused by economic sanctions is quite real.What do people in embargoed countries do when they find out that foreign governments threaten their survival? They want to do what the cat wouldn’t do: bite the hand or face of the perpetrator. In fact, I can think of no case in history where as a result of sanctions imposed by government A on people in country B, country B’s people overthrew their own government. It’s the stuff of novels, and not very good novels. To understand how people in embargoed countries feel, you will have to use your imagination. Picture yourself back in 1974. President Nixon’s popularity has hit bottom. Many Americans want him out, but he holds on. Now imagine that the head of a freer country—say, Switzerland—thinks Nixon is a vicious leader and imposes sanctions on us. Because of these sanctions, we can’t get medicine and we can’t feed our families adequately. We spend our days scraping for the basics we need to survive. (Of course this is implausible in the United States, which is why I said you would have to use your imagination.) Now ask yourself: Is your first thought that you should organize and try to overthrow the president? You can be sure that Saddam Hussein and Fidel Castro are not hurting for antibiotics or high-quality food.Resolving the Ukraine Crisis BADResolving the Ukraine crisis means Russian can be aggressive in the Syria, triggering massive refugee flowsAngela Stent, 2016, Putin’s Power Play in Syria. By: Stent, Angela, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2016, Vol. 95, Issue 1 Angela Stent is a foreign policy expert specializing in U.S. and European relations with Russia and Russian foreign policy.Domestic political factors also contribute to Putin’s calculations. The sanctions that the United States and the eu levied against Russia after its annexation of Crimea have hit hard, especially when combined with the global fall in oil prices and preexisting structural problems in the Russian economy. The Kremlin has sought relief by “freezing” the conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine—a cease-fire between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists has been in force since early September, and both sides have pulled back some of their heavy weaponry, although sporadic reports of fighting have surfaced since then. Putin has calculated that the cease-fire and the decision by pro-Russian separatists to postpone local elections in eastern Ukraine may lead to the partial lifting of eu sanctions. Moreover, by making the Ukraine crisis appear to be headed toward resolution, Russia intends to shift the focus from its role as an instigator of conflict to its new role in Syria as a responsible leader in the global campaign against terrorism. Russia has presented its intervention in Syria as a counterterrorist operation that will reduce the number of refugees leaving Syria for Europe. But Moscow’s policy could have the opposite effect. In fact, by November, there had already been a 26 percent increase in the number of Syrian refugees, according to the Office of the un High Commissioner for Refugees, further exacerbating Europe’s migrant crisis. The Russian bombing campaign may have contributed to the upsurge in refugees. Moreover, Russian air strikes in support of the Alawiteled Assad government—which Sunni extremists consider to be an apostate regime—may both encourage more Russians to join isis (more than 4,000 people from Russia and Central Asia have already done so) and further alienate Russia’s own Sunni population, which numbers about 20 million. Putin has insisted that Russia has no interest in taking sides in a sectarian dispute and is merely fighting extremism, but this may be a hard sell domestically, as some Russian Muslims question Russia’s support of a regime that bombs its Sunni population. And Russia has not acknowledged that the Assad regime’s brutal treatment of its own population is a recruiting tool for ISIS.A2: Need Sanctions to Prevent Russia from Attacking Eastern Europe/The BalkansRussia has no desire to take the rest of the Ukraine, and sanctions have not held Putin backJeffrey Sommers, an associate professor at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee and a senior fellow at its Institute of World Affairs, is visiting faculty at the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, Latvia, December 10, 2015, New York Times, DOA: 12-24-15The architect of U.S. Cold War policy, George Kennan, warned at the end of his life, in 1998, that President Clinton’s policy of advancing NATO east risked war. By winter 2014 Russia perceived Ukraine as NATO’s next entrant. An expansionist Russia could have handily taken Ukraine in response to the Maidan protests, but this would have meant a new Cold War, or worse. An unending string of U.S. policy experts predicted that annexation of Ukraine by Russia was fast forthcoming. But Putin never took Ukraine, or even the Donbass. What happened? It’s clear Putin never intended to seize Ukraine, or even the Donbass — even though domestic pressures weighed heavily on him to act. Instead, Putin’s actions signaled that the status quo over NATO’s forward movement must change. The Donbass was his leverage. Putin is a tough nationalist, but rather than fueling the fire of Russian revanchism, Putin is actually the one carefully dousing those flames. U.S. and E.U. sanctions on Russia have not brought Russia to heel in Ukraine. The sanctions’ effects have been muted. Sanctions only worked to turn Russia to China on trade while working toward a national import substitution-based economy at home. Both results are against U.S. and E.U. wishes. Putin wants partnership with the West, but is not willing to be its supplicant. Meanwhile, many in the U.S. and E.U. genuinely wish to support democracy in Ukraine.Russia won’t start a war—deterrence checksK?stutis Girnius 14, IIRPS lecturer, associate professor, November 19, 2014, "Opinion: Are Baltic states in danger?", DELFI, en.delfi.lt/opinion/opinion-are-baltic-states-in-danger.d?id=66440692The situation is Ukraine has gotten more ominous. Additional armed Russian troops have entered the country's territory a week ago, accompanied by heavy weaponry and tanks. This mobilization of Russia's armed forces is not the first such occurrence, but the significance lies in its timing on the eve of several high-profile international meetings. Previously, Putin would use similar occasions to tone down Russia's military actions and showcase his good will, hoping to get the West refrain from introducing new sanctions or ease the existing ones. This time, however, he conspicuously ignored Western moods, despite his own and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's previous statements indicating that the sanctions had had negative effects on Russia and were of great concern to the Kremlin. It is yet unclear weather the movement of troops is an indication that Moscow wants to capture even more land in Ukraine. Russia and the separatists could use the airport at Donetsk and, even more importantly, the Black Sea coast that would open up routes to easily supply military equipment and other resources to Crimea and separatist-held territories in eastern Ukraine. But then the question that begs itself is why this was not done in August, when the Ukrainian government forces were on the brink of collapse and demoralization. Moreover, Putin has been cautious up to this point. Crimea was not taken before it had become clear that no one there would resist the "little green men". Much effort was put into disguising Russian troops' involvement in Ukraine. They acted openly only once there was a real risk that Ukraine's armed forces could win and bring Donetsk and Luhansk back under Kiev's control. We do not know what Putin wants, but it won't be good, that much is clear. Everyone is understandably concerned - and not just the professional cassandras who see every action Russia makes as the first step towards attacking one more Eastern European country. Roger Cohen, an influential columnist at The New York Times, is worried that "if Ukraine is lost, America's promise to its NATO Allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe is not going to be viewed as credible. A core Russian strategic objective since 1945 — the decoupling of American and European defense — will be on its way to realization." I cannot agree with Cohen. The decoupling of American and European defence will happen if someone actually decouples it. Who is going to do it? Under current circumstances, it will definitely not be the EU, because it is more directly threatened by Russian aggression and has defence capabilities well below those of the US. If NATO went down, EU countries would be forced to massively expand their defence spending. If the EU had wanted to see the US defending Ukraine - and Washington had been reluctant - then Europe might have felt abandoned and would have sought other security guarantees. But the American position is actually stronger on Russia, so there is no basis for disillusionment. It is the US that has reasons to be disappointed with some EU countries that have shamefully neglected their defence forces. But even these under-achievers do make their contributions: they guard the Baltic air space, monitor the Baltic Sea, etc. So neither side is eager to decouple American-European defence, while Russia's opportunism brings additional incentives to move closer together. Ukraine is not a NATO member, while the Baltic states are - and that is a crucial difference. Neither the US, nor the EU had been committed to defend Ukraine and have been clear since the beginning of the crisis that they will not take up arms. The Baltic states are a different matter altogether. The US and Russia know that aggression against one NATO member constitutes aggression against all - or at least those that have a stake in keeping NATO alive and effective. An attack against Lithuania or Latvia would also be an attack on NATO as a credible and self-defending alliance. The reliability of NATO is a vital interest of the EU countries in particular, therefore Russia's aggression would be met with proper response. Putin is well aware of that, enough not to risk triggering NATO actions that Russia would not be able to counter and would be forced to accept humiliation. The concern of Cohen et al. is that inadequate reaction to Russia's aggression would undermine NATO's credibility, turn the alliance into a paper tiger and push scared European nations into sucking up to the Kremlin. Therefore, the Baltic states could be next in line after Georgia and Ukraine. But Putin was so brave in Georgia and Ukraine precisely because he knew that neither represented vital interests of the US, while NATO was aware of the importance of these countries to Russia. He could therefore safely bet on NATO backing down in case of a serious confrontation. Whereas the Baltic nations, members of NATO, do represent vital interests of the alliance, but not the Kremlin (Russia has been getting by well enough without them in its sphere of interests for a quarter of a century now), so Putin knows that NATO will not back down. Even if Putin found himself in an adventurous mood, there are facts that he and his environment cannot ignore. In terms of military capacity, the US and NATO clearly holds an upper hand, have more experienced soldiers, are better equipped, particularly in aviation. Moreover, the US is not a pacifist country shying away from military confrontation. Quite the opposite, since World War Two, the US has been involved in wars or military operations almost uninterruptedly. Even under the less bellicose President Barack Obama, the US has been at war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen and now with Islamic State in Syria. Confrontation with NATO holds little promise to Russia, as only one out of three likely outcomes is any good. There is a chance, albeit a small one, that the West would not resist intervention in the Baltics and let NATO collapse. All other scenarios are not in Russia's interest. Either the West resists Russia's invasion and Moscow is forced to back down, suffering humiliation in front of the world; or, if neither side steps back, a war breaks out that Russia cannot possibly win. The deterrence theory is based on the assumption that both parties of a confrontation are rational and capable of calculating outcomes of different actions - and that they are at least marginally concerned with the welfare of their countries and peoples. One cannot deter suicide bombers because there is nothing that can threaten someone willing to die. There is no basis to assume that Putin and his circle are irrational fanatics. Up to this point, they have shown great aptitude to calculate what they can and cannot do. Putin might risk attacking the Baltic states, providing there were realistic chance that the US and NATO could be intimidated into backing down. But in the face of a clear American military advantage, Putin is free to pose, threaten, use shirtless photo-ops, but he will not take the plunge into actual war.Russia won’t invade other countries – it’s literally too much of a hasslePosner 14 [Eric Posner (Professor at UChicago Law, co-author of The Executive Unbound); ; “What to Do About Crimea? Nothing.: Why all our responses in Crimea are wrongheaded and doomed to fail.”; 3/27/2014]A more straightforward reason for sanctioning Russia is to deter it from attacking other countries. But most countries don’t invade others. Crimea was uniquely vulnerable, with a majority ethnic Russian population that welcomed the invaders; existing Russian military bases; and historical ties to Russia. Putin grabbed Crimea to avenge Ukraine’s defenestration of his puppet, Viktor Yanukovych. Russia’s other neighbors are either already compliant or extremely hostile, like Ukraine itself. Rather than occupy hostile territories, powerful countries prefer to exert influence from across the border while letting the foreign population misgovern itself. It’s just too much trouble to invade a country and be forced to govern a restive population, as the United States recently learned, to its sorrow, in Afghanistan and Iraq. An invasion of Ukraine—at least, beyond a few marginal regions in the east—would offer Russia nothing but a guerilla war on foreign territory.Economic deterrence not key – Russia knows it would be wiped out by NATO if it tries to mess with the rest of Ukraine and Eastern EuropeRoyner 8/26/15 Joshua Rovner is the John Goodwin Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University, where he serves as Director of the Security and Strategy Program, The Week, August 26, 2015, “How Vladimir Putin's paranoia could lead to nuclear war”, Putin's incompetence also creates new risks. His inability to learn from Ukraine, for instance, suggests that he might be willing to try the same gambit in the Baltics on the pretext of defending ethnic Russians. Putin may believe that he can attempt a similar sort of covert coup using special operators and supporting separatists while publicly denying any involvement. He might also begin overt conventional maneuvers near the Estonian or Latvian border to send a tacit threat of Russian intervention. Making good on that threat, however, would risk a conflict with the United States, which would be obligated to come to the defense of its NATO allies. What would happen if NATO sent conventional forces to contest Russian moves in the Baltics? Some analysts correctly note that while NATO possesses overwhelming advantages in the aggregate, it would be outnumbered locally. This means that Russia could quickly establish a foothold on some slice of Baltic territory before the United States could organize a response. NATO would need some time to arrive in theater with the strength needed to confront Russian forces, and it would have to fight very hard to eject them. And beyond the costs of conventional fighting, they would also face the risk of a nuclear exchange. While escalation is not inevitable, Putin's strategic ineptitude makes it more likely. In the abstract, there are psychological, political, and military pathways to nuclear escalation. First, intense wartime psychological stress might cause leaders to misinterpret signals of restraint, exaggerate the costs and danger of fighting, and become risk-acceptant. Second, paranoid leaders might believe the price of losing is regime change. If they are convinced that staying in power requires decisive victory, even against a vastly superior conventional enemy, they might be willing to gamble for resurrection by crossing the nuclear threshold. Third, leaders may opt to use nuclear weapons through a process of inadvertent escalation. They may reasonably construe attacks on their command and control systems, for instance, as part of a campaign to disable their deterrent force. Under these circumstances they might act on a terrible "use it or lose it" impulse, even if their adversary had no intention of destroying their nuclear capabilities. While all three of these scenarios could occur during a NATO–Russia conventional conflict, Putin's strategic myopia is particularly troubling because it exacerbates the psychological and political pathways to escalation. The inability to recognize failure might give him false confidence about Russia's prospect against NATO forces, especially because Russia would enjoy initially superior numbers in a hypothetical war. This lead might not last long. In the last 30 years the United States has demonstrated extraordinary abilities to overcome enemy defenses through a combination of rapid maneuver, electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, and brute force. A successful counter-attack against Russian forces, especially including strikes on Russian air defense installations, would come as a terrifying shock to Russian leaders. In this case a host of familiar psychological pathologies could take hold, making it possible for Putin to lash out in anger and frustration rather than seeking some way of limiting the damage. There is also reason to believe that Putin may view losing to NATO as tantamount to regime suicide. Putin's domestic popularity rests on a self-constructed narrative that Russia is threatened by duplicitous and hostile states, and that he is the only leader strong enough to resist them. Putin's inability to recognize failure probably encourages this delusion. Unfortunately, this worldview implies that backing down is intolerable, because it would suggest Russian weakness and invite more aggression from the West. Rather than concede defeat in the wake of conventional losses, Putin might opt for nuclear weapons to preserve his own rule. Instead of suing for peace in a limited conflict, he might be willing to take the extraordinary risk of escalation to force NATO to accept his terms. There are indications that Russian strategists are preparing for this contingency. Indeed, Russia's nuclear doctrine has included variations on the logic of these so-called "de-escalatory strikes" since 2000.A2: Sanctions Cause Economic Decline and That’s Good – Hurts MilitaryPutin perceives that the economy is improving...which means that even if they win that economic pain is a deterrent, Putin no longer perceives economic pain.Anna Adrianova wrote in a Bloomberg Business article on December 16th that – () DOA: 12-18-15As industrial production capped its sixth month of improvements in November, there’s some catching up to do for the Russian consumer. The collapse of household finances moderated in November after inflation slowed every month since August. Real wages slumped 9 percent from a year earlier, the least in three months, after a revised 10.5 percent drop in October, the Federal Statistics Service in Moscow said Thursday in a statement. That was less than the median estimate for a 10.2 percent plunge in a Bloomberg survey of?18 economists. Even so, a drop in retail sales unexpectedly accelerated and unemployment rose more than forecast. A recovery in incomes will help draw a curtain on a period that saw the biggest drop in consumption under President Vladimir Putin, who said during his annual news conference Thursday that Russia’s passed the worst of its economic crisis after last year’s currency collapse and a slide in oil prices. The central bank, which last week extended its interest-rate pause to three meetings, HYPERLINK "" \o "Link to statement" \t "_blank" said “modest” growth in household incomes will continue to hold back consumer spending. “Russia is moving out of the recession at a snail’s pace,” Piotr Matys, a strategist for emerging-market currencies at Rabobank in London, said by e-mail. “The underlying trend is still fairly weak, especially in the case of domestic demand, as reflected in the ongoing contraction in retail sales and investments. The latest economic indicators also keep the bias skewed in favor of resuming the monetary-policy easing cycle to reduce the burden on the economy.”IF they win that sanctions hurt Russia’s economy, that INCREASES Russia’s threat to the WestSmith ’11 – Director of the Potomac Institute Cyber Center(David J., former Ambassador and Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute, “Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin:? The Once and Future Czar”, Georgian Security Analysis Center, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 10/3/2011, )The danger for Russia?s neighbors is that if the Russian economy sours, Putin could follow the time-honored ? Russian tradition of lashing out at imagined enemies such as Georgia or the Baltic countries. And a conflict ? in the North Caucasus could easily spill—accidentally or purposefully—into Georgia.? Nor should the west discount the possibility of diversionary Russian obstreperousness in the Middle East or? polemics with NATO. Moscow is skillfully setting the stage for either.? Regrettably, aggression will likely be Putin?s default instinctThere is no link to their argument – Russia’s military spending is insulated from an economic downturnBloomberg Businessweek noted in 2015, June 25, DOA: 12-18-15There’s one area of growth, though, that some analysts see as Putin’s version of a stimulus: Military spending. “It’s clear that the efficiency of the military-industrial complex is the most important source of economic growth,” Putin said at a military forum on June 16. On May 12, Putin signed documents creating what he called the “industrial battalions” program, which will give thousands of draftees the option of working in defense enterprises instead of joining the regular military. According to federal budget accounts, after years of chronic funding problems for weapons makers, Russia has started to prepay for goods and services it buys from the defense industry, which employs 2.5 million Russians. Defense, national security, and law enforcement now eat up 34 percent of the Russian budget, more than double the share in 2010. That dwarfs the 18?percent spent by the U.S. last year on defense and national security, according to the Washington-based Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Still, Americans spent $615 billion last year, while the Russians spent $84 billion. “The government has two urgent tasks: strengthening security at all levels of society and promoting innovation to end the macroeconomic stagnation,” says Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of a defense ministry advisory board. “The solution to both problems is to intensify the development of the military-industrial complex.” State-run defense contractors stand to benefit: United Aircraft, which makes Sukhoi and MiG fighter jets; United Shipbuilding, now building a new fleet of destroyers; and Uralvagonzavod, maker of the brand-new T-14 Armata tank. (Each tank costs about $4?million to $5 million to make. Mass production won’t start anytime soon.) Putin’s former finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, has voiced his opposition to plans to spend 23 trillion rubles ($426?billion) through 2020 on defense. Kudrin says the defense buildup does little to solve Russia’s structural problems and the crisis it faces. Putin, who warns of a threat from the West and the need for more self-sufficiency, has vowed to spend the full amount budgeted for the military. He’s already ended the Russian military’s purchases from abroad, so the army will buy only from Russian suppliers.Russia is a retreating powerSerbos 15 (Sortis, Johns Hopkins Assistant Professor in International Politics at Democritus University of Thrace and Fulbright Fellow, “Transatlantic Partnership Forum Working Paper Series Eurozone’s Debt Crisis and US Strategy: A Return of Geopolitics for Europe”)Russia’s hard line against the signing of Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU brings about a policy U-turn on behalf of Ukrainian President Yanukovych; choosing Kremlin’s deal and derailing Kiev’s European orientation. The profound disillusionment among Ukraine’s pro-Western forces quickly turns into “mass demonstrations in central Kiev and other cities, and the occupation of government buildings”26. Escalation of conflict between government and opposition forces generates diplomatic activities, including a broker’s role on the part of EU’s revived Weimar Triangle (Germany, France, and Poland) which comes to mediate “an agreement allowing for early elections and Yanukovych’s removal.”27 Be that as it may, it was too late for Europe and Russia, to avoid President Yanukovych’s overthrow and the installation of a pro-Western transitional government in Ukraine. Apparently, Russia clearly undermined the pro-Western dynamics that had been developed by Americans and Europeans in Ukraine over the last decade. On top of that, Ukraine’s resurgent far-right-wing nationalists significantly escalated the crisis on the ground and sent a red alert signal to Kremlin; underlying that there will be unavoidable bloodshed if Moscow’s regime initiates a multi-level pro-Russian insurrection across Eastern Ukraine.? With the US first in line to put Russia in a tight corner, Washington was now anticipating President’s Putin next move and another round of wrong tactics to be followed. Facing the risk of losing Ukraine as a whole and accepting a huge geopolitical defeat of its core strategic interests over the crown jewel of the former Russian empire, “it was soon evident that only Crimea, where there was already a substantial Russian military presence, was in any sense under Moscow’s control”.28 Indeed, through the use of hybrid warfare29 and more conventional military methods to exercise a low-level war, the Russian Federation invaded and annexed Crimea in March 2014. “By annexing Crimea, on the basis of its military significance and ethnic composition, Russia revived some of the classic concerns of European security”30 and fell into the US’s well-managed but still of high risk trap. In essence, allowing Washington to start working on the coordination of an enduring alliance system that places Moscow in a tactical confrontation game of medium-term character which is far too difficult for Russia to win. Very quickly, Crimea’s invasion “resulted in the expulsion of Russia from the G8, the breakdown of relations between Russia and the United States, a significant cooling of relations between Russia and Western Europe, and the use of economic sanctions by the West against Russia.”31? Based on the present situation, a primary alternative policy for Russia would be to turn to Asia, with the visible risk of an alliance to be formed between US and China to contain Russian influence. After all, Russia and China constitute geopolitical rivalries with conflicting interests, both in Central Asia over Russian efforts for continuing monopolizing its energy resources, and Eastern Siberia which is traditionally eyed by China. In essence, China’s rise in the East coupled with empty Russian territories of Siberia adds another risk for loss of influence possibly more serious than Ukraine. Beyond that, as a result of the new set of control rules that will regulate Europe’s balance of power system, Russia has also lost its second best policy to enter into a future economic and political alliance with Germany32. That kind of shaky prospect would undermine both the future of the EU and the broader American strategy in Europe. Because of the crisis in Ukraine, it is now perceived as a more than downside scenario, clearly not within the realms of a medium term or even long run possibility. Thus, Russia can’t believably threaten the West with a potential anti-US alliance with either China or Germany. More likely, Russia can find itself strategically squeezed between an expanding Europe and China, a development that highlights the burdensome position in which Kremlin is going to move into soon.? To draw a conclusion, as Russia faces all the symptoms of a retreating power, “this is in the end far more a Russian crisis than a western one.”33 As such, Europe and the US should be more confident to deal with Russia’s decline. Currently, Russia’s upshot portrays a Eurasian power with its western part considerably weakened; being still in transition and swinging between European and Asian orientations. With this in mind, European option can breathe new life into Russia providing that Russians accept the real and accurate dimensions of their power. If Russia wishes to move forward and turn to the West, this course of action will have to be compatible with the terms and conditions set by the EU and the US and will include Kremlin’s recognition to give consent for the long-term American policy in Europe. Noting that a backsliding regional actor does not meet the required standards for a global power position, it is preferable for Russia to accept the West’s political platform for closer mutual cooperation. In the interim, “with Russia and Ukraine, what continues to be required is a mixture of efforts designed to shore up Ukraine economically and militarily, strengthen NATO, and sanction Russia.”34No risk of Russian revisionism – US capability and European latent power solves. Kearn 14 (David W. Kearn, Jr., Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Government and Politics at St. Johns University in New York. Dr. Kearn is a graduate of Amherst College, holds a Master of Public Policy degree from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and received his Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia. May 19 2014, “1914 Revisited: Great Power War in the 21st Century”, )Putin’s adventure: How far will he go?Comparisons can be made between Putin's Russia and inter-war Germany. Even if the National Socialists had not come to power in Germany in 1933, war would have been likely. Any nationalist or militarist government would have sought to use force, if necessary, to address the perceived humiliations and territorial penalties of the Versailles Treaty – though probably without the military adventure against the Soviet Union or the final solution. Of course, whether these attempts would have led to another World War is difficult to say.The parallel between post-Weimar Germany and Putin's Russia is most useful in highlighting how nationalism and an assertive foreign policy—especially in the context of perceived national humiliations – can be used to consolidate domestic political power. Today, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the loss of influence over historically compliant territories in Russia's "near abroad," and the expansion of NATO during a period of Russian weakness, animate Moscow elites, just as war guilt, reparations, the loss of territory, and mandated disarmament drove the resentment of German elites a century ago. Putin clearly appreciates the domestic political benefits of a strong Russian foreign policy, and Ukraine has presented an opportunity to reassert Russian interests vis-à-vis the West.Now as then, democratic Western Europe is less than resolute in the face of this belligerence. Preoccupied with recovering from the most serious economic crisis since the inception of the Eurozone, neither Brussels nor (more importantly) Berlin seems to have any appetite for a forceful stand against Russia. But even with its problems, Europe today is unified (at least by historical standards) and remains a global economic power that possesses the latent capabilities to punish Russian transgressions. No less significantly, the presence of US military forces within NATO provides a robust deterrent. While limited economic sanctions have been criticized, the prospect of greater pain for the Russian economy (which is already in serious distress) may be sufficient to prevent further aggression. Unless Putin has truly become an irrational adventurer, committed to expansion at the expense of Russia’s interests, his policies will continue to be merely opportunistic in nature.The current period in world affairs may indeed seem more uncertain and potentially dangerous than any since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the increased assertiveness of non-Western powers only reaffirms the centrality of the United States to the peace, security, and prosperity of its allies around the globe. The threat of force by Moscow or Beijing is likely to be self-defeating, as those threatened will naturally seek to reinforce and re-energize their ties to the keeper of global order, the United States. As long as America’s unwieldy and divided political system does not fundamentally erode its power and jeopardize its standing in the world, the probability of great power war should remain remote.A2: Bad Economy Stops Russian Power Projection[Insert other economy answers]Economic decline has not stopped Russia’s power projectionAngela Stent, 2016, Putin’s Power Play in Syria. By: Stent, Angela, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2016, Vol. 95, Issue 1 Angela Stent is a foreign policy expert specializing in U.S. and European relations with Russia and Russian foreign policy.For all of Russia’s domestic problems—a shrinking economy, a declining population, and high rates of capital flight and brain drain—it has projected a surprising amount of power not only in its neighborhood but also beyond. U.S. President Barack Obama may refer to Russia as a regional power, but Russia’s military intervention in Syria demonstrates that it once again intends to be accepted as a global actor and play a part in every major international decision. This will be a vexing challenge not only for Obama during his remaining time in office but also for the next occupant of the White House.A2: Sanctions Undermine the Russian Economy – GeneralOne - Sanctions have forced Russia to pay down its dollar and Europe dominated , so there is no net negative economic impact. Their evidence is predictive and our evidence is descriptive as to what has actually happened.Leonid Bershidsky, a Bloomberg View contributor, is a Berlin-based writer, wrote on December 22, 2015, Chicago Tribune, Germany is Right to Flout Economic Sanctions, DOA: 12-23-15Some might call the German leniency toward borderline sanction-busting hypocritical, as Renzi does. Yet the sanctions are a political statement more than anything else. In purely economic terms, they have contributed no more than 10 percent of Russia's economic decline this year, or about 0.3 percent of gross domestic product. They have curtailed the ability of Russian banks and companies to borrow in Western markets, and that has hindered their expansion, but they ended up paying down their dollar- and euro-denominated debts, which, given the ruble's shakiness, has only improved their financial health. There has been no other noticeable effect.Two -- Russian sanctions on Turkish products protect the economy. Regardless of the impact of Western sanctions on Russia, Russia’s economy will growKostis Geropolous, December 9, 2015, New Europe, Russia Sees 2% GDP Loss Next Year, DOA: 12-9-2015She said that the question is what the implications would be for Russia’s growth. “I think that because of the sanctions on Turkey growth will most likely remain positive next year,” Orlova said, explaining that Russia’s decision to close its markets to Turkish products after the latter downed its SU-24 warplane near Syria will give Russian producers more opportunities to increase their output. Orlova, however, warned that inflation is likely to be higher than forecasted. But she added that taxes are likely to bring higher revenues for the budget. “I would not be too pessimistic about the budget revenues,” she said. Russian President Vladimir Putin banned Turkish goods including everything from turkeys and chicken to produce such as cucumbers, tomatoes, onions, and tangerines from January 1, which comprised about a quarter of Russia’s imports from Turkey in 2014.Three – Russia’s economy fell prior to the implementation of the sanctions in 2014Surgei Gureiv, December 22, 2015, Pakistan Observor, DOA: 12-23-15Not surprisingly, such reforms—which were publicly announced and even promised in writing—were never implemented. Economic growth slowed from 4 percent in 2011 to just 1 percent in 2013. Given that the social contract and the regime’s support were premised on rising incomes, the economic slowdown coincided with a fall in Putin’s approval ratings from 79 percent in late 2010 to 61 percent by the end of 2013.Four – even with the sanctions, Russia’s economy will rebound in 2016Elena Popina, December 21, 2015, Bloomberg Business, DOA: 12-23-15Russia’s economy will probably shrink 3.8 percent in 2015 and not resume growth until the third quarter of 2016, according to the median of 39 economists surveyed by Bloomberg.Five – austerity measures that have resulted from the crisis will increase Russia’s economy in the long term, and sanctions not keyBen Aris, December 21, 2015, Russia Beyond the Headlines, How much are Western Sanctions hurting Russia’s economy? Sanctions imposed by Western nations on Russia over its involvement in the Ukraine crisis and absorption of Crimea have hurt the country’s economy, but not mortally wounded it. The collapse of oil prices and the subsequent devaluation of the ruble have done far more damage. But faced with this double whammy, the Kremlin is in crisis mode and trying to stitch together a rescue package. In the long run, the current squeeze may end up being a boon for Russian companies, as firms used to easy profits have been forced to cut costs and improve really bad management practices. The sanctions imposed last year were largely symbolic, with the notable exceptions of the ban on offering Russian companies anything more than 30 days’ credits, and the list barring Western firms from doing business with some of the largest corporate and financial institutions in the country. As a result, the banking sector is bearing most of the brunt of the move. “In the old days, our business was easy,” said one senior banker who didn't want to named. “We borrowed long, cheap money from the international markets and lent it short and expensive on the domestic market.” hat business has been brought to an abrupt end. As Russia has failed to establish its own institutional investors, including things like pension and insurance funds, there is no alternative source of long-term credit except the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). Although at the moment the Central Bank is sitting on $370 billion - enough to keep the sector liquid - the bank has problems with its exposure. Central bank funds currently make up some 15 percent of all banking liabilities, up five-fold from the 3 percent they made up during the worst of the 2008 crisis. Happily the peak seems to have passed and the CBR is now unwinding its position to the banking sector, but it is still not out of the woods. Following an emergency hike in interest rates in December 2014, the cost of capital is impossibly high. Despite five rate cuts this year, interest rates are currently 11 percent and need to get into single figures before companies can afford to borrow again to make investments. That is not likely to happen until the middle of next year. In the meantime, banks are unable to make profits and most are simply subsisting. “The problem is that we won’t lend to the companies that want to borrow from us,” Herbert Moos, deputy C.E.O. of VTB Bank said. “And the ones we want to lend to don't want to borrow at these prices.” The lack of lending is weighing heavily on the economy, which contracted by 4.1 percent in the third quarter and is expected to end the year at -3 percent. The collapse of oil prices and the subsequent devaluation of the ruble were real disasters for Russia. As some two-thirds of both the federal budget and export revenue come from oil exports, the size of Russia’s economy has been more than cut in half in dollar terms. However, a quirk of accounting has meant that the federal budget has automatically corrected to make the pain bearable. The budget assumes a dollar oil price to estimate its revenues, but the spending is fixed in unadjusted rubles. If the price of oil changes, the government is one of the biggest winners from the devaluation: Its oil tax revenue dollars can buy twice as many rubles to cover unadjusted ruble expenditures. Nevertheless, the fall in oil has badly hurt growth, which reduces tax revenue. This year the government is expected to run a deficit of 3 percent of GDP. The change in the value of the ruble has virtually wiped out any business that depends on imports. For example, although five of the world’s biggest car manufacturers have production facilities in Russia, they still import up to 60 percent of their parts, which are now twice as expensive for local buyers. Car production was down by a quarter over the first 10 months of this year to just over 1 million units, and way off the approximately 4 million cars Russia was on track to produce in 2008, which would have made it the biggest car market in Europe. The cost of foreign holidays has also doubled, while real incomes fell just over 9 percent in the first nine months of this year. That means the once booming tourism business has been hit by a slate of bankruptcies, which will only get worse after Russians cancelled holidays to Egypt and Turkey – the two top destinations for Russian vacationers – due to terrorism fears. However, the crisis has been a boon for other sectors. Supermarket chains are expanding at top speed, almost entirely unaffected by the crisis. With all imported foods cleared from shelves due to a combination of Russia’s own sanctions on foreign food products and the price increase due to the ruble devaluation, shoppers have retreated to the leading chains to buy Russian-produced goods. Local manufacturers have popped up to replace the missing products, and Russia’s cheese production was up 40 percent in the first half of this year. Likewise, Russian exports are having a bonanza, as their domestic ruble costs have been cut in half while revenues from the international markets in dollars have remained the same. Raw material extractors and related business have seen profits boom. Leading steel mill Magnitogorsk reported record profits in the third quarter, and agricultural giant Rosagro reported record-breaking revenues. This is not to say that times are good for Russian business. High inflation, the high cost of capital and the falling real income of the population has curbed growth and investment for most companies. But analysts speculate that this could be healthy, as it forces companies to become more efficient. The OSCE found that Russia had the lowest productive of any country in Europe in a study two months ago and was half the European average. But now Russian productivity is rising twice as fast as the EU average and is currently at an all-time high. Maybe a year or two of austerity is just what Russian companies need to get rid of the excess fat they gained during the heyday of the boom years in the mid-2000s.Six -- Russia’s economic problems aren’t due to the sanctions and they adaptEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15Considering the dire state of Russia’s economy, these sanctions might appear to be working. The value of the ruble has fallen by 76 percent against the dollar since the restrictions were imposed, and inflation for consumer goods hit 16 percent in 2015. That same year, the International Monetary Fund estimated, Russia’s GDP was to shrink by more than three percent.In fact, however, Western policymakers got lucky: the sanctions coincided with the HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" collapse of global oil prices, worsening, but not causing, Russia’s economic decline. The ruble’s exchange rate has tracked global oil prices more closely than any new sanctions, and many of the actions taken by the Russian government, including the slashing of the state budget, are similar to those it took when oil prices fell during the 2008 financial crisis. The sanctions have inhibited access to Western financing, forcing Russian banks to turn to the government for help. This has run down the Kremlin’s foreign reserves and led the government to engage in various unorthodox financial maneuvers, such as allowing the state-owned oil company Rosneft to recapitalize itself from state coffers. Yet the Russian government has been able to weather the crisis by providing emergency capital to wobbling banks, allowing the ruble to float freely, and making targeted cuts to the state budget while providing fiscal stimulus through increased spending on pensions. Even with continued low oil prices, the International Monetary Fund expects that growth will return to the Russian economy in 2016, albeit at a sluggish 1.5 percent.A2: Sanctions Undermine the Oil SectorTheir oil link is terribleFirst, the fall in oil prices is responsible for the decline in the oil sector, not the sanctions. Vestnik Kavkaza wrote on December 23rd that, “the sanctions have largely been unsuccessful in their nature and have not had the desired effect….the Russia economy has suffered, but this has happened largely due to the price fluctuations on the global oil and gas markets.. the economic damage?cannot be regarded as an indicator of the effectiveness of the anti-Russian sanctions.”(1)Second, there is no reason that investment and technical cooperation are needed. The Hellenic Shipping News wrote on December 23rd that, “in 2015, Russia not only maintained its production levels, but increased output, exceeding all expectations by experts and beating all Soviet and post-Soviet records.” (2)Steven Bierman Wrote on December 21st that, “Russia’s unexpected?oil?bounty this year is the result not of a new Kremlin campaign but of dozens of modest productivity improvements across the sprawling sector. Even pressured by plunging prices, as well as U.S. and European Union sanctions that cut access to much foreign financing and technology, Russian companies have managed to squeeze more crude out of some of the country’s oldest fields. They have also brought new projects on line, offsetting steady declines in its core producing region of West Siberia.”Third, a decline in the oil sector has forced reforms that have actually benefitted the economyRussia Today, May 29, 2015, Russia got rid of "dutch disease," russia-ruble-recovery/ DOA: 12-27-15Low oil prices aren't a tragedy for Russia’s economy, the country has managed to end to its total dependence on oil known as a ‘Dutch disease’, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said. The ruble is currently at its real value, the minister said during an economic forum in the Russian city of Vladimir, RIA Novosti reported on Friday. Investments that previously went only to the oil industry, have been redirected to other areas, according to Siluanov. “We now see that other spheres besides the oil industry can be developed as well. We have started effectively investing in the development of the so-called trade spheres such as agriculture, chemicals and oil products, that were not competitive before.”1- Oil price declines, not sanctions responsible for the economic declineVecstnik Kavkaza, December 23, 2015, CATO Institute Believes extension of sanctions against Russia is a failure of political decision, DOA: 12-23-15However, despite all the efforts of the European community to limit the economic and political activities of the Kremlin, the sanctions have been largely unsuccessful in their nature and have not had the desired effect. Exactly this explains the fall of the ruble, but not the restrictions imposed by the EU. Of course the Russian economy has suffered, but this has happened largely due to the price fluctuations on the global oil and gas markets. Exactly this explains the fall of the ruble, but not the restrictions imposed by the EU. In addition, generally the economic damage?cannot be regarded as an indicator of the effectiveness of the anti-Russian sanctions2- Russia has maintained productionHellenic Shipping News, December 23, 2015, Against All Odds: Russia Sees Oil Output Boost in 2015,” DOA: 12-23-15Despite the global oil market suffering from a continuous decrease in oil prices in 2015, Russia not only maintained its production levels, but increased output, exceeding all expectations by experts and beating all Soviet and post-Soviet records. Russia, the world’s third-largest oil producer, raised its oil output by 0.5 percent in the first nine months of 2015, despite the imposition of Western sanctions and an oversupply in the world market, Bloomberg reported. “I know of no one who had predicted that Russian production would rise in 2015, let alone to new record levels,” Edward Morse, Citigroup’s global head of commodities research said. Although Russia’s output growth was lower than that of the US and Saudi Arabia (up 1.3 and 5.8 percent respectively), the pace matched that of the OPEC cartel, according to Citigroup Inc. Bloomberg explained that Moscow owes its success to “productivity improvements” across the industry. Oil companies focused on some of the country’s oldest fields and developed new projects in those locations amid an output drop in the country’s biggest oil-producing region of West Siberia. The brightest instance of this trend is the work of Bashneft in 2015, Bloomberg noted, adding that the producer accounted for the highest crude output of all Russian companies. Bashneft also showed the best performance of all players on the Russian stock market within the last 12 months. The company produced higher amounts of oil across areas discovered in the previous century that had been widely ignored by Soviet authorities. Bashneft boosted production in those sectors by a factor of 20. The company additionally used custom-designed pumps, produced locally, and so not affected by the Western sanctions. “We’re up 3 percent since the beginning of the year at our mature fields in Bashkiria, the oldest of which has been in production for 83 years and already produced 1.7 billion tons (12.5 billion barrels) of oil,” Mikhail Stavskiy, First Vice President of PJSOC Bashneft, said.Steve Bierman, December 21, 2015, , Siberian Surprise: Russian Oil Patch Just Keeps Pumping, DOA: 12-23-15MOSCOW (Bloomberg) -- In the fight for market share among the world’s?oil?producers this year, Russia wasn’t supposed to be a contender. But the world’s No. 3 producer has been pumping at the fastest pace since the collapse of the Soviet Union, adding to the flood on an already-swamped market and helping push prices to the lowest levels since 2009. Russia’s unexpected?oil?bounty this year is the result not of a new Kremlin campaign but of dozens of modest productivity improvements across the sprawling sector. Even pressured by plunging prices, as well as U.S. and European Union sanctions that cut access to much foreign financing and technology, Russian companies have managed to squeeze more crude out of some of the country’s oldest fields. They have also brought new projects on line, offsetting steady declines in its core producing region of West Siberia. With a rise of 0.5% in the first nine months of 2015, Russia hasn’t boosted production as much as its larger rivals, the U.S. (up 1.3%) and Saudi Arabia (up 5.8%), according to Citigroup Inc.?But having ignored OPEC’s calls earlier this year to join efforts to support prices by pumping less, Russia is keeping up with the cartel. “I know of no one who had predicted that Russian production would rise in 2015, let alone to new record levels,” said Edward Morse, Citigroup’s global head of commodities research.?As recently as April, not even the Russian government thought 2015 would break the record. Bashneft’s Boom But Mikhail Stavskiy said he wasn’t surprised. A veteran of the oil fields of Siberia who’s now head of upstream at Bashneft PJSC, he said his engineers have managed to find more?oil?in some of the fields where he worked summers as a student in the early 1980s. Bashneft, with some of the oldest reserves in Russia, has been the biggest single contributor to increased crude output this year, thanks largely to low-cost efforts to squeeze more?oil out of regions that have been in production for decades. The results have helped make Bashneft’s shares among the best performers on Russia’s stock market in the last 12 months. The other big boosts to Russian production this year have come from a few mid-sized new fields like those of Severenergia in the Arctic Yamal region. Co-owners Novatek OJSC and Gazpromneft PJSC invested in the $9.2-billion project back when?oil?prices were high. With most of the capital already committed, operating costs now are relatively low and output of gas condensate, a light and especially valuable form of crude, is up five-fold this year. One side effect of falling?oil?prices -- the 52% plunge in the ruble over the last two years -- has helped Russian?oil?producers, chopping their costs in dollar terms since between 80% and 90% of their spending comes in rubles. “I don’t know what the?oil?price would have to fall to for things to change dramatically,” Stavskiy said. “We’ve been through $9/bbl and production continued, so if something like that happens, we know what to do.”Fall of oil prices responsible for the decline in the value of the oil sectorKostis Geropolous, December 9, 2015, New Europe, Russia Sees 2% GDP Loss Next Year, DOA: 12-9-2015The Russian ruble fell to dramatic lows on December 8, sinking to 68.5 against the US dollar and 74.4 against the euro for the first time since September, with Russian analysts linking the Russian currency’s downward spiral to slumping oil prices. “It’s basically one-to-one now. One dollar per barrel change in oil prices causes around one ruble per dollar depreciation in terms of declining oil prices,” Natalya Orlova, chief economist at Russia’s Alfa Bank, told New Europe by phone on December 9. Brent crude prices sank under $40 on December 8 for the first time in almost seven years following a decision by the Organization of Petroleum Countries (OPEC) on December 4 to maintain record-high oil output levels.A2: Sanctions Reduce Western InvestmentThere are other reasons investment is decreasing – corruption, Russian restrictionsSergei Guriev, December 22, 2015, Deglobalizing Russia, v DOA: 12-23-15, practice, the pro-globalization rhetoric of Putin’s elites has always coexisted with protectionist policies and resistance to integration. Russia eventually managed to join the WTO, but only in 2012. Both before and after that, the government took numerous steps aimed at undermining free trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2006, Russia forced the Shell-led Sakhalin energy consortium to sell a majority stake to Gazprom. In 2008, the Kremlin adopted a list of more than 30 sectors (including broadcasting, fishing, and publishing) in which foreign investment was subject to government approval; this list eventually expanded to include 45 industries. Even in industries not on the list, there were multiple cases in which foreign investors were quietly dissuaded as their acquisition targets were slated for takeover by politically connected Russian businesses who did not like competition.A2: Ruble DevaluationRuble devaluation will help the economy, ruble value controlled by oil pricesSputnik News, December 17, 2015, German Analysts Spot Advantages in Ruble’s December Dip, DOA: 12-19-15Market experts in Germany have highlighted the possibilities for economic growth that could emerge as a result of the ruble's fall in value. The ruble's December decline in?value will give Russian businesses the opportunity to?increase their share of?the domestic market and increase exports, market analysts in?Germany explained on?Wednesday. According to?figures from?Russia's Central Bank, the dollar/ruble rate was 70.4 on?December 17, a decline of?5.5 percent since?December 1, when it was 66.74. Konstantin Kholodilin, a HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" senior researcher at?the German Institute for?Economic Research in?Berlin, told Deutsche Welle (DW) that this year's fall was caused exclusively by?the fall in?the oil price, in?contrast to?the decline in?value which occurred last year.?Low ruble value boosts tourismDavid Sands, December 16, 2015, Washington Times, DOA: 12-19-15The plunging value of the ruble has had one positive effect for the recession-wracked Russian economy — bargain-hunting international tourists are coming to Russia in numbers not seen since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. The Russian business newspaper Kommersant, citing new figures from the Russian Tourism Industry Union (RTIU), reported Wednesday that the number of international visitors to Russia was up 13 percent in the first nine months of 2015 compared to the same period in 2014. The 2.54 million tourists trips counted so far in 2015 is the highest since 2008.? Flickr/ olle svenssonOil Prices Could Reach $100 in 2016 Over OPEC Concerns, Activities - Saxo BankKholodilin has carried out?research into?the ruble's fall in?value, which revealed that sanctions have had a much less important effect than?the drop in?the oil price. The expert believes that the ruble's price will continue to?follow the price of?oil over?the coming year."It (the weak ruble) allows enterprises to?strengthen their position in?the domestic market and widen possibilities for?export, since?it increases the international competitiveness of?Russian products."Andreas Mannicke, a Russian and Eastern European market analyst, said that while last year Russia's Central Bank was forced to?hike interest rates from?10.5 percent to?17 percent on?December 16 in?response to?the ruble's fall in?value, this time there won't be such a reaction.?This year, the regulator has been gradually lowering its key interest rate. In February it was 15 percent; it has been stable at?11 percent since?August.Mannicke, who writes the HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" East Stock Trends bulletin, believes that greater foreign investment is crucial to?the development of?Russia's export sector. According to?his research, the cost per unit of?labor in?the Russian car industry is now less than?in countries such as?Turkey and Romania, which the sector can use to?its advantage. HYPERLINK "" \t "_parent" Mannicke also agreed with?Kholodilin that the price of?oil will be a deciding factor affecting the ruble's behavior in?2016, and thinks there is a good possibility that its value will rise from?its current level of $37-38 per barrel to?around $50 next year. In that case, he said the ruble/euro rate could strengthen from?its current value of?77 to?as much as?65.?A2: Sanctions Undermine Putin and Putin is BadSanctions cause the public to rally around PutinAndrei Kolesnikov is a?senior associate and?the chair of?the Russian Domestic Politics and?Political Institutions Program at?the Carnegie Moscow Center, DOA: 12-18-15The?Western approach to?Russia is predicated on?the supposition that continued pressure on?the country will cause President Vladimir Putin's regime to?make concessions or even crumble. Nothing could be further from?the truth. The?assumption underlying the?efficacy of?Western sanctions is that the?sharp economic deterioration that results from?them will turn the?Russian public against the?Kremlin. Putin will not be able to?withstand mounting dissent from?affluent urban areas and?the country's burgeoning middle class. Meanwhile, the?thinking goes, military pressure?— in?the form of?potential lethal aid to?Ukraine?— will similarly mobilize ordinary Russians against Putin. They will form an?anti-war movement that will force him to?rein in?his territorial ambitions. Pressed at?once from?above and?from below, the?Kremlin will have to?change its policies, and?perhaps even begin to?democratize. What Western policymakers fail to?understand is that such an?approach is less likely to?undermine the?regime than to?cause Russians to?close ranks behind it. Opinion polls show that Russians perceive Western pressure and?sanctions to?be aimed not at?Putin and?his cronies, but at?Russia and?its citizens. To?be sure, Putin's support is not rock solid; indeed, there is widespread suspicion about corruption in?his government. But Russians have a?long tradition of?defending their compatriots from?outsiders. And?in this case, the?compatriots under attack are Putin and?his government. Russian propaganda taps a?deep well of?nationalism, artfully playing off sentiments and?imagery from?World War II. Known in?the country as the?Great Patriotic War, the?effort to?defend the?country from?German invasion remains sacred to?many Russians. That is why the?Kremlin has repackaged derogatory historical terms like "Nazis" to?refer to?Ukraine's current political elites. Putin has been able to?use Western pressure as a?tool to?regain the?support of?many Russians, who only a?few years ago would have felt detached from, if not alienated by, his government. Presented with a?real or imagined threat to?the fatherland, the?average Russian supports the?country's leaders. Nor is the?Russian middle class likely to?pose much of?a threat to?Putin. With many of?its members owing their recent wealth to?high oil prices and?the economic recovery of?the 2000s, loyalty to?the Putin regime is one of?the Russian middle class's abiding characteristics. Russian opinion polling and?sociological research tends to?show that the?higher one's position in?society, the?more likely one is to?vote for?the incumbents. The?motives behind such voting patterns may vary?— some voters made a?fortune during the?economic recovery, while others are simply satisfied with the?status quo. But the?bottom line is that such voters demonstrate a?fundamental loyalty to?the regime. Indeed, only a?small portion of?the middle class attended the?protests that gathered force in?late 2011 and?early 2012, most of?them concentrated in?Moscow. And?in any case, Putin's clampdown on?dissent was predictably ruthless. He tightened legislation aimed at?throttling civil society, pursued lawsuits against protesters, and?blocked the?activity of?Alexei Navalny, a?promising opposition politician. These efforts have had a?lasting effect on?the groups that were at?the heart of?the protest movement. Russians of?all walks of?life have shown that they prefer passive adaptation over protest. In?the face of?growing economic pressures, Russia's middle class is steering clear of?political involvement. The?working class is no different. The?more the?West increases its pressure, the?less likely it becomes that this will change.Sanctions enable the Russians to blame the West for their economic problemsAssociated Press International, April 1, 2015 American farmer among the winners in sanctions-hit Russia, DOA: 11-27-15Sanctions are routinely cited in state media as the cause of most current economic problems. These include woes more properly blamed on over-dependence on oil revenue, Gontmakher said.The government has managed "to shift the responsibility for it onto the West, and not our own systems and institutions," he said. "In that sense, the initiators of the sanctions have really lost out."Despite a year of sanctions, President Vladimir Putin's approval rating has hovered well over 80 percent in recent months. "Sanctions without popular dissent will hardly work" in weakening the government, said Shevtsova.Economic crisis has increased Putin’s popularityKathryn Stoner, Stanford, December 18, 2015, Russia Direct, US-Russia Relations Should Be Seen as beyond the immediate agenda, DOA: 12-24-15Mr. Putin is still popular in Russia despite the economic crisis because there is no real alternative to him in the political sphere. There is no effective opposition that would present an alternative vision for Russia. And also, for a while at least, nationalism and patriotism can help people to get through the economic crisis. In addition, Crimea is viewed as a legitimate part of Russia And, finally, the economic crisis has been blamed more on the sanctions by the West as opposed to Russia’s policy and not diversifying the economy. But I think the reasonable question is how long people hang on, you can’t eat nationalism and patriotism. It remains to be seen.A2: Russia-Europe Gas Trade GoodRussia-Europe gas trade has not been reduced by sanctionsLeonid Bershidsky, December 27, 2015, Chicago Tribune, DOA: 12-28-15Then there's the contract between state-controlled Russian natural gas supplier, Gazprom, and European companies, such as the German-based E.ON and BASF, to expand the Nord Stream pipeline into Germany. The deal was signed in September and, if implemented, will allow Russia to bypass Ukraine for most of its gas supplies to Europe.A2: Sanctions Target the Elite/Force ChangeThere are a number of reasons that sanctions do not threaten Russian elites.First, Europe enables Russian elites to transfer capital over seas, making them effectively immune from sanctions.Leonid Bershidsky wrote in the Times of Oman on December 23rd, that, “Germany has rallied Europe in support of Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia, but has been less diligent in their implementation. How, then, to explain the Deutsche Bank internal review that found $10 billion worth of suspicious transactions in its Russian operation? These appear to have been meant to help Russian business people move their money overseas. President Vladimir Putin's friends, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, who are under sanctions and should therefore be off limits to banks that operate in the US and Europe, are said to be among the clients (1)Second, Emma Ashford from the CATO Institute wrote in the January/February issue of Foreign Affairs that the sanctions aren’t “inflicting much pain on Russia’s elites. Although…travel bans rule out weekend jaunts to Manhattan, these restrictions are hardly unbearable. One target, the close Putin adviser Vladislav Surkov, has dismissed them as harmless. “The only things that interest me in the U.S. are Tupac Shakur, Allen Ginsberg, and Jackson Pollock,” he said. “I don’t need a visa to access their work. (2) Third, Ashford continues by noting that, “the West’s targeted sanctions have succumbed to the same problem that plagues traditional comprehensive sanctions: the targeted regime shelters its cronies, while the rest of the population suffers…. the Kremlin has sheltered key supporters from their impact. For example, from March to December 2014, companies linked to the Putin cronies Arkady Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko received 12 percent more in government contracts than they had during the entire previous year. The government also stripped Russia’s largest private bank, Alfa-Bank, of a lucrative contract to service the country’s electricity market, awarding it instead to Bank Rossiya.” (3-4)(1) Elites transfer capital overseasGermany has rallied Europe in support of Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia, but has been less diligent in their implementation. German leaders back these ineffectual measures primarily to humour the US and are rightly unwilling to suffer too much for them. In a recent speech to her CDU party, which ended with a nine-minute standing ovation, Chancellor Angela Merkel said of the sanctions: It was the right reaction, no matter how much we'd like to keep a good relationship with Russia. We must adhere to our principles. How, then, to explain the Deutsche Bank internal review that found $10 billion worth of suspicious transactions in its Russian operation? These appear to have been meant to help Russian business people move their money overseas. President Vladimir Putin's friends, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, who are under sanctions and should therefore be off limits to banks that operate in the US and Europe, are said to be among the clients. Up to $1 billion of the deals -- including "mirror trades," where securities are bought in one market and sold in another to move money to a different jurisdiction -- took place in 2014 and 2015, when sanctions were in effect. Yet Germany's regulators appear even less interested in this apparent transgression than Russia's. The Russian central bank has fined Deutsche about $5,000 for the trades, while the German authorities have so far ignored them. Times of Oman, Germany is Right to Flout Russia Sanctions, DOA: 12-23-15 (2) Sanctions haven’t hurt Russian elitesEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15Nor are the sanctions inflicting much pain on HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Russia’s elites. Although Prada and Tiffany are doing less business in Moscow, the luxury housing market is anemic, and travel bans rule out weekend jaunts to Manhattan, these restrictions are hardly unbearable. One target, the close Putin adviser Vladislav Surkov, has dismissed them as harmless. “The only things that interest me in the U.S. are Tupac Shakur, Allen Ginsberg, and Jackson Pollock,” he said. “I don’t need a visa to access their work.”(3) Targeting elites has not workedEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15The Kremlin’s aggression has persisted in large part because the West’s targeted sanctions have succumbed to the same problem that plagues traditional comprehensive sanctions: the targeted regime shelters its cronies, while the rest of the population suffers. It wasn’t supposed to be this way. Modern sanctions are designed to avoid replicating the flaws of the comprehensive embargo placed on HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Iraq during the 1990s, which served only to enrich Saddam Hussein’s regime and impoverish the Iraqi people. With Russia, the U.S. government made sure not to bar overall trade and instead imposed asset freezes and financing restrictions on individual politicians and companies. In theory, members of Putin’s inner circle would use their influence to convince the president to reconsider his bellicose Ukraine policy.(4) Russia protecting the politically influential from sanctionsEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15In practice, however, the sanctions have had the unintended consequence of inflicting widespread punishment on the Russian economy and population. By restricting access to international financing during a recession, the sanctions have compounded the fall in oil prices, requiring Moscow to slash spending on health care, infrastructure, and government salaries, which has created economic hardship for ordinary Russians. The crash of the ruble, meanwhile, has not only destroyed savings but also increased the monthly payments of those who hold mortgages denominated in foreign currencies. The government, in turn, has pressured struggling Russian banks to convert such debt into rubles and absorb the losses, which has rescued homeowners from default but run down banks’ capital reserves. Adding to the pain was the Russian government’s decision to issue its own set of sanctions, which have barred the import of Western foodstuffs. Although the move has hurt eastern European farmers and exporters, it has also created shortages and increased food prices inside Russia. Then there was the unforeseen credit crunch among ordinary consumers. Fearful of a legal backlash, many U.S. and European banks cut off not only billionaire bank owners but also many of their customers. In March 2014, for example, Visa and MasterCard suspended all transactions from four Russian banks in response to sanctions placed on its owners, effectively canceling the credit cards of ordinary Russian consumers. The U.S. government had to intervene to convince the companies to start processing payments again. At the same time that the sanctions have punished the population at large, the Kremlin has sheltered key supporters from their impact. For example, from March to December 2014, companies linked to the Putin cronies Arkady Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko received 12 percent more in government contracts than they had during the entire previous year. The government also stripped Russia’s largest private bank, Alfa-Bank, of a lucrative contract to service the country’s electricity market, awarding it instead to Bank Rossiya.A2: Sanctions Strengthen Putin and Stabilize Russia (Putin Good)Sanctions have undermined the economyXinhua General News Service, December 18, 2014, Commentary: Double-edged sanctions against Russia hurt both sides, DOA: 10-25-15 Rounds of sanctions, like rolling rocks, have rained down on Russia, and severely wounded the country's economy. On Dec. 16, the Russian ruble nosedived to an all-time low, hitting 80 rubles per U.S. dollar and 100 rubles per euro in Moscow trade. The ruble has lost nearly 50 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar and euro since March despite several currency interventions of the Central Bank, indicating Russia's economy has fallen into trouble. The once stubborn Russian government has finally admitted the country would fall into recession in 2015Economic weakness will cause Russia to engage in local diversionary warsSmith ’11 – Director of the Potomac Institute Cyber Center(David J., former Ambassador and Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute, “Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin:? The Once and Future Czar”, Georgian Security Analysis Center, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 10/3/2011, )How Putin—with his man, Medvedev—manages the Russian economy will be a major determinant in the ? success or failure of his second presidency.? The other—and not unrelated—challenge is growing unrest in the North Caucasus. If the Second Chechen ? War of 1999-2000 consolidated Putin?s power in Russia, what effect will a third, broader North Caucasus ? war have? And recall that any analysis of this question must take into account the looming 2014 Winter ? Olympics in nearby Sochi.? The danger for Russia?s neighbors is that if the Russian economy sours, Putin could follow the time-honored ? Russian tradition of lashing out at imagined enemies such as Georgia or the Baltic countries. And a conflict ? in the North Caucasus could easily spill—accidentally or purposefully—into Georgia.? Nor should the west discount the possibility of diversionary Russian obstreperousness in the Middle East or? polemics with NATO. Moscow is skillfully setting the stage for either.? Regrettably, aggression will likely be Putin?s default instinctA2: Need Sanctions to Enforce Ceasefire/Stop Minsk Agreement ViolationsNo impact – Russia doesn’t want to expand beyond CrimeaJeffrey Sommers, an associate professor at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee and a senior fellow at its Institute of World Affairs, is visiting faculty at the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, Latvia, December 10, 2015, New York Times, DOA: 12-24-15The architect of U.S. Cold War policy, George Kennan, warned at the end of his life, in 1998, that President Clinton’s policy of advancing NATO east risked war. By winter 2014 Russia perceived Ukraine as NATO’s next entrant. An expansionist Russia could have handily taken Ukraine in response to the Maidan protests, but this would have meant a new Cold War, or worse. An unending string of U.S. policy experts predicted that annexation of Ukraine by Russia was fast forthcoming. But Putin never took Ukraine, or even the Donbass. What happened? It’s clear Putin never intended to seize Ukraine, or even the Donbass — even though domestic pressures weighed heavily on him to act. Instead, Putin’s actions signaled that the status quo over NATO’s forward movement must change. The Donbass was his leverage. Putin is a tough nationalist, but rather than fueling the fire of Russian revanchism, Putin is actually the one carefully dousing those flames. U.S. and E.U. sanctions on Russia have not brought Russia to heel in Ukraine. The sanctions’ effects have been muted. Sanctions only worked to turn Russia to China on trade while working toward a national import substitution-based economy at home. Both results are against U.S. and E.U. wishes. Putin wants partnership with the West, but is not willing to be its supplicant. Meanwhile, many in the U.S. and E.U. genuinely wish to support democracy in Ukraine.Ukraine violating the Minsk ceasefire agreement and no pressureSputnik News, December 26, 2015, DOA: 12-27-15According to?Bezpalko, such statements by?the representative of?the European Union can be interpreted as "soft support for?Kiev." He noted that when Ukraine builds up?arms in?the Donbass and captures villages in?the buffer zone in?violation of?the Minsk agreements, there is no condemnation from?Brussels. According to?him, if such application is constantly heard in?public, "Usackas' words would have a basis" in?reality."So what does he base his claim on? On some documents? Let him present them. On some consultations? Let him also declare them," said Bezpalko.When asked why the EU is not actively working with?Kiev on?the implementation of?the Minsk Agreement, Bezpalko replied that, in?his opinion, it was due to?the fact that Brussels has lost political independence and follows in?the footsteps of?US policy."The US does not exert pressure on?Kiev. There have been no statements?by [US Vice President Joseph] Biden on?the need to?comply with?the Minsk Agreements. The EU does not have any influence on?events in?Ukraine. Even after?the "Minsk-2" (February 12 agreement), where France and Germany were the guarantors. The EU cannot and does not want to?pressure [Ukraine], because it is not a major political force, and does not undertake such tasks," he concluded.Violations nowKyiv Post, 12-22-15, “Russian proxy fighters occupy strategic village on approaches to Mariupol, DOA: 12-27-15Fighters from one of the Russian-backed armed groups that have seized control of parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast have occupied a strategic village near Mariupol, Ukraine’s military said on Dec. 22. A group of about 100 fighters entered the village of Kominternovo, which straddles one of the main roads leading into Mariupol from the east, on the morning of Dec. 22, Ukrainian military spokesman Anton Myronovych told Ukrainian television’s 112 Ukraina channel. “According to our information, (the fighters) have armored vehicles, possibly even tanks and other weapons, which is prohibited by the Minsk (peace) agreements," Myronovych said. He described the occupation of the village as a “large-scale provocation,” and said the armed forces had reported the move to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – the organization that is supposed to be policing a ceasefire regime and a zone free of heavy weapons agreed under the Minsk peace deal. “In this way they want to provoke us into taking retaliatory action, perhaps by liberating the settlement with the use of heavy weapons,” Myronovych said…. The Ukrainian military has reported a sharp uptick in the number of attacks made on Ukrainian positions in the Donbas conflict zone in recent weeks. It said 39 attacks were made on Dec. 21, and in prior days the number has exceeded 50 per day – figures comparable to those seen during the period of increased hostilities that flared up in the Donbas this summer.Sanctions have not led to the implementation of the Minsk agreementHandelsblatt Global Edition, November 10, 2015 Ukraine Crisis; Russia Can Handle Sanctions, Minister Says, DOA: 11-27-15When it comes to the European Union's planned extension of economic sanctions against his country, Russian Trade Minister Denis Manturov is demonstratively relaxed, saying that while they amount to "moral discrimination," Russia will not retaliate with new countermeasures. "This is a situation we're used to by now and we'll manage," Mr. Manturov, 46, told Handelsblatt in an interview on the sidelines of a German-Russian economic conference in Berlin on Monday. "If that's of any use to the E.U., then please go ahead, but actually European business should decide," he added. As previously reported by Handelsblatt, the European Commission and the German government plan to decide at an E.U. summit in December to extend the sanctions for a further six months. The sanctions were imposed on Moscow after it annexed Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014, and are due to expire on Jan. 31, 2016. They include limiting the access to E.U. capital markets for five top Russian banks, three major Russian energy firms and three defense companies.Mr. Manturov said the European Commission was "too far removed from the real economy" and even claimed that a decision to extend sanctions would be advantageous to Russia. "E.U. nations have agreed that economic sanctions on Russia will stay in place until a ceasefire deal in Ukraine is fully implemented." When challenged with the conclusion that the sanctions had cut Russia's economy off from the international financial markets and that real wages were falling significantly for the first time since President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, he conceded that the measures "of course don't make us happy."But he added that Russia won't expand its countermeasures. "We aren't suicidal," he said. "We don't want to ban buying modern technology abroad." He wants more foreign investment in Russia, as well as an increased technology transfer.Russia has responded to the sanctions by banning the import of food from the E.U. and U.S.Meanwhile, pressure is building from German business leaders to end the sanctions. At Monday's conference, Siegfried Russwurm, management board member of German industrial group Siemens, which has a big presence in Russia, said the company remained committed to its presence in Russia."We're standing by Russia," Mr. Russwurm said. "We will do everything to persuade politicians that some of the measures don't serve anyone." It would be "dishonest to say that the sanctions aren't a hindrance," he added.Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schr?der, an executive for the pipeline consortium Nord Stream, a joint venture in which Russia's Gazprom holds a 51 percent stake, said: "We Europeans should deepen economic and political ties with Russia."The E.U.'s sanctions weren't in Europe's interest, said Mr. Schr?der, a personal friend of Mr. Putin. He said the U.S. had expanded its trade with Russia while E.U. exports there had fallen by around 30 percent.Mr. Schr?der was speaking at an event hosted by Austrian energy group OMV, which wants to expand its Russian operations and is taking part in the planned construction of the planned second Baltic pipeline, Nord Stream II, alongside companies including German energy giant Eon, gas group Wintershall and Shell.Volker Treier, deputy managing director of Germany's chamber of commerce and industry, said: "We want to reach out to our long-standing partner Russia," adding that he hoped the sanctions would end soon.But according to sources in Brussels and Berlin, that's unlikely to happen. E.U. nations have agreed that economic sanctions on Russia will stay in place until a ceasefire deal in Ukraine is fully implemented.The Minsk agreement signed in the Belarus capital in February between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany set a deadline for Ukraine to regain full control over its eastern border by the end of 2015. But sources in the German government said there's no sign that steps are being taken toward full implementation of the agreement.And that means Mr. Manturov and German businesses eager to resume their work in Russia will have to be patient.Sanctions aren’t preventing Putin from violating the Minsk agreementsAndrew Foxall is the director of the Russia Studies Center at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based international affairs think tank, December 16, 2015, New York Times, Stick to Sanctions on the Ukraine, DOA: 12-16-15For all of this, it is Mr. Putin who has done the least to ensure Minsk II remains in place. He has demonstrated that he has the ability to stop and start the war in Ukraine when it suits him. In the first six months following the deal, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe recorded daily violations — including not only small-arms fire, but the use of mortars, tanks and heavy artillery. Then, on Sept. 1, the war stopped — just as Russian forces began arriving in Syria. For two months, there was, as the O.S.C.E. reported, “relative calm.” Then, in early November, hostilities resumed and there have been dozens of incidents daily. The Russia-backed separatist forces have escalated the conflict again.A2: Sanctions Increase Western DiplomacySanctions don’t strengthen Western Diplomacy, they weaken it. This can be seen in the way the EU is in risk of dividing.Financial Times, March 16, 2015, and Speigel say, “But these have been dashed in recent weeks as France, Italy and Spain made clear they would not risk an early extension(of Sanctions) provoking Moscow and endangering fragile gains seen since Minsk.The then go on to say that, quoting Donald Tusk, president of the EU, “If we don’t take the decision soon, we will be subject to more and more Russian propaganda with the aim of splitting the EU,” said a senior EU official involved in the talks.The EU is fearful of a divide and that in turn, weakens their strength. If the EU divides, it will be seen as a catastrophic loss of political power. That it no way increases western diplomacy but rather decreases it, significantly.That it no way increases western diplomacy but rather decreases it, significantly.A2: Need to Maintain Sanctions on Iran to Stop NuclearizationThese sanctions aren’t topical – Their evidence is talking about sanctions on Iran. The US doesn’t have any sanctions on RUSSIA related to Iran. Enforcing Iran sanctions causes Iran to back out of the nuclear deal, triggering nuclear proliferation and strikes on IranNew York Times, January 24, 2015, Playing Politics on Iran, DOA: 1-26-15. In his State of the Union address, Mr. Obama laid out an approach to international engagement that includes shrinking America's military commitments overseas and negotiating limits on Iran's nuclear activities in return for a gradual lifting of sanctions. A move by Congress to pass legislation proposing new sanctions could blow up the talks and divide the major powers that have been united in pressuring Iran. Given an excuse to withdraw from talks, Iran could accelerate its nuclear program, curbed for a year under an interim agreement, and force the United States or Israel to use military action or a cyberattack to keep Tehran from producing nuclear weapons. In a recent Washington Post op-ed article, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, Germany and the European Union also implored Congress to hold off on new sanctions. Similar messages have come from scores of other experts, including two former American national security advisers, Brent Scowcroft, a Republican, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Democrat. According to Secretary of State John Kerry, even Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, warned Congress that new sanctions would scuttle the talks, saying it would ''be like throwing a grenade into the process.'' Mossad later tried to paper over any perceived differences with Mr. Netanyahu. Collaps of the deal causes proliferationBorger, 12/31/14 --- Guardian's diplomatic editor (Julian, “A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world,” , JMP)There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth.An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief.Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times.The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react.However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo.These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets.So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side.This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment.Leslie et al 14, Researcher @ National Iranian Council, Jonathan Leslie, Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi, “Losing Billions: The Cost of Iran Sanctions to the U.S. Economy,” July 2014, , DOA: 1-25-14, There are very few studies measuring the cost of sanctions to the sanctioning countries. In the case of Iran, where unprecedented U.S. and international sanctions may soon be lifted as part of a deal over Iran’s disputed nuclear program, understanding the cost of the policy is particularly important since any debate over whether to exchange sanctions relief for limitations to Iran’s nuclear program would be incomplete at best and misleading at worst if it did not address the cost of sanctions. This report aims to provide just that. ? The United States is by far the biggest loser of all sanctions enforcing nations. From 1995 to 2012, the U.S. sacrificed between $134.7 and $175.3 billion in potential export revenue to Iran. ? These estimates reflect the loss solely from export industries, and do not include the detrimental economic effects of other externalities of Iran-targeted sanctions, such as higher global oil prices. Moreover, since sanctions have depressed the Iranian GDP, Iran’s imports would have been even higher in the absence of sanctions, which further would increase the economic costs to sanctions enforcing nations due to lost exports. Consequently, the full cost to the U.S. economy is likely even higher. ? There is also a human element, measured in terms of jobs needed to support higher export levels. On average, the lost export revenues translate into between 51,043 and 66,436 lost job opportunities each year. In 2008, the number reaches as high as 214,657-279,389 lost job opportunitiesExtensions – Sanctions Stop ProliferationSanctions will kill the current deal and accelerate proliferationAssociated Press, January 23, 2015, Iran: US sanctions vote will kill 'probability' of nuke deal, Bharat Press, DOA: 1-26-15Iran's foreign minister Javad Zarif said Friday that a vote in U.S. Congress for more sanctions against his country will kill a likely nuclear deal with the West. Speaking in an Associated Press debate at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Zarif warned that Iran's parliament will retaliate if U.S. lawmakers approve fresh sanctions. "A sanctions bill by the U.S. Congress will kill the joint plan of action that we adopted last year in Geneva," he said. "Now the president of the United States has the power to veto it, but our parliament will have its counteraction." The Iranian parliament will "retaliate," he added, by passing a bill to increase enrichment of uranium. The United States and Iran hope that nuclear talks which include the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany can be accelerated in order to meet a March target for a framework agreement, and a final agreement by June 30. The U.S. and its partners are hoping to turn an interim Geneva accord into a permanent deal with Iran that would set long-term limits on Iran's enrichment of uranium and other activity that could produce material for use in nuclear weapons. Iran says its program is solely for energy production and medical research purposes, and it has agreed to some restrictions in exchange for billions of dollars in relief from U.S. economic sanctions.Zarif said he believes such a comprehensive deal over his country's disputed nuclear program is almost at hand.Current deal has stopped prolif, collapse of the deal triggers itThe Boston Globe, January 23, 2015 , Congress shouldn't scuttle Iran talks with new sanctions, DOA: 1-25-15 in getting Iran to halt its nuclear program has been slow but steady since the signing of an interim agreement in November 2013. Under the terms of that agreement, the Joint Plan of Action, Iran has frozen its nuclear program and converted its stockpile of enriched uranium to a non-weapons-grade form of the mineral, all under the watch of international inspectors. In return, the United States and its allies have offered limited sanctions relief and access to frozen assets. What remains is for an agreement that would guarantee an Iranian nuclear program limited to energy production, and a plan for transparency, allowing continued monitoring by international inspectors. There's no downside to letting these negotiations continue unhindered by new sanctions. In fact, one condition of the agreement is that no further sanctions be imposed. Meanwhile, the agreement does allow for new sanctions if Iran is found to be in breach. Add to this the distressed state of the Iranian economy and falling price of oil, and the United States is clearly bargaining from a position of strength. The US should not breach the 2013 agreement by imposing sanctions. A nuclear-free Iran is key to a more stable Middle East. Ironically, this sworn enemy of the United States now stands, as Stephen Kinzer pointed out in a recent Globe op-ed piece, as "an island of stability in a volcanically unstable region." Iran's president, Hassan Rouhani, has spoken openly about Iran scaling back its nuclear goals. "Our cause is not linked to a centrifuge," he said. Though Rouhani is answerable to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it's doubtful negotiations would have gotten this far without some tacit approval from on high.Obama, of course, can veto a sanctions bill, as he promised to do in his State of the Union address. But, with only two years left in the Obama presidency, a sanctions vote could send the wrong signals to Tehran, and put an agreement in jeopardy. If Iran backs out of talks now, the United States would be in a worse place than before negotiations began: Iran could resume its nuclear program, and the United States would be alienated from its allies. As Antony Blinken, deputy secretary of state, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday, the United States has nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by imposing further sanctions. Or as, as Obama put it succinctly in the State of the Union, "It doesn't make sense."Iran War ImpactsWar with Iran goes global and nuclear.Avery 13 – (11/6, John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work, Member of the Danish Peace Commission of 1998, former Technical Advisor, World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe , former Chairman of the Danish Peace Academy, PhD in Theoretical Chemistry and MSc in Theoretical Physics, “An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War,” )As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result.Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.A2: Sanctions Mean no Drones/MissilesSanctions haven’t stopped advanced Russian nuclear drones/missilesBill Gertz, December 2, 2015, Free Beacon, State Official: Russian Nuclear-Armed Drone Sub Threatens US, DOA: 12-27-15Russia’s development of a nuclear-armed drone submarine capable of inflicting widespread damage on U.S. coasts poses a serious threat, a senior State Department official testified on Tuesday. Rose Gottemoeller, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told a House hearing that she has raised the issue with the Russians. “I know we are concerned about it; of course we are concerned about it as threat to the United States,” Gottemoeller said under questioning from Rep. Mike Turner. The undersecretary, who is the key policymaker for arms control issues, said the system would be a greater threat if “widely put into operation.” The comment prompted Turner to reply: “One would probably be sufficiently troubling.” “I think it is a troubling system, sir,” Gottemoeller said. The exchange came during a joint hearing of the House Armed Services and House Foreign Affairs Committees on Russian arms cheating that highlighted a developmental weapons system first reported in Sept. 8 by the Washington Free Beacon. The NATO code name for the drone, which intelligence analysts say would be armed with a multi-megaton nuclear warhead for use against U.S. harbors and coastal cities, is “Kanyon.” Russian government-controlled NTV television on Nov. 10 broadcast a purported classified document revealing the drone submarine as a nuclear-armed, nuclear powered unmanned underwater vehicle. The document revealed that a large underwater drone called “Status 6” is under development and will be carried underneath one of two types of submarines. The drone can travel thousands of miles at high speeds and could be used for nuclear attacks on U.S. coastal cities. A CIA HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" analysis of the document and television report assessed that the disclosure was intentional and part of Russian nuclear saber-rattling. Turner pressed Gottemoeller during the hearing to explain what the U.S. government has done to respond and communicate U.S. concerns to Russia about the drone submarine. Gottemoeller declined to say what the United States is doing in response to the drone submarine development but said she has discussed the weapon system with Russian officials. The discussions “make it clear to them that it is a concern of the United States of America.” She declined to provide details on the exchange in an open session. Gottemoeller appeared before the subcommittee on strategic forces to discuss Russia’s violation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. She said Moscow is continuing to deny the development of a new intermediate-range ground launched cruise missile is a treaty violation. Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Mike Rogers (R., Ala.) raised the issue of the nuclear drone submarine during his opening remarks. “According to the Russian translations of what was disclosed, this weapon would provide Russia a new capability to damage ‘the important components of the adversary’s economy in a coastal area and inflicting unacceptable damage to a country’s territory by creating areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be unsuitable for military, economic, or other activity for long periods of time,’” Rogers said. “What does it say about a country that feels that nuclear weapons are such a significant tool of its military and diplomatic strategy that it discloses systems in this manner?” Rogers added. “And what does this say about a country that would invest resources in such a weapon? This is just nuts.” Rogers said the only time President Obama discussed nuclear weapons is “when he wants to propose reducing them.” “The world is paying attention. We need our president to change his rhetoric.” Rogers said. On the treaty violation, Gottemoeller and Brian McKeon, deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, testified that Russia is continuing to deny its new ground-launched cruise missile constitutes a violation. Both officials also declined to specify what actions are being taken in response to the missile violation, which has been known since 2011 but only publicly acknowledged by the administration in 2014. “We have made very clear this is not a technicality, a one-off event or a case of mistaken identity,” Gottemoeller said of the violation. “This is a serious Russian violation of one of the most basic obligations under the [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty.” Gottemoeller and McKeon also asserted that the administration believes it is in the U.S. national security interest to remain in the treaty but neither official could explain why. Russian has responded to the violation by accusing the United States of violating the treaty by deploying armed drones and anti-missile interceptors in Europe. Drones are not covered under the treaty and the missile interceptors or defensive weapons that do not have offensive strike capabilities. McKeon said the Russians falsely believe a ground-based version of the SM-3 anti-missile interceptor to be deployed in Romania and Poland are ground-based variants of land-attack Tomahawk cruise missiles. Gottemoeller denied that the administration kept secret all details about the treaty violation during 2010 Senate ratification debate on the New START arms treaty with Russia. Critics in Congress have said that if the violation had been known during the debate, Republican senators likely would have voted not to ratify the treaty. Gottemoeller said the cruise missile development was known since 2008 but it was not clear it was an illegal ground-launched system until 2011. NATO commander Gen. Philip Breedlove confirmed last month that Russia has tested the new cruise missile several time, including a recent test on Sept. 2. “So the violation is not new and yes we are concerned,” Breedlove HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" told reporters. Defense officials have identified the new cruise missile by the NATO designation SSC-X-8. McKeon said the administration continues to insist that Russia return to compliance with the treaty and eliminate all of the illegal missiles. He testified that the Pentagon’s Joint Staff conducted an assessment of the threat posed by the new missile if it were deployed. “The assessment tells us that the deployment of such a system by the Russian Federation would increase the risk to our allies and an indirect threat to the United States,” he said. As a result of the Joint Staff assessment the Pentagon is reviewing “a broad range of military response options,” he said. “The reintroduction of such weapons systems is destabilizing and not in the interests of the United States, Europe, Asia, or Russia,” McKeon said. “Russia’s violation of the Treaty, and its policies that challenge the European security order, will not go unanswered.” He declined to provide specifics on what steps are being taken in response but said new systems are being funded to counter the missile that will be outlined in the 2017 defense budget. McKeon also said the administration is considering its response to Russia’s treaty violation in the overall context of Moscow’s build up of military forces. The Pentagon is “working to improve our defensive measures to deny Russia offensive capabilities by modifying and expanding air defense systems, including addressing the difficult challenge posed by cruise missiles,” McKeon said. Gottemoeller said the Russian missile that violates the treaty is a threat to European allies because of its very short flight time and the difficulty of obtaining warning of an attack. The undersecretary said the government is “puzzled” by the Russians’ development of the illegal cruise missile. President Vladimir Putin has mentioned the emerging threat of intermediate-range missiles from states like China, Pakistan, and Iran. Economic sanctions on Russia for the treaty violation also are being considered, she said.A2: Sanctions Mean Russia Can’t Get DronesRussian drones in ArmeniaTASS, 12-15-15, Russia tests new stealth drones at Armenian military base, DOA: 12-27-15YEREVAN, December 15. /TASS/. The Russian military base in Armenia has received new Orlan-10 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and started testing Navodchik-2 drones invisible from the ground, a Southern Military District spokesman told TASS on Tuesday. The drones are being tested at the high mountainous Kamkhud training range in Armenia by the servicemen who have undergone special retraining at the training facility in the Moscow Region, the spokesman said. According to the spokesman, "reconnaissance units will use Orlan-10 UAVs for the first time to track extended and point targets in high mountainous areas". "The UAVs will be also involved in combat training of the military base’s units," the spokesman added.Russia has modern dronesPeter Rugg, 12-15-15, Inverse, Russia’s Booming Drone Program is Testing Stealth Models, DOA: 12-27-15By now, drones are just as standard as planes and rifles for militaries around the globe. After lagging behind the West for years, Russia is now on the bleeding edge of drone technology, a development the world’s watched in vivid detail via reconnaissance drones and bombing campaigns on Syria. News that Russia has begun testing a new breed of stealth drone at an Armenian military base is just the latest confirmation of Russia’s reinvestment in the technology. The base is reportedly testing Navodchik-2 drones that are invisible from the ground, as well as new Orlan-10 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles in its mountain training range. A spokesman told HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" TAFF the drones “will boost the volume of tasks accomplished in high mountainous areas in Armenia in the interests of reconnaissance and special units by five timesMissiles NURussia has deployed an advanced missile systemDaniel Wiser, December 23, 2015, Russian Missile System in Syria Threatens US Pilots, DOA: 12-27-15Russia’s S-400 missile system in Syria has the range to target airbases in the region with a U.S. presence, according to a new analysis.Moscow HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" deployed the S-400, an advanced air defense system with surface-to-air missiles, at the end of last month after Turkey shot down a Russian jet that violated the airspace of the NATO country. The system was reported to be installed in the coastal Latakia Province at Bassel al-Assad International Airport, which also serves as a base for Russian and Syrian regime forces.According to the HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Institute for the Study of War, Russia’s S-400 system has a range of up to 250 miles and the capability to track and target aircraft at multiple bases in the region. The think tank noted on Monday that two of those bases have a U.S. presence: Incirlik Airbase in Turkey, and the Al-Shaheed Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Jordan.“The S-400 SAM system is capable of contesting most of the airspace over Syria, southern Turkey, northern Jordan, a significant portion of Israel, as well as all of Lebanon and Cyprus,” the institute said.“At 250 miles, the S-400 is able to track and target aircraft based at numerous United States and Allied Coalition airbases (including Incirlik Airbase) in the region,” it added.A2: Sanctions Mean Naming and Shaming/Protect Human RightsFirst, there is no impact beyond sustaining sanctions on Russia. In the past, Policy teams have read a similar "shunning" argument and claimed that shunning (via sanctions) was important for moral and human rights reasons, but there is no reason a moral shun and protect human rights are in the interests of the West.Second, the cards people read on this are very general. Even if "naming and shaming" can promote human rights in target countries, they have no evidence that it has led to human rights improvements in Russia.Turn – trade penalties cause the worst form of atrocities including genocide, and xenophobia turns their ethics claims and independently risks nuclear escalationMichael Panzner 8 (Faculty Member at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase) 2008 Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138Rising angst will also wreak havoc with links among markets, financial systems, economies, and countries. Many people could find themselves subject to stricter government controls or even find avenues closed off as a result of attempts to stem contagion effects. The widespread urge to withdraw will feed rising xenophobia, already inflamed by illegal immigration, unfair trade practices, and leaking borders. Playing to populist sentiment, politicians around the country will respond enthusiastically to calls for restrictions on foreigners. This will further feed a brain drain, as scientists, students, and other temporary visa holders are left with little choice but to uproot and go elsewhere, further sapping America’s economic resiliency Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.Targeted sanctions threaten the economy and violate human rightsGordon, professor at Fairfield University, 11[Joy, Fall, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 25, Issue 3, “Smart Sanctions Revisited” page PQ, ProQuest, accessed 7/6/13, VJ]Several types of targeted sanctions, such as arms embargoes, have structural problems with implementation that appear to be irresolvable after almost two decades of efforts by practitioners, NGOs, and academics. Most types of smart sanctions have not brought about an increase in effectiveness that is dramatically better than that of "traditional" broad trade sanctions. Some have argued that effectiveness has to be understood more broadly than just target compliance. As noted earlier, Baldwin maintains that sanctions should be seen as effective if they increase the costs to the targeted actor or otherwise affect the calculus of decision-making. Adopting a different approach, Brzoska suggested that, in the case of arms embargoes, while target compliance was very low, arms embargoes could be considered much more successful if we look instead at situations where the sender is satisfied with the outcome, regardless of actual compliance. There may be merit to Baldwin's and Brzoska's strategies for evaluating the impact of sanctions. However, they do not support the view that, because they aim at specific individuals or goods, targeted sanctions are significantly more effective than traditional trade sanctions. These proposals only suggest that if we use different criteria, we will view sanctions as more successful than they seem by the measurement of target compliance. But that is equally true of traditional sanctions. And, as Drezner notes, however "smart" the sanctions are, their effectiveness is compromised when the senders have different goals. One sender can be looking for containment, another for regime change; or one sender's goals can change as its strategic interests in the region change, without any goal being accomplished.75 To the extent that targeted sanctions are imposed to achieve conflicting or ambiguous goals, they will be no more effective than traditional sanctions. More disappointingly, targeted sanctions did not bring an end to the humanitarian damage or the ethical conundrums presented by traditional trade sanctions - at least not in the manner expected. Arms embargoes that are imposed against all parties- both aggressors and victims- can cripple the self-defense efforts of those under attack. Aviation bans can undermine a major component of a nation's transportation sector, adversely affecting the civilian population generally. Financial sanctions targeting the personal assets of individuals - the form of targeted sanctions that is often seen as the most promising in every regard - has raised issues of due process that have brought into question the fundamental nature of the Council's authority to impose Chapter VII measures. It may even be that the rhetoric of targeted sanctions has caused, so to speak, a certain collateral damage: it seems that the trend toward designing- or at least labeling - economic measures as "targeted" has done much to silence the discussion of the humanitarian impact. Where the 1990s witnessed growing demands that humanitarian monitoring be incorporated within the sanctions regime, and for prior assessment of the humanitarian impact, this has largely ceased. It seems that the common view is that since sanctions are now "smart," we no longer have to worry about harming the innocent. But that is clearly not the case. Sanctions targeting a nation's financial system, or critical industries or exports, disrupt the economy as a whole, much like traditional trade sanctions.Sanctions fail, hurt the general public, and strengthen repressive forcesLopez, PhD from Syracuse University, 2K[George A., November 25th, America Magazine, “Toward Ethical Economic Sanctions”, , accessed 7/5/13, VJ]Despite their frequent use, however, the conventional belief still holds that sanctions are mostly symbolic in nature and have little practical impact. One reporter described sanctions as an ineffective bromide intended to placate public demands for action but incapable of achieving real results. Whether in Cuba, where 40 years of U.S. embargo have not dislodged Castro, or in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein remains firmly in power despite 10 years of U.N. sanctions, sanctions seem to have minimal political consequences or none at all. Yet contrary to this critique, as the case of Iraq illustrates, their economic bite can be sufficiently sharp that sanctions will have severe humanitarian and social consequences. In Haiti the short-lived U.N. embargo of 1993-94 also had negative impacts on children’s health. In Cuba and Nicaragua, unilateral U.S. sanctions undermined significant advances in public health. Sanctions often cause social consequences that make the desired political changes within the target regime less likely. During the 1991-95 war in Yugoslavia, U.N. sanctions deprived middle-class human rights groups of international contacts and support and reduced the availability of newsprint and broadcasting equipment with which these groups sought to challenge the regime’s warlike policies. Sanctions harmed the very constituencies within Serbia that were most supportive of the human rights norms being advanced by the United Nations. Sanctions also have the bitterly ironic result of fostering black market criminality, which in many cases is controlled by state forces or paramilitary groups. This strengthens the repressive forces against which sanctions are supposedly aimed.Sanctions fail as symbolic messages—overly penal and there are better alternativesWinkler, PhD in political science, 99[Adam, Human Rights Quarterly Volume 21 Issue 1, “Just Sanctions”, Page 144, , accessed 7/9/13, VJ]A second dilemma for right intention is that posed by the pursuit of symbolic goals. David Baldwin argues that sanctions should be understood to have both primary economic objectives, such as impacting a foreign economy and achieving a change in a target nation's policies, and symbolic objectives, such as demonstrating resolve to allies or domestic constituents. 72 According to Baldwin, even when sanctions have little economic impact, they may still be considered successful if symbolic messages are relayed. 73 As sanctions are more often successful in relaying messages than in achieving policy objectives, Baldwin recommends that states use them for their communicative potential. 74 The principle of right intention, however, renders the pursuit of symbolic goals objectionable. Because of the harm caused by economic sanctions, they are far too penal to be used as signaling devices intended for domestic constituents or foreign allies. Symbolic messages can be sent in numerous other ways without harming anyone, including public statements, resolutions of international organizations, and diplomatic maneuvers, like recalling ambassadors or negotiators. Symbolic sanctions are neither the last resort short of war nor do they aim at objectives that absolutely mandate inflicting harm on others. Finally, symbolic goals are often unarticulated and thus risk the same dangers of vague sanctioning goals described above.Human rights promotion tears nations apart, causing conflictGentry, retired Army officer, researcher and writer on defense and security issues, 4(John A., Human Rights: Opposing Viewpoints, p. 52)The proliferation of human rights is a boon for rights-oriented bureaucracies and trial lawyers, but it damages the social fabric that turns groups of people into communities and communities into a nation. Because the only asset any government ultimately has is its legitimacy, the cost of a government’s inability to satisfy rights-based demands is overwhelming. That cost rises further when governments, and the political parties that seek to control them, favor some rights over competing claims to please political backers or to curry favor with voters. Human rights collapse nationhood and will inevitably cause civil warGentry, adjunct professor at National Intelligence University, 99 (John, “The Cancer of Human Rights”, Sept. 22, The Washington Quarterly, ) Excessive human rights are anathema to nationhood because they denigrate the compromise, discipline, and sacrifice needed for collective work in pursuit of common goals in favor of the immediate gratification of individual desires. With personal desires enshrined as rights through justifications of ideology or theology, there is no need to share them or to compromise on their definition, cost, or speed of actualization. Rights are absolute by definition. With claims to rights clear, the shared community values and goals that helped bond society when rights were fewer and resource constraints more obvious are much less important. There is less need to work together and thus less of the glue of nationhood. Even when nationhood is diminished or destroyed, however, government structures remain to service the rights of individuals and small groups, including the employment rights of bureaucracies and unions built to provide services justified by rights.Although initially created as individual properties, human rights are easily aggregated to become collective assets of groups of similar individuals. The logical step is small, but the consequences of this action are sometimes very large because group rights are different from and greater than the sum of rights of individuals. Just as individuals have alleged rights of opportunity and sometimes results, activists often claim that the collective ambitions of groups deserve actualization as rights. The variously defined performances of groups in society -- be they consumption levels, unemployment rates, or inmate populations -- must in aggregate be at least equal to that of other groups without consideration of troublesome distractions such as historical and cultural factors, labor force participation rates, and work ethics. As in Lake Wobegone, everyone must be at least average. Subpar performance by any of a host of measures is allegedly evidence of discrimination. As for individuals, the rights of groups allegedly are immutable and merit immediate gratification. Because they too are absolute, there is no appropriate compromise among the demands for group rights. The result is proliferation of strident social subgroups of special interests little inclined to work constructively with one another except for reasons of tactical expediency. The degeneration of U.S. society into narrow interest groups further diminishes the nationhood of the United States. Countless commentators have identified symptoms; single-issue groups constitute a growing share of politically active citizens, for example. Samuel Huntington made the point differently by observing that, in the name of multiculturalism, powerful forces in the United States are accentuating the differences among U.S. residents and encouraging their preservation. By so doing, these persons attack the identity of the United States as a member of Western civilization. n3 Failure to assimilate immigrant groups risks transformation of the United States into what Huntington calls a cleft country, with potentially dire consequences for political stability. This amounts to an attack on the whole in the name of the perceived rights of groups that refuse to assimilate. Countries that are not nations can survive a long time in the absence of a crisis. They are prone to fail in the face of external threat but may explode, however, if the crisis is internal. They are especially likely to fail if disparate groups, bolstered by the certainty that they hold rights to their goals, strive for self-gratification at the expense of other groups. If groups threaten the perceived vital interests of other groups, including perceived human rights, civil war may result. This happened in Bosnia in 1992 and in Kosovo in 1998. Although not an immediate threat, it could happen in California, too. A2: Sanctions Key to Enforce Budapest Memorandum/Credibility of Security GuaranteesSyria destroyed US credibility on security guarantees against weapons of mass destructionBen Wolfgang, May 17, 2015, Washington Times, Obama Red Line Erased, DOA: 12-19-15President Obama’s infamous “red line” in Syria seems to have been fully erased. Amid recent reports Syrian President Bashar Assad again used chemical weapons in his nation’s ongoing civil war, Mr. Obama is taking a much different approach than he did in 2012 and 2013, when the U.S. declared itself on the verge of military intervention after Mr. Assad unleashed sarin gas and other chemical agents despite clear warnings from the White House. The most explicit of those warnings came in the form of the president’s “red line” declaration, in which he said the use of chemical weapons was a step too far and would bring dire consequences for Mr. Assad and his forces. The incident was a pivotal foreign policy moment for Mr. Obama and served as a key test of whether he would back up his words with military action. In the end, the U.S., with the help of Russia, secured an international agreement requiring Syria to give up much of its chemical weapons stockpile. The U.S. never mounted military strikes, and the administration claimed it had used diplomacy rather than force to achieve its objective. But now it seems clear history is repeating itself, and Mr. Assad again is relying on chemical weapons. This time, Mr. Obama’s red line is nowhere to be found. At a press conference last week, the president mentioned no possibility of military strikes and instead said the U.S. expects allies of Mr. Assad, chiefly Russia, to intervene and convince the Syrian government to stop using chemical weapons. “My commitment was to make sure that Syria was not using chemical weapons and mobilizing the international community to assure that that would not happen. And, in fact, we positioned ourselves to be willing to take military action. The reason we did not was because Assad gave up his chemical weapons. That’s not speculation on our part. That, in fact, has been confirmed by the organization internationally that is charged with eliminating chemical weapons,” Mr. Obama said last Thursday after a Camp David meeting with officials from the Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf. “If we have the kinds of confirmation that we need, we will, once again, work with the international community and the organization charged with monitoring compliance by the Syrian government, and we will reach out to patrons of Assad, like Russia, to put a stop to it,” Mr. Obama declared. There are numerous reports of Mr. Assad using chlorine bombs against rebel forces over the past several weeks. Chlorine is not a prohibited substance under international treaties — it has countless civilian uses familiar to all Americans, from laundry bleach to swimming pool and drinking water cleansers. But its use in bombs, shells or any other weapons is prohibited. There also are reports the Assad regime has used sarin gas and other chemicals, the mere possession of which is fully banned under international protocols.No impact – nuclear proliferation doesn’t cause war – if anything, it slows conflictWalt, 12 (Stephen Walt – Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 11/30, Foreign Policy, “The mother of all worst-case assumptions about Iran”, /posts/2012/11/30/the_mother_of_all_worst_case_assumptions_about_iran)Yet this "mother of all assumptions" is simply asserted and rarely examined. The obvious question to ask is this: did prior acts of nuclear proliferation have the same fearsome consequences that Iran hawks now forecast? The answer is no. In fact, the spread of nuclear weapons has had remarkably little impact on the basic nature of world politics and the ranking of major powers. The main effect of the nuclear revolution has been to induce greater caution in the behavior of both those who possessed the bomb and anyone who had to deal with a nuclear-armed adversary. Proliferation has not transformed weak states into influential global actors, has not given nuclear-armed states the ability to blackmail their neighbors or force them to kowtow, and it has not triggered far-reaching regional arms races. In short, fears that an Iranian bomb would transform regional or global politics have been greatly exaggerated; one might even say that they are just a lot of hooey.? Consider the historical record.? Did the world turn on its axis when the mighty Soviet Union tested its first bomb in 1949? Although alarmist documents like NSC-68 warned of a vast increase in Soviet influence and aggressiveness, Soviet nuclear development simply reinforced the caution that both superpowers were already displaying towards each other. The United States already saw the USSR as an enemy, and the basic principles of containment were already in place. NATO was being formed before the Soviet test and Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe was already a fait accompli. Having sole possession of the bomb hadn't enabled Truman to simply dictate to Stalin, and getting the bomb didn't enable Stalin or his successors to blackmail any of their neighbors or key U.S. allies. It certainly didn't lead any countries to "reorient their political alignment toward Moscow." Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent missile rattling merely strengthened the cohesion of NATO and other U.S.-led alliances, and we now know that much of his bluster was intended to conceal Soviet strategic inferiority. Having a large nuclear arsenal didn't stop the anti-commnist uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, and didn't allow the Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan. Nor did it prevent the USSR from eventually collapsing entirely.? Did British and French acquisition of nuclear weapons slow their decline as great powers? Not in the slightest. Having the force de frappe may have made De Gaulle feel better about French prestige and having their own deterrent made both states less dependent on America's security umbrella, but it didn't give either state a louder voice in world affairs or win them new influence anywhere. And you might recall that Britain couldn't get Argentina to give back the Falklands by issuing nuclear threats -- even though Argentina had no bomb of its own and no nuclear guarantee -- they had to go retake the islands with conventional forces. ? Did China's detonation of a bomb in 1964 suddenly make them a superpower? Hardly. China remained a minor actor on the world stage until it adopted market principles, and its rising global influence is due to three decades of economic growth, not a pile of nukes. And by the way, did getting a bomb enable Mao Zedong--a cruel megalomaniac who launched the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1957 and the destructive Cultural Revolution in the 1960s -- to start threatening and blackmailing his neighbors? Nope. In fact, China's foreign policy behavior after 1964 was generally quite restrained.? What about Israel? Does Israel's nuclear arsenal allow it to coerce its neighbors or impose its will on Hezbollah or the Palestinians? No. Israel uses its conventional military superiority to try to do these things, not its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Israel's bomb didn't even prevent Egypt and Syria from attacking it in October 1973, although it did help convince them to limit their aims to regaining the territory they had lost in 1967. It is also worth noting that Israel's nuclear program did not trigger a rapid arms race either. Although states like Iraq and Libya did establish their own WMD programs after Israel got the bomb, none of their nuclear efforts moved very rapidly or made it across the finish line.? But wait, there's more. The white government in South Africa eventually produced a handful of bombs, but nobody noticed and apartheid ended anyway. Then the new government gave up its nuclear arsenal to much acclaim. If anything, South Africa was more secure without an arsenal than it was before.? What about India and Pakistan? India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974 didn't turn it into a global superpower, and its only real effect was to spur Pakistan -- which was already an avowed rival -- to get one too. And it's worth noting that there hasn't been a large-scale war between the two countries since, despite considerable grievances on both sides and occasional skirmishes and other provocations.? Finally, North Korea is as annoying and weird as it has always been, but getting nuclear weapons didn't transform it from an economic basket case into a mighty regional power and didn't make it more inclined to misbehave. In fact, what is most remarkable about North Korea's nuclear program is how little impact it has had on its neighbors. States like Japan and South Korea could go nuclear very quickly if they wanted to, but neither has done so in the six years since North Korea's first nuclear test. ? In short, both theory and history teach us that getting a nuclear weapon has less impact on a country's power and influence than many believe, and the slow spread of nuclear weapons has only modest effects on global and regional politics. Nuclear weapons are good for deterring direct attacks on one's homeland, and they induce greater caution in the minds of national leaders of all kinds. What they don't do is turn weak states into great powers, they are useless as tools of blackmail, and they cost a lot of money. They also lead other states to worry more about one's intentions and to band together for self-protection. For these reasons, most potential nuclear states have concluded that getting the bomb isn't worth it.? But a few states-and usually those who are worried about being attacked-decide to go ahead. The good news is that when they do, it has remarkably little impact on world affairs. Non-unique – US abandoning Middle East security guaranteesAndre Critchlow, May 15, 2014, The Telegraph, DOA: 12-19-15Saudi Arabia and a clutch of Arab Gulf states responsible for a quarter of the world’s oil supplies have been told to provide their own security as the US and the UK slash defence spending. For the last 30 years the six members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) have drawn heavily on US and British military support to safeguard their security but these unwritten guarantees are now unravelling amid cuts to defence spending and a reduced dependence on Middle East oil. “Bilateral ties with the United States and American military presence are not enough to guarantee regional security,” US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel told a GCC ministerial conference in Riyadh yesterday. “ A2: Sanctions Strengthen NATOMontenegro expansion, which is independent of sanctions, strengthens NATO unityEvelyn Farkas, December 23, 2015, Defense One, Montenegro will join NATO – and that Matters, DOA: 12-27-15There are six reasons Americans should feel good that Montenegro — a tiny state of little over 600,000 inhabitants with a military of about 2,000 — will become the 29th NATO ally, as ratified by alliance foreign ministers earlier this?month.First, and most obvious: with tension between Russia and the West at center stage, NATO and Montenegro are denying Russia a veto over their policy. We are standing strong in the face of Russian intimidation. Last fall, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov declared NATO’s expansion to include Montenegro “a mistake, even a provocation” and an “irresponsible policy.” And after Russia invaded Ukraine, when Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic visited Washington and took a public stand with the United States and European Union, Russian officials poured vitriol on him personally, while offering bribes for military access to Montenegro’s ports, providing financial and other support to opposition groups against NATO membership, and imposing counter-sanctions on Montenegrin agricultural products. Last week, Russia declared that they would cancel cooperative “projects” with Montenegro; it is unclear what Moscow meant since the two governments have no current notable joint?projects. But Montenegro is standing firm. Some major Russian private investors, such as oligarch Oleg Deripaska, who invested in Montenegro’s aluminum industry, have been forced out of Montenegro. Its Ministry of Defense is moving to modernize its military with U.S. or European equipment — for example, gradually ditching aircraft that require Russian spare parts and maintenance. Montenegro’s determination and NATO’s decision stand in defense of the sovereign right of states to determine their political, military and economic associations and as a counter to Russian?bullying. Second, this is another step in the U.S.-launched effort to bring stability to the Balkans, going back 20 years to the signing of the Dayton agreement, which brought peace to Bosnia. This work is far from complete. Bosnia remains a weak state, wrought with ethnic political tension. Serbia has yet to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state. Macedonia is politically and ethnically polarized. But there has been no war in the Balkans since the Kosovo war, which NATO brought to a finish after about three and a half months in 1999. Montenegro becomes the third former Yugoslav state to join after Slovenia (2002) and Croatia (2009 with Albania). As the Balkan state that prides itself on positive relations with its neighbors, NATO membership acknowledges the significance of that achievement for the youngest Balkan state, founded only in 2006 in a peaceful split with Serbia. And this will only serve to encourage Serbia in its EU-led normalization with Kosovo, since Belgrade’s motivation is also obtaining membership, albeit in the EU, not NATO (for the moment; this will likely?change). Third, this NATO expansion, the first since 2009 (and the first for the Obama administration) will provide much-needed encouragement and pressure on the remaining three formally acknowledged NATO aspirants Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Macedonia (with Ukraine as a longer-shot aspirant). The seven-year lapse after the expansionary burst of the 2000s left many in the Balkans and Georgia wondering whether NATO’s so-called “Open Door” had not quietly been closed. Last week’s decision proves this is not the case. Bosnia and Macedonia still have much work to do in order to be ready for NATO membership and the latter has the formal requirement to come to an agreement with Greece over the name of the country (this is the sole stated requirement, but given political dynamics in Macedonia, NATO may also demand more reform). Georgia is ready in many ways for membership; the chief obstacle is Russia’s military occupation of 20 percent of its?territory. Fourth, including Montenegro seals off the entire Adriatic coast for NATO and prevents — in the words of one senior NATO military official — “Kaliningrad on the Mediterranean.” While NATO faces Russian air defenses and missiles in its Baltic Sea enclave, we can now avoid this in the Adriatic; Montenegro will no longer be vulnerable to subtle Russian military occupation, exercised through access to bases and stationing of Russian personnel and?equipment. Fifth, this is good news for Montenegro. As result of NATO requirements, and in support of their membership bid, they professionalized their military. Among other things, the government revamped military education and training and established a military intelligence agency separate from domestic intelligence services. Since 2010, their forces have deployed with U.S. troops to Afghanistan, where they gained valuable military interoperability with NATO. And they were forced to take some action against corruption and to strengthen rule of law. Here, this is only a start; much more will need to be done, perhaps in a more secure post-accession political?environment. Sixth, and finally, as Damon Wilson, Executive Director of the Atlantic Council has pointed out elsewhere, NATO has demonstrated and boosted its own confidence through its invitation to Montenegro: “You don’t enlarge if you don’t have a sense of confidence in your?institution.” This December 2 brought — along with the horrific San Bernardino attacks — some good news for Americans: we have another formal ally in our war against radical Islamic terrorism and another demonstration of the appeal of free-market capitalism, democracy and collective security built on sovereignty and?consensusA strong NATO risks antagonizing Russia and pulling the US into a nuclear warDoug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is the author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire (Xulon), December 7, 2015, Should the US Leave NATO? DOA: 12-27-15Proposals to add Georgia and Ukraine would multiply the dangers. Russian aggressiveness, though unjustified, illustrates how important Moscow views its influence in both nations, which also never were seen as relevant to European security. Both were not only part of the Soviet Union but the Russian Empire. Bringing them into NATO would be seen by Russia as comparable to the Warsaw Pact inducting Mexico and Canada. Washington would not, shall we say, be pleased. The West’s laudable desire to protect the right of Georgians and Ukrainians to chart their own course unfortunately is seen by the Russian government—in part because of maladroit allied policies, such as NATO expansion—as provocative attempts at encirclement. Nothing in Kiev or Tbilisi is worth a nuclear confrontation. Especially one in which the U.S. likely would find most of its European allies back in Brussels locked in a fetal position. The problem is not just NATO’s recent expansion. An alliance on autopilot ignores changes within existing members. For instance, Turkey is proving to be another area of confrontation that undermines U.S. and European security. Never quite the geopolitical lynch-pin that it was made out to be, Ankara spent years prosecuting a brutal campaign against Kurdish separatists and occupied more than one-third of the Republic of Cyprus, creating an ethnic Turkish state recognized only by Ankara. Turkey turned in an ever more authoritarian and Islamist direction once President Recep Tayyip Erdogan dropped his early liberalizing pretensions. Ironically, he now appears determined to create a presidency modeled after that of Vladimir Putin. So much for NATO promoting liberal democracy. (That always was a job for the European Union anyway.) Worse, though, is Ankara’s irresponsible shoot-down of the Russian plane. Even assuming that Turkey’s claims as to the Russian incursion and Turkish warnings are accurate, 17 seconds over Turkish territory did not warrant such a deadly response. Indeed, Ankara routinely violates the airspace of fellow NATO member Greece. That policy forces cash-strapped Athens to waste its limited resources responding. One wonders at the Erdogan government’s reaction if Greece chose to down the Turkish offenders. (NATO is talking about bolstering Turkey’s air defenses against Russia; how about aiding the Greeks against Ankara?) Of course, Turkey knew that Russian forces have no hostile aims—indeed, none of the active combatants, including Syria, are targeting Turkish personnel or materiel. Ankara may have been protecting the illicit oil trade or insurgents in an area dominated by the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front, or attempting to punish Moscow for backing Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. The first two undermine American interests. The latter might fit with an official aim of Washington, but runs against the more fundamental objective of destroying the Islamic State. None of these potential Turkish goals justifies allowing Ankara to drag NATO into a war with Russia. My Cato Institute colleague Ted Galen Carpenter suggests defenestrating this misbegotten alliance member. Striking is how all of these members, new and old, as well as aspirants—the Baltic States, Georgia and Ukraine, and Turkey—degrade U.S. security. Montenegro, at least, plays the harmless role of the Duchy of Fenwick in the?Mouse that Roared. Although its inclusion in the alliance will further antagonize an already paranoid Russia, Podgorica really is irrelevant strategically and militarily. The others are not. In a worst case all of them could ensnare America in a war with a nuclear-armed power over modest, indeed, minimal, security stakes. The policy frankly is mad.NATO not needed – European countries can defend themselvesDoug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is the author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire (Xulon), December 7, 2015, Should the US Leave NATO? DOA: 12-27-15However, even if Washington’s NATO commitments did not bring far more dangers than benefits, they would be unjustified. Europe could, if it was so inclined, defend itself. Why, 70 years after the conclusion of World War II, 26 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and 22 years after creation of the European Union, are the Europeans still dependent on America? Retired Gen. Robert Scales, commandant of the Army War College, recently complained that: “At 30,000, there are fewer American soldiers protecting Western Europe, a piece of the planet that produces 46 percent of global GDP, than there are cops in New York City.” But why can’t an area that accounts for almost half of the world’s production (an overstatement, but never mind) and has a larger population than America provide its own soldiers for defense? Why can’t an area of such economic prowess, which has around eight times the GDP and three times the population of its only possible antagonist, Russia, deploy an armed force capable of deterring any threats? The reason the Europeans don’t do so is because they don’t want to and don’t have to. Some don’t believe that Moscow actually poses much of a threat. Others figure only the nations bordering Russia face any risk, and there’s little interest in “Old Europe” for confronting Moscow over “New Europe.” And almost everyone assumes America will take care of any problems. Particularly striking is the lack of military effort from those supposedly threatened by the supposed new Hitler to the east. This year NATO-Europe came in at 1.5 percent of GDP, well short of the two percent objective. Only Estonia, Greece (mostly to confront Turkey), Poland (first time ever), and the United Kingdom made that level. Notably missing are France, Germany, and Italy (the continent’s other major powers), Latvia and Lithuania (squealing loudly about Russian threats), and Turkey (challenging Russia over parochial rather than alliance interests). Over the years American officials have pleaded, cajoled, contended, and begged the Europeans to do more. Even during the Cold War such efforts failed to yield much fruit. They have even less chance of working in the future. Reported Jan Techau of Carnegie Europe: “the dependence of European NATO allies on the United States has further increased since the end of the Cold War, not decreased.” Indeed, he added, “while European membership in NATO has nearly doubled since 1990, defense spending by Europeans has gone down by 28 percent since then.” First, the U.S. insists that it will never leave. So long as it frenetically “reassures” allies, trying to convince them that Americans are worthy to subsidize Europe, the latter will respond by not doing?much. Second, Russia doesn’t threaten America or most of Europe. The latter have little incentive to spend more. Third, domestic economic concerns remain paramount throughout the continent. There are few votes to be gained from supporting greater military expenditures to meet a phantom threat because it would gladden hearts in Washington, Vilnius, and Kiev. The United States should do in 2016 what it failed to do in 1990. It should announce that the world has changed since creation of a U.S.-dominated NATO. It is time to refashion the alliance for a world in which allies had prospered and enemies had disappeared. One possibility for the future would be a European-run NATO, with America perhaps as an associate member. Another alternative would be a continental defense run alongside the European Union. Maybe there’s something else. But the time for subsidizing, coddling and reassuring the Europeans is over. American taxpayers deserve as much consideration as European ones. U.S. military forces shouldn’t be deployed to advance interests of greatest concern to other nations. Any future alliances forged by Washington should act as serious military pacts, not international social clubs.NATO not protecting democracyTed Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest, is the author of ten books and more than 600 articles on international affairs, December 16, 2015, National Interest, Eastern Europe’s Drift Into Authoritarianism, DOA: 12-27-15There are alarming signs that some NATO members are spurning the democratic foundations of the alliance. The situation is worst with respect to Turkey. Not only has the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed blatant dictatorial tendencies, but Ankara’s foreign policy (including its ongoing flirtation with ISIS) is also a textbook example of duplicity.But the cancer of authoritarianism within NATO is not confined to Turkey. At least two other members, Hungary and Poland, are also exhibiting worrisome symptoms. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has made a reputation as a leader vehemently opposed to immigrants coming into his country. His views are so extreme that critics within the European Union brand them as xenophobic.But it is Orban’s treatment of domestic political opponents that has set off even louder alarm bells. His government has conducted a crackdown on human rights groups that is not far removed from the behavior of Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia. Over the past few years, harassment of media outlets, civil organizations and other critics of Orban’s rule has steadily grown. In rhetoric reminiscent of Putin, Orban asserts that such groups are “paid political activists attempting to assert foreign interests in Hungary.” The prime minister now even touts the alleged virtues of autocracy, citing China, Russia, Singapore, and Turkey, as models of successful countries that Hungary should consider emulating.Budapest’s authoritarian drift, combined with the government’s growing foreign policy flirtation with Russia has alarmed not only officials in other NATO countries but pro-Western elements in Hungary itself. Such concerns were evident in February 2015 when thousands of demonstrators poured into the streets of Budapest to protest Orban’s policies and urge visiting German Chancellor Angela Merkel not to accord his regime any deference.Matters have only grown more contentious since then. In June, the European Parliament passed a resolution decrying “worrying developments” in Hungary, including the erosion of democratic standards. And just this month the EU Parliament passed another resolution calling on the European Commission to make Hungary the first EU country to face a monitoring procedure regarding its governing practices. Budapest now risks a possible penalty of having its voting rights in EU institutions suspended.Poland is the latest addition to the roster of NATO countries drifting toward autocracy. The electoral victory of the right-wing Law and Justice Party in October has ushered in a number of troubling developments. The new government promptly pardoned the notorious head of the country’s security services, who had received a prison sentence for various abuses of power. But the most alarming measure occurred when the new government ignored several rulings of Poland’s Constitutional Court. One of the rulings invalidated the government’s attempt to replace five judges with five new appointees. The prime minister and his colleagues defied the court and sat the new justices anyway. It was a brazen maneuver that surpassed U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s notorious court-packing scheme and would have made even that renowned player of political hardball blush.The Polish power play has alarmed both domestic critics and EU officials. Some 50,000 people poured into the streets of Warsaw this month to “defend democracy,” and Andrzej Zoll, former president of the Constitutional Court, warned that “twenty-five years of democratic Poland is coming to an end.” European Union Parliament President Martin Schulz described the actions of the Polish government as amounting to a “coup.”These trends are worrisome, but they should not be all that surprising. The nations of Eastern Europe suffered under the rule of communist regimes for more than four decades after the end of World War II. Democratic roots in those societies, therefore, are both recent and shallow. Indeed, the legacy of authoritarianism is much longer than just the communist era. During the period between the two world wars, only one country in that region, Czechoslovakia, enjoyed a stable democratic system. The other countries were all governed by regimes that ranged from conservative authoritarian to outright fascist. It may have been unduly optimistic to expect all of those nations to make an orderly, unimpeded transition to Western-style democracy.A2: Sanctions Change Russia’s BehaviorSanctions radically increase popular support for Russian nationalism and Putin and also drive Russia into alliance with ChinaBusiness News Europe, May 6, 2014, “Why western sanctions will fail” )With the violence in eastern Ukraine escalating by the day, the West’s policy of imposing sanctions on Russia is bound to fail. All this policy has done is to paint both the Kremlin and Washington into their respective corners, making the chances of military confrontation look increasingly likely. As the German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, warned in interviews published in four European newspapers on May 6, “The bloody pictures from Odessa have shown us that we are just a few steps away from a military confrontation.” Thus the time for both Washington and Moscow to cut their losses and agree to meet to thrash out a compromise is now. Each day that passes will see the body count rise and drive the proxies that are actually doing the fighting at the behest of the two Great Game players become more and more invested in the violent cycle of anger and revenge, so that if the overlords try to pull the plug they might find it is too late. Indeed, this point may already have passed with the death of over 40 pro-Russian activists in Odessa. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and US President Barack Obama warned Russia the West would scale up to phase III sanctions, those that target sectors like banking and energy, if Russia interferes in any way with the upcoming Ukrainian presidential poll, slated for May 25. But with the situation in eastern Ukraine clearly spinning out of control, it will be impossible to hold what the international community considers to be a “free and fair election”. Having drawn a line in the sand, the West will be forced to take the nuclear option of doing real economic damage to the Russian economy and so force the Russians to retaliate in kind. We will be lucky if both sides hold themselves to just attacking on the economic front and not the military one as well. The irony is the Germans have tied themselves to a policy that they clearly don’t want, or can ill afford. Of all the European countries, Germany’s economy is the most closely bound to Russia. Germany depends heavily on Russian oil and gas, which accounts for the bulk of the €40bn it imported from the country in 2012. In the other direction, German exports to Russia totalled €38bn in 2012, which was 31% of all European exports to Russia. Therefore, doing real and significant damage to the Russian economy will do similar damage to Germany’s nascent economic recovery. The idea that sanctions, especially the pathetically weak ones that have been imposed so far, will have any impact on the Kremlin’s “calculus” is to totally misjudge the situation. “The whole idea that we are going to defeat the Russians by imposing hardship on them boggles my mind,” says Clifford Gaddy, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution and the author of the “virtual economy” meme that dominated the 1990s discussion of Russia’s problems. “It’s not a matter of how much pain you can impose, but how much they can tolerate. And how much can they tolerate depends on the motivation for their behaviour. For Russia it is a question of national interest and survival. It is not just about greed.” Gaddy’s voice is one of a growing chorus questioning the wisdom of the sanctions policy. Europe is clearly split on the issue, but the US holds the trump card: if Washington imposes financial sanctions on a major Russian firm, due to the integration of the global financial system these sanctions will effectively lock the Russian company out of the international capital and banking markets. “What is less clear, however, is what these sanctions will actually achieve,” says Dmitri Trenin, the highly respected director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. “Making Putin back down and concede defeat in Ukraine is improbable. Driving wedges between the Russian leader and his close associates is equally hopeless. The Russian liberal opposition, already marginalized, will hardly get a shot in the arm thanks to the sanctions. As to the bulk of the Russian people, their instinctive reaction to massive outside pressure against their country is more likely to be a patriotic surge rather than a regime change. The Russian government will now have an excellent reason to explain away the coming economic hardships: US sanctions.” Backfire In reality, the sanctions have so far had precisely the opposite effect to what was intended. Designed to undermine Putin’s support, they have actually lifted the president’s approval rating to an all-time high of 82% – exactly at the time when his popularity was becoming vulnerable due to the woeful state of Russia’s economy – while the popularity of Obama is now at a record low of 42%. Likewise, his inner circle, which has been hardest hit by the current “sanctions-lite”, has closed ranks and mocked their effectiveness. The boost in Putin’s popularity has also handed him shiny new armour against the slings and arrows of Russia’s young opposition movement, at one of the very few junctures where it actually had a chance of finding a flaw in the president’s defences. Domestically, the Ukrainian crisis has killed the nascent opposition dead for the time being. At the same time, other polls show that public approval of the government actions is rising and Russians now regard the country as being on “the right path.” Finally, Putin is clearly digging in his heels and the transparent divisions in European support for the US line on tougher sanctions is child’s play to exploit. Not only was Putin not prepared to back down in the face of western threats, now he is reaping huge domestic political capital from his tough-talking defiance – exactly the capital he needs to weather the disapproval that was bound to follow the first fall in the standard of living in Russia since he took over 2000. The West will truly have to destroy the Russian economy before they can persuade the people that Putin is the wrong man for the job. And that nuclear blitz option would do just as much damage to the European recovery. Indeed the only country that is truly committed to imposing tougher sanctions on Russia is the US, which has virtually no economic interests in the country; those American companies there are in Russia are for the most part multinationals, which are notorious for their lack of interest in politics. “There is palpable resistance on the part of various Western business interests – from German manufacturers to US big oil – against ratcheting up sanctions. The Obama administration’s effort to talk Russia down is countered by the Kremlin’s outreach to the CEOs of the companies that are doing well in Russia,” Trenin concludes. Perhaps the biggest irony of the sanctions policy is that it is driving Moscow into Beijing’s arms. China has been one of the very few emerging market powers to openly condemn the sanctions policy. Beijing’s ambassador to Moscow told reporters on May 2 that China “strongly opposes unilateral sanctions against Russia.” “We are against imposing unilateral sanctions on Russia. They are not a way out,” Chinese Ambassador Li Hui said the day after Washington released a new sanctions list singling out Putin’s friends and other officials on April 28. If Washington’s policy is one of containment, then facilitating a closer alliance between Moscow and Beijing is clearly counter productive. If Russia is cut off from the west, the only place Moscow can go is into the open arms of the and commodity-hungry east. China is already siding with Russia and said on May 5 that it would help finance and build a bridge over Kerch Strait to permanently link the recently annexed Crimean peninsula to Russia. Boris Titov, Russia’s business ombudsman and head of the Sino-Russia business council for the last decade, has said exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), ecologically clean food, timber and wine to China will more than compensate for any losses Russia incurs if relations with the EU worsen.Sanctions won’t cause Russia to change its behavior – it adapts and develops new businessesXinhua General News Service, December 18, 2014, Commentary: Double-edged sanctions against Russia hurt both sides, DOA: 10-25-15 Yet, the "giant rocks attack" has failed to press Russia to yield. President Vladimir Putin has made clear on various occasions that Russia will stick to its stand and never live with the sanctions. Admitting Western sanctions seriously damaged Russia's economy, Putin told his 10th annual year-end press conference Thursday that the current situation can be used to offer additional conditions for production businesses, which would be a start to diversify the economy. "External conditions would urge us to be more effective and shift to more innovative development ways," he noted. Sanctions have not reduced Russia’s supply of arms to the rebelsAlwz Kokharov, Jane's Intelligence Weekly, July 8, 2015 Continued ceasefire violations in eastern Ukraine increase likelihood of further Western sanctions against Russia, DOA: 11-27-15On 8 July 2015 the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly supported a draft resolution condemning Russia's "clear, gross and uncorrected violations" in Ukraine, effectively acknowledging Russia's military involvement in the conflict. The resolution, jointly introduced by Canada and Ukraine, received 97 "yes" votes and 7 "against", while 32 delegates abstained. The non-binding resolution is an indicator of renewed attempts to apply political pressure on Moscow to withdraw its support to the pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions. While the Minsk II ceasefire agreement stabilised the line of contact between Ukrainian and separatist forces at the end of February 2015, shelling and localised fighting continues on a daily basis. The number of ceasefire violations, mostly by the separatist militants, ranges from 80 per day at the end of June to 20 per day in early July, according to the OSCE monitoring mission. After 14 months of fighting, there is no evidence that separatist stocks of weapons and ammunition supplied by Russia have substantially diminished.Sanctions have not reduce the threat from Russia at allEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15And when the sanctions are judged by the most relevant metric—whether they are producing a policy change—they have been an outright failure. Since the United States imposed the sanctions, Russia has not backed down in Ukraine, and there is no reason to believe that they will force it to do so anytime soon. In the meantime, however, the sanctions are harming U.S. economic and geopolitical interests. If Western leaders want to resolve the Ukraine crisis and meaningfully constrain Russia’s bad behavior, they should abandon their failed sanctions-centric policy and focus on other measures instead, such as efforts to aid Ukraine economically, obstruct Russia’s military modernization, and increase European energy independence. Whatever punishment the sanctions have inflicted on Russia, it has not translated into coercion. The Obama administration appears to have expected that it would have by now: in February 2015, for example, Christine Wormuth, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, admitted that the sanctions had “not changed so far what Russia has been doing on the ground, and that is the great concern.” Indeed, after the initial round of sanctions, the Kremlin’s aggression only grew: Russia formally absorbed Crimea and upped its financial and military support for pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine (including those who most likely shot down the Malaysia Airlines flight). It is possible that the sanctions may have deterred Russia from even greater aggression in Ukraine, but it is equally possible that all Russia ever wanted to do there was create a slow-burning insurgency. And at any rate, the sanctions have failed to force Russia to withdraw from Crimea and stop meddling in eastern Ukraine. This should not be surprising: as the most comprehensive study of sanctions found, they fail to achieve their goals in 66 percent of cases, and they fail 79 percent of the time when designed to discourage military misadventurism.Russia has circumvented the sanctions by turning the ChinaEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15The Kremlin has also managed to circumvent the sanctions, partly by turning to China. In May 2014, Putin visited the country to seal a 30-year, $400 billion gas deal with it, demonstrating that Russia has alternatives to European gas markets. That October, Moscow and Beijing also agreed to a 150 billion yuan currency swap, allowing companies such as Gazprom to trade commodities in rubles and yuan—and thus steer clear of U.S. financial regulations. Even in Europe, Russia has been able to find loopholes to avoid the sanctions: in order to obtain access to Arctic drilling equipment and expertise, Rosneft acquired 30 percent of the North Atlantic drilling projects belonging to the Norwegian company Statoil.Sanctions won’t work in the long-termEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15It is tempting to believe that the sanctions will eventually work—say, after a few more years—but that is wishful thinking. U.S. and European negotiations with Russia have focused on the near future, including the implementation of the Minsk II agreement, an armistice with a deadline of December 2015, and with good reason: a drawn-out insurgency is the worst-case scenario for Ukraine and its Western backers. The sanctions were intended to compel Russia to cooperate with this international diplomatic process and withdraw from Crimea; if it doesn’t do so before the Minsk deadline, it is unlikely to in the future. Indeed, as academic studies suggest, the longer sanctions are in place, the less likely they are to produce a policy change. And in the case of Russia, if the price of oil rises again in the next few years, as is likely, their impact will diminish further.Sanctions have not limited Russian aggression in the UkraineElise Labot, June 12, 2015, U.S., Europe ready new sanctions to deter Putin on Ukraine, CNN, Europe ready new sanctions to deter Putin on Ukraine, DOA: 11-27-15The sources said that while they prefer not to impose the new sanctions, they hope the knowledge that they are being prepared will deter Putin from taking further action.READ: U.S. ambassador to U.N. visits Ukraine, slams Russian 'aggression'"It is both preparation and also a degree of credible messaging," the European diplomat briefing reporters said. "One is to make very clear that if there are further acts of aggression that we can move quickly. The other is to let it be known we are serious about being ready to do that as a deterrent."The diplomat stressed, "We would rather not to have to do that, but it needs to be clear that if that is the direction Putin's Russia goes in, that we will react."U.S. officials and European diplomats insist the sanctions are taking a toll on the Russian economy, where the ruble has plummeted in value.But they admit the sanctions have done little to prevent Putin from continuing the campaign in Ukraine or curb aggression by separatists in Eastern Ukraine.In total, more than 6,000 people have died in the fighting in Eastern Ukraine since the conflict began last year, according to the United Nations.Sanctions will not change Russia’s position on the UkraineRussia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama, March 4, 2015 Sanctions won't change Russia's principled position on Ukraine, DOA: 11-27-15It is about time for Washington to understand that no sanctions can affect Russia's position on Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. "No sanctions can change Russia's principled position. It is about time for Washington to understand this," Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich said in a commentary on the U.S. decision to extend its sanctions against Russia, which is available on the ministry website.Since Crimea is an historical part of Russia, sanctions won’t force Russia to give it upStates News Service December 20, 2014, Russia has dismissed US sanctions as useless, DOA: 11-27-15The following information was released by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty:Russia has dismissed new U.S. sanctions as useless and underscored its historic right to the Crimean Peninsula. The Russian Foreign Ministry said on December 20 that the new sanctions won't push Russia to give up Crimea since it is a "historic and integral part of Russia."The ministry referred to Cuba, where it took the United States half a century to restore diplomatic relations, and said it was prepared to wait as long as necessary for Washington to relent.U.S. President Barack Obama on December 19 called on Russia to end its annexation of Crimea and announced new measures prohibiting U.S. companies and individuals from exporting or importing any goods, services, or technology to or from Crimea.Obama also authorized the Treasury Department to impose sanctions on individuals and companies operating in the region.The Treasury Department announced 17 names and seven entities blacklisted under the order.The move comes one day after the European Union banned investment in Crimea.Crimea has been under de facto Russian control since March, after Russian-backed forces took the peninsula from Ukraine.Sanctions fail for Russia Mufson 14(Steven, Washpost contributor, April 29, 2014, “Why the sanctions against Russia probably won’t work” )Correction: An earlier version of this story contained incorrect figures for Russia's daily oil exports and the annual revenue they generated. This version has been corrected. Do economic sanctions work? In Russia, maybe not. Russia is sitting on roughly half a trillion dollars in foreign exchange, and it exports about 7.5 million barrels a day of crude oil bringing in about $300 billion a year — not including its sales of natural gas. It has will as well as means. Russian President Vladi?mir Putin seems content to suffer some economic damage for the sake of correcting what he sees as a historical wrong and bringing Crimea and perhaps more of Ukraine back into the Russian fold. “The whole idea that we are going to defeat Russians by imposing hardship on them boggles my mind,” said Clifford Gaddy, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution, noting that the Russian economy contracted 40 percent after the fall of the Soviet Union. “It’s not a matter of how much pain you can impose, but how much they can tolerate. And how much they can tolerate depends on the motivation for behavior,” he said, adding that Russia’s dispute with the United States and Europe was a “matter of national interest and survival” and not just greed. This is bad news for foreign companies operating in Russia for whom the gradual tightening of sanctions on Monday by the United States and Europe is worrisome. So far the Obama administration has tried to zero in on top officials and advisers to Putin. And trade with Russia outside the energy sector is relatively small; U.S. trade with Russia accounts for less than 1 percent of U.S. overall trade. Still, some international companies have big stakes there. The biggest U.S. investor in Russia is Exxon Mobil, which has an oil and gas production facility off Sakhalin Island in northeastern Russia and which has joined with Russian oil giant Rosneft to explore the country’s Arctic region. It also has an operation extracting natural gas from complex geological formations. Russia accounts for about 6 percent of Exxon Mobil’s global production, according to oil analyst Pavel Molchanov at the investment firm Raymond James. London-based oil giant BP is even more exposed to Russia. It owns a 19.75 percent stake in Rosneft, whose chief executive Igor Sechin was just added to the U.S. sanctions list. The stake is valued at about $13 billion, about 9 percent of BP’s total market capitalization. The Rosneft holding also accounts for about 30 percent of BP’s production, 36 percent of its reserves and contributes about 15 percent to the firm’s net income, Molchanov says. Royal Dutch Shell has a stake in a Gazprom oil and gas field in Siberia and is a partner in Sakhalin 2, which has a liquefied natural gas terminal that in 2012 supplied a tenth of Japan’s gas needs. The company’s chief executive, Ben van Beurden, in Russia for the 20th anniversary of the project, met Putin on April 18 to discuss expanding the facility. “We also know that this is going to be a project that will need strong support to succeed,” he said, according to Russian media. “So one of my purposes of meeting with you, Mr. President, is to also secure support for the way forward on this project.” Weatherford, a U.S. oil services company, is also deeply involved in Russia. As of March 2014, Weatherford had 346 rigs, 74 percent of its international rig count, operating in Russia, Molchanov said. Outside the energy sector, international companies with investments in Russia range from those selling luxury consumer goods to those investing in other natural resources. Putin, like other countries’ leaders, has insisted that automakers have certain levels of domestic content if they are selling in Russia. Ford and General Motors both have plants in Russia. But so far, the United States and European Union have targeted Russian individuals and companies. The intention is to make clear to Russians that the target is Putin and his close allies, not the Russian people overall. Gaddy doubts that will work either. “We are targeting the very best of Russia, the part that’s most modern, most eager to integrate into the global economy, most progressive,” he said. “Sanctions will tend to hurt them.” Russia joins a long list of countries that have been subjected to international sanctions, and the track record is mixed, at best. Even where effective, they work slowly. The U.S. embargo of Cuba has lasted more than half a century, and the Castros still rule there. The embargo of North Korea has inflicted suffering and starvation on the populace, but the Kim family remains in power. Both countries received oil and economic support from Russia and China respectively. The U.S. Congress imposed sanctions on South Africa over President Ronald Reagan’s veto in October 1986, prompting many U.S. companies, such as General Motors and Mobil Oil, to withdraw. The sanctions contributed to ending apartheid, but domestic foes of apartheid had already shaken the country for two years with demonstrations, consumer boycotts and strikes, sparking a flight of capital, no-shows for military service and a reassessment by influential members of the ruling National Party. The United States and European nations are currently negotiating with Iran, which is widely seen to have been brought to the bargaining table by tight sanctions on oil exports and transactions by Iran’s central bank. But the United States imposed sanctions on Iran after the 1979 hostage-taking, and other countries added sanctions after Iran resumed its uranium-enrichment program in 2005. Sanctions were tightened again in 2012, leading to a sharp drop in Iranian oil exports that provide the bulk of government revenue. But Molchanov argues that Russia is different. “Even if Russia were to cross the border into eastern Ukraine , it would be hard to imagine a full embargo on Russian exports because the world needs the oil,” he said. Iran at its peak was exporting about 2.5 million barrels a day, and the embargo eventually cut that to about 1 to 1.5 million barrels a day. “The world can lose a million barrels a day from Iran, and it’s not especially painful,” Molchanov added. “But if it lost 9 million barrels a day from Russia, there is no supply elsewhere that could fully compensate for that loss immediately. If Russian exports went to zero tomorrow, there would be a global oil crisis.” One argument in favor of imposing economic sanctions on Russia is the theory that Putin has made a bargain with the Russian people (similar to the implicit bargain made by China’s Communist Party): The Russian people give him power, and he will give them better living standards. But Russian living standards weren’t that great before the Ukraine crisis. Moreover, many Russia experts think that is the wrong way to look at Russia. Gaddy says that Russians want a better standard of living, but not if it means they aren’t treated as a great power. He said that given a choice of being Sweden or Russia, most Russians would sacrifice Sweden’s comforts and choose Russia for its great-power status. Mark Medish, a National Security Council adviser on Russia and Ukraine under President Bill Clinton, believes Putin’s behavior has been reckless, but he also doubts the effectiveness of economic sanctions. “Sanctions may cause economic inconvenience and reputational pain for the targets, and imposing sanctions may also make us feel correct, that we have done the right thing,” he said. But he warned that “the stated objective of sanctions is to get Russia to change its behavior, and this is unlikely to work. Sanctions are more likely to galvanize the will of the other side.” He added that “great powers, especially nuclear superpowers, do not allow themselves to be extorted.”Sanctions have not altered Russia’s foreign policyAssociated Press International, April 1, 2015 American farmer among the winners in sanctions-hit Russia, DOA: 11-27-15U.S. and EU sanctions were meant to force Russia to back down in the Ukraine crisis - first over Crimea, then over its support for separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine.That has not happened."The sanctions did not produce a change in Putin's foreign policy," said Brookings Institute fellow Lilia Shevtsova, although she added that the threat of further sanctions may have prevented open Russian military intervention in Ukraine.Sanctions have not reduced Russian aggressionHoward Lafranchi, The Christian Science Monitor January 30, 2015, West eyes new Russian sanctions amid renewed fighting in eastern Ukraine, Sanctions don’t threaten Russia, DOA: 11-27-15As fighting once again rages in eastern Ukraine between government forces and Russian-backed separatists, charges and counter-charges between the principal geopolitical backers on each side are spiraling to new heights.Yet even as the United States and European Union prepare another round of sanctions on Russia, and Russia warns of "catastrophe" if the West pursues its support of what it considers to be the aggressor government in Kiev, there are no signs of either side heeding the dire warnings of the other.After President Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed in a phone conversation earlier this week on the need to "hold Russia accountable" for stoking a return to violence in eastern Ukraine, the European Union (EU) moved Thursday to expand the list of mostly Russian individuals hit with sanctions over Ukraine. EU foreign ministers also moved to prepare "further action" to pressure the sides to halt the fighting, signaling that EU leaders could adopt new sanctions against Russia when they hold a summit Feb. 12.Such action could be the moment for the US to proceed with the additional sanctions it has been threatening against Russia, since the two Western powers have moved in tandem at each step of the gradual ratcheting-up of Western sanctions targeting Russia. This week Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said the US is ready to turn the sanctions screw if Mr. Obama issues the order. The ratcheting up of tensions occurred as the State Department announced Friday that Secretary of State John Kerry would visit the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, next week to "highlight the United States' steadfast support for Ukraine and its people."Even Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledges the impact Western sanctions are having on Russia's increasingly fragile economy. On Friday, the Russian Central Bank unexpectedly cut the interest rate, shocking markets and potentially causing more volatility for the ruble. But there are no signs the sanctions are succeeding with the intended objective of altering Russia's support for the separatists.If anything, Mr. Putin is lionizing the separatists before the Russian public as a kind of defensive wall holding back a NATO reach into Russia's historical sphere of political and economic influence.Reports from the conflict zone indicate the separatists are fighting with fresh supplies of heavy weaponry that could have only come from across the border in Russia.Russia has a very different perspective on the conflict, however, labeling the Ukrainian forces fighting in the east as the aggressor.A2: Sanctions Stop Arctic Oil Development/Arctic Oil Development GoodRussian companies have plenty of tech and money to develop oil in the Arctic, the slide of the ruble has only benefitted them.Hellenic Shipping News, December 23, 2015, Against All Odds: Russia Sees Oil Output Boost in 2015,” DOA: 12-23-15Amid a global oil glut Russian mid-sized fields, including those of Severenergia in the Arctic Yamal region, saw fivefold output boosts of light crude and gas condensate. Bloomberg noted that co-owners of those areas, Novatek OJSC and Gazpromneft PJSC, lowered operating costs because the major investments were done when oil prices were higher. Even a 52 percent fall in the value of the ruble following the oil price decreases played into the hands of many Russian companies, as they reduced their costs in dollar terms up to 90 percent.Russian companies can get money from the government -- no reason they need Western financingSamantha Page, October 23, 2015, Think Progress, Don’t Let Shell Fool You. Arctic Drilling is Not a Thing of the Past, DOA: 12-23-15In some ways, Russia is moving ahead in an even tougher climate than other countries face. International sanctions have prevented Russia from obtaining the newest offshore drilling technology and diminish access to long-term financing. Arctic drilling projects can have 20- or even 30-year timelines, Conley said. But on the other hand, Russia’s oil exploration is supported by the state, and is subject to significantly less regulation than U.S. or Norwegian efforts. This could mean that development from Russia is more dangerous than development from other countries. As Conley put it, there is a “greater risk-taking appetite” in Russia, while Western companies face greater regulation and the specter of liability if anything does go wrong. And they’ll develop the technology themselvesAndrew Kramer, October 29, 2014, New York Times, The “Russification” of oil exploration, DOA: 12-23-15MOSCOW — The American and European sanctions against the Russian oil industry have dashed, at least for now, the Western oil majors’ ambitions to drill in the Arctic Ocean. But drilling will continue all the same, Russian government and state oil company officials have been taking pains to point out, ever since the sanctions took effect over the summer. “We will do it on our own,” Igor I. Sechin, the president of Russia’s state-controlled oil company, Rosneft, told journalists in October. “We’ll continue drilling here next year and the years after that.” Rather than throw in the towel in the face of Western sanctions intended to halt Russia’s Arctic oil ambitions by stopping technology transfers, the Russians have responded with plans to “Russify” the technology to be deployed in the world’s largest effort to date to extract oil from the thawing Arctic Ocean. The solution to tapping the Arctic, Yevgeny Primakov, a former prime minister, told a group of high officials in October, “is found first of all in our own industrial base.” A major hurdle is already cleared: An Exxon-led joint venture discovered oil in the Russian sector of the Arctic Ocean in September, proving the region holds commercially viable volumes of oil. Rosneft is already laying plans to drill without Western oil major cooperation. Along with Exxon, Eni of Italy and Statoil of Norway had joint ventures to work with Rosneft in the Kara, Laptev, and Chukchi seas above Russia. After the September sanctions suspended those deals, Rosneft negotiated to rent from Gazprom four Russian ice-class drilling rigs for next season’s exploration work, should Exxon still be sanction-barred from doing the work next summer. Rosneft has also booked six rigs from North Atlantic Drilling, a unit of Seadrill of Norway, under contracts signed in July and grandfathered in under the sanctions. The Russians are in early talks with the Chinese over sailing rigs from the South China Sea to the Arctic Ocean, industry executives say. This spring as the threat of sanctions loomed, Rosneft bought the Russian and Venezuelan well-drilling business of Weatherford, adding to its in-house capabilities. A further “Russification” of the industry seems inevitable. In October, President Vladimir V. Putin approved the creation of a state-owned oil services company, RBC, a Russian business newspaper reported. The intention is to duplicate, as well as possible, the services purveyed now by Halliburton, Baker Hughes and Schlumberger.Massive expansion nowMr. Roughead, a retired U.S. Navy admiral and former chief of naval operations (2007-11), is a visiting fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, Wall Street Journal, In the Race for the Arctic, the US and Russia are Polar Opposites, DOA: 12-23-15Russia is taking the lead in Arctic offshore oil production. Russia began producing offshore oil at the Prirazlomnaya field in the Pechora Sea in 2014, and last year it delivered roughly 2.2 million barrels. Gazprom Neft expects to more than double oil production this year from the country’s only offshore Arctic oil project.Russia already shipping oil from the ArcticSamantha Page, October 23, 2015, Think Progress, Don’t Let Shell Fool You. Arctic Drilling is Not a Thing of the Past, DOA: 12-23-15Meanwhile, Russia is full steam ahead. Last year, the country announced it was shipping the world’s first tanker of oil from the Arctic Ocean.And there is militarization of the Arctic nowNew York Times, December 24, 2015, is reinvesting in its bases in the Arctic: building new ones, expanding old ones and deploying personnel to operate them. Analysts say Russia’s efforts in the Arctic are driven in part by climate change, as the country seeks to exploit and defend maritime trade routes and oil and natural gas resources in areas made more accessible by melting ice.Norway developing gas in the ArcticSamantha Page, October 23, 2015, Think Progress, Don’t Let Shell Fool You. Arctic Drilling is Not a Thing of the Past, DOA: 12-23-15Norway is drilling for offshore natural gas. Every day, Statoil’s Snow White field sends 735 million cubic feet of natural gas through a 90-mile pipeline to an island off northern Norway. Statoil has also been drilling exploratory oil wells in the Norwegian Arctic for 35 years. So far, they have not had much luck, but they keep going. A2: Sanctions Strengthen Russian Democratic GroupsSanctions enable Putin to blame the West for their economic problemsAssociated Press International, April 1, 2015 American farmer among the winners in sanctions-hit Russia, DOA: 11-27-15Sanctions are routinely cited in state media as the cause of most current economic problems. These include woes more properly blamed on over-dependence on oil revenue, Gontmakher said.The government has managed "to shift the responsibility for it onto the West, and not our own systems and institutions," he said. "In that sense, the initiators of the sanctions have really lost out."Despite a year of sanctions, President Vladimir Putin's approval rating has hovered well over 80 percent in recent months. "Sanctions without popular dissent will hardly work" in weakening the government, said Shevtsova.All of their evidence is just predictive of what should happen when sanctions are imposed. None of their evidence claims that any strengthening of democracy has occurred since the sanctions were imposed.Their impact claim assumes the full instutionalization of democracy in Russia, which is absurd, as it would require the elimination of Putin.Sanctions have not strengthened Russia’s democratic oppositionAny postmortem of?Russia's recent regional elections should begin with hearty and?sincere praise for?those in?the opposition who had the?courage and?invested the?time necessary to?run, and?worked to?support campaigns and?protect the?vote. Given the?state of?affairs in?Russia today, theirs is not only a?dangerous undertaking, it is often thankless and?always seemingly Herculean. A?number of?seasoned campaign veterans were involved in?running this year's Parnas campaign. So, they are now doing what good campaign strategists do after an?election: assessing and?evaluating what worked, what didn't work and?determining where to?go from?here. In?looking forward and?charting a?course for?the near future, they may want to?consider first looking back considerably further than this election, and?examine where the?opposition was several years ago. A?good place to?start is a?panel discussion held in?2008 in?Washington, D.C. at?the American Enterprise Institute, where panelists Vladimir Ryzhkov, Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Kara-Murza and?Oleg Buklemishev discussed that year's Russian presidential election. Michael McFaul, who would later become the?U.S. Ambassador to?Russia, was also present. It's striking how the?issues raised by?the opposition panelists then?— unfair barriers to?entry, vote manipulation, lack of?access to?media, the?need for?a unified opposition and?more street demonstrations, oppression of?opposition supporters?— are largely those still being raised today. But after seven years, can it be said any real progress has been made in?building a?stronger, more viable opposition? It would be a?hard case to?make. Except perhaps for?the brief, bright glimmer of?Navalny's 27 percent showing in?the Moscow mayoral election in?2013, the?opposition is essentially where it was seven years ago?— low support among the?populace, no durable, experienced nationwide organization and?pretty much the?same leaders. At?that 2008 gathering, McFaul cited other countries where opposition political forces managed to?build strong organizations under much more oppressive conditions than those existing in?Russia. He also noted "Most successful democratic movements have not had democracy as the?ideology of?the opposition; that is usually a?means to?another end." "Democracy is a?very hard thing to?mobilize people around," he added. "They [other successful opposition movements] had other mechanisms for?mobilization that did not depend on?the state giving them the?chance to?participate in?elections." We can only dream where the opposition in Russia might be today if it had heeded McFaul’s advice and taken to heart his observations back then. If the?progress made over the?last seven years is any measure, the?current strategic approach of?the opposition is not working and?it's time to?at least discuss some radically different paths forward. First, reverse the?current strategic mindset. Though many would deny it, there is a?top-down mentality that pervades the?entire political spectrum in?Russia, from?the ruling regime through the?democratic opposition. There is a?deep conviction among many opposition leaders that change only happens from?Moscow, thus rendering regional organization building and?outreach efforts irrelevant. The?democratic coalition ran a?good, issue-oriented campaign in?Kostroma. But can anyone seriously expect to?be successful in?regional elections running candidates parachuted in?from Moscow? This is not a?successful long-term strategy for?a party. The?opposition been organizing in?Kostroma for?the last seven years, it's a?sure bet that any leaders emerging as candidates out of?that effort would have fared far better Sunday than the?opposition managed. Second, find an?effective mobilizing ideology. Develop a?platform that communicates clearly and?directly to?people how their lives will improve if opposition candidates are elected. For?a long time, the?manifesto on?the Parnas website was "free all political prisoners," followed by?a series of?demands for?structural democratic reform. The?party's latest platform is a?slight improvement. Needless to?say, few Russians get up in?the morning and?wonder how many political prisoners might be freed that day. They worry about the?same things every human the?world over worries about: adequate health care, their pension, their kids' education, putting more food on?the table.To?be viable, a?political party must speak loudly and?explicitly to?those types of?concerns. Third, work to?create a?more democratic party. Democracy may not be a?good mobilizing ideology, but it's a?great way to?build an?effective political organization. Parties serve as a?means of?aggregating citizens' concerns and?addressing them through policies. The?policy formulation process should include substantive input from?the grassroots level of?the organization, where activists can conduct direct citizen outreach and?help develop prescriptions that resonate with citizens. This creates greater solidarity and?a sense of?common purpose throughout all levels of?the organization. Fourth, organize and?mobilize at?the local level?— continually. A?party gains legitimacy by?proving it can be a?relevant and?positive force in?people's lives. That cannot be accomplished by?showing up every election cycle and?making the?case for?votes. Even in?the most difficult times it is possible to?organize to?achieve some sort of?good, particularly at?the local level where such efforts have more impact. Producing tangible, positive results for?people in?their communities legitimizes the?party, develops leaders and?demonstrate the?value of?collective organizing and?mobilization. Finally, as a?kind of?general guiding principle: Focus more on?people and?less on?Putin. Democratic transition depends only in?part on?credibly challenging the?legitimacy of?the ruling authority. Whether or not you believe Putin's approval ratings are as high as polls indicate, there's no doubt he remains the?most popular political figure in?the country. It makes no sense to?try to?build a?political movement based primarily on?simply being opposed to?such a?figure. Take the issue of corruption. It can be used to demonstrate that the regime is full of bad people (Putin focused), or it can be used to show how much corruption is costing citizens in unbuilt kindergartens, kilometers of unpaved roads, and unopened new medical clinics (people focused). The latter approach is likely to be much more effective. Mikhail Khodorkovsky said, "I believe that the?problem in?Russia is not so much with the?president on?a personal level. The?problem is that the?overwhelming majority of?our fellow citizens don't understand that they're the?ones who have got to?be personally responsible for?their own fate themselves." It seems unlikely that a?"bottom-up" democratic transition will ever occur in?Russia. However, liberalization will eventually come, and?consolidating and?sustaining democratic change must come from?the bottom. That means fundamentally re-engineering the?way Russian citizens relate to?government, political parties and?democracy itself. The?opposition should be the?architect and?builder in?that re-engineering project. But a?change in?the mindset of?Russian citizens won't come about by?preaching the?virtues of?democracy. It will happen through empowering grassroots activists to?demonstrate the?effectiveness of?organizing and?mobilizing to?make a?positive impact on?communities. Let's hope that project starts now. Russia cannot afford, and?the Russian people certainly do not need, another seven years of?unorganized drifting and?pointless bickering by?the opposition.No democratic peace, development explains the peaceErik Gartzke, 14 is Professor of Government at the University of Essex and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Alex Weisiger is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, International Studies Quarterly, March 2014Students of international politics have begun to look for, and to find, a systemic liberal peace. Confidence in the dyadic democratic peace observation, and controversy about its theoretical underpinnings, encourages exploration of new empirical territory (Huth and Allee 2003). Constructivist interpretations of the democratic peace (Risse-Kappen 1995, 1997; Wendt 1999) and other norms-based arguments (Kant [1795] 1957; Huntley 1996; Harrison 2004) anticipate virtuous system-level dynamics. “A dyadic approach to the democratic peace predicts peaceful dispute resolution only between democracies, while a systemic approach recognizes the potential for democratic interactions to influence the behavior of nondemocratic states” (Mitchell 2002:749; emphasis original). Existing studies appear to corroborate the claim that democracies are changing behavior, not just in dyads, but systemically. Consensus opinion among researchers clearly mirrors this view. As one set of authors puts it, “[w]ith little exception, scholars support an optimistic long term prognosis: global levels of democracy ameliorate worldwide levels of conflict” (Crescenzi, Kadera, McLaughlin and Thyne 2005:1).2 Yet, the very appeal of such a conclusion suggests that additional caution may be warranted. There are important reasons why democratic peace should fail to translate to the system level. Peace cannot “spillover” from democracies to nondemocracies without also appearing to affect conflict monadically, something that researchers generally do not observe (cf. Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter and Huth 1996). Also, at least initially, the rise of a democratic community creates more pairings with nondemocracies that tend to counteract, or even overwhelm, any pacific systemic consequences of democratic peace. To the degree that regime type heterogeneity (difference) increases conflict, researchers must distinguish difference from democracy to better understand these relationships. In the pages that follow, we first review existing arguments for systemic liberal peace. We then present a theory based on economic development and regime type heterogeneity. The challenge for arguments about a systemic democratic peace—the proposition that the increasing prevalence of democracy will have a general pacifying effect on the level of world conflict—is that democracy cannot simultaneously be associated with peace at both the dyadic and systemic levels, and yet remain unobserved at the monadic level, at least not unless democracies are engaged in a surprising amount of hypocrisy. The obvious problem for potential arguments about a systemic developmental peace, by contrast, is that evidence that development promotes peace between countries is weaker or absent (Richardson 1960; East and Gregg 1967; Rummel 1967; Thompson 1982; Maoz and Russett 1992).3 Ironically, however, just as the existence of strong monadic and dyadic findings places important logical constraints on a systemic democratic peace, the lack of strong lower-level effects for development opens up the possibility that system-level development could condition system-level peace. Indeed, there are good reasons to expect that such a relationship exists. The effect of economic development on interstate conflict can be “hiding” at the system level if development affects the conflict behavior of developing countries, as opposed to the direct recipients and beneficiaries of development. Powerful developed states have unambiguous incentives to discourage conflict by other countries, while continuing to exercise force themselves in pursuing foreign policy objectives. The tremendous disparity in power then makes it possible for developed countries to impose a form of international hypocrisy on developing states. Other scholarship identifies a robust norm against aggression in the postwar world, but fails to consider hypocrisy in the application of the norm (Zacher 2001; Fazal 2007). In short, as we demonstrate here, a richer world is also more peaceful, but the logic of that peace is grounded fundamentally in the hypocrisy of the richest countries.Democratization leads to war by increasing conflict with the regime typeGartzke 14Erik Gartzke is Professor of Government at the University of Essex and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Alex Weisiger is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, International Studies Quarterly, March 2014The dyadic democratic peace observation tells us that democracies do not get along with autocracies. Given the prominence of this initial relationship, any assessment of systemic democratic peace must consider the possibility that, rather than democracy promoting peace, difference promotes conflict. Scholars have long recognized that regime type has two potential effects. The systemic process of democratization may generate a growing community possessing mechanisms of tolerance, deliberation, transparency, or affinity, but regime change also imposes difference in the form of political heterogeneity. Difference can generate conflict as states with incompatible political structures see one another as the proximate threat (Werner 2000; Henderson 2002; Souva 2004). Major wars of the twentieth century pitted political ideologies, and their accompanying regime structures, against one another. Wars to make the world safe for democracy can only be fought in the context of tensions between democracies and autocracies, just as nineteenth-century conflicts to preserve monarchy presupposed the existence of non-monarchical regimes. While regime type difference may or may not constitute an important cause of conflict, this is an empirical question. If difference matters to any significant degree, then it is important to distinguish its effects from the potentially beneficial consequences for systemic conflict and peace of democracy or development.A2: Space Advantage – Link AnswerRussia will still cooperate on space for civilian uses and the debate about the space station is only over 4 yearsShamil Zhumatov, Newsweek, Russia pulls space cooperation in Response to Russia sanctions, DOA: 12-18-15Russia will bar the United States from using Russian-made rocket engines for military satellite launches, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said on Tuesday, retaliating for sanctions on high-tech equipment which Washington has imposed over the Ukraine crisis. He also said Russia would reject a U.S. request to prolong the use of the International Space Station beyond 2020. Russia pledged to respond in kind when the United States said last month that it would deny export licenses for any high-technology items that could aid Russian military capabilities and would revoke existing licenses.Moscow's measures would affect MK-33 and RD-180 engines which Russia supplies to the United States, Rogozin told a news conference. "We are ready to deliver these engines but on one condition that they will not be used to launch military satellites," he said.Washington wants to keep the International Space Station, a $100 billion orbital outpost that is a project of 15 nations and a showcase of Russian-U.S. cooperation, flying until at least 2024, four years beyond the previous target.Even with the current budget, NASA can’t even finance a mission to Mars, let alone colonizationTony Reichhardt, 6/25/2014, Air & Space Magazine, “To Mars! (But not the way we’re going),” will need more money? Without a significant boost in the space agency’s budget, we should forget about Mars, says the panel. Sending humans to the Red Planet will cost on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars, and even though this will be amortized over decades, the nation should be prepared to pay that cost. Americans should also understand that people will likely die carrying out such an ambitious mission.? Spaceflight is popular, but only up to a point? This wasn’t the typical committee of ex-NASA officials and aerospace engineers, repeating the same tired arguments. The panel included historians, economists (co-chair Mitch Daniels is a former head of the U.S. government budget office), and in Roger Tourangeau, one of the leading academic experts on public opinion. As a result, their analysis of public support for spaceflight goes far beyond counting Twitter followers and Facebook likes, or relying on quickie polls to show that people “like space.” Basically, Americans want a human spaceflight program, but it’s far from a priority. “At any given time, a relatively small proportion of the U.S. public pays close attention to space exploration,” the committee wrote. Furthermore, “most Americans do not favor increased spending on space exploration”—which seems a serious problem, given the need to increase NASA’s budget. But, said Daniels in a press briefing timed for the report’s release, this may not be a showstopper. If the public won’t demand more spending, neither is it likely to object if leaders invest more in space, especially if NASA can show tangible results.? The United States can’t go it alone? If NASA aims to send people to Mars, the program will have to be international, and other nations will have to contribute well above the amounts they’ve historically invested in human spaceflight. China should be included.? NASA needs an overhaul? NASA facilities that are obsolete or don’t contribute to the mission should be closed. (This, of course, requires wise management by Congress, whose political patronage sometimes keeps NASA programs alive beyond the point of usefulness.)? If the report’s conclusions sound blunt, they’re meant to. As Daniels told reporters, “We recognize that many of our recommendations will be seen by many as unrealistic—to which we would only observe that, absent changes along the lines we are recommending, the goal of reaching Mars in any meaningful timeframe is itself unrealistic.”Colonization impossible – it costs hundreds of billions of dollars to even finance a mission, and NASA doesn’t have thatLedyard King, 6/25/2014, JC Online, “Daniels: Mars trip a daunting challenge,” will take unprecedented unity, funding and international teamwork to land astronauts on Mars within the next 30 years, the co-chairmen of an independent government panel advocating such a mission told a congressional committee Wednesday.? Then the two co-chairmen got a glimpse of why those goals won’t come easy:? ? GOP lawmakers at Wednesday’s hearing bashed the Obama administration for abandoning a return-to-the-moon mission in favor of using an asteroid as a steppingstone to Mars.? ? Democrats said Republicans have no right to complain about lack of money for the space program when they’ve pushed for budget cuts.? ? And lawmakers from both parties raised doubts about whether potential foreign partners, notably China, can be trusted.? Mitch Daniels, co-chairman of the National Research Council panel that issued the 285-page report earlier this month, acknowledged the enormousness of the task.? “Getting humans to the surface of Mars will be a daunting challenge,” Daniels, now president of Purdue University and a former two-term Indiana governor, told members of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee. “Succeeding in this endeavor will require, we believe, a very different way of doing business than the nation has been practicing in recent decades.”? The other co-chairman, Jonathan Lunine, who directs Cornell University’s Center for Radiophysics and Space Research, told lawmakers that a Mars mission will cost “hundreds of billions” over the next two to three decades and may not be an easy sell to the public.? The National Research Council’s report concludes that exploring Mars — a concept that the committee backs — will require a plan that enjoys almost total support, full funding, and involvement by private and international partners from the get-go.NASA doesn’t have enough funding to colonize MarsRT News, 6/23/2014, “NASA plans to colonize Mars,” , the American space agency is planning to put a human on Mars in 2035 – a plan that depends on the successful completion of a few different missions, as well as stable funding over the course of the next couple of decades. As RT reported earlier this month, a new study by the US National Research Council found that under NASA’s current budget trajectory, reaching the Red Planet would be unlikely.? “Absent a very fundamental change in the nation’s way of doing business, it is not realistic to believe that we can achieve the consensus goal of reaching Mars,” said Mitch Daniels, the former Indiana governor and co-chair of the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Human Spaceflight.** Terraforming Specific Answers **AT Mars Colonization Solves ExtinctionLife on Mars is not any safer than life on Earth – colonization does not solve the risk of extinctionWilliams 10 (Linda, Physics Instructor, Santa Rosa Junior College, Spring, Peace Review Journal of Social Justice, “Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization”, ) CHThe Destruction of Earth Threat According to scientific theory, the destruction of Earth is a certainty. About five billion years from now, when our sun exhausts its nuclear fuel, it will expand in size and envelope the inner planets, including the Earth, and burn them into oblivion. So yes, we are doomed, but we have 5 billion years, plus or minus a few hundred million, to plan our extraterrestrial escape. The need to colonize the Moon or Mars to guarantee our survival based on this fact is not pressing. There are also real risks due to collisions with asteroids and comets, though none are of immediate threat and do not necessitate extraterrestrial colonization. There are many Earth-based technological strategies that can be developed in time to mediate such astronomical threats such as gravitational tugboats that drag the objects out of range. The solar system could also potentially be exposed to galactic sources of high-energy gamma ray bursts that could fry all life on Earth, but any Moon or Mars base would face a similar fate. Thus, Moon or Mars human based colonies would not protect us from any of these astronomical threats in the near future. Colonization ImpossibleTerraforming fails – Mars does not have a magnetic field. Colonies would be destroyed by lethal doses of solar radiationJosh Briggs, 2013, Discovery, “5 hurdles to conquer before colonizing Mars,” though it's the closest planet to Earth for sustaining life, Mars is currently uninhabitable by humans. Yes, it has an atmosphere, wind, clouds and days are similar in length to ours at 24 hour, 37 minutes. Mars even has seasonal changes too [source: Britannica].? But that's essentially where the comparisons stop. By all accounts, Mars is a geologically dead planet. While Mars has plenty of volcanoes and geological evidence that there was tectonic activity at some point in its history, that's not the case anymore. There is no air pressure to hold in water and Mars suffers from the lack of a magnetic field that would shield it from harmful solar winds [source: Fox]. Any effort to process Mars into a livable planet (i.e. terraform) would have to take all these factors into account.? Perhaps it would be possible to jumpstart the atmosphere by turning the carbon dioxide-rich air into oxygen much the way plants on Earth clean our air. But Mars still wouldn't have a magnetic field. Without a magnetic shield for protection, extreme waves of solar radiation strip away the Martian atmosphere, thus subjecting humans to lethal doses of radiation. Evidence suggests the polar ice caps have the remnants of a magnetic shield and are safe from the extreme solar radiation [source: Fox]. If nothing else, terraforming could be limited to those regions.Terraforming is impossible – it will take hundreds of years and we do not have the techJuarez 13More than 100,000 want to go to Mars and not return, project says By Jennifer Juarez, , and Elizabeth Landau, CNN updated 6:06 PM EDT, Thu August 15, 2013 | Filed under: Innovations lander that Mars One sends will be able to carry about 5,511 pounds of "useful load" to Mars, he said. After eight missions, more than 44,000 pounds of supplies and people are expected to have arrived. The capsules themselves, whose weight is not included in that number, will become part of the habitat. Food and solar panels will go in the capsules. Earth won't be sending much water or oxygen though -- those will be manufactured on Mars, Lansdorp said. Astronauts will filter Martian water from the Martian soil. "We will evaporate it and condense it back into its liquid state," he said. "From the water we can make hydrogen and oxygen, and we will use the oxygen for a breathing atmosphere inside the habitat. This will be prepared by the rovers autonomously before the humans arrive." It sounds like terraforming, a process in which the conditions of a planet are modified to make it habitable, but Lansdorp said it isn't. "We will create an atmosphere that looks like the atmosphere on Earth, so you could say that we are terraforming the habitat. But to terraform the entire planet, that's a project that will take hundreds and hundreds of years," he added. A dangerous mission In spite of the risks of space travel, the Mars One founder said he is convinced of the viability of the project. However, some space travel experts have said the risks are far too high to carry out these manned missions to Mars, a distance that humans have never traveled. Radiation is a big concern. NASA does not allow their astronauts to expose themselves to radiation levels that could increase their risk of developing cancer by more than 3%. To maintain the radiation exposure standards that NASA requires, the maximum time an astronaut can spend in space "is anywhere from about 300 days to about 360 days for the solar minimum activity. For solar maximum, in ranges anywhere from about 275 days to 500 days," said Eddie Semones, NASA spaceflight radiation officer. A round-trip journey to Mars could expose astronauts to the maximum amount of radiation allowed in a career under current NASA standards, according to a recent study by scientists at the space agency. Mars One is planning a one-way journey, which doesn't negate the problem, and being on Mars could expose astronauts to even more radiation, depending on how long they stay and what the shielding conditions are like. Radiation damages cells' DNA, which can lead to cell death or permanent changes that may result in cancer. However, "there's no convincing human evidence for excess abnormalities in offspring of radiation-exposed adults," Semones said. While orbiting the Earth, astronauts get exposed to greater concentrations of cosmic background radiation than here on Earth in addition to charged particles trapped in the upper atmosphere and from the sun, said Robert J. Reynolds, epidemiologist at the University of Texas Health Science Center. As a spacecraft moves into deep space, the people on board would be exposed to even more cosmic radiation and solar particles, which is "fairly dangerous," Reynolds said. Interestingly, according to Reynolds, astronauts' risk of dying of cancer is lower than that of the general public because they tend to be in shape, eat well, don't smoke and receive careful monitoring from doctors. Of course, none of them have been to Mars. Semones emphasized that NASA does not study the health effects of Mars colonization and that it's focusing on shorter recognition missions of the surface of Mars. "We're not looking at colonization of Mars or anything. We're not focusing our research on those kinds of questions." Can it be done? Mars One isn't the only group hoping to make history by sending people to the red planet. The Inspiration Mars Foundation wants to launch two people -- a man and a woman -- on a 501-day, round-trip journey to Mars and back in 2018 without ever touching down. 501 days in space with your spouse: Could you handle it? At this time there is no technology that can protect astronauts from an excess of space radiation. "The maximum number of days to stay with our standards is on the order of 500 days. So any mission that would exceed 500 days would not be doable," Semones said. Reynolds agreed: "At this point it's completely infeasible to try to send someone to Mars unless we can get there faster or we develop better shielding for a spacecraft." NASA is working on engines intended to cut the travel time to Mars by the 2030s, but those systems won't be ready for many years, Chris Moore, NASA's deputy director of advanced exploration systems, told CNN this year. In the meantime, Moore said engineers could try to limit travelers' exposures by designing a spacecraft in such a way that it provides more protection. But Mars One founder Lansdorp insisted his group will get people landing on Mars by 2023. "The risks of space travel in general are already very high, so radiation is really not our biggest concern," he said. If that all sounds good, you can still sign up. But remember: You can never go home again.Technology costs make colonization impossibleLoder, ex-professor Emeritus at the University of New Hampshire, is known for his work to end the energy crisis, 2003(Theodore C., “Implications of Outside-The-Box Technologies on Future Space Exploration and Colonization”, EBSCO, 2-5, , 6-16-2011, SRF)Human exploration and, ultimately, colonization of low earth orbit, the moon, asteroids, and other planets will never "get off the ground” with the present costs of technology. At present the United States' only public human lift capability is the nearly two-decade-old shuttle fleet, which is expensive to maintain and limited in turn-around flight capability. Recent projected estimates by NASA for more than the next decade plan for about eight flights per year at a cost of approximately $300 million per flight with lower costs for two more flights (NASA, 2002). With only five flights per year considered to be a "safe" number and ten flights per year considered the maximum number, it is obvious that almost any kind of human exploration and colonization is nearly out the question in the foreseeable future. Even the less expensive Russian launch costs are still prohibitive for significant advances in space exploration and colonization.Humans can’t colonize space-too many technical obstaclesLaunius, Chief Historian for NASA and author of many books on aerospace history, 2010(Roger D., “Can we colonize the solar system? Human Biology and survival in the extreme space environment”, Science Direct, Volume: 34 No. 3, 124, SRF)Although microbial life might survive the extreme conditions of space, for Homo sapiens sapiens the space environment remains remarkably dangerous to life. One space life scientist, Vadim Rygalov, remarked that ensuring human life during spaceflight was largely about providing the basics of human physiological needs. From the most critical-meaning that its absence would cause immediate death, to the least critical-these include such constants available here on Earth of atmospheric pressure, breathable oxygen, temperature, drinking water, food, gravitational pull on physical systems, radiation mitigation, and others of a less immediate nature. As technologies, and knowledge about them, stand at this time, humans are able to venture into space for short periods of less than a year only by supplying all of these needs either by taking everything with them (oxygen, food, air, etc.) or creating them artificially (pressurized vehicles, centrifugal force to substitute for gravity, etc.) Space-flight would be much easier if humans could go into hibernation during the extremes of spaceflight, as did the Streptococcus mitis bacteria. Resolving these issues has proven difficult but not insurmountable for such basic spaceflight activities as those undertaken during the heroic age of space exploration when the United States and the Soviet Union raced to the Moon. Overcoming the technological hurdles encountered during the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs were child’s play in comparison to the threat to human life posed by long duration, deep space missions to such places as Mars. Even the most sophisticated of those, the lunar landings of Project Apollo, were relatively short camping trips on an exceptionally close body in the solar system, and like many camping trips undertaken by Americans the astronauts took with them everything they would need to use while there. This approach will continue to work well until the destination is so far away that resupply from Earth becomes highly problematic if not impossible if the length of time to be gone is so great that resupply proves infeasible. There is no question that the U.S. could return to the Moon in a more dynamic and robust version of Apollo; it could also build a research station there and resupply it from Earth on a regular basis. In this instance, the lunar research station might look something like a more sophisticated and difficult to support version of the Antarctic research stations. A difficult challenge, yes; but certainly it is something that could be accomplished with presently envisioned technologies. The real difficulty is that at the point a lunar research station becomes a colony profound changes to the manner in which humans interact with the environment beyond Earth must take place. Countermeasures for core challenges-gravity, radiation, particulates, and ancillary effects-provide serious challenges for humans engaged in space colonization.Colonization fails – solar rays, lack of oxygen, lack of tech and terraforming failure Williams, Physics Instructor, Santa Rosa College, 10(Lynda, Peace Review Journal of Social Justice, The New Arms Race in Outer Space 22.1, “Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization.” Spring 2010, , AH)What do the prospects of colonies or bases on the Moon and Mars offer? Both the Moon and Mars host extreme environments that are uninhabitable to humans without very sophisticated technological life supporting systems beyond any that are feasible now or will be available in the near future. Both bodies are subjected to deadly levels of solar radiation and are void of atmospheres that could sustain oxygen-based life forms such as humans. Terra- forming either body is not feasible with current technologies or within any reasonable time frames so any colony or base would be restricted to living in space capsules or trailer park like structures which could not support a sufficient number of humans to perpetuate and sustain the species in any long term manner.Mars FailsTerraforming mars will take centuries Lamb ‘1, David Lamb, Philosophy and Bioethics at the University of Birmingham, “The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence: A Philosophical Inquiry”, pp. 114-115The second phase is estimated to take a great deal longer, about 100,000 years (Naclis, 199-'1), and would involve the production of oxygen of sufficient quantity for " humans to breath<:> on the planet. Thus, when the planet has warmed, certain organisms ... for example, the blue-green algae found on Earth could he planted. At present Martian soil lacks oxygen, nitrogen and phosphorous. But the planting of lichens and blue-green algae, if successful, would help to produce oxygen. Once underway, genetically altered plants and self- replicating micro-organisms could be added in order to speed up the process. As the atmosphere becomes thicker the planet would become warmed. Carbon dioxide, nitrogen and water would seep from the crust. Lakes and small oceans would appear. Rocks could be mined for iron oxide which could be heated to give off oxygen. Within several decades there might be soil. But the whole operation could take many centuries. For example, lichens have a very slow growth rate and are not suitable for fast oxygen production. If blue-green algae covered one quarter 'of the Martian surface it would take about 7,000 years to produce 5mb of oxygen; the minimum for human breathing at this rate would take 140,000 years (Smith, 1989: 124). The best solution to this problem lies in further developments in genetically altered plants which could speed up oxygen production. <>Mars colonies will be wiped out by space rocksIan O’Neill, 6/13, ’11, “Mars Hit by Cosmic Buckshot, Again,” Discovery, , Accessed 6/30/2014The Martian atmosphere is the Red Planet's blessing and curse. The blessing is that the Martian atmosphere is so tenuous it allows relatively small lumps of space rock to turn into meteorites, peppering its surface with fascinating impact craters for our satellites to study from orbit. As fun as this may be for us remote observers, should Mars colonization be in our future, we'll be cursing this fact if our habitats get punctured -- or destroyed -- by cosmic buckshot. Fortunately for us, Earth has a hefty atmosphere, some 100 times thicker than Mars', ensuring any renegade space rocks are tortured by the extreme heating of atmospheric entry -- only the largest, toughest rocks survive the burn.COLONIZING MARS WILL NOT SAVE HUMANITYLynda Williams, Spring 2010, Physics Instructor, Santa Rosa Junior College, “Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization,” Peace Review, a Journal of Social Justice, 22.1, peacereview.pdfAccording to scientific theory, the destruction of Earth is a certainty. About five billion years from now, when our sun exhausts its nuclear fuel, it will expand in size and envelope the inner planets, including the Earth, and burn them into oblivion. So yes, we are doomed, but we have 5 billion years, plus or minus a few hundred million, to plan our extraterrestrial escape. The need to colonize the Moon or Mars to guarantee our survival based on this fact is not pressing. There are also real risks due to collisions with asteroids and comets, though none are of immediate threat and do not necessitate extraterrestrial colonization. There are many Earth-based technological strategies that can be developed in time to mediate such astronomical threats such as gravitational tugboats that drag the objects out of range. The solar system could also potentially be exposed to galactic sources of high-energy gamma ray bursts that could fry all life on Earth, but any Moon or Mars base would face a similar fate. Thus, Moon or Mars human based colonies would not protect us from any of these astronomical threats in the near future. Mars Offense—Space DiseasesMars exploration causes space diseases, wiping out life on earthLeslie Mullen ‘3, Aug 25, “Alien Infection,” Astrobiology Magazine, modload&name=News&file=article&sid=570]Chris Chyba, who holds the Carl Sagan Chair for the Study of Life in the Universe at the SETI Institute, says there are two types of potential alien pathogens: toxic and infectious. Toxic pathogens act as a poison on other organisms. Infectious pathogens are viruses or bacteria that are passed between organisms, causing sickness. Some viruses and microbes rely on specific biological systems in order to replicate and infect their host, so not all pathogens affect all organisms the same way. Chicken farmers, for instance, can remain untouched by a disease that decimates their flocks. It could be that a martian microbe would enter the human body, but is rendered harmless because it is incompatible with human physiology. "After living in the dirt of Mars, a pathogen could see our bodies as a comparable host; they could treat us 'like dirt,'" says John Rummel, NASA's Planetary Protection Officer. "But, to quote Donald Rumsfeld, we're dealing with the unknown unknowns. It could be that even if the microbes lived inside us, they wouldn't do anything, it would just be this lump living inside you." The conditions on Mars are much different than those in the human body, so an inert pathogen seems the most likely scenario -- especially since any life on Mars would have evolved without humans being present. Co-evolution is why some pathogens only affect certain organisms. Infectious pathogens evolve based on the reactions of their hosts. As the host develops defenses against a predatory pathogen, the pathogen has to devise new means of sustaining itself within the host (or risk its own extinction). Some toxins also developed through co-evolution. As predatory organisms seek food, their prey develop ever more sophisticated means to escape being eaten. Many organisms developed specially targeted toxins as part of this evolutionary arms battle. Rummel says that humans have evolved a complex defense system to prevent us from getting sick from a whole host of disease and pathogens. But non-specific microbes - where human physiology did not influence their evolution - may evade our defense mechanisms. The best way to understand the spread of potential alien pathogens is to examine the spread of such non-specific pathogens on Earth. One example of a non-specific toxic pathogen is cyanobacteria that produce hepatotoxins (toxins affecting the liver) and neurotoxins. According to Chyba, cyanobacteria living in lakes on the alpine pastures of Switzerland have been implicated in a hundred cattle poisonings over the past 25 years. Chyba says the cyanobacteria most likely did not develop their toxins in order to escape predation from cows (or to kill the cows in order to eat them!). "Rather, the susceptibility of cattle to these toxins seems simply to be an unfortunate coincidence of a toxin working across a large evolutionary distance," Chyba writes. An example of an infectious pathogen working across large evolutionary distances is the bacterium Serratia marcescens. It is found in a variety of animal species, and also can be found free-living in water and soil. Its transmission from human sewage has resulted in the decimation of Caribbean elkhorn coral. "The distance between humans and corals emphasizes the possibility that certain organisms may prove pathogenic across a wide evolutionary divide," Chyba writes. Of course, the evolutionary divide between humans and coral would not be as wide a gulf as between any martian organisms and human beings. Yet one theory for the origin of life on Earth is that it was transferred here from Mars by meteorites. This variant of the "Panspermia" theory suggests that life on Earth and any life on Mars might be closely related. If Mars and Earth share the basis for life, this life would presumably have evolved well beyond the original form. Such a large evolutionary divide could provide protection from infection. But it could also mean that if infection does occur, it might be related closely enough to some Earth life to blaze through that population unchecked. Human infection is not the only concern of planetary protection. Life on Earth forms an interconnected, highly dependent web, so a pathogen affecting any life on Earth could have serious repercussions for the health and environment of our planet.Internal link to Colonization BadMars allows for an increase interest in science and pushes us to the universe beyond.Zubrin, President of the Mars Society ‘11Masters degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington. Viewed as a respected author and a renown expert on Mars.The Case for Mars: The Plan to Settle the Red Planet and Why We Must. 28, June 2011. Source: I09 Found: 29, June 2011 Medium though are real and vital reasons why we should venture to Mars. It is the key to unlocking the secret of life in the universe. It is the challenge to adventure that will inspire millions of young people to enter science and engineering, and whose acceptance will reaffirm the nature of our society as a nation of pioneers. It is the door to an open future, a new frontier on a new world, a planet that can be settled, the beginning of humanity's career as a spacefaring species, with no limits to its resources or aspirations, as it continues to push outward into the infinite universe beyond.Colonization Bad – Extinction Ans.COLONIZATION ONLY SPEEDS UP EARTH DECLINE, CAUSING EXTINCTIONWilliams, ’10 Lynda Williams, Physics Instructor, Santa Rosa Junior College, “Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization”, Peace Review, a Journal of Social Justice, The New Arms Race in Outer Space (22.1, Spring 2010), , Life on Earth is more urgently threatened by the destruction of the biosphere and its life sustaining habitat due environmental catastrophes such as climate change, ocean acidification, disruption of the food chain, bio-warfare, nuclear war, nuclear winter, and myriads of other man- made doomsday prophesies. If we accept these threats as inevitabilities on par with real astronomical dangers and divert our natural, intellectual, political and technological resources from solving these problems into escaping them, will we playing into a self- fulfilling prophesy of our own planetary doom? Seeking space based solutions to our Earthly problems may indeed exacerbate the planetary threats we face. This is the core of the ethical dilemma posed by space colonization: should we put our recourses and bets on developing human colonies on other worlds to survive natural and man-made catastrophes or should we focus all of our energies on solving the problems that create these threats on Earth? COLONIES WON’T SOLVE EXTINCTION—WE CAN’T GET ENOUGH PEOPLE OFF THE PLANETNikos Prantzos, 2000, nuclear astrophysicist in the Institut d'Astrophysique de Paris, France, Our Cosmic Future, p. 84Not only science fiction readers, but also quite a few scientists are dreaming of ways to bring life to other planets in the Solar System, and in particular to Mars. Their motivation is certainly not a solution to overpopulation problems on Earth. Even though Mars has an area equal to all the land area on Earth, it would be impossible to transport any significant fraction of the population. In order to send a hundred million people (which constitutes a negligible fraction of the present population) , in let us say one century, three thousand departures would have to be organised each day. Therefore, the fascination for terraforming Mars is more closely related to the new frontier it represents. Conquest of such a frontier would help our civilisation to release its creative potential and find new vitality. Some have compared the situation with the American frontier, several centuries ago.AT Must Get Off the RockSpace is unsustainable for humans – only earth can sustain life Trevors, J. (Trevors: University of Guelph and Adjunct Professor, a 28 year record of microbiology research, graduate and undergraduate teaching, consulting and editing/editorships has been achieved) ’09 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009 “The Earth Is the Best Place to Live” – The Earth is still the best planet to live despite our current problems/challenges of human population growth, total global pollution, global climate change, pandemics, wars, hunger and intolerance, to name a few examples. The universe has to be billions of years old to have sufficient time to produce the elements required for living organisms and their evolution. One would think that all humans would therefore take better care of the only known outpost of life in the universe. The Earth is the correct distance from our sun to maintain water in its liquid state (and gaseous and solid states) necessary for living organisms. Water has a low viscosity, high melting point, high boiling point and can act as a hydrogen donor and acceptor. Water can buffer against shifts in temperature. Water floats when it freezes and becomes ice, and reaches its maximum density at 4°C not at 0°C. These characteristics have immense importance for aquatic life. The size and mass of the Earth are correct for life. A small planet does not have sufficient gravity to hold an atmosphere such as ours. If the Earth was larger, the atmosphere would be denser and restrict light necessary for photosynthesis. No photosynthesis means no life as we know it on the Earth. The Earth is as good as it gets for the continued survival of all species, if humans simply reduce human population growth and the total pollution of the planet. This will require international cooperation and the efforts of all people, especially in the affluent developed countries that over pollute and over consume. The affluent countries must also provide the resources to assist less affluent countries with their basic human needs and rights. This is all doable if humans simply redirect efforts from conflicts and wars to international cooperation. AT Overview EffectThe overview effect fails—poor technology, psychology, and apathy prove. Okushi and Dudley-Flores 07 [Jun Okushi, NASA-trained space architect, 2 decades of experience in space development, former NASA grant research student, codeveloper of the International Space Station. Marilyn Dudley-Flores, policy analyst and space policy expert] “Space and Perceptions of Space in Spacecraft: An Astrosociological Perspective.” Paper for the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics SPACE 2007 Conference & Exposition. Web. DA 7/3/11. average human being has not experienced the view from space on a personal basis, although these pictures from space have been around for upwards to 40 years. Subsequent years have brought more space missions, both human and robotic, with fabulous imagery. Robotically, we have stood on the ground on Mars, we have seen up close mighty impacts on Jupiter, the rings of Saturn, and towering dune fields on Titan. We have even seen the great columns of hydrogen clouds spanning light years that are the incubation places of stars and looked back in time toward the very birth of the Cosmos. Why haven’t the peoples of the Earth been subsumed by this overwhelming experience of viewing things in space and the world from the space? Why haven’t they beaten their swords into plow shares, held hands and sang Kum Bah Yah, and turned their attention to turning the tide against global warming, a fairly immediate threat as time is kept over generations that can kill more people than all of the wars of the Earth put together? A. Searching for Answers A clue to this enigma lies in a prediction that failed to come true that was made by Sir Arthur C. Clarke in his novel 2061: Odyssey 3 (1987, p. 4). 