IB European History



IB European History

Mr. Mehlbach

Synopsis for Massie’s Dreadnought-Chapter 33, The Naval Scare of 1909,

Chapter 43 Naval Estimates and a Naval Holiday, Chapter 44 The Anchors Held…

Prior to 1900, the German merchant navy, the second largest in the world, used British ports, used British coaling stations, and depended on the Royal Navy for protection around the world. German naval officers all spoke fluent English, had grown up on English ships, burning English coal, and studied British tactics. Nelson was the hero of both navies. British and German naval officers truly looked at each other as a band of brothers. Thus one choice for Imperial Germany after William came to power in 1888 was to build on this already strong relationship, reinforce and solidify it, looking to the day when Her Majesty’s Government and Imperial Germany might act in Europe in brotherly partnership, perhaps even an alliance.

In 1897 the appointment of Bernhard von Bülow as Imperial Chancellor and Alfred Tirpitz as admiral of the German navy signaled that the opposite choice had been made. Bülow was the architect of the German foreign policy of Weltmacht (world power), arguing that Germany must become a world power by establishing colonies in Africa and Asia, making Anglo-German confrontation all but inevitable. Bülow’s policy of Weltmacht was the polar opposite of Bismarck’s policy of colonial restraint, for Bismarck fundamentally understood that the pursuit of German colonies in Africa would eventually lead to military confrontation.

Tirpitz argued that geography dictated confrontation between the United Kingdom and Imperial Germany. German merchant ships leaving the Baltic or the North Sea harbors of Hamburg or Bremen, could only reach the Atlantic and other oceans of the world by steaming through the English Channel or around the coast of Scotland. A German navy strong enough to protect German merchant shipping in these waters and to guarantee unimpeded passage to the oceans meant in the last resort, a German fleet able to defeat the Royal Navy. Thus Bülow’s policy of Weltmacht and the Kaiser’s childish whim to “have a fleet of my own,” fed by Tirpitz’s obsession to build a German navy, were wholly incompatible with British security interests around the world.

On 15 June 1897, only nine days after taking office, Tirpitz presented the Kaiser a 2500 word “memorandum” stamped “Very Secret,” and entitled, “General Considerations on the Constitution of the German Fleet According to Ship Classes and Designs.” The opening sentences, clearly and logically unrelenting, fell like hammer blows on Anglo-German relations. “For Germany, the most powerful naval enemy at this time is the United Kingdom. A German fleet must be constructed to inflict severe damage on the British navy between the island of Heligoland in the North Sea and the Thames River. Only naval warfare in the North Sea will be effective. Commerce raiding through cruiser warfare to destroy English commercial shipping is hopeless because the shortage of bases and coaling stations on our side and the great number of coaling stations and bases on the British side. Thus the theater of naval operations must be the North Sea.”

In 1900, spurred on by the lessons of the January Cheese Incident that same year, the Reichstag voted for funding for the Second Navy Law. The Second Navy Law increased the future German battle fleet from nineteen to thirty-eight battleships. The building program covered seventeen years, 1901-1917; the fleet would reach full strength in 1920, when the last of the authorized ships were commissioned. Although the words “England” and “Great Britain” never appeared in its text, the preamble to the Second Navy Law was studded with references to “a great naval power,” “a substantially superior sea power,” “an enemy who is more powerful at sea than on land,” and most tellingly, “the greatest naval power in the world.”

Tirpitz argued that it was not absolutely necessary that the German battle fleet be as large as the Royal Navy’s. In what Tirpitz called Risk Theory a smaller, concentrated German fleet would have a chance of victory in the North Sea, since the Royal Navy was scattered around the entire world. By fighting the German navy in the North Sea, the United Kingdom would suffer such catastrophic losses that she would then be at the mercy of her two blood enemies, France and Imperial Russia. According to Tirpitz’s unrelenting calculations and cold, unemotional logic the United Kingdom would thus not risk war with Imperial Germany in the North Sea. The element of risk, paradoxically, was not just directed wholly at the United Kingdom. Tirpitz was haunted by Nelson’s preemptive strike in 1801 against Denmark. Fearing France might acquire the neutral Danish Navy, Nelson led a British battle squadron into Copenhagen harbor and destroyed every ship in sight. All of this was set in motion without a British declaration of war. Risk Theory also contained the threat of the Royal Navy destroying German fleet construction preemptively. Thus as the risk of a German navy rose for England, the risk to Germany also increased. Tirpitz understood and accepted this. He calculated the period of time through which Germany must pass before she was too strong for the United Kingdom to attack. He called this period the Danger Zone and, in 1900, he fixed it at 1904 or 1905. By 1909, Tirpitz was forced to admit that Germany would not be out of the Danger Zone until 1915.

In October 1902 British Naval Intelligence, M-60, wrote an intelligence briefing for the British Cabinet: “The German Navy was being constructed with the only purpose of fighting the Royal Navy: restricted cruising radius of their battleships, small coal bunkers below decks and severely cramped crew quarters meant that German battleships were not designed to protect German merchant shipping worldwide, but instead, to fight the Royal Navy in the North Sea.”

