Les USA et le monde : perspectives environnementalistes



M2 - Les USA et le monde : perspectives environnementalistes

Synopis

|Session | |Text -Document |Date |Who |Grade |

|1 |Introduction |Mind map USA-Earth-Chipko |Session 1 |Teacher | |

| | | |10 September 2007 | | |

|1 |Introduction |Document #1 - The Making of US Foreign Policy (1997) |Session 2 |Group work | |

| | | |17 September 2007 | | |

|2 |USA |Document #2 - Slouching Toward Johannesburg: U.S. is a Long Way from |Session 2 |Group work | |

| | |Sustainability (2002) |17 September 2007 | | |

|2 |USA |Text #1 - Greening U.S. Foreign Aid through |Session 3 | | |

| | |the Millennium Challenge Account (2003) |24 September 2007 | | |

|3 |Madagascar |Text #2 - USAID in Madagascar: fiscal year 2004 (2004) |Session 4 | | |

| | | |1 October 2007 | | |

|3 |Madagascar |Text #3 - Safe Water System in Madagascar () |Session 5 | | |

| | | |8 October 2007 | | |

|4 |Madagascar |Text #4 - Antananarivo Declaration () |Session 5 | | |

| | | |8 October 2007 | | |

|4 - 5 |India |Text #5 - Chipko Movement () |Session 6 | | |

| | | |15 October 2007 | | |

|6 |South Africa |Text #6 - Strategies for Social Justice Movements from Southern Africa |Session 7 | | |

| | |to the United States - |22 October 2007 | | |

| | |(2005) | | | |

|7 |Mauritius |Text #7 - Pre-WSSD[1] National Report [for Mauritius]( 2002) |Session 7 | | |

| | | |22 October 2007 | | |

|8 |Reunion |Text #8 - L’Agenda 21- La Réunion (2003) |Session 8 | | |

| | | |29 October 2007 | | |

|8 |USA |Text #9 - Organizing the New South: Local Ecologies and Autonomous |Session 9 | | |

| | |Strategies for Confronting Globalization |5 November 2007 | | |

| | |Term papers due |19 November | | |

SOMMAIRE

M2 - Les USA et le monde : perspectives environnementalistes 1

Synopis 1

About the course (for my eyes only) 3

Session 1 - Introducing the course - concepts - suggested problematic 4

Session 2 - Historical background - conceptual framework 10

Session 3 – La Réunion 13

Session 4 – Madagascar - Safe Water System 25

Session 5 — Madagascar 30

Session 6 - USAID 33

Session 7 - Mauritius 36

Session 8 - RSA 43

Session 9 - NGOs 51

Session 10 - India - 53

About the course (for my eyes only)

Fichier Inspiration dans le même dossier

Aspects administratifs

Présentation du cours sur les brochures étudiants

|Les États-Unis et le monde : perspectives environnementalistes |

|Nom de l’enseignant F. Duban |

|Volume horaire de l’enseignement 20h |

|Le nombre d’ ECTS de l’enseignement 6 ECTS pour l'UE |

|Nature des enseignements : CM |

|Contrôle des connaissances et note finale |

| |

|Descriptif |

|Si l'environnementalisme est né de la culture américaine, le concept de développement durable a vu le jour sous les auspices de l'ONU. Présenté comme la |

|panacée, il est largement critiqué, et relèverait de l'oxymore, en ce qu'il tente de concilier des aspirations relevant de la justice sociale, de la |

|protection durable de l'environnement, et de la croissance économique. Son influence demeure toutefois indéniable. Dans un contexte mondial où |

|l'hégémonisme américain, la prise de conscience des problèmes environnementaux planétaires et la globalisation précipitent les évolutions de tous ordres, |

|en particulier culturel, dans quelle mesure les projets relevant du développement durable, même influencés par l'héritage de l'environnementalisme, |

|sont-ils soit une forme de résistance plus ou moins avouée à cet hégémonisme culturel américain globalisant, soit le Cheval de Troie du néo-libéralisme, |

|lui-même à tort ou à raison associé aux Etats-Unis ? |

| |

|Pour répondre à cette question pour ce qui concerne la zone de l'océan Indien, des exemples précis d'actions entreprises pour la protection de |

|l'environnement seront étudiés afin de mettre en évidence, dans chaque cas, la priorité accordée à l'économique, à l'écologique, à la justice sociale. |

| |

|On espère ainsi montrer à chaque fois les modalités d'application du concept de développement durable dans des contextes culturels différents. |

| |

|Bibliographie Sur le site* Interculturalité |

|Beder, Sharon. Global Spin : The Corporate Assault On Environmentalism. Totnes : Green, 2002. |

|Attfield, Robin. The Ethics of the Global Environement. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1999. |

|Barjot, Dominique and Christophe Réveillard, eds. L'américanisation de l'Europe occidentale au XXe siècle: Mythe et Réalité. Paris: Presse de l'Université|

|Paris-Sorbonne, 2002. |

|Black, Brian. "Beyond Nature's Nation: The Emergence of a Global Environmental Policy." American Studies: Globalization, Transnationalism, and the End of |

|the American Century Vol. 41, Number 2/3. 2000: 349-50. |

|Caron, David R. and Janice Gross Stein, eds. Street Protests and Fantasy Parks: Globalization, Culture, and the State. Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 2002.|

|Desai, Uday, ed. Ecological Policy and Politics in Developing Countries: Economic Growth, Democracy, and Environment. Albany, N.Y.: State University of |

|New York Press, 1998. |

|Elliot, Lorraine. The Global Politics of the Environment. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998. |

|Featherstone, Mike. Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism And Identity. London: Sage Publications, 1995. |

|Honey, Martha and Tom Barry, eds. Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy At the Turn of the Millennennium. New York: St. Martin 's Press, 2000. |

|Johnston, R.J., Peter J. Taylor and Michael J. Watts, eds. Geographies of Global Changes: Remapping the World. Second Edition. Malden, MA., USA: Blackwell|

|Publishing, 2002. |

|Patterson, Matthew. Understanding Global Environmental Politics: Domination, Accumulation, Resistance. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000. |

|Porter, Gareth and Janet Welsh Brown. Global Environmental Politics. 1991, Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996. |

|Harris, Paul G. International Equity and Global Environmental Politics: Power and Principles in U.S. Foreign Policy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001. |

|Held, David and Anthony McGrew, David Gavid Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture. Stanford, |

|California: Stanford University Press, 1999. |

|Caldwell, Lynton Keith. International Environmental Policy: From the Twentieth to the Twenty-First Century, Third Edition. Durham and London: Duke |

|University Press, 1996. |

Aspects recherche

Comment faire travailler les techniques de recherche ?

❑ Un cadre conceptuel donné, une problématique à partir d'une concept map

❑ Des documents pour répondre à la problématique

Course : 20h i.e. 10 seminars , 2 hours each with two texts

Session 1 - Introducing the course - concepts - suggested problematic

GETTING TO KNOW EACH OTHER

Pass table sheet around to collect names

Introducing each other

See if all students are students of English

Organisation du séminaire

Mention Website

Mention BV

FLSH EU et le monde

Seminars

Une séance de présentation par F.D.

Présentations et débats animés par les étudiants à partir de textes et documents, le tout pour répondre à la problématique

Séminaire : Pas un cours, mais des débats sur des documents préparés par tous pour une participation réelle.

Note - Exam

CC : Moyenne de la note de la synthèse finale et de la note de commentaire de document devant le groupe.

Exam (dérogatoire uniquement) : oral à partir d’une préparation écrite en amont.

Bibliographie

Préciser que la bibliographie donnée sur le hand out et celle disponible sur le site sont là avant tout comme compléments des documents donnés en séminaire.

Getting started :

If you had five minutes to give your own opinion on « Les États-Unis et le monde », what would you say ?

…

Discuss their responses

…

introduce the concepts on the mind map

Inspiration Diagram

[pic]

source : the United states and the w.isf

The problematic + table

|Descriptif officiel |Environmental concern developed into a social movement for the first time in the USA. It was called|

|Si l'environnementalisme est né de la culture |environmentalism. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the United States first emerged as the one |

|américaine, le concept de développement durable |global superpower without any visible significant adversary in military terms. So that for a short |

|a vu le jour sous les auspices de l'ONU. |time it was thought that the US could be the world leader in environmental global policy. This |

|Présenté comme la panacée, il est largement |would have been part of an old American tradition which says that the USA has a mission to lead the |

|critiqué, et relèverait de l'oxymore, en ce |world to progress, democracy and liberty. This sense of mission (checked) is part of the puritan |

|qu'il tente de concilier des aspirations |heritage when Puritans in 17th ceintry New England thought they had been elected as a nation to lead|

|relevant de la justice sociale, de la protection|the world to redemption and the final millennium. The Founding Fathers for their part believed it |

|durable de l'environnement, et de la croissance |was the duty of the United States to lead the world to more democracy and liberty. These ideas |

|économique. Son influence demeure toutefois |coalesced into the Manifest Destiny doctrine that emerged as such in 1845 with President Polk’s |

|indéniable. Dans un contexte mondial où |expansionist platform. it led to the annexation of Texas, the Oregon Treaty of 1846 that gave |

|l'hégémonisme américain, la prise de conscience |today’s Washington, Oregon, Idaho to the United States, and war with Mexico and the annexation of |

|des problèmes environnementaux planétaires et la|today’s California, Arizona, Utah, New Mexico. The westward expansion that made the USA a |

|globalisation précipitent les évolutions de tous|continental nation then took on a new form, that of overseas imperialism. The United States was now |

|ordres, en particulier culturel, dans quelle |influential on the international scene. With WWI and WWII, it became one of the 2 superpowers and |

|mesure les projets relevant du développement |after the collapse of the soviet bloc, the only one. Without any significant militarily hostile |

|durable, même influencés par l'héritage de |force to contain, it was thought that the USA could turn to humanitarian and environmental causes |

|l'environnementalisme, sont-ils soit une forme |and thus accomplish a salutary mission on earth. |

|de résistance plus ou moins avouée à cet |9/11 put a stop to hope and the Bush administration gave priority to war on terrorism. The Bush |

|hégémonisme culturel américain globalisant, soit|administration is supported and inspired by neo conservative forces that include Christian Coalition|

|le Cheval de Troie du néo-libéralisme, lui-même |and the moral majority among others. Neoconservatives support an aggressive United States foreign |

|à tort ou à raison associé aux Etats-Unis ? |policy, often dubbed American imperialism. |

|Pour répondre à cette question pour ce qui |At a time when environmental problems and poverty induce increasing economic and social problems, |

|concerne la zone de l'océan Indien, des exemples|many political movements in the countries of the South feel victimized by American hegemony and the |

|précis d'actions entreprises pour la protection |global neo-liberal policy it tends to impose on the global economy. These people feel more |

|de l'environnement seront étudiés afin de mettre|comfortable with the concept of sustainable development publicized by the Earth Summit in Rio in |

|en évidence, dans chaque cas, la priorité |1992. |

|accordée à l'économique, à l'écologique, à la |In what follows--which is a course in American studies in relation with civilizational interaction |

|justice sociale. |(interculturality) from an environmentalist perspective--we shall address this question: to what |

|On espère ainsi montrer à chaque fois les |extent are the projects studied here--somehow in connection with sustainable development in the |

|modalités d'application du concept de |Indian Ocean area—truly a form of resistance to American cultural hegemony or an adaptation to |

|développement durable dans des contextes |neoliberalism? |

|culturels différents. |To address this question, we shall concentrate on a few projects and use indicators that tend to |

| |show for each case that priority is given to sutainable development’s economic development, social |

| |justice and environmental concern or on the contrary indicators showing that the neoliberal credo|

| |prevailed over any other environmental or social justice consideration. |

A glossary (part 1) : foundational concepts

Ask if all students can follow a course in English.

Explain the process : defining foundational concepts that lead to a problematic through which case studies of environmental projects in the Indian Ocean area can be analyzed.

Post-colonialist theory

|global solidarity - Post-Colonialism In Latin American Management: The Genesis And Trail Of North American Reference In Brazilian Culture And |

|Management - Stream 18: Postcolonial Stream Proposal - Miguel P. Caldas - Rafael Alcadipani - FGV/EAESP, Brazil - Av. Nove de Julho, 2029 9 andar - |

|01313-902 São Paulo, SP. Brazil - ++ 55 11 32813271 - mcaldas@fgvsp.br - ralcadipani@fgvsp.br |

|mngt.waikato.ac.nz/research/ejrot/cmsconference/2003/abstracts/postcolonial/Caldas.pdf |

|POST-COLONIALIST THEORY |

|Post-colonialism is an approach whose preeminence in social sciences has been increasing since the early 1970s. It is a movement that began in |

|literature and expanded into several other areas of social science. In general terms, postcolonialism studies the interaction – and the codependence|

|relationships – among European nations and their former colonies in the Modern Age, as well as the U.S. hegemony over the world and the domination of|

|developing countries by expanding capital and globalization. In broad terms, post-colonialism deals with the study of dependence relationships |

|between developed and developing countries, taking a stance in opposition to imperialism and Eurocentrism (Bahri, 1996). |

| |

|The post-colonialist perspective has gained relevance and profile within the postmodern movement, inasmuch as both denounce epistemology and many |

|Western practices as systems for the exclusion of other realities and forms of knowledge (Calás & Smircich, 1999; Prasad & Prasad, 2001). In this |

|context, post-colonialism has acquired relevance in the so-called cultural studies, as well as in critical management studies (CMS). There is also a |

|stream of artistic expressions that use it as basic theme, among which we might point out poetry, film-making, drama, and music (Wyrick & Beasley, |

|1997). |

| |

|A recurring theme is the critique of the notions of “progress” and “modernity” as defined by theoreticians in developed nations. From this |

|perspective, one generally focuses on economic aspects and depicts access to and progress of science and technology as justification for the |

|“development” of certain countries while others remain undeveloped. This development within the parameters of the Western culture or wealthy nations |

|concludes by categorizing people and cultures of “emerging” nations as “undeveloped” or “primitive”, which leads to the exclusion of their knowledge,|

|values and cultures. From this perspective, science and technology arise as enablers of new forms of (neo)colonial control (Wyrick & Beasley, 1997). |

| |

|On the other hand, post-colonialism analyzes the new forms of dependence that afflict developing countries. More specifically, post-colonialism |

|relates to the study of how Western academics create analysis categories that hide their own ethnocentrism (Prasad, 1995; Prasad Prasad, 2001). In |

|this manner, the post-colonial perspective also denounces the ethnocentrism of Western thought and practice. There is also clear criticism of how |

|Westerners recount history from the perspective of the victors, branding indigenous peoples and those from developing nations as “primitive”, |

|“underdeveloped”, or “traditional”. There is also criticism of Third World thinkers that use their space to voice the theory they themselves are |

|excluded by. By focusing on the denouncement of post-colonialist strategies, on popular culture, and on social movements, these analysts attempt to |

|voice expressions that have been so far excluded (Calas & Smircich, 1999; Gopal, Willis & Gopal, 1999). |

Indicators, ….

Explain the following concepts which appear as indicators in the hand out.

|American cultural hegemony |Disneyfication |

| |National Parks |

| |Democracy |

| |Individual rights |

|Neoliberalism |Deregulation |

| |Profit |

| |Free enterprise |

| |Global market system |

| |Emphasis on economic development |

| |Priority given to the private sector |

|Maintstream US |Specific reforms |

|environnementalism |Environmental legislation |

| |Compromise with corporations |

| |National parks - locals evicted |

|Radical environmentalism |Minority rights |

|(deep ecology) |Bioegalitarianism |

| |Criticism of capitalism |

| |Local democracy |

|Sustainable development |Conciliation |

|(Agenda 21) |Consensus |

| |Sustainability |

| |Environmental education |

| |Development |

| |Social justice |

| |Environmental concern |

| |Combating poverty |

| |Changing consumption patterns |

| |Changing population and demographic |

| |dynamics |

| |Promoting health |

| |Promoting sustainable settlement |

| |patterns |

| |Integrating environment and |

| |development into decision-making. |

| |Strengthening the Role of children |

| |and youth, women, NGOs, local |

| |authorities, business and workers] |

| |Consultation and participation |

| |processes |

Hand out or course reader

Explain course - reader

Foundational concepts

Table for problematic

|Features showing concern for |economic development |environmental protection |social justice |All things considered, is the project under |

| | | | |study inspired mostly by neoliberalism or by |

| | | | |sustainable development ? |

|L’Agenda 21 Île de La Réunion | | | | |

|Safe Water System in Madagascar | | | | |

|Antananarivo Declaration | | | | |

|USAID in Madagascar: fiscal year 2004| | | | |

|Mauritius | | | | |

|UFF Initiative | | | | |

|Sustainable development in DURBAN | | | | |

|job: NGO coordinator | | | | |

|India: Chipko Movement | | | | |

Session 2 - Historical background - conceptual framework

The US and the world : from Puritan times to US hegemony

Document #1 John Dumbrell. The Making of US Foreign Policy[2]

[page 4>] (b) Liberalism 'Ideology', of course, bears many meanings and, no doubt, the term can be defined so as to separate it from American liberal pragmatism. Within Marxism, 'ideology' embraces forms of thought which function to preserve or represent class interest. For diplomatic historian Michael Hunt, the concept of ideology comes close to that of 'culture'." Generally, however, it seems reasonable to define 'ideology' in terms of beliefs and values which take a clear shape, a Weltanschauung.10 In this sense, US foreign policy traditions do embrace - as celebrators of America's Cold War victory acknowledged - ideology. The driving ideology of US foreign policy has been traditionally, and remains, the ideology of liberalism. (It is worth remembering that Louis Hartz, the most celebrated modern interpreter of American liberalism, had no doubts about its status as ideology.)11 American democratic liberalism, whose main progenitor was John Locke, may be characterised as embodying commitments to the interdependence of democracy and capitalism; to individual liberty and the protection of private property; to limited government, the rule of law, natural rights, the perfectibility of human institutions, and to the possibility of human progress. It is allied to a strong sense of national mission and American exceptionalism: the belief that American democratic history provides a model for the world. At its heart, Lockeian liberalism embraces a commitment both to national self-determination and to the view that the world belongs to the industrious and the rational. Enemies of liberalism are, on the right, conservative ideologies which exude pessimism about the possibility of progress through human agency; and, on the left, ideologies which assert that human freedom [page 5] may only be realised through a transcendence of private property and capitalism.12 As an ideology underpinning US foreign policy, liberalism oscillates between the poles of non-entanglement and interventionist internationalism. Historically, as in President George Washington's farewell address, non-entanglement has been held up as a consequence of American exceptionalism. According to George Washington in 1798: ' It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.' America's 'detached and distant situation’ invited America to avoid European corruptions, to have 'as little political connection as possible' and to 'steer clear of permanent alliances with portion of the foreign world'." Non-entanglement would allow the United States to shape its frontier destiny, to remain aloof from distant quarrels, to provide a model for the world in the process. Liberal non-entanglement doctrines drew on the Puritan, 'city on a hilI' inheritance. Implicit in this tradition is the belief that US foreign policy leaders somehow lack European guile and dissimulation. John Adams (President, 1797-1801) […] denied 'any notion of cheating anybody'. Standing aloof from the wicked ways of the Old World, America could show others the way of morality. (Swedish ambassador wrote to John Adams in 1784 that he trusted that United States would 'have sense enough to see us in Europe cut each other's throats with a philosophical tranquility'.)14 With the closing of the frontier, and especially with US assuming global leadership after 1945, non-entanglement gave way to the liberal internationalist ideal: the protection and promotion of liberal, capitalist values on a world stage. President Woodrow Wilson appropriated the term 'liberty' to justify American entry into World War One. […] President Franklin Roosevelt used the denigrating label, 'isolationist', to stigmatise the older, non-entanglement tradition. After 1945 the cause of liberal internationalism became inextricably bound up with the idea of containing a putatively expansionist, Soviet-directed communism. Containment of communism became the bedrock of US foreign policy for forty years (notwithstanding the growing disapprobation expressed towards the globalised application of the doctrine by George Kennan, the inventor of the whole notion of containment). The purpose of post-1945 US foreign policy has been summarised thus by Michael Cox: 'to create an environment in which democratic capitalism can flourish in a world in which the US […] remains the dominant actor'.15 With the end of the Cold War, a debate emerged as to whether this purpose - and its underlying liberal ideology would be best served by a return to non-entanglement or by a new active internationalism.

Responding to the document …

…

Document #2 - Slouching Toward Johannesburg

Slouching Toward Johannesburg: U.S. is a Long Way from Sustainability

by John C. Dernbach

July 26, 2002

. Accessed 31 July 2005.

It has now been ten years since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, or Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro. At that conference, the United States and other countries agreed to implement an ambitious plan for sustainable development--both at home and internationally. The World Summit on Sustainable Development (Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002) in Johannesburg will provide an international assessment of what has happened over the past ten years, and lead to decisions about where to go next.

The U.S. has unquestionably begun to take some steps toward sustainable development, largely because of our environmental and conservation laws. Yet, on balance, the United States is now far from being a sustainable society, and in many respects is further away than it was at the time of the Earth Summit in 1992. Unlike many other developed countries, the United States has not used a strategic process to move the country toward a sustainable future and has not educated the American people about the opportunities and challenges of sustainable development.

With 5% of the world's population, the United States was at the time of the Earth Summit responsible for about 24% of the world's energy consumption and almost 30% of the world's raw materials consumption. Since the Earth Summit, materials use has increased 10%, primary energy consumption has increased 21%, and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions have increased by 13%. Over and over, increases in materials and energy efficiency, and in the effectiveness of pollution controls for individual sources, were outweighed by increases in consumption.[ Consumer culture] Despite a significant increase in municipal waste recycling in the past decade, for example, American generation and disposal of municipal solid waste per capita have been growing since 1996. According to Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson, "four more planet Earths" would be needed for "every person in the world to reach present U.S. levels of consumption with existing technology." Yet the U.S. standard of living--equated with high levels of consumption and "the good life"--is widely envied and emulated throughout the world. [ Consumer culture]

National Sustainable Development Strategy is Needed

The federal government should adopt and implement a national strategy for sustainable development, with specified goals and priorities, to harness all sectors of society to achieve our economic, social, environmental, and security goals. The strategy would lead to a stronger, more prosperous America with a higher quality of life because we would be pursuing these goals in ways that support each other in greater and greater degrees over time, rather than undermining each other. The strategy could be modeled on that of the European Union or states such as Oregon and New Jersey, and specifically address climate change, biodiversity, international trade, and other major issues. A set of indicators to measure progress in achieving goals would make the strategy more effective and meaningful.

In addition, the U.S. needs to recognize that its substantial consumption levels [ Consumer culture], coupled with domestic population growth, have serious environmental, social, and economic impacts. Americans also need to understand that human well-being can be maintained and enhanced by more efficient and effective use of materials and energy. A shift in taxes from labor and income, on one hand, to materials and energy consumption, on the other, would encourage both greater efficiency and reduced negative environmental impacts. The challenge for the United States is to be an attractive example of what sustainable development can mean. In this respect, international leadership begins at home. [American sense of (global) mission]

The U.S. needs to take a stronger and more constructive leadership role internationally, not only on terrorism [International terrorism] but also on the broad range of issues related to sustainable development. Congress should repeal or modify laws, policies, and subsidies that encourage unsustainable development. Protection of natural resources and the environment must focus more holistically on the resources to be protected, and on understanding those resources. Transportation, public health, and other social infrastructure and institutions should be designed and operated to promote economic, environmental, and social goals at the same time. sustainable development

In virtually every area of American life, a few people and organizations are exercising leadership for sustainability. The United States would take a large and decisive step toward sustainability if individuals, businesses, educational institutions, local and state governments, federal agencies, and others would simply adopt and build on the leading sustainability practices of their counterparts. sustainable development A properly conceived and implemented strategy would lead to that result.

Toward a Brighter Future for Our Children and Grandchildren

We now face growing environmental degradation around the world and an increasing gap between rich and poor. These are related problems, and they hinder or undermine everything else we care about--security, economic development, social well-being, and even effective governance. Put differently, poverty and environmental degradation are deeply destabilizing because they stifle or reduce opportunities and quality of life for many, many people.

In the next 50 years, global population is projected to increase by three billion people, and the global economy is likely to grow by four or five times. As difficult as things now are, environmental degradation and the gap between rich and poor are likely to get much worse if we continue with business as usual.Polarization Should that be our legacy for our children and grandchildren?

We know what we need to do to move toward sustainability, and we also know why. As Americans, we are called to face these challenges, and to seize this opportunity.

(John Dernbach, law professor at Widener University, is the editor of Stumbling Toward Sustainability, a new book published the Environmental Law Institute (). This commentary for Foreign Policy in Focus () was adapted from testimony he delivered to a joint hearing of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 24, 2002. He can be reached at: .)

Document discussion

Ask students to ask their questions

(they are supposed to have prepared 5 questions with their answers on the text).

Debating should follow

Session 3 – La Réunion

A glossary (part 1) : foundational concepts

Neoliberalism (see Keeling)

|Neoliberalism |

|Latin American Development and the Globalization Imperative:New Directions, Familiar Crises |

|by David J. Keeling |

|2004 |

|wku.edu/~david.keeling/globalization.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2005. |

|Author’s home page: |

|Summary |

|Globalization has emerged as the defining conceptual and contextual socioeconomic framework of analysis for the early 21st century. Throughout Latin |

|America, globalization has become a buzzword for profound structural change, as well as the focus of vociferous and rigorous criticism by those sectors |

|of society disadvantaged, damaged, or bypassed by the forces of global restructuring. This article examines the theoretical and practical implications |

|of globalization for Latin America development, analyzes key regional and local conditions, discusses ‘glocalization,’ and argues for a policy approach |

|that rethinks the extant framework and restructures the analytical context in a more proactive manner. |

|Keywords: Latin America, Argentina, Development, Globalization, Glocalization, Policy. |

|Submitted to the Journal of Latin American Geography |

|by David J. Keeling |

|Department of Geography and Geology |

|Western Kentucky University |

|Bowling Green, KY 42101-3576, USA |

|Tel: 1-270-745-5985, Fax: 1-270-745-6410 |

|Email: david.keeling@wku.edu |

|September 2004 |

|Copyright 2004. May not be reproduced, copied, cited, or extracted without the express written permission of the author. |

|2 |

|Latin American Development and the Globalization Imperative: New Directions, Familiar Crises |

|Introduction |

|Throughout Latin America, globalization has emerged as the defining conceptual and empirical phenomenon of the early 21st century. From an evolving |

|trendy perspective on socioeconomic change two decades ago, globalization has become the dominant contemporary political economic framework for national|

|development policy, as well as the focus of vociferous and rigorous criticism by those sectors of society disadvantaged, damaged, or bypassed by the |

|forces of global change. Many Latin American governments have adopted wholeheartedly globalization policies such as privatization, deregulation, |

|neoliberalism, and free trade in an attempt to reverse decades of economic mismanagement and squandered development opportunities. The shift from an |

|ideology of dirigismo (state-directed development) to one of neoliberalismo (state disengagement) has opened up the region to the global capitalist |

|regime of finance, production, marketing, and consumption, which has altered irrevocably the way in which goods and services are provided, spatial |

|relationships are structured, and cultural identities are defined and understood. |

|As globalization evolves into a fully defined theoretical framework, its impacts and implications in Latin America often are discussed from an |

|absolutist perspective and framed almost exclusively within the context of the political state. This is occurring despite a conceptualization of |

|globalization that implies a frictionless world without state-imposed barriers to economic interaction. Economic development policies throughout Latin |

|America, for example, continue to be framed by a conception of national territory as culturally and structurally homogenous, rather than by the reality |

|of socioeconomic spatial heterogeneity that goes beyond artificial internal or international political boundaries. As a result, regions, peoples, and |

|places frequently are reduced to insignificant actors or are omitted from the analysis altogether. Indeed, a central criticism of globalization |

|throughout Latin America has been its role in accelerating social polarization or the ‘development gap.’ This occurs when an increasing percentage of |

|national income or wealth is concentrated in the hands of fewer people. Increasingly, globalization analysis seems to be driven primarily by |

|macroeconomic statistics that serve as positive indicators of long-term national development trends, while micro-economic data that measure quality of |

|life for individuals and communities are downplayed or dismissed outright as insignificant short-term trends. |

|This paper examines the implications of globalization for development in Latin America by focusing first on six key long-term forces of change, the |

|‘subsurface’ processes that are reshaping the national and regional environments within which globalization operates. Next, it examines six key themes |

|that encapsulate the short-term disruptions experienced by Latin American societies today as a consequence of globalization. Finally, the question is |

|raised about how to mitigate the damage caused by short-term disruptions, while developing meaningful policies that recognize the long-term shifts in |

|the restructuring of Latin American countries and societies, shifts that are being driven by the forces of globalization and neoliberalism. The paper |

|argues ultimately for a policy and management approach based on the concept of ‘glocalization’ that rethinks the analytical approach to globalization's |

|impacts in a more sensitive, proactive, and spatially relevant manner. |

|3 |

|Setting the Stage: The Globalization Thesis |

|Globalization is fast becoming the shibboleth for the profound reordering of the world political economic system that has taken place over the past two |

|decades. The term has emerged as the ultimate expression both of an increasingly interconnected global society and of a socioeconomic Trojan Horse that |

|will wreak deprivation and degradation on local communities. Some explanations and definitions of globalization argue that it is a process of spatial |

|integration, inclusion, and engagement, while others posit that it is a process of spatial segregation, separation, and exclusion (Bauman, 1998; Lechner|

|and Boli, 2003; Sadowski, 1998). Such a seemingly unresolvable theoretical paradox points to the challenges presented by the globalization thesis: to |

|understand its theoretical and ideological context and to analyze empirically its impacts on people and places. From the vast and rapidly growing |

|literature on globalization, Lechner and Boli (2003) have identified six key questions: Is globalization new? What does globalization involve? Is |

|globalization driven by an expanding market? Does globalization make the world more homogenous? Does globalization determine local events? Is |

|globalization harmful? In order to set the stage for an analysis of globalization's implications for development in Latin America, these questions are |

|explored briefly. |

|First, is globalization new? To answer this question, a distinction should be made between what is known generally as historical globalization and what |

|Lloyd (2000:260) calls ‘ultramodernist’ globalization. Historical globalization processes can be traced back at least to the 15th century, with the |

|genesis of the capitalist world economy and the geographic expansion of division of labor, access to raw materials, industrial production, and the |

|circulation of capital. Wallerstein (1974, 1979) conceptualized these developments as a single world system divided into three main economic zones: |

|core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Since 1492, Latin America's development has been shaped almost exclusively by the forces of historical |

|globalization, and many critiques of the impacts of these forces (dependency theory, structural Marxism, neoimperialism, regulation theory) have focused|

|on the external causes of underdevelopment driven by the world capitalist system (Cardoso, 1982; Frank, 1969; Prebisch, 1972). Indeed, the power of |

|imperial or core states to create, manipulate, and unify markets at ever greater scales has been a central feature of globalization many times and in |

|myriad places over the millennia (Lloyd, 2000; Schwartz ,1994). |

|In contrast, ultra-modernist globalization refers to the intensification since the 1980s of the spatial reorganization of production and distribution, |

|the spread of financial markets, the interpenetration of advanced producer services, and the rise of key cities as command and control centers of global|

|capital (Appadurai, 2003; Lechner and Boli, 2003; Lloyd, 2000; Mittelman, 1994). Although the roots of ultra-modernist globalization are planted firmly |

|in the garden of historical globalization, the contemporary system has matured by the adoption and spread of transport and communication technologies. |

|For the first time in human history, multinational corporations can produce anything anywhere on the planet and can sell anything anywhere on the |

|planet. As Held et al. (1999:15) argued, time-space compression has ‘stretched’ capital and information activities across the traditional boundaries |

|constructed by political and geographical structures. This theoretically borderless world now presents few impediments to the rapid and efficient |

|movement of people, capital, goods, services, and information, thus facilitating the emergence of a truly global marketplace. |

|Second, what does globalization involve? Giddens (1990:64) has defined globalization as ‘an intensification of world-wide social relations which link |

|distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.’ In other words, 4 globalization |

|involves changes in the spatial reach of capital, financial activities, advanced producer services, and information that transcend the political state |

|system and where, arguably, multinational corporations replace states and communities as the dominant actors in the global system. In theory, a |

|globalized socioeconomic system would be freer, more efficient, economically rational, and unfettered by state-directed diversions of wealth into |

|unproductive areas. As production is reorganized across time and space, industries interpenetrate across political borders, financial capital spreads |

|across the globe, homogenized consumer goods diffuse to distant markets, and people flow to new areas of economic opportunity, the local and the global |

|will become inextricably intertwined in a system of universal order (Bauman, 1998; Loker, 1999). However, globalization also involves reshaping the |

|social structure of the world system in a way that reinforces social polarization. At the top of the globalization hierarchy are those individuals and |

|communities integrated into the global economy who have command and control functions over global production, finance, and information. In the middle |

|are those who serve the global economy in more precarious employment circumstances, and at the bottom sits the superfluous labor force that represents a|

|potential destabilizing threat to globalization (Cox, 1996). |

|Third, is globalization driven by an expanding market? The global operation of multi-national corporations has played a major role in the expansion of |

|international trade and the emergence of regional trading blocs since the 1980s. A significant number of treaties, institutions, and organizations aimed|

|at facilitating global trade have come into being in order to ‘open up’ national markets and local communities to free trade. Thus, there is a |

|reciprocal relationship between an expanding market and the forces of globalization. As capitalism continues to overcome spatial limitations to market |

|expansion through time compression, an expanding market provides a more conducive environment within which globalization processes can spread. One of |

|the arguments supporting the spread of democracy across the planet, for example, is that, theoretically, stable, participatory democracies encourage the|

|expansion of a consuming middle class. In turn, an expanding middle class creates a growing demand for goods and services, thus facilitating an |

|expanding national market. This allows the forces of globalization to maximize capital returns, economies of scale, production systems, and distribution|

|costs by engaging with specific expanding national and regional markets and integrating them into the global economy. |

|The fourth question asks if globalization makes the world more homogenous and, if so, what are the consequences. Embedded in the ideology of global |

|change is the homogenization or Americanization thesis, which argues that capitalist consumerism has orchestrated the spread of Americanized commercial |

|and media products across the planet, with particular success in developing countries (Friedman, 1999; Tomlinson, 1999). Commodified culture in myriad |

|forms, ranging from Cokes to Big Macs, from Nike to the NBA, and from CNN to Hollywood, has disseminated from the USA to the rest of the world, |

|overwhelming local cultural traits and leaving local communities with few choices in the marketplace (Tomlinson, 2003). Critics of the homogenization |

|thesis argue that globalization is taking multiple paths in local places, giving rise to terms such as ‘hybridization,’ ‘creolization,’ and |

|‘glocalization.’ In many parts of the world, local entrepreneurs and consumers are using imported cultural products to shape and assert their own unique|

|identities, so much so that globalization's success in promoting capitalist consumerism has spawned multiple local variations of so-called globalized |

|culture (Howes, 1996; Kim 2000; Robertson, 1995; Watson, 1997). |

|Fifth, does globalization determine local events? There is little doubt that in Latin America and other regions of the world, many governments have |

|responded to the rhetoric of globalization by 5 adopting neoliberal strategies to restructure economies and societies. As a consequence of these |

|policies, many local businesses and communities are exposed to competition from global corporations who often have better financing, technology, |

|advertising, and market reach. For example, research in Argentina has suggested that for every new internationally controlled Walmart or Carrefour |

|supermarket, five thousand local ‘mom and pop’ operations disappear (Hayes, 1998). Under the influence of the North American Free Trade Agreement |

|(NAFTA), the Mexican Congress changed Article Twenty seven of the constitution to allow the free sale of once-inalienable community or ejido lands and |

|lifted trade and investment barriers to external capital and goods. Rebellion erupted in Mexico's southern state of Chiapas, government price supports |

|for many commodities were abandoned, rural-urban migration accelerated, and falling agricultural prices depressed an already fragile rural economy |

|(Krooth, 1995). Giddens' (1990) argument that as global social relations are restructured, local events are shaped increasingly by external forces and |

|vice versa has much merit. |

|Finally, is globalization harmful? This is perhaps the most complex question of all to address because there are multiple contradictions embedded in the|

|globalization thesis. For example, the socioeconomic elite of most developing countries, who comprise a tiny fraction of a country's population, have |

|integrated into the world system and have become completely globalized. In contrast, many highly developed countries are creating developing world |

|conditions among the bottom tier of their labor hierarchy (Cox, 1996; Sassen, 1998). Throughout the emerging regions of the world, vast segments of |

|society are becoming further impoverished, isolated, and excluded from the socioeconomic opportunities offered by globalization (Kaul, 1999). Other |

|contradictions are the loss of regulatory power by states and the widespread resurgence of attempts to reinforce local religious, ethnic, linguistic, |

|political, and gender identities in the face of wider global forces. Brecher and Costello (1994) have synthesized effectively in a single question the |

|issue of whether or not globalization is harmful: global village or global pillage? The challenge for researchers is to examine both macro-socioeconomic|

|and micro-socioeconomic indicators of development under conditions of globalization to understand the impacts for all segments of society across all |

|possible scales of analysis. This requires a holistic, multidisciplinary approach to development analysis. |

|Without a doubt, globalization, both as ideology and as process, has transformed the world system in profound and fundamental ways over the past two |

|decades. This is especially true in Latin America, where neoliberal policies in many countries have dismantled state regulation of the economy, opened |

|up the much of the region to globalizing processes, and created a new framework for development, growth, and change. As Korzeniewicz (1997:20) argued, |

|the region's institutional structures are being disassembled at a ‘precipitous pace, to be replaced by a deepening differentiation in the arenas of |

|operation of enterprises, states, and households.’ How these changes unfold in different places at different times will determine the long-term |

|contribution of globalization to improving the quality of life for all Latin Americans in the 21st century. |

|Latin American Development under Globalization |

|A fundamental difference exists between the economic ideologies or policies of globalization, which are essentially structural and conceptual in nature,|

|and the processes of globalization, which are outcome driven and can be empirically measured. However, there appears to be much confusion throughout the|

|region about the distinction between the two definitions. Over the past two decades, many Latin American governments have embraced the ideologies of |

|globalization uncritically and enthusiastically, but have done very little to convert these ideologies 6 into measurable development improvements for |

|the majority of the population (Rodrik, 1999). This is indicative of Latin America's general economic failures throughout the 20th century in that the |

|region frequently has embraced changing economic philosophies and ideologies and incorporated them into national policy. Yet these policies ultimately |

|have generally failed because of insufficient attention paid to the processes that translate policy into measurable development. For example, let's |

|accept the premise that transport and communication technologies are the engine driving contemporary globalization. Latin American governments, with few|

|exceptions, have recognized explicitly in publications, conferences, policy statements, and electoral rhetoric that transport and communication are |

|crucial to development success and they have promoted a variety of high-profile projects to address national and regional integration (Keeling 2002). |

|Yet by conservative estimates, Latin America suffers from an infrastructural deficit in excess of US$ one trillion in the transport and communication |

|arena just to bring the region up to a minimum level of support for globalization policies to have any reasonable chance of long-term development |

|success. This deficit suggests that a significant problem exists between policy formation and policy implementation in the region. How, then, has Latin |

|American development fared under globalization, what are the fundamental forces of change shaping the region today, and why do so many of the familiar |

|development crises that afflict the region remain unaddressed? |

|Contemporary or ultra-modernist globalization has emerged from the long-term historical processes that have shaped Latin America's people and places. A |

|useful metaphor for explaining Latin American development in a broader context is provided by plate tectonic theory. Drawn from the physical world, |

|plate tectonic theory is the idea that subsurface convection currents cause continental and oceanic tectonic plates to move, thus causing changes both |

|in the position and surface relief of the oceans and continents. Applying this theory to the socio-economic world, contemporary globalization can be |

|viewed as part of the long-term or tectonic shifts in the socioeconomic forces shaping the world around us. The short-term surface manifestations of |

|these long-term shifts are earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, which can reshape local and regional conditions profoundly and rapidly. Cultural |

|‘earthquakes and volcanic eruptions’ generally are short-term events such as rapid inflation or deflation, war, revolution, coups d'etat, increased |

|social polarization, paradigm shifts, boom and bust cycles, and currency devaluation that have a dramatic and often negative impact on economies and |

|societies (Thurow, 1996). |

|Long-term movements in tectonic plates are driven by a series of interrelated fundamental physical forces. Continuing the metaphor, the long-term shift |

|in global socio-economic change towards a condition of ultra-modernist globalization is being driven in Latin America by a number of fundamental forces.|

|In turn, the fundamental forces involved in the globalization process are creating the ‘earthquakes and volcanic eruptions’ that are reshaping the lives|

|and conditions of people and places in Latin America at the dawn of the 21st century. Drawing on Thurow's (1996) analysis of the future of global |

|capitalism, six fundamental forces can be identified for Latin America. First, the system of state-directed economies that dominated the region for |

|nearly fifty years has ended and neoliberalism is emerging as the dominant economic model. Second, the basic structure of Latin American economies is |

|undergoing a transition from a system based on natural resources to one based on human capital and brainpower. Third, Latin American societies have |

|become predominantly urban in composition, and demographic aging, coupled with economic welfare, is looming as a significant social issue. Fourth, the |

|effects of social polarization in the region are becoming more evident as societies undergo cultural and economic restructuring based on their ability |

|to engage with globalization activities. Fifth, as neoliberal policies and non-interventionist 7 strategies are applied to primary sector export |

|activities, to industrialization, and to urbanization throughout Latin America, increased stress is placed on the physical environment. Finally, as |

|globalization spreads geographically, it exerts change in accessibility and mobility demands through its dependence on the technologies of time-space |

|compression. |

|The Fundamental Forces of Long-Term Change |

|Neoliberal policies adopted throughout Latin America since the 1980s have moved the region's countries and societies in a new economic direction, away |

|from the influences of import substitution and socialist ideologies and towards the integrative embrace of globalization. This policy paradigm shift |

|involves the replacement of state control over resources, production, and services with privatization strategies, the regulation of financial markets |

|with deregulation and fiscal reform, inflexible labor markets with flexible ones, closed domestic markets with open and free trade, and restrictive |

|institutions with more innovative management approaches. Moreover, the transition to a more globalized structure for Latin American economies has |

|coincided with a transformation of the political environment from primarily authoritarian to mostly democratic (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). Reductions |

|in the power of the state through privatization and deregulation are seen as critical to reducing government inefficiencies and management ineptitude in|

|the economic arena and to providing a more technical, disciplined, and flexible approach to running the national economy (Edwards, 1995; Gwynne and Kay,|

|2004). Neoliberal reforms have not been uniform throughout the region, however. Considerable and important variations exist both in the pace of |

|neoliberal restructuring (for example, fairly rapid in Chile and Argentina, very slow in Venezuela and Honduras) and in the level of integration with |

|global markets. In addition, the spatial and structural impacts of globalization are displaying significant local, regional, national, and supranational|

|variations, which suggest that this fundamental force of change is facilitating development divergence rather than convergence. |

|Countries in the developed world such as the United States, Germany, Britain, and Japan have seen the structure of their economies shift over the past |

|fifty years from a natural resource base to a human brainpower base. Information processing, financial management, marketing, research, biotechnology, |

|and other ‘brainpower’ activities have replaced smoke-stack industrialization, manufacturing, and similar traditional ‘blue-collar’ production as the |

|dominant employment sectors of the economy. This transformation of the economic structure also is occurring in Latin America, albeit more slowly and |

|more geographically variegated. Sectoral employment as a percentage of the labor force shifted from agricultural dominance in the 1960s to tertiary and |

|quaternary dominance (service, information, transportation, marketing, finance, etc.) in the 1990s. In Brazil, for example, fiftyfive percent of the |

|labor force worked in agriculture in 1960; in the 1990s, fiftyfive percent of the labor force worked in the tertiary and quaternary sectors. Mexico has |

|seen the same percentage sectoral shift, as have Colombia, Panama, and Costa Rica (Gwynne and Kay, 2004). |

|In 2000, the seven highest-income countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Uruguay) all had over fifty |

|percent of their economically active populations engaged in tertiary and quaternary employment, whereas the percentage of the labor force engaged in |

|traditional industry continued to show a decline (World Bank, 2000). This shift has occurred, in part, because neoliberal policies have removed several |

|of the protections that many companies enjoyed in the domestic market and forced them to become more oriented towards the global market, where |

|competition is fiercer. In addition, labor reforms associated with neoliberalism, particularly in state-owned companies and in the public service |

|sector, have forced many workers to 8 seek jobs in the private formal sector and in export- or globally oriented companies. Job expansion throughout the|

|1990s was most dynamic in the service or human brainpower sector of Latin American economies. |

|Demographic transformation, the third fundamental change shaping the development of Latin America in the early 21st century, is placing new demands on |

|governments as they grapple with globalization strategies. Overall population growth rates continue to decline in the region, with reductions in |

|fertility rates, increases in contraceptive prevalence, improved female literacy, better health care, and greater female participation in the work force|

|as key contributing factors. However, the age structure of the population in many countries, where up to fifty percent of the population is aged twenty |

|five and under (Mexico, for example), suggests that demographic growth potential will remain high over the next few decades. As a result, the sheer |

|volume of people entering the workforce over the coming decades may well outpace the ability of the globalized economy to create new jobs, especially as|

|new centers of high-tech employment emerge in regions such as South Asia, Eastern Europe, and China. A further demographic challenge for those countries|

|that have unequivocally embraced globalization strategies is the changing composition of dependency ratios. One of the key demographic characteristics |

|of economically advanced societies is an increase in the percent of the population over sixty years old. |

|As life expectancies increase throughout Latin America (up to an average of nearly seventy years in the late 1990s) and medical technologies continue to|

|improve the quality of life, the elderly cohort likely will place a greater economic burden on governments and societies. Estimates suggest that people |

|over sixty five years old now represent twenty five percent of the dependent population in Latin America, up from less than ten percent in 1975 (ECLAC, |

|2000; Sen, 1994; World Bank, 2000). Mexico is projected to have nearly twenty million people over sixty years of age in 2025, up from five million in |

|1990, with Brazil (36 million) and Argentina (eight million) experiencing similar rates of increase by 2025 (Lloyd-Sherlock, 1997). These demographic |

|changes are occurring within the framework of a neoliberal welfare ideology that has produced sweeping social security and other public welfare reforms |

|in recent years. |

|A fourth fundamental change in the shift towards a more globalized economy is the growing differentiation of people and communities within Latin |

|America, both across the entire region and within individual countries. The development gap between, for example, Chile and Haiti has widened |

|dramatically since the 1980s, while economic growth in the littoral of Argentina (Buenos Aires and the development corridor from Rosario to La Plata), |

|for instance, has far outpaced growth in the increasingly impoverished Northwest region. Between 1975 and 1995, the gap between the six poorest |

|countries in Latin America and six selected core economies widened dramatically (Table 1). Moreover, the Per Capita Income ratio also has widened |

|between the six richest and poorest economies in Latin America and between the six richest economies in Latin America and the six selected core |

|economies. Preliminary Gross National Income figures for 2002 suggest a slight narrowing of the gap for the A:B and A:C ratios, but no significant |

|improvement in the gap between Latin America's richest and poorest economies (B:C) (ECLAC, 2000; World Bank, 2004). A widening income or wealth gap also|

|is evident within individual countries. In Chile, forty percent of the national income is earned by the top ten percent of the population, while the |

|lowest forty percent earn only fifteen percent of the income. Brazil experiences even greater income inequality, with the lowest forty percent of the |

|population earning about seven percent of the national income, compared to the over fifty percent share gained by the top ten percent of Brazilian |

|society (World Bank, 2000). |

|9 |

|Table 1. Polarization in the World Economy, 1975-2002 |

|[pic] |

|Similar patterns of social polarization are being experienced across the globe, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa where over one-quarter of a billion |

|people live in poverty (Harsch, 2003; World Bank, 2004). The complex mosaic of globalization's development impact is characterized by the emergence of |

|marginalized enclaves where people and communities are unable to gain access to the global economy's productive processes (Mittelman, 1996). How can |

|these local communities and regions demarginalize when state policy options are extremely constrained by the forces of globalization? Although social |

|polarization as a development condition has long been evident in Latin American societies, the current trend appears to be exacerbated because those |

|social groups with specific skills or capital benefit from links to the global economy, while those lacking the necessary skills or capital become |

|increasingly detached. Neoliberal reforms have not addressed such social concerns directly because the policy priorities have been macroeconomic in |

|nature and not geared toward addressing poverty, inequality, or the redistribution of access to skills, capital, and global opportunities. As Sheahan |

|(1997:9) puts it, neoliberal policies ‘do not in principle rule out redistributing assets for the sake of equalization, but their spirit certainly goes |

|against it.’ The theory behind neoliberalism is that macroeconomic stability and greater efficiency will favor economic growth, which in the long term |

|should reduce poverty and inequality and improve access to capital, skills, and opportunities. |

|Latin America's fifth fundamental force of change is intimately related to the first four. Neoliberal reforms and the drive towards free-market |

|economies within the context of globalization have placed renewed pressure on the physical environment and on natural resource inventories. No space or |

|place in Latin America is immune from the impacts of resource demands, whether it is petroleum exploration in the remotest corner of the Amazon Basin or|

|subsistence agriculture in the densely populated highlands of the Andes. The globalization of the region's economies has expanded trade and investment |

|relationships, primarily in non-manufacturing exports such as agriculture, mining, fishing, forestry, and ranching. During the 1990s, primary products |

|continued to dominate the mix of total merchandise exports in the majority of Latin American countries; only Mexico (23 percent) and Brazil (45 percent)|

|recorded values below fifty percent (ECLAC, 1999; Gwynne and Kay, 1999). |

|An emphasis on the export of natural resources has encouraged the incorporation of ever- 10 increasing hectares of land into the resource-extraction |

|economy, with significant impacts on the environment. Moreover, growing social polarization, rural-urban migration, industrialized and mechanized |

|farming, rapid urban expansion, and the ideologies of capitalist consumption have stretched the limits of environmental sustainability to crisis point, |

|particularly in large urban areas. Globalization has accelerated the pace of environmental degradation, raised new challenges for sustainable |

|development policymakers, and questioned the traditional relationships between economic growth, social justice, and environmental quality (Sachs, 1999; |

|Zimmerer and Carter 2002). |

|The final fundamental force of change involves a profound restructuring of time-space relationships in the global system. Innovative technological |

|advances in transport and communication since the 1970s have altered radically the cost, speed, security, and flexibility of interaction across the |

|planet. Long-range jumbo jets, giant container ships, supertankers, satellites, high-speed trains, and computers, among other advances, enable complex |

|global organizations of production, distribution, and consumption to function in an efficient and integrated manner. People, goods, information, |

|capital, and ideas flow relatively unimpeded across time and space and have the potential to reshape local conditions in profound and often unintended |

|ways. No corner of Latin America is immune to the influences of restructured transport and communication systems and networks, especially in terms of |

|the impact of radio, television, and video on the attitudes, aspirations, and cultural values of millions of rural and urban people (Loker, 1999; |

|Sagasti, 1995). Within the context of globalization, Sagasti (1995:600) argues that computerization particularly has created a great divide between |

|those with the capacity to ‘generate, acquire, disseminate, and utilize knowledge, both traditional and scientific,’ and those without. Thus, full |

|participation in globalization can be defined in terms of knowledge producers versus knowledge consumers and in terms of those who have accessibility |

|and mobility within the global system and those who do not. As transport, communication, and information technologies link Latin American intellectuals |

|and the elite more closely to the global community, arguably they draw ‘farther away from the concerns of their own society, reproducing the global |

|divide’ at both the national and local levels (Loker, 1999:26). |

|In the broader context of this paradigmatic shift towards globalization and all that it entails, as suggested by the preceding six fundamental forces of|

|change, Latin America is undergoing a political, social, economic, and cultural metamorphosis. Yet change does not occur without disrupttion or |

|conflict. Across the region, from the maquiladora zones of the Mexican borderlands to the export-oriented agricultural valleys of central Chile, |

|globalization forces are driving the ‘earthquakes and volcanic eruptions’ that are reshaping life and livelihood, people and place, and society and |

|nation. These short-term changes to Latin America's socioeconomic landscapes may well determine to a significant degree the long-term success of |

|neoliberalism and globalization in bringing a more equitable and sustainable level of development to the region. |

|Earthquakes and Volcanic Eruptions: New Directions and Familiar Crises for Latin America |

|There is little debate that globalization is transforming Latin America in myriad ways, both positively and negatively. As the region embarks on a |

|development path that will take people and communities in new directions over the next several decades, many familiar development crises remain |

|unresolved. As the region moves toward the future, it faces not only the long-term challenges presented by neoliberal and globalization strategies but |

|also the short-term socio-economic ‘earthquakes and volcanic eruptions’ that are occurring as a consequence of adopting these strategies. Although the |

|impacts of globalization are myriad and diverse, six specific issues are 11 identified as the most critical ‘earthquakes and volcanic eruptions’ |

|reshaping the Latin American socioeconomic landscape in the first decades of the 21st century: social polarization; democratization; migration and labor|

|flow; cultural identity; accessibility and mobility; and environmental stress. An exploration of these six short-term impacts of globalization serves to|

|crystallize the meeting of the global and the local (GLOCAL) and to help place in context the contradictions embedded in globalism. |

|Growing Polarization of Society |

|Limited Democratization |

|Opportunistic Migration and Labor Flow |

|Conflicting Socio-Cultural Identities |

|Accessibility and Mobility |

|Lower Environmental Quality |

|Growing Polarization of Society: Globalization's fundamental ideology is that a rising tide lifts all boats. Neoliberal reforms are viewed by many |

|throughout the region as imperative for longterm development, and the negative social impacts being experienced by millions are explained away as simply|

|short-term adjustments to the new economic conditions that soon will be overcome. There can be little doubt, however, that serious fraying of the social|

|fabric is occurring throughout Latin America today; witness Argentina’s recent economic collapse, Haiti’s ongoing turmoil, Bolivia’s popular discontent,|

|and the ongoing struggles in Colombia. Over forty percent of the region's population is considered poor, and the absolute numbers in poverty have grown |

|from 120 million in 1970 to over 220 million at the beginning of the new millennium (ECLAC, 2000; World Bank 2004). For example, despite Fujimori's |

|neoliberal development policies in Peru during the late- 1990s, over half of the country's total population still lives in poverty, with more than five |

|million people estimated to be in extreme poverty. Forty percent of Peruvians lack adequate access to basic human needs (potable water, electricity, |

|waste removal, health, and education), and over five million earn less than the equivalent of US$1 per day (World Bank, 2000; Zevallos, 1997). Moreover,|

|poverty has become a major urban problem as well as an ongoing and significant rural development challenge. |

|Analysts of social polarization in the region argue that globalization has vested the boardrooms of multinational corporations with immense power over |

|the daily lives of rural and urban dwellers alike. Globalization is seen as ‘econocentric, technocentric [and] commodocentric,’ abstracted from the |

|social cultural context in which economies, technologies, and commodities operate (Cernea, 1996:15). Indeed, many Latin American governments have turned|

|increasingly towards market-driven forms of social support in an attempt to reduce the state's long-term financial commitment to the welfare of society.|

|The upper middle and elite sectors of society who are able to engage with globalization can afford the high cost of private healthcare, retirement |

|programs, education, and skill development, whereas the poorer majority must fend for itself within an increasingly inadequately funded and declining |

|public welfare system (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996; Gwynne and Kay, 1999; Lloyd-Sherlock, 1997). Throughout the past twenty years of neoliberal reforms in Latin|

|America, the upper twenty percent of society has benefited substantially in terms of income distribution, the middle forty percent has remained static |

|or declined slightly, while the 12 lower forty percent has seen its share of national income decline consistently (ECLAC, 1999; World Bank, 2000, 2004).|

|Trade liberalization, labor-market adjustments, and fiscal reform, the backbone of globalization strategies in Latin America, are exacerbating social |

|polarization in several major areas (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996). First, unemployment rates have grown dramatically as public sector employment is cut and |

|domestic companies are forced to ‘downsize’ their workforce in the face of increased international competition in local economies. Those with the |

|skills, capital, and training needed to take advantage of the opportunities presented by globalization find employment, while those without the |

|necessary attributes drift into the informal economy (underemployment) or become unemployed. Second, downward pressure on wage-labor rates as a |

|consequence of globalization tends to reduce the real minimum wage and thus the level of household income for the majority. This, in turn, widens the |

|gap between average household income and the cost of a basic ‘basket of food’ needed to support that household. Third, the urban formal economy |

|continues to shrink in many of the regions largest cities and the informal economy has expanded as structural adjustment programs bring greater |

|production flexibility to the marketplace. Small-scale enterprises often lack access to the capital, skills, and distribution systems necessary to |

|compete in a globalized local and national economy. Fourth, agricultural policies that are export-oriented and geared toward production rationalization |

|are exacerbating the marginalization of the rural poor. Many rural communities have been dispossessed from subsistence land, the average farm size has |