6 In the story, the Earth had become relatively peaceful once everyone had access to free long-distance telephone calling service. With the Internet and the quality of communications technology today, we can make free long-distance telephone calls. At least those of us who can access, can operate, and can afford the technology can make those calls. One can be in London and make a phone call to someone in Peshawar and the other party sounds like he is speaking from the next room. But, there are still wars, India and Pakistan might yet fight a limited nuclear exchange, and the large part of Earth’s population hasn’t yet caught on to the impending devastation of global warming. What is the problem? The answer to that has to do with the inadequacy of the delivery systems of these images from space and to the fact that studies of how humans comprehend spatial and other types of relationships on the ground, in space, and across cultures are still in the infancy of synthesis and application. Lack of political will is another problem. In An Inconvenient Truth, both the documentary and the book, 7 Albert Gore also spoke of the “backburner” attitude that his American congressional colleagues demonstrated when he gave them slide shows about global warming. The problems on the radar screens of congressional constituents were more immediate so their representatives did not move to act to hammer out legislation to help offset the more overwhelming planetary issue. Sitting in the gravity well of the Earth, with some people being able to see pretty pictures from space, and with some people being able to talk to other people cheaply at a distance still hasn’t communicated the gravity of our situation. The planetary situation awareness of the average person is poor. It isn’t very real to most people that Earth is a planet in space, that it is in danger from global warming, and that seeing it from space helps us assess the condition of the planet and provides us with direction how to keep it livableThe Overview Effect is not supported by scientifically rigorous evidence.William Sims Bainbridge, Co-Director of Human-Centered Computing at the National Science Foundation, has served as a tenured Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Washington, Illinois State University, and Towson University, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University, 2006 (Goals In Space: American Values and the Future of Technology, Electronic Version of a book originally published in 1991, Available Online at , Accessed 06-26-2011, p. 83)Several of the Idealistic goals assert that space travel gives a new perspective to the astronauts who look back at Earth from afar and to those Earth-bound enthusiasts who participate vicariously in voyages beyond our world. From the viewpoint of space, we see ourselves, our nations, and our planet in a new light. In a recent book, Frank White (1987) reports that astronauts commonly experience “the overview effect,” a radical shift in consciousness achieved by seeing the Earth as a unity and from outside the traditional limits of human experience. He documents this thesis with material from a number of interviews, but unfortunately his data collection and theoretical analysis were not conducted in a manner that social scientists would consider systematic. Furthermore, although White considers “consciousness” to be the essential ingredient of any culture, he does not draw upon any of the standard literature on this conceptually slippery topic. Yet, his hypothesis that from the new world-view offered by space exploration will come a series of new civilizations is a stimulating expression of the basic faith of the Idealistic class. A2: Sanctions Support MultilateralismMultilateralism fails—diverging interests and a lack of faith guarantee cooperation is at best superficial Heribert Dieter 14, Senior Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Visiting Professor for International Political Economy at Zeppelin University, Doctorate in Political Science and Economics, Free University of Berlin, 1/31/14, The G-20 and the Dilemma of Asymmetric Sovereignty – Why Multilateralism Is Failing in Crisis Prevention, International Relations and Security Network, , tightening the rules for financial market regulation is not the only field where the G-20 is failing. Despite the mantra-like repetition of memoranda of understanding, the trade ministers of the G-20 have not been able to overcome their conflicts of interest and reach a settlement in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO). What are the reasons for this failure?Although the G-20 managed to prevent a revival of protectionist measures on a broad front in the midst of the crisis, there is a large gap between the announcements of the G-20 and quantifiable results in trade policy. There is not one final communiqué that lacks a clear statement stressing the importance of the WTO and the necessity to conclude the Doha Round. Nonetheless, the reality of trade policy looks very different. All the states that are preventing the conclusion of the Doha Round through their vetoes are members of the G-20.Despite there being little public information available on the reasons for the deadlock in the Doha Round, it is known that the US, Brazil, and China are blocking its conclusion. The emerging economies Brazil and China oppose the US’s demand for the complete elimination of tariffs on industrial goods. Conversely, the US resists the request to comprehensively abandon subsidies to the agricultural sector.Thus, the Doha Round is not concluded because three important members of the G-20 no longer believe in multilateral solutions and would rather engage in preferential agreements. For experts in the field of international trade, this is a paradox. There is a broad consensus that a single rulebook for international trade would facilitate economic growth and contribute to a worldwide increase in prosperity. This, however, cannot be said for the currently popular free trade agreements. So why are the countries in the G-20 incapable of further developing the common rules for international trade? One explanation is the lack of a hegemonic power that is willing to guarantee compliance with the rules of the game, but at the same time establish a system that provides member countries with sufficient economic benefits. In any event, this is how the postwar economy emerged: The US enforced the system of Bretton Woods and made sure that the participation in this economic regime remained attractive. Of course, the Bretton Woods regime never was a truly global system, since member countries of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance did not participate. Still, within the bipolar order of the Cold War, the US managed to keep the system open and stable.? After the collapse of the USSR and the following short-lived “unipolar moment” (Charles Krauthammer) of complete hegemony of the US, the multilateral order was being advanced until 1995, the founding year of the WTO. Since the turn of the millennium and the parallel emergence of a multipolar order, nearly all attempts to organize cooperation without hegemony (Bob Keohane) have failed. The present multipolar world is characterized by superficial cooperation. Global Governance, whether in policies to prevent further climate change or in economic policy, remains on hold. Even worse: The world is returning to regulation on the level of the nation-state and non-cooperation. The American political scientist Ian Bremmer refers to the resulting situation as “G-Zero,” an era in which groups such as the G-20 will no longer play a vital role. The negative perception of the international division of labor? Apparently, there is no such thing as an identity of interests of individual states, as assumed by the advocates of global regulation and global governance. In other words: The gap between the preferences of individual states is widening rather than narrowing. However, governments must respect the preferences of their societies in the formulation of policies if they do not wish to lose legitimacy. Then again, the different preferences of societies are the immediate result of severely diverging perceptions of the international division of labor. Even in the G-20, individual societies have very different perceptions of the effects of globalization and its economic effects.? In Europe and the US, many people are increasingly critical of the international division of labor, if not outright hostile to globalization. According to a number of surveys, only about one-fifth to one-third of the respondents in OECD countries see greater opportunities than risks in globalization. Even in Germany, numerous politicians and citizens have been critical of globalization, although Germany strongly benefits from open markets and the resulting intensification of international trade.? Without a political anchoring in the member states, the G-20 has no future? The unfavorable perceptions of globalization and the outlined asymmetric sovereignty have resulted in a standstill in the G-20. Instead of a further development of the multilateral order, at best the status quo will be preserved. This is why we can expect nothing substantial – at least in terms of economic policy and financial regulation – from the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg on September 5 and 6. The structural impediments to successful financial regulation and trade policies on a supranational level cannot be overcome by the heads of government and state of the G-20. At least there is some hope in those areas where the countries of the G-20 have identical interests. This applies primarily to measures to close down tax loopholes. In 2008, ambitious expectations of a comprehensive reorganization of international trade relations through the G-20 were raised. Unfortunately, the G-20 cannot and will not deliver on crisis prevention. Today, more modest goals will have to be set. The key obstacle to success in the further development of global rules in trade and finance can be found in the G-20 societies themselves. Perceptions about globalization need to be addressed by policy makers at the national level, as do the widespread reservations about the international division of labor in the OECD countries. If societies continue to show diverging preferences, the development of comprehensive global economic governance in the G-20 will be all but impossible.Multilat fails- new mini-coalitions solve issues bestWeinstein ’13 [Jeremy M. Weinstein is associate professor of political science, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Ford-Dorsey Director of the Center for African Studies at Stanford University. Between 2009 and 2011, he served as director for development and democracy on the National Security Council staff at the White House, where he was a principal architect of the Open Government Partnership, “TRANSFORMING MULTILATERALISM: INNOVATION ON A GLOBAL STAGE,” April 19, ]Fast forward 18 months: the Open Government Partnership (OGP) is a robust and growing global effort to make governments better. Launched by eight governments and nine civil society organizations in September 2011, OGP intends to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance. The founding governments announced national action plans at the launch, and 38 new participating countries presented their commitments in Brasilia in 2012. Political leaders representing 2 billion people have made more than 300 commitments to reform and have pledged to be held accountable for their progress by an independent body.? members_of_open_government_partnership_chart? This supplement tells the story of OGP—how it came about, the impact it is having, and the challenges it faces—and speaks to the possibility of social innovation in the multilateral space, as policy entrepreneurs actively seek to redefine and transform how governments and citizens relate to one another across borders. Multilateralism is not an arena that has been known for experimentation, given the cautious nature of governments. But this new form of partnership demonstrates the kind of transformative multilateral engagement that is possible, at the same time exposing the challenges of making multi-stakeholder initiatives work in practice.? CHANGING MODELS OF MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT? For many people, international institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, United Nations, and European Union, are the paradigmatic examples of international cooperation. Designed to facilitate cooperation among states on issues that transcend national boundaries, these institutions establish rules and actions that are considered binding on participating governments. The legitimacy and authority of these international institutions often stem, at least in part, from their broad or near-universal membership. Yet to secure agreement among a diverse set of countries, significant compromise is typically required. As a result, the laws or rules promoted by these organizations often reflect the preferences of the least cooperative country—a “lowest common denominator” outcome—potentially blunting their impact. In addition, as a model of multilateral engagement, international institutions are often seen as opaque, highly bureaucratic, and resistant to change. This is not surprising, given how challenging it is to establish these institutions in the first place.? Contrast this approach with a totally different paradigm, what William Savedoff of the Center for Global Development has called “the mixed coalition” and what Philanthrocapitalism authors Matthew Bishop and Michael Green have termed “the posse.” This approach involves gathering together a wide variety of interested parties—governments, civil society groups, the private sector, philanthropy, international organizations—around specific initiatives that may or may not lead to the establishment of formal organizations.? A focused, achievable goal is at the center of mixed coalitions, and the ambition is to identify governments, organizations, and groups that are willing to take actions that, collectively, will demonstrate success and make the case for broader international engagement. This form of international cooperation prioritizes flexibility and agility, dispensing with universal, binding commitments in favor of voluntary pledges that enable participants to lead by example. Recent examples of initiatives that fit this model include the Global Fund Against AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and the International Campaign to End Landmines.? Traditional approaches to international cooperation have delivered important successes, especially in the period since the end of World War II. The standards and rules contained in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and its successor organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), have contributed to significant growth in international trade. A set of interlocking international treaties and monitoring bodies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), have enabled progress on nonproliferation in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Important treaties and international organizations have emerged to manage climate change, promote global development, ensure global financial stability, and advance basic human rights norms.? But the international environment is changing in consequential ways, and with it, the form that international cooperation is taking. Most international institutions were constructed in a period in which Western countries had nearly unrivaled power. They used their influence to secure near-universal participation and to incentivize compliance. But with the United States now, in the words of New York University politics professor Bruce Jones, “the world’s largest minority shareholder,” international institutions are struggling to manage a far greater diversity of preferences among their members. Emerging powers, including Brazil, India, and China, are making their views known and seeking influence consistent with their growing economic clout. The challenge of seeking unanimity or consensus on international issues is becoming all too apparent, as evidenced by the difficulty of advancing climate change negotiations. And the difficulties of securing compliance with international treaties and agreements are hard to ignore in the face of growing trade disputes and other actions by national governments that flout international rules and laws on proliferation and human rights.? Of course, the old paradigm of international cooperation is not dead—it is being modernized. The emergence of the G-20 is recognition that global cooperation on economic issues cannot happen without the major emerging economies at the table. Commitments to shift the voting shares of countries at the World Bank and IMF and pressure to reform the UN Security Council provide further evidence that a redistribution of influence and power is under way.? At the same time, new forms of cooperation—mixed coalitions or posses—are increasingly important. Tackling issues that are not being adequately addressed by existing institutions, mixed coalitions are playing by a new set of rules. Their membership is not universal, but instead focuses on governments that need to be at the table to get something started. They are often able to set higher standards because they are not universal. They rely on voluntary and collaborative means of generating action, prioritizing meaningful actions over binding commitments that are routinely ignored. And they incorporate the expertise and active participation of nongovernmental players.“Mini-lateralism” is strong and key to solve the warming tipping point- triggers every major impactDellinger ‘13 [Myanna Dellinger, Assistant Professor of Law with Western State College of Law and writes on international law with a particular focus on climate change, graduated from the University of Oregon School of Law at the top of her class, Order of the Coif. While in law school, she interned for the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate? Change. After law school, she clerked for the late Hon. Francis J. D'Eramo of the Superior Court of the? United States Virgin Islands and for the Hon. Procter Hug, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the? Ninth Circuit, “Narrowed Constellations in a Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The “Magic Number” is Four,” , 10/27/13]Just as the world community had almost given up hope for a timely solution to climate change, new events have created reason for cautious optimism that an effective solution may, after all, be found at the supranational scale: In 2012, the 195 parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) agreed that a legal instrument with binding force is to be adopted by 2015 and implemented from 2020.1 In President Obama’s new Climate Action Plan, the President finally promised that the United States will take international action and lead global climate change efforts.2 In the spring and summer of 2013, the United States and China – arguably the two most important parties to a supranational climate change solution - reignited their mutual climate discussions and reached an important bilateral agreement to jointly phase down HFCs, highly relevant to climate change. This is indicative of the two nations’ potential willingness to accede to an internationally binding agreement, which in turn may cause a watershed in negotiations and spur further action. This would be in the nick of time. Science demonstrating the onset of climate change is increasingly grim: Global temperatures reached their highest levels in the history of modern records during the 2001-2010 time period and continue to rise.3 The decade included a more than 2,000% increase in the loss of human life from heat waves,4 not to mention the threatened loss of animal species. New facts about the diverse problems of climate change continue to surface. In August 2013, for example, the journal Science reported that shifts in climate are strongly linked to human violence around the world such as spikes in domestic violence in India and Australia, increased assaults and murders in the United States, ethnic violence in Europe, land invasions in Brazil, police violence in Holland and civil conflicts throughout the tropics.5 The Fifth? Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) has, by its recent conclusion that it is “extremely likely” that human activity is the principal cause of climate change, curtailed reasonable discussion on our role in creating and thus in having to solve the problem.6 According to the International Energy Agency, CO2 levels must be held to 450 ppm in this century in order for us to have a chance to keep global warming to the internationally agreed-upon goal of a temperature increase of no more than 2° C.7 But in 2013, CO2 levels exceeded 400 ppm for the first time in human history,8 demonstrating the uphill and urgent battle to be fought on this front. By putting climate change efforts on hold because of the recent global financial crisis and a lack of political will to agree on effective climate change goals, nations have managed to put the world on track towards a 5.3° C temperature increase with recognized and “potentially disastrous implications in terms of weather events, rising sea levels, and huge related economic and social costs.”9 In fact, global temperatures have already risen 0.85° C since 1880.10 Because the best predictor of future behavior is often past behavior, it is doubtful whether a large number of nations with widely divergent interests in the climate context such as all or most of the 195 members of the UNFCCC will be able to reach the required consensus on a new treaty in just a little over one year from now. The good news is that they do not all have to. By far the most nations have neither played any significant role in the production of the problem nor do they have much real relevance to its solution.11 This article argues that effective climate change action can be instigated by a much lower number of emitters than scholarly and policy-based discussions have promoted thus far and that this is the only realistic solution in the timeframe at hand. The “magic number”12 or “critical mass” may be as little as two, and is certainly less than “all the major emitters,” as most legal scholars have so persistently promoted, at least until recently. Precious time is clicking away. The need has come for international lawmakers and scholars to embrace less ideological solutions to this issue, even though such solutions may not represent cosmopolitan ideals of democratic inclusiveness.13 The world urgently needs a solution that in and of itself can help alleviate the substantive problem, but that can also secondarily act as a catalyst for further treaty membership or replication. Some may say that we do not have time to wait for such a stepped approach. The answer is that we have no more time to continue promoting and hoping for solutions that have already proved ineffective. If we wait for everyone to do something, nothing will happen. But which are the most crucial nations to a new leadership constellation in climate change? Should a new, narrowed regime complex only include the historic and present major emitters? If so, is it realistic to hope that “all” of these major emitters will join? Would it be wiser to attempt other compositions such as the inclusion of nations that stand to bear the worst consequences of climate change and nations that seek the most far-reaching solutions, or would this present even worse gridlock? Is it even possible to assess the scientific, political, and symbolic dimensions of the “relevance” of nations in this context? This article provides answers to the above questions. In doing so, it breaks with scholarly notions that have, by now, proved false. In addition to challenging the viewpoint that all major emitters need to form part of the new treaty, this article analyzes what truly motivates parties to join treaties in the first place, demonstrates the acceptability of climate negotiations not being as democratically developed as is typically called for and shows how even as seemingly insignificant steps as bilateral agreements can relatively quickly lead to broader and deeper multilateral solutions. The article first analyzes factors that have proved crucial to treaty success in recent and more historical contexts. Much current scholarship examines the same, relatively new, but of course highly relevant treaties. This article provides additional insight from a few of the world’s most successful treaties. These happen to be of slightly older origins and have thus unfortunately largely become forgotten about in today’s rush to what seems to be reinventing the treaty wheel. The findings of this can inform today’s treaty decision-making processes in which parties and scholars often fail to think “outside the box” and learn from what has actually worked in the past instead of continually promoting solutions that currently do not. Resisting on this foundation, the article proposes a range of narrower constellations for a new regime complex at the supranational scale that are more likely to be adopted than what has previously been envisioned by scholars and policy-makers. The article also demonstrates that in spite of some recent disappointment with the UNFCCC, this is still the most likely and best climate action governance architecture. Finally, the article identifies nexuses to other international agreements and describes how these may work well as complements to, but not yet substitutes for, a solution under the auspices of the UNFCCC. As the focus of the article is on treaty development, treaty stipulations, compliance and review procedures are not addressed. Much excellent climate change scholarship has been produced in recent years. However and respectfully, some of this no longer matches reality in international legal proceedings. The article takes a pragmatic approach from the standpoint that enough theory has been written about who “should” join a new climate change treaty and why; time has come to look at what can realistically be expected within the near future in this arena. As has so correctly been said, a small club of key emitters “could transform the credibility of climate actions and provide an effective alternative to over-ambitious global negotiations prone to [only] yield legal zombies.”14 Time has come to look at climate treaties in new ways. This article does so.Multilat is zero-sum- mini-lat is winning nowWeaver ’12 [Dr. Catherine (Kate) Weaver is Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs and Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security & Law at the University of Texas at Austin, “Global Governance and the Paradox of US Decline,” ]Yet sustaining the relevance and legitimacy of multilateral institutions, in the zero-sum game of multilateral representation and governance, may in veritably require status quo powers, including the US, to cede power and influence within these institutions to rising powers. The alternative to this inclusive multilateralism, which binds rising powers into existing institutions, is the proliferation of competing venues of global governance that ultimately diffuse power and undermine the authority and leverage of those institutions in which US enjoys a preponderance of influence. We have already seen ample evidence of such governance diffusion, in the form of a shocking proliferation of new preferential trade agreements in the wake of stalled WTO talks, the increased lending power of regional development banks and the threat of a new BRICS development bank, and efforts to create new regional monetary funds (such as the Chiang Mai initiative). While such counterbalancing in global governance has thus far been relatively weak due to elusive collective action among rising powers, a pattern is emerging.Warming causes extinctionSharp and Kennedy ‘14 – is an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). A former British Army Colonel he retired in 2006 and emigrated to the U.S. Since joining NESA in 2010, he has focused on Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported NESA events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and Qatar. He is the faculty lead for NESA’s work supporting theUAE National Defense College through an ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. He also directs the Network of Defense and Staff Colleges (NDSC) which aims to provide best practice support to regional professional military and security sector education development and reform. Prior to joining NESA, he served for 4 years as an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University where he wrote and taught a Masters' Degree syllabus for a program concentration in Conflict Management of Stability Operations and also taught strategy, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and also created an International Homeland Defense Fellowship program. At CISA he also designed, wrote and taught courses supporting the State Department's Civilian Response Corps utilizing conflict management approaches. Bob served 25 years in the British Army and was personally decorated by Her Majesty the Queen twice. Aftergraduating from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 1981, he served in command and staff roles on operations in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. He has worked in policy and technical staff appointments in the UK Ministry of Defense and also UK Defense Intelligence plus several multi-national organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his later career, he specialized in intelligence. He is a 2004 distinguished graduate of the National War College and holds a masters degree in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, Washington, D.C. AND is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets (Robert and Edward, 8-22, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security” )djmOur planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The release of this carbon – however – is changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. The implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to life on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. It has already led to an increase in natural disasters including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms. Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating. As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun’s light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. Rising sea levels will increasingly threaten our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries amentioned, but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security. Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of those available resources. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration. Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders.” Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to integrate climate change across all strategy and planning. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the Pentagon’s alleged report describes a coming climate Armageddon which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries rendered uninhabitable. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons. The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately foster conflict. Climate change is the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely global. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!Multilat trades off with minilat- combo causes confusion and gridlockEckersley ‘12 [Robyn Eckersley, PhD in environmental politics from the University of Tasmania, Professor and Head of Political Science in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia, “Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?” ]Since many parties wear more than one hat in terms of the criteria of “most capable” and ? “most responsible”, the size of the Climate Council could be as small as eight (the USA, ? China, EU, Russia, Japan, India and a representative from AOSIS and LDC) or as large as 23 (the G20 plus AOSIS, LCD and AU). Determining the “magic number” invariably requires a trade-off between the virtues of a relatively smaller, more intimate and efficient group and a larger, more representative group with greater collective “emissions power” and greater potential for trade-offs to facilitate agreement.37? Yet even a Council as small as twelve, ? made up of the USA, the EU, Japan, the Russian Federation, China, India, Brazil, Korea, ? Mexico, AOSIS, AU and LDCs would capture the most responsible, the most capable and the ? most vulnerable while including around 70% of total emissions and around 70% of the world population.? 38? It would also happen to include a rough balance of developed and developing countries, representation from the UN’s five regional groupings, all the major negotiating ? blocs, all the great powers, and a mix of pioneers, leaders, pushers and laggards. And a Council of around twelve would be the size of a jury, which many deliberative democrats ? argue is the optimal size for meaningful deliberation. The proposal for “common but differentiated representation” in a minilateral council builds ? upon the negotiating coalitions, improvized procedures and informal and out-of-session ? meetings developed by the parties to the COP to work around the highly ritualized and ? staged plenary sessions. The most significant of these for present purposes is the “Friends of ? the Chair” groups, which are convened at the discretion of the COP President.39? These ? groups vary in style, name and task, ranging from informal consultation on matters of ? process to end-game bargaining over key issues. There is no set procedure for the selection ? of members – much depends on the issues and context – but the President usually strives to ? achieve some form of balanced representation in terms of interests and regions. Although ? the purpose of such informal groups is to provide a more efficient supplement to the ? bilateral negotiations and shuttle diplomacy conducted by the President, they have ? attracted considerable criticism from excluded parties and have not always been effective.40 If the Friends of the Chair are seen to be unrepresentative, then any deal that is brokered is likely to be rejected.41? However, efforts to improve the representativeness and hence ? legitimacy of the groups by, for example, expanding representation, and providing ? negotiating coalitions with the opportunity to select and consult with their representative ? and observe proceedings, can raise transaction costs and undermine their basic appeal, which is to provide the President with a small, informal, private, candid, flexible and efficient forum to deal with key questions of process and/or substance. Friends groups also ? suffer from other drawbacks. The informal character of the groups means there are no equity and procedural safeguards, they often contain a mix of ministers and officials with different experiences, and they are ad hoc and highly fluid. This sometimes produces a rather chaotic process, with many smaller groups meeting concurrently, creating confusion over the development of the negotiating text.42? At Copenhagen, the regular negotiations ? were suspended on the last day of the conference while a 25 member Friends of the Chair ? group met to craft a short compromise text to replace the 200-plus pages of text that had been negotiated over two years. Violations in normal procedures, including lack of ? transparency and inclusivity, were cited as some of the reasons by those states who refuse ? to give their support to the Accord in the final plenary.43 Noone wants the west in charge Crocker 15 – James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. This essay develops certain themes from his co-edited book, with Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, Managing Conflict in a World Adrift (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, January 2015) ( Chester A. Crocker (2015) The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift, Survival, 57:1, 7-30, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2015.1008292)Happily, the situation is more complex than one-dimensional ‘reversal’ imagery implies. It is by no means clear that the primary authoritarians share a framework of universalist norms, apart from a sense of historic grievance against the West. The backlash is a nasty brew made up of several distinct ingredients: an authoritarian rejection of Western liberal values and principles, the opportunistic exploitation of Western economic woes and overstretched military resources, an assertive drive to be taken seriously in shaping global affairs, and nationalist reflexes against the long-standing presumption of American exceptionalism. Former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd, a close observer of Chinese policy, argues that the Chinese ‘see their own tradition as one which does not make universalist claims beyond China. Which?…?they hold in contrast with what they perceive to be an arrogantly, irrepressibly evangelizing West.’15 This, of course, does not prevent China from imposing its nationalistic claims against its neighbours.Multilateralism fails- gridlock and sovereignty disputesLa?di ‘13 (Zaki La?di, professor of International Relations at Sciences Po., a public research and higher education institution in Paris, scientific director of the double master degree between Sciences Po and Fudan University, former special adviser to Pascal Lamy when commissioner for trade between 2000 and 2004, “The End of Multilateralism,” , 10/2/13)The rise of emerging economies worldwide has generated much optimism, not only in terms of economic development, but also of global cooperation. But the shift to a multipolar world order has not bolstered multilateralism. In fact, the opposite is true: The logic of national sovereignty has staged a comeback with major economies undermining cooperation on issues ranging from security to trade to climate change. Consider the muddle in the United Nations Security Council over Syria's civil war. Just two years ago, the Security Council approved a resolution authorizing a military intervention in Libya — the first resolution to implement the "responsibility to protest," or R2P, principle — which the General Assembly adopted unanimously in 2005. But the emerging powers soon came to believe that the West had used the protection of Libya's civilian population as a pretext for regime change. Now, these countries are largely rejecting R2P, viewing it as a device employed by Western governments to legitimize their attempts to infringe upon national sovereignty.? Brazil has attempted to address the issue by crafting a resolution that would decouple the R2P mandate from the use of force, effectively eliminating the possibility that the doctrine could be applied. For their part, Russia and China have blocked three resolutions condemning the Syrian regime, and Russia has worked hard to derail any military intervention in Syria. In this sense, Russia and China now exercise de facto control over the formal legality of the use of force.? To be sure, many countries ?now believe that the West is going too far in challenging state sovereignty, with most European countries recoiling at the prospect of military confrontation. At the Group of 20 summit in early September, for example, U.S. President Barack Obama struggled to convince 10 states to sign a declaration on Syria that did not even mention the use of force. Only the U.S., Britain and France remain willing to use force if it is deemed necessary.? But viewing intervention in Syria within the paradigm of Western messianism is a mistake. After all, in Syria, as in Libya, the forces challenging the government are not a creature of Western manipulation. They are indigenous, and they are asking the West for help. The legal basis for military intervention may be weak, but Syria is no Iraq either.? Security is not the only area where sovereignty concerns have superseded multilateralism. In 2008, the U.S. abandoned its commitment to the World Trade Organization's Doha Round of global trade negotiations. While the decision followed a technical disagreement with India, it was driven largely by the belief that any agreement would benefit China more than the U.S.? Given that the Doha Round has failed to address the main problems that the U.S. and Europe have encountered in trade relations with China — noncompliance with intellectual-property rules, subsidies for state-owned enterprises, closed government-procurement markets and limits on access to the services market — both sides are now emphasizing bilateral trade agreements. But while the world may be happy to pretend that bilateral cooperation will revitalize multilateralism, nobody should be fooled. The WTO will survive, but its centrality in the trade system is rapidly diminishing. Even cooperation on climate change is crumbling, with the U.S. and China rejecting the multilateral, top-down approach to policymaking. This implies the end of the Kyoto Protocol model, which is based on a detailed agenda, established according to specific and ambitious targets, with the relevant actors then compelled to negotiate each topic.? Rather than being subject to an internationally agreed standard, the U.S. and China want the fight against climate change to begin with countries' individual commitments. But this new, bottom-up framework in which states determine the conditions for a multilateral agreement lacks an authority to establish standards.? Multilateralism requires minimal consensus on global rules and norms among all major powers. The greater the number of countries that have the power to block or veto international initiatives, the more difficult multilateralism becomes — and the less motivated dominant countries are to cooperate. In the emerging multipolar world, characterized by sovereignty concerns and strategic competition, progress toward resolving global issues will be more difficult than ever — with potentially devastating consequences.US can’t make multilat more effective- yielding to minilat solves bestHampson and Heinbecker ’13 [Fen Osler Hampson, CIGI distinguished fellow, is ? also director of the Global Security Program and ? oversees the research direction of the program ? and related activities. Most recently, he served ? as director of the Norman Paterson School of ? International Affairs and continues to serve as ? chancellor’s professor at Carleton University. He ? is the recipient of various awards and honours, ? and is a frequent commentator and contributor to ? the national and international media. Paul Heinbecker, CIGI distinguished fellow, has ? had a celebrated career in Canadian diplomacy, ? including posts as ambassador to Germany, ? permanent representative to the United Nations ? and adviser to various prime ministers. Paul ? Heinbecker is one of Canada’s most experienced ? commentators on foreign policy and international ? governance. He is also the director of the Centre ? for Global Relations at Wilfrid Laurier University, “Leadership in a Turbulent Age,” ]Our world is transforming itself at a rate never before ? seen. How well countries cope with the pace and extent ? of contemporary change depends, as the experience of the ? financial crisis makes clear, on how effectively they govern ? themselves, and how well they cooperate with others. ? Sound economic policies especially are of fundamental ? importance to national security and international ? leadership. Governments with healthy fiscal books are ? better positioned to lead — to underwrite the provision ? of key global public goods and, in extremis, to use military ? force — than those incurring persistent deficits and ? dragging enormous debts. If the United States, now and ? for years to come the leading global power, is to continue to wield decisive influence, it will need to fix its myriad governance and economic problems. But, even then, a return to the dominant status quo ante is not in the cards; others can and will assert legitimate claims to participation in global leadership. The United States will likely find it ? beneficial — even necessary — to share authority, and ? advantageous to accept that others will sometimes work ? together without it. As the complexity and integration of the world accelerates, new forms of “minilateralism,” ? entailing voluntary, exclusive and targeted governance ? approaches and deriving from comparative advantages ? and issue-based interests, will take shape, complementing inclusive treaty-based agreements. These will also include ? new, informal partnerships among countries that are not ? themselves “great powers” by the traditional definition, ? but that nonetheless have compelling strategic interests, ? and the diplomatic and, sometimes, military capacity, ? economic strength and political disposition to make a ? significant difference. Other forms of cooperation, notably ? multi-stakeholder governance, comprising governments, ? industry and civil society, also seem likely to materialize ? in response to challenges arising in the global commons ? that defy conventional, state-based management.multilat—failsMultilateralism fails – its unsustainable and it can’t solve anythingHeld et al, 13 –?Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” ProQuest, 5/24/2013, ) // MS***Edited for ablest languageEconomic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the "supply" side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below. Growing multipolarity. The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that "matter" on a given issue--that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed--has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur. Institutional inertia. The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power. Harder problems. As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards--about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011). Fragmentation. The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs. In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global levelMultilateral cooperation fails – states priorities are too diversePatrick, 10 - Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, “Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, proquest)Rivalry among the emerging powers may also complicate multilateral cooperation. This is most obvious between China and India, which share a disputed border extending over 2,000 miles, compete for regional influence and natural resources, and remain acutely sensitive to changes in their relative military capabilities. China's cultivation of India's neighbors is making New Delhi afraid of strategic encirclement, and maritime competition between the two powers is increasing in the Indian Ocean.Finally, even on those issues on which the basic interests of the established and the emerging powers align-terrorism, climate change, nuclear proliferation, or global financial stability-these states' priorities may differ. The issue of North Korea is an obvious example. Both the United States and China want the North Korean nuclear program eliminated. But whereas Washington places a high priority on this objective, Beijing seeks above all to preserve cordial relations with Pyongyang. It fears the anarchy of a failed state on its borders and would rather maintain the status quo than see the Korean Peninsula reunified under a democratic government that might prove hostile to Chinese interests. Beijing had these motives in mind when it ensured that a UN Security Council resolution in July addressing the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel earlier this year offered only a tepid condemnation, failing to indict by name the obvious perpetrator, North Korea.multilat—no public supportUS politics prevent adjusting to effective multilateralismPatrick, 10 - Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, “Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, proquest)PRESERVATION THROUGH COOPERATIONIn the end, the biggest obstacle to integrating rising powers into the world order may come from within the United States. Making room for emerging players will require psychological adjustments on the part of U.S. officials. They will have to reevaluate the touchstones that have defined U.S. foreign policy since 1945. For more than half a century, the United States has served as the chief architect and ultimate guarantor of an open, liberal international political and economic order. This role has become embedded in U.S. political culture and national identity. But as global power becomes diffuse, the United States' long-standing habits of mind may be more limiting than helpful.By the 1960s, as former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson cruelly noted, the United Kingdom had lost an empire but not yet found a new role. The erosion of U.S. hegemony, although less stark, poses its own challenges. As the United States sheds its primacy, it will need to adopt a more inclusive form of leadership. Compromise will be the order of the day.The U.S. public may be prepared to make this shift: a comprehensive digest of recent polling data compiled by the Council on Foreign Relations and World Public Opinion suggests that Americans are willing to share the world's burdens. Yet at a minimum, multipolarity will test the assumptions of American exceptionalism. The United States has long taken an à la carte approach to its international commitments: picking and choosing among multilateral treaties, institutions, and initiatives and occasionally acting alone or opting out to preserve its sovereignty or freedom of action. But as the U.S. National Intelligence Council's report Global Trends 202$ suggests, "Such a selective approach is . . . running into trouble because those powerful enough to afford picking and choosing are growing more numerous." As today's rising powers avail themselves of the same privilege, such exceptionalism may fray the fabric of the international system. To hold the postwar order together, the United States will have to become a more consistent exemplar of multilateral cooperation.multilat—regionalism checksGlobal multilateralism is impossible, but regional solutions check the impactKhanna, 10 – senior research fellow at the New America Foundation (Parag, “How’s That New World Order Working Out?,” Foreign Policy, December, Sr. chose to give the speech at the United Nations for a reason: America was the preeminent power, but he was a multilateralist. Paralyzed during the Cold War, the United Nations now had a chance toplay the central role as arbiter of global governance for which it was envisioned. But rather than personify multilateralism itself, the United Nations is proving to be at best just one manifestation of it. Free-standing functional agencies like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund -- which has only become more important in the wake of the financial crisis -- are our only effective global bodies, and they are solely economic in nature. But the G-20 has hardly lived up to its billing as the new "steering committee for the world." Before the most recent Seoul summit, world leaders described U.S. proposals for harmonizing current account surpluses and deficits as "clueless." The Security Council has long ceased to be legitimate or effective, with little prospect for reform in sight. As we learned so painfully this year, the United Nations can't forge a global climate deal and can't make the world meet the Millennium Development Goals. For every issue there are now several specialized agencies, like the World Food Program and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, that mostly secure their own funding contributions and are evolving at their own pace.The closest thing we have to multilateral governance happens on a regional level, and it is far more promising, whether the deeply entrenched and supranational European Union, the rejuvenated Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or the nascent African Union. Each is building a regional order tailored to its members' priorities and level of development. On Sudan and Somalia, it's Uganda leading the new diplomatic and peacekeeping push. For Palestine, the Arab League is considering a peacekeeping force. And on Iran, Turkey is now in the lead.The world of 1990 was expected to remain fundamentally international. Yet instead its very structure has changed as globalization has empowered legions of transnational nonstate actors from corporations to NGOs to religious groups. As a result, today's world features overlapping and competing claims to authority and legitimacy. The Gates Foundation gives away more money each year than any European country. Villagers in Nigeria expect Shell to deliver the goods, not their government. And Oxfam shapes the British development agency's priorities more than the reverse.Neither the United States nor the United Nations can put the genie back in the bottle. With each passing year, deal-making at Davos and the Clinton Global Initiative become more important than the glacial advance of empty declarations at international summits. These and other venues are the places where the "new new world order" is being built. And it's happening from the bottom up rather than the top down. xt multilateralism failsEmerging powers won’t cooperate with the USPatrick, 10 - Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, “Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, proquest)COMPROMISE MAY COME SECONDThe emerging non-Western powers do not share the United States' view on global governance. The ideal scenario for Washington would be for the rising powers to embrace Western principles, norms, and rules, just as entrants to the European Union adopt its acquis communautaire, the whole body of eu laws. But the emerging nations are intent on altering existing rules, not adopting them hook, line, and sinker. These countries do not grant the United States the sole authority to define the limits of responsible sovereignty. They believe that they are entitled to reshape international arrangements to suit themselves. This shared aspiration has been on display at the annual bric summits, at which Brazil, Russia, India, and China have (among other things) challenged the dollar's role as the world's reserve currency and demanded a greater voice in international financial institutions.Another important source of tension between the established and the rising powers concerns the limits of national sovereignty. Most of the emerging powers are skeptical of the belief, common in Western circles, that sovereignty is contingent and that international intervention is justified against states that commit mass atrocities, sponsor terrorism, or pursue weapons of mass destruction. This skepticism extends to democracies such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, which have opposed vigorous un Security Council action in response to human rights violations in places such as Myanmar (also known as Burma), Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.Principled differences between the established and the emerging powers extend to other realms. Progress on preventing nuclear proliferation, including an agreement on the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has been stymied by disputes over the relative responsibilities of the nuclear weapons states and the nonnuclear weapons states. Brazil, for instance, insists that all weaponsholding states must make significant progress on their obligations to disarm before it will accept additional controls on its own nuclear facilities.Similar disputes arise in economic relations. All of today's emerging players seek to have greater weight in global governance, but they do not necessarily seek more global governance. Their views on the International Monetary Fund's reform agenda are a case in point. Many Western countries in the G-20 want the imf to assume a more overt surveillance role and to monitor the macroeconomic policies of member states, the status of their regulatory efforts, and the risks these states pose in terms of spawning international financial crises. China, India, and Saudi Arabia, in contrast, oppose a larger role for the imf; they want larger voting shares at the organization without any additional infringement on their prerogatives.The Obama administration often insists that international rules, such as those regarding nonproliferation or trade, must be enforced. It assumes that the world's major players will naturally prioritize global security and economic and environmental challenges just as it does. But the emerging powers do not accept all the current international rules, and the White House has provided little insight into what it can or will do to persuade these powers to cooperate in cases in which their preferences are not, in fact, aligned with those of the United States.Multilateralism fails – interests are too diverse and domestic politics prevent cooperationPatrick, 10 - Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, “Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, proquest)POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITYRising powers are often inclined to enjoy the privileges of power without assuming its obligations. They prefer to free ride on the contributions of established nations. This instinct is reinforced by the anxiety that accepting international commitments could jeopardize their domestic development.Emerging countries wrestle with conflicting identities. They seek a louder voice in global affairs, but as self-identified developing countries, they remain committed to alleviating poverty within their own borders. Thus, they resist global initiatives that would hamper their domestic growth.This dual identity can sometimes allow rising powers to bridge North-South divides. But it can also leave them whipsawed between global ambitions and solidarity with other developing nations. Obama administration officials speak wryly of emerging powers cross-dressing as developed countries within the G-20 only to invoke long-standing developingcountry grievances in other forums.Some of the most prominent rising powers are ringleaders of developing country blocs. Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa, for example, are all leaders of the Group of 77 (G-77), and the last three are members of the Non- Aligned Movement-both groups that impede multilateral cooperation by reinforcing obsolete ideological divisions between the North and the South. Despite strong bilateral ties to the United States, these rising players have a penchant for playing to the gallery and voting against U.S. preferences in the un General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and other multilateral forums. Obama has spoken vristfully of the need to abandon "outdated" bloc mentalities, but the emerging powers show little inclination to do so.Internal political dynamics make integration efforts difficult. Leaders of both the established and the emerging powers must reconcile an increasingly complicated and intrusive multilateral agenda with political realities at home. These pressures are likely to constrain partnership between them.Regime type, for example, is limiting U.S.-Chinese cooperation on cybersecurity. The United States has promoted a vision of cyberspace that is open, global, and relatively anonymous, whereas China's vision is predicated on state control. Both countries are interested in keeping the Internet safe from criminal activities, but it is hard to see how they can agree on any multilateral system as long as Beijing insists on censorship and persecutes online dissidents.Multilateral cooperation does nothing – too many divergent interestsMcGillycuddy, 8 (Sebastian, JULY 16TH, 2008 12:13 “UN-Realpolitik: The Dangers of Multilateralism,” )To be sure, the UN is hindered by the international system, which seasoned realists know is inimical to any genuine multilateralism due to the absence of a common power which makes international relations scarcely more elevated than the law of the jungle. Certainly realpolitik does no more than scratch the surface of the complex relations between states, but it is nonetheless indispensable to any basic understanding of them. But the UN does itself no favours. It naively assumes itself to be capable of transcending the realist analysis through soft power and influence – the quid pro quo of giving up state sovereignty, the stage on which our leaders can flounce around flaunting their precious consciences – which tends to amount to no more than hectoring and parading “moral authority”, the kind beloved of liberals but which is unequal to the task of feeding one starving child or preventing one brutal attack by a dictator’s henchman on a helpless subject. It congratulates itself on its “humanitarian” work, which mainly involves spending other people’s money and winning the support of narcissistic Hollywood actors. It even has the nerve to tell us that we should have a referendum on abolishing our monarchy, an episode so astonishingly audacious in its shocking indifference to national sovereignty that it is impossible to even begin a discussion of it. Its reputation for corruption, whether oil-for-food in Iraq or sexual abuse by its soldiers in Congo, is legendary. Yet there is a sense in which all of this misses the point. If the UN was just another vacuous talking shop like the G8 or Sarkozy’s current Mediterranean jaunt, or even just another pernicious, remote and interfering bureaucracy, like a larger but weaker EU, we would at least know our enemy. Instead it is the organisation which all too often appears to be charged with the responsibility of preventing World War III. It is a dangerous indulgence to believe that it can do this, and its failure would surely make the demise of the ill-fated “EU 3″ in Iran look like a relative diplomatic triumph.Multilateralism failsCampell and O'Hanlon, 6? (Kurt, director at the CSIS Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Michael, senior policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security, October, p. 214) In the convincing phrase Madeleine Albright coined in the 1990s, the United States truly is the "indispensable nation." Another useful metaphor from that era, Richard Haass's description of America as "reluctant sheriff," is also apropos. The United States may show greater skepticism about using its military muscle in the future than it did during much of the George W. Bush presidency, but it needs to play the role of international sheriff at times nonetheless (with the help of "'posses" of like minded states), because no other entity can do so.5 Those moderates and progressives angry about Bush? administration unilateralism and arrogance must avoid overcompensating in such a way that they weaken America’s critical role as a global leader. America's centrality in the international order is another aspect of the reason why moderates and progressives must be careful when they suggest that multilateralism will be a core element of their foreign policy, as many do. While multilateralism is desirable, it should not be taken so far as to devolve simplistically into a "democratic" approach to world affairs in which each nation essentially gets equal say. As Harvard professor and former Pentagon official Joseph Nye argues, the United States should not act multilaterally when doing so would contradict core American values, delay responses to immediate threats to its security, or promote poor policies that might have been improved through a tougher (and more unilateral) bargaining process.6 The United States will sometimes have to do things that are unpopular internationally; it will usually have to help forge consensus among nations rather than wait for it to develop; and it will generally have to act rather than hope that crises will go away on their own. On the subject at hand, this means that America needs to be ready to defend its allies without waiting for global approval or the formation of large coalitions to do so. xt unreliable partnersMultilateralism fails – partners are unreliable and their actions taint the entire effortFarah, 4 (Joseph, “The danger of multilateralism,” WorldnetDaily, 3/18, )Since the first Persian Gulf War, American leaders have sworn by multilateralism in foreign policy.It has become an article of faith that military actions should only be undertaken with the help and cooperation of allies – even when those allies don't have all that much to contribute and even when those allies are brought in kicking and screaming.Let me be the first to point out that one of the dangers of multilateralism was just illustrated in Spain.Spain didn't necessarily contribute much significant in terms of actual military capability in Iraq. As with most of the nations contributing combat or peacekeeping forces to the coalition, Spain's participation was more symbolic than substantive.But symbolism is a two-way street. And when a symbolic partner decides to leave the coalition under pressure, that symbolism is more destructive than its original commitment was constructive.A coalition of the kind we have built in Iraq – symbolically, anyway – is only as strong as its weakest link. We just learned who the weakest link was. But we may find others going the way of Spain before long, if they, too, learn there's a real cost to standing up against the Islamist "holy warriors." xt no public supportMultilateralism causes free riding, crushing public support, making it unsustainablePosen and Ross, 97 (Barry R. Posen and Andrew L Ross, Pofessor of political science at MIT; military theorist, "Competing visions for U.S. grand strategy", International Security, Winter, p. 5) Cooperative security is vulnerable to a range of criticisms. First, individual states are still expected to be able to rise above narrow conceptions of national interest in response to appeals for action on behalf of the collective good, and to engage in what will seem to them as armed altruism. In theory, some collective action problems associated with collective security[40] may be ameliorated by cooperative security. In particular, the combination of intensive arms control, military technological superiority, and U.S. leadership ismeant to reduce substantially the costs of cooperation for any given member of the cooperative security regime. Nevertheless, there will still be defectors and free riders. Major power aggression would still be a problem for cooperative security, as it was for collective security, if some powers perceive the intrinsic stakes as small and the aggressor as far away and difficult to fight. It seems unlikely, for example, that the NATO allies would ever fight the People's Republic of China over Taiwan, even if the United States wanted to doso. States concerned about the possible competitions of the future will still ask if any given opportunity for current cooperation toachieve a common good, or oppose a common bad, changes their power position relative to all other potential challengers, including one another. Second, the task of building sufficient general multilateral credibility to deter a series of new and different potential aggressors seems very difficult. Regular U.S. action to oppose theSoviet Union during the Cold War did not entirely dissuade that regime from new challenges. Since this was an iterative bipolar game,credibility should have accumulated, but that does not seem to have happened. Although U.S. credibility appears to have been quite high in Europe, where direct interests were great and deployed military power was strong, elsewhere Soviet behavior was often mischievous. It is quite likely, therefore, that a true cooperative security strategy would involve the UN, designated regional organizations, and effectively the United States, in a number of wars over many years if it is to have any hope of establishing the ability to deter the ambitious and reassure the fearful. This would, however, serve to further strain public support for a demanding strategy. Third, democracies are problematical partners in a cooperative security project in a crucial respect: their publics must be persuaded to go to war. Since the publics in modern liberal democracies seem to be quite casualty-sensitive, the case for risking the lives of their troops in distant wars is inherently difficult to make. This is one reason why the decisive military superiority of a technologically dominant coalition of peace-loving states is a necessary condition for cooperative security to work. This in turn depends on the military power of the United States.Global multilateral cooperation structurally fails---overwhelming data confirms Robert J Lieber 14, Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown University, 2014, “The Rise of the BRICS and American primacy,” International Politics, Vol. 51, p. 137-154Equally important, liberal internationalists and others tend to assume that international relations are a positive sum game (Keohane, 1984; Ruggie, 1993). Experiences with multilateralism and with regional international institutions are said to encourage cooperation. Transparency, reciprocity and habits of collaboration are seen as self-reinforcing. In order to achieve their own domestic needs for economic growth, countries find not only these experiences beneficial, but such cooperation spills over across related functions and issue areas. A generation ago, scholars writing and theorizing about regional integration in Western Europe defined this process as one of ‘spillover’. For liberal internationalists and globalists there is at least an implied analogy with that European experience despite the immense differences in geography, history and path dependence.5 That assumption has some basis in the areas of economics and trade, though the mercantilist and predatory behavior of China provides a serious contrary indicator. In the security realm, however, there is little reason for such an optimistic assumption. Cases in point include nuclear proliferation (North Korea, Iran), tensions in East Asia (China, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, the Philippines, the East and South China Seas) and conflicts in the Middle East (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Lebanon, as well as Israel and the Palestinians). Nonetheless there are exceptions. Brazil has played a continuing role in UN Peacekeeping. It assigns nearly 2500 military and police personnel to those missions and has played a leading role in Haiti, where it has commanded the UN’s operation since 2004. It also has headed the maritime component of UNIFIL (Lebanon) since 2011. In addition, Turkey has participated actively in NATO-led peacekeeping missions in Bosnia (SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), and Afghanistan (ISAF). Skepticism about the BRICS and the momentum assumed by liberal internationalists has not been scarce.6 Realist scholars have understandably been critical of the assumptions underlying these approaches as well as of the foreign policy choices they imply. However, other scholars too have found increasing reason for criticism. For example, Barma et al (2013, p. 56) have recently observed that, ‘Instead of a gradual trend toward global problem solving punctuated by isolated failures, we have seen over the last several years essentially the opposite: stunningly few instances of international cooperation on significant issues’. Moreover, Patrick (2010, p. 44) of the Council on Foreign Relations has cautioned that, ‘The United States should be under no illusions about the ease of socializing rising nations. Emerging powers may be clamoring for greater global influence, but they often oppose the political and economic ground rules of the inherited Western liberal order, seek to transform existing multilateral arrangements, and shy away from assuming significant global responsibilities’. In this regard, Laidi has argued that despite their own heterogeneity, the BRICS actually share a common objective in opposing Western liberal internationalist narratives that run counter to traditional state sovereignty. Instead, they seek to protect their own prerogatives, independence of action and national autonomy in an increasingly interdependent world (Laidi, 2012, pp. 614–615).Multilateralism fails—diverging interests and a lack of faith guarantee cooperation is at best superficial Heribert Dieter 14, Senior Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Visiting Professor for International Political Economy at Zeppelin University, Doctorate in Political Science and Economics, Free University of Berlin, 1/31/14, The G-20 and the Dilemma of Asymmetric Sovereignty – Why Multilateralism Is Failing in Crisis Prevention, International Relations and Security Network, , tightening the rules for financial market regulation is not the only field where the G-20 is failing. Despite the mantra-like repetition of memoranda of understanding, the trade ministers of the G-20 have not been able to overcome their conflicts of interest and reach a settlement in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO). What are the reasons for this failure?Although the G-20 managed to prevent a revival of protectionist measures on a broad front in the midst of the crisis, there is a large gap between the announcements of the G-20 and quantifiable results in trade policy. There is not one final communiqué that lacks a clear statement stressing the importance of the WTO and the necessity to conclude the Doha Round. Nonetheless, the reality of trade policy looks very different. All the states that are preventing the conclusion of the Doha Round through their vetoes are members of the G-20.Despite there being little public information available on the reasons for the deadlock in the Doha Round, it is known that the US, Brazil, and China are blocking its conclusion. The emerging economies Brazil and China oppose the US’s demand for the complete elimination of tariffs on industrial goods. Conversely, the US resists the request to comprehensively abandon subsidies to the agricultural sector.Thus, the Doha Round is not concluded because three important members of the G-20 no longer believe in multilateral solutions and would rather engage in preferential agreements. For experts in the field of international trade, this is a paradox. There is a broad consensus that a single rulebook for international trade would facilitate economic growth and contribute to a worldwide increase in prosperity. This, however, cannot be said for the currently popular free trade agreements. So why are the countries in the G-20 incapable of further developing the common rules for international trade? One explanation is the lack of a hegemonic power that is willing to guarantee compliance with the rules of the game, but at the same time establish a system that provides member countries with sufficient economic benefits. In any event, this is how the postwar economy emerged: The US enforced the system of Bretton Woods and made sure that the participation in this economic regime remained attractive. Of course, the Bretton Woods regime never was a truly global system, since member countries of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance did not participate. Still, within the bipolar order of the Cold War, the US managed to keep the system open and stable.? After the collapse of the USSR and the following short-lived “unipolar moment” (Charles Krauthammer) of complete hegemony of the US, the multilateral order was being advanced until 1995, the founding year of the WTO. Since the turn of the millennium and the parallel emergence of a multipolar order, nearly all attempts to organize cooperation without hegemony (Bob Keohane) have failed. The present multipolar world is characterized by superficial cooperation. Global Governance, whether in policies to prevent further climate change or in economic policy, remains on hold. Even worse: The world is returning to regulation on the level of the nation-state and non-cooperation. The American political scientist Ian Bremmer refers to the resulting situation as “G-Zero,” an era in which groups such as the G-20 will no longer play a vital role. The negative perception of the international division of labor? Apparently, there is no such thing as an identity of interests of individual states, as assumed by the advocates of global regulation and global governance. In other words: The gap between the preferences of individual states is widening rather than narrowing. However, governments must respect the preferences of their societies in the formulation of policies if they do not wish to lose legitimacy. Then again, the different preferences of societies are the immediate result of severely diverging perceptions of the international division of labor. Even in the G-20, individual societies have very different perceptions of the effects of globalization and its economic effects.? In Europe and the US, many people are increasingly critical of the international division of labor, if not outright hostile to globalization. According to a number of surveys, only about one-fifth to one-third of the respondents in OECD countries see greater opportunities than risks in globalization. Even in Germany, numerous politicians and citizens have been critical of globalization, although Germany strongly benefits from open markets and the resulting intensification of international trade.? Without a political anchoring in the member states, the G-20 has no future? The unfavorable perceptions of globalization and the outlined asymmetric sovereignty have resulted in a standstill in the G-20. Instead of a further development of the multilateral order, at best the status quo will be preserved. This is why we can expect nothing substantial – at least in terms of economic policy and financial regulation – from the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg on September 5 and 6. The structural impediments to successful financial regulation and trade policies on a supranational level cannot be overcome by the heads of government and state of the G-20. At least there is some hope in those areas where the countries of the G-20 have identical interests. This applies primarily to measures to close down tax loopholes. In 2008, ambitious expectations of a comprehensive reorganization of international trade relations through the G-20 were raised. Unfortunately, the G-20 cannot and will not deliver on crisis prevention. Today, more modest goals will have to be set. The key obstacle to success in the further development of global rules in trade and finance can be found in the G-20 societies themselves. Perceptions about globalization need to be addressed by policy makers at the national level, as do the widespread reservations about the international division of labor in the OECD countries. If societies continue to show diverging preferences, the development of comprehensive global economic governance in the G-20 will be all but impossible.No will or capability for effective cooperation Hellmann, 13 (Gunther Hellmann is a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, an initiative of the German Marshall Fund, “The Decline of Multilateralism,” May 2, German Marshall Fund Blog, )WASHINGTON—It is becoming increasingly difficult to argue against retrenchment in Europe and North America. Economic crises and domestic political stagnation absorb energy and consume financial resources. Global military engagements in faraway places cost lives and treasure and often yield limited success. There is growing disillusionment with democracy promotion. Coalitions of sovereign state defenders like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) make life for the guardians of the liberal world order ever more challenging. The upshot is multilateral fatigue in both Europe and North America.? This is a perilous state of affairs because state-transcending global problems are proliferating. “Global Trends 2030,” a study published by the U.S. National Intelligence Council last December, predicts that “the current, largely Western dominance of global structures … will have been transformed by 2030 to be more in line with the changing hierarchy of new economic players.” Yet even if this were to happen, the report argues, it remains unclear to what degree new or reformed institutions “will have tackled growing global challenges.”