Links: Helps Trump/Hurts Biden



Links: Helps Trump/Hurts BidenGeneric Withdrawing from international treaties benefits Trump domestically Tures, LaGrange College Political Science Professor, 5-30-20(John, “Why Ditching the WHO Will Backfire on Trump,” accessed 5-30-20, ) JFNWhen President Donald Trump announced Friday that the United States is cutting ties with the World Health Organization, he relied on an old strategy from the American presidential playbook: attempting to score political points at home by loudly withdrawing from an international body or treaty. The problem? This strategy doesn’t always last: Presidents—or their successors—learn the shortcomings of such noisy departures from world organizations and agreements, realizing that the bluster was often not worth the price. Sometimes, the United States later rejoins the same institution it once left, often quietly, once the folly of abandonment is apparent. We may associate storming out of international organizations with Republicans, but Jimmy Carter showed such actions can be bipartisan. Before he became president, there was already a movement to ditch the U.S. membership in the International Labor Organization. This international institution had been created after World War I to demonstrate the Western world’s concern for workers in order to undercut the Communist appeal. It won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969. But the ILO had fallen out of favor with American conservatives in the 1970s, and even some U.S. labor unions, as political scientist Richard A. Melanson documented in 1979. The ILO’s critics felt the decision-making structure was helping the Soviets and their allies, the organization was too anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian, and West European representatives were too lukewarm in plans to condemn the USSR for its labor practices. Plans to leave the ILO began under the Ford administration, but Carter allowed the departure to continue. The U.S. exited the group in his first year of office, 1977. No doubt Carter was influenced by powerful opposition to the ILO from the AFL-CIO and American Jewish groups, both key backers of the Democratic Party. Three years later, it was a different story. “When Carter officials realized there was little more to be gained by their continued absence, they rejoined the ILO,” political scientist Paul Masters wrote in 1996. There were changes in leadership at the AFL-CIO as well as a new understanding that there were limits to what the U.S. could do outside of the international organization. Still, similar mistakes would be repeated in the following decade. Perhaps the best-known case of a president stomping out of an international organization occurred when Ronald Reagan announced the U.S. would leave UNESCO in 1984. Reagan’s rationale for ditching the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization was summed up by the White House: “UNESCO has extraneously politicized virtually every subject it deals with. It has exhibited hostility toward a free society, especially a free market and a free press, and it has demonstrated unrestrained budgetary expansion.” Getting out of UNESCO was part of an overall plan to sideline international organizations, as the U.S. refused to sign the Law of the Sea Treaty and contemplated leaving the Food and Agricultural Organization and UNCTAD conferences as well—moves designed to woo the nationalists in America who made up much of Reagan’s electoral coalition. International relations scholar Steven Livingston argued in 1992 that perceptions of Reagan’s foreign policy as a success were misguided and that his moves actually resulted in a “more constrained U.S. agenda power.”Plan reminds voters of their mortality and allows Trump to paint himself as the nations “protector,” which leads to his reelection Coleman, Columbia Univ. Psychology Prof., 4-7-20(Peter, “How a Pandemic Could Actually Boost Trump’s Reelection Chances,” accessed 4-14-20, ) JFN But a widely studied psychological phenomenon suggests the opposite: that, with the grimness of death hanging in the air, anxious Americans might actually be more likely to support Trump in November because of his dominant leadership style and his claims of offering protection. One of the most germane areas of theory and research on this matter is something called terror management theory. The theory’s original inspiration was anthropologist Ernest Becker’s Pulitzer Prize-winning 1973 book, The Denial of Death, which argues that humans are uniquely cursed by our innate dual capacities to a) really, really want to survive and b) know that we will one day die. This existential reality is, quite simply, terrifying, so humans tend to go to great lengths to deny, deflect and dispose of this fact in order to manage it. Becker went on to claim that much of what humans do throughout our lives—our work, our family life, our religious beliefs, how we vote—is organized around our profound need to manage this most basic terror. In the 1980s, three prominent social psychologists took this idea into the lab to study it. Since that time, they and their colleagues have conducted hundreds of experiments and field studies to investigate the premises of Becker’s work—in particular, the effects of what they call “mortality salience,” a state of awareness of the cold fact that we are going to die. One of the main findings of this research has been that when humans are reminded of their own mortality—such as during a pandemic—they are much more inclined to cling tightly to their cultural worldviews, to derogate and even harm those who are seen as threatening these views, and to support brash, charismatic leaders who claim to protect them. This means that as Americans begin to fixate more on their own mortality, they are likely to become more nationalistic, socially conforming, prejudiced against outgroups and aggressive. They also are more likely to favor dominant leaders who model these inclinations. Mortality salience has played a role in American politics before. In a fascinating set of experimental studies, researchers found that higher levels of mortality salience brought on by reminders of the 9/11 attacks significantly increased support for George W. Bush in 2004—including support for his reelection—and decreased support for his presidential rival, John Kerry. The researchers saw support for Bush stemming from his incumbency, as well as his “image as a protective shield against death, armed with high-tech weaponry, patriotic rhetoric, and the resolute invocation of doing God’s will to ‘rid the world of evil’”—the ultimate salve for a debilitating terror of death. The research on terror management clearly suggests that the more anxious Americans become through the next election cycle, the more likely that Trump’s current disaster bump in the polls will hold, and the greater his chances for reelection. Although Bush and Trump displayed two very different leadership styles (Bush’s plainspoken resolution in the face of a foreign threat or Trump’s act as a “get-it-done” business executive), they both epitomize the tough, no-nonsense, take-no-prisoners unilateralism that the highly anxious seek. Trump’s christening of himself as a “wartime president,” with the inclusion of military officers in fatigues and dress blues standing shoulder-to-shoulder with him (less than 6 feet apart) during news conferences, should fit nicely with America’s need for an invulnerable, symbolic protector.Plan is spun by Trump as a nativist policy that spurs base turnout Zelizer, CNN Political Analyst, 5-2-20(Julian, “President Trump's reelection strategy is taking shape,” accessed 5-12-20, ) JFN Nativism: Just last week, the President took advantage of the pandemic and announced an immigration ban. "In light of the attack from the Invisible Enemy, as well as the need to protect the jobs of our GREAT American Citizens, I will be signing an Executive Order to temporarily suspend immigration into the United States!" he tweeted. The move harkened back to his 2016 campaign promise to build a wall along the southern US border. This time, the President's executive order was much more limited in comparison, with a long list of exceptions. Expect more of the same. Trump believes that anti-immigration rhetoric is one of the easiest ways to mobilize supporters around an imagined threat that unites them behind his candidacy, regardless of what he actually does for them. Trump can be the president of Wall Street, in his mind, and still win the support of rural working-class voters if he plays to their cultural rage. His nativist attacks on immigrants have always been the key to his conservative populism.Controversial policies only fuel Trump’s popularity with his base Shafer, Politico Columnist, 5-12-20(Jack, “Why Trump Is Peddling Extra-Strength Conspiracy Theories,” accessed 5-13-20, ) JFNSo he keeps harping on China as the responsible party for the 80,000-plus coronavirus deaths in the United States. While offering absolutely no proof for the charge, Trump obscures his own neglect of the pandemic and misdirects culpability to a foreign country. These techniques might not work on you, but that doesn’t bother Trump. His hardcore supporters are the target of the tweets, speeches, pressers and conspiracy theories. The more he does to make himself look persecuted and reviled by the “elites” and the press, the more heroic he appears to his base.Plan encourages Democrats to fall into the Trump Trap and increases his support and popularity numbers Harris, Politico Editor, 5-21-20(John, “Once Again, Democrats Are Caught In the Trump Trap,” accessed 5-21-20, ) JFN Here is the essence of the Trump Trap. For critics, not speaking out against his provocations could be reasonably interpreted as complicity or cowardice. Speaking out, however, gives those provocations the centrality upon which the Trump movement depends. It’s an old phenomenon. What’s new is the pandemic, which looked for a while like it might make Trump’s brand of politics obsolete. Instead, it has proven the adaptability and durability of Trumpism. His immediate predecessor, like many other Democrats and much of the media, has ratified the achievement. Obama’s return this month is a good window also into an underappreciated dynamic of the Trump years. At first glance, this looks like two powerful political leaders with large followings expressing their disdain for each other on more or less equal terms. But the nature of Obama’s command of the loyalty and affection of his supporters is far different than the nature of Trump’s command of his supporters. This difference is critical to the most important question of 2020 politics: Can Trump survive the pandemic and the astounding disruption it has caused in the economy and the routines of everyday life? Most people who admire Obama, it’s clear, do so in absolute terms. To these people, his character and style represent virtues that approximate the ideal of how they might wish all presidents at all times should act. He’s progressive, even if not quite as much as some admirers want. He values rationality and restraint, a bit more so than many partisans would wish—an elegant and inspirational figure in an inelegant and cynical age. These virtues, by these lights, do not depend primarily on context—on who his opponents are, or what external circumstances he is facing. Most people who admire Trump, in my conversations, do so in a relative way. Context is everything. Yes, they say, Trump is coarse and combative, often outrageous, with a wandering attention span. No, this does not represent their ideal of how a president should act. But these aren’t ideal times—they are infused with double standards and cynicism—and this makes Trump a great leader for these particular times. He calls out institutions (the political parties, the Congress, the media) who his partisans don’t believe deserve their respect or influence. He gratuitously offends liberal pieties. He is not boring, and he’s not afraid. It's often said that Trump’s brand of politics requires him to identify enemies—people want to see who he’s against. What’s overlooked is Trump’s brand of politics requires other people to identify him as the enemy. There’s never a shortage of volunteers, and none more prestigious than a former Democratic president widely respected by his party. Democrats were pleased to hear Obama’s words of condemnation. But Trump was even more pleased. No one could doubt that Obama sincerely believed his comparatively mild rebuke of Trump. No one really doubts that whether Trump believes his broadsides against Obama is secondary to his true objective of drawing lines and creating the kind of chaos in which he has previously thrived. The rejoinder to all this is obvious: Who cares? What relevance do Trump’s grievances and posturing and conspiracy theories have in the middle of a pandemic? Surely there is only one question that matters: Is Trump doing a good job responding to the crisis? But that question immediately leads to the next: Good job, according to who? Trump knows that the likelihood that a sufficient number of people will say he’s doing at least an acceptable job during the pandemic increases the more that certain types of people say he’s a terrible person doing a terrible job. Democrats believe that the pandemic and Trump’s belated and erratic response to it will be his undoing. There is polling to bolster this hope. A Quinnipiac Poll released Wednesday showed Joe Biden leading Trump by 50 percent to 39 percent in a head-to-head matchup—an 11 point national lead that, if it held, likely would put several battleground states out of reach for Trump. But weighing against hope is experience. Democrats have yet to be validated, not after the Billy Bush tape in 2016, not after the Ukraine revelations of 2019, that there is a “this time he’s gone too far” moment that will cause Trump backers to mournfully turn their support away from him. So far, there is no evidence that a galvanizing rhetorical moment—such as Joseph Welsh in 1954 challenging Joseph McCarthy, “Have you no sense of decency, sir? At long last, have you left no sense of decency?”