|declined, and many rural workers are being forced to seek wage-labor employment, primarily in urban areas (Loker, 1999). Finally, the time-space |

|compression technologies that drive globalization are accessible generally to the elite segment of society and not to the poorer majority. Lack of |

|accessibility and mobility for the majority widens the development gap between the haves and the have-nots and leads to declining opportunities in the |

|social, economic, and political spheres. |

|Limited Democratization: Although globalization has exacerbated social polarization and fostered greater levels of social inequality in Latin America, |

|neoliberal restructuring appears to be linked to an emerging political equality that has come from the expansion of democratization. Herein lies the |

|paradox of what can be termed ‘limited democratization.’ Improvements in the social and material welfare of society are deemed central to the |

|development of greater political equality and thus democracy. Yet throughout Latin America, many welfare systems have been undermined and social justice|

|appears to have fallen by the wayside as a policy objective. At the same time, globalization appears to have weakened the power of the state to |

|influence the direction of neoliberal policies. Critics are that neoliberalism has created a ‘hollowed out’ state, where most economic decisions now are|

|made by the market, by corporations, and by newly emerging global or regional institutions (WTO, GATT, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, etc.) (Gray, 1998). This leaves |

|little policy room for governments to develop social programs aimed at reducing unemployment, poverty, and the erosion of basic public services. Indeed,|

|the current neoliberal economic conception of globalization allows for much greater tolerance of social inequality than in recent history, which in turn|

|leads to the erosion of political responsibility and political equality. Global capitalism is not held accountable to elected state or local officials, |

|which is a further contradiction with the emerging preference for electoral democracy. |

|Globalization in Latin America has become the most efficient way for governments and consumers to express their economic preferences, and it appears to |

|have relegated citizenship and political participation mostly to elections and voting. Tax breaks and relentless competition are used 13 as tools to |

|attract new investment, with most important political and socioeconomic decisions now made by the global elite, beyond the influence and reach of the |

|vast majority of Latin America's citizens. As O'Donnell (1996:45) observed, ‘...for large sections of the population, basic liberal freedoms are denied |

|or recurrently trampled [and].... individuals are citizens in relation to the only institution that functions close to what its formal rules prescribe, |

|elections. In the rest, only the members of a privileged minority are full citizens.’ Privatization and other neoliberal policies also have accelerated |

|political-economic corruption, which has weakened the ‘prestige’ of democracy, strengthened the general level of political apathy, and encouraged the |

|depoliticization of society. As a result, the most serious immediate threats to democratic development in Latin America are poor management of national |

|affairs (desgobierno), conspicuous political corruption, the abandonment of social justice as a legitimate development objective, and the political |

|disenfranchisement of vast segments of the region's citizenry. |

|Opportunistic Migration and Labor Flow: International flows of labor always have been a defining characteristic of globalization processes, from the |

|historic period down to the present day. Over the past two decades, however, the global restructuring of production has changed both the magnitude and |

|geography of migration, particularly in terms of labor flows from the economies of the South (Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia) to the advanced |

|capitalist countries of the North. In Latin America over the past twenty years, most significant labor flows have occurred between Latin American |

|countries or from the region to North America. Yet the transnational migration flows that affect Latin America are not without political and social |

|conflict. Despite the globalization and neoliberal mantra of promoting the free movement of ‘people, goods, capital, and information’ to facilitate |

|freer trade, many governments increasingly are resistant to transborder labor flows and try very hard to limit both legal and illegal migration. The |

|1,950-mile Mexico-U.S. border, probably the most heavily militarized border between two democracies in the world, is a visceral reminder of the sharp |

|divide in economic opportunity, quality of life, and migration policy that shapes the labor flow dynamic and generates significant political and |

|cultural conflict. Crossborder migration also is viewed as a significant political, economic, and cultural problem between neighboring Latin American |

|countries. During the mid-1990s in Argentina, for example, both then- President Menem and the secretary-general of the Confederación General del Trabajo|

|blamed an influx of foreign workers for the country's high rate of unemployment and argued for legislation to restrict migration (Latin American Weekly |

|Report 1995). Even rural-urban migration has become problematic in most countries as urban environments become migrant-saturated and unable to fulfill |

|the expectations of those that arrive from the countryside. Many researchers have argued that in order to staunch the flow of migrants to the cities, |

|the rural realm should be more than just a ‘warehouse’ for the poor (Loker, 1999). Poverty must be addressed in situ rather than exporting it to cities |

|or across national borders. However, migration from poorer to wealthier regions has had significant positive influences throughout Latin America in |

|terms of remittances, flows of ideas, entrepreneurialism, and the diffusion of technology and intellectual capital (Babcock and Conway, 2000; |

|Jokisch,1997) |

|Despite the positive impacts of remittances, flexible labor markets and internationally mobile capital not only have disrupted households and |

|communities by encouraging migration, they also have changed the nature of job creation, which itself can be disruptive of families and communities. |

|While job creation generally is a good thing, many of the industrial jobs associated with globalization are characterized by a minimum level of skill, |

|low wages, few or no employee benefits, 14 they are female-dominated, and come with limited possibilities for promotion and personal development |

|(Cravey, 1998). In addition, these jobs are changing the social role of many Latin American women; as they move from farm to assembly plants, they |

|become more central to the household economic enterprise (Gwynne and Kay, 2004). Globalization has increased wage-labor competition across the region, |

|with neoliberal restructuring pitting workers and localities against each other in a ‘race to the bottom’ to provide inexpensive and compliant labor |

|(Brecher and Costello, 1994). Downward pressure on wages in Argentina, for example, is seen as a critical component of neoliberal restructuring and key |

|to helping the country become more competitive in the regional and global economy. In 1995, President Menem argued that Argentine workers were |

|significantly overpaid compared to other Latin American workforces, which not only attracted Paraguayans, Bolivians, and Chileans to work in Argentina |

|but also made the country's industries less competitive in the global marketplace (Business Week 1995). This type of rhetoric creates regional friction |

|and works against long-term socio-economic integration. |

|Conflicting Socio-Cultural Identities: Sociocultural identities have always been influenced to some degree by external forces, either directly through |

|colonization and imperialism or indirectly by trade and other interactions (Gwynne and Kay, 2004). The difference today is that ultra-modernist |

|globalization is facilitating the rapid diffusion of cultural images, products, artifacts, and ideas around the world, which in many ways seems to be |

|overwhelming indigenous technical and social knowledge. Globalization is defining new standards for what is considered a desirable lifestyle, it is |

|creating new contexts for choices about ‘wants’ versus ‘needs,’ and it is establishing new definitions of success. Thus, argues Véliz (1994), in order |

|to participate fully and successfully in globalization, Latin America must abandon its historical identity and embrace neoliberalism. Latin America's |

|development failures can be traced to an embedded aversion to risk and change, to distrust of new ideas and technologies, to political and economic |

|preferences for stability and central control, and to an unquestioned respect for social status, hierarchies, and old loyalties. Sociocultural |

|characteristics such as clientelism, ideological traditionalism, authoritarianism, and racism are seen as antimodernist and barriers to the full |

|incorporation of Latin Americans into the globalized world. |

|Globalization is creating a new kind of Latin American sociocultural identity, one that is constructed by individual success, innovative |

|entrepreneurialism, the conspicuous consumption of global products, secularization, privatized social welfare, and international accessibility and |

|mobility. Political-economic values such as state-sponsored welfare, justice, industrial development, full employment, national planning, and centralism|

|no longer are deemed viable in the race to become a ‘winner’ in the globalization competition (Larrain, 1999). The changing identities encouraged by |

|neoliberalism are particularly evident in Latin America's cities, in part because at the beginning of the 21st century the majority (80 percent) of |

|Latin Americans are urbanites. Twentieth century industrial and urban biases to socio-cultural development in the region have been exacerbated by |

|globalization, as the dynamism of economic change rests on cities as the command and control centers of the global system (Knox and Taylor, 1995). As |

|urban wage labor becomes increasingly important, and as globalization draws people into more varied spheres of socio-cultural interaction, either |

|vicariously through mass communication or experientially through migration, urban social, political, and economic identities become further fragmented. |

|Across the region, sociocultural urban space is being partitioned ever more rigidly, both perceptually and physically, between protected areas for the |

|globalized elite and insecure areas for the non-globalized majority (Rotker, 2002). Such fragmentation may well foster increased urban delinquency, |

|intraclass 15 violence, a weakening of grassroots social movements, political apathy, and the general disarticulation and demobilization of civil |

|society. |

|Adverse Accessibility and Mobility: Transport and communication form the foundation of ultra-modernist globalization because they not only facilitate |

|the rapid transfer of capital, goods, people, ideas, and information across the planet but they also shape the accessibility and mobility patterns of |

|individuals and communities. New technologies in the transport and communication arena have revolutionized socioeconomic interaction across space and |

|time and they are driving the dissemination of the knowledge that fosters further technological innovation. Yet despite the significant advances in |

|transport and communication technologies in recent decades, Latin America faces two serious crises in accessibility and mobility (Keeling, 2002). The |

|first is the region's tremendous infrastructural deficit, which is severely limiting the ability of countries, communities, and individuals to |

|participate more successfully in the processes of globalization. Inadequate telecommunications, roads, railroads, port facilities, and public transport |

|systems across the region are stifling the ability of communities to engage with the opportunities presented by globalization. For example, at least one|

|million kilometers of paved roads requiring an investment of hundreds of billions of dollars are needed over the next decade if Latin America is to meet|

|the challenge of hemispheric economic integration and local socioeconomic development. This multi-billion dollar deficit in transport and communication |

|infrastructure is perhaps the most critical development challenge for the region and it remains the Achilles heel of Latin America's engagement with the|

|ideology of globalization. |

|Second, millions of Latin Americans suffer today from inadequate accessibility and mobility, both in terms of their ability to access new opportunities |

|and services and their physical mobility in rural or urban environments. Globalization has restructured the geography of economic opportunity, which, in|

|turn, has reshaped the spatial and temporal patterns of accessibility and mobility demands. Poor access to the marketplace, to needed public services, |

|to credit, to new economic opportunities, or to the resources and skills needed to participate in the global economy further exacerbates social |

|polarization and leads to individual and community disarticulation from whatever development benefits might flow from globalization. Those who are |

|well-connected can improve their circumstances, while those who are disconnected fall even further behind. |

|Lower Environmental Quality: Of all the ‘earthquakes and volcanic eruptions’ that currently are reshaping the socio-cultural landscape in Latin America,|

|the ongoing and worsening degradation of the physical environment perhaps is the most serious immediate threat to development in the region. Moreover, |

|deteriorating environmental conditions do not discriminate by social strata, location, or economic system -- poor-quality air is breathed by both rich |

|and poor, while air pollution recognizes no political boundary. Although international attention has focused primarily on broad issues such as the |

|destruction of the rainforest, local concerns are directed primarily towards the daily hazards to human health and wellbeing such as non-potable water, |

|air pollution, soil degradation, inadequate sewage treatment, and solid waste removal. Governments, business leaders, and the globalization strategists |

|assure critics that the solution to environmental problems ‘lies in pursuing even more single-mindedly the liberalization policies that produced these |

|problems’ (Power, 1997:77). Free-trade advocates, for example, argue that neoliberal policies will replace aging, inefficient, and polluting factories |

|with more efficient and environmentally friendly production systems, leading to cleaner air and rising incomes. Critics argue that globalization is not |

|16 conducive to protection of the environment because competition forces countries to neglect longterm environ-mental safeguards for short-term economic|

|benefits (Roberts, 1996). Environmental concerns do not fit within the neoliberal paradigm; they are an epistemological and policy blind spot (Loker, |

|1999). |

|Latin America's continued focus on resource exploitation, a condition reinforced by the comparative-advantage logic of globalization, is placing |

|ever-greater stress on ecosystems and local environments. Many new ‘nontraditional’ agricultural products are financed, developed, and exported before |

|any accurate ecological evidence has been generated that assesses the sustainability or negative consequences of new production systems. Exploiting |

|water aquifers with new technologies for expanded vegetable production or increasing the use of fertilizer and pesticides often is unsustainable over |

|the long term. Murray's (1998) examination of fruit cultivation for export in Chile has raised important questions about agricultural sustainability, |

|particularly in terms of water shortages and contamination, soil salinity, and declining soil fertility. Export-oriented development policies also |

|encourage households to colonize environmentally sensitive ‘frontier’ zones, leading to social conflict and ecological degradation (Durham, 1995). Other|

|immediate threats to the rural population include the unsustainable intensification of agricultural practices from increased population, land and |

|capital shortage, and excessive chemical inputs. Threats to Latin America's urban population are no less immediate and serious than those experienced in|

|the rural areas, and are perhaps even more localized. Today, over 100 million Latin Americans live in urban conditions that pose a considerable threat |

|to their daily lives (Gwynne and Kay, 2004). Unsafe water, poor-quality shelter, unsafe housing locations, inadequate waste and sanitation services, and|

|a lack of access to health services are just a few of the daily environmental challenges faced by Latin America's poorer urbanites. |

|In summary, the long-term fundamental forces of change emerging under conditions of globalization are driving a regionalized and localized restructuring|

|of socio-economic landscapes. These regional and local ‘earthquakes and volcanic eruptions’ are having different impacts on different places, |

|particularly in terms of the depth, breadth, and type of impacts, in part because of the spatial heterogeneity embedded in the national territory of |

|individual Latin American countries. Although these short-term changes, some positive and some negative, are being experienced throughout Latin America,|

|it is local conditions and local communities structured within a regional framework that determine the level and impact of engagement with neoliberalism|

|and globalization.. |

|Rethinking the Framework, Restructuring the Analysis? |

|Since the late-1970s, many Latin American governments and the business elite have adopted the ideologies and policies of globalization in an attempt to |

|alter the long-term direction of socioeconomic development in the region. Macroeconomic statistics and indices that measure inflation, employment |

|restructuring, trade flows, capital investment rates, currency stability, and export linkages point to some level of success in changing the course of |

|development in Latin America for the better. Globalization advocates rely on these statistics as evidence that the policies of neoliberal restructuring |

|are working and that the short-term development pain experienced by millions across the region will give way ultimately to long-term development gain. |

|Globalization critics argue that the macroeconomic or global indices of success mask the serious local upheaval (the socio-economic earthquakes and |

|volcanic eruptions) suffered by the region's majority and that the short-term 17 socioeconomic pain afflicting the majority of Latin Americans will give|

|way to long-term entrenched development pain. To paraphrase once again Brecher and Costello's (1994) argument, is Latin America integrating into the |

|global village or is the region fast becoming a victim of global pillage? |

|Globalization policies have accentuated the socioeconomic importance of the primary city or city-region in each Latin American country, with the |

|consequence that most gains in labor productivity, economic growth, technology improvements, and employment restructuring have occurred in the core |

|area. Beyond the core region, development prosperity under the conditions of globalization has been linked to the ability of a region or community to |

|attract capital, to produce goods for the export market, and to offer a comparative advantage in the cost of labor. Those regions without this ability |

|have suffered economic stagnation, labor losses, capital shrinkage, and further national and regional isolation. Yet as Gwynne and Kay (2004:21) point |

|out, it is most often ‘at the regional and local scales of analysis that the impacts of globalization can best be seen in terms of changing social |

|relations’ and in terms of sustainable development. Regional economies and societies are an aggregation of the competitive advantages and economic |

|destinies of individual localities and, as such, are critical collectives of interdependent socioeconomic activities (Scott, 1998). Therefore, the |

|immediate policy task for Latin America countries ought to be a clearer democratic articulation of the social, political, and economic development goals|

|that need to be achieved at the regional and local level within the broader context of globalization policies. This requires a set of transparent |

|institutional structures that can cooperate on, coordinate, and integrate the type of strategic planning needed to articulate the global with the local |

|and to allow all of Latin America's disparate regions and countries to benefit fully from globalization. Failure to establish this type of framework for|

|regional and local development likely will result in further damage to the socio-economic landscape as a consequence of globalization's ‘earthquakes and|

|volcanic eruptions.’ Moreover, it will further deepen the problem of lagging development that today restricts millions of Latin Americans from achieving|

|their full life potential. |

|A key theme that emerges from this discussion of Latin America's engagement with globalization is that, in many instances, the ‘global’ seems to have |

|overwhelmed the ‘local’ completely as a framework or context for socio-economic policymaking. As the ideologies and technologies of globalization link |

|governments, planners, and the elite more closely to the global community, they tend to disarticulate these same groups from the local concerns of |

|people and communities. Thus, in order to rethink the broader development implications of globalization and to restructure the ways in which |

|globalization forces affect the socio-economic landscape, governments, planners, and the elite must move towards a conceptualization of sustainable |

|development that merges the global and the local in the policy-making process. Merging the two frames of reference into one can be termed |

|‘glocalization’ or a global-local approach to policymaking, and the broader analytical context for this approach should be regional in nature. In other |

|words, policymakers should move away from a conceptualization of national development that sees the socio-economic landscape as homogenous within the |

|global system to a conceptualization of national development that treats the socio-economic landscape as regionally based, heterogeneous, and imbued |

|with local conditions and contradictions. |

|Finally, we need to rethink the meta-theoretical framework of globalization in policy formation because the use of the term has become problematic and |

|value-laden, and it carries powerful ideologies that tend to refocus societies and economies outward toward a broader context. Glocalization, in |

|contrast, recognizes the wider spatial forces of development and change, but also 18 focuses on the local implications and adaptations. This concept of |

|linking the global and the local conceptually and empirically – thinking globally and acting locally – has been in the lexicon of academics and others |

|for many years, yet it seems to have diverted attention away from actually acting locally because the global has become so overwhelming. The issues |

|presented in this paper suggest that the concept be rephrased to ‘thinking locally within a global framework, while acting globally within a local |

|framework.’ Such an approach may well help Latin Americans to structure the forces of globalization in a more positive and proactive manner for people, |

|communities, and places. |

|Bibliography |

| |

Text #4 L’Agenda 21 Île de La Réunion–octobre 2003

Remind students as a group that in order to address the question in the problematic, we have a table of indicators to decide for each document whether that document mirrors priorities to neoliberal/global/American influences or if it mirrors truly sustainable development policies.

Ask students to copy the « indicators » table from their handouts.

Students as a group will listen to the presentation of the panel/speaker and his/her interpretation sustainable development vs. Americanization. A debate should thus start.

Ask the student in charge of the presentation to do a “commentaire de texte” using and organizing concepts from the document and in his/her conclusion give an answer to the question inn the problematic: sustainable development or Americanization?

L’Agenda 21 Île de La Réunion–octobre 2003[3]



PREAMBULE

Qu’est-ce que le développement durable ?

"Le développement durable est un développement qui répond aux besoins du présent sans compromettre la capacité des générations futures à répondre aux leurs." Rapport de la Commission Mondiale sur l'Environnement et le Développement (Commission Brundtland)

Une démarche globale intégrant les trois piliers du développement durable : le social, l’économique, l’environnement.

C’est une démarche permettant de conjuguer au mieux les objectifs d’équité sociale, d’efficacité économique et de préservation de l’environnement, qui en fonction des enjeux du territoire, prend en compte ces trois composantes pour une définition équilibrée des besoins.

[…]

Concept du développement durable

En 1992, la Conférence Mondiale de Rio sur l’Environnement et le Développement a adopté le Programme Action 21. Celui-ci préconise la mise en place d'Agendas 21, plans d'actions en faveur d'un développement durable pour le XXIe siècle, et met en évidence le rôle essentiel des autorités locales dans l'éducation, la mobilisation et la participation du public en faveur d’un développement durable. [glocalization]

QU’EST CE QU’UN AGENDA 21 LOCAL ?

C’est un projet de développement durable à l’échelle d’un territoire [against deterritorialization - cultural resistance], qui correspond d’une part à une démarche basée sur la concertation et le partenariat des acteurs du territoire et d’autre part à la réalisation d’un programme d’actions qui répond aux principes du développement durable :

=>objectifs d'équité sociale, d'efficacité économique, d'amélioration de l'environnement, de démocratisation des modes de prise de décision, de gestion et de contrôle (gouvernance) ;

=>principes de solidarité dans le temps et dans l'espace, de transversalité et de globalité, de participation, principe de précaution [globalization>modialisation] et enfin, principe de subsidiarité qui demande à traiter les problèmes au plus près de l'endroit où ils se posent.

=>défis de conciliation du long terme et du court terme, de partage des choix par l'ensemble de la société, des citoyens aux acteurs politiques, économiques et sociaux.

L’AGENDA 21 DE L’ILE DE LA REUNION

Objectif de la démarche : une gestion durable de l’île

L’Agenda 21 doit être un guide de bonnes pratiques pour les organismes désirant s’engager dans une démarche de développement durable. Il repose sur un processus d’amélioration continue et ne constitue donc pas un document figé. Il doit pouvoir être modelé en fonction du contexte et des enjeux du territoire. Il ne veut pas être « un document de plus », mais aboutir à une validation partagée d'orientations stratégiques et d’actions concrètes liées aux différentes thématiques du développement durable.

L’Agenda 21 de la Réunion doit ainsi permettre de définir à long terme des orientations et des choix politiques pour une gestion plus durable du territoire réunionnais. Il s’agit de faire adhérer le plus grand nombre de Réunionnais au concept de développement durable de l'île.

Historique de l’Agenda 21 de l’île de la Réunion

=>Juillet 2001 un comité technique réunit des membres des Conseil Régional, Conseil Général, DIREN, DDE, Association des Maires, Conseil de la Culture, de l’Education et de l’Environnement, Conseil Economique et Social Régional.

=>En Septembre 2001, les Journées Agenda 21 prédéfinissent l’Agenda 21 de la Réunion. Etape essentielle, elles permettent de sensibiliser les élus, les services de la Région et les partenaires concernés aux problématiques de développement durable.

=>Février 2002 : les 1es Rencontres Réunionnaises du Développement Durable, officialisent le lancement de l’Agenda 21 de la Réunion et réunissent plus de 400 personnalités publiques, privées et associatives, représentatives du milieu économique, social et environnemental pour réfléchir sur le développement durable de l’île. L’Etat, le Conseil Général, l’Association des Maires de la Réunion, le Conseil de la Culture, de l’Education et de l’Environnement, le Conseil Economique et Social Régional et le Conseil Régional signent une déclaration par laquelle ils s’engagent « à mettre en œuvre ensemble un Agenda 21 local et à promouvoir, dans les politiques dont ils ont la charge, un développement durable ».[Locality]

__ Première série d’ateliers rassemblant 120 personnes de secteurs très divers autour de cinq thématiques jugées prioritaires :

Energie ; Habitat, construction et cadre de vie ; Déplacements ; Education relative au développement durable ; Développement économique, cohésion sociale et métiers de l’environnement.

__ Présentation plénière en août 2002 de l’ensemble des travaux des ateliers. Validation du travail engagé et choix d’axes d’orientations stratégiques..

La démarche d’Agenda 21 est élargie aux chambres consulaires (Chambre des Métiers,

Chambre d’Agriculture, Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie) permettant ainsi une représentativité globale de l’ensemble des acteurs réunionnais.

__ De février à novembre 2003, de nouveaux groupes de travail se mettent en place et se réunissent environ toutes les trois semaines afin de définir des actions en faveur du développement durable.

__ Comité de pilotage juillet 2003 : point d’étape dans le travail des ateliers et présentation des objectifs aux institutions signataires de l’Agenda 21. Cette présentation a permis aux institutions signataires d’amorcer une phase de validation des orientations engagée dans les ateliers.

__ Comité de pilotage en novembre 2003 : validation, hiérarchisation des fiches actions par les institutions signataires et identification des porteurs de projets.

__ Signature de l’Agenda 21 en décembre 2003, marquant ainsi l’engagement des signataires à la mise en œuvre les principes et actions pour le développement durable de l’île.

Méthodologie de l’Agenda 21 de la Réunion

Le point de départ de la démarche a été une concertation [Conciliation]ayant aboutie à la définition d’un diagnostic partagé.

Quelque 200 personnes, issues de la société civile, d’entreprises privées, d’administrations, d’établissements publics, du monde associatif, etc., ont participé aux ateliers, permettant la définition d’orientations et d’actions dans un objectif de promouvoir le développement durable. La Charte Agenda 21 de la Réunion sera donc le résultat d’une initiative participative et partenariale [people’s control over their lives and environment]

Six ateliers thématiques ont été retenus :

=>Habitat, construction et cadre de vie

=>Déplacements

=>Energie

=>Développement économique, cohésion sociale et métiers de l’environnement

=>Education relative au développement durable

=>Codéveloppement durable

EDUCATION RELATIVE AU DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE [environmental education]

Un réel développement durable n’est possible que si chaque Réunionnais se sent individuellement responsable de son environnement et se comporte en conséquence [Consumer culture]. Cette démarche intellectuelle passe par une éducation à l’environnement (au sens large), à la valeur du patrimoine naturel réunionnais, à la gestion rationnelle de nos consommations, etc. Ces notions sont à instiller au plus tôt, dès l’école, en tenant compte des spécificités culturelles locales [cultural resistance to sustainable development, not Americanization/neoliberalism, globalization]. Mais cette sensibilisation ne doit pas s’arrêter à l’école. Elle passe également par l’éducation populaire, indispensable à la prise de conscience des citoyens, et par la responsabilisation des élus et des décisionnaires. C’est donc un véritable plan de formation adapté aux Réunionnais [cultural singularity] qu’envisage cet atelier.

Les objectifs principaux de l’atelier sont les suivants :

=>Convaincre que la protection de l’environnement est compatible avec les politiques de développement. [environmental education]

=>Promouvoir une gestion rationnelle des consommations et faire émerger, dans l’esprit de chaque consommateur, la notion de « coût écologique ». [environmental education]

=>Soutenir les actions intégrant le développement durable, et généraliser les initiatives positive dans ce sens, pour une réelle efficacité.

=>Faire connaître la réglementation et la faire comprendre par tous.

=>Répression : là où éducation et sensibilisation ne suffisent pas, les comportements inciviques doivent être sanctionnés.

Les participants à l’atelier sont conscients que l’information ne suffit pas à induire des changements de comportements. C’est pourquoi il est important de mettre en place un faisceau de communication et d’utiliser plusieurs « armes » pour un même objectif.

La plate-forme du développement durable

La création d’une plate-forme du développement durable, déjà évoquée lors des rencontres de juillet 2002, est le pivot de toutes les actions envisagées par l’atelier Education au développement durable. L’idée consiste à créer un centre de ressources, d’information, de formation, de conseil, de partenariat et d’échanges sur le développement durable. Outil précieux pour tous les acteurs intéressés par le sujet, et en particulier les éducateurs, [environmental education]cet espace rassemblerait notamment les nombreux supports pédagogiques existant sur le thème, actuellement éparpillés. Il servirait de lieu de rencontre et de mise en relation pour tous les partenaires concernés et pourrait constituer une « base de lancement » de projets multiples.

Travail en direction de publics-cibles

L’atelier a déterminé, à titre d’exemple, plusieurs publics-cibles en direction desquels construire des objectifs de formation ou/et de communication. L’objectif de la réflexion consistait à cerner les besoins et les attentes de ces différents publics, afin de concevoir les contenus de formation correspondants. Quatre publics-cibles ont ainsi été étudiés :

=>Formation initiale : enfants de 2 à 7 ans.

=>Formation initiale : enfants de 11 à 14 ans.

=>Formation professionnelle : formation de formateurs.

=>Insertion : les CIA.

DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE, COHESION SOCIALE ET METIERS DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT

La situation économique de la Réunion est particulière à la fois dynamique et difficile. La Réunion affiche un dynamisme économique important [free enterprise] avec une croissance annuelle de 6%, mais elle est touchée par un taux de chômage dépassant la barre des 30 %. Ce groupe part du constat qu’il y a à la Réunion : :

=>741 000 habitants

=>430 000 personnes relevant de la CMU[4]

=>65 000 Rmistes

=>311 000 habitants au revenu >550 euros /mois

Un projet de développement durable est d’autant plus important que l’on se trouve dans cette situation de « fracture sociale ». [polarization]

Priorité à l’emploi

Le mot d’ordre adopté par cet atelier est donc « Priorité à l’emploi ». Divers leviers ont été identifiés pour créer des emplois dans le domaine du développement durable :

=>La volonté politique : elle doit impulser une réflexion concertée, permettre de recenser les activités d’accompagnement social à développer, démontrer que les secteurs de l’environnement et de l’énergie renouvelable peuvent être créateurs d’emplois (ex. : écotourisme).

=>La participation citoyenne : il faut sensibiliser et impliquer la population et les décideurs dans les projets de développement durable, notamment par la mise en place d’Agenda 21 au niveau micro-local. [Democracy] [Local democracy] [locality]

=>L’incitation financière : mise en évidence de la plus-value des projets respectueux du développement durable, mesures incitatives (ex. défiscalisation). [Profit]

Convaincus qu’il existe tout un gisement d’emplois non exploité dans le secteur de la micro-activité et de la micro-entreprise, les participants ont défini une ligne d’action intitulée « Stimuler les très petites, petites et moyennes entreprises », avec notamment pour objectif spécifique d’ aider et structurer le développement local à travers une microéconomie de loisirs et de tourisme durables .

Développer les filières et métiers du développement durable

Les participants ont défini une ligne d’action intitulée « Promouvoir l’environnement comme créateur d’emplois et de cohésion sociale » dans laquelle figure un objectif spécifique formulé ainsi : « Développer les filières et métiers du développement durable ». Il s’agit d’ouvrir l’éventail de ces métiers le plus largement possible, et notamment au domaine de l’accompagnement social. [Social justice]

La réflexion sur les métiers du développement durable s’étant élargie à tous les ateliers, les fruits de cette réflexion seront exposés ci-dessous dans un chapitre spécifiquement consacré à ce sujet et intitulé « Les métiers du développement durable ».

Cohésion sociale et développement économique

Un débat s’est instauré au sein de l’atelier sur la place accordée à la problématique de l’environnement. Certains participants ont exprimé une frustration face à la place, à leurs yeux trop large, de cet aspect dans les travaux, au détriment de l’économique et du social. [Development] [Compromise with corporations] La cohésion sociale et le développement économique apparaissent comme des finalités pour cet atelier. Le travail sur les filières et métiers du développement durable constitue un objectif opérationnel, une action pour y parvenir.

Sensibilisation et conscientisation

L’atelier a souligné la nécessité de faire prendre conscience aux Réunionnais de leur environnement et de la place qu’ils y occupent. [Environmental education] Le secteur marchand doit aussi faire l’objet d’un travail de sensibilisation important.

D’où la définition de l’objectif spécifique « Encourager les entreprises à intégrer la notion de durabilité dans leur stratégie de développement ». Les participants ont émis l’idée qu’une partie de la taxe professionnelle soit consacrée au développement durable. En matière de pollution, ils souhaitent que soit appliqué le principe « pollueur/payeur ». Une taxe doit cependant avoir vocation dissuasive et ne pas être assimilée au paiement d’un « permis de polluer ». Dans le même esprit, afin de prévenir la pollution, il conviendrait de cesser l’importation de futurs déchets, tels les sachets en plastique. [Environmental concern]

En ce qui concerne la part des touristes à l’effort de développement durable, il a été suggéré d’instaurer une taxe d’aéroport destinée à financer ce type de développement dans l’île. Les touristes venant à la Réunion sont sensibles au « tourisme vert » : l’utilisation de cette taxe devra donc être explicitée et les résultats rendus visibles (actuellement, les touristes ne sont pas satisfaits de l’entretien de l’environnement à la Réunion).

HABITAT, CONSTRUCTION ET CADRE DE VIE

En matière de logement, la Réunion se trouve dans une situation d’urgence, notamment, à court terme, en ce qui concerne le logement insalubre. Les premières interrogations de cet atelier ont été les suivantes :

Quel habitat à l’horizon 2020 ? Quel défi pour l’aménagement du territoire ?

Face à la pénurie de logements et à l’exiguïté de l’espace constructible disponible, l’atelier insiste sur la nécessité de rendre le logement collectif plus attractif.

L’indispensable concertation

La cohésion sociale s’est révélée pour les participants à cet atelier un pilier fondamental dans une optique de développement durable. Une démarche participative envers la population apparaît indispensable. [Conciliation] Afin d’éviter les problèmes sociaux, qui découlent souvent d’une mauvaise concertation préalable, [Cultural resistance] il convient de favoriser l’appropriation en amont des projets de construction et de réhabilitation. Dans un objectif de qualité de la vie, il est nécessaire de prendre en compte les habitudes de vie des habitants. [Cultural resistance] La modification du code de l’urbanisme et l’introduction des PLU (Plans Locaux Urbains) intègrent cette participation [Local democracy] en théorie. Mais celle-ci ne se décrète pas, elle se met en oeuvre dans la durée et le long terme. Ce n’est pas seulement de la communication.

Une approche globale de partage du territoire

La pénurie de logements à la Réunion doit être traitée par une approche globale de partage du territoire. Entre Logement et Aménagement du territoire, l’Urbanisme, apparaît comme le maillon essentiel et trop souvent négligé. Le système d’organisation de l’espace est à revoir, car il n’est pas question de réitérer les erreurs du passé : à savoir construire des logements sociaux sans équipements de quartier. La facilité d’accès (existence, proximité) de services, publics ou non, doit être garantie. [Social justice]

Démarche « Habitats 21 »

Cette approche globale exige une nouvelle façon de travailler, un changement d’habitudes. [emergence of ‘hybrid’ cultural identities] Deux axes de travail ont été identifiés :

=>déterminer ce qu’est le développement durable en terme de processus

=>faire en sorte que ce processus devienne un élément incontournable de la production d’habitat.

Il est donc envisagé de proposer une démarche de travail aux responsables qui valident les projets d’habitat et de construction au sens large. Cette démarche doit prendre en compte le développement durable par un processus, composé d’étapes précises. Elle doit en outre permettre aux critères d’évoluer avec le temps. L’une de ses règles de base consiste à aller audelà du besoin apparent.

Ce projet de processus est baptisé « Habitats 21 ».

L’atelier souligne l’importance de la volonté politique en la matière. Se pose alors la question de l’engagement des décisionnaires. Toute réflexion sur l’aménagement passe par les communes, les aménageurs sociaux et les aménageurs privés. Si les signataires de l’Agenda 21, et notamment les communes, s’engagent tous dans cette démarche, cela est déjà encourageant.

Contexte national :

Extrait du programme d’action de la stratégie nationale du développement durable, titre II PROGRAMME D’ACTION LE CITOYEN, ACTEUR DU DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE

I.D. Faciliter la participation du citoyen au débat public

Objectif : développer le nombre de débats publics d’ampleur nationale et les expériences

au niveau local

Entre autre - élaborer des guides à l’attention des services déconcentrés, des maîtres d’ouvrage, des élus et des associations, afin de leur donner des repères pour conduire une bonne concertation. [Local democracy] [Conciliation]

I.C.3. développer la prise en compte du développement durable dans la formation professionnelle

Objectif 3 : développer les actions de formation des architectes en faveur du développement durable

plan d’actions :

entre autres :

- initier des formations continues au développement durable de longue durée pour les professionnels confirmés qui souhaitent s’y impliquer et mettre en place des stages courts et fréquents pour les jeunes architectes ;

- négocier avec les différents acteurs les modalités de certification de ces formations (association HQE - haute qualité environnementale -, centre scientifique et technique du bâtiment - CSTB -, association Qualitel), pour obtenir une meilleure reconnaissance par les maîtres d’ouvrage.

• indicateurs de suivi : nombre d’actions de formation organisées par an, nombre de personnes ayant suivi une formation par an.

TITRES III PROGRAMME D’ACTIONS TERRITOIRES

I.D.2. réduire ces inégalités : engager la rénovation urbaine pour améliorer les conditions d’habitat et d’environnement dans les quartiers prioritaires

Objectif : intégrer dans le programme de rénovation urbaine l’objectif d’un haut niveau de qualité en terme de développement durable.

ENERGIE

Les participants à cet atelier soulignent, que la problématique de l’énergie propre constitue une base-clé d’une politique volontariste de développement durable. La politique de maîtrise de l’énergie existe à la Réunion, mais beaucoup reste à faire : la consommation énergétique va encore augmenter avec la croissance technologique [Technology] et il est difficile de prévoir les besoins. Afin de préserver notre confort sans mettre en danger les équilibres écologiques, [Environmental concern] l’atelier préconise un recours massif aux énergies renouvelables, lié à l’autonomisation énergétique des logements et un développement de la domotique. Une première réflexion insiste sur la nécessité de sensibiliser le grand public aux économies d’énergie, [Environmental education] à la fois par la communication, par une tarification progressive et par la réglementation. [Environmental legislation]

Très vite, cet atelier se définit un objectif central : viser l’indépendance énergétique de la Réunion. Cela suppose que la Réunion se donne les moyens du 100% énergies renouvelables [Radical Environmentalism (deep ecology)] et supprime donc, à terme, le recours aux énergies fossiles. Il s’agit notamment de développer et assurer la pérennité des filières de production d’énergie renouvelables, de sécuriser la production et la distribution de l’énergie, de lutter contre les nuisances liées à la consommation d’énergie. Par ailleurs, un autre objectif essentiel consiste à maîtriser les consommations d’énergie notamment celles liées aux déplacements.

DEPLACEMENTS

[…]

CODEVELOPPEMENT

Un séminaire de juillet 2002 sur le codéveloppement durable, a servi de base au travail de cet atelier.

Des spécificités contraignantes

Les participants ont très vite souligné les difficultés à mettre en place des actions de codéveloppement dans la zone océan Indien. Ils en ont identifié certaines causes à caractère institutionnel :

__Le statut spécifique de la Réunion, Région Ultra-Périphérique de l’Union Européenne dans un ensemble constitué de pays ACP. [Polarization (e.g. gap between rich and poor)]

__La difficulté qui en découle, pour les ressortissants des pays voisins, à obtenir des visas et à circuler librement.

__Le coût prohibitif des transports aériens inter-îles.

L’atelier codéveloppement a donc souhaité, en préambule, demander aux élus réunionnais de travailler sur ces contraintes, afin d’une part de faciliter l’octroi de visas pour les étrangers issus de la zone, d’autre part de faire baisser de manière significative les coûts des billets d’avion.

L’indispensable connaissance de l’autre

Les différences culturelles [Cultural identity] et la mauvaise connaissance de l’autre [Otherness] ont été identifiées comme une importante cause de la difficulté à mener des actions de codéveloppement dans la zone. Le codéveloppement doit répondre aux besoins des populations, aussi est-il essentiel de mieux connaître celles-ci pour trouver des passerelles communes et réaliser des projets de codéveloppement. [Multiculturalism] [National identity] L’atelier a donc listé des actions concourrant à une meilleure connaissance des pays de l’océan Indien : [Interculturality]

Pistes d’actions supplémentaires dans le cadre d’une meilleure connaissance de l’autre :

__Favoriser les modules Océan Indien dans les formation universitaires,

de l’existant : anthropologie, histoire comparée, centre d’étude de recherche en géopolitique de l’OI.

__Enseignement des langues de l’Océan Indien

Contexte : il y a une demande pour l’apprentissage des langues de l’Océan Indien.

2 volets sont proposés :

- Enseignement des langues de l’Océan Indien pour un public d’étudiant

- Enseignement des langues pour un public de non étudiants (avec une délocalisation des lieux

d’enseignement) [Interculturality]

__Recherche sur les langues de l’Océan Indien, les traditions et la sociologie dans les pays de la zone

Ce point a été évoqué lors des assises de la recherche

Acteur potentiel : l’Université de l’Océan Indien ; Autre acteur oeuvrant dans ce domaine : l’ILA [Interculturality]

__Favoriser les échange d’étudiants dans la zone Océan Indien

Faire un bilan des conventions universitaires qui permettent des échanges d’étudiants [Interculturality]

Etablir si les conventions de coopérations régionales ont un volet échanges d’étudiants

Présentation des objectifs des ateliers de l’Agenda 21 et des fiches actions en cours –octobre 2003 17

__________________________________________________

Ebauche de plan de commentaire

Moderate environmental concern

Obvious concern for social justice

Economic concern underpins the whole discourse in fact and suddenly reappears at times.

Multicultural concern : interculturality

Pro-sustainable development, interculturality but no cultural hybridization

Session 4 – Madagascar - Safe Water System

A reminder : the problematic and its tables applied to the two previous documents

Using the tables, would you consider “Slouching Toward Johannesburg”

inspired mostly by neoliberalism or by sustainable development (economic development - environmental protection - social justice) or by some other ideology?

(Teacher’s guess :mainstream environmentalism)

Using the tables, would you consider « L’Agenda 21- La Réunion–octobre 2003 »

inspired mostly by neoliberalism or by sustainable development (economic development - environmental protection - social justice) ?

(Teachers’ guess : truly « sutainable development » with strong local features (unemployment - transportation - .)

We shall now apply the problematic and its tables to the following documents :

Text #5 Safe Water System in Madagascar

Safe Water System in Madagascar

. Accessed January 26th, 2005.

Safe Water System

[last updated January 13, 2004 10:46 AM]

[…]

Partners:

Lead partners denoted by bold italics

Governments:

* Government of United States of America - Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC)

* Government of United States of America - HHS Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

* Government of Japan - JICA

* Government of Bolivia - Ministry of Health

* Government of Ecuador - Ministry of Health

* Government of Zambia - Ministry of Health

* Government of United Republic of Tanzania - Ministry of Health

* Government of Rwanda - Ministry of Health

* Government of Kenya - Ministry of Health

* Government of Madagascar - Ministry of Health

* Government of India - Ministry of Health

* Government of Lao People's Democratic Republic - Ministry of Health

* Government of Uganda - Ministry of Health

* Government of Malawi - Ministry of Health

* Government of Afghanistan - Ministry of Health; Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development

* Government of United States of America - USAID

Major Groups:

* Population Services International (PSI) (United States of America)

* Bristol Meyers Squibb (United States of America)

* CARE (United States of America)

* Catholic Relief Services (Madagascar)

* Centre National de Recherches sur le Environnement (Madagascar)

* Centro Nacional de Enfermedades Tropicales (Bolivia)

* Emory University School of Public Health (United States of America)

* Equipment and Systems Engineering, Inc. (United States of America)

* Instituto Nacional de Laboratorios de Salud (Bolivia)

* Jet Chemicals, Ltd. (Nairobi) (Kenya)

* Max Chemicals (India)

* Medical University of South Carolina (United States of America)

* Megapak (South Africa)

* Pan American Health Org. (PAHO) (United States of America)

* Procter and Gamble Company (United States of America)

* Project Concern International (Bolivia)

* Rotary International (United States of America)

* SFOI (Madagascar)

* Simba Plastics, Ltd. (United Republic of Tanzania)

* SulfoRwanda (Rwanda)

* Tarmal Industries, Ltd. (United Republic of Tanzania)

* Tropical Disease Research Center (Zambia)

* Univ. of North Carolina School of Public Health (United States of America) [American sense of (global) mission]

UN System

* UNICEF (United States of America)

* WHO (Switzerland)

Other intergovernmental organizations:

Other

* Aga Khan University (Pakistan)

* Coca Cola Foundation (United States of America)

* Millipore Foundation (United States of America)

* Universidad Mayor de San Andres (Bolivia) [Globalization]

Thematic Focus:

Primary Themes:

* Health and sustainable development[Sustainable development]

* Water

Secondary Themes:

* Poverty eradication [Development]

Geographic Coverage:

Geographic Scope: Global [Globalization]

Country(ies) where the partnership is being implemented:

Kenya, Nepal, Bolivia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Guatemala, Zambia, Afghanistan, Haiti, Pakistan, Madagascar, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Peru, United Republic of Tanzania, India, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Rwanda

[…]

Goals and Objectives

Summary of the partnership's goals and objectives:

The main objective of this partnership is to reduce diarrheal diseases in children under 5 years old and other vulnerable populations through provision of locally-produced water disinfectant, safe water storage containers, and behavior change techniques directed towards improved hygiene. [Cultural impact]

The goal of providing piped, treated water for all is desirable, but will take considerable resources and time to achieve. While this goal is being pursued, innovative, practical, interim solutions are needed to provide underserved populations with safe water in a more timely fashion. To address this need, the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO) developed a household-based water quality intervention that employs simple, easily disseminated technology. [Technology]The basis of the intervention, which is called the Safe Water System (SWS), is:

| treatment of contaminated water with locally-produced sodium hypochlorite solution;

| safe water storage in plastic containers with a narrow mouth to reduce the risk of water being touched and contaminated;

| behavior change techniques, including social marketing and community mobilization.

[…]

Capacity-Building and Technology Transfer

Arrangements for Capacity-Building and Technology Transfer:

* Human resources development/training

* Education/building awareness

* Technology transfer/exchange [Technology]

Every effort will be made to produce Safe Water System products locally and the private sector will be employed for distribution, [Free enterprise]which will ensure that the country takes ownership of the project [people’s control over their lives and environment]. Virtually all the project personnel will be local and will receive training in the causes and prevention of diarrhea, and the appropriate use of the Safe Water System. [Agenda 21 - Promoting health] Whenever possible, local universities will be used for monitoring and evaluation activities, which will include training on program evaluation. Attempts will be made to publish lessons learned in the public health literature, which will facilitate transmission of knowledge gained and provide opportunities for local students to learn the skill of scientific writing. [Western cultural imperialism]

[..]

Relationship to International Agreements on Sustainable Development [Sustainable development]

How the partnership contributes to the implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, and the Johannesburg Plan of ImplementationAgenda 21]

The Safe Water System project is relevant to Agenda 21, Chapter 6, paragraphs 6.10, 6.12 (e), 6.13, and 6.41 (c). Safe Water System projects are by nature voluntary and involve an array of partners [Multilateralism] from private, NGO, and public sectors, and UN and academic organizations. [Agenda 21 - Strengthening the Role of children and youth, women, NGOs, local authorities, business and workers] The projects are most successful when there is active participation by all partners. The World Summit on Sustainable Development offers a unique opportunity for Safe Water System projects to be initiated in new countries, increasing the number of partners [Multilateralism] , and increasing the funding available to expand the project into new regions of the world. The Safe Water System employs an integrative approach characterized by: local production of the interventions, which generates employment; the elimination of the need for boiling water, which is an expensive and often environmentally damaging practice (e.g., when trees are cut down for wood to boil water); a social marketing approach, which activates the private sector for product distribution and generates income; and a community mobilization process, which encourages active participation and ownership of the project. By providing a short- to medium-term solution to the water quality problem, the Safe Water System fills in a service gap in many developing countries.

Coordination and Implementation

[…]

Implementation Mechanism of the Partnership:

In each country, funding would result in the initiation of a social marketing project that would utilize the commercial sector (neighborhood kiosks, stores, pharmacies, supermarkets) [ Global market system], health facilities, and schools as platforms for promoting and distributing the Safe Water System products. The products would be branded and advertised, [Global market system ] and would have a low price so as to be affordable to most people.

The social marketing process would result in widespread, decentralized access to the products. A community mobilization process would be employed to increase participation of target populations [people’s control over their lives and environment] and would be expected to increase product adoption in target communities. Past projects have sold 200,000 to 500,000 bottles of disinfectant solution in the first year. Donors to the project will be encouraged to provide funding for evaluations, which will permit the measurement of product adoption and health impact.

Many multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations are involved in the water and sanitation development sector. [Multilateralism] [Agenda 21 - Promoting health] There are ample opportunities for the Safe Water System to link with ongoing activities. In fact the Safe Water System has been successfully implemented in several countries in partnership with NGOs such as PSI and CARE. In Kenya, the Safe Water System is a component of CARE's ongoing water and sanitation development projects.

Resources

Funding Currently Available:

Amount in US$: 1,200,000 [American cultural hegemony]

Source(s): Government

Presently, USAID is funding a new project in Afghanistan and PSI has funded a project in Malawi that commenced in November 2002. PSI will fund a project in Kenya in 2003 and in Nigeria in late 2003 or early 2004.

Past donors of SWS projects have included USAID, UNICEF, Rotary, NIH, CDC, and a variety of private sector partners, NGOs, and foundations. An effort will be made to obtain funding from new sources for additional projects.

Non-financial resources available:

Type(s): Computers - Office space - Staff

Source(s): Government - NGO

CDC, Population Services International, and CARE provide these resources both at their home offices in the United States, but also in project countries. [Deterritorializing media and communications technologies]

Funding Sought:

Required Amount in US$: 30,000,000

Source(s) already approached:The money is being sought to initiate and/or expand projects in 20 countries. A variety of foundations, multilateral and bilateral donors are being approaches.

Non-financial resources sought:

Requirement(s):

Source(s) approached and details:

Additional Information

Additional Relevant Information

Additional partnerships with other NGOs, private sector companies, donor agencies, foundations, and research institutions are desired.

Strategic partnerships with Ministries of Health of other developing nations are sought. [Multilateralism]

Intergovernmental organizations: Partnerships with intergovernmental organizations are desired to facilitate region-wide projects that would share costs. [Multilateralism]

Other: Private sector organizations that seek to mobilize resources to improve water quality are desired as partners [Agenda 21 - Strengthening the Role of … business and workers]

Background

In 2002, just 10 years after the end of the International Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, the lack of access to safe water remains a problem for well over a billion people in the developing world. Annually, 2 to 3 million children less than 5 years old die of diarrheal diseases, a large proportion of which are acquired through exposure to contaminated water. In addition, after 41 years, the 7th pandemic of cholera continues unabated, claiming a high percentage of lives of children and adults who acquire the disease. There are a number of reasons for the persistence of these problems despite the investment of tens of billions of dollars in safe water by donor agencies and governments. Population shifts from rural to urban areas[global population movements] have stressed existing water and sanitary infrastructure and exceeded the capacity of most countries to keep up with demand. Large population dislocations [global population movements] caused by armed conflict and natural disasters have created enormous logistical problems in providing water and sanitation services. The dispersed populations and poor transportation infrastructure in many rural areas present substantial logistical barriers to the provision of water and sanitation services. Inadequate maintenance of wells, pumps, water treatment plants and distribution systems has led to failures of technology. Even when the technology is functioning, most populations with access to improved water sources must transport water and store it in the home, which raises the risk of contamination of the water and, consequently, of exposure to disease-causing pathogens.

Comments

Fully Agenda 21 ; but shows dominance of the US in the Project for obvious diplomatic reasons : after Jo’burg’s American fiasco, the Safe Water project combining the involvement of private sector and NGOs and local governments (democracy) is much in keeping with neoconservative foreign policy.

Session 5 — Madagascar

Text #6 Antananarivo Declaration

Antananarivo Declaration

. Accessed 3 August 2005.

African Mountains and Highlands

Declaration of Antananarivo

RECOGNISING

that African mountains and highlands are relatively favourable areas with high population densities compared to mountains outside Africa and to lowland areas, deserts or rain forests in Africa, and that they therefore occupy a central position in tropical eco-regions; that a relatively high level of natural biodiversity has been preserved in relict areas of these mountains;

that African mountains and highlands provide favourable natural resource bases and climatic conditions;

that mountains are important water towers for rivers which represent the potential to irrigate highland and lowland areas in many parts of Africa;

that mountains are a tourist attraction due to their spectacular natural. and cultural landscapes; that mountains may serve as sensitive indicators of global climatic and environmental change; that people living in African highlands represent a pool of knowledge relating to mountain resource management; [cultural singularity]

CONCERNED

that in major resource areas African mountains and highlands are fragile ecosystems; that severe degradation has occurred, and is occurring due to agriculture, livestock production, forestry and mining; [Environmental concern]

that a long history of agricultural traditions and a small range of options under subsistence systems have increased the vulnerability of African land users to food insecurity and eventual famine; [Environmental concern]

that a high portion of the population of African highland areas is employed in the primary sector and suffers from weak economies;

that inappropriate technological development [Technology] and a low level of resource use efficiency at the farm level have further weakened local economic development; that the economic and political frameworks for sustainable mountain development are insufficient; [Sustainable development]

that road access, social infrastructure, utilization of existing knowledge bases and education need to be enhanced;

ENCOURAGED

that a specific chapter of Agenda 21 of the UN Conference on Environment and Development was devoted to mountains and highlands at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit; that an informal group of researchers and policy leaders formed an active global group called "Mountain Agenda" in 1991; [Agenda 21]

that an African Inter-governmental Consultation on Sustainable Mountain Development took place in Addis Abeba in 1996 and resulted in a series of recommendations; that a specific association called "African Mountains Association" was founded in 1986, and four consecutive international workshops have been held on mountain problems and opportunities since that date; [Multilateralism]

that mountain research and development support has been obtained for African and international institutions to work in mountainous environments; that individuals, governments and NGOs have done much to promote sustainable use of mountain resources; [Multilateralism] [Sustainable development]

THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP OF THE AFRICAN MOUNTAINS ASSOCIATION, HELD IN ANTANANARIVO, MADAGASCAR, FROM 26 MAY TO 1 JUNE 1997, ENDORSED THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONCERTED ACTION FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL LEVELS

ENHANCE SUSTAINABLE AFRICAN MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT BY [Sustainable development]

ensuring that conservation of natural and cultural biodiversity and other natural resources be realised; [Environmental concern] [Cultural identity] [Cultural resistance]

enhancing sustainable land management and economic development through multi-level stakeholder involvement and participatory approaches; [Agenda 21 - Integrating environment and development into decision-making] supporting poverty alleviation Agenda 21 - Combating poverty]and food security in marginal mountain areas and economic stimulation in high-potential highland sites; [Agenda 21 - Promoting sustainable settlement patterns]

calling for mechanisms that will make it possible to avoid unbalanced use of mountain resources in highland-lowland interactive systems, through planning, economic, social, and financial means;

searching for non-land-based economic activities that would reduce the pressure on land, water and vegetation; [Agenda 21 - Promoting sustainable settlement patterns]

SUPPORT ACTION-ORIENTED MOUNTAIN RESEARCH AND INFORMED LEARNING BY favouring participatory, opportunity-guided development towards solutions at technological, social, economic and political levels;

applying transdisciplinary approaches involving communities [people’s control over their lives and environment] and other actor categories [Multilateralism] ; introducing approaches focusing on eco-regional benchmarks in mountains and highlands and related outreach activities;

supporting long-term comparative monitoring of benchmark sites that can be used for assessing sustainability and the impacts of development; [Sustainable development]

synthesising available information to identify gaps in knowledge related to research;

FURTHER INTER-INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION BY

following up the African Inter-governmental Consultation network in Sustainable Mountain Development;

linking international institutions in a common effort in research and development; creating NGOs, a Mountain Forum, and broader membership in the African Mountains Association; [Multilateralism]

providing linkages at national levels between ministries and institutions working with mountain people;

developing research and learning institutions which focus on eco-regional mountain development and long-term monitoring of benchmark sites;

realising community involvement and participation at all levels of interaction; [people’s control over their lives and environment]

TAKE PARTICULAR CARE OF THE MOUNTAINS AND HIGHLANDS OF MADAGASCAR BY

acknowledging that a specific biodiversity evolved from a unique geologic and biological past; providing all possible means to combat the particular threat of loss of natural landscapes occurring at present;

making particular efforts to promote environmental improvement and nature protection; ensuring that special attention be paid to the need to enhance research, conflict management, impact assessment and related training at all levels of society.

Contact: Supported by:

African Mountains Association

Dr. Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher

Secretary General

P.O. Box 12760

Addis Abeba

Ethiopia

Fax 0025 11 55 23 50

Email epa@padis.gn.

Supported by:

UNU, Tokyo

UNESCO-MAB, Paris

FAO, Rome I

ICRAF-AHI, Nairobi

ISNAR, The Hague

IBSRAM, Bangkok

GRN, Zurich

CDE, Berne

[Globalization]

Comments: a document that is obviously inspired by Agenda 21, but focuses on cultural resistance, biodiversity. Environmental concern prevails over economic development.

(to fill out table page 2, “Problematic”)

globalization

American cultural hegemony?

Case studies of various projects in the Indian Ocean area

cultural resistance?

an adaptation to sustainable development?

This document, the Antananarivo Declaration is essentially inspired by the doctrine of sustainable development, as clearly stated (p.12, 100-110). Sustainable development can be defined by its three essential components

— social justice

—environmental concern

—economic development, to fight poverty, a source of environmental degradation by humans

In this declaration we find environmental concern is mentioned right from the start (p. 12, ll 59-65.), then in nearly every paragraph, with special emphasis upon Madagascar’s exceptional richness in biodiversity (20-25) in the end.

Social justice is less clearly addressed in the text:

Interestingly, some passage deal with local cultures and knowledge, which may lead us to consider this document as an example of implied, oblique cultural resistance to the dominant ideology—whatever it may be—conveyed by globalization.

(p.12, 75-76; )

Economic development or related concerns is mentioned, but does not seem to be given special emphasis. (p. 12, 66-67; 68-70; 71-72; especially 130-35; )

What is clearly established however, is the link between environmental degradation and poverty (p.12, 79-82).

Of particular interest too is that the section entitled “enhance sustainable Africa mountain development (p.12, 126-27) begins with an emphasis on the protection of biodiversity just at it is ended on the mention of activities that “would reduce pressure on land, water and vegetation” (140-42).