? One might be forgiven for taking this to be an overly optimistic projection. Based on current trends, the outlook is much gloomier, due mainly to the political contagion effects of sovereigntism, the fixation on state sovereignty as an absolute value, and minilateralism. Moisés Naím, who initially coined the term, defined minilateralism as getting together the “smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem.” The problem is that the smallest possible number may quickly grow very large; Naím’s own book, The End of Power, provides ample evidence that this is so. Consider, for instance, the number and political weight of countries needed to address the problems in the aftermath of a military escalation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The minimum number of countries required to effectively regulate global warming does not look any more encouraging. In other words, sovereigntism and minilateralism are symptoms of the crisis of liberal world order — manifestations of The Democratic Disconnect — and not a recipe for curing its ills.? In the old days when multilateralism was not yet qualified politically with such adjectives as “assertive” (Madeleine Albright) or “effective” (EU), it served as a descriptor for a fundamental transformation of interstate collaboration in the second half of the 20th century. In an influential article, John Ruggie, a Harvard professor and former high-ranking UN official, showed that the actual practice of multilateralism by the liberal democracies of North America and Europe after World War II was based on a set of generalized principles of conduct. These principles rendered segments of the post-war international order into more reliable cooperative settings, such as the United Nations, or islands of peaceful change, such as the zone of European integration. A readiness to give up sovereignty or, at least to cooperate on the basis of reciprocity, were characteristic elements of multilateralism and what came to be called the “liberal world order.”? This liberal order is under strain today because its creators and guardians have themselves strayed from these principles. In the security field, “coalitions of the willing” have undermined multilateralism not only in the UN context, but also in NATO. In economic and financial matters, the politics of European sovereign debt crisis management illustrates both the dangers of executive federalism and the limits of diffuse reciprocity among Europe’s nation states in the world’s most integrated region. “Responsible stakeholders,” the former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once said, do more than merely “conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests…They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system.” What was meant as advice to China when Zoellick gave that speech in 2005 can easily be redirected at the liberal democracies of North America and Europe today.? There are no easy ways out. Even if the slide toward retrenchment can be stopped, the prospects do not seem bright for the kind of bold new initiatives for global institutional reform that are required. It is debatable whether calls for “democratic internationalism” or a new alignment among “like-minded democracies” can do the trick, but Europe and North America need to realize that their stakes in the liberal order are much higher than those of relative newcomers. Indeed, overcoming crises at home hinges at least in part on sustaining a conducive global environment. Readjusting the balance between minilateralism and multilateralism will helpMultilat doesn’t solveYun Sun 15, nonresident fellow in the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institute, "The Limits of U.S.-China Cooperation in Africa," 4/6/15, brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/04/06-limit-us-china-cooperation-in-africa-sunHowever, despite the rhetoric and enthusiasm, people might be disappointed at the reality, which is that exemplary cases of successful cooperation between Washington and Beijing on the continent remain scarce. The few examples of collaboration are on issues of the “lowest common denominator” (most basic and least controversial), such as the flaring crisis in Sudan/South Sudan and severe non-traditional threats such as the Ebola outbreak. Upon examining the American and Chinese perspectives on cooperation in Africa, more realistic expectations as to what the two powers can and will jointly do for a better Africa might be warranted.The logic of U.S.-China cooperation in Africa is a sound one. Both Beijing and Washington have important political and economic interests in promoting peace and development of Africa. The two countries’ vested interests in Africa, particularly in commercial investment, make peace and stability imperative. In addition, as two responsible powers, the countries carry a shared moral obligation to Africa. In cases such as South Sudan, both the U.S. and China stand much to lose if the crisis continues to fester. Furthermore, a stable and prosperous Africa will provide both the U.S. and China more investment and trade opportunities, which can enhance the momentum for their cooperation.Nevertheless, while scholars and media reports on both sides have produced numerous papers and analysis on what the U.S. and China “could” or “should” do to cooperate in Africa (as listed above), concrete cooperation that the two countries are in fact pursuing or planning to pursue is yet to develop quickly.The fundamental cause of inadequate U.S.-China cooperation in Africa is an underlying sense of zero-sum competition between the two powers on the continent. Essentially, the U.S. and China are yet to see each other as genuine cooperation partners or friendly forces on many important issues due to their diverging perceptions and national interests. On the U.S. side, a 2014 RAND study accurately captures the current U.S. perspective and reflects the U.S.’s concern around China’s expanding influence in Africa and about the U.S. losing in the Africa game. After listing details of China’s expanding engagements in the continent and how they undermine U.S. influence, the report recommends that the U.S. counter Chinese efforts such as the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) by cultivating relations with a wider range of African countries. Following the same line of thought, President Obama took a swipe at China during the 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit by differentiating the U.S. approach from those that “look to Africa simply for its natural resources … and simply want to extract minerals from the ground …” Although the president did not mention China by name, the comments were clearly aimed at Beijing.Such a competitive theme is also popular in China. As summarized by a 2013 report by the China Academy of Social Sciences, “the strengthening of the West’s influence in Africa means that China will face more difficulties in achieving its strategic interests in Africa … The West’s current campaign to deepen their influence presents more strategic competition to China … China should focus more on a competitive strategy in Africa.” Chinese analysts are keen to study how the U.S.’s Africa strategies might affect or undermine Chinese political and commercial interests on the ground. Some have suspected that the American interventions in Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya were indeed targeted at undercutting Chinese economic interests in those countries. To counter American criticism of China’s resource-centric economic engagement, China has also grown increasingly adept at attributing such disapproval to Americans’ “sore loser” mentality. Other than the strong sense of competition, another key factor that hinders U.S.-China cooperation in Africa is the different approaches and standards the two countries have adopted on issues such as foreign aid and development assistance. While China does not allow political issues such as democratic or authoritarian systems to interfere with its pragmatic ties with African countries, the U.S. has strong value-oriented policies that prevent Washington from engaging regimes with poor human rights records. On the technical level, China views development and foreign aid as practical policy instruments to promote political friendship and economic cooperation, while the U.S. attaches clearly stated goals, stringent conditions, and strict criteria to its development programs. In reality, these vast differences significantly limit the potential for U.S.-China cooperation.Multilateralism can’t stop conflictBordachev 13 (Timofei, Doctor of Political Science, is the Director of the Center for Comprehensive International and European Studies at the Higher School of Economics, “Political Tsunami Hits Hard,” 6/30, )The financial crisis in the United States, which in 2008 went global, and the continuing efforts by countries around the world to fight its effects have highlighted four most important tendencies in international affairs. First, pretty obvious is the conflict between the growing economic unity of the world and its worsening political fragmentation. The rise of sovereign ambitions and attempts to address all problems at the national level has come into conflict with financial and economic globalization and exacerbates crisis trends. Second, democratization in international politics and greater independence of individual states play an ever greater role. This “in-depth unfreezing” for the first time manifested itself in China’s soaring global ambitions and in the national interests and requests of other Asian countries. Turkey, a stable ally of the West in NATO and a EU aspirant waiting patiently in the antechamber, is trying on the guise of a regional power ever more often. In the meantime, the need for taking into account the ever larger range of opinions quickly erodes the international institutions that emerged in the Cold War era. This is seen not just in the sphere of security: the United Nations efficiency has largely fallen victim to the first phase of the global geopolitical catastrophe of the 1990s. Third, the growing international weight of the new countries and attempts by the old-timers, who won the Cold War, to preserve the hard-won status quo bring back the conservative interpretations of such terms as “sovereignty” and “sovereign rights.” Not only the leaders of new-comers to world politics, or the United States, traditionally concerned about its sovereignty, but quite respectable heads of European states, too, start talking about the protection of national interests. Finally, military power is ever more frequently employed by major powers as a tool to address foreign policy issues. EU countries and the United States used force and threats to use force back at the time when they were getting their hands on the assets of the former USSR. However, they were faced with a very limited set of tasks then. It never occurred to anyone in the West to say in 1999 that the purpose of NATO’s operation against Yugoslavia was to force Slobodan Milosevic to resign or, still worse, to put him to death by some untraditional way of hanging. The need for using military force with or without reason merely confirms that the international community has no other means to prevent the emergence or escalation of conflicts.Domestic politics tank multilatHeld 13, David Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham AND Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University AND Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 5/24/13, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” , CMRThe Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems---indeed it is---but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries.The plan won’t lead to effective multilateralism – the US will never follow through and the plan just serves as another scattered movePalacio 13 Ana is a former Spanish foreign minister and former senior vice president of the World Bank, is a member of the Spanish Council of State, “The U.S. suffers from strategic blindness”, 11-7-13, , CMRThat is all the more true given that the nature of such problems has also changed. America, like the rest of us, is vulnerable to climate change, pandemics and terrorism – challenges that require coordinated global solutions. For the U.S., however, the utility of multilateralism is purely situational. Above all, multilateralism is never preferable to a “good” bilateral solution – a view that has reinforced behavior that undermines, rather than strengthens, the capacity for effective international action. Indeed, always ready to negotiate treaties but rarely prepared to sign – and even less likely to ratify – them, the U.S. remains absent from such key global agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Its inspired creativity and support in building formal institutions like the United Nations and World Bank has given way to a predilection for weak, informal and ad hoc groupings, such as the various G-somethings and “coalitions of the willing.” Establishing effective multilateralism requires an emphasis on rules and institutions that facilitate coordination. The recent decision by the U.S. to sign the Arms Trade Treaty could be a good start – if only Congress could marshal the bipartisan support needed to ratify it. But scattered moves in the right direction will not suffice. What is really needed is a change in vision and mentality – a shift from viewing multilateralism as a tactic to embracing it as a strategic imperative.ProSanctions Stop Russian Aggression in the UkraineSanctions have stopped Russian aggression in the UkraineEmma Ashford, Visiting Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, January/February, 2016, Not So Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia, DOA 12-16-15Domestic political factors also contribute to Putin’s calculations. The sanctions that the United States and the eu levied against Russia after its annexation of Crimea have hit hard, especially when combined with the global fall in oil prices and preexisting structural problems in the Russian economy. The Kremlin has sought relief by “freezing” the conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine—a cease-fire between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists has been in force since early September, and both sides have pulled back some of their heavy weaponry, although sporadic reports of fighting have surfaced since then. Putin has calculated that the cease-fire and the decision by pro-Russian separatists to postpone local elections in eastern Ukraine may lead to the partial lifting of eu sanctions.Sanctions Generally EffectiveThe only way to influence Russia is through sanctionsUkraine General Newswire, April 1, 2015 Sanctions against Russia will be lifted when it behaves properly - Danish Ambassador, DOA: 11-25-15Sanctions against Russia will only be lifted when the leaders of the country behave properly, Danish Ambassador to Ukraine Merete Juhl has said. Sanctions are the only instrument to leverage Russia right now. That's why they will only be lifted when Russia behaves properly. That's the logic of imposing sanctions, Juhl said at a press conference in Kharkiv on Wednesday.She also said that Denmark supported sanctions against Russia despite the sanctions causing losses for Danish businesses.Denmark is an EU country that strongly supports sanctions against Russia. In Denmark, we understand that these sanctions won't have an impact at once, but with time they will work. Many Danish companies are losing money because exports to Russia stopped, but Danish businesses have consciously agreed to that. They lose income, because there's no trade with Russia, because they want to influence Russia in such a way and settle the conflict, Juhl said.Sanctions Establish Norms Against Russian AggressionRemoving the sanctions would send a signal that Russia can invade any territory it pleasesAndrew Foxall is the director of the Russia Studies Center at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based international affairs think tank, December 16, 2015, New York Times, Stick to Sanctions on the Ukraine, DOA: 12-16-15It is not only through breaking the cease-fire that Mr. Putin has violated Minsk II. All foreign armed groups, weapons and mercenaries should have been withdrawn from Ukraine. Yet Russia continues to deploy an estimated 9,000 regular troops, and controls over 30,000 irregular troops, in the so-called people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. The O.S.C.E. should be free to oversee the implementation of the agreement, but Russia’s proxy forces have restricted the organization’s ability to monitor the cease-fire, denied it access to the Ukraine-Russia border, and refused to provide it with details of their heavy weapons. The O.S.C.E. surveillance drones, which are used to observe the separatist-controlled territories, have been subjected to “military-grade GPS jamming” by the separatists, rendering them useless. The republics of Donetsk and Luhansk are supposed to allow humanitarian aid to be distributed in eastern Ukraine; instead, they have blocked it. In September, the Luhansk authorities stopped 10 international humanitarian organizations, including Unicef, from entering the separatist-held territory; in October, the Donetsk authorities stopped Doctors Without Borders from operating there. According to the United Nations, the two republics are depriving 150,000 people of monthly food handouts. Yet, Russia has escaped censure from the European governments that brokered the Minsk II agreement. The same governments are preoccupied with other issues: the Syrian war, the self-declared Islamic State and the refugee crisis.The reasons for Russia’s violations are unclear. Mr. Putin may be seeking to derail Ukraine’s progress toward membership in the European Union, including the free-trade agreement scheduled to come into effect on Jan. 1, and thereby undermine Kiev’s pro-Western government. He may also be trying to use the global attention on Syria to increase the military pressure on Kiev, in the hope that Mr. Poroshenko will capitulate to Moscow’s demands over a political settlement in eastern Ukraine. Whatever Mr. Putin’s motivations, it is clear that he sees the world’s distraction from Ukraine as a sign of the West’s weakness. And that only tempts Russia’s president more. Speaking in March, the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, said that European Union sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine last year would not be lifted until there was “complete implementation” of Minsk II. But that was before the terrorist attacks in Paris led France to reach out to Russia. Mr. Putin is wagering that the West will trade an alliance in Syria for concessions on Ukraine. The European Union cannot allow sanctions to lapse. If that were to happen, the union would concede, in effect, that Russia might invade and destabilize any territory it pleased. Russia would have triumphed over the world order imposed by the West after the Cold War. And Moscow’s authoritarianism will have defeated Brussels’ liberal democracy.Sanctions Prevent Further Russian Aggression in the UkraineSanctions deterring Putin from further Russian aggression in the UkraineO’Hanlon 3/3/14Michael Edward O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. He began his career as a budget analyst in the defense field. main reason for my relative lack of anxiety derives from the fundamentals of the situation in Ukraine. It is serious, to be sure. But it does not look likely to become catastrophic. As coercive as Russian President Vladimir Putin has been in this crisis, there have been limits. He hasn’t killed people (so far at least, as of this writing on Monday, March 3). He is apparently trying to make a show of force in a way that gets a specific task done. He wants to protect his military bases in Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet (historically one of Russia’s big four) is based. He also wants to assert certain prerogatives in a former Soviet republic. He wants, he says, to protect fellow ethnic Russians and Russian speakers — of whom there are many in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. There is nothing to admire about how Putin has proceeded. His approach is indeed 19th century-ish, as Secretary of State John Kerry said on Face the Nation Sunday. But it’s not totally surprising for the way great powers behave. Even in this century. For example, the main distinction to draw between what Putin has just done in Crimea and what Washington did in Panama in 1989 — when a dictatorial government started to mistreat its own people badly and jeopardize our bases and access to the Panama Canal — is that we were more patient, and more justified, in making the decision to invade. In fact, we went further in that crisis than Putin is likely to do here. But Putin saw a government in Ukraine that he believed illegitimate. From a certain perspective, it had violated the February 21 deal that would have led to early elections, almost as soon as it was reached. He also saw the Ukrainian parliament last week look to degrade the status of the Russian language within Ukraine — an understandable reaction by angry Ukrainians at one level, to be sure, but also a provocation and a pointless one. I am hardly defending Putin. But I doubt very much that he is seeking to forcibly annex part of Ukraine. Part of his worldview may desire that, to be sure. But we have a pretty strong set of potential economic sanctions and Putin knows it. The West has gotten a lot better at applying sanctions — largely because of the Iran experience, and also our dealings with North Korea, and before that Serbia. The international community now knows how to do this — how to go after the banking sector, the individual wealth of top Russian leaders, their visa travel rights, and so on. We can try to help Europe gain new sources of energy as well, a point Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute wisely made when we appeared together Sunday on Face the Nation. Russia cannot thrive if the Western world collectively seeks to punish Putin and to do so for a considerable period. Were the current crisis to escalate to a bad situation — which it hasn’t yet — and Ukraine to face civil warfare and an invasion by Russia to back up one side, then I think these kinds of tools would be applied. They’d be effective and Putin knows it. So I’m relatively confident he won’t take this gamble, provided we are clear in our communications about how we would respond.Sanctions Needed to Support Minsk AgreementSanctions needed to support the Minsk agreementRIA Novosti, June 7, 2015, West Needs to Maintain Sanctions on Russia - European Council President, DOA: 11-27-15GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, June 7 (Sputnik) - Anti-Russia sanctions should remain in place, as there is a clear violation of the Minsk agreements on Ukraine reconciliation, European Council President Donald Tusk said Sunday adding that the decision will be taken before the upcoming EU summit. "If it comes to Russia and the sanctions, obviously I think it is the most important thing today, because we need to maintain sanctions against Russia, because of the clear violation of Minsk agreements," Tusk said ahead of an annual Group of Seven (G7) summit in Bavaria, Germany."The European council wants to have Russia as a partner, and not an enemy ... but I think that this European decision ... on maintaining [sanctions], which we decided in March, this is something more grave, but also consistent," he stressed adding that the decision would be taken "before our European Council meets."West imposed several rounds of economic sanctions on Russia in 2014 over its alleged involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, a claim which Moscow has firmly denied.The EU leaders agreed in March 2015 that anti-Russia sanctions, which expire in July, will stay in place if the peace agreement reached in February in Minsk would not be fully implemented. The Minsk deal stipulates a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of contact in Donbas.The final decision on prolongation of sanctions against Russia is expected to be announced during the EU summit, due to be held June 25-26 in Brussels.Supporting Minsk Critical to US LeadershipFailure to protect Ukraine causes global prolif cascade by invalidating Budapest Memorandum – japan, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia Boyes 3/6/14 writer, the TimesTwenty years ago Ukraine had the third-largest strategic nuclear weapons stock in the world after the US and Russia, having inherited its share of the Soviet arsenal. It gave up those stocks in return for Western cash and a piece of paper, the 1994 Budapest memorandum that was meant to guarantee its territorial integrity. Today, it seems that Kiev made a bad deal. The agreement, signed by the US, Britain and Russia, has done nothing to shield Ukrainians. Had Ukraine stayed nuclear Russia would have thought twice about snatching Crimea. The invasion is thus not just about the regional manipulation of power and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s effective threat to foment a European civil war unless Ukraine stays in his orbit. It is about the new international order and about nuclear security’s role in it. How safe do non-nuclear Japan and Taiwan feel at the moment? How much are their security agreements with the US worth if Washington is powerless to deter a Russian land-grab in a country that borders four NATO members? How credible as world policemen are the five leading nuclear powers - the US, Russia, China, Britain and France - as the permanent members of the UN Security Council? In the 1990s it was briefly possible to believe in the merits of unilateral disarmament and the dream of global non-proliferation. South Africa admitted to having had secret nuclear plans and promptly dropped them. The threat of Soviet encroachment had evaporated. So, too, had the Soviet Union. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus had more pressing economic problems than keeping their nukes in working order. Ukraine in 1991 boasted inter-continental ballistic missiles, almost two dozen strategic bombers, more than 1000 long-range cruise missiles and several hundred tactical nuclear weapons. To turn that into a purely Ukrainian force, to target it on Moscow rather than NATO, would have meant an investment of $US30 billion to replace Russian-owned early warning systems and communication centres. Some in Kiev argue it would have been worth the effort. “If we had hung on to even a fraction of that force it would have been like hanging a gun on the wall of your living room,” said one Ukrainian politician. “Maybe the gun has no bullets but when the neighbour comes round for dinner, he’s afraid of it.” Neither the West nor Russia bought into the idea of a Ukrainian deterrent. The US did not trust the 90s Ukrainian leadership to keep tight control of the weapons. It paid Ukrainians to load their nuclear kit on to 100 trains and send it to Russia. In 1996 Ukraine officially became a non-nuclear nation - and soon afterwards the Kremlin piled pressure on Kiev to pay more for its gas. Unilateral disarmament doesn’t pay. It only results in nuclear weapons becoming the sole property of those nations that do not renounce them. The quest for nuclear advantage can poison the politics of the whole region. Iran is pushing its nuclear program not only to “balance” Israel’s undeclared weapons but also to win a pivotal role in the Middle East. That prods Saudi Arabia towards getting its own atomic deterrent, perhaps with the help of Pakistan - an enormous challenge to non-proliferation efforts.Ukraine is the litmus test of US primacyKanat 3/17/14 Bugra Kanat is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Erie and a Research Fellow at the SETA Foundation at Washington, D.C. He received his doctoral degree in Political Science from Syracuse University. He holds a master’s degree in Political Science from Syracuse University and a master’s in International Affairs from Marquette University. He completed his undergraduate education in the International Relations Department of the Middle East Technical University. Dr. Kanat also holds a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Middle Eastern Affairs and Certificate of Advanced Graduate Study in Conflict Resolution. His research interests include foreign policy decision-making, foreign policy change, and domestic politics and foreign policy interaction. Dr. Kanat’s writings have appeared in Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, Middle East Policy, Arab Studies Quarterly, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, and Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. He also regularly contributes op-eds to Star, Sabah, Today's Zaman, Zaman Daily, Radikal Daily, and Hurriyet Daily News. He is also co-editor of an edited volume – History, Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey – published by the SETA Foundation.Halford Mackinder, one of the founding fathers of geopolitics, once wrote "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the world." Ukraine was one of the integral parts of the Heartland that he stated. Now, the crisis in Ukraine is becoming an arena for a major geopolitical confrontation. The problem in Ukraine that has been overshadowed in recent days with the mysterious loss of the Malaysian Airlines plane is quickly being transformed into a global problem instead of a regional challenge for countries in Eastern Europe. The crisis not only brought Western powers and Russia face to face in Crimea but is becoming a global chessboard in which global powers have stakes. The most significant centers of gravity in international relations, namely the United States and China and their positions and diplomatic steps regarding the crisis will be very important for the future of the conflict in Crimea, their bilateral relations, as well as the international system. The crisis and its outcomes will be a major determinant of future global geopolitics. The crisis in Ukraine is yet another serious test of U.S. leadership in terms of its international alliances, guarantees and assurances. The world is watching the reaction of the U.S. after Russia's invasion of Crimea.Need to Deter RussiaDeterrence key to stop invasion of Ukraine, Romania, Poland, BalticsBrzezinski 3/3/14Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser from 1977 to 1981. the Russian aggression against Ukraine, much depends on what Vladi?mir Putin does next. But what Putin does depends on not only his calculation of the likely NATO (and especially the U.S.) response but also his estimate of how fiercely the Ukrainian people would respond to any further escalation by Russia. And, to complete the circle, the Ukrainian response would be influenced by citizens’ reaction to any repetition of Putin’s Crimean aggression and by whether the nation believes that the United States and NATO are truly supportive. Putin’s thuggish tactics in seizing Crimea offer some hints regarding his planning. He knew in advance that his thinly camouflaged invasion would meet with popular support from the Russian majority in Crimea. He was not sure how the thin and light Ukrainian military units stationed there would react, so he went in masked like a Mafia gangster. In the event of serious Ukrainian resistance, he could disown the initiative and pull back.His initial success may tempt him to repeat that performance more directly in the far eastern provinces of Ukraine. If successful, the conclusive third phase could then be directed, through a combination of political unrest and increasingly overt use of Russian forces, to overthrow the government in Kiev. The result would thus be similar to the two phases of Hitler’s seizure of the Sudetenland after Munich in 1938 and the final occupation of Prague and Czechoslovakia in early 1939. Much depends on how clearly the West conveys to the dictator in the Kremlin — a partially comical imitation of Mussolini and a more menacing reminder of Hitler — that NATO cannot be passive if war erupts in Europe. If Ukraine is crushed while the West is simply watching, the new freedom and security in bordering Romania, Poland and the three Baltic republics would also be threatened.Unchecked aggression incentivizes Moldova invasion Feifer 3/14/14Gregory Feifer, former NPR correspondent in Moscow,is author of Russians: The People Behind the Power. from an unknown entity, Vladimir Putin has been remarkably consistent from his first days in office. He has steadily consolidated power by marginalizing and prosecuting his opponents and taking control of his country’s natural resources economy. He has done that by resuscitating Russia’s traditional political culture, according to which bluffing and fa?ades obscure decision-making behind the Kremlin’s high walls. His foreign policy serves chiefly to shore up his popularity at home by painting him as a restorer of Russian greatness whose stoking of an imaginary conflict with the West plays on nostalgia for the good old days of the Cold War. Putin sees the world largely as a KGB officer would: a stage for zero-sum games of subterfuge. Although he probably has no endgame in Ukraine, he would rather have civil war break out than see the country join the European Union, which would provide an example for Russians for how to rid themselves of their authoritarian leader. Invading Crimea was a screw-you statement to Ukraine’s new authorities and the West. Putin’s unchecked success would encourage him West. Putin’s unchecked success would encourage him to do more of the same, perhaps in Moldova next.Appeasing Putin BadAny appeasement fails – strength key to deter further Ukraine incursionFund 2/28/14John Fund is a national-affairs columnist for National Review Online. Russian Bear Is Growling: Will the West Appease or Deter It? By John Fund February 28, 2014 3:51 PM Comments 256 Print Text Russia is certainly flexing its military muscles. Masked pro-Russian gunmen have seized two airports in Crimea, in the south of Ukraine. They are being protected by Russian military personnel from nearby bases Ukraine has leased to Russia. Jets from Russia’s air force are invading Crimean airspace, which has now been shut to commercial traffic. “I can only describe this as a military invasion and occupation,” Ukraine’s interim interior minister, Arsen Avakov, writes on Facebook. At a minimum, the tactics being used are right out of an old Russian playbook. Russia taunts an adversary, hoping to provoke some verbal or physical response that could justify further “intervention.” For the West, the time to deter a further escalation is now. Leading representatives from the European Union, including Poland, should fly into Ukraine immediately and accept an invitation to tour all of the trouble spots and file a report. Among the areas that should be highlighted is the port city of Odessa, a heavily pro-Russian area but one that’s Western in its orientation because of its extensive trade ties. Business and political figures from the Odessa area are completely opposed to Russia’s machinations and their voices need to be heard. Ukraine is now a test of the West’s ability to stand up and deter aggression. If its response is weak, you can bet an emboldened Vladimir Putin will only step up his efforts to destabilize the new Ukrainian promise is appeasement – we must stare down Putin to avoid global warSaakashvili 3/6/14 Saakashvili was president of Georgia from 2004 to 2013. He is a senior statesman at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.There are striking similarities between the early stages of Russian aggression against Georgia and what is happening in Ukraine. Watching recent events and the global response, I keep thinking about history repeating itself — and other instances of aggression in Europe. In the 1930s, Nazi Germany occupied part of neighboring Czechoslovakia under the pretext of protecting ethnic Germans. Today, Russia is claiming to protect ethnic Russians — or people with hastily distributed Russian passports — in Crimea or Georgian territories. In September 1938, when Germany annexed the Sudetenland, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain called the situation “a quarrel in a far-away country, between people of whom we know nothing.” Similarly, some today question whether the West should bother about Ukraine, saying Russia has more at stake than the West. Many in the West are talking about the need to reach some kind of compromise with Russia, an option that smacks of Munich 80 years ago. They claim to be motivated by such common strategic interests as nonproliferation and the fight against terrorism; by the same token, under the guise of needing to contain the Soviet Union and stop the spread of communism, Chamberlain reached a deal with Hitler. Now, of course, we know that all attempts to appease the Nazis led the big European powers to feed one country after another to Hitler and, ultimately, led to World War II. Such global catastrophes are what happens when the established international order collapses and rules no longer apply. Ukraine is just the most vivid recent demonstration. Imagine if Ukraine hadn’t given up its considerable nuclear arsenal in the 1990s. To persuade the Ukrainians to do so, the United States and Britain, together with Russia, signed agreements guaranteeing Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine giving its weapons to Russia. And yet, here we are. But then, the European Union and Russia signed an agreement providing for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia in 2008. Russia never complied — something our European guarantors seldom mention. Putin’s motivations are similar to those of prewar Germany: He wants to rectify what he sees as unjust treatment and humiliation by Western powers after the Cold War. He is trying to reconquer lost lands and grab natural resources. Little has been said about the offshore oil resources in Abkhazia that the Russian state monopoly Rosneft confiscated in 2009. U.S. companies have invested considerably in shale gas fields off Crimea. But Ukraine’s emergence as self-sufficient in energy, and even a major gas exporter to Europe, would be Putin’s ultimate nightmare. Putin destabilizes his neighbors in an effort to kill any NATO and E.U. appetite for further expansion. He also sees periodic land grabs as, somehow, the route to his domestic political rejuvenation. There is a logic to his perception of ideological threats: If Ukraine ceased to be a corrupt oligarchy and became a real European democracy, Putin’s opponents would see the contrast — and potential benefit to fighting their own reality. Why should the West care about what happens in Ukraine? We are seeing not just the slicing up of Europe’s largest country but also the destruction of post-Cold War order in Europe. This order was based on clear rules that not only protect small countries but also ensure stability and prosperity for the bigger ones, protect minorities and settle conflicts by peaceful mechanisms. Think of the ramifications if borders across the continent were to revert to ethnic lines. If there are no longer any rules, a spiraling cycle of violence and destruction is inevitable. Such an outcome could still be avoided. The U.S. sanctions announced Thursday are a good first step. They should be implemented immediately, and Europe needs to strengthen its own response. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova should be put on fast-track accession to the European Union and granted membership action plans for NATO to demonstrate that Russia cannot seize its ends through illegal means. We don’t need another visionary like Churchill to know what to do next. Today’s democracies have enough experience; applied with common sense and a modicum of courage, we can avoid the worst.Ukraine Aggression Risks WarAggression in Ukraine risks extinctionBaum 14 - Executive Director @ Global Catastrophic Risk Institute [Seth Baum (Ph.D. in Geography @Pennsylvania State University and a Post-Doctoral Fellowship @ Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions), “Best And Worst Case Scenarios for Ukraine Crisis: World Peace And Nuclear War,” Huffington Post, May 7, 2014, ]Here's the short version: The best case scenario has the Ukraine crisis being resolved diplomatically through increased Russia-Europe cooperation, which would be a big step towards world peace. The worst case scenario has the crisis escalating into nuclear war between the United States and Russia, causing human extinction.Let's start with the worst case scenario, nuclear war involving the American and Russian arsenals. How bad would that be? Put it this way: Recent analysis finds that a "limited" India-Pakistan nuclear war could kill two billion people via agricultural declines from nuclear winter. This "limited" war involves just 100 nuclear weapons. The U.S. and Russia combine to possess about 16,700 nuclear weapons. Humanity may not survive the aftermath of a U.S.-Russia nuclear war.It seems rather unlikely that the U.S. and Russia would end up in nuclear war over Ukraine. Sure, they have opposing positions, but neither side has anywhere near enough at stake to justify such extraordinary measures. Instead, it seems a lot more likely that the whole crisis will get resolved with a minimum of deaths. However, the story has already taken some surprising plot twists. We cannot rule out the possibility of it ending in direct nuclear war.A nuclear war could also occur inadvertently, i.e. when a false alarm is misinterpreted as real, and nuclear weapons are launched in what is believed to be a counterattack. There have been several alarmingly close calls of inadvertent U.S.-Russia nuclear war over the years. Perhaps the most relevant is the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident. A rocket carrying scientific equipment was launched off northern Norway. Russia detected the rocket on its radar and interpreted it as a nuclear attack. Its own nuclear forces were put on alert and Boris Yeltsin was presented the question of whether to launch Russia's nuclear weapons in response. Fortunately, Yeltsin and the Russian General Staff apparently sensed it was a false alarm and declined to launch. Still, the disturbing lesson from this incident is that nuclear war could begin even during periods of calm.World war III – military simulations proveChossudovsky 3/12/14 Chossudovsky is an award-winning author, Professor of Economics (emeritus) at the University of Ottawa, Founder and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal and Editor of the globalresearch.ca website. He is the author of The Globalization of Poverty and The New World Order (2003) and America’s “War on Terrorism”(2005). His most recent book is entitled Towards a World War III Scenario: The Dangers of Nuclear War (2011). He is also a contributor to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. His writings have been published in more than twenty languages. He can be reached at crgeditor@Ukraine: The Worst Case Scenario is World War IIIWe are at a very dangerous crossroads. We are observing the confrontation between the two major nuclear powers, namely the US and Russia. The worst case scenario is World War III. I’m not suggesting that it is going to occur, but I should also mention, having reviewed military documents over the last 10 years, that WWIII, from the point of view of US military planners – Pentagon and NATO – is not an abstract concept. They have been involved in various exercises with the so-called WWIII scenarios. One of these famous exercises was called TIRANNT, which stands for Theater Iran Near Term. That’s when Iran was the object of military threats from the West. But in fact, this particular WWIII scenario involved several countries, including Russia, China and Iran, and North Korea. These were the stated enemies of the Western military alliance. That particular WWIII scenario was leaked to the Washington Post. It is well-documented and it is a very detailed simulation of different actions and failures of diplomacy leading up to a WWIII scenario. So, let’s be under no illusions – the weapons systems are devastating, the decision-making processes are very complex and errors and misjudgments can take place.World war III and depressionVon Greyerz 3/8/14 and Managing Partner of Matterhorn Asset Management AG (MAM) and GoldSwitzerland based in Zurich, Switzerland.EvG forecasted the current present problems in the world economy well over 10 years ago. In 2002 when gold was $300 per ounce, MAM recommended to its investors to put 50% of their investment assets into physical gold stored outside the banking system. Egon von Greyerz started his working life in Geneva as a banker and thereafter spent 17 years as Finance Director and Executive Vice-Chairman of a FTSE 100 company in the UK, Dixons Group Plc. Since the 1990s EvG has been actively involved with financial investment activities including Mergers and Acquisitions and Asset allocation consultancy for private family funds. This led to the creation of Matterhorn Asset Management in 1998, an asset management company based on wealth preservation principles. The GoldSwitzerland Division was created to facilitate the buying and storage of physical gold and silver for private investors, companies, trusts and pension funds. EvG makes regular media appearances such as on, CNBC, BBC and King World News and speaks at investment conferences around the world. He also publishes articles on precious metals, the world economy and wealth preservation.We have also discussed the potential catalysts around the world that could trigger the world falling into the black hole. These can be economic events such as Japan defaulting, or it could a collapse of the dollar. It could also be geopolitical like the Middle East. Each one of those risks can create a major disaster. But we also have the possibility of black swan events. These are events that very few people can forecast, and Ukraine is such an event. Very few people thought the problems in Ukraine could be the trigger for the collapse of the world economy but we have to remember that any of these events are just catalysts. The world is bankrupt economically, financially, and morally. And if Ukraine now will be the trigger for the inevitable economic collapse, it’s also possible that it will be the beginning of World War III as Paul Craig Roberts has indicated. Ukraine is an important pawn for both Russia and the West, which is led by the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin has a strong hand with almost 40 percent of Europe’s gas requirement going through Ukrainian pipelines from Russia. But Ukraine is bankrupt and needs money either from Russia or the West. The $1 billion the U.S. has offered would pay only half of Ukraine’s debt to Russian giant Gazprom. And I’m sure the U.S. does not want to pay $1 billion to Putin. This crisis will have a major impact on both the Ukrainian and Russian economies. Ukrainian bonds are collapsing and interest rates are up to 47 percent now, from 10 percent in January, and the currency is falling fast. The same thing is happening in Russia, with the ruble down 10 percent this year and the stock market falling. The Russian central bank had to raise interest rates from 5.5 percent to 7 percent in order to stabilize markets. But in spite of economic problems, I doubt that Putin is going to give in on Ukraine. And for Obama, a war would be a good solution to the U.S. economic pressure. So with this potential black swan event in Ukraine, the risks are extremely high and the consequences could be devastating. But whether Ukraine is the catalyst or some other event is, the outcome is inevitable. The world is already set up to go into a hyperinflationary depression. That in itself is bad enough, but a major war would also be horrific. Today we are looking at commodities that are still going up strongly, and pointing out that inflation is coming. Most currencies are weak, not just emerging-country currencies but also the dollar. The falling dollar will be the trigger to the hyperinflation I expect, and to higher precious metals prices. Investors should ignore event-driven price movements. Gold went up this week on Ukraine, and then down today on non-farm payrolls. Precious metals investors must understand that long-term price movements in gold and silver have nothing to do with events. Gold is going up because currencies are being destroyed by virtually every nation due to deficit spending, debts, and money printing. So precious metals investors must ignore these short-term moves. The trend is clear and will not change. So it won’t matter what happens in the world politically or economically. With regards to the non-farm payroll figures today, it had to be a good figure. The U.S. had to counteract the bad Ukraine news with some good unemployment figure. But what is interesting and important is that the dollar did not move higher on the bogus jobs release. Currently the euro is just under 1.39, and the U.S. Dollar Index is around 79.7. This is what precious metals investors must focus on. The weak dollar indicates that the 1-percent move down in gold today will be short-lived. What investors must realize is that the time for protecting their wealth is running out. Ukraine could be the black swan event or there could be another. Therefore, it is critical to own physical gold and protect against the inevitable consequences of the mess that the world is in. You must ask yourself if you are prepared for such a collapse. If not, as I said, time is running out.Massive global food price spikes, depression and political instabilityBrombry 3/1714First, an update on my decades-long jack-of-all trades career. You can read me each Monday in "The Australian", each Thursday on , each month in "Australia's Mining Monthly" - and then at least three times a week (discussing rare earths, graphite, potash and others) on the Toronto-based . 1. First and foremost, I'm a mining and resources writer, having carved out a niche within a niche with critical and strategic metals. Latched on to the rare earth story in 1996 (somewhat before most others) and have branched out into what I see are the more fascinating commodities from potash/phosphate to graphite/graphene, not to mention antimony, tungsten and tin. Defending gold's corner takes up a fair bit of my time, too. 2. Forging a new path in book publishing, using both print and electronic formats. The books reflect my interests: "The Farming of Australia", "German Raiders of the South Seas" (my contribution to the present Great War publishing tsunami - this one deals with merchant raiders operating in this region from 1914 and Australia and New Zealand's naval dramas), "Australian Railways: Their Life and Times". And, before the year is out, a book on minerals and metals. No, not a "copper is used for ..." tome, but trying to make sense of how the world is changing and how this will affect future metals demand. Others to follow. How to get them? Highgate Publishing ( .au) is issuing titles available as paperbacks (via Amazon), for e-book readers (Amazon Kindle, Smashwords, Nook, etc.) and also can be purchased as PDF books for downloading on computer through my website. Fifty-one years in this racket, one way or another. Written for and edited newspapers, written a handful of books, made radio documentaries, reported for TV and made a television wild life documentary, written and published books, started a magazine which actually found its audience and would go on for more than 30 years. invasion of Ukraine could drive global food prices up The last thing the shaky global recovery -- and the mining industry in particular, we would add -- needs now is a further spike in food prices caused by disruption to farming in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine is the world's third-largest exporter of corn, the sixth-largest of wheat, and almost all of that is grown in the Crimea and other eastern parts now trembling under Moscow's boot (voting in Crimea was due to begin late yesterday). Any denting of the fragile global recovery sentiment would (probably) have severe consequences for metals demand, a blow this sector can barely afford, with copper down 13 per cent so far this year and fears of a huge unloading of physical metal as financing deals are unwound (as explored here last week). Copenhagen-based Danske Bank says of potential disruption of Ukrainian food exports that this is the last thing the "shaky global economy" needs. It adds that both Russia's and Ukraine's economies are struggling and they need every cent of revenue they can lay their hands on. Ukraine supplies about 40 per cent of all the wheat grown in Europe, 20 per cent of the corn and 10 per cent of the rapeseed. While the wheat and corn are grown mainly in the threatened eastern part of the country, the rapeseed is produced mainly in the west, so is not (yet) threatened by Russian acquisitiveness. Up to 60 per cent of Ukraine's output of wheat and corn is exported while 95 per cent of rapeseed is shipped abroad. Disruption, especially of grain exports, would have "severe repercussions" for the global grain market, the bank says. Here's another cruncher: there are just a few months before the wheat harvest is due. Unavailability of Ukrainian grain is not what Europeans would like to see. This past week we have seen what the Commonwealth Bank termed "massive speculative investor and fund" buying of wheat positions, all pushing the prices higher. Food prices do, indeed, pose a threat to the global economy -- and global stability (remember the food riots in Tunisia and Egypt that brought down those governments). As of last week, coffee prices have risen 78 per cent since January 1, sugar by 23 per cent and soybeans by 11 per cent. Now wheat prices are on the march.Sanctions Undermine Russian Energy Development in the ArcticSanctions have blocked cooperation with western oil companies that is needed for drilling in the arcticAssociated Press International, April 1, 2015 American farmer among the winners in sanctions-hit Russia, DOA: 11-27-15One of the main state-owned companies to be targeted by punitive measures is oil producer Rosneft. It had to postpone plans to drill in the Arctic with U.S. firm ExxonMobil. At the same time, sanctions have largely cut off state firms from international lending, making refinancing difficult, costly and a burden on the government.Russian Arctic Energy Development Bad – Military ConflictArctic energy development by Russia supports Arctic militarization Mitchell 14 (Jon Mitchell, pursuing Masters degree in public policy, with a concentration in international affairs “Russia’s Territorial Ambition and Increased Military Presence in the Arctic” April 23, 2014, Foreign Policy Journal, the U.S. and E.U. keep a very close eye on the situation with Russia and Ukraine, Russia is also increasing its presence and influence elsewhere: the Arctic—a melting region that is opening up prime shipping lanes and real estate with an estimated $1 trillion in hydrocarbons.[1] With the opening of two major shipping routes, the North Sea route and the Northwest Passage, the potential for economic competition is fierce, especially among the eight members of the Arctic council: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Russia, and the United States.[2] President Putin made statements this week concerning Russia’s national interests in the Arctic region: chiefly, militarization and the preparation of support elements for commercial shipping routes.[3] The Russian President called for full government funding for “socio-economic development” from 2017-2020, including a system of Russian naval bases that would be home to ships and submarines allocated specifically for the defense of national interests that involve the protection of Russian oil and gas facilities in the Arctic.[4] Russia is also attempting to accelerate the construction of more icebreakers to take part in its Arctic strategy.[5] The Russian Federation recently staked a territorial claim in the Sea of Okhotsk for 52,000 square kilometers,[6] and is currently preparing an Arctic water claim for 1.2 million square kilometers.[7] The energy giant owns 43 of the approximate 60 hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic Circle.[8] With Russian energy companies already developing hydrocarbon deposits and expanding border patrols on its Arctic sea shelf (in place by July 1, 2014),[9] Putin is actively pursuing a strong approach to the Arctic region. Russian oil fields, which significantly contribute to the country’s revenue, are in decline—forcing Russian oil companies to actively explore the Arctic region.[10] While the U.S. Defense Secretary called for a peaceful and stable Arctic region with international cooperation, the Arctic has created increased militarization efforts, particularly by Russia. Already the Arctic has seen powerful warships of Russia’s Northern Fleet, strategic bomber patrols, and airborne troop exercises.[11] In fact, Russian military forces have been permanently stationed in the Arctic since summer 2013.[12] According to a source in the Russian General Staff, a new military command titled Northern Fleet—Joint Strategic Command, will be created and tasked to protect Russian interests in its Arctic territories; a strategy that was approved in 2009.[13] Furthermore, weapons developers are being tasked with creating products that can face the harsh Arctic environment. According to an RT report, “Putin ordered the head of the Russian arms industry, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, to concentrate the efforts on creation of Arctic infrastructure for the soonest deployment of troops. Rogozin reported that all Russian weapons systems can be produced with special features needed in the extreme North and the weapons companies were ready to supply such arms to the Defense Ministry.”[14] The “Arctic infrastructure” that Rogozin refers to will include Navy and Border Guard Service bases.[15] These bases are part of Putin’s aim to strengthen Russian energy companies and military positions in the Arctic region. In 2013, a formerly closed down base was reopened in the Novosibirsk Islands and is now home to 10 military ships and four icebreakers—a move that Reuters called “a demonstration of force.”[16] The Defense Ministry is also planning on bringing seven airstrips in the Arctic back to life.[17] Russia’s militarization in the Arctic region is only a part of its increasing activity throughout the globe. Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said, “It’s crucially important for us to set goals for our national interests in this region. If we don’t do that, we will lose the battle for resources which means we’ll also lose in a big battle for the right to have sovereignty and independence.”[18] On the contrary, Aleksandr Gorban, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry is quoted saying that a “war for resources”[19] in the Arctic will never happen. But what was once a more hands-off region of the world that provided international cooperation and stability is now turning into a race for sovereignty and resources claims—as evidenced not only by Russia’s increasing military presence, but also Canada and the United States. Canada is now allocating part of its defense budget towards armed ships that will patrol its part of the Arctic Circle,[20] while the United States has planned a strategy of its own. In addition to conducting military exercises with other Arctic nation members, the U.S. Navy has proposed a strategy titled The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030 that was released in February 2014. The 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, cited in the Arctic Roadmap, provides the Navy’s two specific objectives for the Arctic: 1) advance United States’ security interests; and 2) strengthen international cooperation.[21] According to the strategy, the Navy’s role will primarily be in support of search and rescue, law enforcement, and civil support operations.[22] However, this may grow to a more militarized strategy depending on the U.S. government’s view of Russia’s increased military activity in the Arctic region over the next few years. In either case, the U.S. is falling behind in Arctic preparation. It has very few operational icebreakers for the Arctic region where its only primary presence is seen through nuclear submarines and unmanned aerial vehicles, according to an RT article.[23] Until 2020, the Navy will primarily use its submarines and limited air assets in the Arctic, while its mid-term and far-term strategy emphasizes personnel, surface ships, submarines, and air assets that will be prepared for Arctic conditions and operations.[24] Despite its mid and long-term strategy, the U.S. will already be lagging in establishing a military presence to compete with Russia’s, who already has strategies in motion until 2020 and later. Last month, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a united Canadian-U.S. counterbalance to Russia’s Arctic presence, pointing out “they have been aggressively reopening military bases.”[25] While the U.S. cannot legitimately criticize Putin for opening military bases and simultaneously avoid blatant hypocrisy, it is worth noting that Russia is developing a strong military presence in a potentially competitive region. Russia’s plans to reopen bases and create an Arctic military command fosters the conclusion that Russia wants to be the first established dominant force in a new region that will host economic competition and primary shipping lanes, albeit in a harsh environment that makes it difficult to extract resources. Nicholas Cunningham aptly stated “both Russia and the West fear losing out to the other in the far north, despite what appears to be a small prize.”[26] Although the Arctic holds a mass of the world’s oil and gas deposits, the extreme environment and remote location makes it difficult to produce energy quickly and efficiently. Despite this, the Russian Federation is focused on developing disputed hydrocarbon areas that it claims are part of the country’s continental shelf. In addition, Russia is allocating funds and forces to the Arctic to protect its interests. While the U.S. is currently lacking in natural resource development and exploitation in the Arctic Circle, it desires to display a show of strength in the cold region to compete with potential Russian domination and influence. But because the Defense Department faces constant budget cuts, preparing an Arctic naval force will be slow and difficult. For now, the United States can only show strength through nuclear submarines and drone technology. Putin and the Russian Federation are laying disputed claims to territories both inside and outside the Arctic while creating the foundation for a potential military buildup in the Arctic—provided that the U.S. and Canada can even allocate sufficient budgets for Arctic military expansion.Militarization supported by commercial exploitation risks warAerandir 12 (Mate Wesley Aerandir Lieutenant United States Navy B.A., “BREAKING THE ICE: POTENTIAL U.S.-RUSSIAN MARITIME CONFLICT IN THE ARCTIC” December 2012, )When national security is challenged or threatened by another power, the potential for militarized conflict can quickly become an actual conflict. Despite the sub-zero physical climate, the Arctic is a hotbed of competing interests. Receding ice cover in the northern cryosphere presents Arctic nations, and others, with considerable economic opportunities. Whether to exploit a potential “treasure trove” of natural resources or simply to capitalize on time- and money-saving transportation routes, political leaders are under increasing pressure to resolve previously frozen or otherwise insignificant disputes and make these resources available as soon as possible to their constituents. Lack of resolution is bad for business: it creates a “wild west” (or, in this case, a no-law north) of uncertainty as to the legal standing of enterprises and exposes countries and companies alike to unnecessary harassment and possible prosecution by rival interests. Increasing economic opportunities go hand-in-hand with an increased presence in the region, creating an environment for potential conflict. Economic expansion is triggering an associated build-up in military and law enforcement capability in order to protect, defend, and regulate interests and claims. If economic encroachment were not enough to cause anxiety among the Arctic powers, the subsequent militarization of the Arctic has also caused alarm, making countries feel increasingly vulnerable to conventional military pressure from a previously ice-obstructed front. At present, only Russia is capable of defending its claims in the Arctic militarily. Given Russia’s economic dependence on hydrocarbon resources—which the Arctic promises to offer in abundance—Moscow’s economic claims in excess of its recognized EEZ are likely to encroach on, or overlap with, the legitimate claims of neighbors. But it stands alone. Russia’s overwhelming might in this domain may eventually make “right” in its favor if NATO is unable to deter assertive uses of force similar to those to which the Russian Coast Guard continually subjects Japan near the Kuril Islands. Any loss in this regard would be much more damaging to NATO’s deterrence credibility than its current inaction. Unless Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States can come together under the NATO banner and make the Arctic a centerpiece of the Alliance’s collective defense 93 agenda for the twenty-first century, they each risk standing alone in the Arctic as well, and with a significantly smaller troop-to-task capability than their geopolitical rival. Simon Ollivant’s 1984 warning of the dangers of internal dispute within the Alliance is perhaps even more salient today. Analyzing the effects of the latest developments in military technology, force dispositions, and resource and sovereignty claims on the military stability of the region, Ollivant concluded that the greatest dangers to NATO unity were an unbalanced American hegemony in the region and increased political conflict among allied members over contested economic interests in the region.207 Denmark and Canada have yet to officially resolve their dispute over Hans Island. Canada and the United States continue to argue over the legal status of the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. Either one of these disputes could undermine decades of Alliance cohesion. Meanwhile, Russia’s actions and rhetoric in the Arctic leave no room to deduce anything but a firm and committed intent on the part of its leadership to secure its claims. There have been scant, if any, peaceful actions undertaken by the Putin and Medvedev administrations to back up their peace-seeking rhetoric. Calls for diplomatic resolution of territorial disputes in the Arctic and for working “within existing international agreements and mechanisms” have only been operationalized through agreements to cooperate on search and rescue efforts and on (competitive) scientific exploration and research for submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a forum that has no binding authority to settle such disputes. All the while, however, Russia’s ambitious militarization of the Arctic has been clearly reinforced with explicit rhetoric proclaiming its intent to defend its national security interests. For Russia, the natural resources in the Arctic are a national security asset of strategic importance. Canada, too, beats the drum of sovereign defense in the Arctic. Though its rhetoric is significantly less militaristic than that of Russia, it is nevertheless increasingly nationalistic. Actions, in this case, speak for themselves. The Canadians have expressed an intention to build up forces in the region to the extent necessary to defend their sovereignty. If Prime Minister Stephen Harper had his way, this build-up would be happening more quickly than it has been. Indeed, financial constraints constitute the only reason that the four NATO countries in the Arctic have not been building up their Arctic capabilities more rapidly. The bottom line is that the intent of the Arctic nations to defend their regional and broader security interests is real. The capabilities, while in some cases only planned or very slowly coming into service, are materializing, and the economic opportunity has never been greater and will only increase in the future. The threat of a militarized conflict in the Arctic is therefore real as well.US-Russia war causes extinctionHelfand 14 (Ira Helfand, M.D, past president of Physicians for Social Responsibility, co-president of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. “Another View: Ukraine crisis puts focus on danger of nuclear war” May 3, 2014, )//HAThe ongoing crisis in Ukraine has made it clear that the danger of nuclear war is still with us and may be greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. What does that mean for United States nuclear policy? There are today more than 15,000 nuclear warheads in the world. The vast majority, more than 95 percent, are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. Some 3,000 of these warheads are on "hair-trigger" alert. They are mounted on missiles that can be fired in 15 minutes and destroy their targets around the world less than 30 minutes later. During the Cold War, there was a widespread understanding of what nuclear weapons could do. That is not true today. Those who lived through the Cold War have put this painful information out of mind, and a generation has come of age that never learned about the terrible effects of nuclear war. This must change if we are to make rational decisions about nuclear policy. Over the last few years, new information has emerged that underlines the danger posed by even the limited use of nuclear weapons. Studies published in 2006 by Rutgers University's Alan Robock and his colleagues examined the effects of a "limited" nuclear war involving just 100 small nuclear weapons, the size of the Hiroshima bomb, less than 0.5 percent of the world's nuclear arsenals. The specific scenario they examined involved a war between India and Pakistan. The two nations have fought three wars in the last 70 years, have come close to war on two other occasions, engage in daily skirmishes across their contested border in Kashmir, and have more than 200 nuclear weapons in their arsenals, many much larger than the weapons used in the study. The effects in India and Pakistan are horrific. In the first week more than 20 million people are killed by blast, fire and radiation as the great cities of South Asia are destroyed. But the global impact is far worse. As the cities burn, the fires loft 5 million tons of soot into the upper atmosphere, blocking out sunlight. Across the globe, temperatures fall an average of 1.3 degrees Celsius, and precipitation declines as less water evaporates into the cooler atmosphere to fall back as rain. This climate disruption has a catastrophic impact on food production around the world. In Iowa, as across the entire U.S. Corn Belt, soy production declines an average of 7 percent for a full decade, and corn production declines an average of 12 percent. In China, rice production declines an average of 17 percent and the equally important wheat crop declines a staggering 31 percent. "Nuclear Famine," a report issued last year by Physicians for Social Responsibility, explored the impact this decline in food production would have on human health. The world is not prepared to withstand a fall in food production of this magnitude. World grain reserves amount to only some 70 days of consumption and would quickly be exhausted. There are already 870 million people in the developing world who are malnourished today. They get just enough food to maintain their body mass and do a little work to gather or grow food. There are also 300 million people who get adequate nutrition today but live in countries that depend on imported food. All of these people, more than 1 billion, many far removed from the actual conflict, would be at risk of starvation in the event of even this very "limited" use of nuclear weapons. Another 1.3 billion people in China might also starve given the enormous shortfalls in Chinese grain production. And no one has yet studied the effects of climate disruption on other food crops in other countries. Will U.S., Canadian and European wheat production fall as dramatically as in China? A famine of this magnitude is unprecedented in human history. Never have we faced the possible death of 15 percent to 30 percent of the human race in the course of a single decade. Such a catastrophe would not mean the extinction of our species, but it would almost certainly bring about the end of modern civilization as we know it. These data make clear that even the smaller nuclear weapons states, countries that might well go to war, and over whose nuclear arsenals the U.S. has no direct control, pose a threat to all mankind. But the danger posed by the U.S. and Russian arsenals is even greater. A single U.S. Trident submarine carries 96 warheads, each 10 to 30 times larger than the bombs used in the South Asia scenario. That means that each Trident can cause the nuclear famine scenario many times over. We have 14 of them, and that is only one-third of our nuclear arsenal, which also includes land-based missiles and long-range bombers. The Russians have the same incomprehensible level of overkill capacity. What would happen if there were a large nuclear war? A 2002 report by Physicians for Social Responsibility showed that if only 300 of the 1,500 warheads in the Russian arsenal got through to targets in the United States, up to 100 million people would die in the first 30 minutes. The entire economic infrastructure on which we depend — the public health system, banking system, communications network, food distribution system — would be destroyed. In the months following this attack, most of the rest of the population would also die, from starvation, exposure to cold, epidemic disease and radiation poisoning. The global climate disruption would be even more catastrophic. Limited war in South Asia would drop global temperatures 1.3 degrees Celsius. A war between the United States and Russia, using only those weapons they will still possess when the New START treaty is fully implemented in 2017, drops temperatures an average of 8 degrees Celsius. In the interior of Eurasia, North America and in Iowa, temperatures drop 20 to 30 degrees Celsius to a level not seen in 18,000 years — since the coldest time of the last Ice Age. Agriculture stops, ecosystems collapse, the vast majority of the human race starves and many species, perhaps including our own, become extinct. As events in Ukraine have made clear, there is still a very real possibility that the United States and Russia may find themselves on opposite sides of an armed conflict, and that means that these vast nuclear arsenals might be used. Even if there is not a deliberate use of nuclear weapons, there is the danger of an accidental nuclear war.Russia is encroaching on the Arctic—resource consumptionRiddle 4/1/14—master’s student at the Joint Forces Staff College (Kevin, U.S. NATIONAL ARCTIC STRATEGY: PREPARING DEFENSIVE LINES OF EFFORT FOR THE ARCTIC, Kevin W. Riddle Commander, U.S. Coast Guard )Of the five Arctic nations, Russia arguably has more at stake in the Arctic than any other nation. With approximately 3,500 miles of Arctic coastline and almost two million people living within Russia’s Arctic territories, Russia accounts for 34 percent of the Arctic landmasses and 49 percent of the Arctic population.22 Thawing of the Arctic ice has led Russia to look at the Arctic as “a vast marine area more open for use, and, potentially, integrated with the world economy.”23 Accordingly, Russian Arctic policy specifically identifies the Northern Sea Route as a national interest and, in March 2010, Russia announced it was creating a federal agency to regulate and collect fees for use of the Northern Sea Route by shipping companies. 24 Furthermore, Russia intends to solidify its influence in Arctic shipping by developing “infrastructure, including ports, customs facilities and marine checkpoints, along its 17,500 kilometre Arctic coastline.” 25 From a strategic viewpoint, any nation that develops the means to curtail freedom of navigation through “marine checkpoints” is creating an inherent threat to global trade routes. Should the Northern Sea Route become a viable trade route and regional instability threaten the Suez or Panama canals, Russia’s exclusive control of the route could upset the energy security of nations, including the United States. This scenario would be a direct national security threat to all of the Arctic nations (and potentially China as well), which could lead to conflict. As the prospect of an ice-free Arctic increased over the last decade, Russia developed its national Arctic policy. The Foundations of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic Until 2020 and Beyond was released in March 2009. Analysis of this policy indicates Russia is placing a heavy emphasis on economic development in the Arctic and, due to limited abilities and financial resources to exploit the resources, international cooperation. Russia’s Arctic priorities are listed as: ? Usage of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base, allowing for the solution of problems of socio economic development; ? Safeguarding the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation ? Conservation of the Arctic’s unique ecosystems ? Usage of the Northern Sea Route as a national integrated transport communication system of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.26 Russia’s Arctic policy asserts a move to bolster its military presence in the region with “an armed forces contingent and other general-purpose military units.”27 This militarization of the Arctic was subsequently reinforced a few months later when President Medvedev signed Russia’s security strategy, National Security of the Russian Federation Through 2020, in May 2009. This new strategy states “The attention of international politics in the long-term will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic.”28 More alarming to national security interests is the policy’s strong stance on using military means to protect its claim to energy resources: “In case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might. The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be changed.”29 This declaration is significant in that it contradicts parts of Russia’s Arctic Policy, which states, “Russia’s strategic national interests are served by preserving the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation.”30 Furthermore, it contradicts President Putin’s claim to seek peaceful solutions to the division of Arctic territory.31 Russia’s current diplomacy efforts do indicate it seeks peaceful cooperation in the Arctic. However, Russia most recently demonstrated its resolve to protect its national interests using military force in the Ukraine and, as laid out in its national security and Arctic policies, Russia also appears willing to use military options to protect its claim to Arctic resources. More disturbing than this increased militarization is Russia’s warning in its national security strategy that “within a decade nations could be at war over resources in the Arctic Ocean” and those resources will become the “critical point for the world military balance.”46 It further proclaims, “In case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might.”47 Furthermore, in December 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin said, “The U.S. navy’s capability in the Arctic is a key reason for Russia to beef up its presence in the region.”48 Although Putin has stated Russia must cooperate with other countries and the United States, he added “But the [U.S.] submarines are there, and they do carry missiles.”49 Sergey Shoigu, Russia’s Defense Minister, followed up President Putin’s decree stating, “There are plans to create a group of troops and forces to ensure military security and protection of the Russian Federation’s national interests in the Arctic in 2014.”50 This rhetoric coming from Russia’s national leadership should be a clear warning to Western powers that Russia will not shy away from resorting to military options to protect its claim to Arctic resources. If there is any doubt, Russia clearly demonstrated its resolve to protect national interests with military force in the Ukraine. Russia is increasing military use of the arctic for accesses to resources and geopolitical posturing—US policy is current passive SLD 14 (Second Line of Defense, “THE RUSSIAN DYNAMIC IN THE ARCTIC: STRATEGIC POSITIONING” 2014-06-05, )//HA2014-06-05 Although Norway and Canada are very engaged in the Arctic area, the policy stage is still set by the Cold War superpowers Russia and the United States. Russia has a proactive policy; the United States has a reluctant policy. In 2008 after Canada, the United States, and Denmark criticized Russia’s territorial claims to the continental plateau of the Arctic, Russia set out training plans for military units that could be engaged in Arctic combat mission, extended the “operational radius” of its northern naval forces, and reinforced its army’s combat readiness along the Arctic coast— just in case of a potential conflict. In its new national security strategy, Russia raised the prospect of war in the Arctic Ocean if Russia’s interests and border security were threatened by neighboring nations, likely considering the current circumstances of pending border agreements and disagreements between Russia and those nations. To secure and guarantee its overall energy and security interests, Russia stated that “in a competition for resources it cannot be ruled out that military force could be used to resolve emerging problems that would destroy the balance of forces near the borders of Russia and her allies.” 