—will derail Trump. There is plenty of evidence, on the other hand, that being told Trump is bad causes some people to think he is good.Plan paves the way for Trump’s reelection because it allows him to make the case he’s getting stuff done Cillizza, CNN Editor At Large, 5-18-20(Chris, “How Donald Trump wins again, in 3 sentences,” accessed 5-23-20, ) JFN But it is still a fact that the only real path for Trump to a second term -- and I continue to believe that path is quite narrow -- is through a message that doesn't try to make people like Trump but rather forces them to acknowledge that he is getting things done. Trump is, quite simply, not likeable. He says and does things on an almost-daily basis that even many of his supporters think are over the line of acceptable conduct for a president or, really, for anyone. Nothing will change that. Or certainly nothing that he can do between now and November. The only way he wins is to make the case that may not be your idea of what a president should look and act like but that he is someone who knows how to make change in Washington. (He also likely needs to disqualify Joe Biden, which his campaign is already working very hard to do.)Trump withdrawing US troops is a proven political winner Thompson, Lexington Institute COO, 2-26-19(Loren, “Why President Trump Will Likely Be Reelected, And What It Means For Global Security,” accessed 5-23-20, ) JFN Third, the nation is at peace. Trump has avoided involvement in new overseas adventures, and is pressing to scale back what is left of the operations he inherited from his predecessor. Critics complain he is too eager to get out of places like Afghanistan and Syria, however the record shows that voters have little patience for foreign military intervention. Unpopular wars are the one issue that can eclipse a good economy in the minds of voters, but at the moment Trump seems to be delivering both peace and prosperity.Plan activates voter anger and that benefits Trump Grossman, Analyst for , 5-19-20(Matt, “Why Anger At Trump May Not Help Democrats Win,” accessed 5-26-20, ) JFNTrump has stoked outrage among his supporters, who have echoed his rhetoric and fury, and his detractors, who have launched anti-Trump resistance protests and helped recruit new congressional candidates in 2018. It has also set the mood for the 2020 election. There’s only one problem for Democrats looking to replicate Barack Obama’s multiracial coalition: The voters most energized by anger are white. According to the book “The Anger Gap” by political scientist Davin Phoenix, white Americans — both Democrats and Republicans — are a lot more likely to be motivated by anger than black Americans and, to a lesser extent, Latino and Asian Americans. White Americans, Phoenix finds, express more anger about politics in public opinion polls, and they’re also more likely to turn out to vote because they are angry. Since 1980, he finds, black Democrats have been seven points less likely to report feeling angry about the Republican presidential candidate than white Democrats, according to data from the American National Election Studies. “The political power leveraged from being mad as hell is largely reserved only for white Americans,” he writes. Many of the underlying reasons, Phoenix argues, are systemic. Simply put, nonwhite voters have far fewer expectations of the political system working for them. Instead, Phoenix found nonwhite voters are more likely to be motivated to vote if they feel pride or hope — as they did in 2008 due to Obama’s historic presidential nomination. Expressing anger is also difficult for nonwhite voters to navigate politically — especially black voters. There is the “potential stigma that comes from the label of being an angry black woman or an angry black man,” Phoenix told me. White Democrats and Republicans, in contrast, haven’t been afraid to publicly display their polarized opinions in the Trump era — on protest signs and in online comments and polls. Increased anger isn’t a new phenomenon, but it is a rising one. Political scientist Steven Webster argues in his book, “American Rage,” that this current moment of partisan rancor is the culmination of a long pattern of increased anger in American politics. Webster finds that politicians in both parties and those who appear on partisan cable news channels increasingly use angry rhetoric, especially in election years, fueling the fire. Public anger, in turn, fuels negative impressions of the other party and declining trust in government. But if 2020 is an election driven primarily by anger, that might backfire on Democrats. Take the 2016 election. One reason former Sen. Hillary Clinton was less successful in mobilizing Obama’s base was because her focus on Trump’s bigoted comments attracted some who shared her views but did not resonate with nonwhite voters. “The Clinton campaign bet big on the strategy of highlighting the racist and xenophobic undertones of the Trump campaign,” Phoenix writes, “but its ‘basket of deplorables’ messaging appeared to engender more of a rise from Trump supporters falling under this label than people of color feeling targeted. … [It was] a severe miscalculation of the way people of color respond to political threats.”Prefer our link evidence because it based upon polling that employs better and more detailed questions Hannah and Gray, Eurasia Group Foundation, 19(Mark and Caroline, “INDISPENSABLE NO MORE? HOW THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SEES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY,” November 2019, Accessed 5-15-20, ) JFN The views of the American people, particularly around issues of war and peace, are as difficult to categorize as the people themselves. Some studies, such as a recent one by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, suggest Americans support robust global engagement.13 Like ours, the Chicago Council study portrays an American public objecting to military interventions. Yet, that study concludes the American public is “rejecting retreat” because majorities believe U.S. military superiority and stationing U.S. troops in allied countries contribute to U.S. safety (though at only 69% and 51% respectively). By asking detailed questions about specific hot button policy issues with more nuanced answer options, our analysis comes to some different conclusions. We are not alone. The Center for American Progress recently found Americans are committed to improving their foreign policy by strengthening their democracy at home, and are surprisingly informed and innovative in their thinking about newer threats we face, such as cyberattacks and drone warfare.14 We also find common ground with the Chicago Council study: Americans don’t want to recoil or retire from global engagement. Voters appear to see engagement in a different light than many in Washington. For voters, engagement is an antonym of, not a synonym for, the threat or use of military force.Alliances US public doesn’t support alliances that require US military action or limiting the power of countries like Russia and ChinaMead, Bard College Foreign Affairs Professor, 3-4-19(Walter Russell, “Allies Worry Over U.S. Public Opinion; The gap between voters and foreign-policy elites shows little sign of closing,” WSJ, accessed 5-17-20, p. Factiva) JFN There is no more important question in world politics than this: Will U.S. public opinion continue to support an active and strategically focused foreign policy? During the Cold War and for 25 years after, there was rarely any doubt. While Americans argued—sometimes bitterly—over the country's overseas priorities, there was a broad consensus in both parties that sustained engagement was necessary to protect U.S. interests. That consensus is more fragile today. Questions about the reliability of American commitments keep the lights burning late in foreign and defense ministries around the world. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insists, as he said in Manila last week, that a Chinese attack on Philippine forces or territory in the South China Sea would activate Article 4 of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. But will the American people honor the check that Mr. Pompeo has written on their behalf? The best answer appears to be "maybe." A recent poll from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 70% of Americans want the U.S. to take an "active part" in world affairs in the abstract. But in a 2018 Pew survey, only 32% said limiting China's power should be an important long-term foreign-policy priority for the U.S. Similarly, while a strong majority of Americans support membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, just over half of Americans would support military action in response to a hypothetical Russian invasion of Estonia, according to a recent Eurasia Group Foundation survey. The Kremlin studies such poll results carefully, and so do NATO allies on Russia's borders. Perspectives on defense are especially schizophrenic when partisanship comes into play. While 52% of Democrats believe that limiting Russian power should be a top national priority, most Democrats also say defense spending should be reduced. To the extent that young voters' attitudes forecast the political future, poll numbers suggest a continuing drift from Cold War-era ideas about America's place in the world. Voters in their 20s and 30s are significantly less likely than older Americans to think that the U.S. is an exceptional nation, to support humanitarian interventions abroad or to think the U.S. should seek to limit the power of countries like Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.Multilateral alliances are unpopular with voters Greber, US Reporter for The Australian Financial Review, 2-11-20(Jacob, “Struggling Biden touts experience, vows to rebuild Australia alliance,” accessed 5-10-20, ) JFNMr Buchan said the former vice-president was also trying to differentiate himself from President Donald Trump in that he wants the help of "South Korea and Japan, in addition to the third key ally, Australia, in managing China", Mr Buchan said. While Mr Biden's support for a return to strong US support for multilateral arrangements such as NATO would be welcomed in many western capitals, it's not clear it's the kind of message that will resonate with voters in New Hampshire. Nor would it win a presidential race against Mr Trump, whose aggressive "America first" stance is at the core of this political base.NATO US public opposes NATO commitments and pro NATO public opinion polls are flawed because they ignore Article 5 Carpenter, CATO Institute Senior Fellow, 12-4-19(Ted Galen, “NATO’s Dirty Little Secret Is Out,” accessed 5-15-20, ) JFNPro‐?NATO politicians and pundits never tire of citing polls and studies showing that a majority of Americans continue to support the Alliance. Frequently, that argument is presented as part of the larger case that President Trump’s periodic expressions of skepticism about NATO’s relevance are out‐?of‐?touch with the views of the American public. However, the pro‐?NATO case is built on a fundamental deception. Few (if any) surveys of U.S. public opinion about NATO even hint about the extent of the risks Americans incur because of Washington’s obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which commits the signatories to consider an attack on any member as an attack on all. A typical poll question will ask respondents whether the United States should defend country X, if Russia attacks that country. A more honest question would be whether the United States should defend country X from a Russian attack, even if doing so might result in a nuclear war with Russia that could kill millions of Americans. Granted, such an outcome is a worst‐?case scenario, but Washington’s Article 5 obligations bring it into play. The escalation risk is especially relevant with respect to defending Estonia and the other Baltic republics. A 2016 RAND Corporation study concluded that it would be nearly impossible for NATO to defend its Baltic members against a full‐?scale Russian invasion for more than a few days without an extensive upgrade of the Alliance’s existing force deployment. Even after such an upgrade, the outcome of a struggle waged solely with conventional weapons would be uncertain. Escalation to the nuclear level would remain an ever‐?present danger. Even without a robust “truth in advertising” requirement, U.S. public support for NATO is slipping. Mark Hannah, a senior fellow at the Eurasia Group Foundation, concedes that point following a survey his organization recently conducted. He notes: “For a second year in a row, when faced with a hypothetical scenario in which Russia invaded Estonia, a NATO ally, Americans were roughly split on whether they wanted the United States to respond militarily. And that was after respondents were reminded of Article 5, the part of the NATO treaty that obligates the United States to respond to such aggression, and after they were told that U.S. action could be the only way to expel Russia.” In other words, even with wording designed to elicit positive responses—and no disclosure of a potentially dire nuclear risk arising from America’s military obligation to a NATO ally—the survey showed no clear public mandate for defending that ally. Hannah concludes: “It’s not just President Donald Trump who is skeptical of the North Atlantic alliance, in other words. It’s the American people. To the extent that U.S. citizens think about NATO at all, they disagree about whether honoring its commitments would be worth the sacrifice.” He’s correct, and if they were explicitly told about the nuclear risk, it is highly probable that anti‐?NATO sentiment would surge.US public support for NATO commitments is declining Hannah, Eurasia Group Foundation Senior Fellow, 12-3-19(Mark, “It’s Not Just Trump. The American People Are Skeptical of NATO, Too,” accessed 5-15-20, ) JFNBut as the heads of NATO member countries gather this week in London, some of that popular support is in jeopardy. This is one of the conclusions of a national survey that my colleagues and I at the Eurasia Group Foundation recently conducted. For a second year in a row, when faced with a hypothetical scenario in which Russia invaded Estonia, a NATO ally, Americans were roughly split on whether they wanted the United States to respond militarily. And that was after respondents were reminded of Article 5, the part of the NATO treaty that obligates the United States to respond to such aggression, and after they were told that U.S. action could be the only way to expel Russia. It’s not just President Donald Trump who is skeptical of the North Atlantic alliance, in other words. It’s the American people. To the extent that U.S. citizens think about NATO at all, they disagree about whether honoring its commitments would be worth the sacrifice. This wavering commitment likely signals a belief that American protection is no longer necessary for European security or that the United States has different priorities from when NATO was created 70 years ago. If NATO wants to earn the confidence of American citizens—who, after all, elect the American president whom NATO allies deal with—the alliance must rethink its mission for the 21st century. To be sure, most Americans still have a general sense that NATO is important to our country’s security, according to another recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. But even that survey found the same divide on whether Americans would opt to retaliate against a Russian attack on a NATO ally. As recently as the late 1990s, nearly 70 percent of surveyed Americans supported sending U.S. troops to defend a new NATO member from a military attack. What’s going on? NATO is in the midst of an existential crisis; its original mission is a vestige of an earlier era. Even the current secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, acknowledges that there’s no imminent military threat from Russia (whose economy has dwindled to the size of Italy’s), and the Germans certainly don’t seem intent on territorial expansion. So, Americans who retain a positive impression of the alliance might yet hesitate to sacrifice blood and treasure on a mission they don’t see as vital to their interests.US public is at best split on maintaining US commitments to NATO Hannah and Gray, Eurasia Group Foundation, 19(Mark and Caroline, “INDISPENSABLE NO MORE? HOW THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SEES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY,” November 2019, Accessed 5-15-20, ) JFN For example, we found again in 2019 that, despite the uncritical acceptance of the value of NATO among the Washington establishment, the public is split on whether it would support armed retaliation against Russia if it were to invade a Baltic country that was also a NATO ally of the U.S. We also found the public subscribes more to what EGF board president Ian Bremmer has called an “Independent America” worldview than an “Indispensable America” or “Moneyball America” worldview. 