All things considered, this document focuses on sustainable development, and especially its environmental concern facet, without any significant allusion to economic growth or development.

Session 6 - USAID

Text #7 USAID in Madagascar: fiscal year 2004

USAID in Madagascar: fiscal year 2004

. Accessed 3 August 2005.

Mission Achievements:

Fiscal Year 2004

During FY2004, USAID/Madagascar completed the transition to its new FY 2003 – 2008 strategy. Long-term development investments in Madagascar continue to bear fruit. The previous Health program [Agenda 21 - Promoting health] (continued under the current USAID strategy), demonstrated considerable achievement during the fiscal year, meeting or exceeding end of program targets. Individual sector accomplishments are summarized below:

Democracy and Governance: [Democracy]As a result of activities completed under the former Democracy and Economic Growth program, there is a greater knowledge about economic investment and trade, the Malagasy government is more receptive to input from civil society, and there is increased participation in public sector decision-making in targeted sectors and regions. [people’s control over their lives and environment] Three new business laws, passed in the final days of the SPO strategy, are set to strengthen a legal framework that encourages investment in the coming years. [Emphasis on economic development]

The FY 2003 – 2008 Democracy and Governance program was launched by the President of Madagascar on May 28, 2004. USAID support in this area was instrumental in enabling the GOM to develop and launch its first national anti-corruption strategy. USAID funding and technical assistance was also pivotal in establishment of a national coalition of civil society organizations, and the creation of Madagascar’s first women mayors’ association [Agenda 21 - Strengthening the Role of … women, NGOs, local authorities, business and workers]. USAID technical support in the Malagasy Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector played a leading role in modernization of Madagascar’s national ICT policy and legal framework [Deterritorializing media and communications technologies]. In response to the political and ethnic tensions inflamed by the 2002 political crisis, USAID implemented a new program, Fihavanana (solidarity), to address some of the underlying causes of conflict in Madagascar. Reconciliation activities included creation of the country’s first Christian-Muslim platform for dialogue in the northern province of Antsiranana, one of the most religiously and ethnically diverse areas in the country [Interculturality] [Otherness]. Under the Education for Development and Democracy Initiative (EDDI), [Democracy+education: modernity Founding Fathers’ heritage] the Madagascar, Media, and Message program exceeded expectations. The program has provided participatory civic education courses to over 30,000 students in more than 170 middle schools. As a result of USAID assistance in this area, twenty Ministry of Education instructors and pedagogical counselors have gained the capacity to organize training-of-trainer sessions and conduct all necessary in-service training in civic education. Over 220 teachers have received in-depth training on how to use a new participatory methodology to teach civic education.

Health, Population and Nutrition: The 2003 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS III) documents a number of dramatic improvements in a key national health indicators, and data from USAID focus districts demonstrate even greater improvements [Agenda 21 - Promoting health]. The DHS III information reflects the important contribution of USAID health program activities to improved child, maternal and reproductive health in Madagascar. One of the Mission’s most significant achievements in this area is the increase in use of modern contraceptives among women in union. Contraceptive prevalence increased from 10% in 1997 to 18% in 2003, compared to a national target of 14%. According the DHS III data, DPT3 vaccination rates steadily improved, from 48% in 1997 to 61% in 2003 - slightly above the 60% end of program target. The strength of USAID’s essential nutrition actions can be seen in the improvements in exclusive breastfeeding rates which was 67% in the DHS III compared to 22% in DHS II. USAID’s socially marketed safe water solution is helping to improve access to potable water. 526,059 bottles of the solution SurEau, were sold this year well above the 450,000 target level. The SO2 innovative behavior change program to reduce transmission of HIV is also showing good results. The DHS III shows condom use with last non-regular partner increased from 0.3% in 2000 to 8% in 2003 among women and from 2.3% to 9.7% among men. [Cultural impact] Finally, USAID successfully responded to the two of the most devastating cyclones to hit Madagascar in 50 years: Elita and Gafilo, using PL 480 Operational Reserves and emergency Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance funding.

Environment and Rural Development: USAID continued its leadership role in the development and implementation of the Government of Madagascar’s National Environmental Action Plan, the third phase of which (EP3) was launched in September 2004. In the two forest corridors where USAID was concentrating its activities, the rate of forest loss is one-third to one-half that of areas where USAID is not present. Conversely, the control corridor showed an annual deforestation increase from 1.54% to 2.48%, demonstrating the impact of USAID assistance in this area. [Environmental concern]

With USAID support, the GOM took an important step in creating new protected areas and conservation sites by delineating, under inter-ministerial order, a total of 7.7 million hectares as critical biodiversity habitats/potential protected areas. The country’s first strategic forest zoning framework was also developed, and a pilot zoning plan finalized. The program continued to show, through an approach that relates development interventions to conservation, that it is possible to help farmers significantly increase production and become responsible stewards of the environment. 68% of targeted households adopted two or more elements of a more sustainable "farming systems" approach (compared to a target of 63%). In addition, 14 communes in USAID priority zones were certified as "Green Communes" and 20 agreements were established between private sector operators and farmer producer associations. [Sustainable development] [Private sector]

Agriculture and Trade: The USAID/Madagascar economic growth program promotes expansion of critical private markets [Priority given to the private sector], poverty reduction , and sustainable private sector-led economic growth [Priority given to the private sector]. During FY2004, USAID improved private enterprise efficiency [Priority given to the private sector] and access to financial services, exceeding the annual program target for number of businesses assisted by providing 24 enterprises with technical and financial assistance during the fiscal year (target: 17). USAID was also successful in strengthening linkages between natural products enterprises and farmers’ cooperatives, meeting the annual target of 12 linkages supported. Finally, USAID made considerable progress in promoting export market development [Priority given to the private sector] by sending two Malagasy textile and embroidery sector firms to the Las Vegas ASAP show in February 2004 through which $1 million in sales were reported from the event. [Profit]

Food Aid (PL480): Title II food aid resources strengthen the overall impact of the USAID/Madagascar program. These resources support Mission Strategic Objectives in Health, Population and Nutrition (HPN) as well as Environment and Rural Development. The Madagascar PL480 program has existed since 1962 and benefits thousands of people in the country each year. Approximately one-third of the $30 million annual USAID/Madagascar program budget is comprised of PL480 Title II resources, of which 40% is monetized and the remainder distributed under Food for Work and Social Safety Net initiatives. Combined, monetization and distribution commodities improve the lives of Madagascar’s poorest and most vulnerable communities through funding such activities as farm to market roads, strengthening disaster management capabilities in rural areas, improving infrastructure in poor areas and promoting household nutrition. During FY2004, over 800,000 people were reached by the USAID/Madagascar PL480 program, covering 14 of 22 regions of the country.

Gender: Gender considerations are fully integrated into the USAID/Madagascar activity portfolio. Specifically, USAID addresses gender by: increasing the participation of women in politics and civil society [Agenda 21 ??- Strengthening the Role of women]; promoting women’s legal advocacy, and implementation of HIV/AIDS, family planning and reproductive health programs. USAID/Madagascar is a leading participant in the Malagasy National Gender Network - a group of CSOs, private individuals, GOM and donor community representatives working to promote gender equity and better coordinate gender sector activities. [Cultural impact] [American cultural hegemony?] Madagascar is also a focus country under the USAID Women’s Legal Rights Initiative. Mission health sector activities focus on increasing women’s access to quality services and products, especially for maternal, child and reproductive health. Health sector evaluation and assessment data is disaggregated by gender to better analyze overall trends, and because women are most often the primary household caregiver in Madagascar, primary health messages are targeted to women and developed in accordance to the educational level of rural women and men in the country.

|BUDGET |FY 2004 |

|Development Assistance & Child Survival |$21,746,000 |

|Food Aid (P.L. 480 Title II) |$11,777,680 |

|Total |$33,523,680 |

"Mission Vision: Leading the Way to Change for a Better Life"

Comments

USAID in Madagascar

Globalization

American cultural hegemony?

Case studies of various projects in the Indian Ocean area

cultural resistance?

an adaptation to sustainable development?

It goes without saying that this USAID document dated 2004 was written from an official federal American perspective. USAID as a federal agency clearly states,

The principal beneficiary of America's foreign assistance programs has always been the United States. Close to 80% of the USAID contracts and grants go directly to American firms. Foreign assistance programs have helped create major markets for agricultural goods, created new markets for American industrial exports and meant hundreds of thousands of jobs for Americans.[5]

USAID receives guidance from the Secretary of State. We may expect that under the Bush administration, special emphasis must have been granted to the private sector and business.

Of particular interest then is to analyze if sustainable development is taken into account here as it was by USAID in the wake of the Rio conference after 1992, or if neo-liberalism principles prevail in this document.

Reading-notes

p.13, 56-63

Emphasis on the success of the previous Health program

64-73

Democracy and economic growth are associated. Resulted in new business laws.

74-103

Governance - anti-corruption strategy - civil society organizations - women mayors’ association - Fihavanana (solidarity) >reconciliation - emphasis on (civic) education and democracy (typical American cultural features) -

104-133

Emphasis on “improvements” (108, 116, 119) , typical of American obsession with all forms of progress, - a touch of religious decorum “contraceptives among women in union” (emphasis added)

134-144

America as a model, a beacon, to lead the other nations of the world (Manifest Destiny) “USAID … leadership role” 135) - environmental concern 138-140 - success -

145-160

Environmental concern- conservation - sustainable development : development and conservation associated “The program continued to show, through an approach that related development interventions to conservation, that it is possible to help farmers significantly increase production and become responsible stewards of the environment”(151-55) - but the private sector may control this field “20 agreements were established between private sector operators and farmer producer associations” (159-60).

161- p. 14 11

Economic growth - private markets - trade - sustainability all in one : “The USAID/Madagascar economic growth program promotes expansion of critical private markets, poverty reduction, and sustainable private sector-led economic growth. During FY2004, USAID improved private enterprise efficiency” 161-165. Export market - Profit - Success, progress (“expansion”), private enterprise, profit, money oriented culture, so many American cultural features.

p.14 , 12-31

32-41

Gender equity - a form of social justice - sustainable developments characteristics are present in this report.

42-52

education - gender equity - [rural women]

Comments

This document deftly combines sustainable development characteristics with typically private enterprise elements. It exposes the prevalence of American cultural traits such as concern for progress, success, democracy, the economy, education. All things considered, if lip service is paid to sustainable development in this document, the overall impression is that USAID and the United States’ international humanitarian aid is founded on private sector involvement for economic growth and mutual (?) profit. This runs against our own cultural ethos, but is perfectly acceptable in an American cultural context.

Session 7 - Mauritius

Text #8 _ Pre-WSSD[6] National Report [for Mauritius] 2002



CHAPTER 2 THE NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

2.1 THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK

Mauritius has definitely fared well and has successfully moved from a low income to a medium income economy in a relatively short lapse of time. [Economic growth] However, the risk that pressure for greater economic competitiveness and external economic and political pressures might hamper national sustainable development [Sustainable Development] has prompted Government to take effective and coordinated action, targeted at clearly defined priorities through the formulation of Action plans, Policy Papers etc. In fact, Mauritius has a good track record of policy formulation capacities as evidenced by the preparation of national development plans, sectoral papers, and commissioned reports. Much has also been achieved in the last ten years in terms of establishing necessary legal framework for sustainable development in Mauritius.

2.1.1 National Institutions and Administrative Capacity

A. Various institutions are involved in the processes of decision-making and implementation of policies for sustainable development.

· The Cabinet is the supreme authority where Government takes policy decisions on all matters pertaining to sustainable development. Policies formulated by the different Ministries and submitted to Cabinet cut across a wide range of human activities and covers social, economic and the environment. At the end of each

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meeting the Secretary to the Cabinet issues a Communiqué of the important decisions reached and transmits same to the Clerk and the National Assembly.

· The Ministry of Economic Development, Financial Services and Corporate Affairs are responsible for formulating sound policies for the nation’s social and economic sustainable development. It coordinates the activities of sectoral Ministries and is involved in all important sectors influencing economic development such as transport, pension reform, poverty alleviation, and environment protection. In addition, it plans and coordinates all external aid and actively works towards enhancing bilateral ties with friendly countries as well as multilateral co-operation with leading international organisations, especially the World Bank, the European Union and the United Nations .

· The Attorney-General’s Office and Ministry of Justice & Human Rights is mainly concerned with legal advisory work for the Government, representing Government in all civil litigation whether as plaintiff or defendant and respondent and is responsible for the drafting and vetting of all legislation.

· The Ministry of Environment is mandated under the Environment Protection Act (EPA) 2002 to ensure coordination and effective implementation of governmental policies in relation to environmental protection and conservation as well as in the enforcement of all provisions spelt out in the EPA. The Ministry also coordinates activities related to Agenda 21 and sustainable development with other Ministries, Parastatal bodies, Private sector and NGOs.

The National Environment Commission set up under EPA is the highest level of coordination to discuss and decide on national environmental policies and strategies .The EPA also makes provisions for the compulsory consultation with various stakeholders. Furthermore the EPA 2002 provides for the setting up of a “National Network for Sustainable Development “ which will function as a forum

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for debates and consultations among the public sector, private sector and NGOs on environmental matters and other issues related to sustainable development.

· The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development, Financial Services and Corporate Affairs are responsible for economic management and are regularly involved in negotiations with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for long-terms loans to finance projects aiming at the nation’s sustainable development.

· The Ministry of Social Security and National Solidarity is responsible for the provision of a range of social security nets that are targeted towards specific vulnerable segments of the population. The main benefits provided under the national social security system include old age pensions, widow’s pension and disability pension.

· The Ministry of Women’s Rights, Child Development and Family Welfare (MWRCDFW) has the prime responsibility for creating the right conditions and a propitious environment for the development of women and children. The Ministry has set up a programme to empower women through entrepreneurship development. The Gender Bureau was launched in 1998 to provide support to the Ministry to ensure the integration of gender equality and promotion of gender concerns in the development of a more equal society.

· The Rural Development Unit (RDU) of the Ministry of Local Government and Rodrigues is concerned with providing socio-economic infrastructure for rural communities that are financed by small grants from Government and built by private contractors. On completion, these works are handed over to local institutions such as village or district councils.

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. The Development Bank of Mauritius (DBM) is a public sector financial institution and is principally concerned with long-term lending to the industrial and agricultural sectors. The DBM has also put in place a loan scheme to encourage the use of environment friendly energy resources such as solar water heaters and liquefied petroleum gas instead of petrol in motor vehicles.

· The National Housing Development Corporation (NHDC) set up with Government assistance aims at providing decent, durable and adequate housing for every household.

B. There are currently several independent organizations capable of carrying out policy research, analysis, and advocacy outside the Government with a functionality which is geared towards their specific mandates, for examples -

· The National Economic and Social Council (NESC) The National Economic and Social Council is a high powered independent consultative body, set up by the Government of Mauritius in 2001. Its objectives are to provide a forum for informed debate on vital economic and social issues, to help develop consensus and to identify problem areas. It assesses methods of making better use of national resources and its work is carried out through sector groups including representatives of trade unions.

. The National Productivity and Competitiveness Council (NPCC) The NPCC, established by the Government in May 2000, was set up to promote and generate productivity and quality consciousness and drive the productivity and quality movement in all areas of the economy with the aim of increasing national output and achieving sustainable growth and international competitiveness. The NPCC provides a forum for constant dialogue and consensus building on issues relating to productivity, quality and

20

competitiveness. It is also responsible to identify constraints to the improvement of productivity, quality and competitiveness and propose measures. Ten Productivity Committees (PCs) have been put in place under the NPCC, each dealing with a specific sector (human resources, infrastructure, productivity indicators, and information-education-communication). The private and public sector as well as of the unions are represented at the Executive Committee of the NPCC.

· The National Women’s Council is a corporate body which was set up by an Act of Parliament in 1985 to promote the interests and advancement of women and women’s organizations and to ensure that Government’s policy and action meet the needs of women at grass root level.

· The National Women Entrepreneur Council (NWEC) has been set up in 1999 by the NWEC Act. The Council has as mission to foster the development and growth of women entrepreneurs, provide the right framework, enhance enterprise competitiveness and promote economic independence of women.

· Private sector institutions, such as the Joint Economic Council, the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce & Industry, the Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, the Mauritius Employers’ Federation and the Mauritius Export Processing Zone Association, as well as parastatal bodies, including the National Productivity and Competitiveness Council, the Export Processing Zone Development Authority, the Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute, and the Board of Investment, promote particular sectors of activity and disseminate information on the economy and environment-related issues. They can be viewed as think tanks established by the private sector to assess specific trends and requirements and make policy recommendations.

21 · Private consulting firms possess different degrees of fluency in technical or sectoral policy research and have demonstrated capacity for public policy despite not being geared in that direction.

· The University of Mauritius has capacity for policy research, analysis and advice and expertise from the university is often used in decision making.

· The leading NGOs and trade unions also have their say in guiding public decision-making as they are often invited to participate in and express their views during national consultations and other meetings. The Mauritius Council of Social Service (MACOSS) is an umbrella organisation focusing on promoting social and development work in Mauritius. Most NGOs are grouped under this organisation.

2.2 MAIN MECHANISMS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES

In 1997, in its effort to try and avert problems which might threaten Mauritian sustainability, Government carried out a fruitful exercise to redefine the development agenda of the country. This report, commonly known as Vision 2020 formed the basis for articulating a national vision up to year 2020 and a framework for long term socioeconomic development for the country. Along these lines, in 1999, Mauritius prepared its second National Environmental Strategy and Action Plan (NEAP II) for the decade (2000-2010). This plan carries forward and extends the substantial achievements of the first National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP I) prepared in 1989.

Mauritius is also fully committed both at the national and regional level to fulfill the objectives of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) which is endorsed by the African Union. The NEPAD initiative aims at achieving and sustaining an average economic growth of 7% per annum in Africa and halving the population living in poverty by 2015 and this objective can only be achieved by increasing productive investment, improving political and economic good governance and capacity building. Mauritius actively supports the NEPAD initiative and is a member of the Heads of 22 State/Government Implementation Committee responsible for the implementation of NEPAD programmes.

Mauritius is also fully conscious that individual State action towards sustainable development can only work as part of a coordinated international plan of implementation. In this context, Mauritius continues to support international initiatives and thus, is party to at least 36 multilateral environmental agreements.

The main Programmes/Plan/Policies that have contributed to the overall implementation of Sustainable Development in Mauritius are as follows

(i) Vision 2020: The National Long-term Perspective Study” explicitly includes sustainable development as one of the country’s main aims and stresses the need to integrate environmental considerations into all governmental decision-making.

(ii) National Environment Action Plan (NEAP II) is a cross sectoral action plan and covers some 20 projects all of which are geared towards achieving sustainable development in the following strategic areas:

· Environmental management

· Resource management : involving land, water resources, terrestrial biodiversity, air quality, and Iintegrated coastal zone Management

· Economic sector management : Solid waste management, Industrial management, Tourism management, Transport management

(iii) The GEF Small Grant Programme (GEF –SGP) was launched in Mauritius in 1995. It is a three phased programme

· The first operational Phase was from 1996 to March 1999

· The Second Operational Phase started in April 1999.

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This programme emphasised on mainstreaming projects in line with the national strategies (NEAP, NBSAP, and Climate Change Action Plan) in order to achieve global benefits.

· The Third Country Programme Strategy (2002-2004) is putting strong emphasis on addressing poverty alleviation; including targeting of vulnerable communities that have been affected by improved national environmental policy implementation. Long term training support will be provided to CBOs and NGOs in areas of participatory project development, implementation and evaluation.

(iv) National Physical Development Plan (NPDP): The National Physical Development Plan (NPDP) prepared in 1993 and approved in 1994 was meant to provide a framework for the physical development of Mauritius up to 2010. In view of implementation problems, this plan was further reviewed in 1999 and reformatted as the NDS, which makes a number of proposals for improving the planning services namely

· Institutional strengthening within the Government’s Central and Local planning services.

· Statutory approval for the new National Development Strategy

· Streamlining of development permit procedures.

The plan also proposes to create a new high level Planning and Development Commission made up of key Government and private sector representatives to advise the Cabinet of Ministers on strategic land use, development trends and issues.

(v) National Solid Waste Management Plan (NSWMP): The National Solid Waste Management Plan (NSWMP) was commissioned in 1993 to form a basis for future planning and action. The NSWMP was reviewed and updated in 1998 but in the absence of a proper waste characterisation exercise, the recommendations of the report were not implemented.

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In 1999 a further feasibility study was carried out to propose an Environmental Solid Waste Management Programme. This report assessed the problem of collection, storage, transportation of both hazardous and non-hazardous wastes in a holistic approach. Measures for waste minimisation are also being addressed. In fact the overall objective of this strategy is to reduce the generation of waste and the environmental impact of all forms of waste and thereby ensure that the socio economic development, the health of the people and the quality of its environmental resources are no longer adversely affected by uncontrolled and uncoordinated waste management. Projects for composting and recycling are also being developed.

(vi) National Sewerage Plan (NSP): The Waste Water Authority was established with the enactment of the Waste Water Authority Act in 1991 and its proclamation in 1996, the sewerage sector has today moved towards autonomy institutionally with the creation since September 2001, of the Waste Water Management Authority, a corporate body headed by a board of directors.

In 1993, a National Sewerage Master Plan was completed and in 1994 the Government of Mauritius adopted the plan and committed itself to the improvement of the environment. The Master Plan provides a comprehensive national assessment of sewerage needs sets standards of future provision and outlines plans for increased connections to the network and provision of more treatment plants.

(vii) Water Plan: A master plan study for the potable water distribution network will be commissioned by the Central Water Authority (CWA). The objective of the plan is to equip the CWA with a live model of its distribution network from source to mains supply points, supported by a file that will depict the actions required to be taken by CWA on a five year term basis in order to meet its greatest challenge which is to cater for a sustained and uninterrupted supply of water to the population and all other sectors of the Mauritian economy up to horizon 2025.

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To further strengthen management and investment capacity in the potable water sector, Government has commissioned the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank to carry out a study on the best option for a public-private partnership for potable water supply and the possible integration of the management of wastewater treatment and disposal with that of potable water.

(viii) National Climate Change Committee: A National Climate Change Committee was set up under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister’s Office to follow the implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Government has also approved the Climate Change Action Plan which describes its strategies for the implementation of identified adaptative and mitigative measures to curb emission of greenhouse gases.

(ix) National Drainage Committee: A study was commissioned by the Government of Mauritius to carry out a systematic study of the whole land drainage system in the country in order to identify the locations of flood prone areas, the causes of flooding and to propose an action plan for proper flood control. Subsequently a new item has been introduced in the 2003-2004 budget for a National Water Drainage Programme, which will be implemented by the National Land Drainage Committee set up under the Ministry of Local Government & Rodrigues.

(x) Energy Resources Programme: In view of the particular conditions of Mauritius as an insular country with no potential for interconnection, it is Government’s policy to encourage greater use of local and renewable energy sources for electricity generation.

The Government and the Central Electricity Board embarked on the Bagasse Energy Development Programme to encourage the use of bagasse, a local renewable fuel, in electricity production.

Mauritius, being quite exposed to the windy conditions of the South East Trade Winds, is exploring possibilities for wind energy exploitation. Furthermore, Government’s policy 26 is to substitute as far as possible imported oil for power generation and wind power is considered as a priority. In this regard, a Memorandum of Understanding will soon be signed with the Government of India to seek technical assistance for the setting up of a wind farm in the country.

(xi) National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP): Mauritius has already produced a draft National Biodiversity Strategy Plan which includes the following thematic sectors:

· Forest biodiversity

· Terrestrial Biodiversity

· Agro Biodiversity

· Freshwater , Coastal and Marine Aquatic Biodiversity

· Biotechnology

· Sustainable ecotourism

The strategic goal of the terrestrial biodiversity programme is to “ensure that native Mauritian biodiversity survives flourishes and retains its genetic diversity and its components are optimally utilised for the continued progress and socio economic growth of the country”.

Various projects have been implemented by the National Parks and Conservation Service of the Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration with the Mauritian Wildlife Fund, and the Forestry Service since 1994 to honour the obligations of the Barbados Programme of Action Plan.

The Plants Act (1976) is also being amended to enable Mauritius to honour its obligation under the WTO, CBD and the multilateral access and benefit sharing of the PGR for food and agriculture in accordance with International Treaty on PGR for Food and Agriculture (2001).

27

Mauritius, as a SIDS, has requested that it be allowed to participate in activities related to Southern African Biodiversity Support Programme whose objective is to integrate sustainable use into biodiversity conservation and other sectoral programmes.

Mauritius fully supports the Global Invasive Species Programme whose mission is to ‘conserve biodiversity and sustain human livelihoods by minimising the spread and impact of Invasive Alien Species. Under the National Environmental Strategies for the next decade and in the terrestrial biodiversity sector, Mauritius will be preparing a National Pest Control Strategy.

(xii) Transport Strategy: In 1995, the Government of Mauritius addressed a Port Sector Reform Policy Statement to the World Bank showing its intention and firm commitment to bring about the necessary reforms to transform the only port of the island. Consequently, a number of projects/ programmes and institutional reforms were implemented in the port sector as from 1995 under the supervision of the World Bank.

In January 2000, Government of Mauritius commissioned the ‘Integrated National Transport Strategy Study’ to undertake a global review of the transport sector and to come out with an integrated development plan with particular focus on the legal, institutional, economic, administrative and structural aspects to cope with the problems associated with rapid motorisation.

(xiii) National Tourism Policy: The overall strategic objective of Government is to promote Mauritius worldwide as a prime holiday island destination and to maintain the island as an attractive and desirable tourist destination; Government has formulated a number of policies and key strategic objectives to promote namely:

§ Selective and up -market tourism based on the concept of ‘quality tourism’.

§ Eco-tourism where the environmental impact of tourism will be accounted for in the promotion of the industry.

28

A series of incentives for the development of the tourism industry through the Development Incentives Act and the Hotel Management Act have also been granted by Government. Two Tourism Master Plans-one for the island of Mauritius and one for Rodrigues have been prepared and the Association des Hoteliers et Restaurateurs de l’ Ile Maurice (AHRIM) has developed a Tourism Environment Charter which was partly financed by the National Environment Fund and the UNDP.

2.2 SPECIFIC LESSONS LEARNED

Sustainable development is a desirable goal for every economy and developing countries throughout the world strive to reach this objective. Mauritius has always been focused on the three pillars of sustainable development namely economic, social and environmental sustainability. The present state of development of Mauritius is proof of the enormous progress that has been achieved over the past decade, despite the prevailing competitive interna tional context.

Mauritius is continually reviewing its legislative framework so as to incorporate the provisions of its commitments to international conventions and their eventual implementation. However, being a developing country and facing the immense challenges of combining development with sustainability, resources and know-how are constraints that hinder effective compliance.

In many areas, a lot of effort has been made to gather information and to improve its collection, analysis, use and dissemination to the target groups such as decisionmakers, researchers, students and the general public. However, in some cases such as shown by the analysis of environmental problems carried out under NEAP 2, lack of information has fundamentally undermined environmental management in Mauritius.

Although environmental data and information exist in numerous forms and locations, they are poorly organised and difficult to access; there are few consistent measurements of environmental quality and little time series data. In addition, analysis of data which are collected is inadequate. Similarly, there are still insufficient data

29

available to guide spatial development and to protect environmentally sensitive areas from incompatible land use.

A set of Environment Investment Programme 2 projects on the development of information systems for sustainable development, namely the Environmental Information System, Environmental indicators and the Land Information System are under implementation. The computerised land information system will therefore be set up in order to manage the limited resources of Mauritius more efficiently. The Land Surveyor’s Act and the Morcellement Act are being reviewed to make them more compatible with Land Information requirements and a new Land Information Act is under preparation.

Increased emphasis is also being put on training at all levels especially in information and communication technology (ICT) and on environmental protection. Education will therefore provide more opportunities for the personal development of the younger citizens.

Being a small Island Developing State, Mauritius has a fragile economy and a vulnerable environment. This fragility is further enhanced by a certain level of social inequality. Policy makers are very much aware of this state of affairs and are in general very cautious during decision making processes. However, in case of any perceived shortcoming, public reactions are immediate. With a high literacy rate, excellent communication, an active private sector and a “watchdog” journalistic tradition, the population is quick to react to any activity which appears to have future negative impacts on the social, economic or environmental sustainability.

Until now, the role of NGOs in the promotion of sustainable development has been limited but they have the potential of being valued partners in sustainable development.

See this document (0301africa.html on this disk) G.W. Bush No show Mauritius[7]

My commentaries on Text # 8 Mauritius - Pre-WSSD[8] National Report [for Mauritius] 2002

All in all, the them of sustainable development prevails in and pervades this document.

A very diplomatic document written to meet the expectations and the spirit of the 2nd world summit on sustainable development. Sustainable development is to be found everywhere in this document, and often the phrase itself is repeated to underscore the commitment of the authors to the is overarching theme. It is worth noting as well the remarkable balance maintained between

— social goals,

— the respect of the private sector and the demands of productivity in a globalized world in which competitiveness is essential to economic survival

— environmental protection

However, we may note the presence of many allusions to private-public sectors cooperation, which is in keeping with the neo-liberal theory and US foreign policy principles under the G.W. Bush administration.

Also, like the Agenda 21 of Reunion, the author of the Mauritius report even if they praise sustainable development, underscore real problems

— a fragile small island environment

— a fragile economy of a small island state

social inequality

But obviously the message is that Mauritius is right in the middle of the mainstream of international affairs and diplomacy.

The fact that according to this document the Mauritius government integrate environemental considerations into all governmental decision-making processes is evidence of the real impact of environmental issues in the world currently.

Some keywords have been noted :

Rural communities, empowerment 157 p. 14, gender equity, good governance 124 p. 15, community (CBOs), ICT, edeucation, …

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Session 8 - RSA

Text #9 _ DURBAN’S LOCAL AGENDA 21

Durban’s Local Agenda 21 programme: tackling sustainable development in a post-apartheid city

Debra Roberts and Nicci Diederichs[9]

Environment&Urbanization Vol 14 No 1 April 2002 189



SUMMARY: Durban’s Local Agenda 21 programme has been at the forefront of the Local Agenda 21 movement in Southern Africa since the mid-1990s. This paper describes the first four phases of the programme, 1994-2001. The paper also outlines the difficulties faced in localizing the sustainable development concept in Durban. Key amongst these challenges was the initiation and development of the programme during a period of local government transformation and restructuring. The perception that Local Agenda 21 has a “green” focus and is “anti-development” (due to its location within an environmental department) has also resulted in a lack of proactive and sustained political support. These problems have been exacerbated by limited human and financial resources, which have restricted the programme’s capacity to build support and consensus amongst stakeholders. Durban’s Local Agenda 21 programme has, however, helped keep sustainable development on the city’s agenda and has provided a mechanism through which local stakeholders can interact with local government around environmental management issues. The paper concludes with a section on the lessons learned and factors required to ensure future progress.

I. INTRODUCTION

IN 1994, DURBAN became the first city in South Africa to accept the Local Agenda 21 mandate as a corporate responsibility. Since then, Durban has been at the forefront of the country’s Local Agenda 21 movement. The main message to emerge from Durban’s experiences is that Local Agenda 21’s implicit promise of improved sustainability often obscures the real difficulties encountered in realizing this goal. These challenges include: the lack of substantial political support; the tendency to view sustainable development as a “green” issue; the lack of resources to build broad-based consensus; administrative power struggles; and the difficulty of directing external resources in a way that serves local rather than donor interests. Frankness about these difficulties is essential if the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 is to become a forum for realistic and focused debate and is to produce meaningful change in the twenty-first century.

II. DRIVING FORCES FOR CHANGE

IN ORDER TO understand Durban’s Local Agenda 21 experience, it is necessary to understand the context within which it has taken place.

Durban’s commitment to Local Agenda 21 is the result of three important factors. At the global level, Agenda 21 and the 1992 Earth Summit prioritized sustainable development internationally and highlighted the importance of local action in realizing this goal. At the national level, postapartheid( 1)[10] democratization created a “window of opportunity” for new concepts to be debated and accepted by previously conservative governmental structures. At a local level (i.e. Durban) these national and international trends were accompanied by the establishment of an Environmental Management Branch (EMB) that subsequently became the Local Agenda 21 champion within the city.

The visible and vocal role played by the EMB in Durban has influenced the programme’s successes and failures. It has, for example, helped keep Local Agenda 21 and sustainable development on local government’s agenda but it has also contributed to a situation where a strong and dedicated political champion has not yet emerged. This situation has been exacerbated by the perception that Local Agenda 21 is a “foreign” concept largely concerned with “green” issues. This lack of “political mainstreaming” poses serious challenges to the programme’s long-term sustainability. Afurther complication is that local government in South Africa has been in a state of continuous transformation since 1994. The high levels of uncertainty associated with this process have impacted on the development of Durban’s programme and necessitated a phased approach to implementation. To date, three phases have been completed and a fourth, Unicity phase, is in progress (due for completion in 2002).

…

III. PHASE 1: ASSESSMENT AND PRIORITIZATION (1994-1996)

THE AIM OF Durban’s Local Agenda 21 programme is to develop an environmental management system (EMS) that will ensure that social, economic and ecological concerns are integrated into all planning and development processes within the city. From the outset of the initiative, it was clear that the lack of information on the city’s environmental status was an obstacle to realizing this goal. The preparation of Durban’s first State of the Environment and Development Report (SOE&DR) was therefore undertaken as the first step in EMS development.

A participative approach was taken in the planning and execution of the SOE&DR project. This included the establishment of three participative fora to engage communities, business and industry, and local government stakeholders in discussions around the project, and the initiation of case studies in selected local communities to probe environmental and developmental priorities. The resulting SOE&DR highlighted the sustainability challenges and opportunities in 17 key environment and development sectors(2)[11] in the city. These were prioritized through a community-based process and resulted in five environment and development issues emerging as the top priorities amongst Durban’s communities:

• promoting peace, safety and security in the metropolitan region;

• improving water and sanitation management;

• developing an integrated housing policy;

• establishing a structure to coordinate land use, transportation and environmental planning in the metropolitan area; and

• institutionalizing the integrated environmental management procedure of the national Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.

IV. PHASE 2: POLICY FORMULATION AND ACTION PLANNING (1997-1999)

ACLUSTER OF projects was initiated during Phase 2 of the Local Agenda 21 programme to begin addressing the priorities identified during Phase 1. These projects focused primarily on policy formulation and planning, and aimed to develop a framework within which stakeholders could act or contribute towards improved sustainability.

a. Durban Metropolitan Environmental Policy Initiative (DMEPI)

New legislation,(3)[12] promulgated as part of the local government restructuring process, assigned the coordination and planning of environmental management in Durban to metropolitan government, and implementation to local-level authorities. This acknowledged (for the first time) the need for a strategic and coordinating environmental management function that was distinct from the already existing operational activities of local councils and their line functions. The emergence of this new, strategic metropolitan-level environmental management function (together with increasing legislative requirements contained in emerging national and provincial environmental and planning law) made it clear that a restructuring of the environmental function within the city was necessary. In order to initiate this process, the Durban metropolitan council approved the development of Durban’s first environmental management policy and related institutional framework. The development of the policy represented the first building block of the city’s environmental management system and informed the thinking around options for an appropriate and supportive institutional framework.

b. Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the Durban South Basin

|Box 1: Local Agenda 21 develops understanding |

|Case study interviews were undertaken in communities with different racial and socioeconomic profiles during the State of the Environment and Development |

|study.The findings of these interviews challenged the widely held assumption that given choices between environmental and developmental issues, the poor |

|would prioritize development while the affluent, having met basic developmental needs, would give greater weight to environmental needs. The study suggested |

|that there is a far more complex understanding of the inter-dependencies of environmental and developmental issues amongst local communities in Durban. It |

|appeared that the wealthiest and the poorest shared an awareness of the need for environmental protection, the former because they have met other needs and |

|the latter because so few of any of their needs have been met. This awareness was found in all the communities studied and was present in the thinking and |

|views of both leadership and residents. Several community leaders acknowledged that environmental issues had been severely neglected in the past due to the |

|need to focus on political changes but that with the new prioritization of developmental needs, the importance of environmental issues had become |

|increasingly clear. This perspective was not, however, uncontested as many people from all sectors continued to stress the dichotomous relationship between |

|environment and development, with development being regarded as of greater importance than environmental issues. |

The Durban South Basin is an environmental “hotspot” containing areas of heavy industry and residential development located in close proximity to one another in a topographically contained region. It is the economic “heartland” of Durban and is South Africa’s second most important manufacturing centre. Over the past several decades, the South Basin has become a focal point for community mobilization around environmental quality and justice issues. The aim of the SEA was to develop sustainable development guidelines to address existing problems and to guide future development in the area. The study examined potential short-term and long-term development scenarios for the South Basin and evaluated them against sustainable development criteria. The findings of the evaluation process suggested that the area was likely to retain an industrial character well into the foreseeable future and that the resources (financial and technological) required to address environmental quality issues were linked to the need to attract new industrial investment into the South Basin. The extensive public participation process undertaken during this project included an environmental education and capacity-building component. Although much time and effort was spent on this element of the project, it had limited impact due to the heightened tensions that existed between local government and local communities as a result of the study’s finding that certain future development options could result in the loss of existing residential areas.

c. Durban Metropolitan Open Space System (D’MOSS) framework plan

This project focused on the design of an open space plan to protect and guide the management of the city’s natural resource base. Areview of the role of open spaces in meeting the needs of a growing African city showed open spaces to have a key role in providing goods and services (such as water supply and pollution control) that are vital in meeting the basic needs of urban residents, in particular poor, conventionally unserviced communities. In Durban, the total replacement value of these open space services was estimated – using international research in the field of resource economics – at R 2.24 billion per annum. This figure excluded the value of Durban’s tourism sector, worth approximately R 3.5 million per annum. This project provided the opportunity to test the usefulness of tools such as resource economics in raising the profile of “green” issues on the political agenda.

d. Community open space development

In order to demonstrate the advantages of improved environmental management to local communities, a project was undertaken to create usable open spaces in high-density residential areas that would contribute to the ecological functioning of the open space system. This project was also intended to address community priorities such as poverty alleviation, improved quality of life, equal access to resources and job creation. The key problems encountered included: the lack of maintenance funds; vandalism; wasted resources; poor project management; and local communities’ discontent at not being involved in the maintenance of the project areas. Successful projects were characterized by active councillor and community involvement. However, even in these areas, problems such as vandalism and a lack of adequate funds for maintenance limited the success of the intervention.

e. Education and outreach initiative

The lack of understanding amongst all stakeholder groups regarding the importance of environmental management, sustainable development and Local Agenda 21 prompted the initiation of an education and outreach programme. The initiative included the production of media materials, capacity-building and training opportunities, and the use of innovative tools such as street theatre.

V. PHASE 3: TRANSITION AND REVIEW (1999-2000)

FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION of Phase 2 it became apparent that there would be a significant transition period as preparations began for the establishment of the Durban Unicity. It was decided that the most strategic use of this time would be to consolidate work already done and to lay the foundations for future programme development.

a. Cities Environmental Reports on the Internet (CEROI) project

South Africa’s four largest cities participated in this international project.(4)[13] The aim of the CEROI project was to facilitate comparative global reporting through the development of a simple and easily understood State of the Environment Report template for the Internet. This represented an opportunity for Durban to increase the accessibility of the information collected within its Local Agenda 21 programme to a broader range of local, national and international stakeholders.

b. Documentation of Durban’s Local Agenda 21 programme as an international case study

European Commission funding from the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) facilitated the documentation and publication of Durban’s Local Agenda 21 programme and created the opportunity to formally record and evaluate the work undertaken during the first seven years of the programme. This documentation process has been critical in developing an institutional memory in a situation where staff turnover levels are high and where institutional restructuring is a highly disruptive force.

|Box 2: Local Agenda 21 on the street |

|“Green Bafana” was a street theatre performance developed to bring sustainability issues to life, and employed a trio of Zulu freelance actors. In the Zulu |

|language and culture, Bafana means “the boys” but also denotes a connotation of popularity. The key theme of the play was that individual actions have an |

|environmental impact, either positive or negative. The play also celebrated the positive actions being taken by local government and communities to improve |

|quality of life and sustainability in Durban. The script emphasized the contribution that individuals can make towards improving the sustainability of local |

|government services and the environment in general. The performance was targeted at school groups, local government officials and councillors. |

c. Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level (APELL) project

The SEA project recommended the initiation of UNEP’s APELL programme in order to better prepare Durban for technological and industrial accidents in the South Basin. Although a launch workshop was held, this project could not be formally initiated as a leading community-based organization in the South Basin withdrew from the process because of APELL’s association with the SEA project. A subsequent mission by an overseas conflict resolution expert established the conditions to be met if APELL was to be undertaken successfully in Durban. Although all three stakeholder groups (local government, business/industry, local communities) expressed their qualified commitment to these preconditions, the international funding organization that sponsored the mission declined to fund the Durban APELL project. The reasons given were that the expected project budget exceeded its financial means, the project would deviate from its core business and its national government policy for South Africa had shifted to priorities other than environmental protection and resource management. Although the funding organization has offered to assist Durban in obtaining alternative sponsorship, it is possible that this setback will result in the demise of the APELL initiative in Durban.

d. Education and outreach initiative – promotional event

Following a spate of staff resignations,(5) [14]the Environmental Management Branch suspended the education and outreach initiative. In order to ensure that the impact of the initiative was not entirely lost, a promotional event was held to focus the attention of key local government officials and politicians on the achievements of the programme. A series of posters and a video profiled the work undertaken during the first six years (1994-2000).

e. Creation of an Interim Environmental Management Structure

Following approval for the interim restructuring(6)[15] and expansion of the Environmental Management Branch flowing from the DMEPI process, approval was received in 2001 for the filling of seven of the 19 new posts created. A review of critical posts throughout the council, however, led to this decision being revisited and only two of the new posts being approved for advertisement. This effectively leaves the Environmental Management Branch it its current under-resourced form for the foreseeable future.

VI. PHASE 4: PREPARING FOR THE UNICITY (2000-2002)

THE TRANSITION FROM apartheid to democracy in South Africa has brought with it changes to the size and nature of many of the country’s larger metropolitan areas. In Durban, there has been a metamorphosis from a municipal area of 300 square kilometres (pre-1996) to a transitional metropolitan area of 1,366 square kilometres (1996-2000) finally culminating in a Unicity(7)[16] (post-2000) of 2,297 square kilometres. This has resulted in large areas of peri-urban, rural and tribal land being included within the city’s boundaries. Sixty per cent of Durban is currently consid- ered to be peri-urban and rural in nature. The projects initiated during Phase 4 were a response to the required transition from a metropolitan to a Unicity administration.

a. Review of environmental performance in local government

A review of local government’s performance against the requirements of the Durban metropolitan environmental management policy was identified as the next step in the development of the city’s environmental management system (EMS). This process has identified six key projects that will assist in meeting the sustainability objectives of the city’s recently released long-term development framework. It is likely, however, that the resource limitations of the Environmental Management Branch will restrict the extent to which it can further advance EMS development once this review process is complete.

b. Preparation of a Unicity Environmental Services Management Plan (UESMP)

This project focused on the extension of the metropolitan open space plan to the new Unicity boundaries. The Unicity plan differs from the previous metropolitan plan in that it includes only those areas considered to be critical to the sustainable provision of open space services. The metropolitan plan, however, included all areas considered to contribute to the ecological viability of the open space system. This change in design approach has resulted in a substantial reduction in the spatial footprint of the Unicity plan. Available financial and legal tools were also investigated with a view to ensuring that important open spaces in private ownership are not lost because of the owner ’s financial inability to maintain them, or through the implementation of existing, inappropriate development rights. Although the project was completed in June 2001, the Environmental Management Branch is continuing to refine the UESMP during the remainder of Phase 4. The Environmental Management Branch is also hoping to lay the foundations for the handover of the open space planning function to the future Unicity Parks Department so that the planning and management of the natural resource base can be undertaken by a single line function.

c. Cities for Climate Protection Project

Concerns linked to open space planning and air quality management in Durban suggested that there was a need to consider both the local and global implications of these problems. “Climate change” provided a useful umbrella under which the global impacts of these local problems could be debated. A subsequent bilateral grant agreement between the national Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) and USAID (US Agency for International Development) to implement a South African programme to address global climate change (with a specific focus on eight South African cities) will provide funding and technical assistance for the initiation of a climate protection project in Durban.

VII. DURBAN’S SUSTAINABILITY ROAD MAP

IN REVIEWING DURBAN’S experiences, UNESCO’s “wise practice” framework(8)[17] provides a useful tool for highlighting the lessons learned that may be of general applicability to other local authorities which are considering the initiation of a Local Agenda 21 programme.

• Ensure long-term benefit. Benefits of the activity will be evident

years from now and will improve environmental quality.

Need for change. Durban has shown that Local Agenda 21 is not a pseudonym for “business as usual”. It is a call for long-term change in all sectors. For government, this could mean changing its structures to ensure a critical mass of people and resources working towards sustainability or facilitating the involvement of local stakeholders in decision-making processes. For business and industry, it could mean changing modes of production to become responsible contributors to local and global sustainability rather than just a vehicle for economic gain. For communities, it could mean replacing activism with a willingness to sit at the bargaining table to discuss new and difficult issues. Because Local Agenda 21 programmes will have to mediate these processes, they must be flexible enough to meet the expectations of the different stakeholder groups and responsive enough to react to the new priorities and needs that will emerge through time.

Ripple effects. Local Agenda 21 processes are slow to unfold and require time to become well rooted in local administrations and political structures. Changes in attitudes do not occur instantaneously. Because of the evolving nature of these processes, it is possible that decisions made at one point will have consequences later on in the process. This “ripple effect” needs to be managed and the possible long-term consequences of all decision making critically evaluated.

• Capacity-building and institutional strengthening. The activity should provide improved management capabilities and education for the stakeholder groups as well as knowledge and efforts to protect the local environment.

Need for capacity-building. Because the concept of sustainable development is so complex and the term “Local Agenda 21” foreign to so many, capacity-building and education are critical elements of any Local Agenda 21 programme. This capacity-building must be an ongoing process rather than a one-off exercise. Capacity-building must also be a priority task rather than the first programme element to be sacrificed when resources and skills are scarce. In order to be successful, Local Agenda 21 programmes must also acknowledge the capacity mismatch that exists between stakeholder groups. This is an important consideration as these programmes seek to create partnerships for local action under conditions where each partner will usually have different skills and capacity-building needs. One size does not fit all! Capacitybuilding is also important in ensuring that processes are not dominated by the agendas of gatekeeper groups.

Need for a critical institutional mass. There is a need to establish a critical institutional mass to sustain momentum and ensure delivery. This is necessary as Local Agenda 21 programmes require widespread networking and partnership development, a process that cannot be undertaken successfully by one or even a few people. Where this critical institutional mass is not achieved, there is a danger that there will be too strong a reliance on programme champion(s). Under these circumstances, programme sustainability becomes strongly aligned with the commitment and energy of individuals, a situation that is highly unsustainable.

• Sustainability. The activity adheres to the principles of sustainability

(the extent to which the results will last and development will continue

once the project/programme has ended).

The need for mainstreaming. Working towards greater sustainability in the urban environment is a complex task involving the coordination of stakeholders, resources and priorities. Because it will never occur spontaneously, it must be planned for. For this reason, it is imperative that Local Agenda 21 programmes are mainstreamed (i.e. prioritized within the strategic planning processes of local government) in order to ensure broadscale commitment and involvement. Local Agenda 21 programmes in the developing world particularly, need to have a strong developmental focus and must demonstrate how sustainability can help meet people’s basic needs and improve quality of life. Location within an environmental department therefore brings with it the danger that these processes will be seen as “green” or anti-development.

Need for adequate resourcing. Human and financial resource limitations will have severe impacts on Local Agenda 21 programmes. These range from the inability to undertake work, to the need to curtail or stop successful initiatives. Preventing the wastage of human and financial resources will require that Local Agenda 21 programmes are adequately resourced from the beginning. This is important as stakeholder expectations are raised through involvement, and the inability to complete the project or implement the resulting recommendations creates mistrust and reduces commitment to future projects.

Grab opportunities. Local Agenda 21 programmes should make use of “windows of opportunity”. This does not mean that programmes should be deliberately opportunistic in nature but rather, that they should be able to use changing circumstances (e.g. political transformation) to their advantage. The drawback is that the change and uncertainty that often characterize these “windows of opportunity” can have equally negative consequences for the Local Agenda 21 process, making it difficult to plan proactively and impacting on the motivation and commitment of staff.

Catalysts and implementers. There is a division between role players who act as “catalysts” and those who act as “implementers” in any Local Agenda 21 programme. Typically, “catalysts” initiate new projects, promote new ideas and seek out new problem-solving techniques. Every “catalyst” must, however, be partnered by an accompanying implementing agent to give effect to these new ideas. Unless both capacities are present in local government, many sustainable development initiatives are unlikely to go beyond the drawing board.

• Transferability. Aspects of the activity can be applied to other sites, in or outside the country. No carbon copies. Local Agenda 21 processes are not standardized and the individual needs and priorities of each city should be used to craft a city-specific programme. Although key principles and methodologies may be transferable between cities, in each case these have to be applied or used by people and institutions with a deep knowledge of the local context.

• Consensus-building. The activity should benefit a majority of the stakeholder groups while bearing in mind that, in some cases, certain 198 Environment&Urbanization Vol 14 No 1 April 2002 FEEDBACK under-privileged groups may need to be treated as special cases.

Need for compromise. All too often, the notion of sustainable development is taken to imply a “win-win” scenario. This is misleading, as there are likely to be instances where the move to greater sustainability produces situations that are regarded by some stakeholders as “winlose” scenarios. This implies that Local Agenda 21 programmes will be arenas for difficult decision-making and that they will have to rely on strong and visionary leadership to ensure that the best long-term decisions prevail. Particular care must be taken where potential losers belong to vulnerable or disadvantaged groups, in order to ensure that improved sustainability for the many does not further peripheralize the few. These groups must be fully engaged in determining and overseeing the process of change.

Conflict management. Where competition exists between well-established and entrenched power bases, new integrative initiatives such as Local Agenda 21 may be seen as threatening, signalling the emergence of a new competing power base or as an attempt to control existing ones. Local Agenda 21 practitioners should not think that because they advocate a better, more sustainable future, this idea will be readily accepted or embraced by other stakeholder groups. Some stakeholders could have vested interests in perpetuating unsustainability for short-term gain. Local Agenda 21 programmes can therefore be highly conflictual in nature and this must be planned for through the establishment of conflict-management processes and structures that regularly bring together different stakeholder groups and power bases for debate, dialogue and capacity-building in order to build trust and new partnerships.

• Participatory process. Participation of all stakeholder groups – where the intentions of all groups are known – and the involvement of individuals is intrinsic to the process.

Champions. The scale and complexity of the global environmental crisis often serves to trivialize the role of the individual. In Local Agenda 21 processes, a single person or small groups of people can and do make a difference. Local Agenda 21 programmes must therefore make space for more than just stakeholder groups, they must facilitate action by highly motivated individuals, particularly those who will act as champions. Champions are important as they provide continuity when interest wanes amongst other stakeholders, help brand processes, provide a rallying point for people with similar interests and are often instrumental in unblocking stalled or difficult processes. Without hardworking and committed champions, no Local Agenda 21 programme can hope to succeed or survive in the long term. At the same time, there are potential pitfalls associated with too strong a reliance on champions. There is the danger when a champion moves on (either geographically or in terms of interest) that the programme will lose momentum or collapse entirely. This does not mean that champions are irreplaceable but, rather, that Local Agenda 21 programmes should work towards the identification of a range of champions amongst all stakeholder groups (e.g. amongst city administrators in different line functions, politicians, community groups and NGOs) and help build their capacity to ensure the continuity and sustainability of the programme.

• Effective and efficient communication process. A multi-directional communication process involving dialogue, consultation and discussion is needed to attain awareness.

Consultation. The success of the consultation and participation processes within any Local Agenda 21 programme is often the best barometer of overall sustainability. Effective participation and consultation requires the creation of small, committed and accountable stakeholder groups that can play an integral role in the planning and implementation of projects. Astructured approach to participation (i.e. clear objectives and rules for interactions, defined roles and responsibilities) also provides a mechanism for addressing the distrust that can exist between stakeholders. By working together within an agreed format, new understandings and friendships are developed.

• Culturally respectful. The process values local traditional and cultural frameworks while also challenging their environmental validity. The challenge of cultural diversity. In a culturally and politically diverse society, Local Agenda 21 programmes must employ different tools and approaches to communicate ideas to stakeholders in terms that are meaningful to them.

• Gender and/or other sensitivity issues. The process accounts for the many aspects of gender and/or other sensitivity issues. The silent constituency. To date, Durban’s Local Agenda 21 programme has not focused specifically on gender-linked or other sensitivity issues or problems. This is not a result of a lack of awareness but, rather, the result of focusing limited resources on issues that are perceived to have greater developmental and political significance. This demonstrates how easily this aspect of sustainable development can be overlooked. Mechanisms will have to be found to mainstream gender and other sensitivity concerns, particularly in the cities of the developing world. This will require a diversity of interventions, for example training local government officials and the establishment of specific institutional structures to deal with gender and related issues, and for these issues to be incorporated into performance management systems.

• Strengthening local identities. The activity provides a sense of belonging and self-reliance at various levels. A cocktail of action. Local Agenda 21 projects that focus on policy development or planning are unlikely to change the attitudes of local communities. For any Local Agenda 21 programme to survive it must appeal to grassroots stakeholders as well as policy makers. It is difficult for most stakeholders to sustain interest and involvement in high-level processes that appear to have no direct benefits. This suggests that Local Agenda 21 programmes must link planning and policy generation with local development projects in order to ensure sustained buyin from the broader community.

• National legal policy. The activity adheres to current government environmental, economic, legal and social policies.

• Regional dimension. The activity should embody the regional, economic, social and environmental perspective. From the bottom up. Compliance with national and regional policy and law is a critical element in ensuring long-term sustainability. There will, however, be instances where local processes highlight the unsustainability or unsuitability of these higher-order requirements. Under these circumstances, local needs should be used to inform and motivate for changes in these broader frameworks.

• Human rights. The activity should provide freedom to exercise fundamental rights. 200 Environment&Urbanization Vol 14 No 1 April 2002 FEEDBACK Providing a platform. Local Agenda 21 programmes must provide a platform for all stakeholder groups to exercise their fundamental rights and to lobby for change where these rights are compromised through unsustainable development.

• Documentation. The activity and the lessons learnt have been well documented. Creating institutional memory. The complexity and dynamism of many Local Agenda 21 programmes mean that many important processes, experiences and decisions are not adequately documented due to a lack of time and resources. The net result is that no permanent institutional memory is created and valuable lessons are lost. Time and resources must be found in all Local Agenda 21 programmes to document sustainability experiences.

• Evaluation. The activity has been tested to determine the extent to which wise-practice characteristics have been utilized. Measuring progress. It has been internationally recognized that a system for measuring achievements and monitoring the implementation of Local Agenda 21 programmes is important. This need is, however, often overlooked due to the lack of appropriate human and financial resources and the fact that no measurable objectives were specified at the beginning of the process. This means that those involved directly in the programme are not able to assess realistically the level of success and that the progress made will often be obscured by the difficulties associated with the process. The need for monitoring also underlines the urgent need for accurate and comprehensive databases to be developed in all key sustainable development sectors to establish the baseline state and evaluate future progress.

My commentaries on Text #9 _ DURBAN’S LOCAL AGENDA 21

Ideas at random

This report is dated April 2002, before the Jo’burg Earth Summit for which it was written. (See 27-28 p. 18)

The authors insist on the problems in connection with the implementation of sustainable development in the Durban area.

The main source of these problems seems to be the heritage of apartheid.

Another problem is that most people identify sustainable development as anti-development, which entailed lack of political support.

Limited human and financial resources made these problems worse.

But sustainable development still on Durban’s agenda, with mechanisms now existing for its implementation, and lessons acquired from experience.

A unique moment : Rio, end of apartheid, emerging environmental concern in Durban (35-44 p. 18)

This document is typically sustainable development (69-72 p. 18).

Emphasis on participation of all kinds of communities (business, local, …) (79-85 p. 18).

It is said (box 1 p. 19, that, against prevailing beliefs, both rich and poor people acknowledge the importance of environmental issues in Durban.

Durban, with its rich and poor districts, is emblematic of the North/South global situation. 

The Durban South Basin is an area of conflicts typical of the conflicts that follow the implementaiton of Agenda 21 policies. The irony is that industrial investments are necessary to finance local environmental proctection initiatives. The efforts in environmental education had a limited impact because of tensions about the loss of future residential areas.

D’MOSS

Effort to “demonstrate the advantages of improved environmental management to local communities” exemplifies the importance of environmental education in the implementation of Agenda 21. Same with street theater.