1 According to authoritative Russian sources, Russia is willing— and able— to use the entire spectrum of instruments to settle legal status problems in disputed regions such as the Arctic, Caspian, and South China seas. Russia’s 2007– 15 rearmament program plans to rebuild the submarine force, recommending building several dozen surface ships and submarines, including five Project 955 Borey nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines equipped with new Bulava ballistic missiles, two Project 885 Yasen nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines, six Project 677 Lada diesel-electric submarines, three Project 22350 frigates, and five Project 20380 corvettes. With the end of the Cold War, the United States steadily closed some northern military bases, including the naval base on Adak and Fort Greely. These developments reflected the United States’ perception that a significant military presence is— since Soviet Union submarine force collapsed— no longer needed in the Arctic. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to make the challenges easier to resolve, the challenges in the Arctic facing now U.S. policy makers are much more complicated than expected in 1991. Threats are much more nebulous, long term, and complex. Given the importance that Putin assigns to maintaining control of Russia’s energy resources, it is unsurprising that he has already outlined ambitious goals to develop Arctic hydrocarbon resources in coming years. Indeed, the Arctic can be seen as to be part of the overall expansion of Russia’s role in providing global energy and shaping its influence via these means. The Russians have issued several key policies on the evolution of their Arctic policies. For example, on January 14, 2011, the Russian newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta published an interview with Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Russian Security Council, on what he called an issue of “an enormous strategic and economic significance.” Patrushev stated that the council had directed that the government approve a long-term program to extract the mineral resources, especially oil and natural gas, located on Russia’s Arctic shelf by the end of 2011. 2 That same day, two of the world’s giant oil companies, Russia’s Rosneft and BP, announced an unprecedented partnership that will see them exchange shares and expand their joint ventures, including launching a new Arctic oil-drilling project. Both companies bring important assets to their new alliance, but the deal has alarmed foreign governments and environments due to its potential commercial, security, and ecological implications. The deal also raises interesting questions related to the Russian government’s economic modernization program. In terms of Arctic and energy security issues, the new partnership could mark the commencement of a major Russian government drive to develop the energy resources that fall within the boundaries of Moscow’s territorial claims in the Arctic. In recent years, the Russian government has set forth ambitious territorial claims in the Arctic reinforced through recent scientific research expeditions and military measures. Despite losing considerable territory with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation still has the world’s longest Arctic border at over 17,500 kilometers, which amount to one-third of the entire length of Russia’s national frontiers. The Russian Federation also possesses several Arctic archipelagoes, including Franz Josef Land and Wrangel Island. Furthermore, the Russian government claims its continental shelf extends up to the North Pole— and is taking steps to strengthen and enforce this claim in the face of opposition from Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States. For example, the Russian government believes that the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, which lies on the North Pole’s seabed, along with the Mendeleev Ridge and Alpha Ridge, are part of Russia’s continental shelf. As with the case with Canada and the Northwest Passage, Russia also seeks to exercise exclusive control over a burgeoning shipping lane of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR is a system of sea-lanes from the straits between the Barents and Kara seas (south of Russia’s Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site) to the Bering Strait, a distance of approximately 5,000 kilometers. This route connects Asia and Europe and when navigable saves transportation time and costs as compared with using the Suez Canal. Russia’s Arctic policy defines the NSR as a core national interest. In contrast, the U.S. government considers the NSR as an international shipping route. In an effort to bolster its claims of ownership over the NSR, the Russian Ministry of Transport announced on March 18, 2010, that it is drafting legislation to define the route’s precise dimensions and to create a federal agency that would regulate and collect fees from foreign vessels using the NSR. During the Cold War, the Arctic region was a place of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both operated nuclear vessels, long-range bombers, and tactical aircraft in the region. Following the USSR’s collapse in 1991, Russian government interest in the Arctic decreased considerably. During the 1990s, Moscow’s concerns were maintaining the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation in the face of secessionist threats in the North Caucasus and elsewhere. During the 1990s, Russian military overflights and naval patrols in the Arctic declined significantly as the Russian military faced drastic funding and fuel shortages. The Russian army withdrew from many Arctic bases. The inward concentration of the Russian government’s attention and resources hampered the development of a comprehensive policy toward the Arctic. Furthermore, the economic problems that Russia confronted in the 1990s also made it difficult for Russians to conceive of resource-intensive plans to exploit the Arctic region’s mineral wealth. But the rise in world oil and gas prices that began in the late 1990s simultaneously provided the Russian government with increased revenue and renewed Russian interest in developing the increasing valuable energy resources in the Arctic region. The renewed attention was evident on September 18, 2008, when the Russian government issued a “Framework for the Arctic to the Year 2020 and Subsequent Perspectives.” More recently, the “Russian National Security Strategy for 2020” illustrates the growing importance that Russian strategists attribute to exerting control over the maritime domains around Russia, especially the resource-rich Arctic Ocean, Barents Sea, and Caspian Sea. After a series of incidents in the late 1990s, in which several foreign research ships allegedly trespassed into Russian territorial waters, the Russian government began taking steps to secure its northern border. In recent years, Russia has taken more concrete measures than any other country to assert its Arctic claims. Russian warships and warplanes have increased their military activities in the region. The Russian government also began sending more scientific research expeditions to the Arctic. In the past, Russia relied heavily on military personnel and equipment in its Arctic expeditions, but now is using primarily civilian technologies since these can be more readily detailed to the United Nations and other international bodies to justify Russia’s Arctic claims. Russia’s earlier submission to the UN regarding its territorial claim to the Lomonosov Ridge was rejected due to a lack of supporting evidence, which Moscow declined to provide for fear of revealing military secrets. The 2007 Arktika expedition represented a dramatic, high-profile assertion of Russian interest in the region. In August the research expedition climaxed when ship Akademik Fedorov and icebreaker Rossiya sent two specially designed submersible vessels, Mir-1 and Mir-2, 4,300 meters deep to the North Pole seabed. After collecting soil samples and further mapping the Lomonsov Ridge, the expedition planted a Russian flag made of titanium on its floor. Reacting to foreign criticism of the flag ceremony, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “The aim of this expedition is not to stake Russia’s claim but to show that our shelf reaches to the North Pole.” Russian government claims and actions regarding the Arctic stem not only from economic and domestic political considerations but also from offensive and defensive strategic considerations that encourage a greater Russian military presence in the Arctic. The Eurasian landmass of Russia is effectively “walled in” by Siberia and the Pacific to the east, Asia and the Middle East to the south, and Europe to the west. The Arctic has for centuries served as the “fourth wall,” restricting Russian maritime activity to areas largely controlled by other powers. As the Arctic climate changes to open more waters to navigation and exploration, the Russian Federation can extend the range of its military operations. Russia’s Northern Fleet, the largest element of the Russian navy, is based in the port city Severomorsk on the Barents Sea. Although the Northern Fleet maintains year-round access to the north and south Atlantic, its mobility could be strictly limited to the Barents Sea by a Western naval power in the event of unrestricted warfare. An ice-free Arctic would negate this advantage but also present new strategic challenges to Russia. The opening of the Arctic Ocean makes vulnerable Russia’s northern ports, particularly those in the Kola Peninsula that house the majority of Russia’s ballistic-missile submarine fleet. Furthermore, the opening of the NSR could serve as a maritime link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through which warships could pass. At present warships in the NSR are susceptible to structural damage from floating ice, weather conditions, and icing. These conditions will become less severe on a seasonal basis as climate change progresses. Russia is partly able to address the issue of Arctic maritime conditions by maintaining a fleet of icebreakers. There are 18 icebreakers of various sizes in Russia’s military fleet. Seven of these are equipped with nuclear reactors, rather than conventional diesel engines, allowing them to break through ice twice as thick as can be breached by standard icebreakers. The most capable Russian icebreakers are operated not by the Russian navy but by privately owned mining giant Norilsk Nickel. Its icebreakers can penetrate ice up to 1.5 meters thick. But Russia needs to rebuild its icebreaker fleet since all the existing ships except one are scheduled for decommissioning in the next decade. Russia’s economic troubles have delayed the construction of new, third-generation icebreaking vessels. Russia must acquire at least three new vessels of this type in the next several years in order to maintain adequate icebreaking capabilities. Russia must also expand its coastal border guard to better accommodate increased commercial and military traffic. In addition to Arctic regions, the coastal border guard patrols the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas as well as Russia’s Pacific coast. Changing Arctic conditions could double this area of responsibility. The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 includes provisions to strengthen and upgrade the coastal border guard. In 2009 border guard units based on the Barents Sea began patrolling the NSR for the first time since the Soviet era. Russia is also expanding its military presence in the Arctic region. The Russian Presidential Security Council has called for establishing a military force and several new bases in the Arctic, while the Federal Security Service will use its coast guard ships to collect maritime intelligence in the region. The Russian government is moving swiftly to expand its sea, ground, and air presence in the Arctic. Russia has resumed air patrols over the Arctic, and in June 2008, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that it would increase submarine operations if Russian national interests in the Arctic were ever threatened. In October 2010, Navy Commander Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said that Russian naval ships and submarines had already conducted about a dozen military patrols in the Arctic during the first three quarters of that year. Vysotsky explained that “in accordance with the Russian Armed Forces’ plan of strategic deterrence we take measures aimed to demonstrate military presence in the Arctic.” Russia’s strategic ballistic missile launching submarines use the North Pole region because the ice helps shield them from U.S. space satellites and other overhead sensors. In addition, launching a missile from the Arctic can reduce the flight time to U.S. targets. In July 2009, the Russian navy boasted that it had succeeded in launching two long-range ballistic missiles from under the Arctic Ocean without the Pentagon detecting their preparations. Supposedly, Russian attack submarines prevented U.S. surveillance ships from learning of the arrival of two Russian strategic submarines before the missile launches. The state-run RIA Novosti news agency quoted a high-ranking navy source as saying that the successful drill disproved skeptics in Russia and elsewhere that the Russian navy had lost its combat effectiveness: “We slapped these skeptics in the face, proving that Russian submarines are not only capable of moving stealthily under ice, but can also break it to accomplish combat tasks.” Russian officials have sought to downplay the prospects of military conflict in the Arctic region. In late 2010, the special representative of President Medvedev, Anton Vasilyev, stated that “Russia does not plan to create ‘special Arctic forces’ or take any steps that would lead to the militarization of the Arctic,” which contradicts provisions stated in Moscow’s security doctrine. 3 In his year-in-review press conference, Foreign Minister Lavrov said that all Arctic border disputes could be settled through negotiations and that “ rumors that a war will break out over the resources in the North are a provocation.” In 2012, after 40 years of negotiations, Russia and Norway signed a deal to delimitate their maritime border. The two countries have been disputing the 175,000 square kilometer area in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean since 1970. The disputed maritime border has resulted in both parties seizing fishing vessels in the area. Then President Medvedev and Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg signed an agreement dividing the contested area into two equal parts. Meanwhile, while Russia still contests ownership of the Lomonosov Ridge with Canada, both countries have agreed that the United Nations would be the final arbiter of who owns title to the ridge. And as part of improving Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, the Russians have moved two motorized infantry brigades to the region. Moving a Polar Spetsnaz to the Norwegian border is apparently in the Russian perspective part of a broader cooperative Arctic strategy: By 2020, Russia will have increased the number of brigades from today’s 70 to 109, said General Colonel Aleksander Postnikov at a meeting in the Federation Council’s Committee for Defense and Security yesterday. One of the new brigades is to be located in the settlement of Pechenga, some 10 kilometers from the Russian-Norwegian border and 50 kilometers from the Norwegian town of Kirkenes, Nezavisimaya Gazeta writes. This brigade will be specially equipped for military warfare in Arctic conditions. It will be set up with DT-30P Vityaz tracked vehicles, in addition to multi-service army equipment, other armored vehicles and tanks. 4 One analyst has underscored that the Arctic opening could well see the emergence of an anomaly in Russian history— Russia as a maritime power. According to a perceptive article by Caitlyn Antrim: Russian geopolitics of the 21st century will be different from the days of empire and conflict of the nineteenth and twentieth. The increased accessibility of the Arctic, with its energy and mineral resources, new fisheries, shortened sea routes and shipping along the rivers between the Arctic coast and the Eurasian heartland, is both enabling and propelling Russia to become a major maritime state. 5 This means as well augmenting the role of the Russian navy, coast guard, and various air assets over time. The augmentation of the maritime reach of Russia— through ships, submarines, C2, ISR, and air means— can be anticipated.Russia increasing influence in the arctic now—Navy fleet build up Smith 14 (Rich Smith, staff writer,“Russia Builds a New Navy to Dominate the Arctic Ocean” January 19, 2014, )//HAThe mightiest force on the high seas, the United States Navy boasts a fleet 283 warships strong. In comparison, Russia's navy, once America's archrival, has only 208 warships -- but Russia is closing the gap, and quickly. Just last week, in an interview with RIA Novosti, deputy commander of the Russian Navy Rear Adm. Viktor Bursuk confirmed plans to add 40 new vessels to the Russian fleet this year alone -- taking the fleet to within just 35 ships of U.S. fleet strength. Surface warships will make up the bulk of the additions, but a Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and a Varshavyanka-class diesel-electric submarine are both on order as well. An advanced search-and-rescue ship, the Igor Belousov, will further backstop Russia's submarine forces by extending the country's ability to assist submarines in distress. Building a nuclear navy Nor is this the end of Russia's expansion plans. Bursuk told RIA that Russia is working quickly to upgrade the "mothballed" Kirov-class nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, and refurbishing three nuclear-powered attack submarines. Plans may even include the addition of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier -- Russia's first. Russia's only active aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. Source: Wikimedia Commons Why the sudden spate of shipbuilding? President Vladimir Putin gave us a hint last year. In a statement delivered to the Russian Defense Ministry in December, Putin averred that one of Russia's "top defense priorities" going forward is to increase Russia's influence at the North Pole. And for good reason. The Cold War is over. Now we're talking global warming Global warming has opened up 1 million square miles of new navigable waters in the Arctic Ocean. Already commercial shipping companies are beginning to exploit new routes. More crucially to Russia are the mineral resources made accessible by a shrinking ice cap. Already, 95% of Russia's probable natural gas reserves are located in the Arctic, with sizable deposits found in Russia's adjacent Barents and Kara Seas. 60% of the country's believed oil reserves are located in the Arctic as well. Local oil and gas giants Rosneft and Gazprom (NASDAQOTH: OGZPY ) , therefore, have a vested interest in defending these deposits... and searching for new ones. Earlier this month, Russia announced plans to up the tempo of air patrols in the Arctic "significantly," flying Tu-142 and Il-38 reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. The country also intends to reopen upwards of a half dozen Arctic airfields and ports, shuttered since the days of the Cold War. According to reports, many of Russia's new warships may be tasked for Arctic duty to defend these interests. And if Russia actually does build itself a nuclear aircraft carrier, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, former Commander of the Russian Northern Fleet, thinks it should be sent to the Arctic to support the country's nuclear submarines. America responds... sort of America isn't standing entirely still in the face of this Arctic military buildup. Last week, word began filtering out about a new Navy report advocating a program to "harden" U.S. warships to enable them to operate in an Arctic environment -- at a cost of up to $8.4 billion. Talk of a project to build up to 10 new Arctic icebreakers, at a further cost of $7.8 billion, has also begun. If these projects get under way, it could mean billions of dollars of new revenues for America's three main military shipbuilders: Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT ) , General Dynamics (NYSE: GD ) , and Huntington Ingalls (NYSE: HII ) . But while America talks, Russia is forging ahead at flank speed -- and building a new Arctic Navy.Russian Arctic Energy Development Bad – EnvironmentRussia Arctic development risks an environmental catastropheHeath 12 Julia Heath is a writer for Foreign Policy in Focus, February 15, 2012, “Preventing a Blowout in the Arctic”, Russian Record? Russia has had a terrible environmental record and a history of oil spills. The area around Usinsk, just south of the Arctic Circle, is home to what the Huffington Post calls “the world’s worst ecological oil catastrophe,” where leaks in a decommissioned oil well wreaked havoc in 2011.? It wasn't the first such incident. In 1994, the town suffered the third largest oil spill in history. A pipeline in Usinsk had been leaking for eight months when the dike containing the leakage collapsed, spreading 102,000 tons of oil across the tundra, into the Kolva and Rechora rivers, and eventually into the Barents Sea. The leak, eight times larger than the Exxon Valdez spill, was the result of old, corroded, poorly maintained, and over-pumped pipelines. The company responsible, Komineft, had five major accidents in the area between 1986 and 1994. In 1994, Russia was losing an estimated 20 percent of the oil it extracted, but refused to revamp inefficient and environmentally detrimental Soviet pipelines for fear that the break in production would lessen the Russian hold on former Soviet republics and interfere with loan repayment. More recently, Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, and the Institute of the Environment and Genetics of Microorganisms have estimated that Russia continues to spill 5 million tons of oil every year, or as the Huffington Post put it, “one Deepwater Horizon-scale leak about every two months.” ? Vladimir Chuprov, head of the Arctic campaign for Greenpeace Russia, said that Greenpeace International is absolutely against all offshore drilling in the Arctic. Even the U.S. Minerals Management Service estimates a one in five chance of a major spill occurring over the life of just one lease block on Alaska’s outer continental shelf (OCS). Greenpeace International wants to accord the Arctic a world park status similar to Antarctica. At the very least, they demand that the international community provide strict standards to eradicate the risk of oil spills and require mandatory guarantees that any spills will be mitigated at a cost no less than what was spent on the Deepwater Horizon spill.? Like Greenpeace International, the NRDC also advocates mandatory international standards on how to develop the Arctic. According to Lisa Speer of the NRDC, the United States doesn’t “have enough information to be able to determine whether or not oil and gas activities can be conducted safely (in the Arctic). And we don’t have the ability to contain and clean up oil in ice, and therefore we think we should wait for drilling in the Arctic until we do have the ability to deal with that.”? At a forum on Arctic drilling in January 2012, Andrew Hartsig of the Ocean Conservancy recommended that the United States wait until it has a better hold on the technological requirements of Arctic drilling. However, the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy (BOEM) representative Shoshana Lew replied that the federal five-year leasing plan for blocks on Alaska’s OCS would not be deferred until exploration was complete.? Putin abolished the Russian Environmental Agency in order to more easily access Arctic extraction that would otherwise require environmental assessments. This is particularly disconcerting because the Arctic region, according to the UN Environment Programme, “is characterized by some of the largest continuous intact ecosystems on the planet,” and therefore environmentally detrimental projects in the region should require careful consideration and planning.? The United States has been slow to invest in developing its own Arctic energy reserves for fear of ecological devastation. However, it has not done enough to slow development in nearby Russia. Russian offshore drilling is a crucial issue for Americans because polar currents could make an Arctic oil spill into a transnational event. A Russian Arctic oil spill would rapidly become a cultural, ecological, and economic disaster for the United States as well.US control of Arctic energy development critical to protect the environmentSullivan 12 – Commissioner of Alaska's Department of Natural Resources & Fmr. St. Atty. GeneralIt's time to develop our Arctic resources, Dan Sullivan, Special to CNN, Fri July 20, 2012 (CNN) -- The United States is on the verge of an energy renaissance. We need to recognize and seize the opportunity.? This renaissance involves domestic production of natural resources ranging from clean renewables to hydrocarbons.? In particular, domestic hydrocarbon production -- both oil and gas -- is increasing dramatically, with some experts predicting that the United States could become the largest hydrocarbon producer in the word -- outstripping Saudi Arabia and Russia -- by 2020.? Increased domestic production of hydrocarbons is driven by two trends. First, new technology is unlocking unconventional resources such as shale-derived oil and gas. And second, investors and policy makers are recognizing that the U.S. still has an enormous resource base of conventional oil and gas, particularly in Alaska.? Federal agencies estimate that Alaska's North Slope and federal waters off Alaska's northern coast contain approximately 40 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil and more than 200 trillion cubic feet of conventional gas.? According to the U.S. Geological Survey, this region contains more oil than any comparable region located in the Arctic, including northern Russia.? However, the United States is lagging behind its Arctic neighbors in developing these resources. This is unfortunate, because we have some of the highest environmental standards in the world and we should be setting the bar for Arctic development.? Developing our Arctic resources will promote our nation's interests in many ways: securing a politically stable, long-term supply of domestic energy; boosting U.S. economic growth and jobs; reducing the federal trade deficit; and strengthening our global leadership on energy issues. Leading academic researchers and economists in Alaska have estimated that oil production from Alaska's outer continental shelf will bring federal revenues of approximately $167 billion over 50 years, and create 55,000 jobs throughout the country.? Developing U.S. resources in the Arctic has the added benefit of enhancing global environmental protection.? One of the arguments used by Arctic drilling opponents is that "we aren't ready," but it is obvious that no matter what preparations are made, they will argue that it isn't enough.? Shell, for example, has spent billions to prepare for drilling in the Arctic this summer, incorporating the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, state-of-the-art equipment and extensive scientific research. Recently, the Obama administration has publically expressed its confidence in the company's drilling plans.? The U.S. has created some of the highest standards in the world for environmental protection. When we delay or disallow responsible resource development, the end result is not to protect the environment, but to drive hydrocarbon investment and production to countries with much lower environmental standards and enforcement capacity.? Last year, it was reported that between 5 million and 20 million tons of oil leak in Russia per year. This is equivalent to a Deepwater Horizon blowout about every two months. Russia had an estimated 18,000 oil pipeline ruptures in 2010 -- the figure for the U.S. that year was 341.? If we do not pursue responsible development in the Arctic, countries such as Russia -- perhaps even China, which is interested in securing access to Arctic hydrocarbon resources -- will dominate energy production from the Arctic. Such a scenario does not bode well for the global environment.? By embracing the opportunities in the Arctic, the United States will show the world that it can be a strong leader in responsible energy development.Russian standards are a joke- they will wreck the Arctic and are about to start developingMoscow Times ‘14Moscow Times, Safety, Cost Meet Head On in Arctic Oil Race, 2014, 's first step in?tapping the?vast Arctic resources is exploration of?the Prirazlomnoye oil field in?the Barents Sea with estimated reserves of?72 million tons.The?work?— to?be started by?Gazprom this year?— will be conducted from?the Prirazlomnaya platform, Russia's first oil-drilling platform designed for?offshore projects in?the Arctic.The?platform?— ordered by?Gazprom and?built at?Sevmash in?Severodvinsk?— was delivered to?its destination and?set up over an?oil field 60 kilometers off the?coast inAugust.But the?Kolskaya platform tragedy galvanized environmental organizations, including Bellona, Greenpeace and?the World Wildlife Fund.The?government should review its offshore exploration policy and?pass legislation that would guarantee proper liquidation of?the consequences of?possible accidents during offshore exploration, the?organizations said in?a December statement.All offshore projects in?the Arctic and?similar maritime territories should be suspended until such measures are taken, the?statement said.While exploration of?offshore fields in?the Arctic involves significant environmental andfinancial risks, domestic oil and?gas companies have yet to?prove their ability to?carry out such projects, as they neglect safety issues even in?onshore projects, according to?a report by?Greenpeace published last month."If Russia's oil and?gas companies can't get existing fields under control, there's no reason to?hope that they'll demonstrate a?more responsible attitude to?environmental protection issues while exploring the?Arctic offshore areas," the?report said.Spills over to global biodiversity Gill 9 (Michael Gill, Chair of the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program, “ABSTRACT: BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES”, March, UNESCO, )Arctic ecosystems and the biodiversity they support are experiencing growing pressure from climate change and resource development while established research and monitoring programs remain largely uncoordinated, lacking the ability to effectively monitor, understand and report on biodiversity trends at the circumpolar scale. The maintenance of healthy Arctic ecosystems is a global imperative as the Arctic plays a critical role in the Earth’s physical, chemical and biological balance. A coordinated and comprehensive effort for monitoring Arctic ecosystems is needed to facilitate effective and timely conservation and adaptation actions. The Arctic’s size and complexity represents a significant challenge towards detecting and attributing important biodiversity trends. This demands a scaled, pan-Arctic, ecosystem-based approach that not only identifies trends in biodiversity, but also identifies underlying causes. It is critical that this information be made available to generate effective strategies for adapting to changes now taking place in the Arctic - a process that ultimately depends on rigorous, integrated, and efficient monitoring programmes that have the power to detect change within a ‘management’ time frame. Biodiversity is a popular way of describing the diversity of life on earth: it includes all life forms and the ecosystems of which they are a part. World Food Day — the anniversary of FAO's founding on 16 October 1945 — celebrates, in particular, that part of biodiversity that nurtures people and contributes to long-term food security for all. Biodiversity forms the foundation for sustainable development. It is the basis for the environmental health of our planet and the source of economic and ecological security for future generations. In the developing world, biodiversity provides the assurance of food, countless raw materials such as fibre for clothing, materials for shelter, fertilizer, fuel and medicines, as well as a source of work energy in the form of animal traction. The rural poor depend upon biological resources for an estimated 90 percent of their needs. In the industrialized world access to diverse biological resources is necessary to support a vast array of industrial products. In the continuing drive to develop efficient and sustainable agriculture for many different conditions, these resources provide raw material for plant and animal breeding as well as the new biotechnologies. In addition, biodiversity maintains the ecological balance necessary for planetary and human survival.ExtinctionScience Daily 11 ("Biodiversity Key to Earth's Life-Support Functions in a Changing World," Cites Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiburg, August 11, releases/2011/08/110811084513.htm)The biological diversity of organisms on Earth is not just something we enjoy when taking a walk through a blossoming meadow in spring; it is also the basis for countless products and services provided by nature, including food, building materials, and medicines as well as the self-purifying qualities of water and protection against erosion. These so-called ecosystem services are what makes Earth inhabitable for humans. They are based on ecological processes, such as photosynthesis, the production of biomass, or nutrient cycles. Since biodiversity is on the decline, both on a global and a local scale, researchers are asking the question as to what role the diversity of organisms plays in maintaining these ecological processes and thus in providing the ecosystem's vital products and services. In an international research group led by Prof. Dr. Michel Loreau from Canada, ecologists from ten different universities and research institutes, including Prof. Dr. Michael Scherer-Lorenzen from the University of Freiburg, compiled findings from numerous biodiversity experiments and reanalyzed them. These experiments simulated the loss of plant species and attempted to determine the consequences for the functioning of ecosystems, most of them coming to the conclusion that a higher level of biodiversity is accompanied by an increase in ecosystem processes. However, the findings were always only valid for a certain combination of environmental conditions present at the locations at which the experiments were conducted and for a limited range of ecosystem processes. In a study published in the current issue of the journal Nature, the research group investigated the extent to which the positive effects of diversity still apply under changing environmental conditions and when a multitude of processes are taken into account. They found that 84 percent of the 147 plant species included in the experiments promoted ecological processes in at least one case. The more years, locations, ecosystem processes, and scenarios of global change -- such as global warming or land use intensity -- the experiments took into account, the more plant species were necessary to guarantee the functioning of the ecosystems. Moreover, other species were always necessary to keep the ecosystem processes running under the different combinations of influencing factors. These findings indicate that much more biodiversity is necessary to keep ecosystems functioning in a world that is changing ever faster. The protection of diversity is thus a crucial factor in maintaining Earth's life-support functions.A2: Better to Cooperate With Russia in the ArcticRussia does not want to cooperate with the WestRita Boland, Signal, June 2014 China and Russia Pose an Array of Dangers to the WestRussia, though no longer the Soviet Union, presents some of the same and some different geostrategic threats to the world. Dr. Ariel Cohen, senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian studies and international energy policy, The Heritage Foundation, says the situation between Russia and Ukraine is only a symptom of the former turning away from the West, abandoning even the pretense of a liberal democracy. "It's a process that started about 14 years ago," he explains. "It is now sort of moving back in time, not just to the Soviet era, but in many respects to the czarists era that is categorized by extremist nationalism with a lot of racism thrown in for good measure. It's anti-everybody. It's anti-Ukranian. It's anti-Muslim. Now it's increasingly anti-Semitism."Russia aggressive in the ArcticKarl Ritter, June 12, 2014, Lewiston Morning Tribune (Idaho)I spy ice spies :Cold War-style games return to melting ArcticIn 2007 Russia resumed long-range strategic bomber flights over the Arctic and planted a Russian flag on the seabed beneath the North Pole. More recently, it asserted control over the Northern Sea Route with naval deployments and by reopening a military base on the New Siberian Islands. The first oil supplies were unloaded from an ice-resistant platform in Russia's Pechora Sea, which Putin described as "our first step in developing the Arctic sea shelf."A2: Sanctions Fail/Don’t Impact RussiaSanctions put pressure on Russia’s oil industryGuy Chazan, August 10, 2014, Financial Times, access to debt finance is only part of the problem. What could prove more of a headache are the EU and US restrictions on the export of technologies used in Arctic, deepwater or shale oil exploration. That is a smart weapon trained directly at Russia’s future.Production from the ageing workhorses of the country’s oil industry – the vast conventional oilfields of western Siberia – is dropping off sharply. Moscow is determined to offset that decline by pushing beyond frontiers, such as into the oil-rich Arctic oceans and Siberia’s vast Bazhenov shale, and by investing in multibillion-dollar liquefied natural gas ventures in the Yamal peninsula and Sakhalin island. Such ambitions are crucial for Russia’s economic health, with proceeds from oil sales accounting for 44 per cent of budget revenues. It is a cash cow Moscow cannot do without. But branching into such areas requires access to western technology, capital and expertise. Russia does not need western kit to produce conventional oil – it has been pumping crude from its onshore fields for more than a hundred years. But it is unclear how it can exploit its shale oil reserves without sophisticated western fracking equipment. And it does not build the kind of offshore platform that will be required in places such as the Kara Sea, where Rosneft and ExxonMobil started drilling their first well on Saturday. (Exxon’s well is unaffected because its rig was contracted before the latest sanctions were announced.)Sanctions an economic blowAnna Kuchman, August 12, 2014, Related Russia to get oil technologies from Norway and Switzerland Russia sinks $1.5 billion into U.S. tech firms RBTH readers react to food ban Tags u.s.-russia relations business oil sanctions against russia technology Business Headlines Russia bans European and U.S. food imports for 1 year Russia bans European and U.S. food imports for 1 year Competition for Iranian market heats up as Moscow and Tehran pen key deal Competition for Iranian market heats up as Moscow and Tehran pen key deal Russia bans whole categories of food from EU, U.S., Australia, Canada, Norway Russia bans whole categories of food from EU, U.S., Australia, Canada, Norway Evolution or revolution? The rise and rise of luxury hospitality in Russia Evolution or revolution? The rise and rise of luxury hospitality in Russia Pin It U.S. oil sanctions may cost Russia tens of billions of dollars in profits Latest restrictions could hasten decline in Western Siberian production. Source: ITAR-TASS The United States has followed through with new sanctions against the Russian oil industry, limiting the supply of equipment for the production of tight oil. Russia had hoped to earn $54 billion in revenue from the additional oil production over the next 20 years. However, the sanctions deal a significant blow to those plans. The American restrictions, which were announced on August 6, are more stringent than those of the European Union, which previously banned the supply to Russia of technology for deep oil production and the exploration and development of Arctic shelf shale oil reserves, according to RBC. In particular, the United States Department of Commerce has identified deepwater projects as projects at a depth of 500 feet, while the EU sanctions do not specify what ‘deepwater’ entails. A2: Sanctions Hurt US Relations with the EUUS in lockstep with the EU on Russia sanctionsRIA Novosti, June 18, 2015, US to Continue in 'Lockstep' With EU on Anti-Russian SanctionsThe United States will continue to closely follow the lead of the European Union (EU) in extending existing sanctions on Russia, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) John Smith said on Thursday. "I expect you will continue to see us move in lockstep with the European Union, our European partners, as much as possible," Smith said in a speech hosted by the Venable LLP law firm. On Wednesday, EU leaders announced they would extend existing sanctions against Russia for an additional six months, until January 2016. OFAC is the branch of US Treasury Department in charge of implementing economic and financial sanctions. Smith noted that the "keeping the US and EU sanctions as identical as possible" is critical to the success of sanctions aimed at Russia.EU planning to renew sanctionsBanking and Stock Exchange, Finance, Economics (Russia), November 20, 2015, The EU is planning to renew sanctions against Russia regardless of the intentions to jointly struggle against the Islamic State, DOA: 11-27-15Berlin, London and Paris do not want Moscow's assistance in Syria "at the cost of Ukraine", say WSJ's sources. "Any change in the U.S. and EU current position in respect of Ukraine will be very harmful not only to Ukraine, but to Europe as well," said a source close to the Ukrainian government.The EU high-ranking official emphasized that there are no signs at the moment that the countries' position concerning the extension of anti-Russia sanctions could change. "Today there is a general understanding that sanctions must be renewed," he said. A meeting of foreign affairs ministers held on November 16, 2015 did not discuss a revision of the anti-Russia sanctions which could push Moscow to jointly struggle against Islamists in Syria, said Edgars Rinkevics, Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs.The USA, too, has no intention to review its stance, said WSJ's sources. At the G20 summit on November 15, 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama discussed the question of sanctions at a meeting with the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain, WSJ notes. When in Berlin on November 17, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland stressed that sanctions against Moscow must be renewed, declaring further support to Kiev.Today the West is looking into three possible scenarios for the sanctions policy continuation, according to WSJ: the restrictions may be extended for six, twelve or only three to four months. In the latter case, the EU will show an approval of some of Moscow's concessions in respect of Ukraine.A2: Sanctions Are WeakSanctions are tough enoughPifer 3/24/14Steven Pifer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, was the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 1998 to 2000. Obama administration has applied similar measures as it seeks to sway Putin again, but it has added a new penalty: visa and financial sanctions targeted at individual Russians, including some close to Putin. On March 20, the president also announced a new executive order to enable U.S. sanctions against key sectors of the Russian economy, including finance, energy and defense — the kinds of tough penalties that the United States has not previously applied against Moscow. Despite the bluster of former Bush administration officials today, Washington in fact has a stronger hand in the current crisis in Ukraine in one other regard. In 2008, many European states held Saakashvili partially responsible for triggering the war with the Georgian advance into South Ossetia. Ukraine, by contrast, has acted with great restraint. This time, nearly all of Europe agrees that Russia’s actions are out of bounds. Sure enough, European states also appear more ready to sanction Russia than in 2008. Along with the various sanctions the U.S. alone has announced, European Union officials last week also announced visa and financial sanctions on individual Russians. These moves might not end up shaking Putin from his course, but applying the new executive order could inflict real pain on the Russian economy — something Washington did not accomplish in 2008. Those who faced the challenge of punishing Russia over Georgia should understand the complexities of dealing with Putin and, at a minimum, cut the current administration a little slack.A2: Sanctions Cause a Shift Away from the DollarYuan can’t challenge the dollarPeter Hobson, June 15, 2015, The Moscow Times, Russia Embraces Yuan in Move Against US Dollar Hegemony, DOA: 12-23-15Moscow has looked to?China for?trade and?investment since sanctions and?Russian counter-sanctions last year curbed Russia-West trade flows. China is already Russia's second-largest trading partner after the?European Union, with a?trade turnover of?more than $95 billion in?2014, news agency TASS reported citing Chinese customs data. Yet the?omnipresence of?the dollar in?global finance has meant that even non-Western financial institutions have been wary of?lending in?Russia. A?way around that problem is increased use of?local currencies. State-controlled Gazprom Neft, Russia's third-largest oil producer, led the?pack. The?company said this month it had begun settling shipments of?oil to?China in?yuan and?using the?bulk of?the revenue to?source equipment in?China. Gazprom Neft said it would export 2.7 million tons of?oil to?Asia this year, up from?1 million tons in?2014. Alexei Miller, head of?gas company Gazprom, which owns Gazprom Neft and?signed a?$400 billion long-term supply deal with China last year, said soon afterward in?an interview on?television station Rossia-24 that Gazprom was negotiating with China to?use yuan and?rubles for?gas deliveries via a?planned pipeline in?Western Siberia. Gazprom Neft's swift embrace of?the yuan was likely spurred by?sanctions, not profits, said Alexei Devyatov, chief economist at?UralSib Capital. Lacking the?dollar's convertibility, the?yuan is a?less convenient currency for?the company, he said. "It will have caused certain losses," Devyatov said. Sidestepping the?dollar also lets companies avoid the?time-consuming risk checks put in?place by?Western institutions following the?imposition of?sanctions. "Western banks work slower, with more restrictions, and?it becomes simpler to?move to?the currency in?which trade is being done," said Vladimir Pantyushin, senior strategist at?investment bank Sberbank CIB. Also this month the?first deputy governor of?Russia's Central Bank, Ksenia Yudayeva, said the?regulator was in?talks with banks over a?new funding instrument in?China's yuan currency. "Talks with banks are going on, a?discussion about which concrete instrument there will be. We have sent them proposals, now their responses have arrived. We will discuss the?matter further," Yudayeva said. The?Central Bank last year opened a?150 billion yuan ($24 billion) swap line, but has so far not made use of?it. Sberbank on?June 5 said it had issued its first yuan-denominated promissory notes as part of?agreement with the?Export-Import Bank of?China to?finance a?pharmaceuticals import contract worth more than 29 million yuan ($4.7 million). Sberbank said in?a press release that increased cooperation with the?Chinese bank "expands Sberbank's possibilities to?finance clients' foreign trade with Chinese counterparties." The?Finance Ministry meanwhile said it was studying possible debt issues in?yuan. "In general, study of?the Chinese market's opportunities is under way," news agency RIA Novosti quoted Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak as saying earlier this month. Yet it will take decades for?the yuan to?circulate on?the scale of?the euro, and?even longer to?challenge the?dollar, which has the?advantage of?scale, said Sberbank CIB's Pantyushin. "It could rival the?euro, but I doubt it on?the dollar," he said.Euro can’t challenge the dollarJosh Zoffer, July 7, 2012, Harvard International Review, The Future of Dollar Hegemony, DOA: 12-23-15Since the mid-twentieth century, the dollar has enjoyed almost unrivaled status as the world’s preferred reserve currency, or the currency in which most nations denominate most of their international currency reserves. The deep pool of relatively liquid assets denominated in dollars, from the multi-trillion dollar pool of US government securities to the securities of many large corporations, and perceived stability of the currency have given sovereign investors and countries engaged in international trade a large incentive to keep their currency reserves in dollars. For the past sixty or seventy years, this has allowed countries to park their holdings in a stable currency and reduce transaction costs in international trade. This same system has led the majority of international commodities markets, most notably the oil market, to price goods in dollars in order to take advantage of these lower transaction costs and facilitate the mechanisms of trade. In turn, the United States has benefited from slightly lower transaction costs than any other country in the world (it hardly ever needs to exchange currency for trading purposes) and the ability to issue debt at a much lower interest rate than similarly situated countries, as there is almost always demand for assets denominated in the reserve currency.CONTINUESDespite the dollar’s long history as the international reserve currency, the past few years have seen a growing number of calls for the end of dollar hegemony. Countries as diverse as France, Russia, and China have decried the dollar’s monopoly in foreign exchange markets, while in 2009 reports of a shift away from dollar-based oil trading surfaced in the Middle East. Reported plans to move away from the dollar reflected international frustration at a system fueling the United States’ “exorbitant privilege,” as the French have called it, one that rests its stability on the financial conditions of a country mired in debt and facing a financial meltdown. The implications of a true end to dollar hegemony, a shift away from the dollar as a reserve currency and pricing standard for oil transactions, could be catastrophic for the United States. In the worst case scenario, a drastic drop in demand for dollar-denominated assets would cause the interest rates on Treasury Securities to skyrocket, sending ripples through the US economy as the value of the dollar plummets. What is certain, however, is that whatever decrease in demand for US debt occurs will constrain the federal government’s ability to spend and the ability of the United States to defend itself. The United States has built its foreign policy around its vast military capability; a sudden budgetary shock and drop in military spending would leave the United States vulnerable as it scrambles to regroup in a new security environment. The ability of the United States to respond to threats across the globe would be diminished, and enemies would be incentivized to take aggressive action to take advantage of this new weakness. In particular, a rapidly militarizing China might be emboldened by its partial decoupling from US economic fortunes to adopt a bolder stance in the South China Sea, threatening US allies and heightening tensions with the United States. While war with China is all but off the table in the status quo, an international system devoid of both US military might and Chinese dependence on US debt as a place to park excess liquidity might lead to the conflict feared on both sides of the Pacific.While these fears were well-founded a few years ago, Europe’s sovereign debt crisis has undermined the world’s faith in the euro and destroyed its potential to replace the dollar. The crisis has amply demonstrated the euro’s potential for volatility and revealed the uncertainty at the root of the entire EMU project. Any currency for which there is potential for dissolution cannot be a significant part of world reserves, let alone the international reserve currency. Those relying on the strength of the euro to argue for a shift away from the dollar have been proven sorely mistaken by recent events, silencing many of these detractors. More importantly, the rapid change in the euro’s fortunes has given many international observers a bit of perspective on the dollar’s success over the past forty years. Since the 1970s, the dollar has endured OPEC’s oil embargo, the dot-com boom, the Great Recession, and a number of international conflicts. The dollar’s resilience during all of these events has been proven all the more remarkable by the euro’s susceptibility to crisis. Major players in the economic community will hopefully come out of this period more appreciative of the role the dollar has played and the stability it has provided and give the dollar a bit of breathing room.Only one potential alternative still sits on the table: the Chinese renminbi. However, despite China’s efforts to internationalize the currency by increasing deposits denominated in yuan and allowing cross-border settlements in yuan, China’s economy remains yet unproven. Its fast-paced growth has been fueled by exports to the United States cheapened by the very system they have sought to undermine. The renminbi has a long way to go both in terms of its international prestige and the establishment of a track record of stability. For now, the decline of the euro leaves the dollar as the only viable international reserve currency and the United States as the only country able to issue it. While there is no doubt this issue will return to the forefront, for now it seems that the United States will emerge from the Great Recession with a tighter grip on hegemony than it has had in a decade. The global need for dollar hegemony will allow the United States to continue to run up deficits, fund its military supremacy, and maintain an international order premised on a Western-dominated economic system.No one will join China to challenge the DollarBruce Jones, 2014, Bruce Jones is a senior fellow and the director of the?Project on International Order and Strategy?at Brookings and a consulting professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, 2014 Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension Between Rivalry and Restraint, Kindle EditionThere are other schisms as well. China regularly suggests shifting away from the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency, and it has badgered various BRICS summits into issuing joint declarations on the issue. But when China first raised this issue, in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, the proposal was met with deafening silence, and not just from the United States and Europe but also from India. For policymakers in India, strengthening China's hand at the expense of America's hardly seems to be in India's interest. Only Brazil has seriously considered the proposal, and in 2011 China and Brazil began to denominate some of their trade in their own currencies— up to $ 30 billion a year, according to a 2013 BRICS Summit agreement. 23 That sounds impressive, but considering that total BRICS trade now exceeds $ 300 billion a year, the $ 30 billion is roughly 10 percent. And their overall trade is $ 1.7 trillion a year; against that, the $ 30 billion shrinks to insignificance. Jones, Bruce (2014-03-17). Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint (p. 65). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.Asia trade, not oil, key to the dollarMichael Boyle, no date, DOA: 12-23-15It's based on the massive US-Asia trade which makes it natural for the USD to be the de facto Pacific regional currency since the major countries don't want regional integration as Europe has. It has nothing to do with oil pricing. Middle Eastern oil is all going to Asia not the West.Even if there is some decline, he dollar will still remain the largest reserve currencyBruce Jones, 2014, Bruce Jones is a senior fellow and the director of the?Project on International Order and Strategy?at Brookings and a consulting professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, 2014 Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension Between Rivalry and Restraint, Kindle EditionThe debate over the future of the dollar is rife with misunderstanding, much of which depends on the same basic fallacy that plagues the broader debate about the rising powers’ challenge to U.S. leadership— that the U.S. dollar is the international currency and that at some near point it is going to lose that role altogether and be replaced by some other currency, probably the renminbi or the euro . But the essential point is that there can be more than one international currency. Already the euro is being used as a trading currency, although the eurozone crisis may well staunch that trend; and soon the renminbi might be used more frequently by actors who trade extensively with China. If the euro and the renminbi were used more for trade in their respective regions, does this mean that the United States would lose some portion of the advantages that it has from the dollar being the dominant reserve currency? Yes, it does. Whatever percentage of international trade is denominated in those other currencies is roughly the percentage by which the United States would lose its financial advantage in overseas investments. But does this mean that the United States would lose all of those advantages? Absolutely not. There is no foreseeable scenario in which the U.S. dollar is not far and away the largest reserve currency and in which the United States does not still profit from that advantage. Understood this way, the issue of reserve currency is a good metaphor for U.S. leadership overall: over the next decade or two, the United States— although it will continue to slip from its extraordinary recent highs— will continue to be the leading provider of reserve currency, just as it will continue to be the leading power overall. Jones, Bruce (2014-03-17). Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint (Kindle Locations 1894-1899). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.A2: Sanctions Cause Russia Pivot to Asia (Generally)Russia is pivoting to Asia because the US is strengthening its alliance with Japan, it’s not driven by sanctions. Their evidence just cites an asserted rationalization by RussiaAtul Aneja, July 31, 2015, The Hindu, “Russia, China set to counter US-led “Asia Pivot” in the Pacific,” DOA: 12-18-15Russia has released a new naval doctrine that singles out China as its core partner in the Pacific, signaling Moscow and Beijing’s push towards countering the Japan backed “Asia Pivot” of the United States. The Russians unveiled their new doctrine last Sunday on board the frigate Admiral Gorshkov, and in the presence of President Vladimir Putin. Regarding the Pacific, the amended naval doctrine, which will be valid till 2020, underscored that friendly ties with China in the Pacific were one of the cornerstones of Moscow’s new policy. "Cooperating with China and other countries in the region is a crucial part of carrying out the nation's maritime policy," Russia's maritime strategy stressed. Moscow and Beijing appear to have responded strongly to Japan’s budding post-war doctrinal shift, which will allow Tokyo to deploy its armed forces overseas even without an imminent threat to Japanese territory or citizens. Opponents say that the two security bills being debated in Parliament could draw Tokyo into U.S.-led conflicts around the globe. Specifically, the legislations can cement Washington’s “Asia Pivot” doctrine which envisages that 60 per cent of the total US armed forces would be deployed under the Pacific Command, with China as its focal point. A scathing Xinhua commentary had earlier this month slammed the billsas manifesting Japan’s return to its militarist past. On Thursday, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman, Yang Yujun reinforced the attack by trashing Japan’s demand that China halt construction of oil drilling platforms in the East China Sea. "Japan's recent and frequent finger-pointing is to create and play up the 'China Threat,' so as to find excuses for passing controversial security bills," observed Mr. Yang. The Defence Ministry also pointed out that the oil platforms, of which the Japanese had released pictures, were being legitimately established within China’s territorial waters. In parallel, the Russo-Japanese ties are also now under increasing strain. Earlier this month, Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu announced that troops on Kuril islands, disputed by Japan, will be rearmed. On their part the Japanese have raised an alarm about a Russian military build-up in the east of the country, including on the Kuril Islands The clearest signal that the Russians and the Chinese were factoring the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan military alliance in the Pacific came on July 7 when it was announced that Moscow and Beijing will conduct joint military exercises in the Sea of Japan. The Russian Navy’s Pacific fleet will deploy 20 warships as well as aircraft and helicopters, in the August drill, which is a follow up of a similar exercise that the two countries had held in the Mediterranean Sea two months ago. At the heart of the tensions in the Pacific are the South China Sea maritime disputes, which have pitted China against Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. The Chinese have been incensed by the seven hour surveillance mission that was personally undertaken in the South China by Admiral Scott Swift — the U.S. Pacific fleet commander. earlier this month. On Thursday, the Chinese Defence Ministry went ballistic by accusing the U.S. of militarising the South China Sea. "China is extremely concerned at the United States' pushing of the militarisation of the South China Sea region," Mr. Yang observed. China has added punch to its rhetoric with the deployment last Tuesday of more than 100 Chinese naval vessels and dozens of military aircraft during military manoeuvres in the South China Sea. Aligning Moscow’s perception with the Chinese, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov observed in May that the U.S. was the main de-stabilising factor in the Asia-Pacific. "We are concerned by US policies in the region, especially since every day it becomes increasingly focused on a systemic containment of Russia and China," Russia Today quoted him as saying. Independent of sanctions, Russia sees huge economic benefits to pivoting to AsiaMatthew Sussex, June 9, 2015, Lowly Interpreter, “Putin’s Pivot: The Russians Are Coming to Asia,” DOA: 12-18-15For Putin, the logic of an Asian pivot is threefold. The first concerns consolidating Russia's prosperity as an energy and resource giant. He knows that Indo-Pacific appetites for oil and gas will HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" increase massively over the next twenty years. Within the same time-frame, European clients will HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" diversify their energy sources once the US shale gas and oil revolution brings American exports on-line. Russia therefore has a relatively small window of opportunity to begin crowding out competitors for Asia's energy demands. Second, whereas Moscow's strategic posture has long stressed the need to look east, it has now begun increasing its Indo-Pacific trade and security footprint, including in Southeast Asia, in order to give its intended policy substance. Third, Russia is betting that the 21st century will be an Asian one – and it is betting on China as the main driver of change in regional and global order. Until recently, the main question hanging over Sino-Russian relations was whether Moscow could live with being a junior partner to Beijing. It seems that question has now been answered in the affirmative, at least for the moment. Let's take a closer look at Putin's pivot. Russia's pivot to Asia is resulting in a large-scale revamp of its Pacific Fleet. Over the next ten years the fleet will go from Russia's smallest to its HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" biggest naval asset. As part of an overall military build-up costing about HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" US$600 billion, the fleet is getting new ballistic-missile submarines, attack submarines and surface combatants. The two French Mistral helicopter carriers held up over the Ukraine crisis are HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" earmarked for Vladivostok too. And more than just expanding numbers, Russia is keen to show it can project power: its ships are now regularly seen in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Sino-Russian relationship has also entered a more mature phase. Often criticised as being a mile wide and an inch deep, cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is now comprehensive. It spans trade, investment, energy, institutional engagement and military-security ties. The recent? HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Chinese-Russian naval exercises in the Mediterranean, for instance, were partly symbolic. But they would have been unthinkable even a few years ago. Just as unthinkable, in fact, as Chinese troops HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" marching in Red Square, which occurred at the 11 May Victory Day celebrations in Moscow. Much of the development of Russia's Far East is being bankrolled by Beijing. And in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Russia has acquiesced to Chinese preferences for the institution to be an energy-trading club rather than a military-security organisation. Meanwhile, Russia and India already have strong security ties. HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" About 70% of Indian military hardware is Russian. The two nations have been participating in the Indra bi-annual exercises since 2003. Moscow has repeatedly invited India to become a full member of the SCO. And Russia has a deal to construct about HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" 20 nuclear reactors in India at a cost of US$43 billion. Considering India has been a major target of recent Australian diplomatic and trade efforts, it is instructive that Russia and India are now considering an oil pipeline as well as a HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" gas pipeline. The main (and thorny) obstacle is whether they transit through China or Pakistan. Russian engagement with Southeast Asia has also picked up. It now has a 'comprehensive strategic partnership' with Vietnam, and Hanoi has agreed to a free trade agreement with Putin's Eurasian Union. Russia is HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" operating aerial tankers from Cam Ranh Bay to refuel its bombers in the Western Pacific. Last year, Russia and Vietnam HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" agreed to simplify procedures for visits by Russian ships. Post-coup Thailand is also being wooed. A Russian naval battle group HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" visited in March, and there are discussions on deals for rail services, military aircraft, and tanks. Russia is trying to sell more Sukhoi fighters to Indonesia, and recently HYPERLINK "" \l ".VXTn_ksqYds" \t "_blank" promised to include technology transfers in the deal. Other weapons sales being discussed include submarines, amphibious vehicles and helicopters. Russia is poised to become a big player in Asian energy markets, where Australia has a large stake in future growth. In fact, Australia's recent HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" 2015 Energy White Paper foresees increasing trade as fundamental to our energy security, and the Department of Industry's HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Bulk Commodity Exports reports see Australia attempting to meet 60% of Asia's increased LNG demands by around 2025. But here's the problem: Russia is HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" planning to meet 100% of Asia's increased demand by the same time, via its massive development of the Far East. And by the time its $400-billion deal with China starts deliveries in 2018, China will be HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" importing more Russian gas than Germany does now. Putin's HYPERLINK "" \l ".VXTqj0sqYds" \t "_blank" abandonment of the South Stream pipeline and his decision to run it to Turkey allows Russia to sell the same amount of gas (6.5 million tonnes a year) into the EU via Greece, but with the capacity to re-route to India and Asia. Russia is also diversifying to a more balanced mix between pipelines and LNG, so that it will be looking to compete directly with Australia. An example is its LNG plant on Sakhalin Island, which will be HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" handling 5 million tonnes annually from 2018.China will never fully align with Russia because China wants to protect its economic relations with the West. Their evidence only speaks to Russian motivationsSurgei Gureiv, December 22, 2015, Pakistan Observor, DOA: 12-23-15Another important element of the Kremlin’s strategy has been its pivot to Asia. Russia assumed that stronger ties with China would absorb the economic impact of a break with the West. In this sense, Russia was seeking not so much to deglobalize as to redirect trade and investment flows from West to East. Yet these hopes have not materialized. Russia has managed to sign quite a few protocols of intentions and memoranda of understanding with China, but binding agreements and tangible investments have yet to follow. There may be several explanations for this. First and foremost, while China values its relationship with Russia, its economic relations with the West are simply much more important—not only to the Chinese government but also to state-owned banks and corporations. The latter, in particular, have learned from the painful experience of the French bank BNP Paribas, which paid a $9 billion fine for violating U.S. sanctions against Iran: they understand that losing their U.S. business would be even more costly than obeying the sanctions. Another possible explanation is that Chinese negotiators may have decided to wait until their Russian counterparts become more desperate—and then offer them better terms. This theory does not provide grounds for much optimism about Russia’s predicament. With the price of oil and the value of the ruble both falling and China’s own economic growth slowing down, the space for grand bilateral initiatives is shrinking. China’s main geoeconomic project, One Belt, One Road, will also require tens of billions of dollars, and China may not be able to afford too many new expensive investment projects. Finally, Chinese corporate bosses may also be affected by political pressures at home. Given President Xi Jinping’s unprecedented anticorruption campaign, they may be feeling more cautious regarding deals with Russia’s notoriously corrupt state companies.Multiple reasons for Russia Asia pivot – Rising Asian economies, access to energy resourcesCenter for Strategic and International Studies, 2015, Russia’s Asia Pivot, DOA: 12-18-15For a variety of economic and geostrategic reasons, Russia is attempting to develop its eastern territories and integrate them more deeply into the rapidly developing economy of Asia. While engaging in Asian affairs does not come naturally to Russia’s elite, President Vladimir Putin has made relations with the states of Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia a priority in his third term as Russia’s President. Putin is keenly aware of the shifting global economic balance of power towards Asia, and understands that economic integration with the Asia-Pacific is essential for Russia’s successful long-term development. Russian integration with Asia has hinged on its energy resources and its potential to become a major supplier of hydrocarbons to the rapidly-growing economies of the Asia-Pacific region. Yet energy alone does not tell the entire story. Russia’s economic ties to the Asia-Pacific extend well beyond energy, especially with regard to investment. In its relations with China, India, and other Asian states, Russia has made the export of military equipment and collaboration in the field of defense and high-technology top priorities. Furthermore, Russia has increasingly engaged with the Asia-Pacific on a multilateral basis, including through the hosting of the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok and its membership in CICA, the SCO, and other multilateral forums. The project will also analyze the geopolitical implications of Russia’s Asia Pivot and, in particular, its implications for the United States within the context of its own Asia Pivot. The project also will address how development plans and activities for key regions of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East are integrating more deeply with Asian trade and investment networks.All their cards assume a Russia-China alignment, so insert Russia-China alignment goodA2: Sanctions Drive Russia to IndiaIndia-Russia ties inevitable due to terrorismCatherine Putz, December 9, 2015, The Diplomat, India and Russia Begin Naval Exercises in the Bay of Bengal, DOA: 12-18-15Still, Russia and India have plenty of business to conduct, not just in military terms but in the political realm as well. Russia Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said during a visit to New Delhi on Tuesday that the two nations are the vanguard of fighting international terrorism. Rogozin’s India visit paves the way for Modi’s planned HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" December 24-25 state visit to Russia. According to HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" TASS, Rogozin said, “The Indian prime minister is going to visit Moscow at a very important and troublesome period of time. It is not surprising that everything we discussed in New Delhi today largely concerned struggle against terrorism and radical forms of Islam.”Relations are institutionalized – sanctions aren’t key, at least anymoreKabir Taneja is a journalist and researcher specializing in foreign affairs, energy security and defence, November 20, 2015, The Diplomat, India and Russia: A Course Correction, DOA: 12-18-15Over the past six months, Russia has made its presence felt in the global realpolitik scene with gusto. With the Kremlin militarily intervening in Syria, reportedly bombing ISIS and in effect protecting Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus, while juggling a yet unresolved Ukraine crisis and dealing with Western sanctions… Moscow has its hands full. Most aspects of India-Russia bilateral ties are quite institutionalized, and work in an automated manner irrespective of who is in power in New Delhi or Moscow. Russia could perhaps be seen as India’s only definitive “strategic” partner in its truest form, and this unique relationship has developed over decades. However, over the past year the Moscow-Delhi dynamic seems to have lost some of its previous momentum. This may now be about to change, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi preparing to make his first visit to Moscow early next month.A2: Sanctions Cause Russian Arms SalesThere is no unique impact – Russian sales just trade-off with arms sales from Western countries. Their impact cards are just about light weapons and aren’t unique to Russian sales of light weaponsThe Citizen, December 14, 2015, DOA: 10-18-15Arms manufacturers in North America and Western Europe dominated international arms sales in 2014, but their market share dropped while Russian and Asian companies saw theirs rise, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported Monday. Total turnover for the 100 biggest arms and military services companies declined for the fourth year in a row, falling by 1.5 percent from 2013 to stand at $401 billion (364 billion euros). The top company was US-based Lockheed Martin, which saw sales grow by 3.9 percent to $37.5 billion for 2014. Companies based in Western Europe and the United States continue to dominate the top 100, with 80 percent of the total market share. But sales for Western European and US companies decreased by 3.2 percentage points between 2013 and 2014. In Western Europe “a large part of the defence spending, which is missing, is from procurement. It’s easier to cut procurement than to cut salaries — so the quickest thing to do is just buy less,” said Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher at SIPRI’s Arms and Military Expenditure Programme.Also – a lot of their cards are talking about India, so insert your answers to Russia-India tiesA2: Sanctions Cause Putin NationalismNationalism before the sanctionsTheodore P. Gerber, 2014, is Professor of Sociology at the University ofWisconsin-Madison, and canbe reached at tgerber@ssc.wisc.edu, The Washington Quarterly, Beyond Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Public Opinion, DOA: 12-18-15Finally, one must bear in mind that the 2011–2012 election season was a turning point in Russian political life: the outrage of many Russians over fraud during the December 2011 parliamentary (“Duma”) elections provoked the largest political protest movement the country had seen since Putin first came to power at the end of 1999. Nationalist themes played a prominent role in Putin’s presidential campaign and they formed a rhetorical backdrop for the ensuing backlash and crackdown on the protests after his March 2012 election. A similar set of issues was paramount in public discussions at the time, but without the overbearing propaganda campaign and the expansion of military actions, making the 2011–2012 election season an ideal moment for assessing the underlying structure of nationalist and xenophobic sentiments in the Russian public.Widespread nationalism before Russia invaded CrimeaTheodore P. Gerber, 2014, is Professor of Sociology at the University ofWisconsin-Madison, and canbe reached at tgerber@ssc.wisc.edu, The Washington Quarterly, Beyond Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Public Opinion, DOA: 12-18-15Since the onset of the Putin era, Russian nationalism has seemed to play aprominent role in Russian politics.4 Putin himself has invoked a range ofnationalist images, themes, and tropes over the years in his efforts to define hisgoals, justify his policies, and maintain public support. Examples include thethreat purportedly posed to Russia by foreign (mainly “Western”) powers, thedistinctive culture and norms of the Russian people (be they Orthodox faith,collectivism, or “traditional” family values), the historical greatness andachievements of Russians (particularly in defeating the Nazis in World WarII), and the importance of a strong, centralized state in protecting Russians(both those within Russia and those living abroad, as in Crimea). Of course, theRussian government rationalized its recent incursion into Crimea as an effort toprotect ethnic Russians residing there, an overtly nationalist argument.In fact, nationalism is a common thread running through the two mostsignificant stories coming out of Russia in the six months prior to the Ukrainecrisis. The Biryulevo riots of October 2013, where mobs of ethnic Russiansrampaged against immigrants in a Moscow neighborhood, were, in the eyes ofmany observers, an alarming sign of surging xenophobia within the Russianpopulation.5 Similarly, the Sochi Olympics featured strong nationalist themesglorifying Russian history and cultural achievements in the opening and closingceremonies, which the Kremlin clearly used to signal the return of Russia as aneconomic and geopolitical force.A2: Sanctions Russia-China AllianceThere is no evidence that Russia and China wouldn’t enter into an alliance without the sanctions. They have other motivations fro ties, such as energy cooperationDr. Michael Ivanovich, December 15, 2015, CNBC, Russia’s long Asia history makes Xi, Medvedev cosy on energy, defense, trade, DOA: 12-16-15This is to show that, contrary to the political folklore, Russians have not been chased back to Asia by Western sanctions over the Ukrainian civil war; their strengthening ties with Asia are simply meant to reinforce a strategically and geographically more balanced policy enunciated at the beginning of this century, well before China and the rest of Asia became a fashionable must-do political, economic and military pivot. As the 40-year negotiations on territorial issues along their 2,700-mile border were drawing to a close, Moscow and Beijing decided to establish an economic and security framework for their closer ties by setting up the SCO in 2001, with a number of smaller Central Asian countries. The SCO members (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) just finished their annual summit meeting in the central China's Zhengzhou City, where trade, investment, finance, transportation and cultural exchanges were discussed. And, in a sign of times, acute problems of terrorism were at the top of the agenda. Aligning with China doesn’t solve the economic problems created by the sanctions, so the alliance doesn’t make the economic power of the sanctions irrelevant HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Judy Dempsey is a nonresident senior associate at HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Carnegie Europe and editor-in-chief of HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Strategic Europe, December 18, 2015, Newsweek, Lifting Sanctions Against Russia Would Be a Terrible Mistake, DOA: 12-18-15More worrying for an economy that relies on oil and gas exports to maintain growth—exports whose prices are at record lows—is the creeping stagnation that began before the Ukraine crisis. And as Guriev argues, Russian trade and economic deals with China will not reverse the decline, however much the Kremlin tries to promote the idea that it does not need the West and can find a savior in China.China and Russia will never form a complete alliance, which is what their impact assumesFu Ying, How China Sees Russia. By: Ying, Fu, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2016, Vol. 95, Issue 1. Fu Ying is the current vice minister of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China. She was the Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom from March 2007 to 2009.Nevertheless, China has no interest in a formal alliance with Russia, nor in forming an anti-U.S. or anti-Western bloc of any kind. Rather, Beijing hopes that China and Russia can maintain their relationship in a way that will provide a safe environment for the two big neighbors to achieve their development goals and to support each other through mutually beneficial cooperation, offering a model for how major countries can manage their differences and cooperate in ways that strengthen the international system.China bucking the Russians nowZbigniew Brezinski, December 11, 2015, Brezinski is the former national security advisor to President Carter, Once a Hawk, Brezinski sees hope for US-Russian RelationsMH: Should we be worried about Russia cooperating with China—the other great power—in opposition to the United States?I would think not. In the short term the geostrategic interests of China favor stability over conflict. Stability permits China to steadily increase its influence in pursuing its “One Belt, One Road” program, which is a twin program to increase Chinese access to the Indian Ocean and by sea and railroad into Central Asia, and through these countries into the West, and thereby gradually and carefully shift the balance of power in Central Asia between Russia and China in favor of China. The Russians can do nothing about it. And the countries involved welcome it, with the exception at this time of Kyrgyzstan. They know their independence would disappear if they became an integral part of the Moscow-promoted Eurasian Union.