John A - Weebly



Stephen Sumner

Professor Ahmad Kamal

New York University – Wagner School of Public Service

April 20, 2009

NYU – G – SRS – Final Paper

Digital Media and Technology as a force in The Developing world

Thesis

Digital information exchange is challenging traditional state governance institutions and creating a new way of influencing national policy decision-making, including in developing and/or transitional nations.

Facts

Information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as the Internet, real-time TV, mobile communications, e-mail etc., are becoming more prevalent in developing countries and have been a major part of life in North America, Western Europe and parts of Asia.

The Internet and mobile phones permit a rapid exchange of information that can be utilized to organize people, engage in advocacy and report news.

The Internet has become a controversial medium in some non-democratic countries such as Iran and China, as some of its content has been deemed inappropriate for its citizens and is monitored and censored.[1] The Internet can be easily monitored.

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other advocacy organizations within and outside of developing countries are using ICTs to influence policy decision-making and agenda.

“By the end of 2007, almost one out of two people had a mobile phone… More than one out of 4 African and one out of 3 Asian have a mobile phone”[2]

Web 2.0 technologies such as blogs and social networking sites are just beginning to be used in developing nations.

ANALYSIS

Based on the above facts, one can arrive at the following possible opinions:

Introduction

There is ample evidence that supports the idea that ICTs, the source of digital media exchange, have had an impact on policy agenda in developing countries. It is argued that over the course of the past ten to fifteen years, there has been a shift in how governments understand their role in policy decision-making due to this new force.

An article by Tiffany Danitz and Warren Strobel about Internet advocacy and Burma examines this argument and concludes that “it is [also] reasonably well-established that new communication technologies, including the 15-year-old revolution in real-time television, have given new powers to non-state actors, challenging officials’ primacy in international and internal affairs.”[3] Non-state actors such as NGOs, or even individuals now present a strong force on the world stage as potential activist networks.

As a result, there has been some protectionist backlash to ICTs among states that seek to control the flow of information, especially information that is political in nature. Examples that will be discussed are states such as China, which maintains a tight grip on the Internet and other forms of media.

In addition, there are many positives and potential dangers with the deployment of ICTs across borders. There has been some advocacy success when using digital media, however there are warning signs that is can be used to the detriment of the public.

Also, there is evidence that although there has been a rise in ICTs across the world, they have been unequally distributed, with developing nations having limited access to their power. As a result there is a divide between those with access to the Internet and mobile communications and those without. The contrast in this setting describes a world where access to electricity, hardware, software or training is very important in order to operate the machinery of political change in developing countries.

For a closer look at these developments, this paper will examine Myanmar (Burma), Malaysia, Ukraine, Kenya and China as four countries with different experiences with ICTs and their impact on policy decision-making in these regions.

Myanmar (Burma)

Burma has one of the most tightly controlled media in the entire world. According to its Printers and Publishers Registration Law of 1962, media such as periodicals, films, books and songs are subject to submission to the Press Scrutiny Board (PSB) for censorship. The board has strict standards as to the type of material that is allowed to be consumed by the public. Also, the amount of words and circulation is decided by the board. Often, manuscripts and periodicals appear with silver ink covering the names of people or concepts deemed inappropriate.[4] As a result, at one point in time much of the world did not know about the political situation in Burma because this flow of information was managed so closely.

Due to the Internet, during the mid-1990s, Burma’s isolation emerged from darkness. Access to cyberspace offered a new way for people outside of Burma to mobilize and communicate about the state’s political affairs. Viola Krebs refers to this as “cyber empowerment”[5] in a piece about the rise of the Internet and its influence on the state of Burma. One point of the article is that the Internet generated pressure on the state to change its policies or influence the actions of companies that were investing in Burma. For example, published two lists; one listing the companies that were still investing in the country, and the others who had pulled out.

