Authors: Robert M Hathaway
Authors: Robert M Hathaway
Volume: 30
Issue: 1
Pagination: 7-14
ISSN: 0196125X
Subject Terms: Sanctions
International relations-US
Nuclear tests
Arms control
Geographic Names: United States
US
India
Pakistan
Abstract:
Earlier convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance, by the end
of 1999 US lawmakers had turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of
non-proliferation policy. Lawmakers' refusal to impose sanctions against India and Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests is examined.
Copyright Arms Control Association Jan/Feb 2000
Full Text:
Earlier convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance, by the end
of 1999 U.S. lawmakers had turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of
nonproliferation policy.
May 1998 was not a good month for U.S. non-proliferation efforts. On
May 11 and 13, India detonated five nuclear devices, its first nuclear
tests in nearly a quarter century Not to be outdone, its bitter rival
Pakistan conducted six nuclear tests of its own toward the end of the month.
These
sudden developments, long feared but nonetheless catching American
officials
and intelligence analysts by surprise, effectively blew U.S. policy
toward
the South Asian subcontinent to smithereens and laid down a direct
challenge
to the global non-proliferation regime.
Within the U.S. Congress, non-proliferation advocates like
Representative
Edward Markey (D-MA) and India-bashers such as Representative Dan
Burton
(R-IN) voiced outrage and called for the immediate triggering of
sanctions
under Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, universally known as
the Glenn amendment. New Delhi's actions were "reckless, shameful and
irresponsible,"
Markey insisted. Burton urged his House colleagues to "stop
subsidizing
India's nuclear progress" by cutting U.S. economic assistance to New
Delhi.
"India took a terrible, terrible step yesterday," Senator Tom Harkin
(D-IA)
told the Senate the day after India's first round of tests.
Paraphrasing
Franklin Roosevelt, the Iowa Democrat declared that "yesterday is a
day
that will live in infamy for the Nation of India."'
Of greater interest was the response of those who earlier had been
among
India's most vocal supporters. Representative Frank Pallone (D-Nj),
perhaps
New Delhi's leading champion on Capitol Hill, expressed regret at the
tests
but insisted they should not derail the U.S.-India relationship. But
other
lawmakers usually sympathetic to India were less supportive. Many of
the
leading members of the House's India caucus remained noticeably
silent,
and some privately suggested that the caucus publicly condemn India.
Several
legislators, including House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO),
canceled
plans to visit India. "In light of the nuclear tests," a Gephardt
spokesman
explained, "we did not want there to be the appearance of business as
usual.
The situation was exacerbated 17 days later, when Pakistan conducted
its
own tests. Aside from the expected condemnations of Pakistan and
criticism
of the Clinton administration for allowing events to get so out of
hand,
a number of members voiced anxiety that South Asian tensions could
spiral
out of control. "This is the most serious situation since the Cuban
missile
crisis," Senator John McCain (R-AZ) warned, a judgment seconded by
Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) .3
Only days after the tests, President Bill Clinton responded as he was
legally
obligated under the Glenn amendment, slapping wide-ranging economic
and
military sanctions on New Delhi and Islamabad. Yet no sooner had
Washington
taken this stand on behalf of global non-proliferation norms than it
began
to walk back from its position. Within 18 months, the U.S. Congress
swung
from applauding strict sanctions to urging the president to waive not
only
the Glenn amendment, but also the Pressler and Symington amendments,
which
mandate further penalties for states engaged in certain nuclear
activity.
(For more information on this legislation, see text box on p. 11.)
Earlier
convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance as an object lesson
for
other nuclear threshold states, by the end of 1999 U.S. lawmakers had
completely
turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of non-proliferation policy.
Congressional anger over the South Asian tests had given way to
acceptance,
even understanding. Congress, it would appear, had abandoned 25 years
of
non-proliferation activity.
The U.S. Congress was trying to achieve multiple objectives that were
not
entirely compatible. Concerned about proliferation and wanting a voice
in foreign policy that would compete with the execufive branch, it had
mandated the sanctions. But when faced with post-Cold War national
interests,
the growing influence of the domestic South Asian-American community
and
an increasing interest in the subcontinent by U.S. business, the
legislators
moved non-proliferation to the back burner and renounced with dizzying
speed the sanctions on India and Pakistan they had so recently
supported.
The impact of these steps on the non-proliferation regime is not yet
clear.
But what is apparent is that Congress' love-hate relationship with
sanctions
as a tool of foreign policy is far from over.
The Retreat
Discomfort with the Glenn amendment sanctions surfaced shortly after
they
were imposed on Pakistan and served to trigger a broader discussion of
the utility of sanctions in general. It was time "to engage in a
serious
debate on the merits of using unilateral economic sanctions to achieve
foreign policy goals," Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) declared.
Observing
that the threat of sanctions had deterred neither India nor Pakistan
from
testing, he worried that U.S. sanctions could destabilize a Pakistan
already
burdened with enormous economic and political problems. "An unstable
Pakistan
with nuclear weapons," he added, "is not in our interests."4
Other comments focused more narrowly on U.S. economic interests.