2 And the “Wilsonian” outlook described within a popular typology by Walter Russell Mead, so prevalent within the foreign policy community, finds little support or salience within the public.Most Americans don’t support or value NATO Sanders, YouGov Data Journalist, 4-4-19(Linley, “How does America feel about NATO? Support for alliance falls across key Western nations,” accessed 5-21-20, ) JFNAs the North Atlantic Treaty Organization treaty reaches its 70th anniversary on Thursday, support for the international alliance has fallen among key Western nations, and less than half of Americans (44%) support the United States’ place in the agreement once designed to provide collective security against Russia, formerly called the Soviet Union.Most Republicans don’t value the importance of NATO Sanders, YouGov Data Journalist, 4-4-19(Linley, “How does America feel about NATO? Support for alliance falls across key Western nations,” accessed 5-21-20, ) JFNThat inconstancy is mirrored in American opinions of NATO, as well. When asked whether NATO continues to serve an “important role in the defense of Western countries,” just 38% of Republicans agreed. Members of the GOP are outsized by Democrats (60%) and independent voters (45%), who are also more likely to support the international alliance.Japan/South KoreaUS public supports reducing our military presence in Japan and South KoreaHannah and Gray, Eurasia Group Foundation, 19(Mark and Caroline, “INDISPENSABLE NO MORE? HOW THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SEES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY,” November 2019, Accessed 5-15-20, ) JFN When asked which policy they prefer in response to a rising China, the majority favor recalibrating America’s presence downward. They prefer relying more on regional allies in Asia who, with a reduced American military presence, could move toward defending themselves by taking over greater responsibility for security in the region. Fifteen percent fewer thought more troops should be moved onto U.S. bases in allied countries such as South Korea and Japan and increase the naval presence in the Pacific Ocean.US public supports reducing our military presence in Japan and South Korea, even if people believe China is a threat Hannah and Gray, Eurasia Group Foundation, 19(Mark and Caroline, “INDISPENSABLE NO MORE? HOW THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SEES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY,” November 2019, Accessed 5-15-20, ) JFN The second most cited rationale was that China sees the presence of American troops in Asia as a threat and they might respond aggressively which creates an unnecessary risk of war. The fewest people chose the rationale that China is a strong competitor which will naturally seek more influence than the U.S. in the region and the U.S. should accommodate China’s rise by reducing our military footprint. Even respondents who view China as a threat, nevertheless, want to reduce America’s military presence in the region because they believe the burden of security should be shared and a U.S. military presence heightens the security risk. The most cited rationale for increasing America’s military presence in response to China’s growing influence also focuses on U.S. allies in the region. This group believes military power in Asia deters China from attacking America’s Asian allies and if the U.S. withdrew, such allies would engage in a dangerous arms race with China. This was followed by the rationale that China is an expansionist power that could directly harm American interests in Asia. The least popular reason to increase America’s military presence in the region had to do more with the ideological threat China poses to American values. While many have given into “the new red scare,” the majority of respondents still favor reducing America’s military footprint in Asia. They instead call on U.S. allies to help fight off Chinese influence and overreach, sharing the responsibility for regional peace and stability. Like other policy priorities in Washington, American public opinion contrasts with the current national security strategy on how to respond to a rising China.Japan US public supports efforts to avoid war with China Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 19(“Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs,” accessed 5-4-20, ) JFN There is also bipartisan consensus about when not to use US troops, particularly when it comes to China. Six in 10 across party lines say they oppose using US troops if China were to invade Taiwan (59%) or initiate a military conflict with Japan over disputed islands (55%). And a majority of Americans oppose using US troops to remove Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela (59%). In line with the sentiment that stationing US troops in allied countries increases US safety, majorities of Americans say the United States should increase or maintain its military forces in most countries and regions asked about. That includes Japan (57%) and South Korea (69%), both key allies, as well as the Persian Gulf (60%), an important region for US security. However, Americans are divided over troop levels in Afghanistan, Germany, and Poland—nearly as many say the United States should maintain or increase troops stationed there as say they should decrease them or withdraw entirely. (See Appendix Figure 4 for full results.) While Independents are generally inclined to reduce or withdraw US troops, Democrats and Republicans tend to support maintaining or increasing them.South KoreaTrump will sell the plan as a grand bargain with North Korea that boosts his reelection chances Depetris, Analyst for 38 North, 11-21-19(Daniel, “Troops for Nukes: Should the US Trade Its Forces in South Korea for North Korean Denuclearization?,” accessed 5-22-20, ) JFN Unilaterally removing US forces in the South without getting anything of value in return would be politically impossible and strategically misguided. However, linking such a withdrawal in return for the Kim regime’s nuclear disarmament would at least be more defensible in the court of public opinion. This gambit would also kill two birds with one stone for a president who views diplomacy and relationships in strictly transactional terms: accomplishing the Kim regime’s denuclearization—an achievement he could plausibly tout as vindication of his politically risky, top-down nuclear diplomacy—while extricating the US military from what he views as a costly burden. In fact, it is easy to imagine the president claiming this deal as a great diplomatic triumph and a major campaign promise kept to his core supporters. The question is whether such a bargain would serve US security interests and command domestic support. There is considerable evidence that a US troop departure under any circumstances would be a tough sell domestically and run into serious implementation problems.Plan gives Trump a huge short term political win by enabling him to claim he’s reached a grand bargain with North KoreaDepetris, Analyst for 38 North, 11-21-19(Daniel, “Troops for Nukes: Should the US Trade Its Forces in South Korea for North Korean Denuclearization?,” accessed 5-22-20, ) JFN US-DPRK denuclearization appears to be headed for a train wreck, making a bold move to shake things up attractive to a president who takes pride in being unconventional and is obsessed with winning, and whose decisions are driven by his personality and politics. A troops-for-nukes trade would provide the president with an opportunity to claim success on two of his principal objectives: the Kim regime’s nuclear disarmament and ending a US security contribution in South Korea he has long derided as unfair. But it would be bad policy and even worse strategy and would face enormous implementation problems. In the final analysis, Trump would quickly discover that talking about a US troop withdrawal is much easier than executing it.Plan gives Trump the ability to claim a massive political win Fuchs and Bard, Center for American Progress Senior Fellow and Research Associate, 6-10-19(Michael and Abigail, “The Time Is Right for a Deal With North Korea,” accessed 5-22-20, ) JFN Public opinion also supports diplomacy with North Korea. When North Korea was regularly testing missiles in 2017, for example, the American people were inundated with news about how North Korean weapons could now reach the United States, and concerns were high. Since diplomatic efforts began, however, North Korea as an issue has become less of a concern to Americans. Although 83 percent of Americans see North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons as a critical threat, between the beginning of 2018 and the beginning of 2019, the percentage of Americans who listed North Korea as the greatest enemy of the United States dropped from 51 percent to 14 percent.5 Once diplomacy began in 2018, a Pew Research Center poll showed that 71 percent of Americans supported diplomacy with North Korea.6 If President Trump were to strike an interim deal with Kim Jong Un that included concrete North Korean actions related to halting or rolling back the country’s nuclear program, Trump would likely find significant support in Washington and among the American people. At a minimum, he would not face serious opposition.China Debates China debates spark divisions on the left Toosi, Politico Reporter, 4-23-20(Nahal, “Biden ad exposes a rift over China on the left,” accessed 4-23-20, ) JFN Joe Biden’s effort to outflank President Donald Trump on China is leading to blowback from within his own political base. Some worry the rhetoric in a new Biden campaign ad could spur anti-Asian bias already on the rise because of the coronavirus pandemic. Others argue that Biden’s effort to sound tougher on China than Trump could backfire diplomatically in the long run. The rifts on the left are far from a serious fracture, but they nonetheless illustrate the challenge the former vice president faces in trying to lay out a U.S.-China policy that has become even more complicated thanks to the might of a tiny virus. The criticism on the left emerged after the Biden team released a digital ad that ripped the president as too willing to accept Chinese government explanations in the early days of the virus. Trump “rolled over for the Chinese,” the ad says, while Biden takes a tougher line, the message delivered over footage including what appear to be Chinese security forces.Nuclear Umbrella/Nuclear Weapons US public opposes the nuclear umbrella Baron and Herzog, Fellow at the USC Korean Studies Institute and Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Center for Science and International Relations, 4-27-20(Jonathan and Stephen, “Poll: What the American public likes and hates about Trump’s nuclear policies,” accessed 5-20-20, ) JFN Only 34 percent of Americans support the longstanding policy of providing the nuclear umbrella in principle, and that number drops to 27.9 percent for nuclear deployments in Europe. It is no wonder that some experts have speculated that countries like Germany, Japan, and South Korea may soon consider building the bomb. Yet, even with Trump’s rhetoric against these assurances, men and Republicans remain the most supportive of the nuclear umbrella and forward-deployed B61 nuclear bombs. Women, Democrats, and Independents respond less favorably. Additionally, Americans who came of age during the Cold War are more favorable toward these policies than their Millennial and Generation Z counterparts.US public opposes forward deployed nuclear weapons Baron and Herzog, Fellow at the USC Korean Studies Institute and Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Center for Science and International Relations, 4-27-20(Jonathan and Stephen, “Poll: What the American public likes and hates about Trump’s nuclear policies,” accessed 5-20-20, ) JFN What are the US public’s preferences on nuclear weapons? In the age of “America First,” the public appears increasingly skeptical of taking on risks even on behalf of Washington’s closest allies. It may be time for leaders to articulate why alliances and the nuclear umbrella are important, or to begin reassessing policies like forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons. The public also opposes the first use of nuclear weapons, even in response to a cyberattack. These findings suggest a need to revisit declaratory policy and the possibility of making a no-first-use pledge. Likewise, Americans emphatically support ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and slamming the door on US nuclear explosive tests. Overall, the public dislikes spending significant taxpayer dollars on nuclear weapons but appreciates the value of specific systems. And while nuclear diplomacy with Iran remains in bitter partisan gridlock, many Americans appear to be taking a wait-and-see approach to Trump’s talks with North Korea. Whether presidential candidates heed Americans’ attitudes is up to them and their advisors. However, our study suggests that the US public would be receptive to politicians staking clear positions, even if they involve bold changes to longstanding nuclear doctrine. And if politicians and political parties dislike these public attitudes, then they ought to be held accountable to justify their alternatives.Links: Hurts Trump/Helps BidenGeneric Democrats will use the plan to benefit themselves or attack Trump Ferris and Caygle, Politico Reporters, 4-16-20(Sarah and Heather, “Pandemic scrambles House Democrats' election-year agenda,” accessed 4-16-20, ) JFN Rank-and-file lawmakers say they’re trying to quickly hit the reset button on their strategy. Several Democrats say they’re looking at issues that were once at the heart of the caucus’ mission, like immigration, climate change and rooting out corruption, and tweaking them to reflect the current crisis — with an added focus on health care and the economy. Cuellar, for example, whose district sits on the border with Mexico, introduced a bill that would halt border construction to help protect workers during the pandemic — which he said allowed him to highlight aspects of Trump’s failed policy in a tone that fit the moment. “We have those other issues that might have been No. 1 for some of us, but the health issue has been elevated to No. 1,” Cuellar said. “We’ve still got to bring up those issues that are still important to the district.” Many Democrats say the pandemic will only boost support for priorities like universal health coverage after dramatizing some of the nation’s ugliest health and income disparities. And they say it could translate to other progressive issues, as well. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-Md.) added that the all-hands-on-deck national response to the pandemic amounted to “a dress rehearsal for addressing the catastrophic impacts of climate change.” “That's what this election is going to be about, can the government be an instrument in the common good?” Raskin said in an interview. Some issues Democrats have been talking about for years in their much-touted “For the People” agenda have resurfaced in a new and pressing way: infrastructure, election security and even broadband internet. Yet Republicans also pushed back against Pelosi in March when she insisted on a broad set of goals in the most recent coronavirus relief package, including broadband and infrastructure. “Specific bills, when we are not in session, may be treated differently,” House Democratic Caucus Vice Chair Katherine Clark (D-Mass.) said in an interview Wednesday, dismissing concerns that the pandemic might distract from other priorities they planned to address in 2020. “But all of those issues, immigration policy, climate change, are so interwoven into what we’re seeing and how we’re going to handle the public health crisis and how we handle the recovery,” Clark said. “All of these issues have had their urgency reconfirmed.”Media Focus Allowing Trump to remain in the media spotlight ensures Biden wins the election Zelizer, Princeton Univ. History Professor, 4-25-20(Julian, “Biden should let Trump self-destruct,” accessed 4-26-20, ) JFN Joe Biden seems to be inching closer to the White House by simply sitting at home. Although much of the nation has barely heard from the presumptive Democratic nominee since early March, President Donald Trump is struggling to maintain his legitimacy after asking his aides on Thursday whether zapping people with light or injecting them with disinfectants could cure Covid-19. The comments prompted even Fox News anchors to tell their viewers: don't try this at home. The situation is bleak for the GOP. Republicans are worried about a devastating election in November that might leave Democrats in control of the White House and both chambers of Congress. After a temporary spike in his approval ratings when the crisis started for many Americans, the President's numbers have dropped. Every day, the nation is exposed to a commander-in-chief who is pressing the gas pedal in a runaway car without control of the wheel. That doesn't mean Joe Biden has an easy road ahead. With traditional campaigning brought to a standstill, and media attention rightly focused on the pandemic, there is simply not that much room for the Democratic candidate to make his case to the nation. Biden has been holed up at home in Delaware trying to find an alternative means to steer the national conversation, whether it's social media livestreams or interviews with the local press. While some of these efforts might be getting through to voters, by and large, Biden has not been very visible on the national stage since Sen. Bernie Sanders dropped out of the race. It might just be that the best thing that Biden can do right now is to lay low and let the President self-destruct — the more that Trump says about the crisis, the worse he looks. Some criticized television networks for airing the daily coronavirus task force press briefings, which the President sometimes treats as campaign rallies. Those criticisms may hold some merit, but the truth is that these appearances are better than any advertisement the Democratic National Committee could pay for. Each press briefing reminds voters how fundamentally broken our leadership in the White House has become and why the nation needs someone else in command. Historically, a president's reelection campaign presents a referendum on his first-term performance. The elections of 1932 and 1980, for example, were as much about the winners as they were a rejection of the incumbent presidents. President Herbert Hoover's disastrous economic policies at the start of the Great Depression contributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt's win in 1932. Similarly, the failure of President Jimmy Carter to free the American hostages held captive in Iran helped tip the election in Ronald Reagan's favor in 1980. In the same way, the 2020 election will be about Trump. This is why it shouldn't be surprising to hear progressives such as Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez making it clear that they will support the Democratic ticket regardless of their policy differences. Despite the many issues this country faces, nothing will be quite as important on Election Day as how voters feel about having President Trump steer our response to the pandemic and the subsequent recovery for another four years. When the President recommends exploring the efficacy of dangerous and potentially lethal injections of disinfectant, he doesn't inspire much confidence. Biden faces a struggling incumbent who performs poorly each time he is front of the camera. With every press briefing, Trump spews disinformation and inconsistent messaging, reminding voters outside his passionate base that the country is struggling to survive this national crisis without a stable leader up top. Top officials in his own administration are forced to waste precious time trying to work around their boss and to clean up the messes he makes, while state governors — red and blue — have been left to figure things out for themselves. For the time being, the best thing that Biden can do might just be to the stay out of the limelight. Let Trump be Trump, and the odds for a Republican victory are likely to keep plummeting as long as the pandemic continues to pose a threat to the American people. There will be a time when voters need to hear more from Biden to understand who he is and what his platform will be. Even a candidate who has been in the public eye for as long as Biden has needs time to speak directly to voters. But at this moment, nobody is doing more to boost the Democratic campaign than President Trump himself, who flails before our eyes as Americans yearn for their lives to return to normal.Allowing the election to be about Trump ensures Biden wins Enten, CNN Political Analyst, 4-26-20(Harry, “Biden's invisible campaign is winning,” accessed 4-26-20, ) JFN A new Fox News poll from Michigan finds former Vice President Joe Biden leading President Donald Trump by a 49% to 41% margin. Other Fox News polls from Florida and Pennsylvania also showed Biden clearly ahead. In all three cases, Biden's doing better than he is in the long-term polling average in those states. What's the point: A lot of Democrats have been hankering for Biden to try and get out to be more part of the daily media conversation. The latest numbers suggest that these voices are likely wrong. Biden's proving that the less media he receives, the better it is for his electoral prospects. Over the last month and a half, Trump has had the political spotlight shone on him. He's had daily press conferences that the media has extensively covered. Meanwhile, Biden's struggling to attract much of an audience as he is stuck at home. You can see this really well in media mentions in the top paragraph of stories, as measured by . Four years ago from March 20 to April 20, Trump had about 65% of the mentions between Hillary Clinton and him. This year during the same period, Trump's gotten about 90% of the coverage dedicated to Biden or him. That is, Biden's turned a 2:1 disadvantage into a 9:1 disadvantage. You would think that this would be a disaster for Biden. It's not happening. These swing state polls suggest that Biden is in an improved position in the swing states than he was before the coronavirus pandemic took hold. They echo presidential approval rating polls, which show that Trump lost the ground he initially picked up as the crisis has gone on. As I noted last week, Trump had the shortest rally around the flag event in modern presidential history. In this way, 2020 is looking a lot like the 2016 election. Trump likely would have lost the 2016 election had the news focus been on him only. A study of news coverage of that election found that Trump's poll numbers were negatively correlated with how much news he received. Fortunately for him, the final days of the campaign were spent discussing the former director of Federal Bureau of Investigation James Comey's letter. A higher share of Hillary Clinton's coverage in that final week was spent on her alleged scandals than at any other point in the late summer or fall. This is very different from what happened during the 2016 GOP primary. Trump won that at least in part because of all the media he received. The 2020 general election though won't be determined by the Republican base that loves Trump, however. It will be determined by all voters. Over the last three years, Trump's never once had a positive net approval or net favorability rating among the general electorate. A 2020 election about Trump is likely an election Biden wins. We saw it in the 2018 midterms when feelings about Trump correlated extremely well with Democrats taking back the House. Unless something changes dramatically, Biden is likely only to lose if the media attention comes back to him. Trump better hope that Biden starts getting some of the limelight. That won't guarantee a Biden loss, but it'd give Trump a shot.Making the race about Trump ensures Biden win’s Diaz, GOP Political Consultant, 4-28-20(Danny, “‘Smoke-Filled Zoom’: Handicapping Trump vs. Biden in the Middle of a Lockdown,” accessed 4-28-20, ) JFN DANNY DIAZ: I’m a firm believer that the less that people see about Joe Biden, the better it is for Joe Biden. This is a guy that almost every day trips over himself, whether he’s in his library or somewhere else. And from my perspective, I think if this race is a race about Trump to some degree, that’s a pretty good day for Joe Biden. And it’s kind of being exemplified right now: It’s about the president every day behind the rostrum, talking about the coronavirus, and to Beth’s point, Biden’s kind of off the grid. And it’s helping him. If you look at polling the last three or four weeks, it’s been beneficial to him.Pro-China Policies Pro-China policies compromise Trump’s chances at winning the election Lipson, Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Chicago, 4-17-20(Charles, “The More Anger at China, the Worse for Biden,” accessed 4-21-20, ) JFN Vulnerable as Biden is on these comments, the former vice president is even more exposed on how China affects U.S. national security. Voters increasingly consider China a malevolent and menacing adversary. That doesn’t mean either side wants war. It does mean Americans are increasingly skeptical of accommodation and appeasement, which has been Washington’s basic policy since 1972. That policy has intensified since the early 1990s, when the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations helped China join the World Trade Organization. President Trump is adamant about reversing those policies, which were pursued by successive Democratic and Republican administrations. When the U.S. and Europe welcomed China into the WTO, they convinced themselves into believing that Beijing would play by the rules and open a huge internal market to Western firms. Ideally, China would also begin liberalizing politically and edge toward democracy. All wrong, except for the huge internal market. China is becoming more dictatorial, not more democratic. It is stealing intellectual property on a massive scale. The internal market has grown massively, but foreign access to it has been carefully regulated and accompanied by coercive demands for self-censorship, technology transfers, and local partnerships at discount prices. Foreign investors are open to predation, unprotected by the rule of law. By contrast, Chinese firms that invest in America, including state-owned firms, have broad access to the domestic market, as well as legal protection. Trump is clamping down on that access as he reshapes policy toward Beijing. Joe Biden is not responsible for these long-standing American policies, but he is closely associated with them. He championed them for years. The Trump campaign will make sure voters know it. They will imply, rightly, that China would prefer to deal with a pliant President Biden than a battle-hardened Trump. Those are powerful arguments in Midwestern swing states, where manufacturing employment has declined sharply. Many voters blame the losses on outsourcing to China, Mexico, and other low-cost sources.Public anger at China hurts Biden’s chances of victory; plan hurts Trump’s ability to effectively use this strategy Lipson, Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Chicago, 4-17-20(Charles, “The More Anger at China, the Worse for Biden,” accessed 4-21-20, ) JFN For months now, it has been clear that Biden family corruption will be a campaign issue. The impeachment focused attention on ties between the vice president’s son, Hunter, and the corrupt Ukrainian oil and gas giant Burisma. But Hunter had equally close, equally profitable ties to Chinese state-owned banks. Those connections were formed when Joe Biden was leading the Obama administration’s policies toward both China and Ukraine. Cozy, profitable, and possibly corrupt connections with the Chinese government are the last thing Americans want to hear about their politicians right now. Those voters are closeted at home, worried about their future, thanks to a virus that originated in Wuhan. They are mad as hell at Beijing for hiding what it knew, early on, about the pandemic. The Chinese Communist Party knew something terrible was happening, and it refused to share honest information about it. It denied the virus could be spread by human contact, weeks after it knew patients were infecting health care workers, and it hid vital information about the origins and genetic structure of the virus. The World Health Organization spread that misinformation. Beijing’s deception cost lives and livelihoods. Americans are reminded of it every day they are home from work or school under quarantine. This anger at China’s rulers is bad news for Joe Biden. Voters see China as a rising threat and its economic gains as coming out of American pockets. The Trump campaign was already pushing these issues. It won’t have any trouble tying them to Joe Biden and making his family the face of American elites who profit from their insider positions.ChinaChina bashing is the election wining issue for Trump but the plan takes it away from him Young, 5-25-20(JT, “Biden Has Already Lost on China,” accessed 5-26-20, ) JFNJoe Biden will lose the election on China. America is a divided nation on seemingly every issue, but increasingly unified in opposition to China. But because Biden cannot join this unity of opposition, he is ceding this lopsided issue to President Trump. For America, coronavirus has crystallized years of bad Chinese behavior. Almost 100,000 deaths, 1.7 million cases, 39 million lost jobs, and a locked-down nation have brought back to mind all China’s committed, but overlooked, sins. Last week, the administration delivered to Congress a 16-page letter, which dispassionately outlined China’s past and ongoing transgressions. It puts them into three main categories: China’s challenges to America’s economy, security, and values. It also makes clear that, in contrast with previous administrations, China’s behavior will no longer be accepted: “The Administration’s approach to the PRC reflects a fundamental reevaluation of how the United States understands and responds to the leaders of the world’s most populous country and second largest national economy.” Negative as the White House letter is, it may be less so than the American people’s feelings about China. A February Gallup poll (conducted 2/3-16) found Americans had a 33 to 67 percent favorable/unfavorable view of China. That yawning