It was not America but Europe who contributed most to the project (99 p. 19) but USAID (104 p. 20) funded research about global warming! International competition or cooperation to wield more influence in the New South Africa?

It is claimed here that Agenda 21 is not a synonym for “business as usual” which is evidence that ecological conscience is a rising factor in public policies in R.S.A. and elsewhere. The long-term implication is that the American model based on the free exploitation of natural resources is doomed.

Capacity-building [renforcement des compétences] (1-10 p. 21) is a synonym for empowerment, and it is strongly associated with education: a new form of citizen invovemetn is needed for better governance.

Mainstreaming sustainability (38-52 p. 21) means that sustainable development must become the rule in all kinds of planning which amounts to saying that an utterly different approach to governing, planning, organizing development must be implemented especially in people’s minds. [Nicolas Hulot?]

The last part of the report is mostly about a new methodology of public policying (most of page 21).

The section about compromise and special rights for minorities reminds one of the notion of compromise in the US (1787-1861).

In the final part of the report, the usual current themes (gender, sustainability, regionalism, cultural identity, human rights, evaluation) are all mentioned which tends to show that sustainable development involves the implementation of ideas that have nourished the culture wars of recent years and that the world is witnessing a paradigm shift.

As a conclusion

1) this document is undoubtedly “sustainable development” and clearly says so.

2) there is some emphasis on local culture that must be respected in the process of implementing not a neo-libearl globalization but sustainable development itself: in that sense, sustainable development encourages cultural resistance in general and the respect of local cultures.

3) in fact , this report illuminates the fact that our world is to undergo a major shift in matters of governance, from “politics as usual” to “mainstreaming sustainability”.

All things considered, if this report emphasizes the problems that follow the implementéation of Agenda 21 policies, it also defines the governance of tomorrow.

Session 9 - NGOs

Text # 10 job: NGO coordinator

. Accessed 30 July 2005.

job: NGO coordinator, Boston colist at comm-org.utoledo.edu colist at comm-org.utoledo.edu Thu Jan 29 20:00:24 EST 2004

[ed: this job post includes salary info.]

From: Spencer Wells

Coordinator , groundWork USA Job Description

groundwork USA, an affiliate of groundWork, a South African-based environmental justice NGO, is seeking a full-time US Coordinator to work out of its Boston office beginning May 1, 2004.

The coordinator will work to provide our South African partners with the technical assistance, solidarity, contacts and funding they need to forward their campaigns. The coordinator is expected to acquire knowledge about the environmental justice movements in South Africa and the US to effectively connect and support both movements with a primary focus on South Africa.

The coordinator will work closely with and report directly to the director of groundWork USA and will work closely with the staff and management team of groundWork in South Africa to forward groundWork1s mission:

groundWork seeks to improve the quality of life of vulnerable people in South Africa, and increasingly in Southern Africa, through assisting civil society to have a greater impact on environmental governance. groundWork places particular emphasis on assisting vulnerable and previously disadvantaged people who are most affected by environmental injustices.

DUTIES: Responsibilities for this position includes:

- coordinating communication with partners in the US and South Africa

- proposal writing, grants management and reporting

- organizing and coordinating all programatic and operational activities

- working closely with the groundWork USA director and all of the groundWork staff in South Africa on various projects and campaigns

- organizing exchanges and tours in the US and South Africa

- participating in strategic planning

- participating in panels, roundtables, conferences and lecture series on South Africa and environmental justice

- 2-3 weeks annual travel to South Africa

QUALIFICATIONS: A demonstrated interest and at least 2-3 years experience in social and environmental justice work is required. Candidates should also possess strong interpersonal, writing and communication skills, computer literacy (preferably Macs), effective organizing skills, the ability to track multiple tasks, and experience in fundraising, proposal writing and project implementation. A dedicated activist who is also a motivated self-starter is preferred for this position.

TERMS: Full-time (40 plus hours a week) position starting at $26,000 to $32,000 based on experience and education. Benefits include full health insurance. The position will begin May 1, 2004.

Please send a resume and a cover letter detailing how you feel connected to social justice, environmental justice and / or South Africa to Ravi Dixit, groundWork USA c/o The South Africa Development Fund, 555 Amory Street, Jamaica Plain, MA 02130, or by e-mail to rdixit at . Deadline for applications: March 1, 2004. You can also visit our website for further

details .za or groundwork-

People of color are strongly encouraged to apply.

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See this RSA-US_black?activism.doc

About Environmental justice

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Environmental justice is a term in the social sciences used to describe injustices in the way natural resources are used. Environmental justice is a holistic effort to analyze and overcome the power structures that have traditionally thwarted environmental reforms.

The theoretical framework of environmental justice is strongly linked to the environmental justice movement. At the beginning of the 1980s, environmental justice emerged as a concept in the United States. Pointing to a particular date or event that launched the Environmental Justice Movement is difficult, as the movement grew organically out of dozens, even hundreds, of local struggles and events and out of a variety of other social movements.

…

Traditionally the environmental movements have been concerned with purely ecological issues including wilderness preservation, endangered species, overpopulation, recycling, and energy consumption. The environmental justice movement is seen by some as an attempt to shift the focus of the environmental movement away from these issues toward more anthropocentric concerns such as racism, classism, and sexism since these forms of oppression lead to unequal burdens of environmental pollution being felt by people of color, women, and low-income people. However, some criticize the environmental justice movement as being a form of political correctness, and some believe the increasing focus on environmental justice leads to environmental groups compromising environmental protection or even taking positions in opposition to environmental protection. Some critics of the movement suggest that environmental justice advocacy rests on an inadequate empirical foundation, especially regarding allegations of adverse health impacts on low-income and minority communities.

Environmental justice focuses on the direct impact on living conditions of affected communities. These are primarily health concerns. It often focuses on environmental concerns on urban areas where people live, as opposed to wilderness areas. Corporate accountability is a major component of environmental justice.

My comments on Text # 10 job: NGO coordinator

A paradox: an American style NGO in south Africa recruits staff in the United States!

The very fact that groundWork claims to be an environmental justice NGO says that it has been influenced if not ceated by a movement which began in the United States. This shows the strong influence of the United States in environmental matters globally.

Another obvious remark to be made here is that sustainable development is not even mentioned. In so far as sustainable development advocates economic growth, environmental protection and, most important for us here, social justice, it should meet the needs of any environmental justice movement. But there is that specific movement called groundWork in South Africa. Again, it shows that American influence is felt all over the world, nort only in economic terms, but also in terms of environmental resistance.

The ad itself is culturally marked. Emphasis is on work and pay, communications skills, computer skills. The obvious essential taks of the recipient will be fund raising, a foundational American feature.

Session 10 - India -

Introduction (from Britannica online)

Beginning in the 1960s the various philosophical strands of environmentalism were given political expression through the establishment of “green” political movements in the form of activist nongovernmental organizations and environmentalist political parties. Despite the diversity of the environmental movement, four pillars provided a unifying theme to the broad goals of political ecology: protection of the environment, grassroots democracy, social justice, and nonviolence. However, for a small number of environmental groups and individual activists who engaged in ecoterrorism, violence was viewed as a justified response to what they considered the violent treatment of nature by some interests, particularly the logging and mining industries. The political goals of the contemporary green movement in the industrialized West focused on changing government policy and promoting environmental social values. In the less-industrialized or developing world, environmentalism has been more closely involved in “emancipatory” politics and grassroots activism on issues such as poverty, democratization, and political and human rights, including the rights of women and indigenous peoples. Examples of such movements include the Chipko movement in India, which linked forest protection with the rights of women, and the Assembly of the Poor in Thailand, a coalition of movements fighting for the right to participate in environmental and development policies.

Text #11 Chipko

Chipko Movement

. Accessed 9 August 2005.

A. IDENTIFICATION

1. Issue

Deforestation is a severe problem in northern India and local people have banded together to prevent commerical timber harvesting. These people have adopted a unique strategy in recognizing trees as valuable, living beings. The Chipko movement adherents are known literally as "tree huggers."

2. Description

The meaning of Chipko, translated in Hindi, literally means "tree-huggers." No one actually knows when this movement began; however, in the 1970's seemed to be the [time ? moment ?] when the conflict was heightened most. The British government controlled the northern hill districts of India in the nineteenth century. During this period (1815-1947), Uttarakhand was divided into two contiguous but distinct sociopolitical units, the nominally independent chiefdom of Tehri Garhwal and the British administered Kumanun Division. Agriculture dominated both regions in that "eighty- percent of the total population farmed largely with the help of family labour." Although caste distinctions has not been stringent, the agrarian structure of Uttarakhand differs significantly from the adjoining plains.

Historically, the Indian Himalayan region has been under the control of expatriates (particularly Germans) since 1855 in order to produce lumber for the railroads. The government nationalized one-fifth of the forest area and enacted legislation," Indian Forest Act of 1878, "regulating peasant access by restricting it to areas of forest not deemed commercially profitable." Sanctions were enacted on those that breach those laws. Although most of the bureaucratic structures of the government maintained that deforestation was specifically deemed for scientific and legal purpose, they paid off forest managers to excavate entire land areas to be used for commercial expenditures. The proceeds were usually put into the governmental treasury.

Although there is no one particular person that takes credit for starting the movement, one name that seems to be synonymous is Sunderial Bbahuguna, the leader. The protestors, consisting of mostly women and their children, were called on by their leader to form a ban in order to stop the ursuption of trees from the Uttarakhand. The enduring nature of Chipko has raised several questions. The movement has been instrumental in the social and ecological disintegration of the hill society and also the ideological clashes between subcultures of the movement and the redefinition of gender roles.

Environmental awareness increased dramatically in the 1990s in India -- and so did the number of organized lobbies to champion the cause of a cleaner environment. As a result, New Delhi introduced legislation aimed at curbing pollution, but the enforcement mechanism has been little. Multilaternational corporations were affected the most with high costs increasing. As early as August of 1994, Chipko huggers wanted to stop the construction of the dam at Tehri because the protestors claim that it will uproot trees and pose a flood threat. Today, most of the state legislators respect the peasant and their habitants. Nonetheless, to prevent future clearings, the Chipko "tree huggers" are still very active.

Agriculture to feed the indigenous families of the hills is dependent on dense forest coverage. The peasants of India's hills depend on the forests for fuel, fodder, agricultural implements, building timber, medicines and in times of dearth,[18] food. "In the period before state intervention, not only did the peasantry have full access to the forests, but their strong communal institutions fostered the prudent utilization for forest produce." Subsistence agriculture provided women the necessary nutrients needed to feed their families. In most cases, the surplus was used to sell their value added resources through the market economy. Uttarakhand has moved away from subsistence-oriented peasant economy to a dependent on outside remittances to live.

According to Gross, India is caught in the vortex of the market economy and faced with multiple environmental hazards, hill society is today in a state of continuing economic deterioration." The most affected by the deforestation are the women of the villages. They must travel long distances to get firewood and fodder. Because of the distances, they often leave much of the wood behind. In addition, the wood is usually picked over leaving the worse for the women that were not aggressive enough.

The debate is two-fold. the state and means of survival depend on the Himalayas for this commercially profitable resources as well as its scientific richness. Most environmentalist in the Chipko Movement claim that this is a scheme or euphemism for economic exploitation. At a deeper epistemic level, the language of scientific forestry worked to justify the shift towards commercial working. By similar act of redefinition -- one that rested on a priori usurpation of legal rights to ownership by the state -- the customary users of the forest were designated its enemies. Thus the management profile of each forest division, the so-called working plans, while indicating possible sources of injury to the forest crop included men of the same category as natural hazards and wild animals. Recent research by Indian ecologist, ironically enough, commissioned by the Forest Department, clearly demonstrated the "yawning gulf between the ideology of sustained yield and the actual operations of timber harvesting, wherein the output of logged material often exceeds the increment to forest stock."

Commerical Viability

Commercial timber operations were given a boost when laboratory trials at the Forest Research Institute showed that the utilization of chir waste (the material after the conversion of logs to railway sleepers) for paper making was a viable proposition. Selling the waste and utilizing the considerable areas of chir affected by twist, the Forest Department entered into a contract with a large paper manufacturer, the Star Paper Mills of Saharanpur. From 1961 to 1981, under the terms of the agreement, the mill buy waste timber and twisted chir trees at highly subsidized prices. Approximately 15 to 20 thousand tons of pulpwood were supplied annually to the mill. When further research at the FRI established that ash and hornbeam[19] could be used for the manufacture of sports goods, the Symonds Company of Allahabad was granted access to the unexploited broad-leaved forests.

During World War I, the extraction of chir sleepers was high. 400,000 sleepers were exported from Kumaun during 1916-18. Even more were extracted during World War II. In 1940-41, 440,000 sleepers were supplied to the railways, mostly of chir pine. The government, in a need to tightened controls, gave the Forest Department control over the panchayats (forests that are controlled by the villagers). Under the new mandates, the panchayats could only fell trees marked by the department. Local sale of slates and resin were allowed only by permission. According to Yugvani in Hindi Weekly from Dehradum, the villagers could only retain a fixed share (40%) of any royalty on the sale on produce from their forests.

In 1958, a committee was formed to investigate the grievances of the people of Uttarakhand concerning forest management. In protest, villagers refused, as stated in the Forest Act mandates, to put out forest fires. It was not until the heavy monsoon of 1970 that precipitated the turning point in ecological history. According to Bratt, due to the blockage of the Ganga canal, 9.5 million acres of land in eastern Uttar Pradesh went without irrigation. Gram Swarajya Sangh (DGSS), an organization based in the Chamoli district organized in the mid- 60's, combated obstacles to maintain their small resin and turpentine unit. The Chipko Movement began in 1973 in the village of Mandal in the upper Alakananda valley. The DGSS was refused permission to fell ash trees to be converted into agricultural implements. After DGSS did all they could to protest, a leading activist, Chandi Prasad Bhatt, suddenly thought of embracing the trees. Women took their children to the forests and formed a circle around the trees to prevent the slaughtering of trees.

The success of Chipko has saved some 100,000 trees from excavation. The styles of activism differ. On one hand, there is a constant flow of articles and materials and on the other hand, there is an active fight for the survival of 70-80 percent of saplings. This survival is credited mostly to the women of the peasant economy.

The Chipko Movement is inimical to gender [ * ???]-- the theoretical underpinnings as well as the political and economic ones. Women and children gather firewood for domestic consumption. They rely on the forestry for combustible crop residues such as rice straw. This, however, is considered inferior to fuelwood.

Therefore, forestry activities that increase the availability of fuelwood and development projects that promote improved stoves both release women's labour from fuel collection and permit its use in other productive activities, and improve the agricultural environment by permitting crop residues to be better used for enriching depleted soil. Many women claim that they are not the sole collectors of fuelwood, as often presumed. However, subsistence agricultural households may be the leading cause of world deforestation. It is a fact that women in the northern hill area of India such as the Alakananda valley respond rationally to increased resource scarcity. In a utility maximizing household,/ agricultural residues and improved stoves/ are substitutes for fuelwood in consumption. The household can purchase or sell fuelwood and food crops in complete and existing competitive markets, but its purchases are constrained by the sum of household profit from the sale of fuelwood and food crops, plus exogenous household income from business and service activities.

Households may collect fuelwood from community forests and also from trees and woody plants growing on terrace walls and along the boundaries of each household's private agricultural lands. This implies that environmental problems are not just specifically congruent to the poor. Both fuelwood and residues tend to be inferior goods. Fuelwood is inferior for higher income households where there is a more active and higher priced fuelwood market. Residues are inferior for the general population. Therefore, environmental studies should focus on lower class dependence on the forestry as well as including the upper class dependency. Many "environmentalist" would like to claim that the Chipko movement goes against ecologically sound policies and are hazardous to the forests.

The Chipko women's defense is that they are truly concerned about the preservation of forest area but on a higher level, it is the preservation of a little community and its values. This debate between the chipko women and the exogenous as well as the endogenous community resemble on a higher level the debate of the least developed countries (LDCs) as well as the highly developed countries (HDCs). The former would wish to ascribe to an authoritative allocation of resources in the international global economy. The HDCs proscribe many complicated and capricious laws that the LDCs see as contrary to their very way of life. The combination of trade and environmental laws are seen as a hinderance to the LDCs. They are forced into compliance with certain standards and regulations.

On one hand, the Chipko women are seeking an escape from the commercial economy and the centralizing state; at yet another level they are assertive and aggressive, actively challenging the ruling-class vision of a homogenizing urban-industrial culture. Meadows describes this as the culmination for the private (peasant movement) and public (ecological movement) profile that gives Chipko a distinctive quality and strength. This ecological as well as cultural crisis provides on a smaller scale a way that preserving the rudimentary elements of nature.

Some credible solutions that have been proposed by the leaders of the movement include abiding by the recommendations of the state leaders which would be detrimental to the peasantry. Historically, political power by the state bureautics have created downstream solutions. Since the movement effects many boundaries, politicians need to implement a bottom-up approach.

For Bahuguna, shortsighted forest management is a symptom of a deeper malaise, the anthropocentric view of nature intrinsic to modern industrial civilization. He claims man is the "butcher of Earth." Buhuguna's group is very active in the Bhageerathi valley. He works on what they call a prophetic mode: attempting to convert the uninitiated. He asserts that modern science an technology are largely informed by Christian ideals of human transcendence and rightful mastery over nature. He views do not coincide with Western beliefs. Bhatt, on the other hand, is different from Bahuguna in that he believes that the villagers play a distinctive role in deforestation. This has been a result of "separating the local population from the management from the forest wealth." He claimes that the schemes proposed by the urban-centered technocrats have little relevance to the realities of rural India.

Bhatt exemplifies a grassroots campaign. Besides afforestation camps conducted annually, they are also working on the installation of bio-gas plants and energy saving devices that help the underprivileged. His movement has proven to be the most successful. The rate of survival of saplings (65 to 80 per cent) the survival rate achieved in government plantations (around 10 to 15 per cent) is embarrassing. The financial backing of the latter far exceed the former. The lack of sensitivity within the government and unformulated plans that do not include rural areas and women specific environmental projects results in failed schemes. A third group, the Uttarakahand Sangharsh Vahini (USV) active in Kumaun, ideology strongly resembles Marxist theories. Because this movement refuses to associate itself with the state-sponsored development programs, they have many heated confrontations with the administration.

Ironically, the USV also disassociates itself with the other two movements. Perhaps it can be explained that this movement prescribes to the school of thought that the human- nature relationship must not be viewed in isolation from existing relationships among humans. Ecological harmony is second to the redistribution of economic and social avenues for the UVA. Unlike the movement of Bahuguna and Bhatt, UVA believes in violent uprisings. USV prefers social movements that conform the state. They claim that the state has a moral responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. Capitalist penetration (trade) and environmental policies (degradation) should be fixed by the state and not by grassroots reconstruction work of afforestation (Bhatt). Reddy, A.K.N., emphasized the technology is alleviate the dichotomy between the trade and the environment. He says that "technologies that are employment-generating; economically sound; that promote self-reliance (both in terms of invoking mass participation and using local resources; that tend to reduce rather than reinforce inequalities; and that build upon, rather than neglect, traditional skills."

3. RELATED CASES

HIMALAY case EVEREST case JAMES case EXXON case TURBOT case DONUT case INDONES case BRAZIL case

Keyword Clusters

(1): Product = CHEMicals (2): Bio-geography = TEMPerate (3): Environmental Problem = Pollution Sea [POLS]

Similar cases exist in other countries. In the former, the James Bay power project in Quebec, Canada resembles the Chipko Movement, the Kayapo Indians in Brazil, the Nahuatl in Mexico, the Peigan Indians in Alberta, Canada, and the forest project in North Karela, Finland. All of these cases involve the displacement of indigenous people by the state or similar governmental bureaucracies. In India, other cases include the Doon Valley Project and the Sarvodaya activists. In the latter, during the 60's, thousands of villagers (mostly women) opposed the widespread sale and distillation of liquor.

4. DRAFT AUTHOR: Charisse Espy

B. LEGAL CLUSTER

5. DISCOURSE AND STATUS: DISagreement and INPROGress

The Chipko people and the state regulating boards are somewhat in agreement, although no treaty exists to hold the two parties in binding obligations. Even though the Chipko movement has not officially had "their day in court," they have presided over other litigations. The stage of the case towards conflict resolution seems to be moderate. In March of 1987, the Himalayan battle forced the government to impose a 15-year ban on commercial of green trees in the hills of northern Uttar Prades State.

6. FORUM AND SCOPE: INDIA and UNILATeral

7. Scope: 1

By reversing the laws of the indigenous people, many loggers, landowners, corporations, plywood manufacturers, mining companies, consumers of cheap products, undiscerning tropical timbers buyers, developers of dams, political candidates, and scientific ecological seekers would be adversely affected.

8. LEGAL STANDING: LAW

The local laws more times than not are incongruent with national laws. Because the peasants of the hills allot a certain amount of trees to be excavated from the forests, their laws work for them; however, when the government tries to enforce their laws, more trees are excavated than the peasants desire. This makes it extremely difficult to keep an accurate count. No official treaties exist.

C. GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTER

9. GEOGRAPHY

Geographic Domain: [Asia] Geographic Site: South Asia [S Asia] Geographic Impact: India

10. SUB-NATIONAL FACTORS: YES

11. HABITAT TYPE: 1

12. TYPE OF MEASURE: [REGBAN]

13. DIRECT VS. INDIRECT: INDirect

14. RELATION OF MEASURE TO IMPACT:

a. Directly Related: NO b. Indirectly Related: YES WOOD c. Not related to Product: NO d. Related to process: YES, Deforestation

15. TRADE PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION: PAPER, CHIR

16. ECONOMIC DATA

Between 1967-68 and 1978-79, forest revenue from the hill districts increased from 96 to 202 million rupees. Graph missing

17. DEGREE OF COMPETITIVE IMPACT: BAN

18. INDUSTRY SECTOR: WOOD

19. EXPORTER AND IMPORTER: INDIA and UK

20. ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM TYPE: DEFORestation

21. SPECIES INFORMATION

22. IMPACT AND EFFECT: HIGH AND PRODuct

23. URGENCY AND LIFETIME: LOW and 100s of years

24. SUBSTITUTES: RECYCling

F. OTHER FACTORS

25. CULTURE: YES

The Chipko people believed that the trees were living and breathing carbon dioxide, the same as they were. In essence, the trees should be respected. The extensive forests were central to the successful practice of agriculture and animal husbandry. In addition, medicinal herbs were used for healing powers. The hill people believed that the jungle of fruit, vegetables or roots were used as aids in the times of scarity. The dependence of the hill peasant on forest resources was institutionalized through a variety of social and cultural mechanisms. Through religion, folklore and oral tradition, the forests were protected by rings of love. Hilltops were dedicated to local deities and the trees around the spot regarded with great respect. Many wooded areas were not of spontaneous growth and bore marks of the hillfolk's instinct for the plantation and preservation of the forest; indeed the "spacious wooded areas extending over the mountain ranges and hill sides testimony to the care bestowed upon them by the successive generations of the Kumaunies."

Particularly in eastern Kumaun and around temples, deodar plantations were preserved. Hindus consider this magnificent tree superior to most trees. In such sacred groves, the traditonal form of forest preservation, and one found all over India, no villager would injure the vegetation in any way. IN parts of Tehri, leaves are offered to the goddess known as Patna Devi. This is only one example of the Hindu's fascination of vegetation association with gods. According to one elder man, in the Ton's valley, urbers and roots the peasantry's food during times of scarcity are used only during culturally specified times to inhibit overexploitation. Although the sacredness exemplified in the preservation of the forest, it was also the informal management practices regulated the utilization of forest produce by the community.

26. HUMAN RIGHTS: YES

Cultural relativism is a term is defined as the position according to which local cultural traditions (including religious, political and legal practices) determine the scope of political and civil rights enjoyed by people of a given community. Relativists claim that substantive human rights standards vary among different cultures and necessarily reflect national idiosyncrasies. What may be seen as a human rights violation in one country, may be seen as a natural course of action in another country. The Chipko people feverently believe that the "tree-huging," and putting rakhis around the trees are based on cultural traditions. The evacuation of the trees are seen as violations of socioeconomic rights--second generation rights. This is seen as a direct violation of customary international law or the sovereign borders of the indigeous sector.

27. TRANS-BOUNDARY ISSUES: YES

The Himalayan region extends beyond India. They include China, Pakistian, Nepal, Bagledesh and Bhutan. The separation geographically of these regions coincides with transnational properties of the system. The problem of the Himalyian region is a people problem. It is a soical economic and political problem set against a dramatic physical backdrop--the greatest mountain range in the world.

28. RELEVANT LITERATURE

Agarwal, Anil, "Human-nature interactions in a Third World country" Fifth World Conservation Lecture, The Environmentalist, vol. 6, no. 3.

Agarwal and Narain, "India: The State of the Environment," 1985.

Annual Administrative Report for the Tehri Garhwal state 1937.

Adakari, Ajay. Interview. 13 February 1995. Professor of Accounting at The American University.

Bahuguna, Sunderlal, "Uttarakakhand Mein Ek Sau Bis Din, in Hindi, Dehradun. 1974.

Business International. "India Goes Greener in 1990." 17 June 1990.

Gross, Birth, Death and Migration in the Himalayas, New Delhi: pg. 184.

Guha, Ramachandra. "The Malign Encounter: The Chipko Movement and Competing Visions of Nature." United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics.

Guha, Ramachandra. The Unquiet Woods. University of California Press. Berkeley. 1989.

Guha, Ramachandra. "Ecological Roots of Development Crisis" EPW, 12 April 1986.

Inter Press Service, "Modern-Day Gandhi Forces India to Suspend Dam Project" 10 June 1992.

Joshi, Gopa "Men propose women dispose" "Indian Express, 14 January 1982.

Meadows, Donnella, et al. The Limits of Growth. New York, 1971.

New York Times. "Social Activism Sprouts as India's Politics Decay" 15 June 1982.

Reuter News Service India, "India Green says Dam Hurts Hindu Feelings" August 25, 1994.

Smythies, E.A. "The resin industry in Kumaun," Forest Bulletin No. 26 Calcutta. 1914.

Uttar Pradesh Forest Statistics

References

Critique (see Inpiration document Chipko.isf)

Recurrent keywords or themes

Rurality

Women

Community

Remarks at random

Like in RSA, two societies in India, the rich and the poor.

Our ecological crisis is rooted in anthropocentrism.

Ecofeminism ?

The Chipko movement can be considered as an example of ecofeminism but the motives of the Indian women who were and possibly still are active in the movement make us think of a more communal and cultural movement, not unlike that of the the Greenbelt in Kenya.

Theses women (and their children) resisted the effects of a market economy in a India’s state dominated bureaucracy of the Forest Service.

Religion and ecosystem management

Generations after generations, local communities develop rituals associated with their creeds and religious beliefs that prevent them from overexploiting their natural environment. The Himalayas are a good example of this.

Conclusion

The most promising movments it seems as far as sustainability in rural areas of poor countries is concerned seemed to be led by women because the latter are the nourishers of their own families and are aware of the real state of the

Interestingly, local cultures seem to resist globalization and cultural assimilation.

But “economic development is pushing all countries in a common direction, which is manifest as a reinforcement of values such as gender equality, tolerance, good governance and democracy.”

The latter three features undoubtedly are part of the ideals of progressive American activists.

Americanization?

Assessing the seminar

Ask questions about the texts ?

A reminder

Syntheses

Unused material

Ancien Descriptif

|Autre descriptif (janvier 2005) |

|Environnementalisme et globalisation ont désormais partie liée sur la scène internationale. |

| |

|Cette UE propose donc d'étudier plus particulièrement la genèse du concept de développement durable dans le foisonnement des philosophies de |

|l'environnement de la fin du XXe siècle, et les raisons des résistances de l'hégémonisme américain à son essor et à sa prise en compte (Rio, |

|Johannesburg). De même, on verra que la notion de développement durable est en position de concurrence par rapport aux concepts liés à la |

|globalisation et tout particulièrement celui de néolibéralisme. |

| |

|Les pays de la zone OI, pris entre la logique néo-libérale de la globalisation, la manne d'une présence américaine sous l'égide de USAID notamment |

|à Madagascar, et leurs propres traditions culturelles régionales ou nationales, ont déjà exprimé leur résistance aux réformes plus ou moins perçues|

|comme imposées de l'extérieur (Chipko movement en Inde). |

| |

|Ces résistances ou affrontements peuvent être perçus comme la pierre de touche pour les identités locales, la pierre d'achoppement de la mise en |

|place d'un développement aveugle, ou encore le tremplin indispensable sur lequel appuyer le développement durable. A travers quelques études de cas|

|pris dans la zone, les étudiants seront amenés à mesurer les implications de ces confrontations et conflits liés à l'interculturalité. |

Text #1 : Interculturality in the Garden

- The First ASPS Seminar: "Globalization and Business Cultures", American Studies Project at Skeria, Skelleftea, Sweden, February 15-16, 2002. ( on this disk)

INTERCULTURALITY IN THE GARDEN: AMERICANIZATION AND OTHERNESS

Albena Bakratcheva

. Accessed 2 August 2005.

"To do things "railroad fashion" is now the by-word;" - Henry David Thoreau wrote in WALDEN, - "and it is worth the while to be warned so often and so sincerely by any power to get off its track. There is no stopping to read the riot act, no firing over the heads of the mob, in this case. WE HAVE CONSTRUCTED A FATE, AN ATROPOS, THAT NEVER TURNS ASIDE. (Let that be the name of your ENGINE.)".

The year was 1845. Thoreau put a diagnosis and pointed out the irreversible direction of what he called the constructed fate of humankind. Moreover, he named it in terms of brutal intrusion: that of the engine into the pastoral landscape, or of the machine into the garden of Nature. In the vision of this American transcendentalist, who "should be glad if all the meadows on the earth were left in a wild state", his contemporary way of the world could not be but a distraction from true living. And what he pleaded for was concentration. If "the air was full of invisible bolts" he could not but take that as a harsh, extreme opposition to what he cherished most - simplicity. Thus the problem was clearly set; artificial and natural were seen as conflicting powers in a process never to be turned aside. Moreover, man's participation in this process was considered to be false, untrue, i.e. constructed. "Keep on your own track, then", Thoreau concluded.

There is also another thing in the above quoted passage that is interesting to me. Thoreau is mentioning a linguistic novelty - the expression "to do things "railroad fashion"" is obviously a language twist to him, i.e. a manifestation of violence towards language in order for it to express adequately the already existing violence towards Nature. Hence the quotation marks he uses. So language - this other sacred territory for all the romantics - is felt by Thoreau to have been involved in and subdued to the irreversible, alien to Nature process of mechanization.

I would suggest here that talking about Thoreau is not simply talking about American individualistic hostility towards the beginning of the first era of globalization. I would suggest here that talking about Thoreau - regardless of his negative interpretations - makes it clear that a new culture was emerging at the time: the business culture. And it was already acquiring its own language. This culture was still in the singular; the plural [multiculturalism] was yet to come. But it was immediately felt different, i.e. it immediately outlined the issue of OTHERNESS.

Starting from the mid-1800s and lasting till the late 1920s, the first era of globalization, as Thomas Friedman states in his remarkable book, "was built around falling transportation costs. Thanks to the invention of the railroad, the steamship and the automobile, people could get to a lot more places faster and cheaper".(p. XVII) So this was it - DOING it the "railroad fashion" and also SAYING it the "railroad fashion".

Of course, this was not Thoreau's fashion. But once he was able to declare what he was not, he was actually confirming the emergence of a novelty as well as his own awareness of how persistent this novelty was. Speed was not an attraction to him, for - in his own words - he had "learned that the swiftest traveller is he that goes afoot". Thoreau was a walker, who - like Kant some few decades earlier - almost never left his hometown and its vicinity. Kant did not have to face the reality of the world getting smaller and smaller. Thoreau did, though. And what he took to be the disturbed harmony between man and nature became a major concern of his. "Our inventions are... but improved means to an unimproved end - he goes on in WALDEN. - We are in great haste to construct a magnetic telegraph from Maine to Texas; but Maine and Texas, it may be, have nothing important to communicate." These often quoted lines suggest in their turn the idea of distraction v.s. concentration, of artificial intrusion v.s. natural harmony, of losing the focus because of the periphery. It is not hard to imagine a Thoreauvian reaction against todays microchips, satellites, fiber optics and the Internet. It is hard to imagine a Thoreau, though, in our present post-Berlin Wall era of globalization that is built around falling telecommunications costs. Because nowadays Walden has become an even stronger metaphor than it used to be in the time of the transcendentalists. It is not only the Atropos, or the constructed fate that never turns aside now; it is mainly us that can no longer, never ever turn aside from it. Which is not necessarily bad or good. It is simply so.

I would like to draw your attention here to a fact that attracts a sheer interest on my part. Two of the major books, dealing with the first and the second era of globalization - those of, respectively, Leo Marx and Thomas Friedman - have parallel titles. Leo Marx's THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN and Friedman's THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE correspond entirely to one another: both are highly metaphoric and both are grounded on a complete opposition. THE MACHINE is paralleled by THE LEXUS (which appears to be the name of a huge Japanese factory) and THE GARDEN is paralleled by THE OLIVE TREE (that the more recent title is more specific does not at all lessen its metaphoric value). In both cases the thing made by man is set into opposition to the thing made by God; the thing produced is contradicted to the thing originally given. Both these highly metaphoric titles have their completely nonmetaphoric subtitles: "Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America" (Leo Marx) and "Understanding Globalization" (Thomas Friedman). The authors - neither of whom, by the way, comes from literature or literary criticism - have both found it suitable to make their subjects clear, but, obviously enough, have preferred to stick to the metaphor.

WHY IS THAT AND WHY ARE THESE METAPHORS SO SIMILAR? While Leo Marx's gesture can be partially explained by him getting intoxicated by the romantic authors he writes about (Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville), Friedman's cannot. I would like to remind here that, in semiotic terms, a metaphor is a signifier which is used to refer to a signified in a way which is INITIALLY UNCONVENTIONAL, or, in other words, that metaphor expresses the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. This need for a metaphorical image to exist perfectly answers the intention of the books we are now talking about: both of the titles unconventionally unify two conventionally ununified elements each and by the obvious contrast between them suggest the intrusion of the unfamiliar into the familiar. i.e., THE INTRUSION OF OTHERNESS. Hence their high metaphoric degree. I would even go further and say, that the second title echoes, rephrases the first one just like the second, nowadays era of globalization echoes, rephrases the previous one.

Rephrasing, though, means not only similarities, but differences even more. So if we take THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE to be the present-day transformation of THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN and thus the metaphoric naming of all the complexities of our contemporary globalization status, it will definitely imply novelty or, in other words, OTHERNESS. It will imply another Machine - the machine in transition (including media in transition), the whole obviously and incredibly fast ongoing process that has already turned mere technology into globalization. But it will also imply another understanding of the Garden - the garden no more considered mainly in terms of the virginal landscape or the pastoral ideal. Because if Thoreau or Hawthorne at the time were rather upset by the railroad, or the telegraph, or the postal services as destroying what they called true communication, or the original harmony between man and nature, this concern has already ceased to be that troublesome. In the fluid, incoherent, diverse realities of postmodernity it is the disturbed - and restored - harmony between man and man, between different cultures, [cultural hybridity] that has clearly come into light. Hence the new, i.e. the other connotations of the Olive tree in Thomas Friedman's book: "Olive trees are important. They represent everything that roots us, anchors us and locates us in this world - whether it will be belonging to a family, a community, a tribe, a nation, a religion or, most of all, a place called home. [locality] Olive trees are what give us warmth of family, the joy of individuality, the intimacy of personal rituals, the depth of private relationships, as well as the confidence to reach out and encounter others... You cannot be a complete person alone. You can be a rich person alone. You can be a smart person alone. But you cannot be a complete person alone. For that you must be part of, and rooted in, an olive grove."(p. 31)

And here we come to a crucial, invisible at first sight difference between the two metaphorical titles. The Machine in the period Leo Marx is dealing with, i.e. during the first era of globalization, when considered in terms of its relation to the garden, is taken to be primarily a destroyer, a hostile intruder. While the Lexus [technology] in our present-day period Thomas Friedman is dealing with is taken to be "the drive for sustenance, improvement, prosperity and modernization"(p. 32-33) and the most positive about this positive in itself drive is its capability for balancing with an olive tree. In the balancing between the Lexus and the Olive tree, i.e. between globalization and what is intrinsically, deeply human in ourselves, Friedman sees the positive perspective of the world. There is no rejection, no denial here - just coexistence and newly found harmony. Therefore the rudely intrusive preposition "in" is replaced in the recent title by the peaceful, harmonious junction "and". With THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN the two poles are rivals; with THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE they harmoniously coexist, thus guaranteeing the survival of humankind. Such a distinction - clearly outlined even linguistically - is very important, since it lays bare the transformation of the notion of an impossible discourse into the notion of a discourse possible. I would argue here that a sheer difference between the two eras of globalization is thus visibly and clearly marked. And this sheer difference is once again set in terms of the transforming through the years sense of OTHERNESS.

I will definitely have to mention here the in-between era, i.e. the Berlin Wall one, or the Iron Curtain one. The era of the Cold War I cannot talk neutrally about, because to me, coming from a country that belonged then to the Soviet bloc, it means not only an impossible dialogue; it means pain, shame, disrespect towards the individual. (An intellectual, personal drama and not a widespread one, by the way.) When I was in Berlin in 1990, just a couple of months after the Wall had fallen, I was told the following joke. The Wall falls and a huge crowd of East-Berliners rushes into West Berlin. They start hugging and kissing the West-Berliners and finally they shout: "Wir sind ein Volk!" (We are one nation!). The answer of the West-Berliners comes immediately: "Wir auch!" (We also!). This, in a way untypical in terms of style German joke, makes it clear that the relapses were still there at the time, that it was going to take years, if not generations, for the wall in the mind to fall. The East-Berliners were feeling OTHER, i.e. inferior; the West-Berliners were also feeling OTHER, i.e. superior. I bet both of them still do. The problem was economical, of course, but first of all ideological; and there was a huge amount of fear behind it. This joke illustrates perfectly how the countries from the two ex-blocks - in their different degrees, of course - used to refer to each other: in terms of differently understood interplay between inferiority and superiority, in terms of EXTREME OTHERNESS.

During those twelve years since the huge, intrusive Soviet Machine was taken away from the Garden of the world, the very sense of otherness has gradually begun to acquire new parameters, its direction steadily changing from "against" to "and". So it seems to me that a way to define our contemporary phase of globalization is in terms of RECOGNIZED OTHERNESS. We have entered the period of civilization when "other voices" are definitely being heard, when the doors of "other rooms" are being held open. The issue of THE OTHER has nowadays become crucial to globalization. And I would argue here that speaking about RECOGNIZED OTHERNESS is speaking about a TWO-SIDED PROCEDURE. Because, if in the United States an equation between globalization and Americanization is an entirely irrelevant point, for most of the world it is not and the two words are usually considered as almost complete synonyms. Therefore a cultural filter is needed, an awareness of each one of the counterparts as to the differences of the other (of course, this concerns mainly the less strong of the two). And to be always on the alert about otherness means being always on the alert about CULTURAL SELF-IDENTITY - which actually turns out to be the way to prevent cultures from being erased. This is exactly what Thomas Friedman calls the ability to "GLOCALIZE". "I define healthy glocalization - he writes, - as the ability of a culture, when it encounters OTHER strong cultures, to absorb influences that naturally fit into and can enrich that culture, to resist those things that are truly alien [cultural resistance]and to compartmentalize those things that, while different, can nevertheless be enjoyed and celebrated as different. The whole purpose of glocalizing is to be able to assimilate aspects of globalization into your own country and culture in a way that adds to your growth and diversity, without overwhelming it." [cultural hybridization] (p. 295) Assuming a similar viewpoint, I would argue here that cultural differences nowadays can no more and should no more be defined in antithetical terms - i.e. as either catalysts or deterrents to globalization. It is their RECOGNITION that becomes essential to globalization.

More than two centuries ago Goethe introduced the concept of "world literature", seeing literature as the best means for fruitful intercultural influences. With the changed situation at present speculations about ways of crossing cultural borders have been reshaped into discussions on the possibilities of cultural communications in a borderless, i.e globalized community. What has obviously happened is that the notion of the border to be crossed has gradually been transformed into the notion of the otherness to be recognized. As the outstanding US poet Adrienne Rich points out in an interview: "We don't shed racism or sexism... unless we struggle hard to try to create bridges, to find out what our own common base is, to become educated in each other's realities, to search for and document the mistakes of the past so we can stop making them." (Don't these words remind us of Friedman's Olive tree?) Clearly Rich it is not so much concerned about "crossing" rather than about "creating", about getting educated in otherness. And this is more or less a self-education. "Where connections are being made - Adrienne Rich goes on in the same interview - always feels to me like the point of intensest life... and the point of intensest life is where I write poetry." Obviously poetry - actually any creativity - is seen here anew: as both a precondition and a cultural horizon for recognizing differences and establishing connections. But this is no more the global concept of the author of "Faust" pleading for a spiritual community of the talented and inspired. This is the globalizing concept of a contemporary poet, responding to and trying to overcome the realities of the disperse, mutant, full of absences postmodern world. Thus the older idea of INTERCULTURALITY has undergone a transformation towards the creative impulse of nowadays MULTICULTURALITY. Or, in other words, the gardens of interculturality have been turned into a garden of multiculturality. And in this garden of multiculturality it has become crucial for otherness to be recognized.

The boom of academic interest in the new areas of the so called ethnic studies, racial studies, gender studies presents another obvious confirmation of how acute the problem of recognized otherness has become recently. This special scholarly attention is rather symptomatic to a cultural situation of self-conscious diversity. On the one hand such studies are usually done by people who are themselves representatives of otherness, and on the other hand such studies, having kept society on the alert about otherness for a while, have turned to be a legalized expression of cultural globalization itself. Thus, combining the ethnic, racial and gender lines together both in her own self and in her works, Gloria Anzaldua, a brilliant and extravagant US writer and university professor, comes up with a new name for what is to her a new dimension of life and culture. She calls it a BORDERLAND. "Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish us from them - she writes in her mostly discussed book Borderlands/La Frontera. - A border is a deviding line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A BORDERLAND is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition... In fact the Borderlands are physically present wherever two or more cultures edge each other, where people of different races occupy the same territory, where under, lower, middle and upper classes touch, where the space between two individuals shrinks with intimacy." It becomes clear that the transient (in a way even transcendental) borderland is defined here as natural by means of opposition to all kinds of unnatural boundaries; in fact, the undetermined place that it is considered, Anzaldua's borderland turns out to be a metaphor of a wished for - and finally reached - global picture of coexistences made possible. Of the existential substance of multiculturality. And I would like to suggest here that the metaphor of the borderland might be thought of as a nowadays multiculturalistic translation of Frederick Jackson Turner's metaphor of the FRONTIER - one of the most powerful emblems of America and American culture. The lifting of the frontier is implied in order for the GLOBALIZED BORDERLAND to take place. In order for glocalization to enter.

To enter what? The Garden? The Olive tree grove? The Machine? The Lexus? The Media in constant transition? The Borderland? The doing of things "railroad fashion", or computer fashion, or cell-phone fashion, or e-mail fashion, or chat-room fashion, or whatever else not fashion? The answer to all these questions is positive. We have seen how the hostile "in" - or even "against" - characteristic to the first era of globalization gradually transformed itself - overlapping the frozen period of the Cold War - into the coexistential "and" of our contemporary globalization phase. And we have seen how this transformation can be - and should be - considered in terms of a constantly changing SENSE OF OTHERNESS: no matter if otherness means technology, different cultures or the unknown other in our own selves.

It seems to me that globalization and business cultures is what I talked less about. It seems to me that what I actually talked about was less the culture of business than the business of culture.

N o t e s

Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Understanding Globalization (New York: Anchor Books, Random House, Inc., 2000)

Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden (London - Oxford - New York: Oxford University Press, 1967)

Adrienne Rich, An Interview with David Montenegro (1991) - In: Adrienne Rich's Poetry and Prose (New York - London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1993), pp. 262-263.

Document discussion

Ask students to ask their questions

(they are supposed to have prepared 5 questions with their answers on the text).

Debating should follow

Culture (see also interculturality)

|Culture |

| |

|Wiktionary |

|Etymology |

|From Latin cultura, from cultus, perfect passive participle of colere, till, cultivate, worship (related to colonus and colonia) from PIE *qwel, + suffix |

|-ura. |

|[edit] |

|culture (plural: cultures) |

|1. The arts, customs, and habits that characterize a particular society or nation |

|2. The beliefs, values, behavior and material objects that constitute a people’s way of life. |

|3. (Biology): The process of growing a bacterial or other biological entity in an artificial medium. |

|4. (Anthropology) Any knowledge passed from one generation to the next, not necessarily with respect to Human Beings. |

|Culture |

|From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. |

|… |

|Defining culture |

| |

|Different definitions of culture reflect different theories for understanding - or criteria for valuing - human activity. |

| |

|Sir Edward B. Tylor wrote in 1871 that "culture or civilization [singular], taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes |

|knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society", while a 2002 document from the |

|United Nations agency UNESCO states that culture is the "set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social|

|group [no longer universal] and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and |

|beliefs". [UNESCO, 2002] While these two definitions range widely, they do not exhaust the many uses of this concept - in 1952 Alfred Kroeber and Clyde |

|Kluckhohn compiled a list of more than 200 different definitions of culture in their book, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions [Kroeber |

|and Kluckhohn, 1952]. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Culture as civilization |

| |

|Many people today use a conception of "culture" that developed in Europe during the 18th and early 19th centuries. This idea of culture then reflected |

|inequalities within European societies, and between European powers and their colonies around the world. It identifies "culture" with "civilization" and |

|contrasts the combined concept with "nature". According to this thinking, one can classify some countries as more civilized than others, and some people as|

|more cultured than others. Thus some cultural theorists have actually tried to eliminate popular or mass culture from the definition of culture. Theorists |

|like Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) or the Leavises regard culture as simply the result of "the best that has been thought and said in the world” (Arnold, |

|1960: 6), thus labeling anything that doesn't fit into this category as chaos or anarchy. On this account, culture links closely with social cultivation: |

|the progressive refinement of human behavior. Arnold consistently uses the word this way: "... culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of |

|getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world". [Arnold, 1882] |

| |

|In practice, culture referred to élite goods and activities such as haute cuisine, high fashion or haute couture, museum-caliber art and classical music, |

|and the word cultured described people who knew about, and took part in, these activities. For example, someone who used 'culture' in the sense of |

|'cultivation' might argue that classical music "is" more refined than music produced by working-class people such as punk rock or than the indigenous music|

|traditions of aboriginal peoples of Australia. |

| |

|People who use "culture" in this way tend not to use it in the plural as "cultures". They do not believe that distinct cultures exist, each with their own |

|internal logic and values; but rather that only a single standard of refinement suffices, against which one can measure all groups. Thus, according to this|

|worldview, people with different customs from those who regard themselves as cultured do not usually count as "having a different culture"; but class as |

|"uncultured". People lacking "culture" often seemed more "natural," and observers often defended (or criticized) elements of high culture for repressing |

|"human nature". |

| |

|From the 18th century onwards, some social critics have accepted this contrast between cultured and uncultured, but have stressed the interpretation of |

|refinement and of sophistication as corrupting and unnatural developments which obscure and distort people's essential nature. On this account, folk music |

|(as produced by working-class people) honestly expresses a natural way of life, and classical music seems superficial and decadent. Equally, this view |

|often portrays non-Western people as 'noble savages' living authentic unblemished lives, uncomplicated and uncorrupted by the highly-stratified capitalist |

|systems of the West. |

| |

|Today most social scientists reject the monadic conception of culture, and the opposition of culture to nature. They recognize non-élites as just as |

|cultured as élites (and non-Westerners as just as civilized) - simply regarding them as just cultured in a different way. Thus social observers contrast |

|the "high" culture of élites to "popular" or pop culture, meaning goods and activities produced for, and consumed by, non-élite people or the masses. (Note|

|that some classifications relegate both high and low cultures to the status of subcultures.) |

|[edit] |

| |

|Culture as worldview |

| |

|During the Romantic era, scholars in Germany, especially those concerned with nationalist movements -- such as the nationalist struggle to create a |

|"Germany" out of diverse principalities, and the nationalist struggles by ethnic minorities against the Austro-Hungarian Empire -- developed a more |

|inclusive notion of culture as "worldview". In this mode of thought, a distinct and incommensurable world view characterizes each ethnic group. Although |

|more inclusive than earlier views, this approach to culture still allowed for distinctions between "civilized" and "primitive" or "tribal" cultures. |

| |

|By the late 19th century, anthropologists had adopted and adapted the term culture to a broader definition that they could apply to a wider variety of |

|societies. Attentive to the theory of evolution, they assumed that all human beings evolved equally, and that the fact that all humans have cultures must |

|in some way result from human evolution. They also showed some reluctance to use biological evolution to explain differences between specific cultures -- |

|an approach that either exemplified a form of, or legitimized forms of, racism. They believed that biological evolution would produce a most inclusive |

|notion of culture, a concept that anthropologists could apply equally to non-literate and to literate societies, or to nomadic and to sedentary societies. |

|They argued that through the course of their evolution, human beings evolved a universal human capacity to classify experiences, and to encode and |

|communicate them symbolically. Since human individuals learned and taught these symbolic systems, the systems began to develop independently of biological |

|evolution (in other words, one human being can learn a belief, value, or way of doing something from another, even if the two humans do not share a |

|biological relationship). That this capacity for symbolic thinking and social learning stems from human evolution confounds older arguments about nature |

|versus nurture. Thus Clifford Geertz (1973: 33 ff.) has argued that human physiology and neurology developed in conjunction with the first cultural |

|activities, and Middleton (1990: 17 n.27) concluded that human "'instincts' were culturally formed". |

| |

|People living apart from one another develop unique cultures, but elements of different cultures can easily spread from one group of people to another. |

|Culture changes dynamically and people can (must?) teach and learn culture, making it a potentially rapid form of adaptation to change in physical |

|conditions. Anthropologists view culture as not only as a product of biological evolution but as a supplement to it, as the main means of human adaptation |

|to the world. |

| |

|This view of culture as a symbolic system with adaptive functions, and one which varies from place to place, led anthropologists to conceive of different |

|cultures as defined by distinct patterns (or structures) of enduring, arbitrary, conventional sets of meaning, which took concrete form in a variety of |

|artifacts such as myths and rituals, tools, the design of housing, and the planning of villages. Anthropologists thus distinguish between material culture |

|and symbolic culture, not only because each reflects different kinds of human activity, but also because they constitute different kinds of data that |

|require different methodologies. |

| |

|This view of culture, which came to dominate between World War I and World War II, implied that each culture had bounds and demanded interpretation as a |

|whole, on its own terms. There resulted a belief in cultural relativism; the belief that one had to understand an individual's actions in terms of his or |

|her culture; that one had to understand a specific cultural artifact (a ritual, for example) in terms of the larger symbolic system of which it forms a |

|part. |

| |

|Nevertheless, the belief that culture comprises symbolical codes and can thus pass via teaching from one person to another meant that cultures, although |

|bounded, would change. Cultural change could result from invention and innovation, but it could also result from contact between two cultures. Under |

|peaceful conditions, contact between two cultures can lead to people "borrowing" (really, learning) from one another (diffusion (anthropology) or |

|transculturation). Under conditions of violence or political inequality, however, people of one society can "steal" cultural artifacts from another, or |

|impose cultural artifacts on another (acculturation). Diffusion of innovations theory presents a research-based model for how, when and why people adopt |

|new ideas. |

| |

|All human societies have participated in these processes of diffusion, transculturation, and acculturation, and few anthropologists today see cultures as |

|bounded. Modern anthropologists argue that instead of understanding a cultural artifact in terms of its own culture, one needs to understand it in terms of|

|a broader history involving contact and relations with other cultures. |

| |

|In addition to the aforementioned processes, migration on a major scale has characterized the world, particyularly since the days of Columbus. Phenomena |

|such as colonial expansion and forced migration through slavery became prominent. As a result, many societies have become culturally heterogeneous. Some |

|anthropologists have argued nevertheless that some unifying cultural system bound heterogeneous societies, and that it offers advantages to understand |

|heterogenous elements as subcultures. Others have argued that no unifying or coordinating cultural system exists, and that one must understand |

|heterogeneous elements together as forming a multicultural society. The spread of the doctrine of multiculturalism has coincided with a resurgence of |

|identity politics, which involve demands for the recognition of social subgroups' cultural uniqueness. |

| |

|Sociobiologists argue that observers can best understand many aspects of culture in the light of the concept of the meme, first introduced by Richard |

|Dawkins in his 1976 book The Selfish Gene. Dawkins suggests the existence of units of culture - memes - roughly analogous to genes in evolutionary biology.|

|Although this view has gained some popular currency, anthropologists generally reject it. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Culture as values, norms, and artifacts |

| |

|Another common way of understanding culture sees it as consisting of three elements: |

| |

|1. values |

|2. norms |

|3. artifacts. |

| |

|(See Dictionary of Modern Sociology, 1969, 93, cited at [1]) Values comprise ideas about what in life seems important. They guide the rest of the culture. |

|Norms consist of expectations of how people will behave in different situations. Each culture has different methods, called sanctions, of enforcing its |

|norms. Sanctions vary with the importance of the norm; norms that a society enforces formally have the status of laws. Artifacts — things, or material |

|culture — derive from the culture's values and norms. |

| |

|Julian Huxley gives a slightly different division, into inter-related "mentifacts", "socifacts" and "artifacts", for ideological, sociological, and |

|technological subsystems respectively. Socialization, in Huxley's view, depends on the belief subsystem. The sociological subsystem governs interaction |

|between people. Material objects and their use make up the technological subsystem. [2] |

| |

|As a rule, archeologists focus on material culture whereas cultural anthropologists focus on symbolic culture, although ultimately both groups maintain |

|interests in the relationships between these two dimensions. Moreover, anthropologists understand "culture" to refer not only to consumption goods, but to |

|the general processes which produce such goods and give them meaning, and to the social relationships and practices in which such objects and processes |

|become embedded. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Culture as patterns of products and activities |

| |

|In the early 20th century, anthropologists understood culture to refer not to a set of discrete products or activities (whether material or symbolic) but |

|rather to underlying patterns of products and activities. Moreover, they assumed that such patterns had clear bounds (thus, some people confuse "culture" |

|with the society that has a particular culture). |

| |

|In the case of smaller societies, in which people merely fell into categories of age, gender, household and descent group, anthropologists believed that |

|people more-or-less shared the same set of values and conventions. In the case of larger societies, in which people undergo further categorization by |

|region, race, ethnicity, and class, anthropologists came to believe that members of the same society often had highly contrasting values and conventions. |

|They thus used the term subculture to identify the cultures of parts of larger societies. Since subcultures reflect the position of a segment of society |

|vis a vis other segments and the society as a whole, they often reveal processes of domination and resistance. |

| |

|The 20th century also saw the popularization of the idea of corporate culture - distinct and malleable within the context of an employing organization or |

|of a workplace. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Cultural change |

| |

|Cultures, by predisposition, both embrace and resist change. Resistance can come from habit, from religious precepts and from the integration and |

|interdependence of culture traits. For example, men and women have complementary roles in many cultures. One sex might desire changes that affect the |

|other, as happened in the second half of the 20th century in western cultures. |

| |

|Cultural change can come about due to the environment, to inventions (and other internal influences), and to contact with other cultures. For example, the |

|end of the last ice age helped lead to the invention of agriculture, which in its turn brought about many cultural innovations. |

| |

|Some inventions that affected Western culture in the 20th century have included the birth control pill, television, and the Internet. The pill helped |

|families have more money and women have more freedom. Television not only brought similar visual programming into many homes, but also influenced how and |

|when family members interacted with each other. |

| |

|Contact between cultures can result in diffusion, or on a larger scale, acculturation. |

| |

|In diffusion (anthropology), the form of something moves from one culture to another, but not its meaning. For example, hamburgers, mundane in the United |

|States, seemed exotic when introduced into China. "Stimulus diffusion" refers to an element of one culture leading to an invention in another. Diffusions |

|of innovations theory presents a research-based model for why and when individuals and cultures adopt new ideas, practices, and products. |

| |

|"Acculturation" has different meanings, but in this context refers to replacement of the traits of one culture with those of another, such as happened to |

|certain Native American tribes and to many indigenous peoples across the globe during the process of colonization . |

| |

|Related processes on an individual level include assimilation (adoption of a different culture by an individual) and transculturation. |

| |

|Propagating culture |

| |

|Insofar as culture grows and changes naturally within human society, it requires little or no formal propagation. Families or age-based peer-groups will |

|instinctively foster (and develop) their own cultural norms. |

| |

|But few cultures act in such a laissez faire manner. Most societies develop some sort of religion or similar basis for inculcating and preserving |

|established or "correct" cultural behavior. And many societies take the task of education out of the hands of priests and shamans and place it on a wider |

|footing, so that the young (at least) gain a practical and emotional identification with a standardised version of their nurturing culture. |

| |

|Groups of immigrants, exiles, or minorities often form cultural associations or clubs to preserve their own cultural roots in the face of a surrounding |

|(generally more locally-dominant) culture. Thus the world has acquired many Garibaldi Clubs, Pushkin Societies, and underground schools. |

| |

|On a broader scale, many countries market their cultural heritage internationally. This occurs not only in the promotion of tourism (importing money), but |

|also in cultural development abroad (exporting ideas). Note the roles of cultural attachés in embassies and the function of specific organizations devoted |

|to propagating the mother-culture, its language and its ideologies abroad, for example the work of: |

|* the Alliance française |

|* the British Council |

|* the Fulbright Program |

|* the Goethe-Institut |

|* the Instituto Cervantes |

| |

|Cultural studies |

| |

|Cultural studies developed in the late 20th century, in part through the re-introduction of Marxist thought into sociology, and in part through the |

|articulation of sociology and other academic disciplines such as literary criticism. This movement aimed to focus on the analysis of subcultures in |

|capitalist societies. Following the non-anthropological tradition, cultural studies generally focus on the study of consumption goods (such as fashion, |

|art, and literature). Because the 18th- and 19th-century distinction between "high" and "low" culture seems inappropriate to apply to the mass-produced and|

|mass-marketed consumption goods which cultural studies analyses, these scholars refer instead to "popular culture". |

| |

|Today, some anthropologists have joined the project of cultural studies. Most, however, reject the identification of culture with consumption goods. |

|Furthermore, many now reject the notion of culture as bounded, and consequently reject the notion of subculture. Instead, they see culture as a complex web|

|of shifting patterns that link people in different locales and that link social formations of different scales. According to this view, any group can |

|construct its own cultural identity. |

Globalization and Cultural Identity

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|To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: |