"Pakistan
is not a trading partner we can afford to lose," cautioned the
chairman
of the House Agriculture Committee, Robert Smith (ROR), reflecting
sentiment
especially pronounced in wheat-growing areas of the Pacific Northwest.
"There is no leverage in cutting off our sales," complained Senator
Mitch
McConnell (R-KY). "It does not make a difference on the dinner table
in
Islamabad, but it sure will in Topeka."5
Recognizing this widespread dissatisfaction with sanctions, the Senate
leadership created a special 18-member task force, headed by McConnell
and Joseph Biden (D-DE), to examine both the way the India and
Pakistan
sanctions were working, and the larger question of how effective
sanctions
are in influencing the behavior of other nations. "There's a feeling
on
both sides of the aisle that perhaps the proclivity to place economic
sanctions
on countries around the world and with not a clear way of ending those
has become a problem," explained Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) in
what
was clearly an understatement. 6
It did not take long for this uneasiness over the Glenn amendment
sanctions
to translate into congressional action. The initial breach in the
sanctions
regime came in early July, less than two months after the first Indian
test. The impetus behind this move was readily apparent. Pakistan was
the
leading foreign buyer of U.S. white wheat, and the third largest
overseas
purchaser of all U.S. wheat. But unless Congress acted to permit
export
financing, U.S. farmers would be unable to participate in winter wheat
auctions in Pakistan, scheduled for mid-July.
"We are six days away from a disaster," warned Senator Ron Wyden (D-
OR)
in early July. "Farmers around the country are staring an economic
train
wreck in the eye."' The full Senate apparently agreed, rushing through
legislation without the normal committee review and voting 98-0 to
give
both India and Pakistan a one-year exemption from Glenn amendment
restrictions
on Department of Agriculture financing for the purchase of
agricultural
commodities from U.S. farmers.' The Senate bill originally contained
authority
for the president to waive other sanctions as well, but a filibuster
threat
by Senator John Glenn (DOH), author of the Glenn amendment and perhaps
the Senate's leading non-proliferation expert, succeeded in getting
this
provision dropped.
Action in the House was equally swift and revealing of congressional
priorities.
Representatives Robert Livingston (R-LA) and David Obey (D-WI), the
chairman
and ranking minority member, respectively, of the House Appropriations
Committee, urged a more considered approach, but not even these senior
power brokers could slow the stampede. This legislation, its
supporters
argued, did not indicate any lessening of the U.S. commitment to
nonproliferation.
To the contrary, by crafting a more focused sanctions policy, it would
help secure the domestic base for maintaining sanctions.
Such elaborate rationalizations could not hide the actual intent of
most
members, however. Hardly a word about nonproliferation figured in the
House
debate. No one displayed anger at India or Pakistan for violating
long-standing
international norms against testing. Instead, the debate was all about
helping the U.S. farmer, about not losing markets or penalizing
American
wheat growers. The House's leading non-proliferation proponents were
noticeably
absent during the debate. Not surprisingly, the House followed the
Senate's
lead and adopted the measure in time for American farmers to take part
in the Pakistani wheat auction.9
This modest step was quickly followed by others. The day after the
House's
approval of the wheat relief bill, the Senate, with the blessing of
the
administration, adopted the Brownback amendment. The Brownback
amendment-named
for its author, Kansas Republican Sam Brownback, chairman of the
Senate
subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian affairs-provided the
president
with the authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn,
Symington
and Pressler amendment sanctions, except for those pertaining to
military
assistance, dual-use exports and military sales.
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee,
complained that the Senate had "rushed forward, willy nilly," without
adequate
review or committee hearings, but chose not to block passage.10 Glenn,
who might have been expected to protest this gutting of his namesake
legislation,
was conveniently away from Washington training for the space shuttle
flight
he was to make later in the year. Recalling Glenn's absence sometime
afterward,
one insider conceded that while not deliberately planned, Senate
action
on the legislation at the very moment its primary opponent was
preoccupied
with other matters was more than simply a happy coincidence.
The Brownback amendment (formally known as the India-Pakistan Relief
Act
of 1998) was incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations
bill
and signed into law in October 1998. Following its adoption, President
Clinton quickly restored funding for U.S. military training programs
in
India and Pakistan, as well as government-backed financing and credit
guarantees
for U.S. firms doing business there. Clinton also lifted restrictions
on
U.S. commercial loans and credits to both countries and announced that
Washington would support a pending Pakistani request before the
International
Monetary Fund. Encouraged by the absence of opposition to these steps,
Clinton then moved to eliminate another long-standing irritant in the
U.S.-Pakistani
relationship by agreeing to pay Islamabad $325 million in cash and
$140
million in goods as compensation for 28 F-16 aircraft that Pakistan
had
earlier bought, but whose delivery had been prevented by the 1990
triggering
of the Pressler amendment. Once more, Capitol Hill acquiesced
virtually
without dissent.
In October 1999, Congress took a further step by adopting, as part of
the
defense appropriations bill, another, more sweeping Brownback
amendment-sometimes
called Brownback II. This measure gave the president permanent
authority
to waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, all the provisions of
the
Glenn amendment. In addition, it authorized the president to waive the
Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions, which had prohibited
almost
all U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan since 1990.