negative 34 percent gap was double Gallup’sFebruary 2019’s negative 16 percent. A Pew poll in March (conducted 3/3-29) found an even larger negative gap of negative 40 percent. China’s favorability had fallen to just 26 percent, while its unfavorability stayed at two-thirds (66 percent). Both polls recorded their highest negatives ever on China. Significantly, both occurred months ago. Since then, coronavirus has only worsened in America and globally, and China’s known role in it has only increased. Congress did not need a White House letter to see which way the wind was blowing on China. Just last week, the Senate unanimously approved legislation to de-list companies (Chinese) from U.S. security exchanges if they do not allow U.S. review of their audits; it also saw bipartisan legislation introduced aimed at actions that could result from China’s upcoming imposition of tougher rule in Hong Kong. Recently, it had unanimously approved legislation addressing China’s oppression of its Uyghur minorities. Amidst this swelling consensus, is Biden’s unique dissonance. It constitutes a perilously unique threat to his campaign. Biden is prevented from joining America’s growing animosity toward China, while Trump is more than able and willing to do so. It is hard to label any from Biden’s hit parade of gaffes his worst — just wait a day and another entrant joins the litany — but the one with the biggest ramifications is his cavalier dismissal of China. Just a year ago in Iowa, Biden stated, “China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man. I mean, you know, they’re not bad folks, folks. But guess what? They’re not competition for us.” Breathtaking then, Biden’s remarks are mind-boggling now. Patently wrong, they could not be more out of step with America’s sentiment or resentment. They also keep Biden from stepping up on China now. To do so, he would have to explain away what no one could understand then. And the person least able to explain anything is Joe Biden. The second reason Biden cannot criticize China now is that he strategically cannot afford to. Biden needs to keep his campaign’s focus (such as it is) on Trump. By joining America in shifting the focus onto China, he not only puts himself on the hook (via his earlier China jaw-dropper), he lets Trump off it. The economy serves as case in point for Biden’s problem. Before coronavirus’s impact, the economy was Trump’s reelection résumé. Coronavirus’s economic hit finally gives Biden an opening to criticize what he heretofore could not touch. But criticism of China for coronavirus now means absolving Trump for the current downturn. There is a common quip about untouchable issues in American politics being “motherhood and apple pie” — you cannot oppose them. So, politicians unite on these, because they must, and hasten to others to show their differences. Biden’s biggest problem is that his biggest difference with Trump is also one he has with America: China. Biden is blocked from the most unifying and important issue in American politics. Make no mistake: Trump knows it full well. The letter he sent to Congress was really meant for Biden. All Biden can do is read it and weep.Biden will use the plan to bash Trump Sugeno, Nikkei Asian Review Columnist, 5-9-20(Mikio, “Trump and Biden use antagonism against Beijing to win votes,” accessed 5-31-20, ) JFNYet, Trump's actions are seen by many as simply a plan to whip up support ahead of the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 3, against his Democratic opponent, former Vice President Joe Biden. The coronavirus outbreak has made it hard for both candidates to go on the traditional campaign trail. Trump's handling of the pandemic and his many ill-advised comments about cures have made him a laughingstock to many. He is now cranking up the heat on China's management of the crisis to divert this lurid attention away from himself. A poll conducted in March by the U.S. think tank Pew Research Center found that 66% of Americans surveyed are negative about China, while only 26% are positive. A similar survey when Trump took office in 2017 showed roughly 50-50%. Americans have grown wary of China in large part because the Trump administration has taken a tough stance against it, citing Chinese menace and unfair trade practices. The coronavirus has now claimed more than 75,000 lives in the U.S., higher than the number of Americans killed during the Vietnam War. Trump's approval ratings are falling, in large part due to a weakening U.S. economy and stock price plunges, as well as his questionable initial response to the coronavirus outbreak. In a desperate attempt to turn the situation around, the president is wielding the China card. Trump's Republican Party machinery is doing what it can to fuel that animosity. An internal party memo on the COVID-19 pandemic, obtained by a news media organization, told members: "Don't defend Trump, other than the China travel ban -- attack China." The Republicans are also keeping the heat on Biden with their allegations that his son Hunter had illicitly profited from financial dealings with China. This helps them to paint a picture of Biden as being soft on China. Biden is aware that such a perception could hurt his campaign. In a piece he contributed to Foreign Affairs, he stressed the need to get tough on China, vowing that he would not tolerate Beijing's infringement of intellectual property rights owned by U.S. companies and unfair competitive edge that state-run Chinese enterprises enjoy. Biden has also vowed to increase pressure on China over human rights issues in cooperation with U.S. allies, while stressing that "there is no reason we should be falling behind China" in the high-tech sector. In addition, Biden has also aimed his attack of Trump at his earlier remarks praising Chinese President Xi Jinping's handling of the new coronavirus outbreak and the transparency Beijing showed. Despite these efforts by the Biden side, there remains an idea that he took a conciliatory stance on China while he was in government under former President Barack Obama. As such, Biden cannot afford to show any weakness now in this respect, particularly as it is clear that Trump will stop at nothing to be reelected. China will be the main battleground.China bashing is the central feature of Trump’s campaign Sheng and Geng, Univ. of Hong Kong Fellow and Peking Univ. Professor, 5-28-20(Andrew and Xiao, “Cooperate with China or Suffer,” accessed 5-30-20, ) JFN Amid acute emotional and economic trauma, the desire to identify and punish a culprit can certainly be tempting. For Trump, it has emerged as a central feature of his reelection campaign – and a useful way to avoid blame for his administration’s own failures in responding to the pandemic. But history shows the folly of this approach: policies intended to punish the losers of World War I set the stage for the Great Depression and eventually led to another world war.Coronavirus has made China be perceived as a major national security threat by the US public Continetti, Washington Free Beacon Columnist, 4-17-20(Matthew, “The Viral Center,” accessed 4-19-20, ) JFN A justifiable fear drives public opinion. This anxiety is not limited to the virus. It extends to the economy and to the mechanisms of globalization that spread the disease. Infectious diseases are now the greatest threat in the eyes of the public. Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and cyberattacks rank second, third, and fourth. China is fifth. The percentage of Americans who identify China as a major threat has risen 20 points in three years. Hawks have thought for a while that Americans would not recognize the danger of China without a showstopping event. Coronavirus is it.China is very unpopular with voters Lawler, Axios Reporter, 4-21-20(Dave, “Poll: Americans' views of China darken dramatically,” accessed 4-21-20, ) JFNTwo-thirds of Americans now view China unfavorably, up from 47% two years ago, according to data from Pew that suggests the increasingly adversarial approach from Washington is spreading throughout the country. The big picture: Americans have tended to view China negatively since 2013, but that sentiment has grown dramatically over the past two years amid the U.S-China trade war and, more recently, the coronavirus pandemic. In that time, the proportion of Americans who view China very unfavorably has more than doubled (15% to 33%). Key findings: The trend is bipartisan, though Republicans (72% unfavorable) are more wary of China than Democrats (62%). Younger people are more likely to view China favorably, with 43% of 18 to 29-year-olds holding positive views compared to 26% of 30 to 49-year-olds and 21% of those older than 50. Confidence in Xi Jinping plummeted over the last year, with 71% of Americans now having no confidence in him, compared with 50% in 2019. Nine-in-10 Americans now view China as a threat, with 62% viewing China as a major threat — up from 48% in 2018. Concerns with China’s impact on the environment and policies on human rights are on the rise, while economic concerns over jobs and the trade deficit are lower than a decade ago. Most Americans view the U.S. as a bigger economic power than China, and 91% say the world is better off with America as the leading superpower, rather than China (4%).American public is intensely anti-China Pavlich, editor for , 4-29-20(Katie, “Joe Biden's China problem,” accessed 4-30-20, ) JFN According to recent Harris polling, 77 percent of Americans believe China, led and controlled by the CCP, is responsible for unleashing the disease on the world. The CCP is being held responsible for the health and economic consequences of the virus. Further, 54 percent of Americans want paid reparations from the country. Given Biden’s record, this spells trouble for him in November.China is the key issue in the 2020 campaign and being perceived as anti-China is a political winner Allen-Ebrahimian, Axios Staff Writer, 4-29-20(Bethany, “Democrats and Republicans have argued about China for 150 years,” accessed 4-30-20, ) JFNChina will likely be a major issue in the 2020 presidential election, as the coronavirus crisis continues to paralyze large swaths of the U.S. economy. But even without a global pandemic ramping up the geopolitical stakes, Democrats and Republicans have long disagreed over how to deal with the world's most populous country. Why it matters: Debates from decades ago still echo in today's partisan divide over China policy, revealing entrenched attitudes that complicate America's search for a sustainable relationship with Beijing. What's happening: Republicans are coming down harder than ever on China, and there are almost no political downsides for them in this campaign season. Administration officials who have pushed for U.S.-China economic decoupling now feel vindicated, as governments around the world are realizing they are dependent on Chinese imports for crucial medical supplies. As the number of coronavirus cases and deaths in the U.S. soar, deflecting blame onto China for the pandemic isn't just expedient, it's almost a necessity. It's an approach with wide appeal, as 9 out of 10 Americans now view China as a threat. Democrats, meanwhile, are experiencing a kind of paralysis. A dramatic rise in anti-Asian racism in the U.S. has led Democrats to rally in support of Asian Americans and to disown rhetoric by leading Republicans that pins blame for the coronavirus on China. But that has made it politically toxic for Democrats to appear tough on Beijing. Many leading Democrats share Republicans' deep concerns over China's increasingly assertive authoritarianism, but China policy is now largely focused on the country's role in the pandemic. Former Vice President Joe Biden campaign's new line of attack — trying to sound tougher than President Trump on China — was widely panned by many on the left as racially inflammatory. Details: Partisan issues dating as far back as the 19th century still inform the national conversation today: The 1870s and 1880s: The Chinese Exclusion Act A wave of anti-Chinese sentiment, tied in part to fear of competition in the labor market, resulted in the first U.S. law barring all Chinese nationals from entry. Republicans, who were "still the party of Lincoln" at this time, opposed the act because they believed in "ideals of racial equality," and many supported an expansion of Pacific trade, Gordon H. Chang, a professor of American history at Stanford University, told Axios in an interview. Democrats, on the other hand, supported the act, because they "represented portions of labor, and more racially prejudiced portions of the population," said Chang. Since Trump's election, Chinese-American groups have pointed to similarities between the political environment in the 1880s and today. The memory is alive in China, too. In early February, shortly after the United States banned entry to Chinese nationals amid the coronavirus pandemic, the Chinese tabloid Global Times published an article comparing the travel ban to the 1882 law and the racist fears of a "yellow peril" that had accompanied it. The 1940s and 1950s: The Chinese Communist victory and the start of the Cold War In the early years of World War II, Democrats and Republicans were united in their support of China's Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek and their opposition to the invading Japanese and the Chinese Communists. But this bipartisanship didn't last. Democrats grew dissatisfied with Chiang's ineffectiveness and his own authoritarian tendencies, and their support for Chiang's government waned. Republicans remained strong Chiang supporters and blamed the Democratic administration for the Chinese Communist Party's victory over the Nationalists in 1949. In an early episode of nascent McCarthyism, Republicans spearheaded an investigation into State Department officials whom they accused of secretly supporting China's Communists, leading to a purge of China experts. That was the moment "China became a sensitive domestic political issue," said Chang. To this day, Democrats have remained deeply fearful of a return to Cold War-era suspicions, which makes them loathe to echo some of the more hardline Republican rhetoric that has become mainstream since 2016. The 1990s: Appeasement after the Tiananmen massacre President George H.W. Bush slapped sanctions on China after its leaders sent in tanks to quell pro-democracy protests in Beijing. But the tough attitude didn't last, and Bush soon worked to open up trade between the two countries. In a well-known 1992 presidential debate, Bill Clinton accused Bush of "appeasing the Butcher in Beijing," said Yafeng Xia, a professor of East Asian and diplomatic history at Long Island University Brooklyn. The criticism stuck and damaged Bush's candidacy. "From that time on, China would become a football in U. S politics," said Xia. The bottom line: The divide between Republicans and Democrats on China policy runs deep.China bashing is a key and successful part of Trump’s reelection strategy Kumar, Politico Reporter, 5-3-20(Anita, “Trump says blame China. His supporters are listening,” accessed 5-3-20, ) JFN President Donald Trump’s decision to focus his coronavirus anger on China, America’s top economic rival, is part of a pivot for Trump’s reelection team as it scrambles to revise a campaign message that had been focused on financial prosperity. Now, with the economy in a coronavirus-induced coma, Trump’s