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|Page 1 |

|23 |

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|Globalization and Cultural Identity |

|John Tomlinson[20] |

| |

|It is fair to say that the impact of globalization in the cultural sphere has, most generally, been viewed in a pessimistic light. Typically, it has |

|been associated with the destruction of cultural identities, victims of the accelerating encroachment of a homogenized, westernized, consumer |

|culture. This view, the constituency for which extends from (some) academics to anti-globalization activists (Shepard and Hayduk 2002), tends to |

|interpret globalization as a seamless extension of – indeed, as a euphemism for – western cultural imperialism. In the discussion which follows I |

|want to approach this claim with a good deal of scepticism. |

|I will not seek to deny the obvious power of globalized capitalism to distribute and promote its cultural goods in every corner. Nor will I take up |

|the argument – now very commonly made by critics of the cultural imperialism thesis (Lull 2000; Thompson 1995; Tomlinson 1991) that a deeper cultural|

|impact cannot be easily inferred from the presence of such goods. What I will try to argue is something more specific: that cultural identity, |

|properly understood, is much more the product of globalization than its victim. |

| |

|Identity as Treasure |

| |

|To begin, let me sketch the implicit (for it is usually implicit) reasoning behind the assumption that globalization destroys identities. Once upon a|

|time, before the era of globalization, there existed local, autonomous, distinct and well-defined, robust and culturally sustaining connections |

|between geographical place and cultural experience. These connections constituted one’s – and one’s community’s – ‘cultural identity’. This identity |

|was something people simply ‘had’ as an undisturbed existential possession, an inheritance, a benefit of traditional long dwelling, of continuity |

|with the past. Identity, then, like language, was not just a description of cultural belonging; it was a sort of collective treasure of local |

|communities. But it was also discovered to be something fragile that needed protecting and preserving, that could be lost. Into this world of |

|manifold, discrete, but to various degrees vulnerable, cultural identities there suddenly burst (apparently around the middle of the 1980s) the |

|corrosive power of globalization. Globalization, so the story goes, has swept like a flood tide through the world’s diverse cultures, destroying |

|stable localities, displacing peoples, bringing a market-driven, ‘branded’ homogenization of cultural experience, thus obliterating the differences |

|between locality-defined cultures which had constituted our identities. Though glob- alization has been judged as involving a general process of loss|

|of cultural diversity, some of course did better, some worse out of this process. Whilst those cultures in |

|TGT2eC23 19/03/2003 10:40 AM Page 269 Page 2 |

|the mainstream of the flow of capitalism – those in the West and, specifically, the United States – saw a sort of standardized version of their |

|cultures exported worldwide, it was the ‘weaker’ cultures of the developing world that have been most threatened. Thus the economic vulnerability of |

|these non-western cultures is assumed to be matched by a cultural vulnerability. Cultural identity is at risk everywhere with the depredations of |

|globalization, but the developing world is particularly at risk. |

|This, then, is the story that implicates globalization in the destruction of cultural identity, and in the threat to that particular subset of |

|cultural identity that we call ‘national identity’. But another, quite contradictory, story can be told: that globalization, far from destroying it, |

|has been perhaps the most significant force in creating and proliferating cultural identity. This story involves a rather different understanding of |

|the idea of ‘identity’ than the somewhat reified understanding of an individual or collective posses- sion. And it also involves a rather more |

|complex understanding of the globalization process: one, at least, which allows for a degree of unpredictability in its consequences. |

|Identity as Cultural Power |

|Let us begin with identity, a concept which surely lies at the heart of our contempor- ary cultural imagination. It is not, in fact, difficult in the|

|prolific literature of analysis of the concept to find positions which contest the story of identity as the victim of globalization that I sketched |

|above. To take just one example, Manuel Castells devoted an entire volume of his celebrated analysis of ‘The Information Age’ to the proposition |

|that: ‘Our world and our lives are being shaped by the conflicting trends of globalization and identity.’ For Castells, the primary opposition to the|

|power of globalization lies in ‘the widespread surge of powerful expressions of collective identity that challenge globalization . . . on behalf of |

|cultural singularity and people’s control over their lives and environment’ (1997: 2). Far from being the fragile flower that glob- alization |

|tramples, identity is seen here as the upsurging power of local culture that offers (albeit multi-form, disorganized and sometimes politically |

|reactionary) resistance to the centrifugal force of capitalist globalization. |

|This more robust view of the ‘power of identity’ is one to which anyone surveying the dramatic rise of social movements based around identity |

|positions (gender, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, nationality) might easily subscribe. So, recognizing the significant cultural sources of |

|resistance to the power of globalization goes a long way towards getting this power in perspective. The impact of globalization thus becomes, more |

|plausibly, a matter of the interplay of an institutional-technological impetus towards globality with counterpoised ‘localizing’ forces. The drive |

|towards ‘globality’ combines a logic of capitalist expansion with the rapid development of deterritorializing media and communications technologies. |

|But this drive is opposed by various processes and practices expressing different orders of ‘locality’. Amongst these we can count the cultural |

|identity movements that Castells focuses on, but also less formally organized expressions of identity, for example, those involved in local |

|consumption preferences (Howes 1996). And, on quite another level, we have to add the considerable cultural effort exercised by nation-states in |

|binding their populations into another cultural- political order of local identification. |

|This more complex formulation clearly implies that cultural identity is not likely to be the easy prey of globalization. This is because identity is |

|not in fact merely some |

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|John Tomlinson |

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|fragile communal-psychic attachment, but a considerable dimension of institutional-ized social life in modernity. Particularly in the dominant form |

|of national identity, it is the product of deliberate cultural construction and maintenance via both the regulatory and the socializing institutions |

|of the state: in particular, the law, the education system and the media. The deterritorializing force of globalization thus meets a structured |

|opposition in the form of what Michael Billig (1995) has called ‘banal nationalism’ – the everyday minute reinforcement; the continuous routinized |

|‘flagging’ of national belonging, particularly through media discourse – sponsored by developed nation-states. |

|Of course this is not to deny that nation-states are, to varying degrees, compromised by globalization in their capacity to maintain exclusivity of |

|identity attachments, just as they are in their capacity independently to regulate national economies within a global market. For example, the |

|complexities and tensions introduced by the multi- ethnic constitution of societies arising from global population movements – a chronic feature of |

|all modern nation-states (Smith 1995; Geertz 2000) – pose obvious problems for the continued cultural ‘binding’ of twenty-first-century nations into |

|coherent identity positions. This problem is, moreover, more dramatic in its consequences for some nations of the developing world, where |

|multi-ethnic composition arising from the crude territorial divisions of colonial occupation combines with comparatively weak state structures to |

|produce a legacy of often bloody political instability and inter- ethnic violence. |

|But notice that none of these problems conforms to the scenario of the general destruction of identities by globalization. Rather, they attest to an |

|amplification of the significance of identity positions in general produced by globalization. It is this proliferation of identity that causes |

|problems for the nation-state’s hegemony over its population’s sense of cultural attachment. |

| |

|Identity and Institutional Modernity |

| |

|This brings me to my central claim that globalization actually proliferates rather than destroys identities. In this respect I depart somewhat from |

|Castells’s position: in setting identity as a sort of autonomous cultural dynamic, surging up from the grassroots as an oppositional force to |

|globalization, Castells really fails to see the rather compelling inner logic between the globalization process and the institutionalized |

|construction of identities. This, I think, lies in the nature of the institutions of modernity that globalization distributes. To put the matter |

|simply: globalization is really the globalization of modernity, and modernity is the harbinger of identity. |

|It is a common assumption that identity-formation is a universal feature of human experience. Castells seems implicitly to take this view when he |

|writes: ‘Identity is people’s source of meaning and experience’ (1997: 6). But whilst it is true that the construction of meaning via cultural |

|practices is a human universal, it does not follow that this invariably takes the form of identity construction as we currently understand it in the |

|global-modern West. This form of ethnocentric assumption has been recently criticized both by anthropologists and media and cultural critics. For |

|example, David Morley, commenting on Roger Rouse’s study of Mexican labour migrants to the United States, points out that these people ‘moved from a |

|world in which . . . identity was not a central concern, to one in which they were pressed . . . to adopt a particular form of Globalization and |

|Cultural Identity 271 TGT2eC23 19/03/2003 10:40 AM Page 271 Page 4 personhood (as bearers of individual identities) and of identity as a member of a |

|collective or “community” . . . which was quite at odds with their own understanding of their situation and their needs’ (Morley 2000: 43 – emphasis |

|added). |

|Understanding that what we call ‘identity’ may not be a universal, but just one particular, modern, way of socially organizing – and indeed |

|regulating – cultural experience takes some of the wind from the sails of the argument that globalization inevitably destroys identity. The |

|social-psychology of attachment to locality is a powerful phenomenon, but it is also a complex one, with different possible modes of articulation and|

|different consequent implications for people’s sense of self and of existential well-being. And these differences are all relative to cultural |

|context. The assumption that these various attachments can and must be focused through the western-modern prism of ‘identity’ is no less |

|short-sighted than the corollary assumption that these attachments have remained unchanged across time in ‘traditional’ societies. And this is, of |

|course, related to the common mistake, criticized by anthropologists such as James Clifford (1997), of regarding ‘traditional’ societies as, by |

|nature and not merely in comparison to modern ones, static and immobile. |

|The implication of understanding identity as a specifically modern cultural imagination is sufficient to undermine the simple idea that globalization|

|destroys identity. But the stronger claim that globalization actually generates identity – and, indeed, the danger that, in some circumstances, it |

|produces too much identity – requires more elaboration. |

| |

|Globalization and Modernity |

| |

|To appreciate this, it is necessary to take a more complex view of the globalization process than is often adopted – certainly in the polemical |

|discourses of the anti-globalization movement, where globalization is essentially understood as the globalization of capitalism, achieved in its |

|cultural aspect via a complicitous western-dominated media system. This more complex, multidimensional conceptualization, which views globalization |

|as operating simultaneously and interrelatedly in the economic, technological-communicational, political and cultural spheres of human life, is in |

|fact relatively uncontentious – at least in principle – within academic discourses. But the cultural implication, rather less easily swallowed by |

|some, is that globalization involves not the simple enforced distribution of a particular western (say, liberal, secular, possessive-individualist, |

|capitalist-consumerist) lifestyle, but a more complicated dissemination of the entire range of institutional features of cultural modernity. |

|Modernity is a complex and much contested idea, but in this context it means, above all, the abstraction of social and cultural practices from |

|contexts of local particularity, and their institutionalization and regulation across time and space (Giddens 1990). The examples of such |

|institutionalization that most readily spring to mind are the organization and policing of social territory (the nation-state, urbanism), or of |

|production and consumption practices (industrialization, the capitalist economy). |

|But modernity also institutionalizes and regulates cultural practices, including those by which we imagine attachment and belonging to a place or a |

|community. The mode of such imagination it promotes is what we have come to know as ‘cultural identity’ – self and communal definitions based around |

|specific, usually politically inflected, differentiations: gender, sexuality, class, religion, race and ethnicity, nationality. Some 272 John |

|Tomlinson TGT2eC23 19/03/2003 10:40 AM Page 272 Page 5 of these differentiations of course existed before the coming of modernity, some – like |

|nationality – are specifically modern imaginings. But the force of modernity is as much in the substance of these categories of imagined belonging as|

|in the very fact of their institutionalization and regulation. In modern societies we live our lives within structures that orchestrate existential |

|experience according to well-policed boundaries. |

|We ‘live’ our gender, our sexuality, our nationality and so forth as publicly institution- alized, discursively organized belongings. What could be a|

|much looser, contingent, particular and tacit sense of belonging becomes structured into an array of identities, each with implications for our |

|material and psychological well-being, each, thus, with a ‘politics’. This is what I mean by saying that modernity is the harbinger of identity. And |

|in so far as globalization distributes the institutional features of modernity across all cultures, globalization produces ‘identity’ where none |

|existed – where before there were perhaps more particular, more inchoate, less socially policed belongings. This, rather than the sheer obliteration |

|of identities, is the most significant cultural impact of globalization, an impact felt at the formal level of cultural experience. This impact |

|might, on a narrow reading, be seen as ‘cultural imperialism’ – in that this modern institutionalization of cultural attachments clearly arose first |

|in the West. But, more interestingly, it can be understood as part of the cultural package, mixed in its bless- ings, that is global modernity. |

| |

|Identity and Deterritorialization |

| |

|One broad approach to this ‘package’ is in terms of the ‘deterritorializing’ character of the globalization process – its property of diminishing the|

|significance of social- geographical location to the mundane flow of cultural experience (Garcia-Canclini 1995; Tomlinson 1999). What this idea |

|implies is not that globalization destroys localities – as, for example, in the crude homogenization thesis, everywhere becoming blandly culturally |

|uniform – but that cultural experience is in various ways ‘lifted out’ of its traditional ‘anchoring’ in particular localities. One way of |

|understanding this is to think about the places we live in as being increasingly ‘penetrated’ by the connectivity of globalization. We may live in |

|places that retain a high degree of distinctiveness, but this particularity is no longer – as it may have been in the past – the most important |

|determinant of our cultural experience. The idea of deterritorialization, then, grasps the way in which events outside of our immediate localities – |

|in Anthony Giddens’s terse definition of globalization, ‘action(s) at a distance’ – are increasingly consequential for our experience. Modern culture|

|is less determined by location because location is increasingly penetrated by ‘distance’. |

|The more obvious examples of this sort of penetration of localities are in such areas of mundane cultural experience as our interaction with |

|globalizing media and com-munications technologies – television, mobile phones, email, the Internet – or in the transformation of local into |

|increasingly ‘international’ food cultures (Tomlinson 1999). What is at stake in such examples is a transformation in our routine pattern of cultural|

|existence which brings globalized influences, forces, experiences and outlooks into the core of our locally situated lifeworld. Television news |

|brings distant conflicts into the intimate spaces of our living-rooms, ‘exotic’ tastes become routinely mixed with domestic ones, assumptions we make|

|about the health and security of our fam- ilies now routinely factor in an awareness, however vague, of global contingencies such Globalization and |

|Cultural Identity 273 TGT2eC23 19/03/2003 10:40 AM Page 273 Page 6 as environmental risk or stock-market stability. But we can add to these a more |

|subtle example of deterritorialization: precisely, the reach of the institutional-modern form of identity into cultural life. |

|For the remaining part of this discussion, I shall try to sketch some of the implica- tions of what we can call this proliferating but ‘uneven’ |

|generation of identity, focus- ing on the key issue of the challenge this poses to the coherence of national identities. |

|Since the eighteenth century, national identity has been the most spectacularly successful modern mode of orchestrating belonging. And the fact that |

|virtually all of the world’s six billion population today either enjoy or claim a national identity is itself testament to the power of the |

|globalization of modernity. It is clear from this that the nation and national identity are not in danger of imminent collapse. But the very dynamism|

|and complexity of globalization is such that the stability of this form of identification is not guaranteed indefinitely. The very dynamic which |

|established national identity as the most powerful cultural-political binding force of modernity may now be unravelling some of the skeins that tie |

|us in securely to our national ‘home’. The kernel of truth in the claim that national identity is threatened by globalization lies in the fact that |

|the proliferation of identity positions may be producing challenges to the dominance of national identity. |

|The most remarked examples of this sort of challenge are, naturally enough, the most immediately destructive ones: the violence and chaos of ethnic |

|and religious confrontations with the nation-state. The repercussions of the fall of Eastern European communism – most dramatically in the former |

|Yugoslavia – in the final decade of the twentieth century are an obvious case in point. The collapse of communism is often interpreted in |

|political-economic terms as a reaction to a step change in the global advance of capitalism. The increasing power and integration of the global |

|capitalist market made it impossible for the control economies of the eastern bloc to survive outside of this indisputably dominant economic world |

|system. Although the capitula- tion of these regimes was most immediately due to internal pressures for liberaliza- tion across both the political |

|and the economic spheres, the impetus towards this lay – so the economistic story goes – in a combination of the external economic forces which were |

|rapidly undermining the economic bases of these countries, and the demonstration, via a globalizing media, of the attractions of western consumer |

|cul- ture ineluctably associated with both economic and democratic liberalism. |

|But the ensuing conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo could not, on any reasonable interpretation, be judged as the fall-out from an |

|exclusively political- economic process. What the ‘opening up’ of globalization meant in this context was not the engagement with a global market |

|system, but the unleashing of violent cul- tural forces – ethnic/nationalist factionalism – which had been, apparently, artificially contained under |

|the communist federal regime. The rapid disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation revealed deep divisions in cultural and religious identities – |

|Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, ethnic Albanians; Christians and Muslims – which became rapidly inflamed into what Mary Kaldor (1999) has aptly called the |

|‘new wars’ of the era of globalization. The key point in Kaldor’s analysis of these ‘globalization wars’ is that they are fought around a vicious, |

|particularistic form of ‘identity politics’ in which ‘movements . . . mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of |

|claiming state power’ (1999: 76). |

|Such examples of the violent assertion of, and the struggle over, cultural identity seem, on the one hand, to fit the argument about the generation |

|of modern institutionalized 274 John Tomlinson TGT2eC23 19/03/2003 10:40 AM Page 274 Page 7 forms of identity rather well. For, far from being simply|

|atavistic reversions, the deliberate aim of such ethnic conflicts is, as Kaldor says, to claim state power – that is, to institutionalize a |

|particular cultural identity in a modern political form. But, on the other hand, we might view such instances as less of a fundamental challenge to |

|the dominant form of identity as national identity, than as struggles for dominance within this form (Tomlinson 2000). |

| |

|There are, of course, examples of projects of cultural ‘reterritorialization’ – the claiming and reclaiming of localities – which don’t inevitably |

|involve claims to state power. For example, the land rights movements of aboriginal groups in Australia, the USA, Canada and elsewhere that have come|

|to prominence in recent years. Though in such examples the claims of identity are inextricably mixed with issues of political and economic justice, |

|there is the indication that what is being argued for is a right to an ethnic ‘homeland’ that is conceived as coexistent and compatible with a |

|national identity. What is interesting about such projects is that, again, they exemplify a particularly modern cultural sensibility: the very notion|

|of a juridical contestation of rights linked to identity seems understandable only within the sort of global-modern institutional form of identity |

|which we have identified. |

|But for evidence of a more fundamental shift in the grip of the nation-state over our cultural imagination, we may have to look for more gentle, |

|subtle, long-term shifts in identification. The most discussed aspect of this sort of shift – particularly within cultural studies and in |

|post-colonial studies – is the emergence of ‘hybrid’ cultural identities as a consequence both of the multicultural constitution of modern nation- |

|states and of the emergence of transnational forms of popular culture (Nederveen Pieterse 1995; Werbner and Modood 1997). Significant as this trend |

|is, there is a dan- ger that the concept of hybridity may be expected to do too much explanatory work and, indeed, that the idea of continual |

|hybridization as the destination of global cul- tures may be overstated (Tomlinson 1999: 141f.). So, to conclude, I want to present an example, in |

|the form of a little vignette, of a modest popular-cultural consequence of globalization that does not fit into either of the usual schemas of |

|homogenization or hybridization. |

|The Revival of the Qipau |

|In the fashionable Dong An shopping centre in the Wang Fu Jing district of Beijing you will find a small boutique called Mu Zhen Liao. Here, young, |

|discriminating and upwardly mobile Beijingers come to choose clothes, not from the designer labels of the West, but ‘classical’ Chinese clothing: |

|elegant qipaus, cheongsams and finely tailored jackets in beautiful silks and other traditional fabrics. These clothes display all the detail and |

|finesse of the fashions favoured by the wealthy Manchurian elite in the Qing dynasty of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. But they are not in |

|any simple sense ‘traditional’ clothes. The young women wearing them in the streets will turn as many heads amongst the locals as amongst the western|

|tourists. For the fact is that ten or fifteen years ago a shop like Mu Zhen Liao would not have existed in China. |

|Its appearance amongst the new up-market stores, and the Starbucks cafés, of the Dong An centre is a small but interesting consequence of China’s |

|open-door economic policy introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s. Effectively, Deng’s policy opened up both Chinese economic and cultural |

|life to the process of globalization Globalization and Cultural Identity 275 TGT2eC23 19/03/2003 10:40 AM Page 275 Page 8 – culminating in China’s |

|entry into the WTO in 2001. Mu Zhen Liao – a chain store with branches in many of the provincial capitals – exists, in cultural as in economic terms,|

|as a consequence of globalization. |

|Fashion is a significant expression of cultural identity. But what sort of identity does this ‘classic’ dress style represent for the affluent |

|younger generation of Chinese who choose it in preference to the European fashions or American sportswear brands with which it competes? It is not |

|easy to pin down. Certainly, this is not a national identity (or a reaction to ‘westernization’) in the simple sense of expressing the version of |

|‘Chineseness’ sponsored by the Chinese state. For a rather bland, dull, conservative western style seems, if anything, to be the mainstream dress |

|code smiled upon by China’s political leaders. Indeed, after the disastrous experiment in cultural engineering sym- bolized in the so-called ‘Mao |

|Jacket’ uniform of the Cultural Revolution, it might seem that China has simply lost confidence in a symbolically ‘traditional’ dress code. There are|

|some interesting subtleties here, however. What in the West was called the ‘Mao Jacket’ in fact developed out of the Zhong Shan style of clothing |

|invented by the revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen at the start of the first Chinese Republic in 1912. Sun based this design upon a blend of western |

|‘modern’ dress with Chinese styles from as early as the Tang dynasty. This was intended to express both modern republican and at the same time |

|‘authentic’ Chineseness, in contrast to the dress of the hated Manchu rulers of the collapsing Qing dynasty. The qipau, then, is a Manchurian, as |

|distinct from a ‘Chinese’ (Han) style. It is doubtful, of course, that any of the young women purchasing qipaus consciously wish to express a Manchu |

|identity. But at some level below the mere appeal of fashion, they are surely expressing a form of Chineseness that contrasts with the drab, dominant|

|‘People’s Republic’ version, and the cultural hegemony under which their parents lived. Globalization here does not so much directly challenge, as |

|promote, new and complex versions of national identity. |

|And this is not, of course, just a problem for bureaucratic regimes such as China, trying to maintain political control over a vast population |

|experiencing rapid eco- nomic and cultural transformation. All nation-states now contain and seek to govern populations whose identities are both |

|multiple and complex. This complexity does not by any means necessarily entail the diminishing significance of identification with the nation: |

|identity is not a zero-sum game. But it does suggest that the way in which national identity is experienced within globalization is, like everything |

|else, in flux. Political subjects can now experience and express, without contradiction, both attachments to the nation, multi-ethnic allegiances and|

|cosmopolitan sensibilities. The really interesting cultural-political question that emerges is of how nimble and reflexively attuned state |

|apparatuses are capable of becoming in response to these changes. |

|References |

|Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. |

|Castells, M. (1997) The Power of Identity, vol. II of The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Oxford: Blackwell. |

|Clifford, J. (1997) Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. |

|Garcia Canclini, N. (1995) Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. |

|276 |

|John Tomlinson |

|TGT2eC23 19/03/2003 10:40 AM Page 276 |

|Page 9 |

|Geertz, C. (2000) Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. |

|Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. |

|Howes, D. (ed.) (1996) Cross-Cultural Consumption: Global Markets, Local Realities. London: Routledge. |

|Kaldor, M. (1999) New and Old Wars. Cambridge: Polity Press. |

|Lull, J. (2000) Media, Communication, Culture: A Global Approach. Cambridge: Polity. |

|Morley, D. (2000) Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity. London: Routledge. |

|Nederveen Pieterse, J. (1995) Globalization as Hybridization. In M. Featherstone et al. (eds), Global Modernities, London: Sage, pp. 45–68. |

|Shepard, B. and Hayduk, R. (eds) (2002) From ACT UP to the WTO: Urban Protest and Community Building in the Era of Globalization. London: Verso. |

|Smith, A. (1995) Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. |

|Thompson, J. B. (1995) The Media and Modernity. Cambridge: Polity. |

|Tomlinson, J. (1991) Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction. London: Pinter. |

|Tomlinson, J. (1999) Globalization and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. |

|Tomlinson, J. (2000) Proximity Politics. Information, Communication and Society, 3(3): 402–14. |

|Werbner, P. and Modood, T. (eds) (1997) Debating Cultural Hybridity. London: Zed Books. |

Interculturalité - « Interculturality » - Transculturation - civilizational interaction - intercvilizational impact - Interculturalism

interculutralité

|Que signifie le terme : interculturalité? |

| |

| |

|Même si la définition de l'interculturalité continue d'évoluer, un consensus semble se dégager chez certains universitaires et spécialistes de la |

|culture qui définissent l'interculturalité comme l'interaction, l'échange et la communication entre les cultures où une personne reconnaît et accepte |

|la réciprocité d'autrui 2. Cette définition élargit donc le concept du multiculturalisme. |

| |

|Les spécialistes de la culture et les universitaires décrivent le multiculturalisme comme un ensemble de principes et de politiques axées jusqu'à |

|présent sur |

|1) la reconnaissance par l'État de la pluralité culturelle au cœur d'une société; |

|2) la réduction des obstacles à la participation sociale des groupes culturels marginalisés; et |

|3) l'appui à la reproduction des cultures. |

| |

|Un grand nombre de gouvernements dans le monde appliquent les principes du multiculturalisme à l'élaboration de leurs politiques culturelles |

|respectives pour assurer l'essor et la protection de la diversité culturelle à l'intérieur de leurs frontières. Toutefois, bien que l'on s'accorde pour|

|dire que le concept du multiculturalisme prend en compte les cultures nouvellement représentées dans une société donnée, certains spécialistes ont |

|récemment soutenu qu'il ne contribue pas à l'établissement de liens réels entre les cultures hôtes, qui constituent les normes sociales, et les |

|cultures nouvellement présentes dans cette société. 3 |

| |

|En revanche, le concept de l'interculturalité met de l'avant la notion qu'il faut plus que définir et protéger chaque culture isolément car cela ne |

|suffit pas à créer une vraie cohésion sociale. L'interculturalité suppose l'interaction entre les cultures, les échanges et la communication. Chaque |

|personne reconnaît et accepte la réciprocité de la culture d'autrui. De plus, les principes de l'interculturalité établissent qu'il faut créer la |

|notion " d'espaces " où les cultures peuvent non seulement coexister, mais aussi interagir et apprendre à se connaître au sein d'une même société. |

|Essentiellement, l'approche interculturelle fait valoir le point de vue selon lequel la diversité culturelle ne menace pas le tissu social d'une |

|société, mais l'enrichit. 4 |

| |

|Il est important de souligner que l'interculturalité ne rejette pas le concept du multiculturalisme puisque ce dernier reste un principe directeur |

|important et pertinent pour l'élaboration d'une politique culturelle. Ce concept enrichit donc celui du multiculturalisme. |

|Bulletin no 30 – Avril 1998 |

|1 |

|Les concepts de “Culture” et d'“Interculturalité”. Approches de définitions et enjeux pour la recherche en communication interculturelle. |

| |

| |

|Hans-Jürgen LÜSEBRINK |

|Université de Saarbrücken, Allemagne: |

|Le concept de Culture |

|En ce qui concerne le concept de “culture”, il semble important de différencier entre un concept de culture fondé sur les textes et les médias, d'une |

|part, et un concept de culture orienté vers les mentalités d'autre part: la culture comme texte ou bien la culture comme mentalité, comme modèle de |

|perception collective, ou, selon la formulation de Gert Hofstede, comme “software of the mind” (Hofstede 1993). Le premier concept de culture, que l'on|

|peut définir comme sémiotique, est sans aucun doute celui qui prédomine dans les domaines des Lettres et Sciences Humaines. Il englobe le domaine des |

|Belles-Lettres et des Beaux-Arts, occupant une place centrale dans la définition traditionnelle du concept de culture, de la culture de la bourgeoisie |

|instruite, avec un ensemble de textes et d’œuvres d'art canonisés, dont le noyau central le plus hautement valorisé est constitué par les “classiques”.|

|Ce concept de culture fondé sur les textes et les médias s'est trouvé considérablement élargi au cours de ces dernières décennies, vers des domaines |

|comme la littérature populaire, les bandes dessinées, la photographie, et même vers la publicité, comme en témoignent les récompenses obtenues dans le |

|domaine de la culture par les publicités pour la marque Benetton qui se trouvent assimilées à l'art (ou visant à l'être). Karl-Heinz Bohrer a, dans un |

|article intitulé “Les trois cultures” et publié en allemand, tenté d'analyser cette extension du concept traditionnel de culture, vers de nouveaux |

|domaines comme les médias, en partageant le champ culturel en trois formations culturelles, à trois niveaux différents (Bohrer 1982): - Il comprend |

|sous le terme de old culture la culture classique traditionnelle, définie par un canon très restreint de textes et d’œuvres transmis par les |

|institutions; - la newculture est constituée pour Bohrer par des cultures d'avant-garde existant depuis la fin du 19ème siècle qui, contrairement à la |

|“old culture”, sont marquées par un processus de renouvellement relativement accéléré; - et enfin la culture populaire recouvre le large champ des |

|médias et les formes textuelles de la culture de masse qui ont petit à petit, tout d'abord dans certains domaines très limités, trouvé leur entrée et |

|leur légitimation sociale dans la mémoire culturelle, à travers certaines formes de canonisation institutionnelle. |

| |

|Le second concept - anthropologique - de culture peut être défini comme un modèle global d'action et d'explication du monde inhérent à des groupes |

|sociaux, acquis au cours du processus de socialisation, une définition qui se rapproche du terme d'“outillage mental” utilisé par Lucien Febvre (Febvre|

|1953). On retrouve également chez l'anthropologue américain Ward.Goodenough (cité par Geertz,1973, p.11) les fondements d'une telle définition de la |

|culture: “A society's culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner operable to its members [...] |

|Culture describing is the writing out of systematic rules, an ethnographic algorithm, which, if followed, would make it possible so to operate, to pass|

|(physical appearance aside) for a native.” Mais ni chez Goodenough, ni chez Geertz ou Hofstede, ne furent thématisés les faisceaux de relations entre |

|les deux formes de culture qui constituent un objet central de la littérature et de la sociologie littéraire et culturelle (Lucien Goldmann par |

|exemple). Dans la recherche récente en histoire des cultures, chez Roger Chartier ou Walter Moser par exemple, les concepts de “représentation” |

|(définie comme des modes de perception collectifs s'articulant dans des actes ou des textes) et d'“appropriation culturelle” jouent un rôle essentiel. |

|Ici se trouve évoquée la perspective de parvenir à dégager des modèles d'action et de perception à partir de types de textes représentatifs et de leur |

|appropriation socioculturelle, en les soumettant soit à une analyse qualitative et herménétique, soit à une analyse quantitative et sérielle. Il |

|existe, par contre, une dissension - ou plutôt de larges variations - dans la recherche, à propos de l'ancrage géographique et socioculturel du concept|

|de culture. On trouve en effet, à coté d'importantes macro-structures, tel l'espace culturel asiatique, africain, ou celui de l'Occident, des |

|microstructures très significatives, comme par exemple le groupe socioculturel dans lequel vivent Bulletin no 30 – Avril 1998 2 les Surinamiens |

|habitant aux Pays-Bas (Ten Thije et Kolle 1994). L'unité culturelle dominante dans la recherche en communication interculturelle moderne et |

|contemporaine est sans aucun doute la culture nationale, dont on peut justifier la signification à travers l'ancrage anthropologique du concept de |

|culture dans des “learning styles” et “learning patterns”. On peut cependant relativiser l'ancrage dominant de la notion de culture dans la culture |

|nationale, en soulignant sa qualité différentielle, impliquant l’existence, dans chaque culture, de structures et de segmentations multiples, et en |

|reconnaissant, par-là même, comme significatives les différences entre les systèmes culturels européens et extra-européens. La prise en considération |

|de systèmes de signes non-verbaux relativise également le caractère étroitement national du concept de culture, et met en lumière des unités |

|culturelles régionales ou transnationales, tel l'espace méditerranéen. Des qualités différentielles ou des démarcations entre des cultures, (que ce |

|soit au niveau macro- ou micro-structurel) peuvent être en partie mesurées à l'aide de différences dans les domaines langagier, vestimentaire ou dans |

|les comportements. Elles sont cependant marquées de façon décisive par des formes de thématisation de soi, de présentation de soi, et par des mises en |

|scène de formes d'identité collectives avec les auto- et hétéro-images qui en découlent. Le concept de culture, quel que soit le niveau auquel il se |

|situe, se trouve donc étroitement lié aux concepts d'“identité”, de “perception de soi” et de “perception de l'autre”. Ces derniers peuvent, en partie,|

|être objectivés de façon empirique, mais ils contiennent aussi une large part d'auto- et hétéro-qualifications. Des différenciations socio-culturelles |

|et socio-graphiques, tels les concepts de “culture de chefs d'entreprise”, “culture musicale”, “culture intellectuelle”, “culture ouvrière” ou “culture|

|régionale”, qui sont liés chacun à un style de vie et à une tradition spécifiques ainsi qu'à une conscience identitaire, se situent pour leur part sur |

|un autre niveau structurel, qui peut se définir comme un sous-système d'entités culturelles plus larges, telle la “nation” par exemple. Au niveau de |

|ces sous-systèmes, et en ce qui les concerne, il paraît non seulement très inusuel de parler de “communication interculturelle”, mais ceci semble |

|également inadéquat sur le plan méthodologique. |

|Le concept d'interculturalité |

|La “communication interculturelle” définit des relations entre différentes cultures, et ces relations reposent sur plusieurs processus: des processus |

|d'interaction interculturelle, des processus de perception de l'autre perceptibles dans l'interaction mais aussi façonnés et transmis par les médias, |

|et des processus de transfert et de réception entre cultures. Contrairement à la définition assez étroite proposée par Gerhard Maletzke dans son livre |

|récent intitulé “Communication interculturelle”, une définition plus large de ce concept semble pouvoir, selon les recherches réalisées en matière de |

|théorie de la communication, être élargi au-delà du domaine de l'interaction situative interpersonnelle. Maletzke part, en effet, de la définition |

|suivante: Quand des personnes de cultures différentes se rencontrent, nous qualifions les processus qui sont alors impliqués de “communication |

|interculturelle” ou bien d'“interaction interculturelle” [...]. Nous utilisons ces deux termes lorsque les partenaires de cultures différentes sont |

|conscients du fait que l'autre est vraiment différent et qu'ils reconnaissent réciproquement leur altérité." |

|Le concept d'interculture est maintenant le plus souvent utilisé, comme l'ont proposé entre autre Bernd Müller-Jacquier et Ten Thije, pour désigner les|

|processus psycho-langagiers qui peuvent être observés lors d'interactions interculturelles c'est-à-dire des situations de communication entre membres |

|de cultures différentes; alors que les concepts d'interculturel et d'interculturalité tendent, eux, à être employés pour décrire les déroulements et |

|les formes d'expression des rencontres entre différentes cultures à tous les niveaux - journaux, médias audiovisuels, littérature, etc. On peut parler |

|dans ce sens d'“écriture métissée ” pour évoquer l'orientation interculturelle de modes d'expression littéraires, d'“histoire interculturelle”, ou |

|encore de “philosophie interculturelle”. |

|L'un des problèmes les plus importants à résoudre, du point de vue de la méthode, est de relier le 'mainstream' de la recherche en communication |

|interculturelle, axé autour de l'étude d'interactions interculturelles, avec les objets d'étude en partie nouveaux des études culturelles et |

|médiatiques. Ainsi, ce ne sont pas uniquement les “relations humaines” qui, comme c'est le cas chez Maletzke, doivent être qualifiées |

|d'interculturelles, mais également tous ces phénomènes qui paraissent être constructifs pour les interactions interculturelles: à savoir, par exemple, |

|les relations entre l'identité Bulletin no 30 – Avril 1998 3 propre et l'altérité (ancrées bien souvent dans des discours, des institutions ou des |

|processus de socialisation) qui sont, à travers leurs codes, leurs conventions, leurs opinions et leurs formes de comportement, à la fois les |

|conditions préalables et les constituants de la communication interculturelle. |

|En second lieu, on a trop négligé, dans l'étude des phénomènes de la communication interculturelle, les processus de transfert et les figures |

|d'intermédiaires, qui déterminent de façon décisive les processus interculturels et les modèles d'identité et de perception qu'ils véhiculent: par |

|exemple les journalistes, hommes politiques, diplomates, enseignants, managers, éducateurs, travailleurs sociaux, scientifiques, etc., dont une des |

|fonction est d'établir des liens communicatifs entre des membres de cultures différentes et de résoudre, par leur action pratique mais aussi |

|communicative, les conflits qui peuvent en résulter. Il en découle comme perspective de recherche l'étude de la socio-anthropologie des intermédiaires |

|culturels et de leurs formes de discours. L'idée centrale est ici de penser et d'analyser la communication interculturelle comme un processus de |

|relations entre les cultures, incluant l'interaction directe et verbale, mais englobant aussi l'ensemble des processus de communication liant des |

|cultures différentes, et de par là comme un processus complexe de communication dans chacun de ses différents éléments structuraux. Ce processus de |

|communication comprend deux ou plusieurs cultures, qui ne peuvent être considérées comme culture de départ et culture d'arrivée que dans le cas d'un |

|transfert culturel. Il semble important de repenser la communication interculturelle en tant que processus complexe, dans une perspective à la fois |

|historique et médiatique, et de détacher ainsi la recherche en communication interculturelle d'une privilégiant trop exclusivement des formes de |

|communication orales et des formes d'interaction “saisies à chaud” actuelle et authentique. Ceci implique de réorienter la recherche en communication |

|interculturelle d'une triple manière : |

|- En premier lieu en tant que processus, d'une part, car à côté des signes de communication verbaux ou non-verbaux eux-mêmes, les institutions et les |

|figures d'intermédiaires sociauxculturels jouent un rôle central, comme le montre par exemple les travaux de T.- Kolle et de D. Ten Thije (1994); |

|- en second lieu à travers son articulation médiatique, car à côté de la communication 'vécue directement' et considérée comme plus 'authentique', des |

|formes de communication médiatisées et théâtralisées jouent un rôle non négligeable dans la construction de modèles sociaux, en général, et dans |

|l'interaction interculturelle en particulier; |

|- la prise en compte, en troisième lieu, de la perspective historique dans les analyses de la communication interculturelle conduit à intégrer |

|systématiquement les dimensions médiale et processuelle. La différence - qui parait à l'heure actuelle évidente à première vue et qui se trouve |

|hypostasiée par certaines directions de la recherche - entre communication interactionnelle directe, d'une part, et communication interculturelle |

|médiatisée, d'autre part, s'efface de façon croissante si on se place dans une perspective historique. Une telle mise en perspective historique n'est |

|pas sans poser un défi à la recherche en communication interculturelle, en particulier en ce qui concerne son insertion interdisciplinaire. Dépassant |

|les frontières de la psychologie, de la sociologie et de la linguistique, qui forment trop exclusivement le noyau de la recherche interculturelle, |

|cette dernière devrait s'ouvrir beaucoup plus largement à des disciplines comme l'histoire, la philosophie, les sciences, les études culturelles et |

|littéraires et celles des communications de masse. Au lieu de tendre à devenir une discipline autonome et cloisonnée, la communication interculturelle |

|devrait ainsi s'ancrer dans l'ensemble des sciences sociales et historiques, en tant que perspective méthodologique, à l'instar des questionnements |

|comparatistes qui lui sont complémentaires (Werner 1997). Ce décloisonnement de la communication interculturelle en tant que champ de recherche et |

|d'enseignement, basé sur les réflexions qui précèdent, à l'égard des concepts de culture et d'interculturalité, s'impose: dans l'intérêt de l'ensemble |

|des chercheurs qui consacrent leurs travaux à l'étude des relations entre les membres de cultures différentes, un champ de recherche de plus en plus |

|complexe et d'une actualité intense. Bulletin no 30 – Avril 1998 4 |

|Bibliographie sommaire |

|… |

| |

|Dictionnaire suisse de |

|politique sociale |

| |

|Interculturalité |

| |

|Le concept d'interculturalité est né dans les années septante, à propos d'abord de l'intégration scolaire des élèves migrants. En mettant l'accent sur |

|les échanges entre les diverses cultures habitant nos sociétés, l'interculturalité s'oppose à la multiculturalité, simple juxtaposition de cultures |

|différentes. |

|L'approche interculturelle de l'éducation a été prônée par le Conseil de la coopération culturelle du Conseil de l'Europe à Strasbourg (1977, 1982, |

|1985, 1988) et, en Suisse, par la Conférence suisse des Directeurs de l'Instruction Publique (1985). En 1977 déjà, Bruxelles édicte une directive (donc|

|exécutoire par les pays membres) établissant le droit des élèves migrants à bénéficier, durant trois heures par semaines, d'un enseignement officiel |

|sur leur langue et culture d'origine. |

|Force est cependant aujourd'hui de constater que l'interculturalité n'a le plus souvent guère été plus loin que les déclarations de bonnes intentions ;|

|du moins en Suisse. Dans la plupart des cantons, la langue maternelle est bannie des écoles, les enseignants de langue et de culture d'origine n'ont |

|pratiquement aucun contact avec leurs homologues de la société d'accueil, et l'échange présupposé par le terme interculturalité - en dehors du folklore|

|musical ou gastronomique - reste généralement pensé à sens unique. L'interculturel serait-il alors, comme le Conseil de l'Europe s'interrogeait en 1985|

|déjà, un "fourre-tout" vide de sens? La question est aujourd'hui d'autant plus pertinente que le concept d'interculturalité est désormais nomade : s'y |

|réfèrent aussi les professionnels de la santé et du social, les œuvres d'entraide et les multinationales. |

|De fait, une véritable interculturalité implique une redéfinition de notre rapport à soi et à l'autre. Rapport à soi : prendre conscience du métissage |

|historique de notre propre culture, de son caractère par essence dynamique ; chercher à connaître et reconnaître nos propres repères culturels, tâche |

|assez ardue en cette époque de globalisation et d'évanescence du sens. Rapport à l'autre : chercher à le (re)connaître et à nous faire (re)connaître |

|par lui, prendre conscience de nos inévitables jugements de valeur, (re)trouver les similitudes fondamentales - ou les "universels-singuliers" - que |

|lui et moi, de même que tout être humain, partageons. Inévitablement, les professionnels du social, de la santé et de l'éducation doivent alors |

|redéfinir leur rôle, prêter une attention soutenue au lien social qui dédouble la relation professionnelle entretenue avec les usagers, les patients, |

|les élèves et leurs parents. |

| |

|Voir: Conférence des directeurs cantonaux de l'instruction publique (CDIP) Conseil de l'Europe Immigration Instruction publique Intégration |

|Interculturalité Médiation culturelle |

| |

|# Références: M. Abdallah-Pretceille, L. Porcher, Diagonales de la communication interculturelle, Anthropos, Paris, 1999. - J.-C. Métraux, " Le don au |

|secours des appartenances plurielles ", in : Les défis migratoires, Ed. Centlivres P. & I. Girod, Seismo, Zurich, 2000, pp. 457-464. |

| |

|Jean-Claude Métraux |

Transculturation

|Transculturation |

|From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. |

| |

|Transculturation is a term coined by Fernando Ortiz in 1947 to describe the phenomenon of merging and converging cultures. In simple terms, it reflects the|

|natural tendency of people (in general) to resolve conflicts over time, rather than exacerbating them. In the modern context, both conflicts and |

|resolutions are amplified by communication and transportation technology —the ancient tendency of cultures drifting or remaining apart has been replaced by|

|stronger forces for bringing societies together. Where tranculturation impacts ethnicity and ethnic issues the term "ethnoconvergence" is sometimes used. |

| |

|In one general sense, transculturation covers war, ethnic conflict, racism, multiculturalism, interracial marriage, and any other of a number of contexts |

|that deal with more than one culture. In the other general sense, tranculturation is the positive aspect of global phenomena and human events, where |

|resolutions to conflicts are inevitable. |

| |

|The general processes of transculturation are extremely complex -- steered by powerful forces at the macrosocial level, yet ultimately resolved at the |

|interpersonal level. The driving force for conflict is simple proximity -- boundaries, once separating people (providing for a measure of isolation) become|

|the issue of a conflict when societies encroach upon one another territorially. If a means to co-exist cannot be immediately found, then conflicts can be |

|hostile, leading to a process by which contact between individuals leads to some resolution. Often, history shows us, the processes of co-existence begins |

|with hostilities, and with the natural passing of polarist individuals, comes the passing of their polarist sentiments, and soon some resolution is |

|achieved. Degrees of hostile conflict vary from outright genocidal conquest, to lukewarm infighting between differing politcal views within the same ethnic|

|community. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Concepts |

| |

|Where attempts are made to keep a cultural identity "pure," the realities of social change, via natural and artificial means, dictates that cultures do not|

|remain "pure," rather are destined to change. It is the perception of individuals within cultures that their cultures do not in fact change fundamentally |

|over time. |

| |

|Human mortality and reproduction provides for social regeneration as well, and by this process of regeneration, which naturally includes sexual union, |

|other cultures are often integrated. The inability of societies to maintain divisions over generations, despite attempts to engrain divisive elements, is |

|reflective of this. As parents die, their children have the opportunity to reflect upon the nature and validity of established non-convergent precepts, and|

|change them if they like. |

| |

|These changes often represent differences between homeland populations, and their diasporic communities abroad. Nevertheless, obstacles to ethnoconvergence|

|are not great. The primary issue; language, (hence, communication and education) can, be overcome within a single generation - as is evident in the easy |

|acclimation of children of foreign parents. English, for example, is spoken by more non-Anglo-American people than Anglo-Americans, making it the current |

|lingua-franca, the worldwide de facto standard international language. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Homogenization versus ethnoconvergence |

| |

|It is observed that even in monolingual, industrial societies like urban North America, some individuals do cling to a "modernized" primordial identity, |

|apart from others. Some intellectuals, such as Michael Ignatieff, argue that convergence of a general culture does not directly entail a similar |

|convergence in ethnic identities. This can become evident in social situations, where people divide into separate groups, despite being of an dentical |

|"super-ethnicity", such as nationality. |

| |

|Within each smaller ethnicity, individuals may tend to see it perfectly justified to assimilate with other cultures, and some others view assimilation as |

|wrong and incorrect for their culture. This common theme, representing dualist opinions of ethnoconvergence itself, within a single ethnic group is often |

|manifested in issues of sexual partners and matrimony, employment preferences, etc. These varied opinions of ethnoconvergence represent themselves in a |

|spectrum; assimilation, homogenization, and cultural compromise are commonly used terms for ethnoconvegence which flavor the issues to a bias. |

| |

|Often it's in a secular, multi-ethnic environment that cultural concerns are both minimalised and exaccerbated; Ethnic prides are boasted, hierarchy is |

|created ("center" culture versus "periphery") but on the other hand, they will still share a common "culture", and common language and behaviours. Often |

|the elderly, more conservative-in-association of a clan, tend to reject cross-cultural associations, and participate in ethnically similar |

|community-oriented activities. Xenophobes tend to think of cross-cultural contact as a component of assimilation, and see this as harmful. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Obstacles to ethnoconvergence |

| |

|The obstacle to ethnoconvergence is ethnocentrism, which is the view that one's culture is of greater importance than anothers.' Ethnocentrism often takes |

|different forms, as it is a highly personal bias, and manifests itself in countless aspects of culture. Religion, or belief, is the prime ethnocentric |

|divider. Second is custom, which may overlap religion. With the adherence to each distinct component, comes the repulsion of the other. In most regions, |

|ethnic divides are binary, meaning only two distinct cultures are present, each seeing the other as foreign. Many, however make the point that the binary |

|example is the exception, and the norm is far more dynamic. |

| |

|We can divide ethnicity into two distinct areas, as they relate to ethnoconvergence: Utilitarian traits, and traditional customs. Language usually falls |

|into the first category, as people often do not attach to language a highly ethnic value. Learning a foreign language does not, in the eyes of most people,|

|constitute a forfeiting of one's cultural heritage. |

| |

|Religion, on the other hand, is a highly personal and attached part of culture. However, religion does not neatly correspond with ethnic identity. In many |

|cosmopolitan societies, religion is everything - social, utilitarian, intellectual, political; from the point of view of people of immersed cultures; The |

|very concept of ethnicity and its distinctions is incongruous to their immersed concepts. |

| |

|In many societies, such as in those in Europe, languages are considered a significant component of ethnic values. This does not mean that most Europeans |

|reject learning other languages. Quite the contrary, Europeans are often polyglots, and may label other individuals by their ethnicities; practical means |

|of distinguishing cultures may resemble tendencies similar to ethnocentrism. |

| |

|However, the political and cultural significance of regional or national languages are retained due to the fact that these polyglots conform to the |

|linguistic norms of the place they visit - doing "as the Romans do". Thus, conforming to the "ethnic integrity" of the region. |

| |

|It has even become a cliche that "to learn a new language is to adopt a new soul". There are many other examples of the essential significance of language.|

|In pre-Russian Siberia, Tatar-Mongol colonists in the Taiga often recognized indigenous speakers of Turkic languages as their "own people" and non-Turkic |

|groups as "foreigners". This is in spite of the fact that these indigenous groups had a similar level of material culture, and shared much of a primitive |

|culture with tribes foreign to the Muslim-Buddhist Tatar-Mongols. |

| |

|See also: |

| |

|* multiculturalism |

Multiculturalism

|Multiculturalism |

|From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. |

| |

|Multiculturalism is a policy that emphasizes the unique characteristics of different cultures, especially as they relate to one another in receiving |

|nations. The word was first used in 1957 to describe Switzerland, but came into common currency in Canada in the late 1960s. It quickly spread to other |

|English-speaking countries. |

|Contents |

|[hide] |

| |

|* 1 Overview |

|* 2 Official multiculturalism |

|o 2.1 Origins |

|o 2.2 Implementation |

|o 2.3 Official multiculturalism around the world |

|* 3 Criticisms |

|o 3.1 Criticisms of multiculturalism in general |

|o 3.2 Country-specific criticisms |

|+ 3.2.1 United States |

|+ 3.2.2 Canada |

|# 3.2.2.1 Criticism of Kymlicka's communitarianism |

|+ 3.2.3 United Kingdom |

|* 4 See also |

|* 5 References |

|* 6 External links |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|Overview |

| |

|Multiculturalism...is a theory (albeit vague) about the foundations of a culture rather than a practice which subsumes cultural ideas. (Harrison, 1984) |

| |

|Looked at broadly, the term is often used to describe societies (especially nations) which have many distinct cultural groups, usually as a result of |

|immigration. This can lead to anxiety about the stability of national identity, yet can also lead to cultural exchanges that benefit the cultural groups. |

|Such exchanges range from major accomplishments in literature, art and philosophy to relatively token appreciation of variations in music, dress and new |

|foods. |

| |

|On a smaller scale, the term can also be used to refer to specific districts in cities where people of different cultures co-exist. The actions of city |

|planners can result in some areas remaining monocultural, often due to pressure groups active in the local political arena. This is especially applicable |

|for the UK. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Official multiculturalism |

| |

|Multiculturalism can also be a prescriptive term which describes government policy. |

| |

|In dealing with immigrants groups and their cultures, there are essentially three approaches- |

| |

|* Monoculturalism: In most Old World nations, culture is very closely linked to nationalism, thus government policy is to assimilate immigrants. These |

|countries have policies aiming at the social integration of immigrant groups to the national culture. This is typical of nations that define themselves as |

|one and indivisible and do not recognize the existence of other nations within their midst. |

|* Melting Pot: In the United States the traditional view has been one of a melting pot where all the immigrant cultures are mixed and amalgamated without |

|state intervention. However, many states have different language policies within the union. |

|* Multiculturalism: In comparison to the above two approaches, multiculturalism is a view, or policy, that immigrants, and others, should preserve their |

|cultures with the different cultures interacting peacefully within one nation. Today, this is the official policy of Canada and Australia. Multiculturalism |

|has been described as preserving a "cultural mosaic" of separate ethnic groups, and is contrasted to a "melting pot" that mixes them. |

| |

|No country falls completely into one, or another, of these categories. For example, France has made efforts to adapt French culture to new immigrant groups,|

|while Canada still has many policies that work to encourage assimilation. |

| |

|Some, such as Diane Ravitch, use the term multiculturalism differently, describing both the melting pot, and Canada's cultural mosaic as being multicultural|

|and refers to them as pluralistic and particularist multiculturalism. Pluralistic multiculturalism views each culture or subculture in a society as |

|contributing unique and valuable cultural aspects to the whole culture. Particularist multiculturalism is more concerned with preserving the distinctions |

|between cultures. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Origins |

| |

|Multiculturalism became incorporated into official policies in several nations in the 1970s for reasons that varied from country to country. |

| |

|In Canada, it was adopted in 1971 following the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, a government body set up in response to the grievances |

|of Canada's French-speaking minority (concentrated in the Province of Quebec). The report of the Commission advocated that the Canadian government recognize|

|Canada as a bilingual and bicultural society and adopt policies to preserve this character. Biculturalism was attacked from many directions. |

| |

|Progressive Conservative leader John Diefenbaker saw multiculturalism as an attack on his vision of unhyphenated Canadianism. It did not satisfy the growing|

|number of young francophones who gravitated towards Quebec nationalism. While many Canadians of British descent disliked the new policies of biculturalism |

|and official bilingualism, the strongest opposition to biculturalism came from Canadians of neither English nor French descent, the so-called "Third Force" |

|Canadians. Biculturalism did not accord with local realities in the western provinces, where the French population was tiny compared to other groups such as|

|the Ukrainian Canadians, the group that was arguably most important in modifying the policy of biculturalism. To accommodate these groups, the formula was |

|changed from "bilingualism and biculturalism" to "bilingualism and multiculturalism." |

| |

|The Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau passed the Official Multiculturalism Act in 1971. Symbolically, this legislation affirmed that Canada was a |

|multicultural nation. On a more practical level, federal funds began to be distributed to ethnic groups to help them preserve their cultures. Projects |

|typically funded included folk dancing competitions and the construction of [community centres. This led to criticisms that the policy was actually |

|motivated by electoral considerations. After its election in 1984, the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney did not reverse these policies,|

|although they had earlier been criticized by Tories as inconsistent with "unhyphenated Canadianism." This policy has been supported by every subsequent |

|government and was added to Canada's 1982 constitution. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Implementation |

| |

|Around the world, important government multicultural policies can include: |

| |

|* dual citizenship |

|* government support for newspapers, television, and radio in minority languages |

|* support for minority festivals, holidays, and celebrations |

|* acceptance of traditional and religious dress in schools, the military, and society in general |

|* support for arts from cultures around the world |

|* programs to encourage minority representation in politics, education, and the work force |

| |

|While multiculturalist policies oppose cultural assimilation, countries such as Canada do support structural assimilation. Immigrant groups are still |

|encouraged to participate in the larger society, learn the majority languages, and enter the labour force. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Official multiculturalism around the world |

| |

|The other country to have most fully adopted Canada's view of multiculturalism is Australia where many of these policies related to multiculturalism are |

|pursued, for example the formation of the Special Broadcasting Service. |

| |

|In the United States multiculturalism is not an official policy at the federal level. At the state level, it is sometimes associated with English-Spanish |

|bilingualism. However, the government, in recent years, moved to support many multiculturalist policies. In some ways, the United States has gone even |

|further than Canada and Australia with such policies. For instance, California drivers can take their exams in a number of languages and gerrymandered |

|districts guarantee minority representation in government. |

| |

|In the United Kingdom multiculturalism has been the subject of extensive debate in recent years. Under the Conservatives (1979-1997), multiculturalist |

|rhetoric and policies were confined to left-leaning councils. Since the election of the Labour government in 1997, multiculturalism has influenced |

|government policies and statements. |

| |

|Multiculturalism, along with other identity politics, has, in part, been successful because it is a useful tool for politicians to win the votes of minority|

|groups. Government money for cultural celebrations or ethnic-specific newspapers can encourage new immigrants to support the governing party. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Criticisms |

| |

|There have been many criticisms of official multiculturalism from both the left and right. However, criticism of such policies can be difficult, because it |

|can quickly lead to accusations of racism and xenophobia. |

| |

|Criticisms of multiculturalism can focus on the circumstances of one country or they can be more general. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Criticisms of multiculturalism in general |

| |

|One of the dangers of pursuing multiculturist social policies is that social integration and cultural assimilation can be held back. This can potentially |

|encourage economic disparities and an exclusion of minority groups from mainstream politics. The political commentator Matthew Parris has questioned whether|

|the pursuit of particularist multiculturalism is not apartheid by another name. |

| |

|One of the most forceful critics of multiculturalism was Ayn Rand, who condemned the world-wide ethnic revival of the late 1960s as a manifestation of |

|tribalization that would lead to an ethnic Balkanization destructive to modern industrial societies. Her philosophy considers multiculturalism to be based |

|on the same premise as monoculturalism; this premise being culturally determinist collectivism (i.e., that individual human beings have no free choice in |

|how they act and are conditioned irreversibly by society). Philosophically, Rand rejected this form of collectivism on the grounds that: 1) it undermines |

|the concept of free will, and 2) the human mind (according to her philosophy) is a tabula rasa at birth. Combining these two premises, she concludes that we|

|all can modify our actions volitionally, assuming we modify the premises we hold to support those actions (which is also volitional). Since this thinking |

|was also her basis for rejecting racism, Objectivists and Neo-Objectivists/Post-Objectivists consider multiculturalism to be akin to racism. |

| |

|In her 1999 essay, later expanded into an anthology, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" the feminist and political theorist Susan M. Okin argues that a |

|concern for the preservation of cultural diversity should not overshadow the discriminatory nature of gender roles in many minority cultures, that, at the |

|very least, "culture" should not be used as an excuse for rolling back the women's rights movement. |

| |

|One of the most articulate and careful recent critics of multiculturalism is the political theorist Brian Barry, who argues from the liberal left in his |

|2002 book "Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism" that multiculturalism divides people when they need to be united in order to |

|fight for social justice. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Country-specific criticisms |

|[edit] |

| |

|United States |

| |

|Diane Ravitch argues that the celebration of multicultural diversity in America is used to mask hostility toward the mainstream, as multiculturalists would |

|claim that the mainstream has ignored blacks, women, American Indians, and so on in history. |

| |

|In his 1991 work, Illiberal Education, Dinesh D'Souza argues that the entrenchment of multiculturalism in American universities has undermined the |

|universalistic values that liberal educations once attempted to foster. In particular, he was disturbed by the growth of ethnic studies programmes, (e.g., |

|Black Studies). |

|[edit] |

| |

|Canada |

| |

|In Canada, the most noted critics of multiculturalism are Kenneth McRoberts, Neil Bissoondath and Reginald Bibby. |

| |

|As a young man, McRoberts worked for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and his career as a political scientist has roughly coincided |

|with the policy of multiculturalism. While some argue that the shift in official discourse from biculturalism to multiculturalism has had a neutral effect |

|on relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada, McRoberts believes that it was disastrous for Canadian nationalism, as it offended Quebeckers and their |

|a dualistic vision of Canada as a bilingual and bicultural society. |

| |

|In 1971, when official multiculturalism was introduced by the federal government, separatism was fringe movement in Quebec, with less than a tenth of the |

|population supporting the idea of being an independent country. The next few years saw the growth of separatist sentiment and the election of a provincial |

|government committed to independence. To many French Canadians, multiculturalism threatened to reduce them to just another ethnic groups, along with the |

|Greeks and the Vietnamese. In the 1995 independence election on separation from Canada, the advocates of Quebec independence lost by only a small margin. |

| |

|Of all Canadian provinces, Quebec has been the least supportive of multiculturalism, welcoming people of all races, but insisting that they assimilate into |

|Quebec's French-speaking society. Recently, the more assimilationist aspects of this policy have been tempered with a recognition that Quebec is a de facto |

|pluralist society. The Quebec government has adopted a form of multiculturalism. It is described by the Quebec government as an "interculturalism policy." |

|This policy seeks to integrate immigrants to the mainstream French-speaking society of Quebec. |

| |

|The government of Quebec understands pluralism as being a feature of modern Quebec society or any other society that welcomes immigrants. Because it |

|considers itself the national government of all Quebecers, the Quebec government seeks to have all its citizens participate to a common civic culture. In |

|order to accomplish this, it promotes French, the language of the majority, as the common public language of all Quebecers. |

| |

|Whether as a first, second, or third language, French becomes the instrument which allows the socialization of Quebecers of all origins and forces |

|interaction between them. Interculturalism is a policy that aims at fighting racism, misunderstanding of others, and ultimately bring about the |

|solidarization of the multiethnic human collectivity the nation is supposed to be. |

| |

|In his Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada, the Trinidad and Tobago born Bissoondath argues that official multiculturalism limits the |

|freedom of minority members by confining them to cultural and geographic ghettos. He also argues that cultures are very complex and must be transmitted |

|through close family and kin relations. To him, the government view of cultures as being about festivals and cuisine is a crude oversimplification that |

|leads to easy stereotyping. |

| |

|Bibby, in his Mosaic Madness: Pluralism Without a Cause, argues that official multiculturalism is a divisive force that is reducing national solidarity and |

|unity. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Criticism of Kymlicka's communitarianism |

| |

|It devolves responsibility of the public society to its "subsets" which are cultural communities, whose responsibility is to integrate individuals |

|experiencing cultural alienation or in need of cultural choices. In other words: the society doesn't integrate individuals, "communities" do; the society |

|doesn't integrate individuals, it only integrates "communities". Through such communal devolution, the society actually devests itself of the direct |

|responsibility to rein in racism assaulting human dignity (not just "group dignity") and to provide equal opportunities and cultural fulfillment for |

|individuals. And then, the discourses concerning anti-racism and egalitarianism are directed exclusively toward the preservation of group dignity, group |

|integrity, group autonomy and inter-group harmony. |

|[edit] |

| |

|United Kingdom |

| |

|In the UK, supporters of the current Labour government's approach have described it as having defended the rights of minorities to preserve their culture, |

|while also seeking to ensure they become fully particpatory citizens — that is, integrating without assimilating. Critics say the policy fails on all |

|accounts: If social conditions and racism become barriers to the integration of minorities, then multiculturalism does not properly function. There is now a|

|lively debate in the UK over multiculturalism versus "social cohesion and inclusion." The current Labour government appears to favour the latter. In the |

|wake of bomb attacks on London in 2005 (which left over 50 people dead) the opposition Conservative home secretary called on the government to scrap its |

|"outdated" policy of multiculturalism. One of the foremost critics of multiculturalism is Trevor Phillips the chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality|

|and a one-time black activist. Criticisms of the multiculturalism policy have also been made by Uganda-born author Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, in her seminal 2000|

|work After Multiculturalism. |

|[edit] |

| |

|See also |

| |

|* Interculturalism |

|* Racial integration |

|* Transculturation |

|* Cosmopolitanism |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|References |

| |

|M Harrison, cited in Sneja Gunew, Denaturalizing cultural nationalisms: multicultural readings of Australia in Bhaba, Homi K. (ed.) 1990, Nation and |

|Narration, New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc. (p.99) |

|[edit] |

| |

|External links |

| |

|* Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures - article by Diane Ravitch on pluralistic vs. particularistic multiculturalism |

|* News (10-Apr-2004): British Head of Commission for Racial Equality says the term should be scrapped |

|* Commentary and user comments from Open Democracy - Multiculturalism: translating difference |

|* The Menace of Multiculturalism by Cameron McKenzie |

|* Davis attacks UK multiculturalism - BBC News article concerning Conservative opposition to multiculturalism |