This is just one example of the several campaigns that were driven by the Internet during the 1990s, which at the very least, educated activists and their networks about the political struggle in Burma. However, it is argued that many campaigns that are rooted in online grassroots activism, including a boycott of PepsiCo at Harvard, the beginning of the websites such as and influence of selective purchasing legislation from Massachussetts[6], has had a clear impact on public affairs in the US, as well as Burma.

was the original activist website that was founded by Daniel Steele, a student in Thailand. He basically disseminated full articles about events in Burma on the Internet from neighboring Thailand, the only place that was publishing news about human rights violations in Burma. The site realized success through the late nineties, growing rapidly, going from 30 to 400 subscribers over the course of one year. The target user group was the Burmese exile community that fled Burma after the events of 1962 and who were determined to end the dictatorial State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In addition, later on there were moves to integrate news from the source, working with pro-democracy advocates within the state of Burma. By using encrypted technologies and other means of transporting news, BurmaNet was able to produce news based on sources from within the country.[7]

The PepsiCo boycott at Harvard also did much to mobilize and organize individuals using the Internet in advocacy efforts supporting the Burmese cause. Since all students at the university had access to the Internet and email, it was easy for activists to build a network and rally groups of people to influence student government, and other matters including the selective purchasing legislation from Massachusetts. This legislation was the precursor to laws that banned American business in Burma.

The impact of the Internet is two-fold here; in one way, there is an internal struggle within governments to attempt to maintain its control while information continues to proliferate on the Web. And, the other is the impact that new campaigns are having on business as companies realize the PR sensitivities about investing in a state with questionable human rights policies. So in this example we understand the Internet to have real effective change from NGOs or other activists working outside of the country.

The culmination of this activism is noted in President Clinton’s backed federal legislation banning any new investment by US companies in Burma in April 1997.[8] So it can be argued that due to the political movement through the new Internet medium, activists were able to change US national policy towards Burma.

Additionally it is important to note the role of the famous opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi as she was one of the only players to have been able to stand up to the government internally. This had an impact politically as international newspapers showcased her bravery and exerted further pressure on the government on the international stage.[9]

Saffron Revolution

More recently, there is another example of how the Burmese state has been challenged by the media and the Internet as well as other communications devices. In response to an uprising that originated from the end of subsidies to oil in the country, the people and Burmese monks protested. The government took swift action against protestors and tortured monks who were engaged in peaceful protest.[10]

As a result, new web-based technologies such as online video and blogs enabled activists and pro-democracy citizens to communicate the tragedy of the government’s violence against protestors. The news permeated the Web and traveled to Western mainstream news outlets, reaching millions.[11] As a result the state shut down the Internet on September 29 after the protests to end the threat of rising international outrage to the state.

Limits of the Internet’s Impact on the State

Although there is evidence that the evolution of cyber-activism and empowerment can have a substantial impact political action and ultimately policy, affecting change within regimes is difficult. In Burma, the bulk of the activity against the regime remains from outside of the country. Although the picture of repression is becoming clearer to the rest of the world, the state has taken steps to use the Internet for propaganda purposes. They have set up websites such as and myanmar- that project a positive image of the country.

Also, it’s unclear whether or not the protests did have an impact on policy decision making, other than exerting pressure on the regime. It may be chipping away at the strength and legitimacy of the state, however there is no evidence to suggest that it is influencing policy beyond the Internet. We know for sure that public opinion and political discourse is surely becoming a more visible issue among exiles and Westerners, and will continue to have an impact on propaganda, as well as peaceful protesting.

China

Dubbed the ‘Great Firewall of China’, the country’s approach the Internet has sparked outrage and controversy among global human rights advocates. To combat the flow of free information to its people, China has undertaken a massive and sophisticated program to monitor the Internet.

According to a summary of the program by Robert McMahon of the Council on Foreign Relations, there are twelve agencies that enforce regulations. This includes the policing of cyber cafés, as well as “government-run computers”.[12] In addition, “China’s Ministry of Public Security reportedly employs tens of thousands of human monitors to screen Internet content. The ministry has also established a system of online reporting centers that encourage citizens to report “harmful” information ranging from sites displaying pornography to banned political activities. Forbidden items include sites giving information on the Falun Gong spiritual movement or the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.”[13] China is said to have censored out 400 to 500 keywords, which are avoided by publishers.[14]

China’s approach to the Internet is a key example of the way in which governments are reacting to its openness through protectionism. However, the Chinese are taking things a step further by monitoring closely the Internet’s usage and trying to “police” the Web. The state has wielded tremendous authority in order to combat potential politically sensitive material, and in the process has systematically repressed the people.