team is working to instead make the 2020 race a referendum on who will be tougher on China — Trump or Joe Biden. In recent days, Trump’s campaign has even dubbed the president’s likely Democrat opponent “Beijing Biden." The message appears to be resonating. John Fredericks, the Virginia talk radio host and Trump supporter, said his callers, many out of work in rural areas, trust Trump to retaliate against China.China bashing is an effective tactic for Trump Kumar, Politico Reporter, 5-3-20(Anita, “Trump says blame China. His supporters are listening,” accessed 5-3-20, ) JFN Polls conducted for the Trump campaign and Republican senators show China will be an effective issue for Republicans in November, according to three people who have seen the numbers, leading the GOP to buy a flurry of TV and Facebook ads, dash off emails to supporters and increase their tough rhetoric. “Unlike Sleepy Joe Biden and the rest of the Crooked Democrats, President Trump keeps his promises, which is why we're not letting China get away with using America as a scapegoat,” one Trump campaign Facebook ad read.China bashing is a successful political strategy for TrumpKumar, Politico Reporter, 5-3-20(Anita, “Trump says blame China. His supporters are listening,” accessed 5-3-20, ) JFN In response, Trump has touted the narrative that China, not him, is at fault. It’s a message that plays into American’s current feelings about China. About two-thirds of the country has an unfavorable view of China, the highest number in 15 years, according to a poll by Pew Research Center. That figure is also up nearly 20 percentage points since Trump was inaugurated in 2017. “The desire for China to be held accountable for the spread of Covid-19 is no longer limited to Trump supporters,” said Brian Swenson, a Republican strategist in Florida who worked for Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), referencing the disease that results from the coronavirus. “There is a growing bipartisan call at the local level for China to be held accountable for their lack of transparency with the world community, their spreading of propaganda and misinformation and for failing to diminish the spread of Covid-19.” Kyle Hupfer, chairman of the Republican party in the red state of Indiana, said residents expect Trump to get to the bottom of the pandemic. “There’s certainly a level of distrust related to what China has done and how they’re approached this,” he said. In recent weeks, Trump has tried to take advantage of those growing feelings of animosity — nicknaming the virus the “Chinese virus,” accusing China of lying about its number of cases and boasting he contained the outbreak by restricting travel from China in January, even though many public health experts say the ban merely bought the U.S. time that Trump did not use to prepare adequately. This week, Trump said his administration was investigating whether China covered up what it knew about the early spread of coronavirus. His aides are discussing ways to penalize the country.China bashing is a key issue for Trump and being consistent is vitalKumar, Politico Reporter, 5-3-20(Anita, “Trump says blame China. His supporters are listening,” accessed 5-3-20, ) JFN Trump’s allies say going after China is a particularly compelling issue for the president because he constantly criticized Beijing while on the campaign trail in 2016, accusing the country of taking U.S. jobs, spying on U.S. businesses and stealing U.S. technology. “He should stay on the message he has had for many years,” said a Republican who speaks to Trump. So far, Trump’s surrogates and aides have stayed on that message, talking about China daily in online campaign events. America First Action, a pro-Trump super PAC, released a new TV ad attacking Biden on China Friday in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. In the coming weeks, Trump’s campaign is expected to launch a similar ad blitz. “Our internal data shows that Joe Biden’s softness on China is a major vulnerability, among many,” said Trump campaign spokesman Tim Murtaugh, though he declined to release the polling numbers. There are growing signs Trump’s strategy is working.International RespectPolicies that increase US alliances and prestige globally are popular with voters Lawler, Axios Reporter, 4-20-20(Dave, “Poll: Voters worry Trump has made America less respected,” accessed 4-21-20, ) JFNA poll designed to test President Trump’s vulnerabilities on foreign policy finds that 56% of voters in 12 battleground states believe he has made America less respected in the world, compared to 31% who say America is now more respected. By the numbers: Among the 16% of voters who remain undecided ahead of November’s election, 59% agree that Trump is making the U.S. less respected, compared to 16% who say the U.S. is now more respected. The poll was commissioned by National Security Action, a group founded by former Obama administration officials to advise Democrats on foreign policy. Ned Price, the group's director of policy and communications, told Axios that Democrats now need to "connect for voters why the fact that America’s reputation is in the dumpster makes us less safe." Voters were also given 10 possible foreign policy priorities and asked which three were most important to their vote.Military Alliances US public overwhelmingly supports maintaining US military alliances Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 19(“Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs,” accessed 5-4-20, ) JFN The upending of US foreign policy under the Trump administration, the revolt against establishment politicians, and the rise of the progressive wing in US politics has led many foreign policy experts to conclude that Americans want to retreat from the world. Much of Washington and its foreign policy elite believe that “Iraq and other debacles” have left Americans wearied, worried, and inclined toward either America First or retrenchment ideas.1 They believe the American public sees the rules-based international order established after World War II as bankrupt. But that is not what the American public actually thinks. Americans may be searching for a new way to make sense of the world. But the 2019 Chicago Council Survey demonstrates that retreating from the world, abdicating international leadership, and abandoning alliances and global institutions is not what the American public has in mind. Whether they identify as Democrats, Independents, or Republicans, large numbers of Americans continue to favor the foundational elements of traditional, post–World War II US foreign policy. They express continued or increased support for security alliances and military deterrence by maintaining superior military capabilities and US bases abroad. They believe international trade is good for the United States and American companies, and that promoting democracy and human rights around the world makes the United States safer. In fact, support for NATO, military alliances, and trade have never been higher in the history of the Chicago Council Survey.Americans support maintaining military alliances Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 19(“Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs,” accessed 5-4-20, ) JFN Solid majorities of Americans say that preserving US military alliances with other countries (74%), maintaining US military superiority (69%), and stationing US troops in allied countries (51%) contribute to US safety. (See Appendix Figure 1.) Fewer say the same about military interventions (27%), suggesting that Americans favor using US military clout to deter aggressive actions by other countries rather than to invade or occupy them. In other words, when it comes to the US military, the public seems to adhere to President Theodore Roosevelt’s admonition to “speak softly and carry a big stick.”Allies Majority of Americans support compromising with US allies PEW Research Center, 4-2-19(“Large Majorities in Both Parties Say NATO Is Good for the U.S.,” accessed 5-21-20, ) JFN A majority of Americans (54%) say “the U.S. should take into account the interests of its allies even if it means making compromises with them,” while 40% say “the U.S. should follow its own national interests even when its allies strongly disagree.”NATOUS public supports maintaining NATO commitments Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 19(“Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs,” accessed 5-4-20, ) JFN In addition, even more Americans now than in 2017 say that security alliances in East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East benefit both US allies and the United States (Figure B). This holds true across partisan lines. Asked about NATO specifically, all-time high percentages among Democrats (86%), Independents (68%), and Republicans (62%) believe that NATO is still essential to US security. And 78 percent of Americans overall say that the United States should maintain or increase its current commitment to NATO.US public overwhelmingly support NATO and maintaining the alliance Reinhart, Gallup Analyst, 3-4-19(RJ, “Majorities of Americans See the Need for NATO and the UN,” accessed 5-16-20, ) JFNPresident Donald Trump, who has questioned U.S. support for international organizations with his "America First" foreign policy, has been particularly skeptical of NATO, openly questioning the need for the alliance and expressing his wish to pull the U.S. out of it. A clear majority of Americans (currently 77%) continue to say the alliance should be maintained. These latest data come from Gallup's annual World Affairs survey, conducted Feb. 1-10. The survey was conducted less than a month after media reports broke that Trump publicly questioned the relevance of NATO and repeatedly brought up potentially withdrawing the U.S. from the NATO alliance. In response, European leaders and U.S. senators have been critical of Trump's views. The current 77% of Americans who support maintaining the NATO alliance is little changed from the 80% who said the same the last time Gallup asked the question, in 2017, when Trump began to question its relevance. The current level of support is among the highest Gallup has measured on six occasions since 1989, although the higher support mainly reflects a decline in the percentage not having an opinion rather than a decrease in opposition. Majority support for NATO is seen across political party groups, though Republicans express the lowest level of support, at 70%. Democrats' support is highest, at 88%, while independents fall in between, at 75%. Republicans' support for NATO is not substantially lower under Trump than it has been under other presidents, since 1990. Democrats' support, however, is much higher now than during the 1980s and 1990s, but off of the 97% peak in 2017. For Democrats, this may be a partisan response to Trump's criticisms of NATO.Even if a majority of Americans don’t support NATO, only 10% support withdrawing Sanders, YouGov Data Journalist, 4-4-19(Linley, “How does America feel about NATO? Support for alliance falls across key Western nations,” accessed 5-21-20, ) JFNAs the North Atlantic Treaty Organization treaty reaches its 70th anniversary on Thursday, support for the international alliance has fallen among key Western nations, and less than half of Americans (44%) support the United States’ place in the agreement once designed to provide collective security against Russia, formerly called the Soviet Union. One in ten (10%) Americans oppose NATO membership and 29% are unsure of their position, according to new YouGov RealTime data that surveyed key NATO countries and several prospective members.US public supports Article 5 of NATO Sanders, YouGov Data Journalist, 4-4-19(Linley, “How does America feel about NATO? Support for alliance falls across key Western nations,” accessed 5-21-20, ) JFNA key tenant of the NATO treaty is Article 5, which outlines that an attack on one NATO ally is an attack on all, obliging all member countries to defend one another. Clear majorities of Americans (57%), Britons (66%) and Germans (58%) back the pledge, with around half of French people (53%) also being willing to come to the defense of their allies. Hypothetically, most citizens in key NATO countries believe in the promise—until they are asked about their willingness to defend specific nations. More Americans are willing to use military force to defend other countries against Russia than those who don’t wish to get involved—making it one of the only key NATO allies to uphold the same defense for each nation listed. While pluralities in each country tend to support coming to the aid of most nations, there is particular ambivalence about defending Turkey, despite its status as a NATO member. In fact, only in the US do people tend to think Turkey should be reinforced (36% vs 22%).Majority of Americans have a favorable view of NATO IPSOS, 12-3-19(“NATO Seen As Force For Good, But Support is Low,” accessed 5-21-20, ) JFNFavourability towards NATO is highest in Poland (60%), the US (56%), Canada (55%) and Britain (50%), but low in some key member states: Germany: 30% France: 31% Italy: 35%Spain 29%NATO has robust public support in the US Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, 12-3-19(Jens, “Questions and answers: by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the ''NATO Engages: Innovating the Alliance'' conference,” accessed 5-21-20, ) JFN JENS STOLTENBERG: Yes. But I think you just have to realise that that’s a different world. That’s true. But if you look at, for instance, the opinion polls, especially in the United States, it’s record high support for . . . for NATO. And not only in the public opinion in the United States, but also in the Congress. They have stated again and again their strong support for NATO. So there is this big paradox that while people are questioning the strength of the transatlantic bond, on both sides of the Atlantic, actually, there is stronger public popular support for NATO than it has been for many, many, many years in most of the NATO Allied countries, especially in the United States. Second, we are doing more together in North America and Europe than we have done for decades, with more US presence and European Allies stepping up. You know, I’m a politician and I’m used to be criticised for having good rhetoric . . . rhetoric, but bad substance. In NATO it’s the opposite. We have bad rhetoric, but extremely good substance. And . . . and that’s a good thing.JapanUS public supports our alliance with JapanMead, Bard College Foreign Affairs Professor, 9-16-19(Walter Russell, “China and Trump Are Making Japan Nervous; Tokyo is committed to the Pacific alliance. Can Washington get its act together?,” WSJ, accessed 5-17-20, p. Factiva) JFN The neo isolationist wing of the Trump administration and its counterpart among left-wing Democrats share a common worldview: If the U.S. faces no great-power threats and has no powerful rivals, they ask, why should it invest so heavily in military alliances and order-building? But China's rise is focusing American minds and discrediting this approach. Over time, public opinion is likely to embrace and even demand a more focused and strategic foreign policy. That means the more mature and forward-looking elements of the Trump foreign policy in Asia are likely to persist under both Republican and Democratic administrations, while the more erratic elements in both parties