… The Chinese are very good at being neutral publicly, but privately helping one side or another. And recently they voted in favor of Ukraine becoming a member of the U.N. Security Council. That’s hardly something the Russians favoredChina will never fully align with Russia because China wants to protect its economic relations with the West. Their evidence only speaks to Russian motivationsSurgei Gureiv, December 22, 2015, Pakistan Observor, DOA: 12-23-15Another important element of the Kremlin’s strategy has been its pivot to Asia. Russia assumed that stronger ties with China would absorb the economic impact of a break with the West. In this sense, Russia was seeking not so much to deglobalize as to redirect trade and investment flows from West to East. Yet these hopes have not materialized. Russia has managed to sign quite a few protocols of intentions and memoranda of understanding with China, but binding agreements and tangible investments have yet to follow. There may be several explanations for this. First and foremost, while China values its relationship with Russia, its economic relations with the West are simply much more important—not only to the Chinese government but also to state-owned banks and corporations. The latter, in particular, have learned from the painful experience of the French bank BNP Paribas, which paid a $9 billion fine for violating U.S. sanctions against Iran: they understand that losing their U.S. business would be even more costly than obeying the sanctions. Another possible explanation is that Chinese negotiators may have decided to wait until their Russian counterparts become more desperate—and then offer them better terms. This theory does not provide grounds for much optimism about Russia’s predicament. With the price of oil and the value of the ruble both falling and China’s own economic growth slowing down, the space for grand bilateral initiatives is shrinking. China’s main geoeconomic project, One Belt, One Road, will also require tens of billions of dollars, and China may not be able to afford too many new expensive investment projects. Finally, Chinese corporate bosses may also be affected by political pressures at home. Given President Xi Jinping’s unprecedented anticorruption campaign, they may be feeling more cautious regarding deals with Russia’s notoriously corrupt state companies.There were economic ties before the implementation of the 2014 sanctionsFu Ying, How China Sees Russia. By: Ying, Fu, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2016, Vol. 95, Issue 1. Fu Ying is the current vice minister of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China. She was the Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom from March 2007 to 2009.Ever since, Chinese-Russian relations have gradually improved and deepened. During the past 20 years or so, bilateral trade and investment have expanded on a massive scale. In 2011, China became Russia’s largest trading partner. In 2014 alone, China’s investment in Russia grew by 80 percent—and the trend toward more investment remains strong. To get a sense of the growth in economic ties, consider that in the early 1990s, annual bilateral trade between China and Russia amounted to around $5 billion; by 2014, it came close to $100 billion. That year, Beijing and Moscow signed a landmark agreement to construct a pipeline that, by 2018, will bring as much as 38 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas to China every year. The two countries are also planning significant deals involving nuclear power generation, aerospace manufacturing, high-speed rail, and infrastructure development. Furthermore, they are cooperating on new multinational financial institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank brics, and the brics foreign exchange reserve pool.Economic incentives for Russia-China cooperationDr. Michael Ivanovich, December 15, 2015, CNBC, Russia’s long Asia history makes Xi, Medvedev cosy on energy, defense, trade, DOA: 12-16-15Energy, of course, remains Russia's main export item to China. Mr. Medvedev seems happy with "tens of billions of dollars" coming into Russia from that business. With nearly a million barrels of oil per day flowing to China, Russia has edged out the Saudis as China's largest energy supplier. In a recent interview with Russian media, Mr. Medvedev was also talking about a huge expansion of energy and other businesses following a number of already signed investment contracts with China. He was probably alluding to 58 large investment projects agreed last June in Saint Petersburg during the meeting of the Sino-Russian government investment commission. The two countries now seem determined to take their economic and political cooperation to an entirely new level by combining the China-sponsored Belt and Road Initiative with development projects under way in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.Partnership is self-defeatingBaker & Glosserman 15 (Carl Baker is the director of programs and co-editor of Comparative Connections at Pacific Forum, CSIS and an adjunct professor with the International Studies Department at Hawaii Pacific University. P A graduate of the Air War College, he has an M.A. in public administration from the University of Oklahoma and a B.A. in anthropology from the University of Iowa. Brad Glosserman is executive director at Pacific Forum CSIS and co-editor of Comparative Connections.J.D. from George Washington University, an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. from Reed College. May 2015 “Comparative Connections A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations”, )As a result, China and Russia have been reluctant to turn their strategic partnership relationship into an alliance, even if they perceive that their strategic space is been squeezed by tightening of the military alliances by the world’s most powerful countries (NATO and the US-led alliances with Asian countries) in the name of collective defense. It that sense, China and Russia are not just being haunted by the ghost of WWII, but also that of World War I, when major powers in the West (except the US) declared war on each other in 10 days. If anything, the world today is more dangerous than 100 years ago with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of nation-states in a far less balanced world than either the pre-World War I era or the Cold War. In this context, one wonders how long the current strategic partnership relationship (not alliance) between Russia and China would continue. Russia-China alliance doesn’t cause wars. Ikenberry 14 (G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and George Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College, University of Oxford. MAY/JUNE 2014 ISSUE, “The Illusion of Geopolitics The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order”)Not only does Mead underestimate the strength of the United States and the order it built; he also overstates the degree to which China and Russia are seeking to resist both. (Apart from its nuclear ambitions, Iran looks like a state engaged more in futile protest than actual resistance, so it shouldn’t be considered anything close to a revisionist power.) Without a doubt, China and Russia desire greater regional influence. China has made aggressive claims over maritime rights and nearby contested islands, and it has embarked on an arms buildup. Putin has visions of reclaiming Russia’s dominance in its “near abroad.” Both great powers bristle at U.S. leadership and resist it when they can.But China and Russia are not true revisionists. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami has said, Putin’s foreign policy is “more a reflection of his resentment of Russia’s geopolitical marginalization than a battle cry from a rising empire.” China, of course, is an actual rising power, and this does invite dangerous competition with U.S. allies in Asia. But China is not currently trying to break those alliances or overthrow the wider system of regional security governance embodied in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the East Asia Summit. And even if China harbors ambitions of eventually doing so, U.S. security partnerships in the region are, if anything, getting stronger, not weaker. At most, China and Russia are spoilers. They do not have the interests—let alone the ideas, capacities, or allies—to lead them to upend existing global rules and institutions.In fact, although they resent that the United States stands at the top of the current geopolitical system, they embrace the underlying logic of that framework, and with good reason. Openness gives them access to trade, investment, and technology from other societies. Rules give them tools to protect their sovereignty and interests.Despite controversies over the new idea of “the responsibility to protect” (which has been applied only selectively), the current world order enshrines the age-old norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention. Those Westphalian principles remain the bedrock of world politics—and China and Russia have tied their national interests to them (despite Putin’s disturbing irredentism).It should come as no surprise, then, that China and Russia have become deeply integrated into the existing international order. They are both permanent members of the UN Security Council, with veto rights, and they both participate actively in the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the G-20. They are geopolitical insiders, sitting at all the high tables of global governance. Russia-China cooperation important for world stabilityXinhua General News Service, May 20, 2014 Commentary: Closer China-Russia cooperation needed for world development, stabilityBy holding their second face-to-face talks within three months, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, have infused new vitality into bilateral ties and cooperation. The frequency of top-level meetings is an indication both of the increasing amity between Beijing and Moscow and of the deepening personal friendship between the two leaders -- two cornerstones for the future development of China-Russia relations. Hailing China as a reliable friend, Putin said on Monday in Moscow that expanding cooperation with China is undoubtedly Russia's diplomatic priority. With bilateral trade nearing 90 billion U.S. dollars in 2013 and their political coordination growing smoother, China and Russia have advanced their relationship to its all-time best. Yet they should and can do more. Closer China-Russia cooperation is a requirement for achieving common development, promoting international fairness and justice, and maintaining world peace. The extensive consensus reached by the two presidents will undoubtedly inject fresh impetus into the various bilateral cooperation projects as well as their coordination in the international arena. For one thing, in a turbulent global economy it is of crucial significance for the two countries to strengthen mutually beneficial economic and trade relations and expand mutual investment. For another, complicated political and security challenges are still haunting the world, which demands that the two global heavyweights work more closely to safeguard the international order and world stability. China-Russia cooperation in this area is particularly necessary amid alarming attempts by the likes of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to tamper with World War II history and disrupt the post-war order. That said, the two large economies and hefty players should seize the historic opportunity to further boost their cooperation in various fields for the sake both of themselves and of the world at large. China-Russia military cooperation stabilizes AsiaChina Daily European Edition, May 29, 2014 China-Russia military cooperation serves regional stability: spokesmanBEIJING - Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng on Thursday said China-Russia military cooperation "has a positive meaning" for bilateral relations and regional stability. Geng told a press briefing that recent Joint Sea-2014 drills in the East China Sea were "successful" and armed forces of the two countries will carry out more cooperation. Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin reached an important consensus during their meeting in Shanghai last week, Geng said, noting military-to-military cooperation in various fields has achieved remarkable results. The Joint Sea-2014 drills, inspected by Xi and Putin, made breakthroughs in various aspects and enhanced the two naval forces' ability for joint action, according to Geng. A delegation of Russian paratroopers has come to China on exchanges with Chinese counterparts, Geng said, and a Chinese delegation will participate in the Second Tank Biathlon Championships in August at Moscow's invitation. Both armed forces will participate in "Peace Mission 2014", a multi-national, anti-terror drill under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, he added. The pragmatic exchanges and cooperation showed China-Russia mutual trust and strategic coordination has reached a higher level and is conducive to bilateral ties and regional peace and stability, Geng said. No military threat from the Russia-China relationshipRita Boland, Signal, June 2014 China and Russia Pose an Array of Dangers to the WestIn terms of the Russia-China relationship, Nation says threats from a Moscow-Bejing axis are overrated. The two countries are the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that also includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Superficially, the two powers try to assert an enduring cooperation, but they have many disagreements, including how China penetrates to other parts of Asia. "Russia can't really, do anything about these situations," Nation explains. "It's a junior partner in its relationship with China. This is a big change in how things used to be."A2: Undermining Russia’s Economy Hurts the Global EconomyRussia is basically irrelevant to the global economySam Ro, August 11, 2014, Business Insider, Russia is Puny, DOA: 12-18-15Russia's recent activities have captured the attention of the world. Its role in destabilizing Ukraine has earned it economic sanctions from the U.S. and the European Union. And Russia has returned fire with economic sanctions of its own, including sweeping bans on food imports from the West. While these sanctions are likely to affect Russia and some of its trading partners materially, they are also likely to have a surprisingly small impact on the global economy as a whole. "In principle, the size of Russia’s economy — less than 3% of global GDP — suggests a limited impact on the global economy," writes Barclays' Christian Keller. Keller offered this eyeopening chart (see below) of how Russia fits into the bigger picture. As you can see, Russia accounts for less than 2% of the world's imports. The financial industry's exposure to Russia is also quite small. Relative to the U.S. and other developed economies, the EU has much more at risk. And it certainly doesn't help the EU that its economic recovery story has been falling apart. Still, the EU's exposure to Russia is small. Exports to Russia account for less than 3% of total exports. Even food exports to Russia account for just a fraction of a percent of total exports. "By themselves, Russia-related sanctions should not have much impact on the global economy," Keller said.A2: Sanctions Cause Russian Cyber AttacksThis is silly – Russia has been engaging in cyber attacks for a long time and will continue to do so. There is no reason that sanctions are a unique triggerAP, December 21, 2015, Huffington Post, US Not Prepared to Defend Power Grid from Cyberattacks, DOA: 12-24-15In 2012 and 2013, in well-publicized attacks, Russian hackers successfully sent and received encrypted commands to U.S. public utilities and power generators; some private firms concluded this was an effort to position interlopers to act in the event of a political crisisNo impact – there are cyber attacks all the time and we are all still here. Literally, not a single person has died.[There is no evidence that a Russian cyber attack shut-down the Pentagon for 2 weeks. They have no evidence and this would have been all over the news].Russia has aggressive cyber capabilities but does not use themManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of cardOne important observation from the analysis of this data is that there has only been one cyber dispute that accompanied a conventional armed conflict. Several vandalism and DDoS incidents disrupted government and telecommunications companies in the tiny state of Georgia during its five-day conflict with Russia. These incidents were not part of any military strategy; rather, they were propagandist messages and disruptive measures utilized to instill fear and confusion in the Georgian government and population. As noted in Chapter 2, Russia is one of the most cyber-capable states on the globe; therefore Russian restraint, even during a military campaign, is evident given the lack of severity of their incidents. Thus no state has opted to open the Pandora’s box of escalated cyber conflict during conventional military campaigns. Opportunities are replete: the Iraq War of 2003, the NATO Libya campaign, and possibly Syria, if international intervention is ever initiated, are all examples. We have observed evidence for cyber restraint even among the most capable states in the international system. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 95). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.Empirically denied and ineffective for RussiaManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of cardThat restraint exists in the realm of cyber conflict is an idea few seem ready to engage. Some have begun to make this point in various forums. Rid (2011, 2013) argues that cyber war in the extreme sense that death will result has not yet occurred, and is unlikely to occur. “Cyber war has never happened in the past, it does not occur in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb our future” (Rid 2013: xiv). Likewise, Gartzke (2013) develops the logic for cyber war being utilized by states as a low-level form of conflict. We (2014) have made this point in our research on Russian foreign policy, which argues that cyber conflict is literally the least damaging and easiest option that Russia could use to retaliate against Estonia during their dust-up in 2007. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 41). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.No cyber attacks – civilian harm, can only be used once, can be reversed to target the attacker, retribution, resource limits, need luck, lack of assetsManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of cardWe find that the security dilemma has no place in these international interactions. The cyber world is nebulous; an infiltration against a military facility in this realm could bleed into the public sector. Malicious cyber incidents on infrastructure have been and will continue to be rare to nonexistent because states are restrained due to the high probability of civilian harm, the nature of the weapons (single use), and the weak payoffs if utilized (Gartzke 2013). These types of offensive cyber actions are just as unlikely as interstate nuclear or chemical weapons attacks. There is a system of normative restraint in cyber operations based on the conditions of collateral damage, plus the factors of blowback and replication. Foreign policy tactics in the cyber world can be replicated and reproduced. Any cyber weapon used can be turned right back on its initiator. On top of this, it is likely that severe cyber operations will be bring retribution and consequences that many states are not willing to accept. We have seen many interstate conflicts since the advent of the Internet age, but the largest and only cyber operation thus far during a conventional military conflict, the 2008 Russo-Georgian skirmish, consisted of almost trivial DDoS and vandalism. Since then, Russia has even avoided using cyber weapons during the Crimean and larger Ukrainian crises of 2014. Other operations are mainly propaganda operations or occur in the realm of espionage. That the United States did not use cyber tactics against Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libya, at least as directed at the executive level, signifies that cyber tactics are typically restrained despite significant constituencies in the military that want to use the weapons. Stuxnet is the outlier, as our data demonstrate, not the norm or the harbinger of the future to come. Cyber operations are limited in that their value is negligible, the consequences of a massive cyber incident are drastic, and the requirements to carry one out are vast. The idea of a lone cyber hacker being able to bring states to their knees is a fantastic one. Cyber operations like Stuxnet require an exceptional amount of funds, technical knowledge, luck, and on-the-ground assets for successful implementation. Massive and truly dangerous cyber operations are beyond the means of most countries. These statements are not opinions, but contentions made based on the facts at hand and the data we have collected. We also see regionalism dominate in cyberspace. Despite the vastness and transboundary capacity of the Internet, most operations are limited to local targets connected to traditional causes of conflict, such as territorial disputes and leadership disagreements. Issues are important (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981) in world politics and in cyber politics. This is why international relations scholarship is so important in relation to the cyber question. Cyber operations are not taken devoid of their international and historical contexts. What has happened in the past will influence how future technologies are leveraged and where they are applied. The goal of this book will be to use this theoretical frame to explain the cyber conflict dynamics of rival states, as well as non-state actors willing and able to launch cyber malice. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (pp. 16-17). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. No impactManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of cardWe developed our theory of cyber engagement fully in Chapter 3. The argument considers that cyber restraint is expected to dominate cyber interactions and should be predictive of future cyber operations. States will restrain themselves from crossing the “red lines” of cyber conflict because of the high operational and normative cost associated with these operations. They will not shut down military networks, knock out power grids, or black out Wall Street; the fear of blowback and retaliation not only in cyberspace, but by conventional means as well, is too great. States will also avoid these actions because of fears of collateral damage and infecting the rest of the Internet. Actions taken in cyberspace tend to invade all aspects of cyberspace. Even when states take actions to keep operations in the realm of cyber, the operations tend to spread and proliferate in ways not predicted. Escalated offensive capabilities will not be used because they could lead directly to war, civilian harm, and economic retaliation, which would then escalate conflict among states. These tactics would spread the conflict from the cyber realm to conventional conflict. Therefore, restraint is what we expect to find when we examine cyber conflict among states. States will do what they believe they can get away with and then will go no further. Restraint is the outcome we expect to see among states, while the process we expect to see at work is what we term cyber straitjacketing. The low level and limited amount of cyber conflict we do observe will mostly be between regional rivals, an unexpected result given the global reach of cyber technologies. Cyber regionalism is the assertion that most rival interactions in cyberspace will have a regional context, usually tied to territorial issues and other traditional issues between regional actors. However, because cyber conflict is restrained, these cyber incidents and disputes will usually take the form of propaganda, vandalism, or inconvenient denial of service methods and will not escalate to militarized conflict solely because of cyber issues. Escalation, especially among regional rivals, has been prevented through restraint thus far. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 213). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.DA turns case – the root cause of cyber conflicts is warManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of cardThis leads to another issue that we raise throughout this volume: the need for the settlement of the root causes of conflict. Cyber conflicts are not disconnected from the normal international relations policy sphere. International cyber operations are directly connected to the long history of interactions between states. Traditional security rivals extend to cyberspace. Ignoring this process misses the root causes of cyber conflicts and instead commits the error of focusing on the tactic rather than the fundamental issues of disagreement between states. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 210). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. Cyber straight-jacketing means no attacks and diplomacy solves any impactManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of cardOur notion of restraint being in operation in the cyber world also suggests the concept of straitjacketing cyber actors. Restraint alone cannot really be used to describe the policy process a state might consider when contemplating a cyber incident. Restraint represents the outcome of the policy process; the term that outlines the process under consideration might be more accurately termed cyber straitjacketing. States are straitjacketed in their ability to utilize cyber methods. In some ways, they are prevented from using the technology in order to prevent self-harm. Blowback and replication are real issues that need to be confronted in the cyber world. Any weapon used in this domain can be reproduced and directed back at the initiator. Using cyber tactics in many ways can harm the state more than it helps it. Likely the use of the technology will not produce a change in behavior of the target, but the action will be punished, and the cyber incident will become public. It is for these reasons that states will often willingly place their operatives in what might be considered constrained restriction. The consequences of using the technology at a maximum level are just too devastating. Another way to describe straitjacketing is that states are handcuffed in the operation of cyber tactics. Extreme actions are limited, because the conduct of these technologies is ungoverned and unlimited. The full range of motion is limited, due to the nature of the tactic and the taboo associated with its usage. Whichever term is preferred, the outcome is still the same: the limitation of action. While there might be negative connotations associated with each term given their history, the reality remains— that states are likely constrained in their actions, despite protestations that the international system is governed by anarchy. The paradox here is that no actor likes to be constrained in its policy choices. While the functional outcomes of the policy process and choices available to states are limited in the cyber realm, offensive posturing remains an option. States can threaten cyber retaliation in order to restrain a target from escalating a conflict, but the actual method of retaliation is often never in the cyber realm. When China infiltrates the United States in cyberspace, the United States utilizes diplomacy to solve the problem, rather than responding in a tit-for-tat manner. This avoids needless escalation, which could possibly get out of hand. Once again, the demonstration of responsibility of state-based actors defies conventional wisdom. States will even be prevented from using a cheap and quick tactic like cyber methods, because of the consequences of this use of the technology. When confronted with a new dynamic with immense potential, often states are prevented from utilizing the technology because of the difficulties in application, evaluation, and implementation. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 65). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.A2: Sanctions Meaning Russian Military Involvement in Syria, No Resolution of the CrisisIf Russian intervention in Syria is stopped, Russia will just intervene elsewhereAngela Stent, 2016, Putin’s Power Play in Syria. By: Stent, Angela, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2016, Vol. 95, Issue 1 Angela Stent is a foreign policy expert specializing in U.S. and European relations with Russia and Russian foreign policy.Even if the United States finds an effective way to respond to Russia’s moves in Syria, or even cooperate with the Russians there, there is no guarantee that Putin won’t try to assert Russia’s military presence elsewhere: he has surprised the West twice in recent years and may yet have other ambitions. Iraq has hinted that it may ask Russia for help in fighting isis. When asked in October about whether Russia would intervene in Iraq, Putin replied that Russia had not yet received a request from Baghdad. Russia has also indicated that it will not stand by if the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates further, as this would threaten Russia’s neighborhood by destabilizing Central Asia.Their claim is factually false – Russia is leading a plan for peace in Syria nowBradley Klapper, 12-18-15, Military Times, Russia calling the shots as nations lock-down Syria plan, DOA: 12-18-15WASHINGTON — As the U.S.?and world powers gather again in an attempt to end Syria's civil war, Russia appears to be calling the shots. Nations meeting Friday in New York and the U.N. will essentially be negotiating a Russian plan for a "political transition," based on the Syrian government's consent and with no clear reference to President Bashar Assad's departure. And as they look for a way to secure and enforce a peace that has proved all too elusive since 2011, Russia's recent military intervention appears to be providing the key leverage. As President Obama said earlier this month, rebels who join the process could enjoy "pockets of cease-fire" where they no longer face Syrian or Russian bombs. The implication was that those who refuse could still be targeted In any event, diplomats from East and West say the chances of ending the conflict between Assad's military and moderate rebel forces are better now than they've been for a long while. All speak of seizing the momentum of several groundbreaking meetings in recent months. For the first time, the rise of the Islamic State group has the U.S., Russia and even sworn enemies such as Saudi Arabia and Iran committed to a blueprint for peace negotiations and a set of principles for Syria's future. These are expected to be endorsed by the U.N. Security Council on Friday, following meetings among foreign ministers in New York. The body has passed no such resolution previously. There are other signs of progress. The opposition is finalizing the makeup of its delegation for talks with the government that are supposed to start next month. Jordan is close to completing a list of militant groups that could join a unity government, and which, like the Islamic State group and al-Qaida, would be declared terrorists and enemies of all.Russia keeps bombing in Syria for practice, they can’t reverse that motivationJames Marson, December 17, 2015, Wall Street Journal, Vladimir Putin Says Russia’s Economic Crisis Has Peaked, DOA: 12-17-15The Kremlin leader returned to center stage in world politics when he launched an air war in Syria this fall. He defended the campaign’s cost, saying: “It is hard to imagine a better training drill. In principle we can train there for a long time without making a substantial dent in our budget.”Russia in Syria to boost its Middle East leadership, they can’t reverse that motivationAngela Stent, 2016, Putin’s Power Play in Syria. By: Stent, Angela, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2016, Vol. 95, Issue 1 Angela Stent is a foreign policy expert specializing in U.S. and European relations with Russia and Russian foreign policy.The Syrian gambit is thus part of a broader move to recoup Russian influence in the Middle East. In the second half of 2015, the leaders of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates all visited Moscow, and some have signed agreements to purchase arms from Russia. In July, Saudi Arabia pledged to invest up to $10 billion in Russia, mostly in agricultural projects; if Riyadh delivers on that promise, it will be the single largest foreign investment in the country. Israel and Russia have maintained a steady dialogue as the crisis has progressed in Syria, partly to ensure that Russian aircraft don’t clash with the Israeli jets that have occasionally struck targets in Syria, including those associated with the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah, which has sent thousands of fighters to Syria to aid the Assad regime. Although the Israelis have no particular affection for Assad, they seem to share Russia’s preference that his regime stay in place, because what comes after Assad could be more detrimental to Israel’s security: Israeli officials have quietly pointed out that under Assad’s rule, Israel’s border with Syria has been calm.A2: Sanctions Hurt European UnityEU just unanimously agreed to extend sanctionsGabrielle Steinhauser, December 18, 2015, Wall Street Journal, DOA: 12-18-15BRUSSELS—The European Union moved on Friday to extend economic sanctions on Russia for six months, with senior officials from the bloc’s 28 member states signing off on the decision. If no last-minute objections are raised in the bloc’s capitals this weekend, the decision will become official on Monday afternoon, EU officials said. Sanctions would then be extended from late January to late July.Multiple other causes of European DisunionNgaire Woods, The European Disunion. By: Woods, Ngaire, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2016, Vol. 95, Issue 1 Ngaire Woods is the Founding Dean of the Blavatnik School of Government and Professor of Global Economic Governance at the University of OxfordThe eu is under siege. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has tested the single-border principle at the core of the union. The ongoing financial crisis in Greece has strained the single currency. The United Kingdom will soon hold a referendum on whether or not to exit the eu. The survival of an eu with a single border, a single currency, and a stable membership appears less likely than ever before. European federalists dismiss these problems as growing pains. The eu is an incredibly ambitious work in progress, they note, one that is rooted in a vision of Europe that challenges deepseated notions of sovereignty and statehood. Surveying the destruction during World War II, Jean Monnet, considered by many to be a founding father of the eu, wrote, “There will be no peace in Europe if the states are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty…. The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development. The European states must constitute themselves into a federation.” Monnet’s union would be built through cooperation and common markets and would ultimately resemble a “United States of Europe,” a phrase later embraced by Winston Churchill to describe his own vision of Europe’s best possible future. The question is whether that vision can withstand the blows that have rained down on the eu since the financial crisis began in 2008. When the euro was adopted, in 1999, many voiced concerns that the monetary union would prevent countries from responding properly to financial crises because they were forfeiting the ability to devalue their currencies, which most economists contend is the best response to such situations. But the political logic of binding the continent together through a common currency trumped the doubts. Supporters of the single currency argued that crises could be averted through adherence to a set of rules (the Maastricht rules) that prevented countries from accumulating too much debt. The euro supporters’ view took a major hit in 2008, when the financial crisis spread from the United States to Europe. In October 2009, George Papandreou became Greece’s prime minister and discovered that his country had vastly underreported its debt levels. Greece’s creditors, particularly French and German banks, were overexposed. The eu called in the International Monetary Fund, fearing that the crisis would spread. It did, and soon Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain were all affected. Negotiations between each government and the so-called troika—the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the imf—resulted in eu-imf programs in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The eu response, and the showdowns it has produced in the subsequent years, has been interpreted by observers in two ways. One view holds that the crisis has drawn Europe closer together. This is what the political scientist Kathleen McNamara argues in her thoughtful new book, The Politics of Everyday Europe. Despite a fraying sense of European solidarity, she writes, eu member states committed roughly one trillion euros to keep the currency afloat and the eurozone’s member states financially stable. The eu has also inaugurated new institutions designed to help the member states respond to crises: the European Stability Mechanism; a new fiscal compact; and a European banking union, currently under construction. The power of the European Central Bank has increased, she writes, making it “the most effective and active actor in the Eurozone crisis,” and European leaders have met more and more frequently in summits “too numerous to count.” A less sanguine interpretation of the crisis is that the eu, far from being drawn together, has been split down the middle. Southern European countries, including Greece, Italy, and Spain, blame the eu for punitive austerity measures that have left millions out of work. Meanwhile, northern countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, complain that the eu has not been strict enough with highly indebted member states; some officials in those countries, including German Finance Minister Wolfgang Sch?uble, have openly called on Greece to exit the monetary union. (The refugee crisis has precipitated a similar split, as southern and eastern states have shouldered the bulk of the burden, breeding resentment toward their northern and western neighbors.) At this point, it requires a great deal of optimism to interpret the eu’s response to the eurozone crisis as proof that the union’s institutions can steer Europe toward more integration. More likely is the prospect of a more fractious, divided union, drifting away from the vision of its founders and champions. McNamara views the eu’s response to the financial crisis as evidence of the union’s successful integration. Such a response would have been impossible, McNamara writes, were it not for “decades of slow accumulation of everyday symbols and practices” that “created a permissive consensus for such political developments.” These “symbols and practices” include not just the single currency and the absence of border controls but also “European” buildings and spectacles, a common market in European soccer players, a shared statistics agency (Eurostat), and a European diplomatic corps. Put simply, the quiet introduction of European “labels, mental maps, and narratives” has built a European way of interpreting the world. The next phase in creating a federated Europe will not be easy, McNamara concedes. She argues that it will require greater democratic representation, more citizen participation, and a higher quality of debate. “The eu needs more overt contestation and direct discussion of its policies, and debate over its leaders,” McNamara writes.Optimistically, McNamara sees such change happening already. As evidence, she points to the most recent election of the European Commission president and to the 2014 eu parliamentary elections, which she describes as “much more publicly contested than any before in eu history,” noting that they received “wide coverage in national newspapers” and that “various trans-European interest groups—from students to environmental activists to high-priced consultants”— sought to mobilize eu-wide constituencies.The 2014 eu parliamentary elections may well have been “more publicly contested,” as McNamara argues, but the results swept an extraordinary number of anti-eu and anti-euro parties into power. In France, the right-wing National Front won the largest share of the vote; in the United Kingdom, that distinction went to the anti-eu uk Independence Party. In the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom, which has advocated withdrawal from the eu, won more than 13 percent of the votes (it had won an even greater percentage in 2009). In Greece, the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn won just over nine percent of the votes.In light of severe government cutbacks across Europe, such results are not surprising. In the wake of the 2008 crisis, austerity has meant fewer jobs, smaller pensions, less affordable health care, tighter school budgets, and cutbacks to local services. People are feeling the pinch, and they are afraid. Meanwhile, support for populist and nationalist parties has risen, and support for the eu has declined. Between 2007 and 2013, the Pew Research Center reports, the eu’s favorability rating fell by 34 percentage points in Spain, 21 points in France, and 20 points in Italy. As McNamara notes, “The close identification of [austerity] policies with ‘Europe’ is an association that is piercing the banal authority the eu has been built on, and creating new challenges for legitimation.”Public opinion toward the eu has improved recently, but not much, with the median figure for eu favorability rising from 46 percent in 2013 to 52 percent in 2014. Eurobarometer, a series of public opinion surveys conducted by the European Commission, has shown slight increases in the percentage of Europeans who say they have a positive image of the eu (41 percent in May 2015, up from 39 percent in November 2014), trust the eu (40 percent, up from 37 percent), and feel that their voice counts in the eu (42 percent, up from 40 percent).It’s unclear, however, whether this trend has much to do with the new institutions the eu created in the wake of the crisis and which McNamara hails. Once the crisis erupted, it became clear that the eu’s rules on debt management were not being enforced, that its banking regulations were inadequate and ill equipped to deal with cross-border issues, and that the eu had no centralized fiscal capacity to bail out a member state. Still, the eurozone’s members held together, aware that the cost of a Greek exit would be greater than the cost of a bailout. In 2012, they signed a treaty creating the European Stability Mechanism, which comes with an emergency lending capacity of 500 billion euros. To borrow from the new fund, countries must submit an outline of their economic programs for approval by the troika and ratify the new fiscal compact, a strict set of rules designed to prevent countries from going into debt—in part by threatening economic sanctions against those that do not comply. Eu leaders have also committed to a new banking union.The new institutions may sound promising, but the details reveal significant weaknesses. Germany remains terrified of any initiative that involves sharing liabilities. And so the banking union has no common deposit insurance, no simple resolution process for failing financial institutions, and no single backstop with which to bail out banks. The fiscal compact is simply another version of the Stability and Growth Pact, introduced in 1999, which failed when France and Germany did not abide by it. There is little to suggest that this time around will be any more successful. And the European Stability Mechanism, for its part, is less a sign of European integration than of continued German dominance. It will raise 500 billion euros by selling bonds that will enjoy creditworthiness only because, to quote the credit-rating agency Moody’s, they are “closely correlated” with key shareholders. Put simply, the markets assume that the European Stability Mechanism will reflect Germany’s intentions, and the eurozone governments know that there will be negative repercussions at any hint that Germany disapproves of a loan.THE FUTURE OF EUROPEThe eu has survived the crises of the past few years so far, but it seems unlikely to cohere any further into a tightly bound superstate. Three other possibilities seem more likely. The rise of localism, regionalism, and even separatism—witness the renewed strength of Scottish nationalists and Catalan separatists—suggests that many Europeans yearn for more self-determination. One way the eu could respond is by accommodating, rather than blocking, the emergence of small independent nations that might see closer ties with Brussels as a form of freedom from overbearing national capitals. Such a future would certainly fit within McNamara’s vision of a more politically active, participatory Europe.This possibility was derided after the interwar years as a recipe for conflict and instability. Indeed, it was to defend Europe from the threat of various nationalisms and regionalisms that Monnet developed his concept of a European federation. In reality, however, the growth of the eu has gone hand in hand with demands for autonomy within it. Indeed, the eu has itself made such demands plausible: Scots would likely find the idea of secession from the United Kingdom far less attractive if there were no eu for an independent Scotland to join. The problem for the eu is that if it were to accept Scotland as a member, the Basques, the Catalans, and others would soon line up to be next, opening the floodgates to secessionism. This is not something major powers in the eu will permit.A second possible future would see the reinforcing of Germany’s de facto hegemony within the eu. France and Italy are declining in influence and economic power, and the United Kingdom is not a eurozone member, so Germany has become ever more powerful as the core of the eu. This observation is curiously absent from McNamara’s book. German leadership is driving European integration forward, providing the resources to ensure that the eu succeeds, even as the resolve of other member states weakens. Yet for many states, the eurozone crisis underscored the threat of unchecked German influence. As Bill Cash, the chair of the British Parliament’s European Scrutiny Committee, put it recently, “The European Union has morphed into an increasingly undemocratic German-dominated Europe.” As a result, countries have become less interested in a European federation, even as they continue to follow eu rules and regulations. And poorer, smaller nations understandably fear a union whose stability would depend on a German chancellor’s self-restraint.A third future for Europe hinges on the continent’s changing demographics. Crucially, Europe’s low birthrates and aging populations have created a need for immigrant labor. In 2014, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Commission reported that Europe’s workingage population is projected to decline by 7.5 million between 2013 and 2020, and in a scenario of zero net immigration, it could decline by up to 11.7 million. The continent is suffering from a shortage of skilled labor just as it needs most to compete globally for talent. Meanwhile, Europe has been flooded by what the oecd calls “an unprecedented number of asylum seekers and refugees,” which includes 350,000 to 450,000 people who “could be granted refugee or similar status, more than in any previous European refugee crisis since World War II.”Europe is quickly becoming one of the most diverse regions of the world. Germany now has the third-highest number of immigrants of any country, according to the United Nations, and more than 16 million of its 81 million people are of foreign or immigrant descent. The United Kingdom has the second-highest number of immigrants in the eu after Germany. As these and other European economies continue to grow, so, too, will their demand for foreign workers. Put another way, Europe will become more like the United States, since immigration will be unstoppable (geopolitically) and necessary (demographically and economically). This might make further European integration easier as old national identities become ever more porous. Countries looking for social cohesion may well turn to a broader European identity, one tied together by the “labels, mental maps, and narratives” McNamara describes. In the short term, however, it is precisely this prospect that fuels opposition to both immigration and further European integration.A2: Sanctions Hurt Europe’s EconomyThere is no impact to this argument and no explanation as to why hurting Europe’s economy makes the sanctions ON-BALANCE economically undesirableEU exports to Russia almost totally irrelevant to its economySam Ro, August 11, 2014, Business Insider, Russia is Puny, DOA: 12-18-15Russia's recent activities have captured the attention of the world. Its role in destabilizing Ukraine has earned it economic sanctions from the U.S. and the European Union. And Russia has returned fire with economic sanctions of its own, including sweeping bans on food imports from the West. While these sanctions are likely to affect Russia and some of its trading partners materially, they are also likely to have a surprisingly small impact on the global economy as a whole. "In principle, the size of Russia’s economy — less than 3% of global GDP — suggests a limited impact on the global economy," writes Barclays' Christian Keller. Keller offered this eyeopening chart (see below) of how Russia fits into the bigger picture. As you can see, Russia accounts for less than 2% of the world's imports. The financial industry's exposure to Russia is also quite small. Relative to the U.S. and other developed economies, the EU has much more at risk. And it certainly doesn't help the EU that its economic recovery story has been falling apart. Still, the EU's exposure to Russia is small. Exports to Russia account for less than 3% of total exports. Even food exports to Russia account for just a fraction of a percent of total exports. "By themselves, Russia-related sanctions should not have much impact on the global economy," Keller said.A2: Russian Military Modernization Good[This assumes sanctions hurt the economy. You should insert arguments as to why they don’t hurt the economy]They don’t have any evidence that removing sanctions stops insecurity. The US will still continue to modernize its military and still be ahead of Russia. So, Russia will still feel threatened. The same is probably true of Chinese military modernization. Nial McCarthy, June 25, 2015, Forbes, The Biggest Military Budgets as a Percentage of GDP, DOA: 12-24-15No country worldwide comes close to matching the United States in military expenditure. In 2014, US military spending reached $571 billion, a huge distance ahead of second placed China’s $129.4 billion.They have no reversal causal evidence. Not a single card says that lifting sanctions will make it possible for modernization to continue.Sanctions haven’t slowed Russian military modernization – they are modernizing nowNew York Times, December 24, 2015, Russia Rearms for a New Era, DOA: 12-24-15The country is buying, updating and developing its military equipment, with the intent to modernize 70 percent of its military by 2020. “This is Russia catching up on where the West has gotten itself technologically,” said Nick de Larrinaga at IHS Jane’s.IF they win that sanctions hurt Russia’s economy, that INCREASES Russia’s threat to the WestSmith ’11 – Director of the Potomac Institute Cyber Center(David J., former Ambassador and Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute, “Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin:? The Once and Future Czar”, Georgian Security Analysis Center, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 10/3/2011, )The danger for Russia?s neighbors is that if the Russian economy sours, Putin could follow the time-honored ? Russian tradition of lashing out at imagined enemies such as Georgia or the Baltic countries. And a conflict ? in the North Caucasus could easily spill—accidentally or purposefully—into Georgia.? Nor should the west discount the possibility of diversionary Russian obstreperousness in the Middle East or? polemics with NATO. Moscow is skillfully setting the stage for either.? Regrettably, aggression will likely be Putin?s default instinctThere is no link to their argument – Russia’s military spending is insulated from an economic downturnBloomberg Businessweek noted in 2015, June 25, DOA: 12-18-15There’s one area of growth, though, that some analysts see as Putin’s version of a stimulus: Military spending. “It’s clear that the efficiency of the military-industrial complex is the most important source of economic growth,” Putin said at a military forum on June 16. On May 12, Putin signed documents creating what he called the “industrial battalions” program, which will give thousands of draftees the option of working in defense enterprises instead of joining the regular military. According to federal budget accounts, after years of chronic funding problems for weapons makers, Russia has started to prepay for goods and services it buys from the defense industry, which employs 2.5 million Russians. Defense, national security, and law enforcement now eat up 34 percent of the Russian budget, more than double the share in 2010. That dwarfs the 18?percent spent by the U.S. last year on defense and national security, according to the Washington-based Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Still, Americans spent $615 billion last year, while the Russians spent $84 billion. “The government has two urgent tasks: strengthening security at all levels of society and promoting innovation to end the macroeconomic stagnation,” says Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of a defense ministry advisory board. “The solution to both problems is to intensify the development of the military-industrial complex.” State-run defense contractors stand to benefit: United Aircraft, which makes Sukhoi and MiG fighter jets; United Shipbuilding, now building a new fleet of destroyers; and Uralvagonzavod, maker of the brand-new T-14 Armata tank. (Each tank costs about $4?million to $5 million to make. Mass production won’t start anytime soon.) Putin’s former finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, has voiced his opposition to plans to spend 23 trillion rubles ($426?billion) through 2020 on defense. Kudrin says the defense buildup does little to solve Russia’s structural problems and the crisis it faces. Putin, who warns of a threat from the West and the need for more self-sufficiency, has vowed to spend the full amount budgeted for the military. He’s already ended the Russian military’s purchases from abroad, so the army will buy only from Russian suppliers.Unchecked Russian Aggression Causes WarUnchecked Russian influence risks extinctionFisher 15 (Max, Foreign affairs columnist @ VOX, "How World War III became possible," 6/29, )That is why, analysts will tell you, today's tensions bear far more similarity to the period before World War I: an unstable power balance, belligerence over peripheral conflicts, entangling military commitments, disputes over the future of the European order, and dangerous uncertainty about what actions will and will not force the other party into conflict. Today's Russia, once more the strongest nation in Europe and yet weaker than its collective enemies, calls to mind the turn-of-the-century German Empire, which Henry Kissinger described as "too big for Europe, but too small for the world." Now, as then, a rising power, propelled by nationalism, is seeking to revise the European order. Now, as then, it believes that through superior cunning, and perhaps even by proving its might, it can force a larger role for itself. Now, as then, the drift toward war is gradual and easy to miss — which is exactly what makes it so dangerous. But there is one way in which today's dangers are less like those before World War I, and more similar to those of the Cold War: the apocalyptic logic of nuclear weapons. Mutual suspicion, fear of an existential threat, armies parked across borders from one another, and hair-trigger nuclear weapons all make any small skirmish a potential armageddon. In some ways, that logic has grown even more dangerous. Russia, hoping to compensate for its conventional military forces' relative weakness, has dramatically relaxed its rules for using nuclear weapons. Whereas Soviet leaders saw their nuclear weapons as pure deterrents, something that existed precisely so they would never be used, Putin's view appears to be radically different. Russia's official nuclear doctrine calls on the country to launch a battlefield nuclear strike in case of a conventional war that could pose an existential threat. These are more than just words: Moscow has repeatedly signaled its willingness and preparations to use nuclear weapons even in a more limited war. This is a terrifyingly low bar for nuclear weapons use, particularly given that any war would likely occur along Russia's borders and thus not far from Moscow. And it suggests Putin has adopted an idea that Cold War leaders considered unthinkable: that a "limited" nuclear war, of small warheads dropped on the battlefield, could be not only survivable but winnable. "It’s not just a difference in rhetoric. It’s a whole different world," Bruce G. Blair, a nuclear weapons scholar at Princeton, told the Wall Street Journal. He called Putin's decisions more dangerous than those of any Soviet leader since 1962. "There’s a low nuclear threshold now that didn’t exist during the Cold War." Nuclear theory is complex and disputable; maybe Putin is right. But many theorists would say he is wrong, that the logic of nuclear warfare means a "limited" nuclear strike is in fact likely to trigger a larger nuclear war — a doomsday scenario in which major American, Russian, and European cities would be targets for attacks many times more powerful than the bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even if a nuclear war did somehow remain limited and contained, recent studies suggest that environmental and atmospheric damage would cause a "decade of winter" and mass crop die-outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine.World War 3Butters 15 (analyst citing British Intelligence Experts from Chantam House which is a independent policy institute based in London. The report was authored by two former British ambassadors to Moscow. the West fails to stand up to Vladimir Putin and Moscow, then it could initiate a chain of events which would lead to World War 3, British intelligence experts have warned. The U.K’s foreign affairs think-tank, Chatham House, has issued a report which states that Putin and Moscow could easily use tactical nuclear weapons on Europe in the future and create a possible World War 3 scenario. “Just because something is unimaginable for Western planners does not mean it is not considered a viable option by Russia.” The authors of the report include Sir Roderic Lyne and Sir Andrew Wood. The two former ambassadors to Moscow are well-aware just how ruthless Vladimir Putin can be. They are hypercritical in their condemnation of the Western leaders’ failure to predict the Ukraine crisis, and its potential to be one of the contributing factors to a World War 3 scenario. The report accuses U.S. President Barack Obama and U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron of suffering from a “collective amnesia,” and whose “weak and unconvincing responses” have encouraged Putin to further his global interests and ambitions. “The Kremlin perceives that the West lacks the will to pay the necessary price to defend its principles.” The report states that lack of effective support for the “outgunned and outmanned” Ukrainian government by the West would have far reaching consequences for the Western alliance, namely the possible risk of a World War 3 situation. “The conflict in Ukraine is a defining factor for the future of European security. Russia may have the greater interest in Ukraine, but the West has an even bigger interest in preserving the post-Cold War environment. If that is dismantled, it is conceivable that Nato and the EU could collapse too.” The report, which indicates World War 3 could be a possible outcome of current global situations if the West refuses to act accordingly, also admits that Putin currently faces the HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" biggest challenge of his 15-year rule. However, the British intelligence experts stress that Putin’s fragile position could make the Russian bear even more dangerous if provoked. “Indeed one school of thought holds that Moscow is at its most dangerous when weak.” The Express reports that the HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" intelligence paper arrives at a time when both Europe and the U.S. are facing increasing aggression and bullish manoeuvres from Putin. In May of this year, both Britain and Sweden scrambled fighters to intercept Russian bombers who were close to violating their respective airspaces, and a Russian fighter’s “sloppy and unsafe” interception of a U.S. reconnaissance plane in international aerospace above the Baltic Sea has caused the United States to file a complaint with Russia. Europe Minister David Lidington has announced, in no uncertain terms, Europe’s intentions to curb Putin’s aggressive tactics. “The blame for the current crisis lies squarely with Russia and the separatists in eastern Ukraine, who are backed by the Russian authorities. The UK is working closely with EU and G7 partners in response to Russian actions in Ukraine. By imposing a robust sanctions regime, we have shown Russia that its unjustifiable and illegal actions will not be tolerated.” What respect HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Putin will give to such words is questionable, but as the British intelligence report indicates, the West must start effectively standing up to Putin and defend what it holds dear if it is to prevent the hell and horror of a World War 3 scenario.A2: Nuclear Materials Security Cooperation Good/Sanctions DisruptThe program was mostly ended before 2014 and Congress cut funding in 2014 Julian Borger, January 25, 2015, The Guardian, US-Russian rift threatens security of nuclear material, DOA: 12-23-15The spirit of cooperation that underpinned the programme has crumbled over recent years. Under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia has increasingly bristled at the premise that it was unable to ensure the security of its own arsenal and fretted about Americans using the programme to spy on its nuclear secrets. In 2012, Moscow announced it would not extend Nunn-Lugar, but a replacement US-Russian bilateral nuclear security deal was cobbled together in its place a year later. That deal, under the framework of the Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme in Russia (MNEPR), was more limited. The US would not longer take part in the dismantling of weapons but would continue to assist safeguarding stocks of fissile plutonium and uranium. Now, even that has fallen apart. In December, Congress voted to cut funding, in part because the Ukraine war, although unspent money in the programme could still have been used. MNEPR funding cuts are not sanction relatedJulian Borger, January 25, 2015, The Guardian, US-Russian rift threatens security of nuclear material, DOA: 12-23-15A State Department official said MNEPR activities are not related to Ukraine sanctions imposed on Moscow.Russia doesn’t need the money and may divert it to its own nuclear build-upBill Gert, May 8, 2015, Washington Times, The US is Spending $60 million on Russian nuclear security, DOA: 12-23-15The administration officials told the Free Beacon there are concerns within the administration that Russia will divert the funds to help mitigate the impact of the? HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" economic sanctions, or that the money will be misused in other ways. Former Pentagon official Eric Edelman agreed. The cooperative threat reduction program made sense after the Soviet collapse, but Russia is no longer a poor country and has oil revenues that can be used to pay for securing its own material, he said in an interview. “The idea that they’re securing nuclear materials as a favor to us is absurd,” said Edelman, a former under secretary of defense for policy. “Since money is fungible, by continuing to fund these programs we are in effect having U.S. taxpayers subsidize Russia’s nuclear buildup.”A2: (Russia Relations) Iran ImpactUS and Russia can still cooperate on IranJAKES and ISACHENKOV 3/26/14Associated press staff monthlong crisis in Ukraine that led to Russia annexing the strategic Crimean Peninsula has forged a new bitterness between Moscow and Washington. It's too soon to say whether relations will fully freeze over, especially in areas where both sides share a common interest. But, "given Putin shows no signs of backing down here," former Obama administration national security adviser Tom Donilon said earlier this month, "I think we're in for a very difficult time in Russia-U.S. relations."Some key areas where the U.S. and Russia are still working together — for now.IRANBoth Russia and the U.S. have been clear about wanting to limit Iran's ability to build a nuclear bomb. At last week's negotiations session in Vienna between world powers and Iran, officials said U.S. and Russian diplomats openly agreed to ignore other topics and together focus on the talks with Tehran.Iran often sought to exploit U.S.-Russian differences in the past and it may use the current tensions to resist significant nuclear cutbacks. Moscow already has an agreeable relationship with Tehran: Russia is one of Iran's main trading partners and has sold Iran arms over the years. Russia built Iran's first nuclear reactor and is drafting an agreement to build two more.Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned last week that Moscow wouldn't like to use the negotiations with Iran as "an element of the game of raising the stakes" with the West amid tensions over Ukraine. But he added that, "if they force us into that, we will take retaliatory measures."A2: (Russia Relations) Syrian ImpactUS and Russia still coop on SyriaJAKES and ISACHENKOV 3/26/14Associated press staff monthlong crisis in Ukraine that led to Russia annexing the strategic Crimean Peninsula has forged a new bitterness between Moscow and Washington. It's too soon to say whether relations will fully freeze over, especially in areas where both sides share a common interest. But, "given Putin shows no signs of backing down here," former Obama administration national security adviser Tom Donilon said earlier this month, "I think we're in for a very difficult time in Russia-U.S. relations." Some key areas where the U.S. and Russia are still working together — for now. IRAN Both Russia and the U.S. have been clear about wanting to limit Iran's ability to build a nuclear bomb. At last week's negotiations session in Vienna between world powers and Iran, officials said U.S. and Russian diplomats openly agreed to ignore other topics and together focus on the talks with Tehran. Iran often sought to exploit U.S.-Russian differences in the past and it may use the current tensions to resist significant nuclear cutbacks. Moscow already has an agreeable relationship with Tehran: Russia is one of Iran's main trading partners and has sold Iran arms over the years. Russia built Iran's first nuclear reactor and is drafting an agreement to build two more. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned last week that Moscow wouldn't like to use the negotiations with Iran as "an element of the game of raising the stakes" with the West amid tensions over Ukraine. But he added that, "if they force us into that, we will take retaliatory measures." However, the U.S. has developed much of the negotiation strategy against Iran. Harsh U.S. and European Union sanctions against oil exports and threat of U.S. or Israeli military action has, says former U.S. Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, largely been the driving force behind Iran's willingness to negotiate. "These tools remain with or without Russian cooperation," says Jeffrey, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. SYRIA Russia and the U.S. have been at odds over Syria, where Washington and the West want to see opposition forces succeed in their three-year battle against Syrian President Bashar Assad, who has Moscow's support. Russia has sold weapons to Syria's military and repeatedly blocked United Nations resolutions to condemn or sanction Assad's government. If Russia chooses to play a spoiler on Syria, it may boost financial aid and weapons supplies to Assad. However, Russia has agreed to help broker a cease-fire and a transitional government, and over the last year has worked with the U.S. to bring Assad officials and rebel leaders to negotiate. But those efforts have failed to yield any breakthroughs. Russia is also vital in leaning on Assad's government to give up its chemical weapons stockpile — less than half of which has been shipped out against a June 30 deadline. "It's not that we need something from Russia — it's that the Syrian people need the Russians and the Iranians and anyone else with influence over the regime to keep pushing them," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said Wednesday. "Quite frankly, we have been able to work together on Syria, on things like chemical weapons, even when we very strongly disagree with other parts of their Syria policy, certainly."A2: (Russia Relations) Afghanistan ImpactUS Russia still coop on Afghan drawdownJAKES and ISACHENKOV 3/26/14Associated press staff monthlong crisis in Ukraine that led to Russia annexing the strategic Crimean Peninsula has forged a new bitterness between Moscow and Washington. It's too soon to say whether relations will fully freeze over, especially in areas where both sides share a common interest. But, "given Putin shows no signs of backing down here," former Obama administration national security adviser Tom Donilon said earlier this month, "I think we're in for a very difficult time in Russia-U.S. relations." Some key areas where the U.S. and Russia are still working together — for now. IRAN Both Russia and the U.S. have been clear about wanting to limit Iran's ability to build a nuclear bomb. At last week's negotiations session in Vienna between world powers and Iran, officials said U.S. and Russian diplomats openly agreed to ignore other topics and together focus on the talks with Tehran. Iran often sought to exploit U.S.-Russian differences in the past and it may use the current tensions to resist significant nuclear cutbacks. Moscow already has an agreeable relationship with Tehran: Russia is one of Iran's main trading partners and has sold Iran arms over the years. Russia built Iran's first nuclear reactor and is drafting an agreement to build two more. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned last week that Moscow wouldn't like to use the negotiations with Iran as "an element of the game of raising the stakes" with the West amid tensions over Ukraine. But he added that, "if they force us into that, we will take retaliatory measures." However, the U.S. has developed much of the negotiation strategy against Iran. Harsh U.S. and European Union sanctions against oil exports and threat of U.S. or Israeli military action has, says former U.S. Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, largely been the driving force behind Iran's willingness to negotiate. "These tools remain with or without Russian cooperation," says Jeffrey, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. SYRIA Russia and the U.S. have been at odds over Syria, where Washington and the West want to see opposition forces succeed in their three-year battle against Syrian President Bashar Assad, who has Moscow's support. Russia has sold weapons to Syria's military and repeatedly blocked United Nations resolutions to condemn or sanction Assad's government. If Russia chooses to play a spoiler on Syria, it may boost financial aid and weapons supplies to Assad. However, Russia has agreed to help broker a cease-fire and a transitional government, and over the last year has worked with the U.S. to bring Assad officials and rebel leaders to negotiate. But those efforts have failed to yield any breakthroughs. Russia is also vital in leaning on Assad's government to give up its chemical weapons stockpile — less than half of which has been shipped out against a June 30 deadline. "It's not that we need something from Russia — it's that the Syrian people need the Russians and the Iranians and anyone else with influence over the regime to keep pushing them," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said Wednesday. "Quite frankly, we have been able to work together on Syria, on things like chemical weapons, even when we very strongly disagree with other parts of their Syria policy, certainly." AFGHANISTAN Russia has played a key role in providing air and land corridors for supplying the U.S. and other coalition troops in Afghanistan. It has provided an alternative to a route through Pakistan, which has been unstable amid local protests. If Russia chooses to shut the transit route, it would swell U.S. costs and may cause major logistical challenges as the U.S. and its allies pull their forces out of Afghanistan this year. Putin appeared to signal last week that Russia wants to continue to cooperate on Afghanistan. He said that Russia will keep funding a program run jointly with NATO to service Afghan helicopters and train their crews.Russia will retaliate by shutting down the Northern Distribution networkPanda 3/6/14 Panda is Associate Editor of The Diplomat. He was previously a Research Specialist at Princeton University where he worked on international crisis diplomacy, international security, technology policy, and geopolitics. He has traveled extensively in Asia, and has lived in India, Malaysia, and Japan. He is a graduate of Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.Sometimes timing in international politics can be really bad – at least this is what those dealing with the Afghan withdrawal plans at the Pentagon must be feeling at this point. After much uncertainty, the zero option for Afghanistan – a complete withdrawal by the end of the year – is being taken seriously. The White House and the Pentagon both see it as a viable endgame situation should the Bilateral Security Agreement remain in eternal limbo. Unfortunately, with recent developments in Ukraine, executing on the zero option might get significantly more expensive for the United States.The key to pulling off a successful and manageable withdrawal is the Northern Distribution Network – a route established in 2008 to get supplies in and out of Afghanistan while bypassing the risky (but cheaper) Pakistan-based routes entirely. Unfortunately, despite its massive defense R&D spending, the U.S. never quite figured out a way to teleport its equipment in and out of landlocked war zones. The original Pakistan-based routes provided a quick, sea-based route into Afghanistan, over the Durand line.As the situation on the Afghan-Pakistan border destabilized, it became apparent that approaching Afghanistan via the northern frontier was preferable. In this route, equipment came to Afghanistan from sea, docking first in the Baltic, then on the Georgian and Turkish shores of the Black Sea, and eventually transiting via land to Afghanistan. For the equipment that entered the Eurasian landmass via the Baltic, there was no way around Russia. And it is likely that when American hardware leaves Afghanistan, it will do so via the Northern Distribution Network. There is also an eastern extension of the network that traverses Kazakhstan and eventually ends up in Vladivostok, on the Russian Pacific Coast.Now what does this have to do with Ukraine?Well, Russia’s prized geography places it at the center of the network. In the event that the United States and Europe decide to severely punish Russia for its actions in Crimea, Putin won’t be hesitant to play his hand by shutting down U.S. and NATO use of the network’s Russian component – effectively rendering it useless (apart from the Georgia and Turkey-based Black Sea routes, which also require a Caspian Sea crossing given Iran’s geography). An article in the Christian Science Monitor is replete with quotes from senior U.S. defense officials lamenting that a disruption to the network could be disastrous to the U.S. withdrawal effort. “It’s been a heck of a process and of course we’re always looking out for any disruptions to it,” notes one defense hand, adding that “Political problems with Russia is certainly one of them.”Russia’s acquiescence to the network isn’t a no-strings attached proposition though. The Kremlin rakes in around $1 billion a year for allowing the transit of supplies via its land routes. For Putin, the benefits of maintaining a pro-Russian Crimean peninsula certainly outweigh the potential lost revenue from the closure of the Northern Distribution Network. Additionally, surely when Russia agreed to permit the use of its supply routes for the Afghan war effort, it know that it had acquired a powerful card.Should the political situation between Putin and the U.S. and NATO continue to deteriorate, the U.S. road out of Afghanistan could get complicated. A2: Sanctions Cause US-Russia WarRussia can’t initiate larger conflict – too weakBowen 6-7-15 (Andrew S. Bowen is a Ph.D Candidate in Political Science at Boston College. Andrew S. Bowen is an editorial assistant for The Interpreter, a Russian language translation and analysis journal, and a member of the strategic-consulting firm Wikistrat. "Russia's Deceptively Weak Military", The National Interest, , 6-7-15)Yet, little attention has been paid to what actually constitutes the Russian military. Indeed, many commentators lauding the return of the Russian military have pointed to the plans and statements of the Russian military, focusing on the toys used more than actual capabilities. Beyond the public displays lays a more complicated view with more nuanced realities. While Russia has produced new technological toys (such as the Armata series tanks and armored vehicles), Moscow’s ability to pay and sustain modernization efforts leaves lingering doubts about a resurgent Russian military. Despite the almost ebullient hysteria surrounding Russia’s new equipment and capabilities, its military is still hampered by structural, economic and strategic constraints that not only limit its evolution and growth, but also threaten its current progress. The “New Look” modernization effort Russia began in 2008 has created two militaries; an elite (or more professional) force capable of conducting rapid, complex operations with generally modern equipment; and the rest of the military, which still relies upon conscription, mass mobilization and mixed levels of modern equipment. Even among the “little green men,” the outlook is far more mixed than the Crimea annexation would suggest. Most spetsnaz are actually conscripts on one year terms, although they do get the pick of the conscription call up. As Mark Galeotti notes, “the bulk of spetsnazovets may arguably best be compared with the French Foreign Legion, the British 16th Air Assault Brigade or the U.S. 75th Ranger Regiment, in that they are elite, mobile light infantry able to function in a range of operations and climates, and optimized for interventions, but not a 'Tier One' special operations force.” Moscow does retain around 500 tier one troops (equitable to Delta or Seal Team Six) in a separate force, which were utilized in seizing the Crimean parliament. And while the more elite units of the military are starting to embrace small unit independence and rapid deployment, the conventional Russian military continues to be influenced by the old Soviet structure of numerous under-manned units, pre-positioned with equipment to be brought up to full staffing levels during times of conflict. The drawbacks of this design were laid bare during the 2008 war with Georgia, where airborne units (VDV) were able to deploy faster from interior Russia than those units stationed in the Caucasus. The 2008 modernization effort sought to replace this unwieldy division structure with smaller, more agile and autonomous Brigades. Although, the efforts to reduce the reliance upon mass mobilization and undermanned units continue, this trend has been somewhat reversed as some divisions have been brought back. Despite plans for fully staffed units, the troops injected into Ukraine have been pulled from fully (or partially) staffed subunits all across Russia and thrown together to fulfill requirements. Reports of casualties of “Russian volunteers” are indicative of troops from various regions and units being put together for mission specific operations (although most have come from the elite Paratrooper and Spetsnaz). Even with the efforts to eliminate the mass mobilization structure of the Army, most units remain woefully undermanned. The vacillation between unit structures is in part confounded by the same strategic issues that have always plagued Russia. It has too few men to guard its borders and the diverse threats the country faces. Russia today must have a technologically advanced military to guard against NATO, a counter-insurgency force for rapid deployment in the Caucasus and Central Asia, forces for the increasingly competitive Arctic, and a large conventional force able to guard against threats in the Far East. Russia is still debating how to balance between guarding against all threats and fielding more efficient unit structures. Complementing plans to increase units to permanent readiness status have been efforts to increase the level of professional troops, kontrakniki. These efforts have fallen considerably short (the retention rate for kontrakniki remains unacceptably low, and recruitment targets are struggling to keep up with the attrition rate). Slightly increased housing, pay and status have remained unconvincing to most of Russian society. Efforts to recruit kontrakniki were also designed to create an NCO corps that the Russian military never had (not to mention never having a professional recruiting corps that has also limited the recruitment of professional soldiers). NCO roles in western armies are filled in the Russian military by lower level officers, contributing to a bloated officer corps. While many nations do not retain a professional NCO corps (China), experienced NCOs are crucial not only to manage the increasingly technical components of warfare (especially with the emphasis on increasing the military’s network-centric and C4ISR capabilities), but also to ensure the proper training and readiness of the units. As much as Russia has announced and displayed its modern army, it is still reliant upon the conscription of its youth to project its great power status. In terms of new equipment, it is easy to look at specifications and be impressed by details. However, this ignores considerations of how these systems will actually operate. The new toys Russia displayed during May 9th parade—such as the Armata T-14 tank, Kurganets 25, T-15 IFV and Boomerang—are extremely impressive in isolation, and do represent a dramatic revolution in Russian armament design (although it remains to be seen if they can produce high quality optics domestically. Russia currently imports its optics from Thales for its T-90 tanks). And while their actual utilization will represent large increases in capability for the Russian military, their utility is constrained by their ability to arrive on the battlefield. Russian strategic transport capabilities remain woefully lacking and still rely upon rail transportation, with little improvement of air and sea transport, limiting the Russian military’s capacity to rapidly reorient its forces. The Kurganets 25 IFV, for example, is ten tons heavier than previous BMP units, making it far more difficult to rapidly transport to conflict zones. The Soviet military compensated for its inadequate transportation infrastructure by pre-positioning large equipment depots to supply conscripts once they arrive. This strategy is inadequate in a threat environment relying upon the rapid movement of troops (and equipment) to emerging crisis. While the Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry and Spetsnaz units retain sufficient logistical support to conduct operations like Crimea, the same cannot be said for the regular troops necessary to support those rapid deployments. Despite the issues over strategic design, manning and transportation, economic considerations may well determine the extent of Russia’s grand military designs. As Dmitry Gorenburg notes, with the economy suffering from sanctions, investment flight and low oil prices, “the money allocated may not be sufficient to build what they want to build.” The situation is succinctly summed up by one of Russia’s most famous economists (now in self-imposed exile in Paris) Sergei Guriev, “In any case, Kudrin's economic and financial logic is even more valid today than it was at his dismissal from office. If Russia could not afford a 4 percent-of-GDP defense budget in good times, it cannot possibly manage such a high rate of military spending now, when it confronts rock-bottom oil prices, Western sanctions and economic recession.”No war – 7 reasonsPeck 14 [Michael Peck?(Contributor on defense and national security for Forbes); “7 Reasons Why America Will Never Go To War Over?Ukraine”; 3/05/2014; ]America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war with Russia.This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick:Russia?is a nuclear superpower.?Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the?Federation of American Scientists. Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn’t inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike.For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat?that.Russia?has a powerful army.?While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the “Military Balance 2014″??from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine’s coast.U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the?2008 Russo-Georgia War. American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses.Ukraine?is closer to?Russia.?The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It’s much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air.The?U.S.?military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America’s armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan.The?U.S.?doesn’t have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier?George H. W. Bush?and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize.The American people are tired.?Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain’s words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.”America‘s allies are tired.?NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region’s sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn’t evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And Germans fighting Russians again? Let’s not even go there.Nuclear DeterrenceWeitz 11 - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor(Richard, 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” )Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.Crimea won’t escalate other countries.Posner 14 [Eric Posner (Professor at UChicago Law, co-author of The Executive Unbound); ; “What to Do About Crimea? Nothing.: Why all our responses in Crimea are wrongheaded and doomed to fail.”; 3/27/2014]A more straightforward reason for sanctioning Russia is to deter it from attacking other countries. But most countries don’t invade others. Crimea was uniquely vulnerable, with a majority ethnic Russian population that welcomed the invaders; existing Russian military bases; and historical ties to Russia. Putin grabbed Crimea to avenge Ukraine’s defenestration of his puppet, Viktor Yanukovych. Russia’s other neighbors are either already compliant or extremely hostile, like Ukraine itself. Rather than occupy hostile territories, powerful countries prefer to exert influence from across the border while letting the foreign population misgovern itself. It’s just too much trouble to invade a country and be forced to govern a restive population, as the United States recently learned, to its sorrow, in Afghanistan and Iraq. An invasion of Ukraine—at least, beyond a few marginal regions in the east—would offer Russia nothing but a guerilla war on foreign territory.Economics has absolutely nothing to do with it even in the face of an overwhelming western threat., heres a re-highlighting. Royner 8/26/15 Joshua Rovner is the John Goodwin Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University, where he serves as Director of the Security and Strategy Program, The Week, August 26, 2015, “How Vladimir Putin's paranoia could lead to nuclear war”, Putin's incompetence also creates new risks. His inability to learn from Ukraine, for instance, suggests that he might be willing to try the same gambit in the Baltics on the pretext of defending ethnic Russians. Putin may believe that he can attempt a similar sort of covert coup using special operators and supporting separatists while publicly denying any involvement. He might also begin overt conventional maneuvers near the Estonian or Latvian border to send a tacit threat of Russian intervention. Making good on that threat, however, would risk a conflict with the United States, which would be obligated to come to the defense of its NATO allies. What would happen if NATO sent conventional forces to contest Russian moves in the Baltics? Some analysts correctly note that while NATO possesses overwhelming advantages in the aggregate, it would be outnumbered locally. This means that Russia could quickly establish a foothold on some slice of Baltic territory before the United States could organize a response. NATO would need some time to arrive in theater with the strength needed to confront Russian forces, and it would have to fight very hard to eject them. And beyond the costs of conventional fighting, they would also face the risk of a nuclear exchange. While escalation is not inevitable, Putin's strategic ineptitude makes it more likely. In the abstract, there are psychological, political, and military pathways to nuclear escalation. First, intense wartime psychological stress might cause leaders to misinterpret signals of restraint, exaggerate the costs and danger of fighting, and become risk-acceptant. Second, paranoid leaders might believe the price of losing is regime change. If they are convinced that staying in power requires decisive victory, even against a vastly superior conventional enemy, they might be willing to gamble for resurrection by crossing the nuclear threshold. Third, leaders may opt to use nuclear weapons through a process of inadvertent escalation. They may reasonably construe attacks on their command and control systems, for instance, as part of a campaign to disable their deterrent force. Under these circumstances they might act on a terrible "use it or lose it" impulse, even if their adversary had no intention of destroying their nuclear capabilities. While all three of these scenarios could occur during a NATO–Russia conventional conflict, Putin's strategic myopia is particularly troubling because it exacerbates the psychological and political pathways to escalation. The inability to recognize failure might give him false confidence about Russia's prospect against NATO forces, especially because Russia would enjoy initially superior numbers in a hypothetical war. This lead might not last long. In the last 30 years the United States has demonstrated extraordinary abilities to overcome enemy defenses through a combination of rapid maneuver, electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, and brute force. A successful counter-attack against Russian forces, especially including strikes on Russian air defense installations, would come as a terrifying shock to Russian leaders. In this case a host of familiar psychological pathologies could take hold, making it possible for Putin to lash out in anger and frustration rather than seeking some way of limiting the damage. There is also reason to believe that Putin may view losing to NATO as tantamount to regime suicide. Putin's domestic popularity rests on a self-constructed narrative that Russia is threatened by duplicitous and hostile states, and that he is the only leader strong enough to resist them. Putin's inability to recognize failure probably encourages this delusion. Unfortunately, this worldview implies that backing down is intolerable, because it would suggest Russian weakness and invite more aggression from the West. Rather than concede defeat in the wake of conventional losses, Putin might opt for nuclear weapons to preserve his own rule. Instead of suing for peace in a limited conflict, he might be willing to take the extraordinary risk of escalation to force NATO to accept his terms. There are indications that Russian strategists are preparing for this contingency. Indeed, Russia's nuclear doctrine has included variations on the logic of these so-called "de-escalatory strikes" since 2000.US will never go to war with Russia – self-preservation, war-fatigue, empirics Peck 14 – Contributing editor for Foreign Policy Magazine, a writer for the War is Boring defense blog and of course a contributor at Forbes. My work has also appeared in the Washingon Post,Slate, Defense News, USA Today, the Philadelphia Inquirer? (Michael, 7 Reasons Why America Will Never Go to War over Ukraine,” , March 5, 2014, )America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war with Russia.This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick:Russia?is a nuclear superpower.?Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the?Federation of American Scientists. Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn’t inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike.For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat?that.Russia?has a powerful army.?While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the “Military Balance 2014″??from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine’s coast.U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the?2008 Russo-Georgia War. American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses.Ukraine?is closer to?Russia.?The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It’s much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air.The?U.S.?military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America’s armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan.The?U.S.?doesn’t have many troops to send.?The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier?George H. W. Bush?and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize.The American people are tired.?Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain’s words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.”America‘s allies are tired.?NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region’s sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn’t evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And Germans fighting Russians again? Let’s not even go there.No Chance – good luck Russia…Charap 15 (Samuel Charap Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the IISS. “Is Russia an Outside Power in the Gulf?”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57:1, 153-1702/5/15 )When Russia is invoked in analysis of outside powers’ role in the Middle East, it is often thought of in two related ways: either as a shrunken Soviet Union or as a potential regional security guarantor should the United States abdicate that role. Following the 2013 IISS Manama Dialogue, a Gulf leader was quoted as saying: ‘the Russians have proved they are reliable friends … As a result, some states in the region have already started to look at developing more multilateral relations, rather than just relying on Washington.’1 This particular statement was alleged to have been fabricated, but the sentiment contained therein is broadly reflective of regional elite opinion about Russia.2 The implication is that Russia seeks clients, as the Soviet Union did; is active in the region largely to compete with the US; and could, if asked, step in to displace or supplement the US regional role. Despite all of the headlines generated by the Ukraine crisis, however, Russia is not a shrunken Soviet Union, nor is it in a position to replace the US in the regionWhile the Soviet Union had global ambitions and reach, Russia has neither. The Soviet Union was engaged in a global ideological competition with the US that created imperatives to seek influence and connections everywhere. That ideology also gave it a presence in many regions via communist parties, workers’ movements, or governments with anti-Western policies. In contrast, post-Soviet Russia lacks both the ideological impetus and the geopolitical imperative to compete with the US in every region.Moreover, despite the country’s economic recovery during the Putin era, it lacks the resources to project power – be it hard power, economic power or soft power – in the way that the Soviet Union did.Post-Soviet Russia is a qualitatively different kind of outside power for the Middle East than the US. Firstly, it does not value what could be called ‘regional public goods’ enough to sacrifice for and provide them on its own – beyond its immediate neighbourhood, that is. Russia has not created military alliances, nor even offered security guarantees, beyond its neighbourhood. Moreover, it has no interest in doing so. This means that Russia does not have to balance its national interests in the region against broader objectives, a dilemma the US faces regularly due to its focus on regional public goods and its commitment to allies’ security. For the US, goals such as maintaining stability in energy markets and countering Iran often trump worries about extremism or human-rights concerns. For Russia, however, there are no similar balancing factors that prevent it from pursuing its more narrow national priorities. While extremism is arguably an equal threat to both the US and Russia, the two countries focus on this problem in completely different ways.Ukraine backfired—Russia will suffer massive international backlashDingli 1/29/15 (Shen, Professor and Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University. “Balancing interests in Ukraine”, )While the United States has been much hurt by handling the Ukraine disaster erroneously, Russia has been no less discredited this time, as many would view its absorption of Crimea as a rampant interference of internal affairs of a sovereign country. This might also be the first case of changing international boundary since the end of World War II through coercing or using force by a major power. The UNGA has to make its response to the Crimean referendum to secede from Ukraine invalid.Russia's legitimate national security concern regarding EU expansion into Ukraine ought to be respected. Often times such expansion has been followed by a NATO expansion. Clearly America would not feel comfortable if the Soviet Union or Russia would deploy its military at the doorstep of the United States, as the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated. Therefore it will be sensible to perceive and respect a similar Russian security sensitivity, especially when the then Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych made a concession last February to call an early election, after which his sudden removal invoked controversy and confrontation inside his country, and between Russia and the West.Despite Russia's own justification of its high-handed intervention, its international image has certainly not been improved. On the Crimean issue, China has maintained its position that Ukraine's sovereignty shall be properly honored, though this matter per se has its own historical background. With Crimea's change of status by external forces, Ukraine's sovereignty has been undoubtedly challenged. Thus far, Beijing's argument has won the respect of Kiev government and many others.With the sanctions that the EU and the U.S. have pushed for, Russia's energy, financial and defense sectors have been undercut. Even worse, the OPEC members have chosen an inopportune time for Russia to play their oil price game. As a country that depends heavily on exports of fossil energy, Russia has been hit by international circumstances which may not have been meticulously choreographed at all.Russia is not a big deal –they’ll fall in line with the American orderCampbell 14 (Benjamin W., Southern Illinois University Carbondale, “Revisionist Economic Prebalancers and Status Quo Bandwagoners: Understanding the Behavior of Great Powers in Unipolar Systems”, )The immediate question to follow is whether or not Russia has the capability to revise the international system in the short-run. Given the sheer power disparities between Russia and the United States, the answer is simply no. If China, a state that is stronger than Russia in many essential indicators – ground force size, military expenditures, naval strength, GDP, and GDP growth rates – is unable to challenge the United States in the short-run, than it is illogical to suspect that Russia could. Russia, much like China, lacks the naval capabilities necessary to challenge the United States – an example of such is that they do not have a blue water navy as they did in the Soviet era. They only have one aircraft carrier, again, a tenth of what the United States possesses. Second, Russia lacks the economic power or growth rates to supplant the United States in the short-run. Russia must make a large amount of economic reforms to have an economy stable enough to grow and challenge the United States. On a list of global GDP figures, Russia appears at the end of all great powers studied by this paper, including the United States, China, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. In addition, Russia’s economic growth rates are only marginally larger than the United States and do not demonstrate a trend towards exponential growth (World Bank).Given that Russia is a revisionist state that lacks the capabilities to challenge the United States in the short-run, does the empirical record confirm my finding that it is pursuing a strategy of economic prebalancing? The answer is not a definite as in the case of China, but is leaning more towards economic prebalancing than any other alternative strategy.Russia’s accession into the World Trade Organization, and various economic reforms to liberalize their economy reveal a transition towards privileging economic growth over material power gains in the short-run. While Russia very much continues to use its energy exports as a weapon, the disputes between Russia and Ukraine between 2005 and 2009 serve as evidence, they are focusing more upon economic growth than challenging the United States. In 2013, the Kremlin released its foreign policy goals, which indicated a decision to increase economic growth in the long run through “technological modernization” and “innovation-based development,” (Putin 2013). Russia won’t escalate—serious conflicts won’t occurBaran et al, Senior Fellow and Director Center for Eurasian Studies and member of the Hudson Institute, ‘07[Zeyno, Summer 2007, “U.S. – Russian Relations: Is conflict inevitable?” Pg. 26. , accessed 7/12/13, J.J.]How far is Russia ready to go to pursue its assertive agenda? Is the Russian elite ready for confrontation with the West? Definitely not. A significant part of the Russian elite is not ready for serious conflict with the West. But at the same time it is ready to continue to use anti-Western rhetoric to consolidate society. In fact, it is trying to have it both ways: integration with the West for themselves, but not for the rest of society. There is a logic to this seemingly schizophrenic behavior. The Russian elite can maintain their privileged status only in a society that is hostile to the West. The question, however, could be raised: will the Russian elite be able to control the consequences of this dual-track policy?Cold war calculations no longer apply – neither side would consider warCartwright et al 12 [Gen (Ret) James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Amb. Richard Burt, former ambassador to Germany and chief negotiator of START; Sen. Chuck Hagel; Amb. Thomas Pickering, former ambassador to the UN; Gen. (Ret.) Jack Sheehan, former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for NATO and Commander-in-Chief for the U.S. Atlantic Command; GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUcLEAR POLicy cOMMiSSiON REPORT, ]These illustrative next steps are possible and desirable for five basic reasons. First, mutual nuclear deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation to attack is no longer a cornerstone of the U.S.-Russian security relationship. Security is mainly a state of mind, not a physical condition, and mutual assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship. To be sure, there remains a physical-technical side of MAD in our relations, but it is increasingly peripheral. Nuclear planning for Cold War-style nuclear conflict between our countries, driven largely by inertia and vested interests left over from the Cold War, functions on the margins using outdated scenarios that are implausible today. There is no conceivable situation in the contemporary world in which it would be in either country’s national security interest to initiate a nuclear attack against the other side. Their current stockpiles (roughly 5,000 nuclear weapons each in their active deployed and reserve arsenals) vastly exceed what is needed to satisfy reasonable requirements of deterrence between the two countries as well as vis-à-vis third countries whose nuclear arsenals pale in comparison quantitatively.Extension – Nuclear Deterrence SolvesNuclear Deterrence – Russia and US are rationalWeber, Senior Editor at TheWeek, 14 [Peter, 3-5-14, TheWeek, “What would a U.S.-Russia war look like?,” , accessed 7-13-14, J.J.]Even with the slow mutual nuclear disarmament since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia each have thousands of nuclear warheads at the ready. As Eugene Chow noted earlier this year, the entire stockpile of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — 448 active — is essentially aimed squarely at Russia. Russia's hundreds of ICBMs are probably returning the favor.In all, the U.S. has about 7,700 nuclear warheads, including 1,950 warheads ready to deploy via ICBM, submarine, and airplane, plus thousands more in mothballs or waiting to be dismantled, according to the latest tally by the Federation of American Scientists. Russia has slightly more warheads overall — about 8,500 — but a slightly fewer 1,800 of them operational. China, in comparison, has about 250 nuclear warheads, a bit less that France (300) and a bit more than Britain (225).Nuclear war with Russia is still mutually assured destruction. Hopefully, that's still deterrent enough.Empirics prove that nuclear deterrence will work, even if Russia gets aggravated—leaders are rationalTepperman, Managing Editor at Council of Foreign Affairs, 2009[Jonathan, 8-28-9, The Daily Beast, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” , accessed 7-13-14, J.J.]A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.Mutually Ensured Destruction means that the US and Russia won’t go to war. Nuclear Threat Initiative, 12[No author, August 22, Global Security Newswire Produced by National Journal, “U.S. Antinuclear Steps Should Focus on Russia: State Dept. Advisers,” , accessed July 7, 2014, EK]In a world political climate characterized by "mutual assured stability," countries would no longer use nuclear weapons to ward off aggression because their connections would include no "major, core security issues such as ideological, territorial, or natural resource competition issues, and the benefits from peaceful integration in economic, political, and diplomatic spheres provide a counterbalance to the perceived advantages of nuclear conflict," according to the Aug. 14 analysis by the International Security Advisory Board.It would be "a critical, first step" to establish the dynamic in U.S.-Russian ties, as the former Cold War rivals' "nuclear weapons stockpiles are so large as to overshadow other nations’ stockpiles," the document says. Moscow and Washington are believed to hold more than 90 percent of all nuclear weapons.The sides have achieved "some modest progress" since the Soviet Union's collapse in creating such conditions, but "many years" would be required to achieve them more fully, the paper's authors wrote.Ext – Russia Lacks Resources to Initiate WarNo Russian conflict—they lack the resourcesMotyl and Menon, The American Interest, 7[Alexander J., World Affairs Correspondent Rajan, Nonresident Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, March 1, The American Interest, “The Myth of Russian Resurgence,” , accessed July 12, 2014As with almost any broad generalization, this one is not entirely false. Indeed, it cannot be. Russia sprawls across Eurasia, contains 148 million people, possesses more than 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads, is the world’s second-largest exporter of oil and armaments, is the foremost exporter of natural gas, and is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Any country with these attributes will have strategic heft. But a scrutiny of its power reveals that Russia is far weaker than the reigning consensus suggests. Russia is not “back.” If anything, the next few years may show Russia with its back to the wall.RUSSIA’S POWERRussian power can be assessed in four aspects: military prowess, economic vitality, human capital and “soft power” assets. We take these in turn.The once mighty Red Army is now a pale imitation of itself, a wheezing symbol of Russia’s deterioration. From a total of three million men under arms toward the end of the Cold War, the Russian armed forces have shrunk to one million. That would be good news were it now a better force. But except for some elite units, most Russian troops are poorly trained and demoralized draftees subjected to pitiless hazing and prone to alcoholism, suicide and corruption. Ninety percent of the males supposedly required to complete the two-year stint of military service evade the draft both legally and illegally. Service contracts signed in 2004 ranged from 17 percent of the recruiting goal in the Moscow region to 45 percent in the North Caucasus.22.International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 2005-2006 (Routledge, 2005), p. 151.Less than a fifth of the kontraktniki (those who sign up for the money) re-enlist, complaining of paltry pay and primitive living conditions.33.Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 24, 2006.The problem transcends raw numbers. In 2005 an astonishing 40 percent of draftees were declared unfit to serve on account of physical or mental disabilities. Russia’s weaponry is aging and falling behind qualitatively, and new equipment reaches the armed forces in insufficient numbers. Defense spending has risen 25 percent annually since 2004, but years of neglect ensure that it will be a long time before existing armaments are replaced and soldiers’ morale and quality of life improve. The upswing in hardware expenditure is also mitigated by the 8 percent average inflation rate in 2004–06 and the need to allocate a large chunk of these monies to attract better-qualified people (particularly if plans for a volunteer force are to pan out).Russia remains a nuclear power, having inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal, but there have been no dramatic improvements in its capabilities. Russia’s nuclear armory certainly suffices for deterrence, but it cannot thwart smaller yet more urgent threats in its immediate neighborhood, among them terrorism, Islamic radicalism and failing states; nor, as other nuclear powers have found, can nuclear weapons be translated into prosaic political influence. Paradoxically, and unlike during the Cold War, the principal threat now posed by Russia’s nuclear arms is that they, or the fissile materials they require, could end up in terrorists’ hands.No Russia war---no motive or capabilityBetts 13 Richard is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies @ Columbia. “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, Vol. 92, Issue 2, OnlineThese continuities with the Cold War would make sense only between intense adversaries. Washington and Moscow remain in an adversarial relationship, but not an intense one. If the Cold War is really over, and the West really won, then continuing implicit deterrence does less to protect against a negligible threat from Russia than to feed suspicions that aggravate political friction. In contrast to during the Cold War, it is now hard to make the case that Russia is more a threat to NATO than the reverse. First, the East-West balance of military capabilities, which at the height of the Cold War was favorable to the Warsaw Pact or at best even, has not only shifted to NATO's advantage; it has become utterly lopsided. Russia is now a lonely fraction of what the old Warsaw Pact was. It not only lost its old eastern European allies; those allies are now arrayed on the other side, as members of NATO. By every significant measure of power -- military spending, men under arms, population, economic strength, control of territory -- NATO enjoys massive advantages over Russia. The only capability that keeps Russia militarily potent is its nuclear arsenal. There is no plausible way, however, that Moscow's nuclear weapons could be used for aggression, except as a backstop for a conventional offensive -- for which NATO's capabilities are now far greater.? Russia's intentions constitute no more of a threat than its capabilities. Although Moscow's ruling elites push distasteful policies, there is no plausible way they could think a military attack on the West would serve their interests. During the twentieth century, there were intense territorial conflicts between the two sides and a titanic struggle between them over whose ideology would dominate the world. Vladimir Putin's Russia is authoritarian, but unlike the Soviet Union, it is not the vanguard of a globe-spanning revolutionary ideal.No war---Russia has no capabilityChina Daily 14, “US-Russia relations frosty, but no Cold War II afoot,” 7-28-14, L/N, Y2KUS-Russia relations are at a low point not seen for more than a decade, but chilled ties between the two are unlikely to plunge the world headlong into another Cold War. WASHINGTON - US-Russia relations are at a low point not seen for more than a decade, but chilled ties between the two are unlikely to plunge the world headlong into another Cold War, experts here said. As the crisis in the Ukraine threatens to escalate amid US claims that Russia is firing artillery rounds into Ukrainian territory, US media is likening the now frosty relations between Washington and Moscow to a new Cold War. But experts contend that description amounts to journalistic hyperbole, as current US-Russian tensions in no way resemble the Cold War that engulfed the globe for decades and sparked fears of nuclear destruction. "It's a good headline, but it's not an accurate reflection of either what the Cold War was or what we are seeing today," RAND Corporation Senior International Policy Analyst Olga Oliker told Xinhua. "The Cold War was a conflict that lasted decades in which the United States and the Soviet Union were basically fighting over the fate of the world. It involved the entire planet," she said, adding that today's situation is a far cry from that dark chapter of world history. "This (current issue) is Russia and the United States not getting along...over something that's going on within Europe," she said. "It's not a global standoff. It's not going to drive all of the defense spending and foreign policy of the US and (Russia)," she said. Still, the Ukraine crisis does amount to a fundamental and serious disagreement between the US and the Russian Federation, she said, adding that Russia has challenged a vision of European security that the US and its European allies have held to since the end of the Cold War. US santions In a bid to voice their displeasure of what they believe is a disruption of that vision, the US and European Union hit Moscow with a new round of sanctions earlier this month. Russian President Vladimir Putin has billed the sanctions as "aggressive foreign policy," referring to the sanctions that hit Russian banks, defense firms and energy companies. Putin urged the US to work to stop the bloodshed in the Ukraine instead of slapping sanctions on Russia. But the sanctions are not expected to stop the crisis, and the White House seems to have few concrete solutions. "It's a difficult situation because there aren't a lot of easy, satisfying actions one can take," Oliker said of the options available to the administration of US President Barack Obama. "The Obama administration continues to weigh its options," she said. Military conflict A full-on military conflict between the US and Russia is highly unlikely, experts said, and Russia would stand little chance in a conflict against fully mobilized US forces, David Clark, chairman of the Russia Foundation, told Xinhua. He added there are doubts about Russia's capacity to sustain military operations, even in neighboring countries, pointing to the 2008 war with neighboring Georgia. The conflict exposed significant deficiencies in Russian military equipment and organization, so much so that many analysts believe Moscow suspended military operations sooner than it wanted to, Clark said.Nuclear Deterrence – Russia and US are rationalWeber, Senior Editor at TheWeek, 14 [Peter, 3-5-14, TheWeek, “What would a U.S.-Russia war look like?,” , accessed 7-13-14, J.J.]Even with the slow mutual nuclear disarmament since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia each have thousands of nuclear warheads at the ready. As Eugene Chow noted earlier this year, the entire stockpile of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — 448 active — is essentially aimed squarely at Russia. Russia's hundreds of ICBMs are probably returning the favor.In all, the U.S. has about 7,700 nuclear warheads, including 1,950 warheads ready to deploy via ICBM, submarine, and airplane, plus thousands more in mothballs or waiting to be dismantled, according to the latest tally by the Federation of American Scientists. Russia has slightly more warheads overall — about 8,500 — but a slightly fewer 1,800 of them operational. China, in comparison, has about 250 nuclear warheads, a bit less that France (300) and a bit more than Britain (225).Nuclear war with Russia is still mutually assured destruction. Hopefully, that's still deterrent enough.Empirics prove that nuclear deterrence will work, even if Russia gets aggravated—leaders are rationalTepperman, Managing Editor at Council of Foreign Affairs, 2009[Jonathan, 8-28-9, The Daily Beast, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” , accessed 7-13-14, J.J.]A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.Mutually Ensured Destruction means that the US and Russia won’t go to war. Nuclear Threat Initiative, 12[No author, August 22, Global Security Newswire Produced by National Journal, “U.S. Antinuclear Steps Should Focus on Russia: State Dept. Advisers,” , accessed July 7, 2014, EK]In a world political climate characterized by "mutual assured stability," countries would no longer use nuclear weapons to ward off aggression because their connections would include no "major, core security issues such as ideological, territorial, or natural resource competition issues, and the benefits from peaceful integration in economic, political, and diplomatic spheres provide a counterbalance to the perceived advantages of nuclear conflict," according to the Aug. 14 analysis by the International Security Advisory Board.It would be "a critical, first step" to establish the dynamic in U.S.-Russian ties, as the former Cold War rivals' "nuclear weapons stockpiles are so large as to overshadow other nations’ stockpiles," the document says. Moscow and Washington are believed to hold more than 90 percent of all nuclear weapons.The sides have achieved "some modest progress" since the Soviet Union's collapse in creating such conditions, but "many years" would be required to achieve them more fully, the paper's authors wrote.No ExtinctionEven a nuclear exchange would de-escalateQuinlan 9 [Michael Quinlan, former British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Defence, former Director of the Ditchley Foundation, Visiting Professor at King's College London, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects,” Oxford University Press, p. 63-4]Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. No war---Putin’s a rational dudeAkhilesh Pillalamarri 15 is an assistant editor at The National Interest, “Putin: Russia’s Last Remaining Pragmatist?” 3/11/’15, relations are at their frostiest levels since the cold war. Can the two sides reach an accommodation? Or are relations doomed to continue their downward spiral? These are some of the questions that Dimitri K. Simes, the President of the Center for the National Interest, who visited Russia for a series of high-level meetings with officials and other experts last week, addressed at a luncheon this Tuesday. Simes was the speaker at an event at the Center for the National Interest titled The Crisis in U.S.-Russia Relations. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, ambassador to the UN, Iraq and Afghanistan during the George W. Bush administration, moderated. Simes carefully distinguished between two groupings in the Russian government, the first convinced that relations with the West can conceivably be repaired; the second, that Russia must prepare for a protracted conflict. Putin himself, Simes emphasized, is still inclined toward the first camp and is not ideologically driven. He is “not crazy” and “not a Communist,” Simes said. Putin, along with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in particular, are relatively moderate on Ukraine and relations with the United States, particularly when contrasted with what Simes called a “second school of thought” in Russia, which believes that the Kremlin should “absolutely challenge the existing world order” and treat the United States as Moscow’s main enemy. Putin is well-aware of Russia’s limitations and the fact that it can’t “play the sanctions game.” Russia does not want to incorporate eastern Ukraine and is content with a united Ukraine that grants autonomy to its Russian-speaking east. Moreover, Russia would insist on a guarantee that NATO would not include Ukraine in the foreseeable future. It is important, Simes said, for the United States to understand that Putin is not prepared to permit the Ukrainian rebels to be defeated, as he does not want to “look like a loser.” However, Putin might be receptive to a grand bargain that will protect Russian interests. According to Simes, this is desirable because it is not in the West’s interests for Russia to become a rogue nuclear power, to move closer to China or for the confrontation between Russia and the West to “dominate global politics.”Putin is moderate and playing a political game---NATO would have to invade Russia to cause nuclear useJeffrey Lewis 14, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “A Boy and His Toys,” 9/6/’14, of what sort of nuclear weapons or strategic concepts Washington develops, U.S. policymakers will always worry that Moscow or other nuclear powers might be willing to take risks that the United States simply will not. In this way, Washington falls victim to its own self-doubt. The rub is that different nuclear weapons won’t solve what is essentially a lack of courage or resolve. The president probably would be just as well off with a stiff drink or two than some new nuclear weapon. Well, not too many stiff drinks. Fortunately, Putin is not quite so bold as we might worry. I doubt Putin’s enthusiasm for aggression extends to initiating the limited use of nuclear weapons — at least not in scenarios short of a NATO invasion of Russia. Piontkovsky notes (in Russian, sorry) that Putin’s motives are more "modest" than the destruction of the United States — "the maximum expansion of the Russian World, the collapse of NATO, [and to] discredit and humiliat[e] the United States as the guarantor of the security of the West." If Piontkovsky is right, then Putin needs a neutral Germany. As I’ve argued before, the centerpiece to Putin’s strategy is a de facto neutral Germany that prevents NATO from offering a robust defense of its easternmost members. (It’s worth remembering that the Soviet Union desperately tried to keep a unified Germany out of NATO.) That’s why Putin does things like show up at former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s birthday party and avoids mentioning that he would have sent in the tanks in 1989. Using nuclear weapons is, at a basic level, contrary to this strategy. That is to say, Putin’s maintenance of the increasingly flimsy fiction that Russia has not invaded Ukraine is largely about trying to avoid inflaming German opinion to the point where NATO stands up to the aggression; Putin wants to take Ukraine, but he needs to do so in small pieces. Nuking Warsaw, of course, throws that strategy out the window.Extensions – Russia Won’t Initiate WarRussia won’t strike NATO countries---there’s no draw inKevin Lees 14, Suffragio founder, editor and chief political analyst Kevin Lees is a journalist and attorney in Washington. He has written for in The Atlantic, Americas Quarterly, E!Sharp, EurActiv, EUObserver, Deutsche Welle, Huffington Post, McClatchy Newspapers, The National Interest, The New Republic and Reuters. He has participated on a panel discussion at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, A graduate of Duke University and New York University Law School, he also studied law and European integration at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. "The idea of a nuclear war with Russia is absolutely crazy," 9-5-2014, No Publication, , DOA: 4-13-2015, y2kAs if timed to coincide with this week’s NATO summit in Wales, which could mark the most important gathering of Western allies since the end of the Cold War, US-based commentary this week took a huge leap forward in its assessment of the Russian threat — though not necessarily in a way that’s incredible rational. Russia Flag Icon Call it the ‘underpants gnome’ theory of understanding Russia today: Russian aggression in Ukraine + ????? = World War III! But even as a ceasefire takes effect today between the Ukrainian military and the Russian-backed separatists based in Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, based on a plan put forward earlier this week by none other than Russian president Vladimir Putin and brokered by talks hosted by increasingly nervous officials in Belarus, US writers are nevertheless openly contemplating the audacious notion of a potential Russian nuclear strike. In Foreign Policy yesterday, Jeffrey Tayler writes that Putin could launch a limited nuclear strike on a peripheral NATO member. His reasoning is that Putin can neither easily withdraw from his standoff over Ukraine nor launch a conventional attack, because the Russian military would be sure to lose a conventional war. That’s because the defending NATO member would presumably invoke Article 5 of the NATO charter — the ‘all for one and one for all’ article that states that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all NATO members. As David Frum wrote earlier this week at The Atlantic, US president Barack Obama’s speech in Tallinn on Wednesday established that the Article 5 principle extends to eastern Europe just as surely as it does elsewhere: And he forcefully assured Estonians—and all NATO’s new allies—that waging war on them meant waging war on the United States. “[T]he defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London,” Obama said. “Article 5 is crystal clear. An attack on one is an attack on all. So if, in such a moment, you ever ask again, who’ll come to help, you’ll know the answer: the NATO alliance, including the armed forces of the United States of America, right here, present, now.” This is the ultimate commitment, given by the ultimate authority, in the very place where the commitment would be tested—and would have to be honored. There’s no turning back from that. Today, for the first time perhaps, Eastern Europeans have reason to believe it. That, Tayler, writes, backs Putin into the corner of nuclear war: That leaves Putin only one option: a nuclear attack. Not a massive launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles at the United States or Western Europe, which would bring about a suicidal atomic holocaust, but a small, tactical strike or two against a NATO member that few in the West would be willing to die to protect. Piontkovsky surmises that, in such a conflict, the nuclear-armed country with the “superior political will” to alter the geopolitical “status quo” and — most importantly — with the “greater indifference to values concerning human lives” would prevail. Any guesses which country that would be? Tayler’s argument is that Putin is willing to call Obama’s Article 5 bluff. After all, would a tactical nuclear strike on Tallinn actually be the same as an attack on London? Would a war-weary United States be enthusiastic about fighting and dying for Estonians and Latvians and Lithuanians? Tayler envisions a scenario whereby Putin starts stirring up trouble in a city like Narva, Estonia’s third largest city, where nearly 19 out of 20 residents is a native Russian speaker. If you look at a map of the Estonian-Russian border, it’s quite clear just how vulnerable a city like Narva might be to a potential attack: Still, it’s noteworthy that Russian aggression in the Putin era has targeted non-NATO members like Ukraine and Georgia. If there’s a reason that NATO was hesitant to offer membership to former Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko and to former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, there’s a reason why Putin hasn’t sent Russian soldiers and tanks headlong into the Baltic. NATO’s expansion, while robust, has a much more delicate footprint than you might expect. NATO today includes just three former Soviet republics, the three Baltic states, all of whom joined in 2004. Between 1999 and 2009, however, eight former members of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact joined NATO: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Albania and Croatia. For now, however, NATO has been hesitant to extend membership to additional former Soviet republics, including Ukraine and Georgia. Though they are forging closer ties with NATO, Sweden and Finland never actually joined the alliance. (Notably, fellow Scandinavian Jens Stoltenberg, the former social democratic prime minister of Norway, will become NATO’s new secretary-general on October 1). Anne Applebaum, the typically thoughtful foreign affairs columnist for The Washington Post, and the spouse of Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski, perhaps the most prominent (and understandably) hawkish voice in the European Union with respect to Russia, got the ball rolling last week. She suggested that, just as no one in Poland believed in the summer of 1939 that the annihilation of World War II was necessarily coming, it’s equally naive for Americans and Europeans today, in our integrated and globalized world, to believe that war with Russia is so far-fetched: Not long ago, Vladimir Zhirinovsky — the Russian member of parliament and court jester who sometimes says things that those in power cannot — argued on television that Russia should use nuclear weapons to bomb Poland and the Baltic countries — “dwarf states,” he called them — and show the West who really holds power in Europe: “Nothing threatens America, it’s far away. But Eastern European countries will place themselves under the threat of total annihilation,” he declared. Vladimir Putin indulges these comments: Zhirinovsky’s statements are not official policy, the Russian president says, but he always “gets the party going.” Zhirinovsky, however, is well past his sell-by date. Back in 1996, when his LDPR (Политическая партия ЛДПР), formerly the Liberal Democratic Party (which was neither liberal nor democratic) was the second-largest bloc in the Russian parliament, he ran for president on a platform that Russia should extend south to the Indian Ocean. He’s one of a handful of politicians that now exist as the approved opposition in Putin’s Russia. Zhirinovsky, in March, suggested that Russia should annex all of central Asia, and even in the presidential ‘election’ in March 2012, he was rattling the nationalist saber against the Baltic states. (In that election, Zhirinovsky won all of 6.2% of the vote). That Applebaum cites Zhirinovsky as a credible source of Russian policy intentions should be a caution sign that her analysis might be worth taking with a heap of skepticism. Both Applebaum and Tayler draw from the writings of Andrey Piontkovsky, a Russian mathematician and dissident who’s been highly critical of Putin’s ‘managed’ democracy. It’s Piontkovsky who has suggested the possibility of a limited nuclear strike. Piontkovsky argues that by calling Obama’s (and NATO’s) bluff with a very limited nuclear strike against a Baltic (or Polish) city, Putin could show that the Article 5 guarantee means very little. In the language of the Cold War, the logic of ‘mutually assured destruction’ has broken down today, because NATO leaders aren’t willing to start World War III over Narva or another Baltic city. It’s true that late last month, Putin chillingly reminded the world that Russia remains one of the world’s leading nuclear powers: “Russia’s partners…should understand it’s best not to mess with us,” said Putin, dressed casually in a grey sweater and light blue jeans. “Thank God, I think no one is thinking of unleashing a large-scale conflict with Russia. I want to remind you that Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers.” Nevertheless, launching preemptive nuclear strikes seems like a relatively risky step to take to make an academic point. If NATO won’t go to war for Narva or even Tallinn, it would certainly stand up to Russian aggression against Warsaw, especially now that Polish prime minister Donald Tusk will assume the presidency of the European Council in December. So “calling the Article 5 bluff” only goes so far as a credible strategy. Undoubtedly, much of Putin’s aggression in Ukraine involves Russian domestic politics. In one of the most brilliant analyses to date on Putin’s motivations, Vox’s Max Fisher argues that Putin’s anti-Western, nationalist rhetoric has its roots in the December 2011 parliamentary elections, which took place in the context slowing Russian economic growth, marred by accusations of fraud, and met with widespread protests in Moscow and elsewhere: Putin panicked. He saw his legitimacy slipping and feared a popular revolt. So he changed strategies. Rather than basing his political legitimacy on economic growth, he would base it on reviving Russian nationalism: imperial nostalgia, anti-Western paranoia, and conservative Orthodox Christianity. That, in turn, propelled Russian mischief in Ukraine, which boosted Putin’s approval ratings at home, thereby massively increasing the costs for Putin to back down over eastern Ukraine: In a rational world, Putin would have cut his losses and withdrawn support for the rebels. But, thanks to months of propagandistic state media, Russians do not live in a rational world. They live in a world where surrendering in eastern Ukraine would mean surrendering to American-backed Ukrainian Nazis, and they believe everything that Putin has told them about being the only person capable of defeating these forces of darkness. To withdraw would be to admit that it was all a lie and to sacrifice the nationalism that is now his only source of real legitimacy. So Putin did the only thing he could to do to keep up the fiction upon which his political survival hinges: he invaded Ukraine outright. In addition, Ukraine is one of the few countries in the former Soviet Union that’s developed a relatively strong, institutionalized form of democracy. Given that much of eastern Ukraine (and many of Kiev’s residents) are native Russian speakers, that makes Ukraine a particularly dangerous example of how democracy might work in Moscow as well as Kiev — in the same language that everyday Russian citizens speak. But it’s not like Putin lacked strategic reasons to slow Ukraine’s turn back toward the West. When the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych fled office in February, it made sense that Putin would want to complicate and delay what felt like a whipsaw move from east to west. In part, it worked — his annexation of Crimea is now largely regarded as successful, and his tactics arguably resulted in the election of a more Russian-friendly president in Petro Poroshenko, who as recently as 2012 served as Yanukovych’s minister of trade and economic development. If, during the heart of the Cold War, the United States wasn’t willing to start World War III over Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1963, it makes no strategic sense for the United States to do so in 2008 over Georgia or today over Crimea — or even southeastern Ukraine or the breakaway coastal strip of Transnistria within Moldova, another non-NATO member. Critics like Frum would also be more credible if they acknowledged that Yanukovych’s ouster, however justifiable on moral grounds, was undemocratic — Yanukovych was duly elected in 2010 with a majority of the Ukrainian electorate. It’s also true significant far-right and nationalist elements, including the newly formed Right Sector (Правий сектор) made common cause during the anti-Yanukovych protests over the winter, and many of their leaders held key roles, especially in defense, in the interim Ukrainian government. Even today, as the ceasefire between Kiev and the rebels takes effect, it wouldn’t seem too difficult for Putin to declare victory in Ukraine — with or without taking more territory in eastern Ukraine, such as a ‘land bridge’ that links Crimea to the Russian mainland. I argued in July that the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 would actually bring Putin and Poroshenko closer to a ceasefire and, ultimately, a peace deal. As world opinion hardens against Putin, and US and European sanctions tighten against an increasingly flagging Russian economy, Putin has a pecuniary incentive to back down. Likewise, Poroshenko has both personal and policy reasons to prefer peace with the Kremlin, and Germany and other leading European countries have both strategic and economic reasons that are smoothing the peaceful option. Though Ukraine is still in crisis mode, it’s not such an existential crisis that there isn’t time for domestic politics, with parliamentary elections now scheduled for October 26. Writing about the geopolitical forces that are causing the Ukraine crisis to smolder from flames into dull embers isn’t as sexy as World War III or unhinged nuclear strikes on Tallinn. But ultimately, that kind of talk is both irresponsible and a bit silly. While US commentators are forecasting doom, Europeans and Ukrainians are quietly getting on with the work of finding a peaceful solution to the Ukraine-Russia standoff.Russian public doesn’t want war and Putin has to side with the public—Ukraine proves even if they hate the west, there’s no risk that the public will agree with violenceRojansky, Former Deputy Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Carnegie Endowment, & Yalowitz, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Belarus, 14 [Matthew & Kenneth, 6-25-14, Thomson Reuters, “No matter what Putin says — Russian people have no appetite for war,” , accessed 7-13-14, J.J.]Russia and the West are again at odds, eying each other with suspicion over Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and support of armed separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Basic rules of the game for security, stability and prosperity in Europe and beyond are at stake. Some commentators are calling this a “new Cold War.”But the crucial fact is that the public on each side does not have any appetite for a sustained conflict.Attention has focused on the key leaders — President Barack Obama, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Putin has used his acts of aggression?to build public support.?Yet the focus should be on whether the Russian people want renewed confrontation — or would even countenance something like a “new Cold War.”Russia may not be a democracy, but it is also not the totalitarian Soviet Union. The flip side of Putin’s brand of authoritarian populism is his reliance on public opinion to maintain legitimacy.Putin’s popularity ratings have soared from roughly 50 percent to more than 80 percent since the annexation of Crimea, and his domestic opposition has been effectively muted. The less educated, more conservative and nationalistic segments of the Russian public have enthusiastically bought into his attacks on the West for ignoring or threatening Russia’s strategic interests.More than half of all Russians, according to the polling agency VCIOM, now agree that relations with the West “can only be tense and be based on distrust.” Nor is this a new phenomenon —eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Western support for Kosovo independence and the “color revolutions” throughout the post-Soviet periphery all heightened Russians’ sense that the West was taking advantage of their weakness.Popular support for translating this anti-Western resentment into a sustained confrontation, however, appears shallow at best. Though another Russian polling agency, the Levada Center, reports negative attitudes toward the United States at a 20-year high, both Levada and VCIOM confirm that nearly two-thirds of Russians view isolation from the West as unlikely or impossible.In addition, despite strong opposition to the new Western-backed government in Ukraine, most Russians oppose further military intervention there, even while they support diplomatic and economic assistance for Russian speakers in the region. Russian troops are still present near Ukraine’s eastern border, but Putin has clearly backed off from a full-scale invasion — likely calculating that the Russian public would not tolerate the high costs of a prolonged and bloody conflict in Ukraine.Russia won’t escalate—serious conflicts won’t occurBaran et al, Senior Fellow and Director Center for Eurasian Studies and member of the Hudson Institute, ‘07[Zeyno, Summer 2007, “U.S. – Russian Relations: Is conflict inevitable?” Pg. 26. , accessed 7/12/13, J.J.]How far is Russia ready to go to pursue its assertive agenda? Is the Russian elite ready for confrontation with the West? Definitely not. A significant part of the Russian elite is not ready for serious conflict with the West. But at the same time it is ready to continue to use anti-Western rhetoric to consolidate society. In fact, it is trying to have it both ways: integration with the West for themselves, but not for the rest of society. There is a logic to this seemingly schizophrenic behavior. The Russian elite can maintain their privileged status only in a society that is hostile to the West. The question, however, could be raised: will the Russian elite be able to control the consequences of this dual-track policy?No Russian conflict—they lack the resourcesMotyl and Menon, The American Interest, 7[Alexander J., World Affairs Correspondent Rajan, Nonresident Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, March 1, The American Interest, “The Myth of Russian Resurgence,” , accessed July 12, 2014As with almost any broad generalization, this one is not entirely false. Indeed, it cannot be. Russia sprawls across Eurasia, contains 148 million people, possesses more than 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads, is the world’s second-largest exporter of oil and armaments, is the foremost exporter of natural gas, and is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Any country with these attributes will have strategic heft. But a scrutiny of its power reveals that Russia is far weaker than the reigning consensus suggests. Russia is not “back.” If anything, the next few years may show Russia with its back to the wall.RUSSIA’S POWERRussian power can be assessed in four aspects: military prowess, economic vitality, human capital and “soft power” assets. We take these in turn.The once mighty Red Army is now a pale imitation of itself, a wheezing symbol of Russia’s deterioration. From a total of three million men under arms toward the end of the Cold War, the Russian armed forces have shrunk to one million. That would be good news were it now a better force. But except for some elite units, most Russian troops are poorly trained and demoralized draftees subjected to pitiless hazing and prone to alcoholism, suicide and corruption. Ninety percent of the males supposedly required to complete the two-year stint of military service evade the draft both legally and illegally. Service contracts signed in 2004 ranged from 17 percent of the recruiting goal in the Moscow region to 45 percent in the North Caucasus.22.International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 2005-2006 (Routledge, 2005), p. 151.Less than a fifth of the kontraktniki (those who sign up for the money) re-enlist, complaining of paltry pay and primitive living conditions.33.Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 24, 2006.The problem transcends raw numbers. In 2005 an astonishing 40 percent of draftees were declared unfit to serve on account of physical or mental disabilities. Russia’s weaponry is aging and falling behind qualitatively, and new equipment reaches the armed forces in insufficient numbers. Defense spending has risen 25 percent annually since 2004, but years of neglect ensure that it will be a long time before existing armaments are replaced and soldiers’ morale and quality of life improve. The upswing in hardware expenditure is also mitigated by the 8 percent average inflation rate in 2004–06 and the need to allocate a large chunk of these monies to attract better-qualified people (particularly if plans for a volunteer force are to pan out).Russia remains a nuclear power, having inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal, but there have been no dramatic improvements in its capabilities. Russia’s nuclear armory certainly suffices for deterrence, but it cannot thwart smaller yet more urgent threats in its immediate neighborhood, among them terrorism, Islamic radicalism and failing states; nor, as other nuclear powers have found, can nuclear weapons be translated into prosaic political influence. Paradoxically, and unlike during the Cold War, the principal threat now posed by Russia’s nuclear arms is that they, or the fissile materials they require, could end up in terrorists’ hands.No Russia war – no capacity O’Hanlon, Brookings Foreign Policy Director of Research, 2015, (Michael, Specializes in national security and defense policy, “The Future of Land Warfare”, Brookings, 47-48, PAS) Russia will not be able to restore its previous superpower status under any of the above approaches to national security policy. It's population base and economic strength are too limited, and will remain so even if Russian political leadership makes occasional conquests, as with Crimea. But it can sustain very substantial capabilities. Russia might, for example, spend 3 percent or perhaps an even higher fraction of GDP on the nation's armed forces. That could imply a total of perhaps 5 percent or more of GDP spent on all security capabilities, including internal defense, an area of recent emphasis in light of various internal challenges, among them unrest from growing Muslim populations and exclusionary groups.14 This level of effort would exceed that of any major Eurasian power and would also exceed projected levels for the United States, as a percentage of national economic output. ? Because Russia's economy will remain so much smaller than that of the United States, China, or even Japan or Germany under any realistic extrapolation from today, such a higher level of military spending as a fraction of national economic power would not elevate Russia to superpower status. But Russia would probably be able to retain and indeed solidify its position as the world's number 3 military spender, after the United States and China. And it may be able to create a sense of military momentum over a period in which American and other Western defense spending may continue to decline, a momentum that Russia could seek to translate to favorable strategic outcomes, at least close to home. ? Notionally, under this approach, in 2020 U.S. military spending might total around $500 billion to $550 billion. China might tally around $300 billion. Russia's military spending, depending on what happens to its economy in the interim, might range from $100 billion to $150 billion annually, with several major American allies and India ranking next on the list, in the range of $50 billion a year each. ? With all of that money, Russia would still be hard-pressed to maintain a military with full capacity to secure all its land borders through conventional military means alone. ? It would, of course, remain incapable of recreating the kind of military that the Soviet Union once possessed. ? A million-man force, up modestly from today's, would be a realistic ceiling on the total active duty strength of the armed forces, even with the resources presumed in this scenario. ................
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