After analyzing the cataclysmic defeat of the Russian navy at the battle of Tsushima on 27 May 1905, the United Kingdom decided to revolutionize naval warfare and to build the HMS Dreadnought. The purposes of the dreadnought class battleship were to maximize the two governing principles of naval warfare, guns and speed. The United Kingdom would build a weapon system so fast and so lethal that the naval power balance would forever swing to her favor. The HMS Dreadnought revolutionized naval power. Her entry into service in 1906 represented such a marked advance in naval technology.

In 1909 M-60 came to another frightening conclusion. Seven shipyards in Germany were capable of building dreadnought class battleships. These shipyards were Wilhelmshaven Dockyard in Wilhelmshaven, Weser Works in Bremen, Vulcan Works in Stettin, Blohm-Voss in Hamburg, Schichau Works in Danzig Germania Works in Kiel, and Howaldt’s Works also in Kiel. Additionally, M-60 received reports from foreign observers touring the huge Krupp steel works in Essen, of row after row of massive twelve-inch naval guns awaiting delivery. Though the Reichstag had passed the Naval Laws of 1908 authorizing the construction of only 4 dreadnought class battleships for 1908-1909, M-60 was convinced of a secret German building program. On 3 January 1909 the First Sea Lord of the English Admiralty, Lord McKenna, presented his analysis to the English Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith:

1. Imperial Germany was secretly preparing for a massive ship building program.

2. Imperial Germany was secretly building dreadnought class battleships.

3. Imperial Germany would have 13 dreadnought class battleships in her High Seas Fleet by 1911.

4. Imperial Germany would have 21 dreadnought class battleships in her High Seas Fleet by 1912.

5. Imperial Germany’s capacity to build dreadnought class battleships was equal to that of the United Kingdom.

The English press printed McKenna’s naval estimates of 1909 and Parliament demanded the immediate construction of eight more dreadnought class battleships. “We Want Eight and We Won’t Wait!” became the battle cry of the nation. The English government became obsessed with the numbers: if both Imperial Germany and the United Kingdom built four new ships in 1909 and these ships were ready for deployment by 1912, Imperial Germany would have 13 dreadnought class battleships compared to England’s 16. In 1889 the British Admiralty committed the United Kingdom to what was known as the “Two Power Standard.” This meant that the United Kingdom would always have 10% more warships than the combined navies of her two closest rivalries, Imperial Russia and France. Hence, the United Kingdom could face two powers at any given time. The dramatic German naval build up however rendered the Two Power Standard somewhat problematic if not all together obsolete. From keel-laying to sea trials, a single dreadnought class battleship required an average of eleven months construction time. On paper the German navy could build seven new dreadnought class battleships a year.

Thus, the United Kingdom faced a mathematical dilemma. If Imperial Germany could build seven dreadnought class battleships per year, England could not afford to keep up with Imperial Germany and stay 10% ahead of the combined fleets of Imperial Russia and France. The English economy could simply not afford such a massive outlay in military expenditures.

In 1912 His Majesty’s government began to test the waters for a freeze on battleship production. In what became known as the Haldane Mission, the English Secretary of War, Richard Haldane traveled to Berlin in February 1912. Haldane’s goal was to convince Admiral Tirpitz and the Kaiser to freeze battleship production. Haldane pointed out the staggering cost to both economies of the naval arms race, a fact that was not lost on Imperial Germany. In 1909 a single dreadnought class battleship was the most expensive weapons system in the history of the world. Each one cost a staggering £ 1.8 million or the equivalent of $6 million. For the sake of contemporary comparisons a single dreadnought class battleship today would cost between $800 million and $1.2 billion. This would mean that the price tag for a single dreadnought battleship today would be about one third the price of America’s most expensive weapon system, a Nimitz class aircraft carrier, costing currently about $4.7 billion.

The II Reich had one of the most backward tax systems of Europe. The naval arms race was bankrupting the country. Haldane reported to London that both Tirpitz and the Kaiser appeared extremely interested in a deal. After days of negotiation Tirpitz was ready to sign the documents. Imperial Germany would agree to an English superiority ratio of 3:2. Then at the eleventh hour during the absolute last stages of the negotiations, the Kaiser asked for one further demand: Germany would agree to a 3:2 battleship ratio only if the United Kingdom would agree to remain neutral if Germany were to ever invade Belgium. It was the Moroccan Crisis of 1905 all over again. London ordered Haldane home. Haldane left Berlin frustrated, exhausted and empty handed.

In March 1912 Winston Churchill became First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty. Churchill opted for a different approach for dealing with Imperial Germany. Churchill threw down the gauntlet: you [Imperial Germany] want a naval arms race, you’ve got one: the United Kingdom will out produce you ship for ship: we will destroy your economy with a naval arms race unprecedented in the annals of world history: the Royal Navy is fully prepared and fully capable of annihilating any hostile German battle groups in the North Sea. In Churchill’s own words, “The German navy is a luxury. The English navy is a necessity.” In April 1912 Churchill announced that the United Kingdom was abandoning the Two Power Standard. Henceforth the goal of English naval production was to maintain a 3:2 superiority ratio in dreadnought class battleship production. The target country was Imperial Germany.