American cultural hegemony

American cultural hegemony

|Cultural hegemony |

|From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. |

| |

|Cultural hegemony is the concept that a diverse culture can be ruled or dominated by one group or class, that everyday practices and shared beliefs provide|

|the foundation for complex systems of domination. |

| |

|The analysis of hegemony (or "rule") was formulated by Antonio Gramsci to explain why predicted communist revolutions had not occurred where they were most|

|expected, in industrialized Europe. Marx and his followers had advanced the theory that the rise of industrial capitalism would create a huge working class|

|and cyclical economic recessions. These recessions and other contradictions of capitalism would lead the overwhelming masses of people, the workers, to |

|develop organizations for self-defense, including labor unions and political parties. Further recessions and contradictions would then spark the working |

|class to overthrow capitalism in a revolution, restructure the economic, political, and social institutions on rational socialist models, and begin the |

|transition towards an eventual communist society. In Marxian terms, the dialectically changing economic base of society would determine the cultural and |

|political superstructure. Although Marx and Engels had famously predicted this eschatological scenario in 1848, many decades later the workers of the |

|industrialized core still had not carried out the mission. Why not? |

| |

|Gramsci argued that the failure of the workers to make anti-capitalist revolution was due to the successful capture of the workers' ideology, |

|self-understanding, and organizations by the hegemonic (ruling) culture. In other words, the perspective of the ruling class had been absorbed by the |

|masses of workers. In "advanced" industrial societies hegemonic cultural innovations such as compulsory schooling, mass media, and popular culture had |

|indoctrinated workers to a false consciousness. Instead of working towards a revolution that would truly serve their collective needs (according to |

|Marxists), workers in "advanced" societies were listening to the rhetoric of nationalist leaders, seeking consumer opportunities and middle-class status, |

|embracing an individualist ethos of success through competition, and/or accepting the guidance of the Catholic Church. |

| |

|Gramsci therefore argued for a strategic distinction between a "war of position" and a "war of movement". The war of position is a culture war in which |

|anti-capitalist elements seek to gain a dominant voice in mass media, mass organizations, and educational institutions to heighten class consciousness, |

|teach revolutionary analysis and theory, and inspire revolutionary organization. This is the attempt, in the words of Bob Marley, to "Emancipate yourself |

|from mental slavery, None but ourselves can free our minds." Following the success of the war of position, communist leaders would be empowered to begin |

|the war of movement, the actual insurrection against capitalism, with mass support. |

| |

|Critics of the concept of "cultural hegemony" have noted that it tends to imply a false consciousness of the working class, which suggests that the masses |

|of people are gullible and easily manipulated. |

| |

|Although the analysis of cultural domination was first advanced in terms of economic classes, it can be applied more broadly. Gramsci's analysis suggested |

|that prevailing cultural norms should not be viewed as "natural" or "inevitable". Rather, cultural norms - including institutions, practices, beliefs - |

|should be investigated for their roots in domination and their implications for liberation. |

| |

|For instance, one could note the support offered by scientists, educators, politicians, and journalists to the project of eliminating and/or assimilating |

|Native Americans in the United States, to continuing the subjugation of all women, or maintaining the super-exploitation and subordinate status of |

|African-Americans. |

| |

|Although leftists may have been the primary users of this conceptual tool, the activities of organized conservative movements also draw upon the concept. |

|This was seen, for instance, in evangelical Christian efforts to capture local school boards in the U.S. during the 1990s, and thus be able to dictate |

|curriculum. Patrick Buchanan, in a widely discussed speech to the 1992 Republican Convention, used the term "culture war" to describe political and social |

|struggle in the United States. |

| |

|Theory about hegemonic culture has profoundly influenced Eurocommunism, the social sciences, and activist strategies. In social science the application of |

|the concept of hegemony in the examination of major discourses (as by Michel Foucault) has become an important aspect of sociology, political science, |

|anthropology, and other cultural studies. In education the concept has led to the development of critical pedagogy. |

| |

| |

|See also: Reformism, cultural identity, Laclau and Chantal Mouffe :Hegemony and Socialist Strategy:, Noam Chomsky's, :Hegemony or Survival:, looking at the|

|current US context. |

|About American cultural hegemony |

| |

|Getting Hegemony Right - analysis of the United States as a "hyperpower" nation |

|National Interest, The, Spring, 2001 by G. John Ikenberry |

|. Accessed 9 August 2005. |

| |

|IN MAY 1999 the Oxford Union debated the proposition, "Resolved, the United States is a rogue state." The resolution was ultimately defeated, but around |

|the world there is growing unease about a global order dominated by American power--power unprecedented, unrestrained and unpredictable. The unease is felt|

|even by America's closest allies. "The United States of America today predominates on the economic level, the monetary level, on the technological level, |

|and in the cultural area in the broadest sense of the word", French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine observed in a speech in Paris in early 1999. "It is not|

|comparable, in terms of power and influence, to anything known in modern history." European diplomats, following Vedrine's coining of the term, have begun |

|calling the United States a "hyperpower." During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States kept each other in check. Today the restraints are |

|less evident, and this has made American power increasingly controversial. |

| |

|This is an unexpected turn of events. Just a little over a decade ago many pundits argued that the central problem of U.S. foreign policy was the graceful |

|management of the country's decline. Paul Kennedy's famous book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, argued that the United States would go the way of |

|all great powers--down. Japan was on the rise and Europe was awakening. World politics after the Cold War, it was widely assumed, was to be profoundly |

|multipolar. |

| |

|But the distribution of world power took a dramatic turn in America's favor. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline in ideological rivalry, |

|lagging economic fortunes in Japan and continental Europe, growing disparities in military and technological expenditure, and America's booming economy all|

|intensified power disparities during the 1990s. Today it is not decline that the United States must manage but the fear, resentment and instabilities |

|created by a decade of rising American power. |

| |

|A global backlash to U.S. power is not inevitable, however, particularly if the United States remembers its own political history. Our leaders have the |

|ideas, means and political institutions that can allow for stable and cooperative order even in the midst of sharp and shifting asymmetries of power. The |

|United States faced this problem after World War II and solved it by building what might be called a "stakeholder" hegemony. America can do it again today.|

| |

|The Dangers of Success |

| |

|THE UNITED STATES has a hegemony problem for a simple reason: It started the decade of the 1990s as the world's only superpower and then proceeded to have |

|a better decade than any other power. Disparities in economic and military power between the United States and the other major states widened. Between 1990|

|and 1998, U.S. economic growth (27 percent) was almost twice that of the European Union (15 percent) and three times that of Japan (9 percent). [1] The |

|weakness of the euro since its launch is ultimately a result of these divergent European and U.S. economic trends. While Europe and Japan have struggled |

|with economic restructuring, America has ridden the wave of the "New Economy" and rising productivity. The United States also reduced defense spending at a|

|slower rate after the Cold War than the other major powers, resulting in greater relative military capabilities by the end of the 1990s. In fact, it has |

|come close in recent years to monopolizing military-related research and development, spending roug hly 80 percent of the world's total. [2] These |

|developments have resulted in an extremely lopsided distribution of world power. The U.S. economy has slowed in recent months, but the disparities in |

|wealth creation remain. |

| |

|While such brute material disparities might normally be hidden below the surface, recent developments have rendered them salient and provocative. The |

|U.S.-led NATO air campaign over Kosovo in 1999 provided at times dramatic--and, to countries such as China and Russia, disturbing--evidence of America's |

|military and technological advantage. The squabble between the United States and Germany over the leadership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also |

|gave the impression that America had acquired a taste for dominance. Washington similarly bullied Japan during the East Asian financial crisis, opposing |

|Tokyo's plan for an Asian Monetary Fund and insisting on American-approved remedies. Bipartisan support for a national missile defense, despite the |

|opposition of the other major states and its potentially unsettling consequences for world security relationships, is another source of resentment and |

|suspicion. In the meantime, the expansion and integration of world markets--unfolding under the banner of globali zation--are seen by many as a |

|Washington-directed phenomenon that spreads American values and disproportionately favors American interests. For these and many other reasons, it is |

|widely believed around the world today that the global distribution of power is dangerously out of balance. |

| |

|Realist thinkers argue that what is happening is not surprising. Balance of power theory makes a clear prediction: Weaker states will resist and balance |

|against the predominant state. According to realists, security--indeed survival--is the fundamental goal of states, and, because states cannot ultimately |

|rely on the commitments or guarantees of other states to ensure their security, they will be very sensitive to their relative power position. When powerful|

|states emerge, secondary states will seek protection in countrevailing coalitions of weaker states. The alternative is to risk domination. [3] A leading |

|scholar of balance of power theory, Kenneth Waltz, argues that with the end of the Cold War, relations between the United States and its allies will loosen|

|and move toward a more traditional balance of power model. With the end of bipolarity, "the United States as the strongest power will often find other |

|states edging away from it: Germany moving toward Eastern Europe and Russia, and Russia moving towar d Germany and Japan." [4] According to this view, |

|unipolarity is simply not stable. Eventually, the anarchic character of international politics will reassert itself: economic rivalry, security dilemmas, |

|alliance decay and balance of power politics among the major states. |

| |

|The driving forces of this expected global reaction are the everyday frustrations and worries that are produced by sharp power disparities. Because of the |

|size of the United States, little shifts in U.S. policy can have huge consequences for other states. The Europeans will slowly expand their investments in |

|autonomous military capabilities and increasingly articulate an independent strategic vision. Japan will expand its diplomatic engagement of East Asia, |

|quietly launching independent security dialogues with other states in the region. At the same time, there is little in America's environment to discipline |

|the exercise of Washington's power. It is hard for the world to ignore or work around the United States regardless of the issue--trade, finance, security, |

|proliferation or the environment. |

| |

|But while the world worries about what America does next--or neglects to do--the United States needs to worry very little about what the rest of the world |

|does. In such a benign and unchallenged environment, U.S. foreign policy tends to be driven by domestic politics or the current policy tastes of its |

|leaders. The sad fact is that in a world of unipolar power Americans need to know very little about what other governments or peoples think, but foreigners|

|must worry increasingly about the vagaries of congressional campaigns and the idiosyncratic prejudices of congressional committee chairmen. |

| |

|For those who see this world as inherently unstable, the existing world order will change not in large, dramatic leaps but in small steps. The great powers|

|in Europe and Asia will begin making minute adjustments to protect themselves from the uncertainties of American power. Even in more balanced times, |

|secondary states have worried about the ability of the United States simultaneously to restrain and commit itself. As the power imbalance has grown more |

|extreme America's willingness and ability to show restraint and make commitments is increasingly thrown into question. One can only imagine the discussions|

|that go on, for example, in diplomatic cables between Paris and Berlin. Paris has never wanted to be a "junior partner in the American project", as one |

|French official recently observed. Worried states are making small adjustments, creating alternatives to affiance with the United States. These small steps|

|may not look important today, but eventually the ground will shift and the U.S.-led postwar order will fragment and disappear. |

| |

|The Acceptable Face of American Power |

|Continued from page 1. |

| |

|THIS BLEAK vision of backlash and strategic rivalry is not destiny. Indeed, the most striking fact of international life in the decade since the end of the|

|Cold War is that stable and cooperative relations between the democratic great powers continue largely unabated. In some ways these relations have actually|

|deepened, such as with the creation of the World Trade Organization and the expansion of intergovernmental working groups under the auspices of the G-7. |

|One reason for this is simple enough: There is a broad convergence of interests among the advanced industrial countries, all of which share deeply held |

|common commitments to economic openness, democracy and multilateral management of global issues. The huge start-up costs of establishing an alternative to |

|the U.S.-centered system also probably deter the other major states. |

| |

|A critical ingredient in stabilizing international relations in a world of radical power disparities is the character of America itself. The United States |

|is indeed a global hegemon, but because of its democratic institutions and political traditions it is--or can be--a relatively benign one. Joseph Nye's |

|arguments on "soft power" of course come to mind here, and there is much to his point. But, in fact, there are other, more significant aspects of the |

|American way in foreign policy that protect the United States from the consequences of its own greatness. |

| |

|When other major states consider whether to work with the United States or resist it, the fact that it is an open, stable democracy matters. The outside |

|world can see American policymaking at work and can even find opportunities to enter the process and help shape how the overall order operates. Paris, |

|London, Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo and even Beijing--in each of these capitals officials can readily find reasons to conclude that an engagement policy toward |

|the United States will be more effective than balancing against U.S. power. |

| |

|America in large part stumbled into this open, institutionalized order in the 1940s, as it sought to rebuild the postwar world and to counter Soviet |

|communism. In the late 1940s, in a pre-echo of today's situation, the United States was the world's dominant state--constituting 45 percent of world GNP, |

|leading in military power, technology, finance and industry, and brimming with natural resources. But America nonetheless found itself building world order|

|around stable and binding partnerships. Its calling card was its offer of Cold War security protection. But the intensity of political and economic |

|cooperation between the United States and its partners went well beyond what was necessary to counter the Soviet threat. As the historian Geir Lundestad |

|has observed, the expanding American political order in the half century after World War II was in important respects an "empire by invitation." [5] The |

|remarkable global reach of American postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of Europe an and Asian governments to harness U.S. |

|power, render that power more predictable, and use it to overcome their own regional insecurities. The result has been a vast system of America-centered |

|economic and security partnerships. |

| |

|Even though the United States looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure. |

|Three elements matter most in making U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. |

| |

|First, America's mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The |

|pluralistic and regularized way in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build longterm, mutually |

|beneficial relations. The governmental separation of powers creates a shared decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of |

|any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. An active press and competitive parry system also provide a service to outside |

|states by generating information about U.S. policy and determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed, frustrate American|

|diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over the long term, democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies--policies that do |

|not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat. |

| |

|Think of the United States as a giant corporation that seeks foreign investors. It is more likely to attract investors if it can demonstrate that it |

|operates according to accepted accounting and fiduciary principles. The rule of law and the institutions of policymaking in a democracy are the political |

|equivalent of corporate transparency and accountability Sharp shifts in policy must ultimately be vetted within the policy process and pass muster by an |

|array of investigatory and decision-making bodies. Because it is a constitutional, rule-based democracy, outside states are more willing to work with the |

|United States--or, to return to the corporate metaphor, to invest in ongoing partnerships. |

| |

|This open and decentralized political process works in a second way to reduce foreign worries about American power. It creates what might be called "voice |

|opportunities"--that is, opportunities for political access and, with it, the means for foreign governments and groups to influence the way Washington's |

|power is exercised. In 1990 the political analyst Pat Choate wrote a bestseller entitled Agents of Influence, detailing the supposedly scandalous ways in |

|which Japanese ministries and corporations were manipulating the American political process. High-priced lobbyists were advancing Tokyo's commercial |

|interests within the hallowed halls of the American capital and undermining the pursuit of the U.S. national interest. Today Washington is even more |

|inundated by foreign diplomats and revolving-door lobbyists working to ensure that the interests of America's partners are not overlooked. Looked at from |

|the perspective of the stable functioning of America's hegemonic order, Choate was actually describing one of the brilliant aspects of the United States as|

|a global power. By providing other states opportunities to play the game in Washington, they are drawn into active, ongoing partnerships that serve the |

|long-term strategic interests of the United States. |

| |

|A third and final element of the American order that reduces worry about power asymmetries is the web of multilateral institutions that mark the postwar |

|world. After World War II, the United States launched history's most ambitious era of institution-building. The UN, IMF, World Bank, NATO, GATT and other |

|institutions that emerged provided a more extensive rule-based structure for political and economic relations than anything seen before. The United States |

|had been deeply ambivalent about making permanent security commitments to other states and about allowing its political and economic policies to be |

|dictated by intergovernmental bodies. The Soviet menace was critical in overcoming these doubts. Networks and political relationships were built |

|that--paradoxically--made U.S. power both more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and malleable. |

| |

|In effect, the United States spun a web of institutions that connected other states to an emerging American-dominated economic and security order. But in |

|doing so, these institutions also bound the United States to other states and reduced--at least to some extent--Washington's ability to engage in the |

|arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of power. Call it an institutional bargain. The price for the United States was a reduction in Washington's policy |

|autonomy, in that institutional rules and joint decision-making reduced U.S. unilateralist capacities. But what Washington got in return was worth the |

|price. America's partners also had their autonomy constrained, but in return were able to operate in a world where U.S. power was more restrained and |

|reliable. |

| |

|Secretary of State Dean Rusk spelled out the terms of the bargain in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1965: |

| |

|We are every day, in one sense, accepting limitations upon our complete freedom of .... We have more than 4,300 treaties and international agreements, |

|two-thirds of which have been entered into in the past 25 years.... Each one of which at least limits our freedom of action. We exercise our sovereignty |

|going into these agreements. |

| |

|But Rusk argued that these agreements also create a more stable environment within which the United States can pursue its interests. "Law is a process by |

|which we increase our range of freedom" and "we are constantly enlarging our freedom by being able to predict what others are going to do." [6] The United |

|States gets a more predictable environment and more willing partners. |

| |

|Continued from page 2. |

| |

|There have been many moments when Asian and European allies have complained about the heavy-handedness of U.S. foreign policy, but the open and |

|institutionalized character of the American order has minimized the possibilities of hegemonic excess over the long term. The untoward implications of |

|sharp power asymmetries are reduced, cooperation and reciprocity are regularized, and the overall hegemonic order is rendered more legitimate and stable. |

|The bargain--on both sides--remains intact. |

| |

|Renewing the Institutional Bargain |

| |

|AMERICA's soaring power in the 1990s has put this open and rule-based postwar order to the test. Over the last fifty years, the advanced industrial states |

|have been relatively confident that the institutional foundations of this order would guard against the worst abuses of U.S. unilateralism and domination. |

|The system had characteristics of a stakeholder hegemony that promoted stability and cooperation. Today, in various political circles around the world, it |

|is harder for some people to make this judgment. Even the leader of a major U.S. ally, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, has raised concerns. "That there|

|is a danger of unilateralism, not by just anybody but by the United States, is undeniable." [7] |

| |

|The implication of my argument is that the more America's brute power capabilities emerge from behind mutually acceptable rules and institutions, the more |

|that power will provoke reaction and resistance. American leaders are indeed ambivalent about entangling the country in restraints and commitments. In the |

|past, however, these leaders have consistently concluded that some restraint on U.S. autonomy was a useful way to allay the worries of other states and |

|bind them to America's postwar global political-economic order. As Robert Zoellick, former undersecretary of state and now U.S. Trade Representative in the|

|Bush administration, describes the operation of this postwar order: |

| |

|The more powerful participants in this system--especially the United States--did not forswear all their advantages, but neither did they exercise their |

|strength without substantial restraint. Because the United States believed the Trilateral system was in its interest, it sacrificed some degree of national|

|autonomy to promote it. [8] |

| |

|What can America do to prevent the unraveling of this order? Three suggestions are offered here. First, U.S. officials should keep the country's current |

|good fortunes in historical perspective. This might induce a bit more modesty. America's long-time rival from outside the advanced democratic |

|world-Russia--now has an economy about the size of Denmark's. America's one-time rival from within the advanced democratic world-Japan--has gone through |

|ten years of economic stagnation, with no end in sight. China is still a developing country in terms of both economic and military capabilities, far from |

|being able to challenge the United States in either arena. Western Europe is stable and expanding, but it is consumed with its own union, embarked on a |

|politically difficult economic restructuring, and still is not capable of projecting global power. This unusual--perhaps unique--set of circumstances gives|

|the United States a de facto license to act as the world's manager and CEO. But U.S. officials should remember tha t the wheel of world power does turn. |

|Russia will not be down forever, nor will Japan. Europe will eventually get its house in order. The way America treats the other major states when they are|

|in decline will influence how these states treat America when--not if--they recover. |

| |

|Second, the United States needs to renew the postwar institutional bargain by making it more explicit and more encompassing. This means that America must |

|make it clear that it will play by multilateral rules in exchange for cooperation by other states on issues that matter most to us. The U.S. government |

|should bury once and for all legislation such as Super 301 and the Helms-Burton Act, which give the president authority to act unilaterally to protect |

|narrow economic interests. Such exercises of U.S. power create more problems than they solve. The United States should also expand its capacity to consult |

|with other governments throughout the policymaking process. Washington is not just the capital of the country or even of "the West"; it is also--at least |

|for a few more decades--the capital of a larger global order. These foreign stakeholders must be brought more fully into our policy process. Increasing |

|opportunities to voice opinions can be achieved informally in the day to day willingness of U.S. officials to consult with other governments. If not, |

|Washington risks an ultimate shift toward some other form of global order. |

| |

|President George W. Bush seemed to acknowledge the dangers of an overweening foreign policy--and chest thumping about America as the "indispensable |

|nation"--during one of the presidential debates, when he called for more modesty as America operates around the world. The Bush team has also made |

|"listening to our allies" a central theme of its foreign policy. Whether this is more than hollow campaign rhetoric will depend on how the new |

|administration acts on such issues as U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations, national missile defense, and a variety of proposed multilateral |

|political and environmental accords. |

| |

|Preserving the existing system through the redoubling of rule-based relationships will also require American elites to elevate the domestic debate on |

|international commitments and institutions. The old canard that building international rules and authority threatens American sovereignty is still too |

|tempting to many politicians on the Left and Right. The argument that many--if not most-- of the existing multilateral institutions are inspired by U.S. |

|leadership and advance the country's goals needs to be made more convincing to the American people. Politicians are more likely to stress the short-term |

|costs to the United States in terms of lost policy autonomy or sovereignty than the gains in building an enlightened order that serve long-term U.S. |

|interests. |

| |

|Finally, the United States needs to find more ways to pursue its economic and security goals through joint or multilateral decision-making exercises. A |

|good example of such intergovernmental processes that create stakeholder cooperation is the 1999 Perry commission on North Korea. Responding to a |

|congressional request for a reassessment of U.S. policy toward North Korea, the Clinton administration charged former Secretary of Defense William Perry |

|with the task of policy review. The deliberations eventually involved extensive talks with Japan and South Korea. In a de facto way, the commission became |

|multilateral, and Japanese and South Korean officials were integrated into the process and ultimately helped shape its content. The Perry report helped |

|clarify U.S. policy toward North Korea, but the process by which it was generated also helped build consensus in the region on how to deal with that state.|

|It also made American involvement in the region more consistent with the goals of partner states. The G-8 proc ess--which in recent years has launched |

|ongoing intergovernmental working groups to pursue common approaches to issues such as transnational organized crime and environmental policy--is also a |

|place where coordinated policymaking can be expanded. |

| |

|America's unipolar moment need not end in antagonistic disarray. But the United States needs to rediscover the solutions that it has brought to the problem|

|of unequal power in the past. These solutions are celebrated in our national political tradition. The rule of law, constitutional principles and inclusive |

|institutions of political participation ensure that governance is not simply a product of wealth or power. The wealthy and the powerful must operate within|

|principled institutional parameters. Because a rule-based order generates more stable and cooperative relations within the country even the wealthy and |

|powerful gain by avoiding social upheaval, which puts everyone's interests at risk. America can once again take this old domestic insight and use it to |

|shape post-Cold War international relations. And it is time to do so now, when America's relative power may be at its peak. |

| |

|G. John Ikenberry is Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. His most recent book is After |

|Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton University Press, 2001). |

| |

|(1.) Calculated from OECD statistics (July 1999 web edition). GDP measures are figured at 1990 prices and exchange rates. |

| |

|(2.) See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999/2000 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999). For additional indicators |

|of an intensification of U.S. power, see William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World", International Security (Summer 1999). |

| |

|Continued from page 3. |

| |

|(3.) For views along these lines, see Peter W. Rodman, "The World's Resentment: Anti-Americanism as a Global Phenomenon", The National Interest (Summer |

|2000); and Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", Foreign Affairs (March/April 1999). |

| |

|(4.) Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", International Security (Fall 1993), p. 75. |

| |

|(5.) See Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952", The Journal of Peace Research (September 1986). |

| |

|(6.) Quoted in Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919-1999 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, |

|1999), p. 61. |

| |

|(7.) Craig Whitney, New York Times, February 15, 1999. |

| |

|(8.) Zoellick, "The United States", in Zoellick et al., 2lst Century Strategies of the Trilateral Countries: In Concert or Conflict?, Report No. 53 (New |

|York Trilateral Commission, 1999), p. 5. |

| |

|Clarity at Last? |

| |

|Are we all clear that we want to build something that can aspire to be a world power? In other words, not just a trading bloc but a political entity. Do we|

|realize that our nation-states, taken individually, would find it far more difficult to assert their existence and their identity on the world stage? |

| |

|--Romano Prodi, president of the European Commission, Financial Times, February 14, 2001 |

| |

|COPYRIGHT 2001 The National Affairs, Inc. |

|COPYRIGHT 2003 Gale Group |

Disneyfication

| |

| |

Neo-Conservatism

|Neoconservatism in the United States |

|From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. |

| |

|''Neoconservatism'' is a somewhat controversial term referring to the political goals and ideology of the "new conservatives" in the United States. The |

|"newness" refers to the term's origination as either describing converts new to American conservatism (sometimes coming from a liberal or big-government |

|New Deal background) or to being part of a "new wave" of conservative thought and political organization. |

| |

|The neoconservatives, often dubbed the neocons by critics, are credited with (or blamed for) influencing U.S. foreign policy, especially under the |

|administrations of George Bush (1989–1993) and George W. Bush (2001–present). Neoconservatives have often been singled out for criticism by opponents of |

|the 2003 invasion of Iraq, many of whom see this invasion as a neoconservative initiative. Compared to other U.S. conservatives, neoconservatives may be |

|characterized by an aggressive moralist stance on foreign policy, a lesser social conservatism, and weaker dedication to a policy of minimal government, |

|and a greater acceptance of the welfare state, though none of these qualities are necessarily requisite. |

| |

|Neoconservatism is a controversial term whose meaning is widely disputed. Most people currently described as "neoconservatives" are members of the |

|Republican Party. The term is used more often by those who oppose "neoconservative" politics than those who subscribe to them; indeed, many to whom the |

|label is applied reject it. The term is frequently used pejoratively, both by self-described paleoconservatives, who oppose neoconservatism from the |

|right, and by Democratic politicians opposing neoconservatives from the left. Recently, Democratic politicians have used the term to criticize the |

|Republican policies and leaders of the current Bush administration. |

| |

|Critics of the term argue that the word is overused and lacks coherent definition. For instance, they note that many so-called neoconservatives vehemently|

|disagree with one another on major issues. They also point out that the meaning has changed over time. Whereas the term was originally used for former |

|Democrats who embraced the welfare state but aggressively opposed the Soviet Union, now the term is primarily used to describe those who support an |

|aggressive worldwide foreign policy. The term is also used to describe those who are accused of adopting a "unilateral" foreign policy rather than relying|

|on United Nations consensus and actions. |

| |

|In academia, the term refers more to journalists, pundits, policy analysts, and institutions affiliated with the Project for the New American Century |

|(PNAC) and with Commentary and The Weekly Standard than to more traditional conservative policy think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation or periodicals|

|such as Policy Review or National Review. |

|Contents |

|[hide] |

| |

|* 1 Beliefs |

|* 2 Origins |

|o 2.1 Neoconservatism as a "Jewish" movement |

|o 2.2 Neoconservatism as an "ex-leftist" movement |

|o 2.3 Reagan and the Neoconservatives |

|o 2.4 The comeback of neoconservatism under George W. Bush |

|* 3 Details |

|o 3.1 Neoconservatives and Israel |

|o 3.2 World War II analogies |

|o 3.3 Neoconservatives and Iraq |

|* 4 Contrasts with other perspectives |

|o 4.1 Relationship with other types of U.S. conservatism |

|* 5 Criticism of term |

|* 6 Related Publications and Institutions |

|* 7 Film |

|* 8 See also |

|* 9 References |

|* 10 External links |

|* 11 Neoconservatism and American area studies |

| |

|Beliefs |

| |

|This political group supported a militant anticommunism; more social welfare spending than was sometimes acceptable to libertarians and mainstream |

|conservatives; civil equality for blacks and other minorities; and sympathy with a non-traditionalist agenda, being more inclined than other conservatives|

|toward an interventionist foreign policy and a unilateralism that is sometimes at odds with traditional conceptions of diplomacy and international law. |

|They feuded with traditional right-wing Republicans, and the nativist, protectionist, isolationists once represented by ex-Republican "paleoconservative" |

|Pat Buchanan. Still, the neoconservatives have generally allied with other conservatives electorally and in terms of which administrations they have |

|joined. Ideological differences between paleoconservatives and neoconservatives are often ignored in alliance against those to their left. |

| |

|But domestic policy does not define neoconservatism; it is a movement founded on, and perpetuated by an aggressive approach to foreign policy, free trade,|

|opposition to communism during the Cold War, support for beleaguered liberal democracies such as Israel and Taiwan and opposition to Middle Eastern and |

|other states that are perceived to support terrorism. Thus, their foremost target was the conservative but pragmatic approach to foreign policy often |

|associated with Richard Nixon, i.e., peace through negotiations, diplomacy, and arms control, détente and containment (rather than rollback) of the Soviet|

|Union, and the beginning of the process that would lead to bilateral ties between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the U.S. Today, a rift still |

|divides the neoconservatives from many members of the State Department, who favor established foreign policy conventions. |

| |

|Intellectually, neoconservatives have been strongly influenced by a diverse range of thinkers, from Max Shachtman 's strongly anti-Soviet version of |

|Trotskyism (in the area of international policy), to the libertarian-leaning Milton Friedman, to the elitist, ostensibly neo-Platonic ideas of Leo |

|Strauss. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Origins |

| |

|Neoconservatives are conservatives who are "new" (neo) to the conservative movement in some way. Usually, this comes as a result from the migration from |

|the left of the political spectrum to the right, over the course of many years. Though every such neoconservative has an individual story to tell, there |

|are several key events in recent American history that are often said to have prompted the shift. |

| |

|Some of today's most famous neocons are from Eastern European Jewish immigrant families, who were frequently on the edge of poverty. The Great Depression |

|radicalized many immigrants, and introduced them to the new and revolutionary ideas of socialism and communism. The Soviet Union's break with Stalinism in|

|the 1950's led to the rise of the so-called New Left in America, which popularized anti-Sovietism along with anti-capitalism. The New Left became very |

|popular among the children of hardline Communist families. |

| |

|Opposition to the New Left and Détente with the Soviet Union would cause the Neoconservatives to emerge as the first important group of social policy |

|critics from the working class. The original neoconservatives, though not yet using this term, were generally liberals or socialists who strongly |

|supported the Second World War. Multiple strands contributed to their ideas prior to becoming neoconservatives, including the Depression-era ideas of |

|former New Dealers, trade unionists and Trotskyists, particularly those who followed the political ideas of Max Shachtman. The current neoconservative |

|desire to spread democratic capitalism abroad often by force, it is sometimes said, parallels the Trotskyist dream of world socialist revolution. The |

|influence of the Trotskyists perhaps left them with strong anti-Soviet tendencies, especially considering the Great Purges targeting alleged Trotskyists |

|in Soviet Russia. A number of neoconservatives such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz were Shachtmanites in their youth while others |

|were involved in the Social Democrats, USA, which was formed by Schachtman's supporters in the 1970s. |

| |

|The original "neoconservative" theorists, such as Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, were often associated with the magazine Commentary, and their |

|intellectual evolution is quite evident in that magazine over the course of these years. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the early neoconservatives |

|were anti-Communist socialists strongly supportive of the civil rights movement, integration, and Martin Luther King. However, they grew disillusioned |

|with the Johnson administration's Great Society. Some neoconservatives also came to despise the counterculture of the 1960s and what they felt was a |

|growing "anti-Americanism" among many baby boomers, in the movement against the Vietnam War and in the emerging New Left. |

| |

|According to Irving Kristol, former managing editor of Commentary and now a Senior Fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute in Washington |

|and the Publisher of the hawkish magazine The National Interest, a neoconservative is a "liberal mugged by reality." Broadly sympathetic to Woodrow |

|Wilson's idealistic goals to spread American ideals of government, economics, and culture abroad, they grew to reject his reliance on international |

|organizations and treaties to accomplish these objectives. |

| |

|As the radicalization of the New Left pushed these intellectuals further to the right in response, they moved toward a more aggressive militarism. |

|Admiration of the "big stick" interventionist foreign policy of Theodore Roosevelt remains a common theme in neoconservative tracts as well. Now staunch |

|anti-Communists, a vast array of sympathetic conservatives attracted to their strong defense of a "rolling-back" of Communism (an idea touted under the |

|Eisenhower administration by John Foster Dulles) began to become associated with these neoconservative leaders. Influential periodicals such as |

|Commentary, The New Republic, The Public Interest, and The American Spectator, and lately The Weekly Standard have been established by prominent |

|neoconservatives or regularly host the writings of neoconservative writers. |

| |

|Academics in these circles, many of whom were still Democrats, rebelled against the Democratic Party's leftward drift on defense issues in the 1970s, |

|especially after the nomination of George McGovern in 1972. Many clustered around Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson, a Democrat derisively known as the "Senator |

|from Boeing," but then they aligned themselves with Ronald Reagan and the Republicans, who promised to confront charges of Soviet "expansionism." |

| |

|In his semi-autobiographic book, "Neo-conservatism", Irving Kristol cites a number of influences on his own thought, including not only Max Shachtman and |

|Leo Strauss but also the skeptical liberal literary critic Lionel Trilling. The influence of Leo Strauss and his disciples on some neoconservatives has |

|generated some controversy. Some argue that Strauss's influence has left some neoconservatives adopting a Machiavellian view of politics. See Leo Strauss |

|for a discussion of this controversy. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Neoconservatism as a "Jewish" movement |

| |

|One of the most controversial issues surrounding neoconservatism is its relation to specifically Jewish intellectual traditions; in the most extreme form |

|of this view, neoconservatism has been regarded by some as primarily a movement to advance Jewish interests. Classic anti-Semitic tropes have often been |

|used when elaborating this view, such as the idea that Jews achieve influence through the intellectual domination of national leaders. David Brooks in his|

|January 6, 2004 New York Times column wrote, "To hear these people describe it, PNAC is sort of a Yiddish Trilateral Commission, the nexus of the |

|sprawling neocon tentacles." |

| |

|The controversial evolutionary psychologist Kevin B. MacDonald published an article in The Occidental Quarterly, a journal of opinion, on the alleged |

|similarities between neoconservatism and several other possibly Jewish-dominated influential intellectual and political movements. He argues that "[t]aken|

|as a whole, neoconservatism is an excellent illustration of the key traits behind the success of Jewish activism: ethnocentrism, intelligence and wealth, |

|psychological intensity, and aggressiveness."[1] His general conclusions are that neoconservatism fits into a general pattern of twentieth-century Jewish |

|intellectual and political activism. Since Leo Strauss, a philosophy professor, taught several of the putative founders of the neoconservatism, MacDonald |

|concludes he is a central figure in the neo-conservative movement and sees him as "the quintessential rabbinical guru with devoted disciples". [2] |

| |

|MacDonald contends that, like Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism, neoconservatism uses arguments that appeal to non-Jews, rather than appealing |

|explicitly to Jewish interests. MacDonald argues that non-Jewish neo-conservatives like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Donald Rumsfeld are examples of an ability |

|to recruit prominent non-Jews while nevertheless preserving a Jewish core and an intense commitment to Jewish interests: "it makes excellent psychological|

|sense to have the spokespeople for any movement resemble the people they are trying to convince."[3] He considers it significant that neoconservatism's |

|commitment to mass immigration is uncharacteristic of past conservative thought and is identical to liberal Jewish opinion. MacDonald's views of |

|neoconservatism are not widely accepted in the United States, though similar theories have found a more receptive audience in some Arab media, such as Al |

|Jazeera. His views have been characterized as anti-Semitic and have been condemned as "nauseating" by some, including the writer Judith Shulevitz. (For |

|wider discussion, see Kevin B. MacDonald) |

| |

|Michael Lind, a self-described former neoconservative, wrote in 2004, "It is true, and unfortunate, that some journalists tend to use 'neoconservative' to|

|refer only to Jewish neoconservatives, a practice that forces them to invent categories like 'nationalist conservative' or 'Western conservative' for |

|Rumsfeld and Cheney. But neoconservatism is an ideology, like paleoconservatism and libertarianism, and Rumsfeld and Dick and Lynne Cheney are |

|full-fledged neocons, as distinct from paleocons or libertarians, even though they are not Jewish and were never liberals or leftists." [4] |

| |

|Lind argues that, while "there were, and are, very few Northeastern WASP mandarins in the neoconservative movement", its origins are not specifically |

|Jewish. "...[N]eoconservatism recruited from diverse 'farm teams,' including liberal Catholics (William Bennett and Michael Novak..) and populists, |

|socialists and New Deal liberals in the South and Southwest (the pool from which Jeane Kirkpatrick, James Woolsey and I [that is, Lind himself] were |

|drawn)." [5] |

|[edit] |

| |

|Neoconservatism as an "ex-leftist" movement |

| |

|Lind further writes that neoconservatism "originated in the 1970s as a movement of anti-Soviet liberals and social democrats in the tradition of Truman, |

|Kennedy, Johnson, Humphrey and Henry ("Scoop") Jackson, many of whom preferred to call themselves 'paleoliberals.'" When the Cold War ended, "many |

|'paleoliberals' drifted back to the Democratic center... Today's neocons are a shrunken remnant of the original broad neocon coalition. Nevertheless, the |

|origins of their ideology on the left are still apparent. The fact that most of the younger neocons were never on the left is irrelevant; they are the |

|intellectual (and, in the case of William Kristol and John Podhoretz, the literal) heirs of older ex-leftists." [6] |

| |

|Lind further argues that "The organization as well as the ideology of the neoconservative movement has left-liberal origins". He draws a line from the |

|center-left anti-Communist Congress for Cultural Freedom to the Committee on the Present Danger to the Project for the New American Century and adds that |

|"European social democratic models inspired the quintessential neocon institution, the National Endowment for Democracy." [7] |

| |

|In particular, Lind argues that the neoconservatives are influenced by the thought of Trotskyists such as James Burnham and Max Shachtman, who argued that|

|"the United States and similar societies are dominated by a decadent, postbourgeois 'new class'". He sees the neoconservative concept of "global |

|democratic revolution" as deriving from the Trotskyist Fourth International's "vision of permanent revolution". He also points to what he sees as the |

|Marxist origin of "the economic determinist idea that liberal democracy is an epiphenomenon of capitalism", which he describes as "Marxism with |

|entrepreneurs substituted for proletarians as the heroic subjects of history." [8] |

| |

|Some writers maintain that Lind's claim of a connection between neoconservatism and Trotskyism is historically misleading. They argue that those |

|neoconservatives who adhere to the concept of "global democratic revolution" have no demonstrable historical or ideological links to the Fourth |

|International or Trotskyism. [9] They futher point out that those neoconservatives who actually were Trotskyites in their youth, such as Irving Kristol |

|and Seymour Martin Lipset, have never adhered to said concept. [10] With regards to Max Shachtman and James Burnham, leading neoconservatives have pointed|

|out that by the time Shachtman had an influence on them inside the social-democratic movement, he had long since broken definitively with Trotskyism. [11]|

|No leading neoconservatives cite James Burnham as a major influence, and indeed he differed with them on many substantive issues. [12] |

| |

|Finally, critics of Lind argue that there is no theoretical connection between Trotsky's "permanent revolution", which is concerned with the pace of |

|radical social change in the third world, and neoconservative support for a "global democratic revolution", with its Wilsonian roots. Indeed, many see the|

|use of the "Trotskyism" issue by Lind, and also by many paleoconservatives, as primarily polemical in nature, and not based on actual historical research.|

|[13] |

|[edit] |

| |

|Reagan and the Neoconservatives |

|Jeane Kirkpatrick |

|Jeane Kirkpatrick |

| |

|During the 1970's political scientist Jeane Kirkpatrick increasingly criticized the Democratic Party, of which she was still a member, since the |

|nomination of the antiwar George McGovern. Kirkpatrick became a convert to the ideas of the new conservatism of once-liberal Democratic academics. |

| |

|During Ronald Reagan's successful 1980 campaign, he hired her as his foreign policy advisor and later nominated her as U.S. ambassador to the United |

|Nations, a position she held for four years. Known for her anti-communist stance and for her tolerance of right-wing dictatorships (her criticism of which|

|was often tempered, calling them simply "moderately repressive regimes"), she argued that US policy should not aid the overthrow of right-wing regimes if |

|these were only to be replaced by even less democratic left-wing regimes. The overthrow of leftist governments was acceptable and at times essential |

|because they served as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet interests. |

| |

|Under this doctrine, known as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, the Reagan administration initially tolerated leaders such as Augusto Pinochet in Chile and |

|Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. As the 1980's wore on, however, younger, second-generation neoconservatives, such as Elliot Abrams, pushed for a |

|clear policy of supporting democracy against both left and right wing dictators. Thus, while U.S. support for Marcos continued until and even after the |

|fraudulent Philippine election of February 7, 1986, there was debate within the administration regarding how and when to oppose Marcos. |

| |

|In the days that followed, with the widespread popular refusal to accept Marcos as the purported winner, turmoil in the Philippines grew. The Reagan |

|administration then urged Marcos to accept defeat and leave the country, which he did. The Reagan team, and particularly the Assistant Secretary of State |

|for Inter-American Affairs, Elliot Abrams, also supported the 1988 Chilean plebiscite that resulted in the restoration of democratic rule and Pinochet's |

|eventual removal from office. Through the National Endowment for Democracy, led by another neoconservative, Carl Gershman, funds were directed to the |

|anti-Pinochet opposition in order to ensure a fair election. |

| |

|In this sense, the neoconservative foreign policy makers of the Reagan era were different from some of their more traditionalist conservative |

|predecessors, and from the older generation of neoconservatives as well. While many of the latter believed that America's allies should be unquestionably |

|defended at all costs, no matter what the nature of their regime, many younger neocons were more supportive of the idea of changing regimes to make them |

|more compatible and reflective of U.S. values. |

| |

|The belief in the universality of democracy would be a key neoconservative value which would go on to play a larger role in the post-Cold War period. Some|

|critics would say however, that their emphasis on the need for externally-imposed "regime change" for "rogue" nations such as Iraq conflicted with the |

|democratic value of national self-determination. Most neocons view this argument as invalid until a country has a democratic government to express the |

|actual determination of its people. |

| |

|For his own part, President Reagan largely did not move towards the sort of protracted, long-term interventions to stem social revolution in the Third |

|World that many of his advisors would have favored. Instead, he mostly favored quick campaigns to attack or overthrow terrorist groups or leftist |

|governments, favoring small, quick interventions that heightened a sense of post-Vietnam triumphalism among Americans, such as the attacks on Grenada and |

|Libya, and arming right-wing militias in Central America seeking to overthrow radical leftist governments such as that of the Sandinistas. |

| |

|In general, many neocons see the collapse of the Soviet Union as having occurred directly due to Reagan's hard-line stance, and the bankruptcy that |

|resulted from the Soviet Union trying to keep up the arms race. They therefore see this as a strong confirmation of their worldview. |

|[edit] |

| |

|The comeback of neoconservatism under George W. Bush |

| |

|Many critics charged that the neoconservatives lost their raison d'être following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Others argue that they lost their |

|status due to their involvement with the Iran-Contra scandal. During the 1990s, neoconservatives were once again in the opposition side of the foreign |

|policy establishment, railing against the post-Cold War foreign policy of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, which reduced military expenditures and was, |

|in their view, insufficiently idealistic. They accused it of lacking "moral clarity" and the conviction to unilaterally pursue U.S. strategic interests |

|abroad. In the writings of Paul Wolfowitz, Norman Podhoretz, Elliott Abrams, Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Max Boot, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, |

|William Bennett, Peter Rodman, and others influential in forging the foreign policy doctrines of the Bush administration, there are frequent references to|

|the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938, to which are compared the Cold War's policies of détente and containment (rather than rollback) with the |

|Soviet Union and the PRC. Also particularly galvanizing to the movement was George H.W. Bush and Colin Powell's decision to leave Saddam Hussein in power |

|and what neoconservatives viewed as a betrayal of the Iraqi Kurds, although some neoconservatives, notably Dick Cheney, supported the action at the time. |

|Neoconservatives were also members of the blue team, which argued for a confrontational policy toward the People's Republic of China and strong military |

|and diplomatic support for Taiwan. |

| |

|Such so-called neoconservatives were eager to implement a new foreign policy with the change in Administrations from Clinton to George W. Bush. Early in |

|the Bush Administration, it was confronted with its first foreign policy crisis known as the China spy plane incident. On April 1, 2001, an EP3-C spy |

|plane was on a surveillance mission over the South China Sea -- a remnant of Cold War practices -- when a Chinese F-8 fighter that was shadowing it struck|

|it forcing it to make an emergency landing on Hainan, a Chinese island. The 24 members of the US crew were held and interrogated and the plane searched by|

|the Chinese. After much diplomacy and after issuing an apology on April 11 to the Chinese Foreign Ministry for intruding into Chinese airspace and for the|

|death of the Chinese pilot[14], the US crew was permitted to leave after eleven days and the plane was eventually removed in pieces. While such a |

|performance and outcome was lauded by many, some neoconservatives were upset by Bush's non-confrontational policy toward the PRC. For instance, Frank |

|Gaffney, who served as assistant secretary of defense under President Ronald Reagan, warned in an article in National Review Online that President Bush |

|"should use this occasion to make clear to the American people that the PRC is acting in an increasingly belligerent manner. Mr. Bush needs to talk about |

|these threats as well as his commitment to defend the American people, their forces overseas and their allies."[15]. Additionally, some neoconservatives |

|perceived that Bush's Administration initially insufficiently supported Israel. As a result, many neoconservatives perceived Bush's foreign policies to be|

|not substantially different from the policies of Clinton. |

| |

|Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the The Pentagon, however, the influence of neoconservatism -- at least as it is |

|understood to mean an aggressive stance toward foreign policy threats -- in the Bush administration appears to have found its purpose in the shift from |

|the threat of Communism to the threat of Islamic terrorism. |

| |

|As compared with traditional conservatism and libertarianism, which sometimes exhibites an isolationist strain, neoconservatism is characterized by an |

|increased emphasis on defense capability, a willingness to challenge regimes deemed hostile to the values and interests of the United States, pressing for|

|free-market policies abroad, and promoting democracy and freedom. Critics have charged that, while paying lip service to such American values, |

|neoconservatives have supported undemocratic regimes for realpolitik reasons. |

| |

|But the newly aggressive support for democracies is founded on a new recognition that, over the long term, it will reduce the extremism that is a breeding|

|ground for islamic terrorism. Neoconservatives have often postulated that democratic regimes are, on aggregate, less likely to instigate a war than a |

|country with an authoritarian form of government. In support, they argue that there has been no war between democracies anywhere in the world since the |

|War of 1812. Further, they argue that the lack of freedoms, lack of economic opportunities, and the lack of secular general education in authoritarian |

|regimes promotes radicalism and extremism. Consequently, the Administration has advocated spreading democracy to regions of the world where it currently |

|does not prevail, most notably the Arab nations of the Middle East. |

| |

| |

|Richard Perle |

| |

|In his well-publicized piece "The Case for American Empire" in the conservative Weekly Standard, Max Boot argued that "The most realistic response to |

|terrorism is for America to embrace its imperial role." He countered sentiments that the "United States must become a kinder, gentler nation, must eschew |

|quixotic missions abroad, must become, in Pat Buchanan's phrase, 'a republic, not an empire'," arguing that "In fact this analysis is exactly backward: |

|The September 11 attack was a result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more |

|assertive in their implementation." |

| |

|Neoconservatives won a landmark victory with the Bush Doctrine after September 11th. Thomas Donnelly, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise |

|Institute (AEI), an influential conservative thinktank in Washington that has been under neoconservative influence since the election of Reagan, argued in|

|his AEI piece "The Underpinnings of the Bush doctrine" that "the fundamental premise of the Bush Doctrine is true: The United States possesses the |

|means—economic, military, diplomatic—to realize its expansive geopolitical purposes. Further, and especially in light of the domestic political reaction |

|to the attacks of September 11, the victory in Afghanistan and the remarkable skill demonstrated by President Bush in focusing national attention, it is |

|equally true that Americans possess the requisite political willpower to pursue an expansive strategy." |

| |

|The Bush Doctrine, a departure from previous U.S. foreign policy, is a proclamation on the right of the United States to wage pre-emptive war should it be|

|threatened by terrorists or rogue states. This doctrine can be seen as the abandonment of a focus on the doctrine of deterrence (in the Cold War through |

|Mutually Assured Destruction) as the primary means of self-defense. There is some opinion that preemptive strikes have long been a part of international |

|practice and indeed of American practice, as exemplified, for example, by the unilateral U.S. blockade and boarding of Cuban shipping during the Cuban |