are likely to lose influence. Americans will increasingly appreciate the value of strategic assets like the alliance with Japan—the third-largest economy in the world, a major source of aid and infrastructure spending across Asia and Africa, and a key economic and political competitor with Beijing.US public holds Japan in high regard Armitage, Former Deputy Secretary of State, 7-1-19(Richard, “THE GRANDMASTER: AN INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADOR RICHARD ARMITAGE,” States News Service, accessed 5-20-20, p. Nexis Uni) JFN Ambassador Armitage: Well, I think look at our own society. Japan is in public opinion polls here extraordinarily highly regarded. The US Congress regards Japan and holds them in the highest esteem I think for their behavior, for their activities post-war, their support for the international institutions, et cetera. So there's a lot to recommend itself in the way Japan is approaching not only Asia but the world, but most importantly, I think, has been the indefatigable diplomacy of Shinzo Abe during this whole time.NATO/South Korea/JapanUS public supports NATO and our military alliance with South Korea and Japan Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 19(“Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs,” accessed 5-4-20, ) JFN While Americans are more likely to say that US military interventions make the United States less safe (46%) rather than more (27%), there are times when they think military action is appropriate. For example, Americans favor using US troops to take action to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons (70%) and fight violent Islamic extremist groups in Iraq and Syria (59%). Americans also support the use of US troops to defend allies. Majorities across party lines favor committing US troops to defend South Korea from a North Korean invasion (58%) and to defend a NATO ally such as Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia from a Russian invasion (54%). Bipartisan majorities also prefer to maintain or increase current levels of US military forces in South Korea (69%), Japan (57%), and the Persian Gulf (60%). (See Appendix Figure 4.)NATO/South KoreaUS public supports NATO and our military alliance with South KoreaChicago Council on Global Affairs, 19(“Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs,” accessed 5-4-20, ) JFN Americans broadly support the use of military force to address these top threats. Whether it is to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons (70%), to fight violent Islamic extremist groups in Iraq and Syria (59%), or to defend South Korea if North Korea invades (58%), a majority of Americans across party lines support the use of US troops. Bipartisan majorities also support using US troops to defend a NATO ally such as Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (54%) if Russia invades (Figure 8).Japan/South Korea/GermanyUS public supports our military alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Germany Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 19(“Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs,” accessed 5-4-20, ) JFN But the American public does not view all partnerships and alliances equally. When asked whether relations with specific countries strengthen or weaken US national security, there is a clear stratification. Large majorities of Americans believe that relations with longstanding allies such as Japan (78%), Germany (75%), and South Korea (70%) strengthen US national security. Meanwhile, Americans are divided on whether US relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia strengthen or weaken US national security. And an outright majority believes that the US relationship with Pakistan weakens US security. (See Appendix Figure 2 for full results.)South KoreaUS public supports the security alliance with South KoreaSnyder, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 10-24-19(Scott, “South Koreans And Americans Agree On How To Deal With China,” accessed 5-22-20, ) JFN South Korean and American public opinion toward China and toward each other provides an important window through which to measure the impact of rising economic competition and political rivalry between China and the United States. Parallel public opinion polls by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies conducted in the summer of 2019 show that both publics strongly support the U.S.-South Korea security alliance as a hedge against China’s rise, while simultaneously supporting policies focused on cooperation rather than confrontation with China. China has come to perceive South Korea as a possible weak link in the American alliance architecture in Northeast Asia. China retaliated against South Korea for the 2017 U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system in the South in response to growing North Korean missile capabilities. Chinese maritime and air patrols are testing South Korea’s exclusive economic zone and the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone with increasing regularity. China’s more muscular approach toward regional security has induced a backlash among the South Korean public, which prior to 2016 held a relatively rosy view of China’s future influence and impact on the region. In the most recent Asan survey, over 78% of South Koreans said their government should prioritize strengthening ties with the United States over China. South Koreans continue to favor the United States over all of their immediate neighbors. Favorability toward the United States remains positive, with a mean score of 6.0 on a 0-10 point scale, while China’s favorability was 3.8, the same as North Korea but higher than Japan, at 3.1. This finding coincides with support among two-thirds of Americans for building up strong relations with Japan and South Korea over relations with China.US public strongly supports the alliance with South KoreaSnyder, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 10-24-19(Scott, “South Koreans And Americans Agree On How To Deal With China,” accessed 5-22-20, ) JFN But the underlying significance of the convergence of public views is that there is strong support in both the United States and South Korea for the U.S.-ROK alliance to act as a hedge against expanded Chinese political and economic influence in the region. Public support for cooperation between allies as a hedge against the downsides of China’s rise does not stem from an ambition to pursue confrontation with China, but rather from the desire to engage cooperatively with China from a position of strength.Removing US troops from South Korea is unpopular with the public Depetris, Analyst for 38 North, 11-21-19(Daniel, “Troops for Nukes: Should the US Trade Its Forces in South Korea for North Korean Denuclearization?,” accessed 5-22-20, ) JFN Unilaterally removing US forces in the South without getting anything of value in return would be politically impossible and strategically misguided. However, linking such a withdrawal in return for the Kim regime’s nuclear disarmament would at least be more defensible in the court of public opinion. This gambit would also kill two birds with one stone for a president who views diplomacy and relationships in strictly transactional terms: accomplishing the Kim regime’s denuclearization—an achievement he could plausibly tout as vindication of his politically risky, top-down nuclear diplomacy—while extricating the US military from what he views as a costly burden. In fact, it is easy to imagine the president claiming this deal as a great diplomatic triumph and a major campaign promise kept to his core supporters. The question is whether such a bargain would serve US security interests and command domestic support. There is considerable evidence that a US troop departure under any circumstances would be a tough sell domestically and run into serious implementation problems.Plan would ignite a political firestorm against Trump Depetris, Analyst for 38 North, 11-21-19(Daniel, “Troops for Nukes: Should the US Trade Its Forces in South Korea for North Korean Denuclearization?,” accessed 5-22-20, ) JFN The real-world prospects of a US troop withdrawal from South Korea, even if North Korea’s final and complete denuclearization were part of the equation, are slim at best. No influential political constituency in Washington would support this move. Maintaining a permanent US force presence in South Korea commands a solid, bipartisan majority on Capitol Hill; as a consequence, there would be intense congressional opposition to a US troop withdrawal—and probably any major drawdown in US troop strength. In fact, concerns about Trump making a sudden lurch in this direction prompted Congress to include a provision in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act preventing the reduction of active-duty US forces below 22,000 unless the president certified that the US national security interest would be served. Resistance would be equally fierce in the executive branch, particularly from the US Department of Defense, and the uniformed military leadership, which believe that the US presence on the Korean Peninsula is critical to preventing Chinese hegemony in Northeast Asia and maintaining a credible deterrent against North Korean aggression. And while it may not matter to Trump, the US Department of State and his key national security advisors in the White House would worry about the detrimental effects of a US troop withdrawal on America’s system of global alliances as well as the potential for nuclear proliferation in the region.Internal LinksBrink Slight shifts in public opinion make the difference in battleground states Siders, Politico Reporter, 4-22-20(David, “‘The map is bigger now’: Coronavirus rewires 2020 election,” accessed 4-22-20, ) JFN “People here need look no further than their Facebook feed to see stories of friends and family suffering joblessness, closing a business, or worse yet, noting loved ones who are sick or who've lost their lives,” she said. “I see it, everyday. That matters a great deal in a state like Michigan that could be won or lost on the margins." Still, in an election that is likely to be framed almost exclusively around issues of an economic recovery, even a slight positive shift in public opinion about Trump’s handling of the economy could be enough to tilt a marginal state, such as Nevada or New Hampshire, in his favor. “You could see a 2- to 4-point movement in any state, frankly,” said former Rep. Ryan Costello, a Republican from Pennsylvania.China KeyBeing strong on China is the keystone to victory in 2020 Caputo, Politico Reporter, 5-20-20(Marc, “Anti-China sentiment is on the rise,” accessed 5-20-20, ) JFNAnti-China sentiment is rising in the United States, according to a new poll that reflects the foreign country’s role as the point of origin of the coronavirus and the millions of dollars in negative ads spent by President Donald Trump, former Vice President Joe Biden and their allies as each paints the other as weak on the U.S.-China relationship. Since January, the percentage of U.S. voters who say China is an “enemy” has risen 11 percentage points to 31 percent, while the percentage of voters who say China is either an ally or friend has fallen 9 points to a combined 23 percent, a new POLITICO/Morning Consult poll shows. The 30 percent who say China is unfriendly but not an enemy has held about constant in the past five months. For all the negativity, U.S. voters, by a 28-point margin, favor working with China to respond to the coronavirus instead of confronting the country aggressively. “This is a trend to watch,” Tyler Sinclair, vice president at Morning Consult, said of the numbers. The shifting poll numbers and the crush of negative, and sometimes misleading, advertising concerning China show the depth of its salience as a central issue in the presidential campaign. But unlike other matters in U.S. politics, the clash with a global superpower has worldwide ramifications that recall the hostilities of the Cold War and raise domestic political concerns about anti-Asian racism. U.S. perceptions of China have periodically worsened and improved over the years. But sentiment toward the country grew markedly negative after 2017, according to polling from Pew Research that now shows two-thirds of Americans have a negative view of China and only a quarter have a positive one. The spread of the coronavirus during a presidential election year “was just an accelerant” that made the tensions more pronounced, said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It has just caused the relationship to go into a virtual free fall and it’s hard to know where the bottom is. I don’t think we’ve hit it yet,” Glaser said. “The next six months is going to be a competition between the Republicans and Democrats over who can bash China harder, more effectively and show they can stand up for American interests better than the other guy.”Winning the China debate is the keystone to winning the election Collinson, Reporter for CNN Politics, 4-21-20(Stephen, “Trump and Biden launch battle over China that could define 2020 election,” accessed 4-21-20, ) JFNPresident Donald Trump and presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden are unleashing the first shots over China and the coronavirus pandemic that could turn into a critical showdown in November's election. Trump has now turned on China, where the pandemic originated, as an apparent distraction from domestic criticism of his slow recognition of the crisis that has now killed more than 42,000 Americans. But he is also exposed by his repeated flattery of President Xi Jinping's management of the virus. So, as he often does, the President is adopting attack as his best form of defense, slamming Biden for what he claims is a long record of appeasing Beijing. But the former vice president is hitting back with an extremely stark digital ad that claims "Trump rolled over for the Chinese. He took their word for it." The attack previews a searing accusation likely to dominate the fall -- directly blaming millions of lost jobs and tens of thousands of US deaths on Trump, who the ad says left America "unprepared and unprotected." It is a sign of the disjointed, globalized times that a virus that first emerged in a city in central China unknown to most Americans could potentially define a US presidential election. But the President's struggle to find an exit from the worst domestic crisis since World War II -- exacerbated by a series of missteps bound up in his dealings with Beijing -- will likely decide his fate in November. The conflagration over China is also consequential because it's about far more than the virus. It lays bare the differing temperaments, worldviews and economic and political instincts of the rivals. And US-China relations crystalize multiple forces shaping American politics -- industrial blight in Midwestern electoral battlegrounds, trade wars, Trump's America First nationalism, the challenge to US influence in Asia and the President's climate change denial.China is the keystone issue in the 2020 election Kumar, Politico Reporter, 5-3-20(Anita, “Trump says blame China. His supporters are listening,” accessed 5-3-20, ) JFN But while Republican pollster Frank Luntz predicted China will be the biggest issue in the presidential campaign, second only to the coronavirus itself, he said it’s not clear the issue will benefit Trump. “The question