Ukraine

The 2004 “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine pitted the government-backed Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych against challenger and leader of the opposition party, Our Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko in a special election that took place in December of that year. The election occurred after rampant, widespread voter fraud was alleged by the people, with demonstrations taking place directly after the election. After six days of protest the Ukrainian parliament recommended to the Supreme Court that a re-run take place[15] and the court later ruled in its favor.

The roots of this revolution begin during the general election and feature the Internet and SMS text messaging as the digital tools that helped pave the way for Yushchenko’s victory. It could be said that these tools help to channel the will of the people. The Orange Revolution was fueled by pro-democracy advocates that used alternatives to government-run media to organize campaigns, mobilize volunteers, raise money and report unbiased, or non-governmentally controlled news.

Joshua Goldstein’s (The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University) work on the influence of new media on the election is a good basis to understand the use of the new media technologies. His case study covers the broad underpinnings of the revolution including popular websites, the rise of Channel 5, the only independent television station in Ukraine, and the use of mobile phones to communicate breaking news virally to important influencers, or opinion leaders.[16]

According to Goldstein, there were two main ways that digital tools were used to spark the revolution in Ukraine – through citizen journalism, or activism on the blogosphere, as well as SMS mobile phone technology by political activists. In the end, pro-democracy activists used the convergence of mobile phones and the Internet to their advantage better than the pro-government institutions that existed in late-2004.[17]

Pravda, Obozrevatel and ProUA are some of the major alternative online news sites that challenged the government influenced television stations that controlled much of the media environment. These sites were considered a “hybrid” of citizen and professional journalism that was usually committed to changing political discourse in Ukraine. Citizens also took part in communicating satire or jokes across the Internet and through mobile phones that continued to raise awareness about the issues, but did so in a humorous way. This even included video games about events that took place on the campaign trail.[18]

A good example of the mobile network that aided the revolution, was Pora (meaning “It’s Time”), which developed political networks in Ukraine, “including 150 mobile groups responsible for spreading information and coordinating election monitoring, with 72 regional centers and over 30,000 registered participants.”[19] The website also served as a home base for activists trying to gather news about events and the election. The mobile network could be used to quickly spread information to key influencers about what was going on in the election and where people were organizing for events. Pora works with mainly the liberal groups in Ukraine and therefore had a lot of clout among the youth who were particularly active in this election.

Goldstein concludes that the turn to digital media techniques helped make the activists’ jobs easier. And that without the Internet and digital media exchange, the revolution may not have happened in the way that it did, and may not have been successful. In this way, there is a clear case that the state, or the regime in place prior to the Yushenko winning, was directly impacted by new digital media techniques. Goldstein makes the point that it was the activists themselves that made these tools work. The ultimate result was that the national agenda changed with the election of Yushenko.

Malaysia

In 2008, Malaysia elections represented a seismic shift in not only the elected officials that took over government positions in the country, but the way the political process is conducted. Over the course of the campaign, supporters of Anwar Ibrahim's opposition party ticket communicated heavily on the Internet through blogs, and mobile devices to exchange and disseminate information about the party’s candidacy. These sources of information outpaced the ruling Barisan National (BN) party, which had been in power since 1957. The BN relied on older means, such as the government-controlled media to communicate its message. But this mechanism for political control no longer worked, and hearts and minds of the people were swayed by the blogosphere and other forms of free-press. As a result, the incumbent BN coalition lost and the opposition won a two-third majority in parliament.

“The use of blogs, text messages and copies of Internet-streamed videos became the most influential information sources for voters ahead of Malaysia’s March 8 (2008) parliamentary elections and resulted in a surprise blow to the Barisan National (BN) party” observed Stephen Kaufman from .[20]

In further support of the idea that the rise of the Internet in Malaysia contributed to the opposition party’s victory, “according to the government's multimedia regulator, 3.9m of the country's 28m people have dial-up Internet subscriptions and 1.2m broadband. Some 60% of the population, it reckons, use the Internet. Even if that is an overestimate, the limitations of the mainstream media are enough to drive politics online.”[21]

However, as the state was not very tech-savvy, there were other reactions to protests that took place during November, 2007. According to the “Internet and Democracy Blog,” by Victoria Stodden, a fellow with the Internet and Democracy Project at the Berkman Center at Harvard Law School, 40,000 people are reported to have marched in Kuala Lumpur to demand electoral reform. In reaction, the government blocked the country’s top blogs and news websites, including Malaysia Today during the afternoon of the protests. This was an effort to temper the effects of the news day on the voting public to maintain control of a story that could have had an impact on the spring elections. Malaysiakini, one of the most popular websites in the country was not available during much of the day.[22]

It is unclear whether or not the protests had a direct impact on the outcome of the election; however it is apparent that there was a movement to change the electoral politics of the time and the Internet played an important role. This does illustrate the impact of the Internet and news media on the state, as the reaction is another example of how the government aimed to control the story and neutralize an aggressive protest.