|Missile Crisis. The doctrine also states that the United States "will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up|

|in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." |

| |

|While more conventional foreign policy experts argued that Iraq could be restrained by enforcing No-Fly Zones and by a policy of inspection by United |

|Nations inspectors to restrict its ability to possess chemical or nuclear weapons, neoconservatives considered this policy direction ineffectual and |

|labeled it appeasement of Saddam Hussein. |

| |

|Today, the most prominent supporters of the neoconservative stance inside the administration are Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State |

|Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, recently nominated to head the World Bank. |

|Neoconservatives are perhaps closer to the mainstream of the Republican Party today since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon than any |

|competing faction, especially considering the nature of the Bush Doctrine and the preemptive war against Iraq. Nevertheless, many of the prominent people |

|labeled as neoconservatives are actually registered Democrats. |

| |

|At the same time, there have been limits in the power of neoconservatives in the Bush administration. The former Secretary of State Colin Powell (as well |

|as the State department as a whole) was largely seen as being an opponent of neoconservative ideas, and while the neoconservative notion of tough and |

|decisive action has been apparent in U.S. policy toward the Middle East, it has not been seen in U.S. policy toward China and Russia or in the handling of|

|the North Korean nuclear crisis. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Details |

|[edit] |

| |

|Neoconservatives and Israel |

| |

|The neoconservatives also support a robust American stance on Israel. The neoconservative-influenced Project for the New American Century called for an |

|Israel no longer dependent on American aid through the removal of major threats in the region. |

| |

|Opponents of neoconservatives have sought to emphasize their interest in Israel, and the large proportion of Jewish neoconservatives and have raised the |

|question of "dual loyalty", an issue they do not raise with the neoconservatives equally staunch support of Taiwan. A number of critics, such as Pat |

|Buchanan, have accused them of putting Israeli interests above those of America. In turn these critics have been labeled as anti-Semites by many |

|neoconservatives (which in turn has led to accusations of professional smearing, and then paranoia, and so on). However, one should note that some |

|prominent neoconservatives are not Jewish, such as Michael Novak, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Frank Gaffney, and Max Boot. Furthermore, neoconservatives in the |

|1960s were much less interested in Israel before the June 1967 Six Day War. It was only after this conflict, which raised the specter of unopposed Soviet |

|influence in the Middle East, that the neoconservatives became preoccupied by Israel's security interests. They promote the view that Israel is the US's |

|strongest ally in the Middle East as the sole Western-style democracy in the region, aside from Turkey (George W. Bush has also supported Turkey in its |

|efforts to join the European Union). |

| |

|Moreover, they have long argued that the United States should emulate Israel's tactics of pre-emptive attacks, especially Israel's strikes in the 1980s on|

|nuclear facilities in Libya and Iraq. |

| |

|Identification with the state of Israel was furthered by the September 11 terrorist attacks, which served to highlight parallels between the United States|

|and Israel as both democratic nations under the threat of terrorist attack. In Israel one of the major forces on the secular right are Soviet immigrant |

|parties which often join Likud coalitions because of agreement on issues of national security. The similarities between American neoconservatism and these|

|immigrant parties are many. In addition to similar approaches to foreign policy and national security, the two groups also share important "biographical" |

|details, with the neoconservatives' alienation from left-wing politics during the 1960s mirrored by the Israeli immigrants' alienation from Labor Zionism |

|because of their experiences under Soviet Communism. A leading figure among immigrant politicians is former-Soviet dissident and now an Israeli minister |

|without portfolio Natan Sharansky, whose book, The Case For Democracy, promotes a foreign policy philosophy nearly identical to neoconservatives'. |

|President Bush has effusively praised this book[16] and called it a "glimpse of how I think". |

|[edit] |

| |

|World War II analogies |

| |

|In foreign policy neoconservatives have a tendency to view the world in 1939 terms, comparing adversaries as diverse as the Soviet Union, Osama bin Laden,|

|and China to Nazi Germany, while American leaders such as Reagan and Bush stand in for Winston Churchill. There is also a tendency to accuse leftists, and|

|others who oppose them as being appeasers and/or Anti-American. The fullest account of this is Donald and Frederick Kagan's While America Sleeps, the |

|entirety of which is dedicated to these comparisons. |

| |

|In addition, neoconservatives have a very strong belief in the ability to install democracy by conquest - comparisons with denazification in Germany and |

|Japan starting in 1945 are often made. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Neoconservatives and Iraq |

|Paul Wolfowitz |

|Paul Wolfowitz |

| |

|Within a few years of the Gulf War in Iraq, many associated with neoconservatism were pushing for the ouster of Saddam Hussein. On February 19, 1998, an |

|open letter to President Clinton was signed by dozens of pundits, many identified with both neoconservatism and, later, related groups such as the PNAC, |

|urging decisive action to remove Saddam from power [17]. However, although sanctions, encouragement of insurrection, and enforcement of no-fly zones |

|continued under Clinton and then Bush, no such action was taken until after the Iraq disarmament crisis of 2003. |

| |

|Proponents of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 sought to compare their war to Churchill's war against Hitler, with speakers like United States Secretary of |

|Defense Donald Rumsfeld comparing Saddam to Hitler, while likening the tolerance shown Saddam to the 1930s appeasement of Hitler. This represented a major|

|turnaround for many conservatives, including Donald Rumsfeld himself, who in 1983 met Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz and declared that "the U.S. and Iraq |

|share many common interests" [18]. Prior to war, Bush compared Saddam Hussein to Stalin and Hitler and invoked the spectre of "appeasement." Like the |

|Nazis and the Communists, Bush said, "the terrorists seek to end lives and control all life." But the visage of evil conjured up by Bush during his |

|European trip was that of Saddam Hussein, not bin Laden, who many considered a greater threat. Iraq's dictator was singled out as the "great evil" who "by|

|his search for terrible weapons, by his ties to terrorist groups, threatens the security of every free nation, including the free nations of Europe." |

| |

|Following the release, on June 16, 2004, of the preliminary findings of the staff of the bipartisan commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, terror |

|attacks, the commission found no evidence that Iraq had anything to do with the attacks and no evidence of a "collaborative relationship" but did find |

|that |

| |

|"Bin Laden also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime", |

| |

|"A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting Bin Laden in 1994", |

| |

|"There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after Bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan" [3] |

| |

|Further, the commission found that, |

| |

|"With al Qaeda as its foundation, Bin Laden sought to build a broader Islamic army that also included terrorist groups from Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Saudi |

|Arabia and Oman, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia and Eritrea. Not all groups from these states agreed to join, but at least one from each|

|did." [4] |

| |

|Protesting the press' "portrayal" of the 911 Commission's statement, Vice President Dick Cheney, in an interview with CNBC television, insisted that |

|"there clearly was a relationship. It has been testified to. The evidence is overwhelming." [5] |

|[edit] |

| |

|Contrasts with other perspectives |

|[edit] |

| |

|Relationship with other types of U.S. conservatism |

| |

|The traditional conservative Claes Ryn has developed the critique that neoconservatives are actually what he calls a variety of neo-Jacobins. True |

|conservatives deny the existence of a universal political and economic philosophy and model that is suitable for all societies and cultures, and believe |

|that a society's institutions should be adjusted to suit its culture. Neo-Jacobins in contrast |

| |

|are attached in the end to ahistorical, supranational principles that they believe should supplant the traditions of particular societies. The new |

|Jacobins see themselves as on the side of right and fighting evil and are not prone to respecting or looking for common ground with countries that do not |

|share their democratic preferences. (Ryn 2003: 387) |

| |

|[Neo-Jacobinism] regards America as founded on universal principles and assigns to the United States the role of supervising the remaking of the world. |

|Its adherents have the intense dogmatic commitment of true believers and are highly prone to moralistic rhetoric. They demand, among other things, "moral |

|clarity" in dealing with regimes that stand in the way of America's universal purpose. They see themselves as champions of "virtue." (p. 384). |

| |

|Thus, according to Ryn, neoconservatism is analogous to Bolshevism: in the same way that the Bolsheviks wanted to destroy established ways of life |

|throughout the world to replace them with communism, the neoconservatives want to do the same, only imposing free-market capitalism and American-style |

|"liberal democracy" instead of socialism. |

| |

|There is also conflict between neoconservatives and libertarian conservatives. Libertarian conservatives are distrustful of a large government and |

|therefore regard neoconservative foreign policy ambitions with considerable distrust. |

| |

|There has been considerable conflict between neoconservatives and business conservatives in some areas. Neoconservatives tend to see China as a looming |

|threat to the United States and argue for harsh policies to contain that threat. Business conservatives see China as a business opportunity and see a |

|tough policy against China as opposed to their desires for trade and economic progress. Business conservatives also appear much less distrustful of |

|international institutions. In fact, where China is concerned neoconservatives tend to find themselves more often in agreement with liberal Democrats than|

|with business conservatives. Indeed, Americans for Democratic Action - widely regarded as an "authority" of sorts on liberalism by both the American left |

|and right alike - credit Senators and members of the House of Representatives with casting a "liberal" vote if they oppose legislation that would treat |

|China favorably in the realm of foreign trade and many other matters. |

| |

|The disputes over Israel and domestic policies have contributed to a sharp conflict over the years with "paleoconservatives," whose very name was taken as|

|a rebuke to their "neo" brethren. There are many personal issues but effectively the paleoconservatives view the neoconservatives as interlopers who |

|deviate from the traditional conservative agenda on issues as diverse as states' rights, free trade, immigration, isolationism, the welfare state, and |

|even abortion and homosexuality. All of this leads to their conservative label being questioned. |

| |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|Criticism of term |

| |

|The term was coined by socialist Michael Harrington, who wanted a way to characterize former leftists who had moved significantly to the right – people he|

|had been deriding as "socialists for Nixon." |

| |

|Many of the men and women to whom the neoconservative label is applied reject it as artificial and too abstract. The fact that its use has rapidly risen |

|since the 2003 Iraq War is cited by conservatives as proof that the term is largely irrelevant in the long term. David Horowitz, a purported leading |

|neo-con thinker offered this critique in a recent interview with an Italian newspaper: |

| |

|Neo-conservatism is a term almost exclusively used by the enemies of America's liberation of Iraq. There is no "neo-conservative" movement in the United |

|States. When there was one, it was made up of former Democrats who embraced the welfare state but supported Ronald Reagan's Cold War policies against the |

|Soviet bloc. Today neo-conservatism identifies those who believe in an aggressive policy against radical Islam and the global terrorists. |

| |

|Similarly, many other supposed neoconservatives believe that the term has been adopted by the political left to stereotype supporters of U.S. foreign |

|policy under the George W. Bush administration. Others have similarly likened descriptions of neoconservatism to a conspiracy theory and attribute the |

|term to anti-Semitism. Paul Wolfowitz has denounced the term as meaningless label, saying: |

| |

|[If] you read the Middle Eastern press, it seems to be a euphemism for some kind of nefarious Zionist conspiracy. But I think that, in my view it's very |

|important to approach [foreign policy] not from a doctrinal point of view. I think almost every case I know is different. Indonesia is different from the |

|Philippines. Iraq is different from Indonesia. I think there are certain principles that I believe are American principles – both realism and idealism. I |

|guess I'd like to call myself a democratic realist. I don't know if that makes me a neo-conservative or not. |

| |

|Jonah Goldberg and others have rejected the label as trite and over-used, arguing "There's nothing 'neo' about me: I was never anything other than |

|conservative." Other critics have similarly argued the term has been rendered meaningless through excessive and inconsistent use. For example, Dick Cheney|

|and Donald Rumsfeld are often identified as leading "neocons" despite the fact that both men have ostensibly been life-long conservative Republicans |

|(though Cheney has been vocally supportive of the ideas of Irving Kristol). Such critics thus largely reject the claim that there is a neoconservative |

|movement separate from traditional American conservatism. |

| |

|Other traditional conservatives are likewise skeptical of the contemporary usage term, and may dislike being associated with the stereotypes, or even the |

|supposed agendas of the "neocons." Conservative columnist David Harsanyi wrote, "These days, it seems that even temperate support for military action |

|against dictators and terrorists qualifies you a neocon." |

| |

|On the other hand, some of those identified as neoconservatives embrace the term. For example, Irving Kristol (who once famously defined a |

|"neoconservative" as "a liberal who got mugged by reality") published a collection of his essays under the title Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an |

|Idea (paperback ISBN 1566632285, hardcover ISBN 0028740211). Use of the term enables neoconservatives to distinguish themselves from conservatives when |

|they find it advantageous to do so. In addition, neoconservatives who were once leftists can soften the implication that they have "defected" to the side |

|they once opposed. |

| |

|One might also observe that during the 1970s, for example in a book on the movement by Peter Steinfels, the use of the term neoconservative was never |

|identified with the writings of Leo Strauss. The near synonymicity, in some quarters, of neoconservatism and Straussianism is a much more recent |

|phenomenon, which suggests that perhaps two quite distinct movements have become merged into one, either in fact or in the eyes of certain beholders. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Related Publications and Institutions |

| |

|* American Enterprise Institute |

|* Bradley Foundation |

|* Commentary |

|* Front Page Magazine |

|* Heritage Foundation |

|* John M. Olin Foundation |

|* The National Interest |

|* National Review |

|* Policy Review |

|* Project for the New American Century |

|* Public Interest |

|* Smith Richardson Foundation |

|* Weekly Standard |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|Film |

| |

|* Video: Hijacking Catastrophe (Documentary featuring Noam Chomsky, Chalmers Johnson, Tariq Ali, and many more critics speaking about the neoconservative |

|agenda and the climate of action the neoconservatives have promoted in America.) |

|* Confessions of an Economic Hit Man (John Perkins on how the neoconservative movement uses globalization to interact economically, politically and |

|militarily with countries of less standing; a Democracy Now! hour-long interview.) |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|See also |

| |

|* Group Wilders |

|* List of people described as neoconservatives |

|* Neoconservatism and neoliberalism in Canada |

|* Quotations about neoconservatism from Wikiquote |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|References |

| |

|* John Dean, Worse Than Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W. Bush (Little. Brown, 2004) ISBN 031600023X (hardback) -- Deeply critical account of |

|neo-conservatism in the administration of George W. Bush. |

|* Mark Gerson, ed., The Essential Neo-Conservative Reader (Perseus Publishing, 1997) ISBN 0201154889 (paperback) or ISBN 0201479680 (hardback) |

|* Jim Hanson, The Decline of the American Empire, (Praeger Publishers, 1993) ISBN 0275944808 |

|* Halper, Stefan & Clarke, Jonathan, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge University Press, 2004) ISBN 0521838347 |

|* Robert Kagan et al., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (Encounter Books, 2000) ISBN 1893554163. |

|* Irving Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea. (Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 1999) ISBN 1566632285 |

|* Michael Lind, "A Tragedy of Errors", The Nation, February 23, 2004, 23-32. |

|* Tod Lindberg, "Neoconservatism's Liberal Legacy." Policy Review, 127 (2004): 3-22. |

|* James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. (2004) Viking. ISBN 0670032999 (cloth) |

|* Joshua Muravchik, "The Neoconservative Cabal", Commentary, September, 2003 |

|* Michael C. Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil, New Society Publishers, 2004. ISBN 0865715408|

|* Claes G. Ryn, America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire. Transaction Publishers, 2003. ISBN 0765802198 (cloth). |

|* Peter Steinfels. The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.) ISBN 0671226657. |

|* Leo Strauss , Natural Right and History. (University of Chicago Press, 1999) ISBN 0226776948. |

|* Leo Strauss , The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism. (University of Chicago Press, 1989) ISBN 0226777154. |

|* Joseph Wilson, The Politics of Truth. (2004) Carroll & Graf. ISBN 078671378X. |

|* Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack. (2004) Simon and Schuster. ISBN 074325547X. |

|* Irwin Stelzer (ed), Neoconservatism, Atlantic Books 2004 |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|External links |

| |

|* The Neoconservative, a neoconservative blog |

|* Irving Kristol: The Neoconservative Persuasion |

|* Max Boot (a neoconservative): What the Heck Is a 'Neocon'? |

|* Paul Gottfried: What’s In A Name? The Curious Case Of “Neoconservative” |

|* Alan Wald, History News Network: Debate with Michael Lind on neoconservatism and Trotskyism |

|* Bill King: Neoconservatives and Trotskyism Challenges the view that there is a relation between the neocons and Trotskyism |

|* Logos Spring 2004 Issue: Confronting Neoconservatism. Several articles on the different aspects of neoconservatism. |

|* Irwin Stelzer: Nailing the neocon myth. |

|* Bill Steigerwald: So, what is a 'neocon'? |

|* RightWeb - critical analysis and biographies of important neoconservatives. |

|* Gorin, Julia, "Blame It on Neo," Opinion Journal. September 23, 2004 - "Just because we call ourselves "neocons," it doesn't mean you can." |

|* "The State Department's extreme makeover", an October 4, 2004 article in by an anonymous "veteran Foreign Service officer currently serving as|

|a State Department official" and predicting a neoconservative surge in any second George W. Bush administration. |

|* Kevin B. MacDonald, "Understanding Jewish Influence III: Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement", Occidental Quarterly -- A comparison of neo-conservatism|

|with other allegedly Jewish intellectual movements by the evolutionary psychologist . MacDonald has also written a popular summary of the paper, "Thinking|

|About Neoconservatism". |

|* Claes G. Ryn, "The Ideology of American Empire". Orbis 47 (2003), 383-397. A longer and more scholarly traditional conservative critique. |

|* The Christian Science Monitor, "Neoconservatism: Empire Builders." |

|* Donnelly, Thomas, "The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine," AEI Online. February 1, 2003. |

|* Wallerstein, Immanuel, "The Eagle Has Crash Landed: Pax Americana is over." (An alternative position to that of the AEI.) |

|* Eden, Amid, "Now it's Trotsky's fault?" - A sceptical look at the existence of a Trotskyist - Neoconservative link. |

|* Zmirak, J.P., "America the Abstraction," A conservative critique of neoconservatism. |

|* American Jewish Committee, A "Cabal" of Neoconservatives |

|* European Legal Site, United States Neoconservatives |

|* Neocon 101 |

|* Robert J. Lieber, Chronicle of Higher Education The Left's Neocon Conspiracy Theory |

|* The Christian Science Monitor, "Q&A: Neocon power examined." (Max Boot discusses the extent of neoconservative influence with The Christian Science |

|Monitor.) |

|* Jim Lobe: Attacking Neo-Cons From the Right (Review of America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, a critique by two center-right |

|authors) |

|* Daniel McKivergan, Deputy Director of PNAC: September 11 Commission Staff Report |

|* Zachary Selden, Director of the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly: Neoconservatives and the American Mainstream |

|* Ben Jelloun, Mohammed, : Wilsonian Or Straussian Post-Cold War Idealism? (A postcolonial-Nietzschean view) |

|* Schema-: neoconservatives current news feeds for prominent neoconservatives |

|* Wes Vernon, China Plane Incident Sparks Re-election Drives of Security-minded Senators, April 7, 2001. |

|* Khurram Husain, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: "Neocons: The Men Behind the Curtain" |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|Neoconservatism and American area studies |

| |

|* Mongols knocking on the ivory tower gates - articles about "self-censorship" and neoconservative overt control in the United States national area |

|studies program: "The Terror of Controversy" by Michael P. Gallen (American), "The Clashes Within Civilization" by Christopher Schwartz (American) and "A |

|Cultural Revolution in the American Academy?" by Ma Haiyun (Chinese) |

| |

Globalization : The Lexus and the Olive Tree

|Globalization's Cultural Consequences |

|Robert Holton |

|. 9 August 2005. |

|Globalization has been associated with a range of cultural consequences. These can be analyzed in terms of three major theses, namely, homogenization, |

|polarization, and hybridization. The homogenization thesis proclaims that global culture is becoming standardized around a Western or American pattern.|

|While some evidence supports this view, the presence of cultural alternatives and resistance to Western norms suggests that polarization provides a |

|more convincing picture of global cultural development. Global interconnection and interdependence do not necessarily mean cultural conformity. |

|Culture, it seems, is harder to standardize than economic organization and technology. Yet the idea of polarization has its limits, too. The |

|hybridization thesis argues that cultures borrow and incorporate elements from each other, creating hybrid, or syncretic, forms. Evidence to support |

|this view comes mainly from popular music and religious life. The cultural consequences of globalization are therefore diverse and complex. |

|The Lexus and the Olive Tree |

| |

|The Lexus and the Olive Tree |

|May 2000 |

| |

|Published by Anchor Books |

| |

|paperback; 490 pages |

|ISBN: 0385499345 |

| |

|Originally published in |

|hardcover by |

|Farrar, Straus & Giroux |

| |

|ISBN: 0374185522 |

| |

|Read an excerpt from the Introduction, Opening Scene |

| |

|Read an excerpt from Chapter 1: Tourist with an Attitude |

| |

|As the Foreign Affairs columnist for The New York Times, Thomas L. Friedman has traveled to the four corners of the globe, interviewing people from all|

|walks of contemporary life -- Brazilian peasants in the Amazon rain forest, new entrepreneurs in Indonesia, Islamic students in Teheran, and the |

|financial wizards on Wall Street and in Silicon Valley. |

| |

|Now Friedman has drawn on his years on the road to produce an engrossing and original look at the new international system that, more than anything |

|else, is shaping world affairs today: globalization. |

| |

|His argument can be summarized quite simply. Globalization is not just a phenomenon and not just a passing trend. It is the international system that |

|replaced the Cold War system. Globalization is the integration of capital, technology, and information across national borders, in a way that is |

|creating a single global market and, to some degree, a global village. |

| |

|You cannot understand the morning news or know where to invest your money or think about where the world is going unless you understand this new |

|system, which is influencing the domestic policies and international relations of virtually every country in the world today. And once you do |

|understand the world as Friedman explains it, you'll never look at it quite the same way again. |

| |

|With vivid stories and a set of original terms and concepts, Friedman shows us how to see this new system. He dramatizes the conflict of "the Lexus and|

|the olive tree" -- the tension between the globalization system and ancient forces of culture, geography, tradition, and community. He also details the|

|powerful backlash that globalization produces among those who feel brutalized by it, and he spells out what we all need to do to keep this system in |

|balance. |

| |

|Finding the proper balance between the Lexus and the olive tree is the great drama of the globalization era, and the ultimate theme of Friedman's |

|challenging, provocative book -- essential reading for all who care about how the world really works. |

| |

|One day in 1992, Thomas Friedman toured a Lexus factory in Japan and marveled at the robots that put the luxury cars together. That evening, as he ate |

|sushi on a Japanese bullet train, he read a story about yet another Middle East squabble between Palestinians and Israelis. And it hit him: Half the |

|world was lusting after those Lexuses, or at least the brilliant technology that made them possible, and the other half was fighting over who owned |

|which olive tree. |

| |

|Friedman, the well-traveled New York Times foreign-affairs columnist, peppers The Lexus and the Olive Tree with stories that illustrate his central |

|theme: that globalization--the Lexus--is the central organizing principle of the post-cold war world, even though many individuals and nations resist |

|by holding onto what has traditionally mattered to them--the olive tree. |

| |

|Problem is, few of us understand what exactly globalization means. As Friedman sees it, the concept, at first glance, is all about American hegemony, |

|about Disneyfication of all corners of the earth. But the reality, thank goodness, is far more complex than that, involving international relations, |

|global markets, and the rise of the power of individuals (Bill Gates, Osama Bin Laden) relative to the power of nations. |

|… |

|Lou Schuler |

Transnationalism

|Transnationalism |

|From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. |

| |

|The concept of transnationalism is focused on the heightened interconnectivity between people all around the world and the loosening of boundries between |

|countries. The nature of transnationalism has social, political and economic impacts that affect people all around the globe. The concept of |

|transnationalism has facilitated the flow of people, ideas and goods between regions. It has been greatly affected by the internet, telecommunications, |

|immigration and most importantly globalization. Concepts like citizenship, nationalism and communitarianism are being changed and reexamined by this |

|phenomenon of the modern age. |

|Transnationalism |

International terrorism

Development

Environmentalism (mainstream)

|B- Mainstream environmentalism |

|1- Anthropocentrism |

|Mainstream environmentalism is first concerned with the protection of man’s health - Clean Air Act (1963, 1970 …) - |

|2- Reforms |

|Mainstream environmentalism doe not seek to change the economic an social system but to reform it when necessary for the comfort or health of American |

|citizens. |

|3- Compromising with big business |

|Mainstream environmentalists are middle-upper class Whites mostly, like the bulk of the employees of corporate America. Because of these class links, both|

|tend to compromise. Such compromises ease funding of environmental organizations by big companies. |

| |

Environmentalism (deep ecology)

|C- Radical environmentalism |

|1- Deep Ecology: biocentrism and holism |

|Holism argues that there is more in the whole than the sum of its parts. The interrelationships between the components of the whole create the whole which|

|therefore has an existence of its own. An ecosystem is more than the soil, the air, the plants and animals that make it. |

|Deep ecology’s basic value is life and the respect of the right of all living forms to develop freely. Man has no right to restrict this right. |

|2- Social ecology and ecofeminism |

|Social ecology (Murray Bookchin) considers that the ecological crisis is mostly due to the hierarchical system that characterizes our society. We must |

|transform such a system from the bottom up. Bioregional communities will deal gently with the earth (organic farming) and everybody’s right to be his/her |

|true self must be respected. |

|Feminists denounce the evils created by a hierarchic, male dominated society. Because of their biological functions (reproduction) women are allegedly |

|closer to nature and embrace ecological views more readily than men. Ecofeminism was the combination of these two trends which have obvious links with |

|social ecology. |

|3- Environmental Justice |

|Environmentalism has long been a white people’s movement in the USA. Recently, a new movement, Environmental Justice, has combined the heritage of the |

|civil rights movements and ecologism. It is a local, ethnic, environmental movement that may well give a fresh start to US environmentalism. |

Rio

|THE LONG ROAD TO JOHANNESBURG |

| |

|The idea of sustainable development is not new. Its concepts have been used implicitly in many societies of ancient history. Increasing environment and |

|development needs of the last decades led to the 1972 Stockholm UN Conference on Human Environment that resulted in the formation of the UN Environment |

|Programme (UNEP). The Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan defined principles for the preservation and enhancement of the natural environment, and |

|highlighted the need to support people in this process, while development strategies were not meeting the needs of the poorest countries and communities.|

| |

|In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development produced the so-called Brundtland Report "Our Common Future", which framed much of what |

|would become the Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. The report defined sustainable development as development that “meets the needs of present |

|generations without compromising the ability of future genera-tions to meet their own needs”. |

| |

|The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the "Rio Earth Summit", convened in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, was the largest UN conference ever |

|held. It agreed Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration and resulted in several international conventions. [ see overview of the results ] |

| |

|The year 2000 saw the the UN Millenium Summit, with some 150 heads of State or government participating. The summit addressed major global challenges |

|such as how to pull over 1 billion people out of extreme poverty, reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and protect the environment. |

| |

|The state of the world has not improved since UNCED, but the summit can still be considered a milestone in achieving sustainable development. A |

|multidimensional process of conferences, dialogues, negotiations, agreements and action plans started after the summit and is still ongoing. |

| |

|The different strains of environmental and development concerns on global, regional and national level are being bundled again for the upcoming World |

|Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), to be held in Johannesburg in September 2002. Progress in implementing Agenda 21 will be reviewed and new |

|issues raised to tackle the prevailing challenges of the world. |

|L A S T U P D A T E D 18-jul-03 |

|OUTCOMES OF THE RIO EARTH SUMMIT 1992 PROCESS |

| |

|Generally, Rio 1992 gave a good impulse to the further development of international environmental law. Six conventions came out of Rio 1992 some of which|

|have been converted into the next and more decisive phase, namely protocols, from which point they would become ratified in their respective countries |

| |

|The results: |

| |

|The Rio Declaration - a set of 27 principles designed to commit government to ensure environmental protection and responsible development and intended to|

|be an Environmental Bill of Rights. It established the "Precautionary principle " and the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities". |

| |

|The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the Kyoto Protocol from 1997 -- an international agreement aimed at the |

|stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations of global greenhouse gases to prevent dangerous climate change as a result of anthropogenic greenhouse gas |

|emissions. Its Kyoto Protocol is planned to be ratified before WSSD. |

| |

|The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, including the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety -- an international agreement to conserve biological|

|species, genetic resources, habitats and ecosystems; to ensure the sustainable use of biological materials; and to provide for the fair and equitable |

|sharing of benefits derived from genetic resources. Here as above, the goal has been set for ratification of the Protocol before WSSD. |

| |

|The Rio Forestry Principles - Fifteen non-binding principles for the protection and sustainable use of global forest resources. These principles have |

|often been regarded as a foundation for a process to negotiate and agree an International Forestry Convention (so far without success). |

| |

|The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification - to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought in countries experiencing serious|

|drought and/or desertification. The convention was actually not a direct result of UNCED but added after the conference. To date this convention has been|

|ineffective for lack of a financing mechanism. A revitalisation could take place by expanding the thematic coverage of the Global Environmental Facility |

|(GEF) |

| |

|Agenda 21 - undoubtedly the most important and complete document that came out of the Earth Summit. It has become the blueprint for sustainability and |

|forms the basis for sustainable development strategies. Its recommendations range from news ways to educate, to new ways to care for natural resources |

|and new ways to participate in shaping a sustainable economy. The overall objective of Agenda 21 was very ambitious for it was nothing less than |

|designing a safe and just world with people in the South and North alike would live an equitable life within Earth's capacities. |

| |

|The institutional result of the UNCED was the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). Agenda 21 called for the creation of the CSD to ensure |

|effective follow-up of UNCED and further the process of constituting sustainable development. CSD was also meant to be the international body to monitor |

|the implementation of Agenda 21. In addition, many countries, set up sustainable development commissions and to develop national strategies for |

|sustainable development. |

| |

|Also in the wake of the Rio Earth summit process were |

| |

|+ The Convention on Persistant Organic Pollutants (POPs) )which was signed by Germany and the USA on May 23, 2001; the POPs convention takes the lead on |

|the ban of at least 8 of these dangerous organic substances including the insecticide DDT. The implementation of this ban in southern countries is |

|faltering due to lack of financial means. + [ see WWF campaign page ] |

| |

|+ The Convention on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks |

| |

|+ The Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade + [ see WWF campaign|

|page ] |

| |

|The attempt to create a Convention for the Protection of Forests failed. Many ideas, among others a Convention on an International Environmental |

|Liability Law were not seriously discussed. For discussion it would be well worth it to draw up a series of national minimal environment liability |

|regulations in order to prevent a "liability dumping". This would have to include an obligation for international cooperation in the case of violation by|

|the Parties. Furthermore, there is the need to clarify liability when it comes to transboundary activities and claims. |

| |

|Also in the wake of Rio 1992, and apart from the above-mentioned conventions, a so-called "soft law" was established. Examples for this are the |

|guidelines of the World Commission on Dams and the World Bank and OECD guidelines of foreign investments and lending. However, these guidelines are |

|non-binding and clearly show the limits of this new approach. |

| |

|L I N K S |

| |

|[ NGO treaties and conventions from the 92 Global Forum ] |

| |

| |

|R E S O U R C E S |

| |

|[ UNED's Rio Conventions Briefing Paper -- pdf ] |

| |

|[ Effects of Globalisation on Sustainable Development after UNCED - an Analysis of the UNCED Process; by Martin Khor, Director of Third World Network ] |

| |

|[ Who to Blame 10 Years after Rio? How the US, Canada and others undermine the Rio commitments; Greenpeace briefing -- pdf ] |

| |

|[ United Nations Web Site on Sustainable Development ] |

| |

| |

|BACK |

| |

|L A S T U P D A T E D 9-jul-03 |

Agenda 21

|Agenda 21 |

|From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. |

| |

|Agenda 21 is a programme of the United Nations related to sustainable development. It is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally |

|and locally by organisations of the UN, governments, and major groups in every area in which humans impact on the environment. The number 21 refers to |

|the 21st century. |

|Contents |

|* 1 Development of Agenda 21 |

|* 2 Rio+5 |

|* 3 The Johannesburg Summit |

|* 4 Implementation |

|* 5 Structure and Contents |

|* 6 Local Agenda 21 |

|* 7 See also |

|* 8 External links |

| |

|Development of Agenda 21 |

| |

|The full text of Agenda 21 was revealed at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit), held in Rio de Janeiro where|

|179 governments voted to adopt the programme. The final text was the result of drafting, consultation and negotiation, beginning in 1989 and culminating |

|at the two-week conference. |

| |

|Rio+5 |

|In 1997, the General Assembly of the UN held a special session to appraise five years of progress on the implementation of Agenda 21 (Rio +5). The |

|Assembly recognised progress as 'uneven' and identified key trends including increasing globalization, widening inequalities in income and a continued |

|deterioration of the global environment. A new General Assembly Resolution (S-19/2) promised further action. |

|[edit] |

| |

|The Johannesburg Summit |

|The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, agreed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Earth Summit 2002) affirmed UN commitment to 'full |

|implementation' of Agenda 21, alongside achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and other international agreements. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Implementation |

|The Commission on Sustainable Development acts as a high level forum on sustainable development and has acted as preparatory committee for summits and |

|sessions on the implementation of Agenda 21. |

| |

|The United Nations Division for Sustainable Development acts as the secretariat to the Commission and works 'within the context of' Agenda 21. |

| |

|Implementation by member states remains essentially voluntary. |

| |

|Structure and Contents |

| |

|There are 40 chapters in Agenda 21, divided into four sections: |

| |

|Section I: Social and Economic Dimensions |

|including combating poverty, changing consumption patterns, population and demographic dynamics, promoting health, promoting sustainable settlement |

|patterns and integrating environment and development into decision-making. |

| |

| |

|Section II: Conservation and Management of Resources for Development |

|including atmospheric protection, combating deforestation, protecting fragile environments, conservation of biological diversity (biodiversity), and |

|control of pollution. |

| |

| |

|Section III: Strengthening the Role of Major Groups |

|including the roles of children and youth, women, NGOs, local authorities, business and workers. |

| |

| |

|Section IV: Means of Implementation |

|including science, technology transfer, education, international institutions and mechanisms and financial mechanisms. |

| |

|Local Agenda 21 |

|The implementation of Agenda 21 was intended to involve action at international, national, regional and local levels. Some national and state governments|

|have legislated or advised that local authorities take steps to implement the plan locally, as recommended in Chapter 28 of the document. Such programmes|

|are often known as 'Local Agenda 21'. |

|[edit] |

| |

|See also |

|List of environment topics |

| |

|External links |

| |

|* Agenda 21 text & references to Information data & communication, Access, participate & participation & Educate, education & aware in Agenda 21. |

| |

|Retrieved from "" |

| |

|Categories: |

|The Agenda 21 for Culture |

|Reference Dialogue: Interacció '04. Towards an Agenda 21 for culture |

| |

|The Agenda 21 for Culture promotes the adoption of a series of principles, commitments and recommendations to strengthen the development of culture on an|

|international scale from the local arena, considering it as a collective right to participation in the life of societies. |

| |

|>The Agenda 21 for Culture was the tool for Interaction '04, the dialogue that opened the Forum. |

| |

|Twelve years ago, the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development met in Rio de Janeiro to approve the Agenda 21 on Environmental |

|Sustainability. Between 4 and 6 May, the directors and all kinds of cultural actors, invited to the seventh edition of the biennial meeting of |

|Interaction ’04, were called to reflect on the Agenda 21 for Culture, before it was approved at the IV Forum of Local Authorities of Porto Alegre, held |

|in Barcelona on 7 and 8 May. |

| |

|The Agenda 21 is based on reflections concerning environmental sustainability and is set out as a proposal that describes the dangers and threats being |

|experienced today by cultural ecosystems in the world, as well as putting forward a new map as to how to intervene and treat culture as a principal |

|element for cohesion, inclusion, identity and, finally, security, in today’s globalised environment. |

|For the Right to Culture |

| |

|The director of Interaction ‘04, Jordi Martí, presented the document, which brings together principles, commitments and recommendations in order to |

|strengthen the development of culture on an international scale from the local arena. Among the principles of Agenda 21, Martí highlighted the right not |

|only to access to culture, but the collective right to participation in cultural life and the role of culture as a means of responding to many of the |

|problems emerging on a global level. In the framework of the debate, Vitor Ortiz, Cultural Secretary for the City Council of Porto Alegre, noted that it |

|was important that governments commit to comply with this document. He added that “it should be recognised for once and for all that culture is a basic |

|social right for citizens” and “a means of social inclusion” for discriminated sectors with regard to the problems of immigration or development in the |

|Third World. Cohabitation and Cultural Plurality |

| |

|With regard to recent world socioeconomic changes such as transnationalism and globalisation, migratory waves towards major cities are on the increase. |

|The receiving governments are seeking solutions to the new conflicts based on previous experiences, without taking into account the new framework and |

|context in which these phenomena are taking place. Some of the decisions taken by the governments provoke reactions and polemical debates that go beyond |

|national barriers, such as the case of the recent French legislation prohibiting school attendance with any form of religious icon. Professor Grillo |

|termed this phenomenon the "Backlash against difference". |

| |

|The poor results obtained by the application of previous models calls for new solutions that contribute to the creation of an intercultural society that |

|is able to coexist in harmony and without segregation. The growth in “Unbridled Multiculturalism”, according to Grillo, results in policies that |

|strengthen separatism and generate xenophobic ideological trends. The very capacity of cohesion of cultural identification means that cultural policies |

|are a key element in the field of global coexistence in order to preserve cultures, promote inclusion and guarantee security. One of the main challenges |

|of the 21st century is, therefore, to make sure that cultural policies have a central character amongst policies throughout the world. Civil society |

|needs to be the real protagonist of these policies. In this way, therefore, culture has to be understood as a veritable tool for local and global |

|development. Thus, the transversality of cultural policies is necessary to ensure that culture reaches all of the fields of public policies. Cultural |

|coexistence represents the alternative to the creation of a single world culture that dissolves all others. This is why the organisation of cultural |

|coexistence on a world level is one of the main political issues of the 21st century. |

| |

|The main challenge where communication is concerned is, according to Dominique Wolton, to coexist, respect and organise life alongside those who are |

|different to us. This is because “democracy cannot exist without communication”, in the opinion of the director of research for the National Centre for |

|Scientific Research (CNRS) in France. The French thinker predicted a demand for identities as a consequence of the opening-up and increase in |

|communication. The speaker also insisted on the need for nations to protect their cultural industries and asserted that language was the fundamental |

|element behind any cultural policies. |

| |

|In “The Other Globalisation”, which is the title of his latest book, presented at Interaction '04, Wolton suggests comparing the conflictive relations |

|that emerge from the identity-culture-communication triangle that he calls “explosive” with another triangle, in which identity-respect-human rights and |

|cultural diversity interact to promote cultural coexistence. During the dialogue, it was noted that, based on the premises put forward beforehand, a |

|political project on a world level that refers to the issues of culture, identity and communication was lacking. Information and communication are one of|

|the main political challenges of the 21st century, and we should see them as being inseparable from culture and identity. It is essential to find |

|effective means to manage cultural diversity in order to enable the establishment of a third globalisation with a cultural and communication aspect, |

|which goes beyond political and economic globalisation. |

| |

|Cultural coexistence in a democratic framework is, in itself, more than a proposal: it is an unavoidable condition in order to construct a globalisation |

|of culture and communication over the next 20 to 30 years. |

| |

|Dominique Wolton, who is a French sociologist and researcher, spoke about the European experience to illustrate the fact that cultural coexistence is |

|possible. In his view, Europe is an example of cooperation that guarantees the respect of each country’s cultures. The French sociologist concluded that |

|“the drawing closer of styles of living will never result in a common culture”. |

| |

|Professor Grillo proposed the implementation of a combined model by way of intercultural dialogue, driven by civil society and supported by policies that|

|promote it. The model calls for the creation of spaces for debate in which cultural exchange can originate and which belong to civil society and the |

|public sphere. Cultural negotiation that generates transethnic identities should follow a natural course of interrelation and should establish itself by |

|way of the experience of coexistence itself. Multiculturalism should, under no circumstances, be introduced by way of governmental policies of a cultural|

|and educational nature, given that institutionalisation converts cultural exchange into a static form, resulting in the standardisation of perception of |

|other cultures. |

| |

|During the dialogue, French philosopher Patrick Viveret, a consultant at the Court of Accounts in France, called for a change in the political culture of|

|industrialised countries to assess social wealth. Viveret claimed that the authorities were governed by exclusively productivist and monetary values |

|alone, which caused paradoxes such as the way in which road accidents, the arms industry, or an environmental catastrophe such as the Prestige disaster |

|could now be accounted for in the GDP as generators of wealth. Faced with such ‘crude wealth’, Viveret advocated that the authorities should employ |

|indicators based on the methodology of the work carried out by Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen; that they measure social health and sustainable |

|development, which form the social wealth of a country. |

| |

|Political powers should act accordingly and promote social and cultural values represented by health, education and citizen associationism. All in all, |

|quality of life and social and human values as opposed to quantity in production and purely economic benefits. Robert Palmer, a well-known international |

|adviser of cultural projects, proposed a conceptual and administrative reconsideration of culture in response to the needs of a globalised society in |

|which cultural commodification is a fact. Robert Palmer found solutions, with sustainable value, based on the broadening of the concept of culture, which|

|goes beyond the arts, to include the more social aspects of culture; the union of synergies between the authorities and the civil society; professional |

|multidisciplinariness; cultural consideration before any kind of development plan; and the horizontal and integrated planning of culture. Culture has |

|undergone a notably evolutionary process since the second half of the 20th century. It has gone from being a simple visual and aesthetic element to an |

|economic source of huge dimensions. Cultural commodification, strengthened by certain neoliberal policies and large-scale cultural production, has |

|created the need for a new and more sustainable reconsideration of culture that offers solutions for the future. |

| |

|In this context, Robert Palmer generated the idea of Creative Capital as the need to accumulate and strengthen creativity that could resolve current and |

|future problems. Robert Palmer put creativity forward as a social value based on the capacity to deal with the challenges that arose and as an |

|evolutionary step in the face of the current cultural climate. |

| |

|A multicultural society that considers new needs, the growing importance of cities as cultural centres, changes in cultural consumption, the current |

|situation of chaos in culture, the growing need for decentralisation, dialogue and reflection, the emergence of new identities and organisations, and the|

|search for solutions to the challenges of the new century are also factors that determine the theory of Robert Palmer’s Creative Capital. |

| |

|Robert Palmer set forth a series of proposals to promote creative development in the form of a cultural map that recognised culture as a broader system |

|that was not linked to the economy, in which decision-making and planning were carried out in a more collective manner, including the various |

|organisations of civil society. A Cultural map, created by way of horizontal and integrated cultural planning which does away with the bureaucracy, |

|centralisation and rigidity of the authorities, in which diversity and multidisciplinariness take on importance and which generates professionals and |

|specific skills aimed at developing creativity. |

| |

|As a model, Robert Palmer proposed the creation of Cultural Clusters, formed by organisations that promote creative development and centres that work in |

|cultural production: a kind of network of different international bodies with different functions, but which focus on creating and developing Creative |

|Capital. Identity has to do with the feeling of belonging and culture, which is generally identified with national collective identity. It comes from the|

|need for a group to have power, which leads to the creation or construction of national identities based on values that have the function of including or|

|excluding. |

| |

|From the point of view of artistic creators, Javier Montero, who is a writer and conceptual artist, reflected on the displacement of the transmission |

|function of literature or philosophy to the culture of the image. In this way, he considered the convenience of creating new bodies of communication, |

|learning and creativity, and making civil society the veritable protagonist of cultural policies. |

| |

|Jordi Borja, in his conference on “Emerging Rights”, advocated in favour of cultural rights, like other rights such as housing or employment rights, |

|becoming reclamatory rather than merely proclamatory. That is, that citizens have the right to demand their accomplishment with regard to the law in the |

|same way as the right to intellectual property or public health. “If we want cultural rights to be more than the right to visit a museum but the right to|

|have symbolic elements that give meaning to life, it is necessary to propose ways of fighting to make them effective, with performance means and |

|principles to guide them”, said the town planner from Barcelona. Along these lines, he concluded in favour of the right to illegality, defined as a |

|formula to “force the political frameworks into converting the legitimate into the legal” faced with the institutional resistance of the political class |

|to innovation, in spite of the fact that this is just and necessary. Finally, the concept of identity was also introduced during the dialogue. Identity |

|is used to communicate, mark out and define. |

| |

|According to Baskin Shehu, an Albanian writer who lives in Catalonia and is an adviser for Eastern Europe at the Barcelona Centre for Contemporary |

|Culture, Cultural Plurality is the capacity of the individual to have different identities beyond national ones, which involves the possibility of |

|finding common ground in terms of communication and belonging between individuals of different cultures. Cultural or national identity is not indivisible|

|because other collective identities exist that define the individual and can be useful as a communication point that promotes coexistence on a daily |

|basis. |

| |

Sustainable development

|Sustainable development |

|From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. |

| |

|Sustainable development is 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own |

|needs', according to Our Common Future, a 1987 report from the UN. One of the factors which sustainable development must overcome is environmental |

|degradation. |

| |

|For some, the issue is considered to be closely tied to economic growth and the need to find ways to expand the economy in the long term without using up |

|natural capital for current growth at the cost of long term growth. For others, the concept of growth itself is problematic, as the resources of the Earth|

|are finite. |

| |

|The 2005 UK Sustainable Development Strategy has the objective: The goal of sustainable development is to enable all people throughout the world to |

|satisfy their basic needs and enjoy a better quality of life, without compromising the quality of life of future generations. |

|Contents |

|[hide] |

| |

|* 1 Environmental degradation |

|* 2 Popularization of the concept of sustainable development |

|* 3 Sustainable development in the law |

|* 4 See also |

|* 5 External links |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|Environmental degradation |

| |

|Environmental degradation refers to the diminishment of a local ecosystem or the biosphere as a whole due to human activity. Environmental degradation |

|occurs when nature's resources (such as trees, habitat, earth, water, air) are being consumed faster than nature can replenish them. An unsustainable |

|situation occurs when natural capital (the sum total of nature's resources), is used up faster than it can be replenished. Sustainability requires that |

|human activity, at a minimum, only uses nature's resources to the point where they can be replenished naturally: |

| |

| |

|* Human consumption of renewable resources > Nature's ability to replenish: Environmental degradation |

|* Human consumption of renewable resources = Nature's ability to replenish: Enviornmental equilibrium / sustainable growth. |

|* Human consumption of renewable resources < Nature's ability to replenish: Environmental renewal / also sustainable growth. |

| |

|The long term final result of environmental degradation will be local environments that are no longer able to sustain human populations. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Popularization of the concept of sustainable development |

| |

|The idea of sustainable development did not become popular until the 1990s. It was during this decade that scientific evidence began to mount indicating |

|that human actions were having a negative impact on the environment on a global scale, leading to outcomes such as global warming. The idea of sustainable|

|development became a widespread concern when enough people concluded that the current path of human activity was unsustainable in the long term and |

|changes in human society were needed. |

| |

|The first major manifestation of this popularization of sustainable development occurred at the United Nations Conference for Environment and Development |

|(the Earth Summit) in 1992. |

| |

|The conference was prompted by the report Our Common Future (1987, World Commission on Environment and Development, also known as the Brundtland |

|Commission), which called for strategies to strengthen efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound development. A series of seven UN |

|conferences on environment and development followed. The Brundtland Commission coined the most widely used definition of sustainable development, which |

|contains two key concepts: The concept of "needs", in particular the essential needs of the world`s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; |

|and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs. |

| |

|Sustainable development demands ways of living, working and being that enable all people of the world to lead healthy, fulfilling, and economically secure|

|lives without destroying the environment and without endangering the future welfare of people and the planet. |

| |

|The precise meaning of sustainable development has been widely debated. For example, two years after the Brundtland Commission's Report popularised the |

|term, over 140 definitions of sustainable development had been catalogued. However, the term "sustainability" has since been defined with reference to |

|sound scientific principles (see The Natural Step). |

| |

|The United Nations Environment Programme's position is as follows: |

| |

|The intensified and unsustainable demand for land, water marine and coastal resources resulting from the expansion of agriculture and uncontrolled |

|urbanisation lead to increased degradation of natural ecosystems and erode the life supporting systems that uphold human civilisation. Caring for natural |

|resources and promoting their sustainable use is an essential response of the world community to ensure its own survival and well being. (source: |

|Sustainable Management and Use of Natural Resources) |

| |

|Many people reject the term sustainable development as an overall term in favor of sustainability, and reserve sustainable development only for specific |

|development activities such as energy development. |

| |

|Sustainable development is one of the issues addressed by international environmental law. |

|[edit] |

| |

|Sustainable development in the law |

| |

|A few countries have introduced the principle of sustainable development into their laws. Among them is Poland. The article 5 of the 1997 Constitution |

|says: |

| |

|The Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory and ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the |

|security of the citizens, safeguard the national heritage and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment pursuant to the principles of |

|sustainable development. |

| |

|In principle it means that the Constitutional Tribunal may strike down any law it deems incompatible with the principle of sustainable development. |

|However, as in the last decades the enviromental regulations have, with few exceptions, only become stronger, it's unlikely that the Tribunal will |

|exercise this power anytime soon. |

| |

|In France in 2004, along with the lists of human rights set out in the 1789 Declaration of the rights of man and the citizen and in the preamble of the |

|1946 constitution of the Fourth Republic, an Environmental Charter was added to the Constitution, recognizing among others a duty to preserve the |

|environment and the right to live in a "balanced and health-respecting" environment. |

| |

|The proposed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe also includes sustainable development, as one of the European Union's objectives. |

|[edit] |

| |

|See also |

| |

|* Earth Summit 2002 |

|* The Natural Step |

|* Restorative Development Initiative |

|* Urban ecology |

|* Green building |

|* Green technology |

|* Renewable energy development |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|External links |

| |

|* WorldChanging - Collective weblog on the topic of sustainable development. |

|* iNSnet - Portal site for sustainable development. |

|* Sustainable Development Indicators free database, includes Millennium Development Goals |

|* SustainabilityStart - Links and database on sustainable development. |

|* United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014) |

|* The World Summit on Sustainable Development: reaffirming the centrality of health |

|* The 2005 UK Sustainable Development Strategy |

|* Big Picture TV Free video clip of Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari Maathai discussing sustainable development |

| |

Johannesburg

|See this file : Jo'burg_assessment.pdf |

|See 's/public/Evlm(on%20site)/Africa%20and%20evlm/Culture_evt_Afriq.html |

Cultural resistance

|Strong idea |

|Globalization and Cultural Resistance |

|Reference Dialogue: Globalization, identity, diversity |

| |

|Despite the belief that globalization imposes a hegemonic culture, reality demonstrates that there is a cultural resistance that persists and is |

|increasingly strong. This resistance allows a cultural diversity to exist that can promote the common interests of society. |

| |

|Ronald Inglehart, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and Director of the World Values Survey, presented the results of this |

|international project, which consists of measuring, analyzing and comparing cultural values in the different countries and geographical regions of the |

|world to determine whether these values are converging due to globalization. He averred that, despite what could be presupposed, there is no convergence. |

| |

|"Cultural diversity persists and is increasingly valued," asserted Inglehart. In this regard, he held that "it is poor countries that display less |

|indicators of cultural change and where traditional values are maintained with most strength." |

| |

|Nevertheless, Inglehart pointed out that economic development is pushing all countries in a common direction, which is manifest as a reinforcement of |

|values such as gender equality, tolerance, good governance and democracy. |

| |

|Historically, explained Inglehart, the processes of industrialization brought a substitution of traditional values by rational-secular ones. In the |

|present world, hardly industrialized, recently industrialized and postindustrial societies coexist. This explains the major geographical differences |

|regarding the presence of traditional and survival values, on the one hand, and rational-secular and self-expression values on the other. |

| |

|For Inglehart, cultural change is thus closely linked to the economic development of a society. |

| |

USAID

|United States Agency for International Development |

|From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. |

|(Redirected from USAID) |

|USAID logo |

|USAID logo |

| |

|The United States Agency for International Development (or USAID) is the US government organization responsible for most non-military foreign aid. An |

|independent federal agency, it receives overall foreign policy guidance from the US Secretary of State and seeks "extend a helping hand to those people |

|overseas struggling to make a better life, recover from a disaster or striving to live in a free and democratic country.." [1] |

| |

|It advances US foreign policy objectives by supporting: |

| |

|* economic growth, agriculture and trade |

|* health |

|* democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance |

| |

|USAID provides assistance in four regions of the world: |

| |

|* Sub-Saharan Africa |

|* Asia and the Near East |

|* Latin America and the Caribbean |

|* Europe and Eurasia |

| |

|Contents |

|[hide] |

| |

|* 1 Origins of USAID |

|* 2 USAID in the context of U.S. foreign aid |

|* 3 USAID and the CIA |

|* 4 Iraq |

|* 5 Related links |

|* 6 External links |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|Origins of USAID |

| |

|USAID's origins date back to the Marshall Plan reconstruction of Europe after World War II and the Truman Administration's Point Four Program. In |

|September 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act into law and by executive order established USAID by consolidating U.S. |

|non-military foreign aid programs into a single agency. |

|[edit] |

| |

|USAID in the context of U.S. foreign aid |

| |

|At the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the world's governments adopted a program for action under the auspices of the United Nations–Agenda 21, |

|which included an Official Development Assistance (ODA) aid target of 0.7% of gross national product (GNP) for rich nations, roughly 22 members of the |

|OECD, known as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). |

| |

|US levels for foreign aid fall short of this goal (the US currently ranks last among the world's wealthiest countries at about 0.1 percent of GNP.) |

|However, in absolute amounts, the United States is currently the world's top donor of economic aid, providing $16.254 billion in 2003 according to the |

|Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. |

| |

|In 2001, the United States gave $10.9 billion, Japan $9.7 billion, Germany $4.9 billion, the United Kingdom $4.7 billion, and France $4.3 billion. As a |

|percentage of GNP, however, the top donors were Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Sweden. The Netherlands (pop. 16.3 million) gave $3.2 |

|billion in 2001 — almost a third of what America contributed. |

| |

|The 2003 budget of President Bush proposed $11.4 billion in foreign aid with an additional $4.3 billion for peacekeeping operations and to finance, train,|

|and educate foreign armed forces. By fiscal year 2006, the President's budget requested $9.1 billion for development and humanitarian assistance |

|administered by USAID; the Agency will uniquely program and manage approximately $5.0 billion and manage an additional $4.1 billion in coordination with |

|the Department of State. |

| |

|The fiscal year 2006 USAID budget request totals $4.22 billion in the following accounts: Child Survival and Health: $1.252 billion, Development |

|Assistance: $1.103 billion, International Disaster and Famine Assistance: $655.5 million, Transition Initiatives: $325 million, P.L. 480 Food for Peace: |

|$885 million. In addition, USAID will manage the following programs with the Department of State: Support for East European Democracies: $382 million, |

|FREEDOM Support Act: $482 million, and Economic Support Funds: $3.036 billion. |

| |

|USAID states that "U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and |

|free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world." However, some critics say that the US government more frequently gives |

|aid to reward political and military partners than to advance genuine social or humanitarian causes abroad. |

|[edit] |

| |

|USAID and the CIA |

| |

|The question of USAID’s relation to the Central Intelligence Agency is a controversial one. |

| |

|Most claim that there was in the past, but no longer is, a relationship between the CIA and USAID. Others disagree. |

| |

|Some assert that the CIA has used USAID to provide support for its programs. For example, Louis Wolf, co-publisher of CovertAction Quarterly, who worked |

|in Laos from 1964 to 1967, asserts that some of the CIA personnel working in Operation Phoenix in Vietnam were working under USAID cover. John Paul Vann |

|is another critic who linked the two. |

| |

|In a lecture given in 2000 at the University of the Philippines-Manila, Roland G. Simbulan described the importance of the CIA’s operations in the |

|Philippines, and noted: “During my interview in 1996 with Ralph McGehee, a former CIA agent, and other former CIA operatives assigned to the Manila |

|station, I was told that the CIA had many unheralded successes in the Philippines such as the manipulation of the trade union movement through the |

|Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) and through funds which were channeled through the USAID, Asia Foundation and National Endowment for |

|Democracy.” [2] |

| |

|Eva Gollinger, for example, maintains that the USAID was being used by the CIA as recently as the 2002 attempt to bring down the government of Hugo Chávez|

|in Venezuela. [3] |

|[edit] |

| |

|Iraq |

| |

|Main article: Reconstruction of Iraq |

| |

|Syndicated columnist John McCaslin wrote: |

| |

|So who rebuilds Fallujah now that the U.S. military is mopping up its operations and securing the Iraqi city? We do, through the U.S. Agency for |

|International Development (USAID). Prior to the recent fighting, USAID workers were already in Fallujah working with the district government, moderate |

|sheiks and tribal leaders on 17 projects totaling $2.3 million. (Hopefully, all were spared during the fighting.) Now, as soon as security is in place, |