In December of 1912 Churchill analyzed the intelligence numbers for the previous year. As promised by Tirpitz in 1909 there were 13 dreadnought class battleships in the German High Sea Fleet. They were faced by 22 English dreadnought class battleships. 13 German battleships faced 22. The British fleet held an almost 2:1 superiority. The numbers didn’t lie. Churchill concluded that there had never been a secret German building program. All had been a lie. What became known as the Naval Scare of 1909 was just that: a huge media hoax fueled by English nationalism, a German bluff and British government paranoia.

Tirpitz also looked at the numbers for 1912. What was infinitely clear was any future naval engagement in the North Sea would be the mother of all battles. In December the admiral wrote privately to Churchill, “The English demand for a 3:2 dreadnought class battleship advantage is both reasonable and rational. Imperial Germany has no objection to the naval superiority of an island nation that is so dependant on her fleet for survival. Let us reach a 16:10 ratio agreement.” That same year Churchill decided to ratchet up the pressure on Imperial Germany. He upped the ante in the arms race. The British Admiralty signaled the HMS Terrible, the flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet: “Assemble the fleet fifty nautical miles west of the Cape of Trafalgar; steam north, northeast; reinforce the North Sea Fleet.” The 1912 Anglo-French Naval Agreement stipulated that France would defend the Mediterranean. The Royal Navy would defend the Channel and the North Sea. What England would actually do in time of war was never fully stated.

By mid 1913 M-60 reported to Churchill that 34 English dreadnought class battleships faced 18 from Imperial Germany. A sense of calm in England replaced the Naval Scare of earlier years. With more than the 16:10 ratio proposed by Tirpitz, Churchill suggested a Naval Holiday. Both the United Kingdom and Imperial Germany would freeze battleship production. Due to the enormous costs of a single dreadnought class battleship, the naval arms race had become a hot-button topic in both Parliament and the Reichstag. By January 1912 the Kaiser had lost interest in battleships. William II wanted to get back into the good graces the Army, feeling abandoned and neglected after a full decade of exorbitant naval spending. In 1913 the Kaiser ordered the German Army to increase in size by 170,000 men, or four army corps. This cost the German budget the equivalent of one battleship. By 1913 the German economy was crippled by massive debt. The naval arms race had bankrupted the strongest economic power of Europe. 1890-1914 the German national debt was twice that of 1871-1890. After 1890 a full 90% of the Reich budget had been spent on either the Army or the Navy. Less than 10% of all military expenditures were financed through direct taxation. The SPD was well aware of the economic consequences of the naval arms race. Germany’s largest political party was leading the charge in the Reichstag, demanding a halt to military expenditures. Social reform not battleship production was the major agenda of the German peace party. Terrified of a backlash in public opinion the Kaiser stubbornly refused to increase taxes. By 1913-1914 a decade and a half of astronomical military spending had taken its toll.

England’s economic plight was even worse. In addition to accumulating the largest national debt in the world, the United Kingdom also suffered massive spikes in unemployment. By 1914 the United Kingdom had an unemployment rate hovering around 15% and a national debt more than three times that of 1815.

Besides the sheer economic costs, another dynamic was also at work 1913-1914. The Kaiser had fallen back in love with his English cousins. In the words of the German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, “The Kaiser’s love affair with England is beginning to worry us all.” For reasons still unclear, by 1913 the Kaiser was once again infatuated with his English blood. Though the Kaiser refused to forgive Churchill for his 1912 barb against German naval production, the Kaiser had clearly entered a period of passionate Anglophilia.

By April 1914-a mere five months before the outbreak of the Great War-William admitted that “Anglo-German relations had never been better.” This affection seemed to go both ways. In May 1914, the British Admiralty announced that the British North Sea Fleet would visit Kiel, the home port for the German High Sea Fleet. This would have been unthinkable a year earlier. The week long event would consist of joint military operations, sail boat racing, dinners and winner-take all drinking contests between English and German sailors. On 28 June 1914, the very day Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, the Kaiser was on board the sailboat Meteor. German and English naval officers were competing in a sailboat race in Kiel Harbor. At 2:30 in the afternoon the Kaiser was told the news of the assassination. While trying to raise a sail with one good arm the Kaiser angrily spat back, “What do you want me to do, abandon the race? We’re winning!” Two days later the British fleet sailed out of Kiel Harbor. The signal masts of the German battleships flew the signal, “Unending love, trust and friendship for England.” From the signal room of the HMS Iron Duke, the flagship of the Grand Fleet, a wireless message was sent back to the Kaiser’s personal ship SMS Hohenzollern: “Friends in past and friends forever.” Less than five weeks later, Imperial Germany and the United Kingdom were at war. Over the course of the next four years, 8 million men, virtually an entire generation of young men would be wiped out in the trenches of the Great War.

HMS Dreadnought (1906)

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