Access to ICTs in Developing Nations and the Rise of Mobile Communications

The access to ICTs among developing nations is lower than in developed nations. The vast majority of the Internet and other mobile phone communications are taking place among advanced economies of the world. According to the Internet Telecommunications Union, an example of the disparity in Internet usage between LDCs and developed nations shows an enormous digital divide. There is only 5.6% penetration in Africa versus 74.4% in North America (in terms of the continent’s entire population).[23]

Charles Kenny, a Senior Economist at the World Bank, has noted that as an indication of the relative limits to the IT infrastructure in the developing world that support the Internet and other digital forms of communication the developing world’s share of secure servers is only at about 3% of the global total (World Bank, 2005).[24] This is among continued “concerns about the extent and quality of backbones [infrastructure] as well”.[25]

Additionally, there are obvious obstacles to building networked and digital technologies such as poor infrastructure, which includes limited electricity and software in some countries. There are also limits to training, which makes the idea of political movements on a wide scale a difficult task. Without access to these important elements, it will be difficult to develop the Internet into a formidable force in parts of the developing world.

It is important to note that there are obvious differences in many developing countries, which includes technological potential. As we’ve seen from many of the case studies, the level of income and access to technology would be different in Burma versus a more transitional nation such as Ukraine. But, there have been strides made in the development of mobile technology in the developing world that has had an impact on development and given potential to influence policy and the state.

Susan Schorr, the head of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)'s Regulatory and Market Environment Division told Internet Evolution Magazine that “or the developing world, the Internet experience is going to be a wireless experience.” She noted that 61 percent of the world's 2.7 billion mobile phone users are in developing countries, compared to 10 percent of the world’s 1 billion Internet users.[26]

Charles Kenny from the World Bank supports this, explaining that “private operators in developing countries have used innovative business models to extend profitable access to low-income users. By 2003, there were more prepaid than postpaid mobile subscribers worldwide, again with the developing world leading the way. Africa was the region with the largest percentage of prepaid customers, accounting for nearly 90% of subscribers.”[27]

The use of mobile phones in Kenya after the recent election crisis is an example of both new participation by civil society and a mechanism for ethnic-based mob violence within the country. In response to a disputed outcome of the election, the mobile phone became the communication device that spread information rapidly, and virally. However there are dangers to the use of mobile technology as “mobile phones made hateful and violent messages easier and cheaper… On January 1, 2008, Kenyans started to receive frightening text messages that urged readers to express their frustrations with the election outcome by attacking other ethnic groups.”[28] In response, two technologists created Ushahidi, a mashup technology that brings together two Internet applications, Google Maps and a reporting tool, which helped to report incidents of violence on the Internet or the mobile Web. This technology was used with some success by civic-minded Kenyans to quell violence in the region, and promote political stability.[29]

The use of mobile technology can directly influence the political apparatus of the state with some unforeseen consequences such as violence, but also positive civic engagement in developing countries as discussed in the case of Kenya.

Conclusion

Digital media exchange has had a serious impact on developing nations. We’ve seen two clear examples where the use of digital media tools has contributed to the significant change in policy direction based on our case studies of Ukraine and Malaysia. In other examples we understand that there has been a significant impact of ICTs on the state and its use of Internet and media policies, however there is no evidence to suggest that it has changed the political direction of the country.

For our purposes here, it is clear that digital media exchange and ICTs are a strong force, which is having an unquestionable impact on state governance. Cyber-activism and empowerment are becoming factors among non-state actors to affect change within and outside of countries. However, Ethan Zuckerman, co-founder of Global Voices and a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, makes an interesting point that “Cyber activism inside a country can work if there is not a high degree of fear…”[30] This fits well with out cases on Ukraine and Malaysia, where fear of the government did not appear to be as high as in Burma or China.