|USAID in Washington says it will re-enter Fallujah and begin neighborhood cleanups, clinic rehabilitation and municipal building repairs, all the time |

|providing short-term employment to residents who will be returning to the city. Upwards of 250,000 residents fled Fallujah, and USAID has been providing |

|many of them food and relief supplies, such as tents, blankets, mattresses, plastic sheeting, jerrycans, buckets, and hygiene and health kits. [4] |

| |

| |

|Rebuilding Iraq - C-SPAN 4 Part Series In June 2003, C-SPAN followed USAID Admin. Andrew Natsios as he toured Iraq. The special program C-SPAN produced |

|aired over four nights. [5] |

| |

| |

|USAID itself is transparent on the information distributed to the public about its operations in Iraq. Detailed weekly reports, contracts and special |

|reports are a part of the agency's web site on Iraq. [6] |

|[edit] |

| |

|Related links |

| |

|* Andrew Natsios |

|* Bretton Woods Agreement |

|* Mutual Security Act |

| |

|[edit] |

| |

|External links |

| |

|* USAID website |

|* Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |

|* The US and Foreign Aid Assistance, article by Anup Shah |

| |

|Retrieved from "" |

| |

|Categories: United States federal agencies | |

|The US and Foreign Aid Assistance |

|Author and Page information |

| |

|by Anup Shah |

|This Page Last Updated Saturday, June 25, 2005 |

|• This page: . |

|• To print full details (expanded/alternative links, side notes, etc.) use the printer-friendly version: |

|• |

| |

|The US being the wealthiest, strongest and most influential nation, it is worth seeing how their actions or inaction affect other nations. One notable |

|area is US foreign aid. Being a major part of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and even helping to formulate the United Nations over 50 years |

|ago, their actions can be felt around the world. |

| |

|Around the world for numerous years, many have criticized the US for cutting back on its promised obligations and responsibilities, and that furthermore, |

|when it has provided aid, it has been tied to its own foreign policy objectives. Yet, many rich nations that provide aid can be criticized in a similar |

|way. |

|Table of contents for this page |

| |

|This web page has the following sub-sections: |

|• Governments Cutting Back on Promised Responsibilities |

|• Agenda 21: Rich Nations Agreed at the United Nations to 0.7% of GNP To Aid |

|• Almost all rich nations fail this obligation |

|• Recent Increases in Aid Modest; Longer View Shows Decline |

|• Foreign Aid Numbers in Charts and Graphs |

|• Side note on private contributions |

|• Side Note on Private Remittances |

|• Adjusting Aid Numbers to Factor Private Contributions, and more |

|• Ranking the Rich based on Commitment to Development |

|• Private donations and philanthropy |

|• Are numbers the only issue? |

|• Aid money is actually way below what has been promised |

|• Aid is Actually Hampering Development |

|• Aid has been a foreign policy tool to aid the donor not the recipient |

|• Aid And Militarism |

|• Aid Money Often Tied to Various Restrictive Conditions |

|• More Money Is Transferred From Poor Countries to Rich, Than From Rich To Poor |

|• Aid Amounts Dwarfed by Effects of First World Subsidies, Third World Debt, Unequal Trade, etc |

|• But aid could be beneficial |

|Governments Cutting Back on Promised Responsibilities |

| |

|“Trade, not aid” is regarded as an important part of development promoted by some nations. But in the context of international obligations, it is also |

|criticized by many as an excuse for rich countries to cut back aid that has been agreed and promised at the United Nations. |

|Agenda 21: Rich Nations Agreed at the United Nations to 0.7% of GNP To Aid |

| |

|When the world’s governments met at the Earth summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, they adopted a programme for action under the auspices of the United |

|Nations — Agenda 21. Amongst other things, this included an Official Development Assistance (ODA) aid target of 0.7% of gross national product (GNP) for |

|rich nations, roughly 22 members of the OECD, known as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). [Note that terminology is changing. GNP, which the OECD|

|used up to 2000 is now replaced with the similar as GNI, Gross National Income which includes a terms of trade adjustment. Some quoted articles and older |

|parts of this site may still use GNP or GDP.] |

| |

|ODA is basically aid from the governments of the wealthy nations, but doesn’t include private contributions or private capital flows and investments. The |

|main objective of ODA is to promote development. It is therefore a kind of measure on the priorities that governments themselves put on such matters. |

|(Whether that necessarily reflects their citizen’s wishes and priorities is a different matter!) |

|Almost all rich nations fail this obligation |

| |

|Even though these targets and agendas have been set, year after year almost all rich nations have constantly failed to reach their agreed obligations of |

|the 0.7% target. Instead of 0.7%, the amount of aid has been around 0.2 to 0.4%, some $100 billion short. |

| |

|In addition some interesting observations can be made. For example: |

|• USA’s aid, in terms of percentage of their GNP has almost always been lower than any other industrialized nation in the world, though paradoxically in |

|the last four years, their dollar amount has been the highest. (Only in 2004 did they move up from last place by one.) |

|• Since 1992, Japan had been the largest donor of aid, in terms of raw dollars. That was until 2001 when the United States reclaimed that position, a |

|year that also saw Japan’s amount of aid drop by nearly 4 billion dollars (as tables and charts below will also show). |

|Recent Increases in Aid Modest; Longer View Shows Decline |

| |

|Overall, ODA has been declining despite some increases in recent years. The UN notes the irony that the decline in aid comes even though conditions are |

|improving for its greater effectiveness. According to the World Bank, overall, the official development assistance worldwide has been decreasing about 20%|

|since 1990. |

| |

|For the change in aid trends in 2001, the OECD noted that: |

|• “Most of the United States' increase in 2001 was due to a $600 million disbursement to Pakistan for economic support in the September 11 aftermath.” |

|• Japan’s ODA fell by nearly $4 billion. “A key factor accounting for this was a 12.7 per cent depreciation of the Yen....” Other factors were “the |

|timing of Japan’s disbursements to multilateral organisations and loan repayments from Asian countries that have recovered from the Asian financial |

|crisis.” |

| |

|For the increase in overall aid in 2002 (by just 5%), the OCED commented that: |

|• “The United States increased its ODA by 11.6% in real terms in 2002 ... mainly due to additional and emergency funds in response to the 11 September |

|2001 terrorist attacks as well as new aid initiatives, especially in relation to health and humanitarian aid.” |

|• “Japan’s ODA fell slightly by 1.8% in real terms in 2002. Most of the fall ... was because the Yen depreciated against the US dollar.” |

| |

|For 2003 trends, the OCED noted that: |

|• The aid increases were modest in 2003. |

|• Reasons » |

|• In addition, the OECD admitted this was still not enough, and it “underlines the need for developing countries to make efforts on a range of fronts, |

|including by creating an environment where the private sector can thrive.” |

|• In parallel, the OECD “stresses that OECD countries must do more to promote economic growth in poor countries through coherent economic policies that |

|take account of these countries' needs.” |

|• Some positive long-term trends were also noted, for example towards more support for governments that were delivering results, more untied aid, more |

|support for policies “owned” by developing countries rather than imposed upon them through conditionality, and a greater emphasis on governance and |

|health. |

|• However, there was also a sharp decline in aid for agricultural development, and a rising share in total aid outlays of humanitarian aid in response to|

|emergencies as opposed to long-term development and aid to the poorest countries. |

| |

| |

|For 2004 trends, the OECD noted that: |

|• Aid rose 4.3% in real terms between 2003 and 2004. |

|• Reasons » |

|• EU countries combined represented 0.36% of GNI. |

| |

| |

|Inter Press Service (IPS) noted a number of important issues based on a report released April 18, 2005, where U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan “warned |

|against any premature rejoicing over the rising numbers.” |

|• “Adjusted for depreciation of the fast-falling U.S. dollar and worldwide price inflation, the 18.4 percent annual increase of ODA reported for 2003 |

|relative to 2002 ‘falls to around a quarter of that figure,’ [Kofi Annan] notes” |

|• “Arabella Fraser, policy advisor for the international humanitarian organisation Oxfam, is equally guarded” noting that “Rich country |

|self-congratulation is unwarranted,” because “Aid levels are still pitiful ... way below the promise of 0.7 percent, which was made 35 years ago.” |

|• With only around 40 cents in every dollar spent on overseas aid actually reaching the poorest countries, Fraser said that the recent report shows “that|

|aid flows are largely dictated by geo-strategic concerns rather than by efforts to reduce poverty.” (Emphasis added) |

|• In his report, Annan says that although ODA is normally expected to provide new cash resources for recipient countries to increase development |

|spending, “an increasing portion of the recent increases of ODA has taken the form of expenditures on emergency relief in countries that donors have |

|deemed critical for security reasons.” (Emphasis added) |

|• When the large amounts of aid given to Afghanistan and Iraq is taken into account, “ODA in 2003 barely increased in real terms, suggesting that the |

|increase in resources available to meet the MDGs has been quite modest.” |

| |

|Foreign Aid Numbers in Charts and Graphs |

| |

|Charts and data from the OECD web site have also been reproduced here for 2001 to 2004, which are latest available figures (at time of writing. It will be|

|updated when possible). You can sort by GNP or raw dollars to see how various nations rank by using the column heading links: |

|Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 2001 to 2004 |

| |

|… |

|You can also see: |

|• Original barchart images from OECD of the above data |

|• Donor charts for previous years. |

| |

|In addition, the OECD web site also provides a break down of how that money is spent. For example, the following chart is a breakdown for all countries |

|combined for 2002-2003, which is the latest periods available in these chart formats: |

| |

|Source: Aid at a Glance 2002-2003, OECD Web Site |

| |

|Similarly, the following chart is a breakdown of US aid for 2002-2003: |

| |

|Source: Aid at a Glance 2002-2003, OECD Web Site |

| |

| |

|You can also see: |

|• US aid breakdown for previous years |

|• Full list of country breakdowns. |

|Side note on private contributions |

| |

|As an aside, it should be emphasized that the above figures are comparing government spending. Such spending has been agreed at international level and is|

|spread over a number of priorities. |

| |

|Individual/private donations may be targeted in many ways. However, even though the charts above do show US aid to be poor (in percentage terms) compared |

|to the rest, the generosity of the American people is far more impressive than their government. Private aid/donation has been through charity of |

|individual people and organizations though this of course can be weighted to certain interests and areas. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note for |

|example, per latest estimates, Americans privately give at least $34 billion overseas — more than twice the US official foreign aid of $15 billion at that|

|time: |

|• International giving by US foundations: $1.5 billion per year |

|• Charitable giving by US businesses: $2.8 billion annually |

|• American NGOs: $6.6 billion in grants, goods and volunteers. |

|• Religious overseas ministries: $3.4 billion, including health care, literacy training, relief and development. |

|• US colleges scholarships to foreign students: $1.3 billion |

|• Personal remittances from the US to developing countries: $18 billion in 2000 |

|• Source: Dr. Carol Adelman, Aid and Comfort, Tech Central Station, 21 August 2002. |

| |

|While Adelman admits that “there are no complete figures for international private giving” she still says that Americans are “clearly the most generous on|

|earth in public — but especially in private — giving”. Hence these numbers and claims may be taken with caution, but even then, these are high numbers. |

|Side Note on Private Remittances |

| |

|Many economists and others, including Adelman in the article above, point out that personal remittances are effective. They “don’t require the expensive |

|overhead of government consultants, or the interference of corrupt foreign officials. Studies have shown that roads, clinics, schools and water pumps are |

|being funded by these private dollars. For most developing countries, private philanthropy and investment flows are much larger than official aid.” |

| |

|Unfortunately Adelman doesn’t cite the studies she mentions as “these private dollars” do not seem to be remittance dollars, but private investment. |

|Economists at the IMF surveyed literature on remittances and admitted that, “the role of remittances in development and economic growth is not well |

|understood ... partly because the literatures on the causes and effects of remittances remain separate.” When they tried to see what role remittances |

|played, they concluded that “remittances have a negative effect on economic growth” as it usually goes into private consumption, and takes place under |

|asymmetric information and economic uncertainty. |

| |

|Even if that turns out to be wrong, the other issue also is whether personal remmittances can be counted as American giving, as people point out that it |

|is often foreign immigrant workers sending savings back to their families in other countries. Political commentator Daniel Drezner takes up this issue. |

|“Americans aren’t remitting this money — foreign nationals are,” he notes. |

| |

|Comparing Adelman’s figures with her previous employer’s, USAID, Drezner adds that “Adelman’s figure is accurate if you include foreign remittances.” |

|However, if you do not count foreign remittances then it matches the numbers that the research institute, the Center for Global Development uses in their |

|rankings (see below). |

| |

|Finally, Drezner suggests that Adelman is not necessarily incorrect in her core thesis that Americans are generous, but “lumping remittances in with |

|charity flows exaggerates the generosity of Americans as a people.” |

|Adjusting Aid Numbers to Factor Private Contributions, and more |

| |

|David Roodman, from the CGD, attempts to adjust the aid numbers by including subjective factors: |

|• Quality of recipient governance as well as poverty; |

|• Penalizing tying of aid; |

|• Handling reverse flows (debt service) in a consistent way; |

|• Penalizes project proliferation (overloading recipient governments with the administrative burden of many small aid projects); |

|• and rewards tax policies that encourage private charitable giving to developing countries. |

| |

|In doing so, the results (using 2002 data, which was latest available at that time) produced: |

|Quality-adjusted aid and charitable giving/GDP (%) |

|Country |

|Quality-adjusted aid as percent of GDP |

| |

|Source: David Roodman, An Index of Donor Performance, Center for Global Development, April 2004 |

| |

|If you are viewing this table on another site, please see for further details. |

| |

|… |

| |

|Ranking the Rich based on Commitment to Development |

| |

|The CGD therefore attempts to factor in some quality measures and has an attempt at “Ranking the Rich” based on their commitment to development for the |

|world’s poor. This index considers aid, trade, investment, migration, environment, security, and technology. |

| |

|Their result leads in the US ranking joint seventh, with Germany, Norway, and France. Recent claims of “stingy” may put people on the defensive, but many |

|nations whom we are told are amongst the world’s best, can in fact, do better. The results were charted as follows: |

| |

|Source: Center for Global Development, Commitment to Development Index 2004 |

| |

|Adelman, further above noted that the US is “clearly the most generous on earth in public — but especially in private — giving”, yet the CGD suggests |

|otherwise, saying that the US does not close the gap with most other rich countries. “The US gives 13c/day/person in government aid....American’s private |

|giving—another 5c/day—is high by international standards but does not close the gap with most other rich countries. Norway gives $1.02/day in public aid |

|and 24c/day in private aid” per person. |

| |

|Private donations and philanthropy |

| |

|Government aid, while frought with problems (discussed below), reflects foreign policy objectives of the donor government in power, which can differ from |

|the generosity of the people of that nation. It can also be less specialized than private contributions and targets are internationally agreed to be |

|measureable. |

| |

|Private donations, especially large philanthropic donations and business givings, can be subject to political/ideological or economic end-goals and/or |

|subject to special interest. A vivid example of this is in health issues around the world. Amazingly large donations by foundations such as the Bill and |

|Melinda Gates Foundation are impressive, but the underlying causes of the problems are not addressed, which require political solutions. As Rajshri |

|Dasgupta comments: |

| |

|“Private charity is an act of privilege, it can never be a viable alternative to State obligations,” said Dr James Obrinski, of the organisation Medicins |

|sans Frontier, in Dhaka recently at the People’s Health Assembly (see Himal, February 2001). In a nutshell, industry and private donations are feel-good, |

|short-term interventions and no substitute for the vastly larger, and essentially political, task of bringing health care to more than a billion poor |

|people. |

|— Rajshri Dasgupta, Patents, Private Charity and Public Health, Himal South Asian, March 2001 |

| |

|As another example, Bill Gates announced in November 2002 a massive donation of $100 million to India over ten years to fight AIDS there. It was big news |

|and very welcome by many. Yet, at the same time he made that donation, he was making another larger donation — over $400 million, over three years — to |

|increase support for Microsoft’s software development suite of applications and its platform, in competition with Linux and other rivals. Thomas Green, in|

|a somewhat cynical article, questions who really benefits, saying “And being a monster MS [Microsoft] shareholder himself, a ‘Big Win’ in India will |

|enrich him [Bill Gates] personally, perhaps well in excess of the $100 million he’s donating to the AIDS problem. Makes you wonder who the real |

|beneficiary of charity is here.” (Emphasis is original.) |

| |

|India has potentially one tenth of the world’s software developers, so capturing the market there of software development platforms is seen as crucial. |

|This is just one amongst many examples of what appears extremely welcome philanthropy and charity also having other motives. It might be seen as horrible |

|to criticize such charity, especially on a crucial issue such as AIDS, but that is not the issue. The concern is that while it is welcome that this |

|charity is being provided, at a systemmic level, such charity is unsustainable and shows ulteria motives. Would Bill Gates have donated that much had |

|there not been additional interests for the company that he had founded? |

| |

|In addition, as award-winning investigative reporter and author Greg Palast also notes, the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Intellectural |

|Property Rights (TRIPS), “the rule which helps Gates rule, also bars African governments from buying AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis medicine at cheap |

|market prices.” He also adds that it is killing more people than the philanthropy saving. What Palast is hinting towards is the unequal rules of trade and|

|economics that are part of the world system, that has contributed to countries such as most in Africa being unable to address the scourge of AIDS and |

|other problems, even when they want to. See for example, the sections on free trade, poverty and corporations on this web site for more. |

| |

|In addition to private contributions, when it comes to government aid, these concerns can multiply as it may affect the economic and political direction |

|of an entire nation if such government aid is also tied into political objectives that benefit the donor. |

|Are numbers the only issue? |

| |

|The above talks a lot about numbers and attempts to address common questions about who gives what, as for Americans and Europeans, there is indeed a |

|fascination of this topic. |

| |

|Less mentioned in the media is that some aid money that is pledged often involves double accounting of sorts. Sometimes offers have even been reneged or |

|just not delivered. This site’s section on the Asian tsunami disaster and on third world debt has more on these aspects. |

| |

|It is common to hear that the US is the most generous country on earth. While the numbers above may say otherwise in a technical sense, is “who gives the |

|most” really the important discussion here? While important, concentrating on this one aspect diverts us from other pressing issues such as does the aid |

|actually help the recipient, or does it actually help the donor. |

| |

| |

|As we will see further below, some aid has indeed been quite damaging for the recipient, while at the same time being beneficial for the donor. |

|Aid money is actually way below what has been promised |

| |

|According to the British paper, the Guardian, in March 2002, if all countries from the OECD were spending 0.7% of GNP on aid, aid flows would be $114bn |

|higher than current levels. (The World Bank say some $40 to $60 billion extra is needed, while the international development organization, Oxfam, say some|

|$100 billion is needed. So, regardless of those numbers, meeting the 0.7% promise is therefore important.) |

| |

|2002 saw an increase in ODA from 2001 by about 5%. However, the total still only accounted for just 0.23% of their combined resources, still well below |

|the agreed 0.7%. For the OECD, the optimistic side of this was that this may have marked “the beginning of a recovery from the all-time lows of 0.22% of |

|GNI in each of the last three years.”2001 had seen an overall decline in the ODA, as the OECD also noted. The OECD pointed out (in the previous link) that|

|the fall resulted “in part from falls in the exchange rates of some currencies against the United States dollar.” Furthermore, “In real terms, ODA |

|remained relatively stable, with a slight fall of 1.4 per cent.” In a similar way, the OCED also noted that 2000 didn’t differ much from 1999, either. |

| |

|2003 saw ODA reach $68.5 billion, the highest level ever, both in nominal and real terms. This amounted to 0.25% of DAC members' combined gross national |

|income (GNI). While this was up from 0.23% in 2002, it was still well below the promised 0.7%. As noted further above some trends are encouraging, such as|

|promoting good governance, but others should cause concern, such as less focus on long term development and a substantial amount of aid being counted |

|towards Iraq’s reconstruction. |

| |

|Aid is Actually Hampering Development |

| |

|The United Nations Economic and Social Council, when noting that effectiveness of aid to poor countries requires a focus on economic infrastructure, also |

|noted that ODA was hampering aid. Jose Antonio Ocampo, Under-Secretary-General for the United Nations Economic and Social Affairs said that debt, |

|commodities, official development assistance and, in some cases, the risk of conflict is hampering development in the least developed countries. |

| |

| |

|See also, for example, the well-regarded Reality of Aid project for more on the reality and rhetoric of aid. This project looks at what various nations |

|have donated, and how and where it has been spent, etc. |

| |

|As an aside, note that ODA’s prime purpose is to promote development. From the OECD’s own statistics, taking 2001 for example (which is the latest |

|available data at time of writing), while the net total ODA was approximately $52.34 billion from the DAC countries, |

|• Total flows was down to $108.19 billion (from $133.79 billion the previous year), of which (in addition to ODA) |

|• Private flows (direct investment, private export credits, security of multilateral agencies and bilateral portfolio investment) was $49 billion (about |

|$77.66 billion the previous year). |

|• Grants by Private Voluntary Agencies was $7.29 billion (up from $6.93 billion the previous year). $4.57 billion of which came from the US alone ($4.07 |

|billion the previous year) |

|• Credits and other flows came to $0.55 billion (from -$4.54 billion the prevoius year) |

|• Source: |

|• Statistical Annex of the 2002 Development Co-operation Report, OECD |

|• See this OECD Excel Spreadsheet, from the OECD web site for the source of the data, in particular, Table 13e. |

|• Alternatively, visit Statistical Annex of 2002 DCR page for other formats of the data. |

| |

|Yet, (as detailed further below) these total flows are less than the subsidies many of the rich nations give to some of their industries, such as |

|agriculture, which has a direct impact on the poor nations (due to flooding the market with — or dumping — excess products, protecting their own markets |

|from the products of the poor countries, etc.) |

| |

|In addition, a lot of other inter-related issues, such as geopolitics, international economics, etc all tie into aid, its effectiveness and its purpose. |

|Africa is often highlighted as an area receiving more aid, or in need of more of it, yet, in recent years, it has seen less aid and less investment etc, |

|all the while being subjected to international policies and agreements that have been detrimental to many African people. |

| |

|For the June 2002 G8 summit, a briefing was prepared by Action for Southern Africa and the World Development Movement, looking at the wider issue of |

|economic and political problems: |

| |

|It is undeniable that there has been poor governance, corruption and mismanagement in Africa. However, the briefing reveals the context — the legacy of |

|colonialism, the support of the G8 for repressive regimes in the Cold War, the creation of the debt trap, the massive failure of Structural Adjustment |

|Programmes imposed by the IMF and World Bank and the deeply unfair rules on international trade. The role of the G8 in creating the conditions for |

|Africa’s crisis cannot be denied. Its overriding responsibility must be to put its own house in order, and to end the unjust policies that are inhibiting |

|Africa’s development. |

|— It’s the 'Blame the Victim' Summit, Action for Southern Africa, June 25, 2002. (You can see the full briefing (PDF format). |

| |

|As the above briefing is titled, a common theme on these issues (around the world) has been to “blame the victim”. The above briefing also highlights some|

|common “myths” often used to highlight such aspects, including (and quoting): |

|• Africa has received increasing amounts of aid over the years — in fact, aid to Sub-Saharan Africa fell by 48% over the 1990s |

|• Africa needs to integrate more into the global economy — in fact, trade accounts for larger proportion of Africa’s income than of the G8 |

|• Economic reform will generate new foreign investment — in fact, investment to Africa has fallen since they opened up their economies |

|• Bad governance has caused Africa’s poverty — in fact, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), economic conditions imposed by |

|the IMF and the World Bank were the dominant influence on economic policy in the two decades to 2000, a period in which Africa’s income per head fell by |

|10% and income of the poorest 20% of people fell by 2% per year |

| |

|Christian Aid weighs in on this with a more recent report noting that sub-Saharan Africa is a massive $272 billion worse off because of “free” trade |

|policies forced on them as a condition of receiving aid and debt relief. They also note that: |

| |

|The reforms that rich countries forced on Africa were supposed to boost economic growth. However, the reality is that imports increased massively while |

|exports went up only slightly. The growth in exports only partially compensated African producers for the loss of local markets and they were left worse |

|off. |

|— The economics of failure: The real cost of ‘free’ trade', Christian Aid, June 20, 2005 |

| |

| |

|We see from the above then, that the quantity of aid has not been as much as it should be. But what about the quality of the aid? |

|Aid has been a foreign policy tool to aid the donor not the recipient |

| |

|Aid appears to have established as a priority the importance of influencing domestic policy in the recipient countries |

|— Benjamin F. Nelson, International Affairs Budget: Framework for Assessing Relevance, Priority and Efficiency, (Washington, DC: General Accounting |

|Office, October 30, 1997) |

| |

|As shown throughout this web site (and hundreds of others) one of the root causes of poverty lies in the powerful nations that have formulated most of the|

|trade and aid policies today, which are more to do with maintaining dependency on industrialized nations, providing sources of cheap labor and cheaper |

|goods for populations back home and increasing personal wealth, and maintaining power over others in various ways. As mentioned in the structural |

|adjustment section, so-called lending and development schemes have done little to help poorer nations progress. |

| |

|The US, for example, has also held back dues to the United Nations, which is the largest body trying to provide assistance in such a variety of ways to |

|the developing countries. Former US President Jimmy Carter describes the US as “stingy”: |

| |

|While the US provided large amounts of military aid to countries deemed strategically important, others noted that the US ranked low among developed |

|nations in the amount of humanitarian aid it provided poorer countries. “We are the stingiest nation of all,” former President Jimmy Carter said recently |

|in an address at Principia College in Elsah, Ill. |

|— Who rules next?, Christian Science Monitor, December 29, 1999 |

|Aid And Militarism |

| |

|IPS noted that recent US aid has taken on militaristic angles as well, following similar patterns to aid during the cold war. The war on terrorism is also|

|having an effect as to what aid goes where and how much is spent. |

| |

|For example: |

|• “Credits for foreign militaries to buy US weapons and equipment would increase by some 700 million dollars to nearly five billion dollars, the highest |

|total in well over a decade.” (This is also an example of aid benefiting the donor!) |

|• “The total foreign aid proposal ... amounts to a mere five percent of what Bush is requesting for the Pentagon next year.” |

|• “Bush’s foreign-aid plan [for 2005] actually marks an increase over 2004 levels, although much of the additional money is explained by greater spending|

|on security for US embassies and personnel overseas.” |

|• “As in previous years, Israel and Egypt are the biggest bilateral recipients under the request, accounting for nearly five billion dollars in aid |

|between them. Of the nearly three billion dollars earmarked for Israel, most is for military credits.” |

|• This militaristic aid will come “largely at the expense of humanitarian and development assistance.” |

| |

|The European Union is linking aid to fighting terrorism as well, with European ministers warning countries that their relations with the economically |

|powerful bloc will suffer if they fail to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. An EU official is quoted as saying, “aid and trade could be affected |

|if the fight against terrorism was considered insufficient”, leading to accusations of “compromising the neutrality, impartiality and independence of |

|humanitarian assistance”. |

| |

|Aid Money Often Tied to Various Restrictive Conditions |

| |

|As a condition for aid money, many donors apply conditions that tie the recipient to purchase products only from that donor. In a way this might seem fair|

|and “balanced”, because the donor gets something out of the relationship as well, but on the other hand, for the poorer country, it can mean precious |

|resources are used buying more expensive options, which could otherwise have been used in other situations. Furthermore, the recipient then has less |

|control and decision-making on how aid money is spent. In addition the very nations that typically promote free-markets and less government involvement in|

|trade, commerce, etc., ensure some notion of welfare for some of their industries. |

| |

|IPS noted that aid tied with conditions cut the value of aid to recipient countries by some 25-40 percent, because it obliges them to purchase |

|uncompetitively priced imports from the richer nations. IPS was citing a UN study which also noted that just four countries (Norway, Denmark, the |

|Netherlands and the United Kingdom) were breaking away from the idea of “tied aid” with more than 90 percent of their aid “untied”. |

| |

|In addition, IPS noted the following, worth quoting at length: |

| |

|[Njoki Njoroge] Njehu [director of the 50 Years is Enough campaign] cited the example of Eritrea, which discovered it would be cheaper to build its |

|network of railways with local expertise and resources rather than be forced to spend aid money on foreign consultants, experts, architects and engineers |

|imposed on the country as a condition of development assistance. |

| |

|Strings attached to US aid for similar projects, she added, include the obligation to buy products such as Caterpillar and John Deere tractors. “All this |

|adds up to the cost of the project.” |

| |

|Njehu also pointed out that money being doled out to Africa to fight HIV/AIDS is also a form of tied aid. She said Washington is insisting that the |

|continent’s governments purchase anti-AIDS drugs from the United States instead of buying cheaper generic products from South Africa, India or Brazil. |

| |

|As a result, she said, US brand name drugs are costing up to 15,000 dollars a year compared with 350 dollars annually for generics. |

| |

|... |

| |

|AGOA [African Growth and Opportunity Act, signed into US law in 2000] is more sinister than tied aid, says Njehu. “If a country is to be eligible for |

|AGOA, it has to refrain from any actions that may conflict with the US’s ‘strategic interests.’” |

| |

|“The potential of this clause to influence our countries' foreign policies was hinted at during debates at the United Nations over the invasion of Iraq,” |

|she added. |

| |

|“The war against Iraq was of strategic interest to the United States,” Njehu said. As a result, she said, several African members of the UN Security |

|Council, including Cameroon, Guinea and Angola, were virtually held to ransom when the United States was seeking council support for the war in 2003. |

| |

|“They came under heavy pressure,” she said. “The message was clear: either you vote with us or you lose your trade privileges”. |

|— Thalif Deen, Tied Aid Strangling Nations, Says U.N, Inter Press Service, July 6, 2004 |

| |

| |

|In their 2000 report looking back at the previous year, the Reality of Aid 2000 (Earthscan Publications, 2000, p.81), reported in their US section that |

|“71.6% of its bilateral aid commitments were tied to the purchase of goods and services from the US.” That is, where the US did give aid, it was most |

|often tied to foreign policy objectives that would help the US. |

| |

|Leading up to the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002, the Bush administration promised a nearly $10 billion |

|fund over three years followed by a permanent increase of $5 billion a year thereafter. The EU also offered some $5 billion increase over a similar time |

|period. |

| |

|While these increases have been welcome, these targets are still below the 0.7% promised at the Earth summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The World Bank |

|have also levelled some criticism of past policies: |

| |

|Commenting on the latest US pledge [of $10 billion], Julian Borger and Charlotte Denny of the Guardian (UK) say Washington is desperate to deflect |

|attention in Monterrey from the size of its aid budget. But for more generous donors, says the story, Washington’s conversion to the cause of effective |

|aid spending is hard to swallow. Among the big donors, the US has the worst record for spending its aid budget on itself — 70 percent of its aid is spent |

|on US goods and services. And more than half is spent in middle income countries in the Middle East. Only $3bn a year goes to South Asia and sub-Saharan |

|Africa. |

|— Monterrey: US Will 'Seek Advice On Spending Aid', World Bank, March 21, 2002 |

| |

|In addition, promises of more money were tied to more conditions, which for many developing countries is another barrier to real development, as the |

|conditions are sometimes favorable to the donor, not necessarily the recipient. Delhi-based Centre for Science and Environment commented on the US |

|conditional pledge of more money that: |

| |

|Thus, status quo in world relations is maintained. Rich countries like the US continue to have a financial lever to dictate what good governance means and|

|to pry open markets of developing countries for multinational corporations. Developing countries have no such handle for Northern markets, even in sectors|

|like agriculture and textiles, where they have an advantage but continue to face trade barriers and subsidies. The estimated annual cost of Northern trade|

|barriers to Southern economies is over US $100 billion, much more than what developing countries receive in aid. |

|— Puppets on purse strings, Down To Earth, (Centre for Science and Environment) Vol 10, No 23, April 30, 2002 |

| |

|Another aspect of aid tying into interests of donors is exemplified with climate change negotiations. Powerful nations such as the United States have been|

|vocally against the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. Unlike smaller countries, they have been able to exert their influence on other countries to push |

|for bilateral agreements conditioned with aid, in a way that some would describe as a bribe. Center for Science and Environment for example criticizes |

|such politics: |

| |

|It is easy to be taken in with promises of bilateral aid, and make seemingly innocuous commitments in bilateral agreements. There is far too much at stake|

|here [with climate change]. To further their interests, smaller, poorer countries don’t have aid to bribe and trade muscle to threaten countries. |

|— Pop of the world, Equity Watch, Center for Science and Environment, October 25, 2002. |

| |

|This use of strength in political and economic arenas is nothing new. Powerful nations have always managed to exert their influence in various arenas. |

|During the Gulf War in 1991 for example, many that ended up in the allied coalition were promised various concessions behind the scenes (what the media |

|described as “diplomacy”). For example, Russia was offered massive IMF money. Even now, with the issue of the International Criminal Court, which the US |

|is also opposed to, it has been pressuring other nations on an individual basis to not sign, or provide concessions. In that context, aid is often tied to|

|political objectives and it can be difficult to sometimes see when it is not so. |

| |

|But some types of conditions attached to aid can also be ideologically driven. For example, quoted further above by the New York Times, James Wolfensohn, |

|the World Bank president noted how European and American farm subsidies “are crippling Africa’s chance to export its way out of poverty.” While this |

|criticism comes from many perspectives, Wolfensohn’s note on export also suggests that some forms of development assistance may be on the condition that |

|nations reform their economies to certain ideological positions. Structural Adjustment has been one of these main policies as part of this neoliberal |

|ideology, to promote export-oriented development in a rapidly opened economy. Yet, this has been one of the most disastrous policies in the past two |

|decades, which has increased poverty. Even the IMF and World Bank have hinted from time to time that such policies are not working. People can understand |

|how tying aid on condition of improving human rights, or democracy might be appealing, but when tied to economic ideology, which is not always proven, or |

|not always following the “one size fits all” model, the ability (and accountability) of decisions that governments would have to pursue policies they |

|believe will help their own people are reduced. |

|More Money Is Transferred From Poor Countries to Rich, Than From Rich To Poor |

| |

|For the OECD countries to meet their obligations for aid to the poorer countries is not an economic problem. It is a political one. This can be seen in |

|the context of other spending. For example, |

|• The US recently increased its military budget by some $100 billion dollars alone |

|• Europe subsidizes its agriculture to the tune of some $35-40 billion per year, even while it demands other nations to liberalize their markets to |

|foreign competition. |

|• The US also introduced a $190 billion dollar subsidy to its farms through the US Farm Bill, also criticized as a protectionist measure. |

|• While aid amounts to around $50 to 55 billion per year, the poor countries pay some $200 billion to the rich each year. |

|• There are many more (some mentioned below too). |

| |

|In effect then, there is more aid to the rich than to the poor. |

| |

|While the amount of aid from some countries such as the US might look very generous in sheer dollar terms (ignoring the percentage issue for the moment), |

|the World Bank also points out that at the World Economic Forum in New York, February 2002, “[US Senator Patrick] Leahy noted that two-thirds of US |

|government aid goes to only two countries: Israel and Egypt. Much of the remaining third is used to promote US exports or to fight a war against drugs |

|that could only be won by tackling drug abuse in the United States.” |

| |

|In October 2003, at a United Nations conference, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that |

| |

|developing countries made the sixth consecutive and largest ever transfer of funds to “other countries” in 2002, a sum totalling “almost $200 billion.” |

| |

|“Funds should be moving from developed countries to developing countries, but these numbers tell us the opposite is happening.... Funds that should be |

|promoting investment and growth in developing countries, or building schools and hospitals, or supporting other steps towards the Millennium Development |

|Goals, are, instead, being transferred abroad.” |

|— Kofi Annan, Development funds moving from poor countries to rich ones, Annan says, United Nations News Centre, October 30, 2003 |

| |

|And as Saradha Lyer, of Malaysia-based Third World Network notes, instead of promoting investment in health, education, and infrastructure development in |

|the third world, this money has been channelled to the North, either because of debt servicing arrangements, asymmetries and imbalances in the trade |

|system or because of inappropriate liberalisation and privatisation measures imposed upon them by the international financial and trading system. |

| |

|This transfer from the poorer nations to the rich ones makes even the recent increase in ODA seem little in comparison. |

|Aid Amounts Dwarfed by Effects of First World Subsidies, Third World Debt, Unequal Trade, etc |

| |

|Combining the above mentioned reversal of flows with the subsidies and other distorting mechanisms, this all amounts to a lot of money being transferred |

|to the richer countries (also known as the global North), compared to the total aid amounts that goes to the poor (or South). |

| |

|As well as having a direct impact on poorer nations, it also affects smaller farmers in rich nations. For example, Oxfam, criticizing EU double standards,|

|highlights the following: |

| |

|Latin America is the worst-affected region, losing $4bn annually from EU farm policies. EU support to agriculture is equivalent to double the combined aid|

|budgets of the European Commission and all 15 member states. Half the spending goes to the biggest 17 per cent of farm enterprises, belying the |

|manufactured myth that the CAP [Common Agriculture Policy] is all about keeping small farmers in jobs. |

|— Europe’s Double Standards. How the EU should reform its trade policies with the developing world, Oxfam Policy Paper, April 2002, p.18 (Link is to the |

|press release, which includes a link to the actual Microsoft Word document from which the above is cited.) |

| |

|The double standards that Oxfam mentions above, and that countless others have highlighted has a huge impact on poor countries, who are pressured to |

|follow liberalization and reducing government “interference” while rich nations are able to subsidize some of their industries. Poor countries therefore |

|have an even tougher time competing. IPS captures this well: |

| |

|“On the one hand, OECD countries such as the US, Germany or France continue through the ECAs [export credit agencies] to subsidise exports with taxpayers'|

|money, often in detriment to the competitiveness of the poorest countries of the world,” says [NGO Environment Defence representative, Aaron] Goldzimmer. |

|“On the other hand, the official development assistance which is one way to support the countries of the South to find a sustainable path to development |

|and progress is being reduced.” |

| |

|... |

| |

|Government subsidies mean considerable cost reduction for major companies and amount to around 10 per cent of annual world trade. In the year 2000, |

|subsidies through ECAs added up to 64 billion dollars of exports from industrialised countries, well above the official development assistance granted |

|last year of 51.4 billion dollars. |

|— Julio Godoy, New Report Reveals Drop in Aid to Developing Countries, Inter Press Service, May 16, 2002 |

| |

|As well as agriculture, textiles and clothing is another mainstay of many poor countries. But, as with agriculture, the wealthier countries have long held|

|up barriers to prevent being out-competed by poorer country products. This has been achieved through things like subsidies and various “agreements”. The |

|impact to the poor has been far-reaching, as Friends of the Earth highlights: |

| |

|Despite the obvious importance of the textile and clothing sectors in terms of development opportunities, the North has consistently and systematically |

|repressed developing country production to protect its own domestic clothing industries. |

| |

|Since the 1970s the textile and clothing trade has been controlled through the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) which sets bilateral quotas between importing|

|and exporting countries. This was supposedly to protect the clothing industries of the industrialised world while they adapted to competition from |

|developing countries. While there are cases where such protection may be warranted, especially for transitionary periods, the MFA has been in place since |

|1974 and has been extended five times. According to Oxfam, the MFA is, |

| |

|“...the most significant..[non tariff barrier to trade]..which has faced the world’s poorest countries for over 20 years”. |

| |

|Although the MFA has been replaced by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) which phases out support over a further ten year period — albeit |

|through a process which in itself is highly inequitable — developing countries are still suffering the consequences. The total cost to developing |

|countries of restrictions on textile imports into the developed world has been estimated to be some $50 billion a year. This is more or less equivalent to|

|the total amount of annual development assistance provided by Northern governments to the Third World. |

|— Clothes, The Citizens' Guide to Trade, Environment and Sustainability, Friends of the Earth International, January 24, 2001 |

| |

|There is often much talk of trade rather than aid, of development, of opening markets etc. But, when at the same time some of the important markets of the|

|US, EU and Japan appear to be no-go areas for the poorer nations, then such talk has been criticized by some as being hollow. The New York Times is worth |

|quoting at length: |

| |

|Our compassion [at the 2002 G8 Summit talking of the desire to help Africa] may be well meant, but it is also hypocritical. The US, Europe and Japan spend|

|$350 billion each year on agricultural subsidies (seven times as much as global aid to poor countries), and this money creates gluts that lower commodity |

|prices and erode the living standard of the world’s poorest people. |

| |

|“These subsidies are crippling Africa’s chance to export its way out of poverty,” said James Wolfensohn, the World Bank president, in a speech last month.|

| |

|Mark Malloch Brown, the head of the United Nations Development Program, estimates that these farm subsidies cost poor countries about $50 billion a year |

|in lost agricultural exports. By coincidence, that’s about the same as the total of rich countries' aid to poor countries, so we take back with our left |

|hand every cent we give with our right. |

| |

|“It’s holding down the prosperity of very poor people in Africa and elsewhere for very narrow, selfish interests of their own,” Mr. Malloch Brown says of |

|the rich world’s agricultural policy. |

| |

|It also seems a tad hypocritical of us to complain about governance in third-world countries when we allow tiny groups of farmers to hijack billion of |

|dollars out of our taxes. |

|— Nicholas D. Kristof, Farm Subsidies That Kill, New York Times, 5 July 2002 |

| |

|In fact, J. Brian Atwood, stepped down in 1999 as head of the US foreign aid agency, USAID. He was very critical of US policies, and vented his |

|frustration that “despite many well-publicized trade missions, we saw virtually no increase of trade with the poorest nations. These nations could not |

|engage in trade because they could not afford to buy anything.” (Quoted from a speech that he delivered to the Overseas Development Council.) |

| |

|As Jean-Bertrand Arisitde also points out, there is also a boomerang effect of loans as large portions of aid money is tied to purchases of goods and |

|trade with the donor: |

| |

|Many in the first world imagine the amount of money spent on aid to developing countries is massive. In fact, it amounts to only .03% of GNP of the |

|industrialized nations. In 1995, the director of the US aid agency defended his agency by testifying to his congress that 84 cents of every dollar of aid |

|goes back into the US economy in goods and services purchased. For every dollar the United States puts into the World Bank, an estimated $2 actually goes |

|into the US economy in goods and services. Meanwhile, in 1995, severely indebted low-income countries paid one billion dollars more in debt and interest |

|to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) than they received from it. For the 46 countries of Subsaharan Africa, foreign debt service was four times their |

|combined governmental health and education budgets in 1996. So, we find that aid does not aid. |

|— Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Eyes of the Heart; Seeking a Path for the Poor in the Age of Globalization, (Common Courage Press, 2000), p. 13 |

| |

|One could add to the above that while aid does not aid the recipient, it aids the donor. For the US here, its aid agency was an aspect of its foreign |

|policy to enhance its interests, successfully. |

| |

|And then there has been the disastrous food aid policies, which is another example of providing aid, but using that aid as an arm of foreign policy |

|objectives. It has helped their corporations and large farmers at a huge cost to developing countries, and has seen an increase in hunger, not reduction. |

|For more details, see the entire section on this site that discusses this, in the Poverty and Food Dumping part of this web site. |

| |

|For the world’s hungry, however, the problem isn’t the stinginess of our aid. When our levels of assistance last boomed, under Ronald Reagan in the |

|mid-1980s, the emphasis was hardly on eliminating hunger. In 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz stated flatly that “our foreign assistance programs |

|are vital to the achievement of our foreign policy goals.” But Shultz’s statement shouldn’t surprise us. Every country’s foreign aid is a tool of foreign |

|policy. Whether that aid benefits the hungry is determined by the motives and goals of that policy — by how a government defines the national interest. |

|— Frances Moore Lappé, Joseph Collins and Peter Rosset, World Hunger: 12 Myths, 2nd Edition, (Grove/Atlantic and Food First Books, Oct. 1998), Chapter |

|10, p.130. |

| |

|The above quote from the book World Hunger is from Chapter 10, which is also reproduced in full on this web site at this link. It also has more facts and |

|stats on US aid and foreign policy objectives, etc. |

| |

|(As an aside, it is interesting to note the disparities between what the world spends on military, compared to other international obligations and |

|commitments. Most wealthy nations spend far more on military than development, for example. The United Nations, which gets its monies from member nations,|

|spends about $10 billion — or about 3% of what just the US alone spends on its military. It is facing a financial crisis as countries such as the US want |

|to reduce their burden of the costs — which comparatively is quite low anyway — and have tried to withhold payments or continued according to various |

|additional conditions.) |

| |

|But, as the quote above highlights as well, as well as the amount of aid, the quality of aid is important. (And the above highlights that the quality has |

|not been good either.) |

|But aid could be beneficial |

| |

|Government aid, from the United States and others, as indicated above can often fall foul of political agendas and interests of donors. At the same time |

|that is not the only aid going to poor countries. The US itself, for example, has a long tradition of encouraging charitable contributions. Indeed, US tax|

|laws are favourable to such giving, compared to say most (or all) of Europe. But private funding, philanthropy and other sources of aid can also fall foul|

|of similar or other agendas, as well as issues of concentration on some areas over others, of accountability, and so on. (More on these aspects is |

|introduced on this site’s NGO and Development section.) |

| |

|Oxfam highlights the importance of trade and aid: |

| |

|Some Northern governments have stressed that “trade not aid” should be the dominant theme at the [March 2002 Monterrey] conference [on Financing for |

|Development]. That approach is disingenuous on two counts. First, rich countries have failed to open their markets to poor countries. Second, increased |

|aid is vital for the world’s poorest countries if they are to grasp the opportunities provided through trade. |

|— Meeting the Challenge of Poverty Reduction, Oxfam, March 2, 2002 |

| |

|In addition to “trade not aid” perspectives, the Bush Administration is also pushing for grants rather than loans from the World Bank. Grants being free |

|money appears to be more welcome, though many European nations aren’t as pleased with this option. Furthermore, some commentators point out that the World|

|Bank, being a Bank, shouldn’t give out grants, which would make it compete with other grant-offering institutions such as various other United Nations |

|bodies. Also, there is concern that it may be easier to impose political conditions to the grants. John Taylor, US Undersecretary of the Treasury, in a |

|recent speech in Washington also pointed out that “Grants are not free. Grants can be easily be tied to measurable performance or results.” Some comment |

|that perhaps grants may lead to more dependencies as well as some nations may agree to even more conditions regardless of the consequences, in order to |

|get the free money. (More about this issue is discussed by the Bretton Woods Project.) |

| |

|In discussing trade policies of the US, and EU, in relation to its effects on poor countries, chief researcher of Oxfam, Kevin Watkins, has been very |

|critical, even charging them with hypocrisy for preaching free trade but practising mercantilism: |

| |

|Looking beyond agriculture, it is difficult to avoid being struck by the discrepancy between the picture of US trade policy painted by [US Trade |

|Representative, Robert] Zoellick and the realities facing developing countries. |

| |

|To take one example, much has been made of America’s generosity towards Africa under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This provides what, on |

|the surface, looks like free market access for a range of textile, garment and footwear products. Scratch the surface and you get a different picture. |

|Under AGOA’s so-called rules-of-origin provisions, the yarn and fabric used to make apparel exports must be made either in the United States or an |

|eligible African country. If they are made in Africa, there is a ceiling of 1.5 per cent on the share of the US market that the products in question can |

|account for. Moreover, the AGOA’s coverage is less than comprehensive. There are some 900 tariff lines not covered, for which average tariffs exceed 11%. |

| |

|According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the benefits accruing to Africa from the AGOA would be some $420m, or five times, greater if the US |

|removed the rules-of-origin restrictions. But these restrictions reflect the realities of mercantilist trade policy. The underlying principle is that you |

|can export to America, provided that the export in question uses American products rather than those of competitors. For a country supposedly leading a |

|crusade for open, non-discriminatory global markets, it’s a curiously anachronistic approach to trade policy. |

|— Kevin Watkins, Trade hypocrisy: the problem with Robert Zoellick, Open Democracy, December 12, 2002 |

| |

|Watkins lists a number of other areas, besides the AGOA that are beset with problems of hypocrisy, and concludes that “nihilism and blind pursuit of US |

|economic and corporate special interest represents an obstacle to the creation of an international trading system capable of extending the benefits of |

|globalisation to the world’s poor.” (See also this site’s section on free trade and globalization, where there is more criticism about northern countries |

|exhibiting mercantilist, or monopoly capitalist principles, rather than free market capitalism, even though that is what is preached to the rest of the |

|world.) |

| |

|In that context then, and given the problems mentioned further above about agricultural and textiles/clothing subsidies, etc. the current amount of aid |

|given to poor countries doesn’t compare to “aid” given to wealthier countries' corporations and industries and hardly compensates for what is lost. |

| |

|Both increasing and restructuring aid to truly provide developing countries the tools and means to develop for themselves, for example, would help |

|recipients of aid, not just the donors. Aid is more than just charity and cannot be separated from other issues of politics and economics, which must also|

|be considered. |

| |

|The United Nations notes that effectiveness of aid to poor countries requires a focus on economic infrastructure. Furthermore, to aid development |

|requires, for example: |

|• Targeted investment |

|• Productive development strategies to attract currency and sustaining economic growth. |

|• For least developed countries (LDCs) to minimize their disadvantages — such as the small size of their economies — regional integration would help. |

| |

|Countries giving aid could help by providing: |

|• Greater investment |

|• Greater debt relief |

|• Actually practise free and fair trade |

| |

| |

|“Trade not Aid” sounds like decent decent rhetoric. As the economist Amartya Sen for example says, a lot that can be done at a relatively little cost. |

|Unfortunately, so far, it seems that rhetoric is mostly what it has turned out to be. |

| |

|In addition, as J.W. Smith further qualifies, rather than giving money that can be squandered away, perhaps the best form of aid would be industry, |

|directly: |

| |

|Do Not Give the Needy Money: Build Them Industries Instead |

| |

|With the record of corruption within impoverished countries, people will question giving them money. That can be handled by giving them the industry |

|directly, not the money. To build a balanced economy, provide consumer buying power, and develop arteries of commerce that will absorb the production of |

|these industries, contractors and labor in those countries should be used. Legitimacy and security of contracts is the basis of any sound economy. |

|Engineers know what those costs should be and, if cost overruns start coming in, the contractor who has proven incapable should be replaced-just as any |

|good contract would require.... When provided the industry, as opposed to the money to build industry, those people will have physical capital. The only |

|profits to be made then are in production; there is no development money to intercept and send to a Swiss bank account. |

|— J.W. Smith, Economic Democracy; The Political Struggle for the 21st Century, Second Edition, (1st Books, 2002), pp. 300-301 (also available in full |

|online) |

| |

|Whether any of this will actually turn into reality is harder to know, because of power politics, which has characterized and shaped the world for |

|centuries. |

Text #7 Universal Flour Fortification (UFF) Initiative

Text #8 Sustainable development in DURBAN

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[1] World Summit on sustainable Development (Johannesburg) (2002)

[2] John Dumbrell. The Making of US Foreign Policy. Manchester University Press. 1990. 1997. Manchester, G.B., 4-5.

[3] Document remis aux participants. Voir le site pour accéder à la documentation publique.

[4] couverture médicale universelle

[5] .

[6] World Summit on sustainable Development (Johannesburg) (2002)

another killer: agricultural trade subsidies in the U.S. and Europe. Last year's U.S. farm bill, for example, added some $83 billion in new subsidies for rich U.S. farmers, whose exports already undercut developing country farmers who produce rice, maize, and other food crops. Such subsidies also undercut African exports. In a report last fall, for example, Oxfam calculated that U.S. cotton farmers received subsidies of $3.9 billion. Oxfam estimated the damage to African cotton producers from these subsidies at about $300 million a year.

[7]

In mid-December, in the midst of the controversy over racist remarks by Senator Trent Lott, Bush administration officials intimated that a presidential trip to Africa in January would demonstrate the U.S. president's sensitivity to African American concerns. If President George W. Bush had followed through on his plan to visit five African countries, Africans would have posed hard questions: Is your policy "just another trip"? Or are you willing to commit real resources to responding to the deadly threat of AIDS, and to other urgent African priorities?

An answer of a sort came just before Christmas, when a White House press release curtly announced that the trip was being postponed. Later Secretary of State Colin Powell also called off plans to fill in for President Bush at the U.S.-Africa consultation being held in Mauritius this week. Heading the U.S. delegation instead will be U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, who will tout the benefits to Africa of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (which mandated this second consultation), and pitch other U.S. policies for promoting free trade.

Both the reduced U.S. presence in Mauritius and the exclusive focus on trade accurately reflect the realities of current U.S. Africa policy. Washington policymakers are offering band-aids for the continent's gaping wounds, while pushing policies that add to the damage and deprive Africans of resources to fight back. This is evident in the U.S. willingness to use Africa as a military staging ground for war in the Middle East, while ignoring Africans' concerns for their own security.

It shows up as well in the stingy U.S. contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, amounting to only a tiny fraction of the $ 3.5 billion a year that would be the fair U.S. contribution. Meanwhile, the administration proposes handing over some $36 billion a year to rich investors by abolishing the tax on dividends. Last week UN Special Representative Stephen Lewis called rich countries' failure to respond to the AIDS pandemic "mass murder by complacency."

The administration brushes off findings that current "debt relief" programs leave desperately poor countries paying more to foreign creditors than they spend on the health needs of their people. And Bush refuses to act positively on global issues from women's reproductive rights to global warming, where the penalty for failure falls most heavily on Africa.

Bush's balance sheet is also deeply in the red even in the realm for which the U.S. claims most credit: trade policy. It is true that AGOA has opened some additional opportunities for textile exports from African countries. But the benefits from this are estimated at only about $100 million to $140 million a year, and only go to a few countries. An International Monetary Fund study estimates that these benefits could have been five times greater if the U.S. had not imposed extremely restrictive rules of origin for the materials used in exported textiles. Meanwhile, African exports to the U.S. continue to be dominated by oil.

In December Washington stood alone to block a World Trade Organization agreement to allow export of generic medicines from one developing country to another. African and other developing countries were outraged. The New York Times commented that Washington's position was "so obviously influenced by the drug companies that America is alienating nations whose support it needs on other trade issues."

As African countries face the combined impact of famine and AIDS, they also see their agriculture devastated by current business-as-usual policy. When and if President Bush does visit Africa, he may seek to avoid answering the question of whether he values African lives. Two years into his administration, the policy record leaves little doubt that the answer is "no."

(William Minter is a senior research fellow at Africa Action, the oldest U.S.-based advocacy group on African affairs. This commentary was originally published in Le Mauricien (), January 15, 2003.)

[8] World Summit on sustainable Development (Johannesburg) (2002)

[9] Dr Debra Roberts is a biologist specializing in urban open-space design and the development of urban environmental management systems. She currently holds the post of environmental manager in the eThekwini Municipality (Durban) and has managed Durban’s Local Agenda 21 programme since its inception in 1994.

Nicci Diederichs is a selfemployed environmental consultant with a background in urban environmental management, now specializing in environmental design. She was employed in the Environmental Management Branch during Phases 2 and 3 of Durban’s Local Agenda 21 programme. The authors can be contacted at:

eThekwini

Municipality, Development

Planning Department,

PO Box 680, Durban 4000,

South Africa; e-mail:

robertsd@cesu.durban.

gov.za or niccid@sai.co.za

[10] 1. Apartheid policies created a society divided along racial lines and exacerbated the economic gulf between the wealthy, advantaged minority and the poor, disadvantaged majority.

[11] 2. Terrestrial resources, atmospheric resources, freshwater resources, marine resources, urban form, housing, transport, water supply and sanitation, waste, energy, economy, education, health, violence and peace, governance, city finances and the legal framework.

[12] 3. Schedule 2 of the Local

Government Transition Act

[No 209 of 1993].

[13] 4. The CEROI project was conceived and coordinated internationally by UNEP/GRID-Arendal (United Nations Environment Programme/Global Resources Information Database) in partnership with the ICLEI Cities 21 campaign.

[14] 5. This was largely due to the high workloads, poor salaries and limited opportunities for advancement in the underresourced Environmental Management Branch.

[15] 6. Recommendations for final restructuring in the new Unicity council were also made but it was acknowledged that these would be addressed only in the medium to long term. The interim restructuring was a short-term measure to address immediate capacity shortages in the environmental function.

[16] 7. Now known as the eThekwini Municipality.

[17] 8. See: csi/pub/info/wise10.htm

[18] disette

[19] frêne (ash) et le charme (hornbeam)

[20] Professor John Tomlinson - Director: ICAn; Professor of Cultural Sociology

Tel: +44 (0)115 848 6320 - Email John Tomlinson

John Tomlinson is head of research in Communications, Media and Cultural Studies and Director designate of NICA. His books include Cultural Imperialism (Pinter, 1991) and Globalization and Culture (Polity Press, 1999) both of which have been extensively translated ( 8 languages). He has published on issues of globalization, cosmopolitanism, modernity, media and culture across a range of disciplines from sociology, communications and cultural studies to geography, urban studies and development studies, and has lectured extensively in Europe, Latin America, Asia and North America. He is currently researching into the impact of cultural globalization in China and writing a book on the implications of speed and tempo in modern cultures.

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colonialism

ecofeminism

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