pollsters can't answer right now is whether this helps Trump or Biden,” Luntz said “More precisely, both candidates will be criticized for past and current comments they've made. It's not clear which candidate will be hurt more by China.”Trump Popularity Trump’s approval ratings and popularity is the biggest factor in the election Caputo, Politico Reporter, 5-15-20(Marc, “Team Biden has a message for the haters: Look at the scoreboard,” accessed 5-18-20, ) JFN While the Biden campaign says the former vice president’s advantage is partly rooted in his name brand, his advisers acknowledge that the biggest factor in the election is Trump, who is more disfavored than favored in polls and who hasn’t been able to increasing his standing during the crisis, in contrast with most governors, who have seen their approval numbers rise. “One thing that’s a fact of life in this campaign is Donald Trump carries a very unfavorable rating in the mid-to-high 40s,” senior Biden adviser Mike Donilon said, calling the president’s approval ratings “the single biggest driver” of the campaign’s dynamics.Suburban VotersSuburban voters are key to winning in 2020 Godfrey, Reporter for The Atlantic, 3-10-20(Elaine, “Joe Biden Is the Candidate of the Resistance,” accessed 5-11-20, ) JFN A deluge of voters—including many in the suburbs—filed into churches and community centers across the country to vote for a moderate candidate in an act they viewed as a repudiation of the president. This is what happened in 2018. And it happened again last week. Joe Biden’s victories on Super Tuesday suggest that many voters are thinking and acting much like they did in the previous midterm elections, when Democrats—thanks to historically high turnout—flipped 41 congressional districts and regained control of the House. Many Democrats say that this is how Biden wins more delegates tonight, and how the party wins in November: through a campaign to enact a more modest agenda and provide a check on Donald Trump—not one that relies on turning out the most progressive voters in the country.Older Voters Older voters are key to victory Nilsen, Vox Reporter, 5-26-20(Ella, “The voters Joe Biden needs to win the election, explained,” accessed 5-26-20, ) JFNAnd — maybe the biggest play of all — see if the campaign can win or at least significantly cut into the president’s margins with older voters, a traditionally more conservative and reliable bloc that suddenly seems to be turning away from the president. A recent Fox News poll found voters aged 65 and older said they preferred Biden to Trump by 17 points. A recent Quinnipiac University poll also showed Biden 22 points ahead with women 65 and older (and Trump leading men in the same age group). These polls could certainly change, but they’re worrying sign for Trump, who won older voters by 7 points in 2016. “Even if Joe Biden cuts the margin of what Trump won [with older voters], because they’re the largest single age group, it is a huge, huge game changer,” said Biden adviser and pollster John Anzalone.Young Voters Younger voters are key to victory Nilsen, Vox Reporter, 5-26-20(Ella, “The voters Joe Biden needs to win the election, explained,” accessed 5-26-20, ) JFNPolls around the country show Biden has some work to do with younger voters. These voters tend to be more progressive; they also tend to turn out less reliably than older voters. The former vice president is doing outreach; he has already assembled policy-focused task forces with his former competitor Sen. Bernie Sanders, a popular figure among the younger generation. But more work will need to be done to make up an enthusiasm gap. “In a close and tight election, these are the difference makers, these are the people who could swing this election,” said Sanders’s former 2020 campaign Faiz Shakir.Democratic Divisions Even small Democratic divisions ensure Trump wins reelection Siders, Politico Reporter, 4-15-20(David, “Why Democratic unity is a huge problem for Trump,” accessed 4-16-20, ) JFNDonald Trump has suggested that the Democratic establishment stole the primary from Bernie Sanders, that Barack Obama doesn't really support Joe Biden and that progressives would be crazy to vote for Biden in any case. The messages vary, but they have one thing in common: they are designed to stoke discord between the Democratic Party’s centrist establishment and its progressive ranks. More than any sitting president in recent history, Trump's reelection is reliant on divisions and unrest in the opposition party, a predicament that reflects the electoral math he faces as he seeks a second term. He won the White House with just 46 percent of the vote. He consistently polls below 50 percent — and has struggled to broaden his coalition. Another possible complication: Rep. Justin Amash, a Michigan independent who left the Republican Party last year, is considering running for president. Even if he had a marginal effect on the results, the presence of a third-party candidate with his background might be enough to affect the outcome — much the same as the Green Party’s Jill Stein is thought to have affected the results in several key states in 2016. Against that backdrop, whether Trump wins or loses in November, it's unlikely that he will capture a majority of the popular vote. “With an approval rating in the low- to mid-40s, barring any unforeseen developments — which in this world, if there’s anything there are unforeseen developments — the expectation is a majority would be a reach for him in the popular vote,” said Lee Miringoff, director of the Marist College Institute for Public Opinion. If Trump is going to “thread the needle” as he did in 2016, Miringoff said, “any division to create just a wrinkle in the data, a crease in the data, is desirable for him … So he’s playing the cards he’s dealt, and that is, he’s not likely to get a majority, try to keep the Democratic enthusiasm down and get Biden into the mix, and hopefully don’t do it in a way that arouses Democratic sentiment any more than it already needs to be.”Trump Gets the Blame Trump will get the blame for the planIsenstadt, Politico Reporter, 5-18-20(Alex, “Swing-state Republicans warn Trump's reelection is on shaky ground,” accessed 5-18-20, ) JFNOthers see reason for worry. Former Pennsylvania Rep. Phil English said the state’s Democratic governor would face backlash for his management of the coronavirus but that voters would likely focus any frustrations toward national Republicans in power. “I think there is too much blame-mongering going on, but that is predictable and I think that is going to complicate the political landscape for Republicans in Pennsylvania because they’re the party with the White House, so all negatives are going to first be set at their direction,” said English.FloridaFlorida is key to Biden winning the election Enten, Senior Writer and Analyst for CNN Politics, 4-18-20(Harry, “Why Florida may have a big role in 2020,” accessed 4-18-20, ) JFN Without knowing anything else, Florida would seem like a good investment for Biden. If the polling is to be believed, it's at least as good as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. What makes Florida so enticing among these states is that it has 29 electoral votes. For Biden to win, he needs to pick up 38 electoral votes compared to Hillary Clinton. Florida gets him more than halfway there. Biden cannot win by merely picking up Arizona (11 electoral votes) and Michigan (16 electoral votes). Indeed, Biden almost certainly would need to win at least three of the other states, if he doesn't win Florida. Biden would only need to win two of five states (Florida plus one other) if he carries Florida. More than that, Florida diversifies the types of states Biden would be competing hard in. When you want to give yourself as many electoral pathways as possible, you want states that are demographically and geographically diverse from each other. That way, if you underperform in one state, it doesn't mean you have in the others. Florida has more nonwhite voters than any of the other close states Trump won in 2016. And it's a southeastern state, unlike Arizona, Michigan, Pennsylvania or Wisconsin. There's really no other state like it. Florida is the type of state where you'd expect Biden to outperform Clinton given the recent polling. It has the highest percentage of seniors in the country amongst its citizen voting age population. Right now, Biden actually leads Trump among those 65 years and older by nine points in an average of the five most recent probability national polls. Now, there is a cautionary tale in the 2018 midterms. In Florida, Democrats lost the Senate and governor's race. They won at least one of those in all the other four close states. Moreover, Democrats only won the statewide cumulative House vote by a point, which is more than five points worse than they did nationally. According to an analysis by the New York Times' Nate Cohn, however, the southern swing state voters who didn't cast a ballot in 2018 were much more friendly to Democrats than those in the northern swing states. In the sunbelt, a large portion were nonwhite. In the north, the clear plurality were whites without a college degree. With presidential year turnout, Biden's likely going to be very competitive in Florida. If he wins there, it'll be awfully tough for Trump to beat him nationally.MichiganMichigan is key to Trump winning reelection Coaston, Vox Political Reporter, 4-19-20(Jane, “What the anti-stay-at-home protests are really about,” accessed 4-19-20, ) JFN But Michigan isn’t just a state with a Democratic governor (a potential vice presidential candidate at that) — it’s a state Trump won in 2016 by a slim margin, the first Republican to win the state since George H.W. Bush did so in 1988. And in order to win reelection in 2020, Trump will likely need to claim the state’s 16 electoral votes once again, with coronavirus, and the federal government’s failed response, standing in his way.Pennsylvania Pennsylvania is a key battleground state Southwick, PennLive Reporter, 4-16-20(Ron, “Pa. remains key battleground but COVID-19 radically changes 2020 election,” accessed 5-11-20, ) JFNAnalysts agree Pennsylvania will remain a battleground state. “One constant is Pennsylvania remains extremely coveted," said Christopher Borick, a political analyst at Muhlenberg College. "The electoral math hasn’t changed because of CoVid-19. Pennsylvania will be an epicenter of the campaign.”Wisconsin Wisconsin is the crown jewel of the election Catanese, Senior Politics Writer for US News & World Report, 3-12-19(David, “Wisconsin Emerges as the Top 2020 Battleground,” accessed 5-11-20, ) JFN The 2020 presidential race is ushering in a new premiere battleground state: Wisconsin. Democrats' selection of Milwaukee as the site for the party's national convention next year cements the Badger State as one of the most significant prizes on the electoral map and represents a burgeoning belief that the Rust Belt will factor more crucially than the Sun Belt in this campaign for the White House. Choosing Milwaukee over the larger southern cities of Miami and Houston also discards the historical notion that the convention host city doesn't matter politically. "It's saying something to Wisconsin and, frankly, the whole Midwest: We're here to win. I think that's a statement," says David Pepper, the Ohio Democratic Party chairman who supported Milwaukee's bid. The upper Midwestern state's 10 electoral votes are also just as important to President Donald Trump's re-election calculus. Wisconsin, of course, was one of the three traditionally blue states – along with Michigan and Pennsylvania – that Trump was able to flip out of the Democratic Party's column in 2016, securing his astounding upset over Hillary Clinton. Of the three, Republican operatives see Wisconsin as the most friendly turf to retain. If the 2020 Democratic nominee replicates the 2016 electoral map and recovers both Michigan and Pennsylvania, Trump could still manage a narrow Electoral College victory by holding on to Wisconsin. "The reason is, Wisconsin has balanced on a knife's edge for so long. Go back to 2004 when George W. Bush very nearly won the state. Republicans won all the midterm years and the anomalies are [President Barack] Obama's big wins in 2008 and 2012. Wisconsin's blue shade was dropped years ago. It's now coming into its own. It's the crown jewel," says Brian Reisinger, a Republican strategist in the state who has worked for Sen. Ron Johnson and former Gov. Scott Walker.ArizonaArizona is a key battleground state Mahtesian, Politico Senior Politics Editor, 2-7-20(Charlie, “How Trump Rewired the Electoral Map,” accessed 5-11-20, ) JFN This year, though, no one questions the strategic relevance of Arizona and Georgia. Arizona is expected to be so tight that it’s listed by most political handicappers as a toss-up. Major news organizations, including CNN and the New York Times, now include it in their battleground state polling for the first time.Minnesota Minnesota is a key battleground state Biegon, Univ. of Kent Lecturer in International Relations, 5-1-20(Rubrick, “Primary Primers: Why Minnesota is – and isn’t – a swing state,” accessed 5-11-20, ) JFN Trump clearly thinks Minnesota is up for grabs. He has visited the state a number of times as president, holding campaign-style rallies in several places. Rather than appealing to voters in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region, home to over half of the state’s population, Trump’s strategy centres on expanding his base. By bolstering turnout in rural counties, he could potentially find the votes to overcome the narrow margin of his 2016 loss. In such a scenario, however, he would need to limit his deficit in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Data suggest Trump struggles with the suburban demographic relative to previous Republicans.North Carolina North Carolina is a key battleground state Adams, Real Clear Politics Contributor, 5-16-20(Myra, “As North Carolina and Arizona Go, So Goes the Nation?,” accessed 5-16-20, ) JFN Now I look southeast on my faded coffee mug map, stopping at North Carolina with its 15 electoral votes. Bush won it handily with 56.1% of the vote in 2004. I believe that North Carolina is underplayed as a decisive battleground state — overshadowed by Florida, “the mother of all swing states.” Consider electorally that North Carolina is more significant than Wisconsin, but receives less national media attention, even with five additional electoral votes. Let’s review North Carolina’s revealing presidential voting history. The Tar Heel State went red for seven straight presidential elections stretching from 1980 to 2004. Then, in 2008, due to rapidly changing demographics and Barack Obama’s unique appeal to African American voters, he broke the GOP’s long stranglehold — narrowly winning by 49.7% to 49.4% over Sen. John McCain. In the 2012 election, Mitt Romney brought the state back to red — defeating Obama by a margin of 50.4% to 48.4%. Four years later, in another squeaker, Trump defeated Clinton there 49.8% to 46.2%. Currently, RCP’s poll average shows Trump and Biden virtually tied, but the last poll had Trump up by three percentage points. Again, it bears repeating: On election night, watch this New South bellwether state because “As North Carolina goes, so goes the nation.” ................
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