Finally, as we’ve seen with the example of Kenya, ICTs and digital media exchange should not be romanticized. They can serve a positive purpose; however there are also dangers to their existence, as noted with the sophisticated monitoring tactics in China. Although mobile phones are becoming much more common in Africa, there is still the potential for campaigns to promote violence or hate speech in times of crisis.

Bibliography

Daniel Drezner, “Weighing the Scales: The Internet's Effect on State-Society Relations”

The International Telecommunications Union,

Mridul Chowdhury, “The Role of the Internet in Burma’s Saffron Revolution” The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University



Nicole Ferraro, “The Internet and the Developing World,” The Internet Evolution ; Jan 24, 2008

Charles Kenny and Mohsen Khalil, “The Next Decade of ICT Development: Access, Applications, and the Forces of Convergence,” World Bank 2005

Joshua Goldstein and Juliana Rotisch, “Digitally Networked Technology in Kenya’s Post-election Crisis,” The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University

Stephen Kaufman, “Malaysia’s Alternative Media Become Decisive Political Factor,” (U.S. State Department Website)

“The Internet and Malaysian Politics,” The Economist, March 13, 2008

The Internet and Democracy Project, The Berkman Center at Harvard University -

International Telecommunications Union, World Statistics March, 2009 -

Charles Kenny and Mohsen Khalil, “The Next Decade of ICT Development: Access, Applications, and the Forces of Convergence,” World Bank 2005

By Paul Quin-Jedge and Yuri Zarakhovich, “The Orange Revolution,” Time, Nov. 6, 2004

Joshua Goldstein, “The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution,” Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University

Paul Quin-Jedge and Yuri Zarakhovich, “The Orange Revolution,” Time, Nov. 6, 2004

Tiffany Danitz and Warren P.Strobel, “Networking Dissent Cyber-Activists Use the Internet to Promote Democracy in Burma,” pg 139

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[1] Daniel Drezner, “Weighing the Scales: The Internet's Effect on State-Society Relations,” pg 5

[2] The International Telecommunications Union,

[3] Tiffany Danitz and Warren P.Strobel, “Networking Dissent Cyber-Activists Use the Internet to Promote Democracy in Burma”

[4] Viola Krebs, “The Impact of the Internet of Myanmar” -

[5] Ibid.

[6] Tiffany Danitz and Warren P.Strobel, “Networking Dissent Cyber-Activists Use the Internet to Promote Democracy in Burma,” pg 139

[7] Tiffany Danitz and Warren P.Strobel, “Networking Dissent Cyber-Activists Use the Internet to Promote Democracy in Burma,” pg 136 - 137

[8] Ibid.

[9] Viola Krebs, “The Impact of the Internet of Myanmar”

[10] Mridul Chowdhury, “The Role of the Internet in Burma’s Saffron Revolution” The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University



[11]Ibid.

[12] Robert McMahon, “U.S. Internet Providers and the ‘Great Firewall of China’, Author: , Deputy Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, February 15, 2008 -

[13] Ibid.

[14] “Reporters without Borders” Report, Oct 2007 -

[15] By Paul Quin-Jedge and Yuri Zarakhovich, “The Orange Revolution,” Time, Nov. 6, 2004

[16] Joshua Goldstein, “The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution,” Berkman Center

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid

[20] Stephen Kaufman, “Malaysia’s Alternative Media Become Decisive Political Factor,” (U.S. State Department Website)

[21] “The Internet and Malaysian Politics,” The Economist, March 13, 2008

[22] The Internet and Democracy Project, The Berkman Center at Harvard University -

[23] International Telecommunications Union, World Statistics March, 2009 -

[24] Charles Kenny and Mohsen Khalil, “The Next Decade of ICT Development: Access, Applications, and the Forces of Convergence,” World Bank 2005

[25] Ibid.

[26]Nicole Ferraro, “The Internet and the Developing World,” The Internet Evolution ; Jan 24, 2008

[27] Charles Kenny and Mohsen Khalil, “The Next Decade of ICT Development: Access, Applications, and the Forces of Convergence,” World Bank 2005

[28] Joshua Goldstein and Juliana Rotisch, “Digitally Networked Technology in Kenya’s Post-election Crisis,” The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University

[29] Ibid.

[30] Mridul Chowdhury, “The Role of the Internet in Burma’s Saffron Revolution” The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University



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