Finally,
the legislation stated that the "broad application" of export controls
on Indian and Pakistani government agencies and private companies
suspected
of having links to their country's nuclear or missile programs (the
so-called
"entities list") was "inconsistent" with U.S. national security
interests.
Instead, the lawmakers urged the executive branch to apply U.S. export
controls only to those agencies and companies that made "direct and
material
contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and
only
to those items that can contribute to such programs."
Brownback II represented an extraordinary reversal of American policy.
The measure handed the president the authority to lift all sanctions
imposed
upon India and Pakistan as a result of their 1998 nuclear tests. More
remarkably
yet, Congress abandoned even those sanctions it had placed upon
Pakistan
prior to Islamabad's tests. Seventeen months after its nuclear
detonations,
Pakistan found itself far better off vis-a-vis American nuclear
non-proliferation
law than it had been at any time since 1990. Finally, with its
statement
on export controls, the U.S. Congress appeared to condemn rigorous
steps
to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology that might be used in
the
nuclear weapons or missile programs of India or Pakistan, and
implicitly
authorized the export of materials that might indirectly assist those
programs.
It was a stunning retreat from Capitol Hill's decades-long reliance on
punitive measures to block the spread of weapons of mass
destruction.11
Never happy about being forced in 1990 to trigger the Pressler
amendment,
the executive branch saw Brownback II as the achievement of a long-
desired
objective. Administration officials were pleased with the measure in
another
respect as well. An earlier draft of the legislation would have
suspended
for five years the Glenn, Symington and Pressler sanctions, whereas
Brownback
II, as finally adopted, gave the president the latitude to lift the
sanctions
only when and if he saw fit. This flexibility, the State Department
believed,
would strengthen the president's hand in subsequent negotiations with
India
and Pakistan.
The timing of these proceedings also merits mention. A House-Senate
conference
committee adopted the defense appropriations bill containing Brownback
II on October 11, 1999. The following day the Pakistani military
dismissed
the civilian government in Islamabad and seized power. On October 13
and
14, the House and Senate respectively took up the defense bill. Both
houses
adopted the measure by substantial majorities. The military coup in
Pakistan
was all but ignored during debate over the bill, with only one member
of
either house troubling to go to the floor to express skepticism about
the
wisdom of a wholesale abandonment of sanctions against Pakistan at the
very moment the Pakistani military was throwing out a democratically
elected
government. True, Brownback 11 was but one small provision in a huge
bill
appropriating over one-quarter of a trillion dollars. Nonetheless,
this
silence about contemporaneous events in Islamabad suggests just how
far
Congress had traveled since the South Asian tests 17 months earlier.
South Asia in the Congressional Mindset
All in all, it had been a remarkable year and a half. The United
States
had imposed extensive sanctions and then just as quickly lifted not
only
Glenn amendment sanctions, but Symington and Pressler amendment
restrictions
as well. Initially expressing concern for the global non-proliferation
regime, Congress, in less than 18 months, had moved to the position
that
it should not jeopardize other interests in pursuit of unobtainable
non-proliferation
objectives. How does one explain this dramatic transformation in
congressional
attitudes and actions?
The Indian-American community
Part of the explanation is political. As the 1990s unfolded, South
Asia,
and India in particular, gained increasing prominence on the
congressional
agenda. This new politically inspired concern for the region partly
reflected
changes in the Asian-American community. As recently as 1980, there
were
only 387,000 IndianAmericans in the United States. But the next two
decades
saw a dramatic increase in the size of this community. By 1997, this
number
had more than tripled, to 1,215,000. (The total U.S. population during
the same period grew by 17.8 percent.) By the later date, the Indian-
American
community comprised the third largest Asian-American population in the
country, surpassed only by Chinese- and Filipino-Americans.
Numbers tell only part of the story. The Indian-American community is
also
highly educated and prosperous. Fiftyeight percent of the adult
community
has at least a bachelor's degree. A larger percentage of the Indian-
American
work force holds a managerial or professional position than any other
group
in the country, with especially high representation among well-paid
doctors,
engineers, scientists, architects and computer professionals. As a
result,
the Indian-American per capita income exceeds that of every other
group
in the country, including whites.12
[IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH] Captioned as: A Nebraska wheat farmer harvests his
field
in summer. U.S. wheat farmers would have faced significant economic
consequences
had Congress not waived the nuclear testing-related sanctions imposed
on
Pakistan, which is the third-largest importer of U.S. wheat.
Until recently, this wealth and status had not translated into
political
clout, but that is rapidly changing. Since the community is widely and
relatively evenly distributed throughout all parts of the country, few
congressional districts are without at least a handful of Indian-
American
families. Even in states such as Kansas, where the Indian-American
community
is negligible, Senator Brownback notes that they make their presence
felt.13
The largest concentrations, however, reside in the major industrial-
urban
states of New York, New Jersey, California, Pennsylvania, Michigan,
Ohio,
Illinois, Texas, Florida and Massachusetts. As a whole, the community
has
avoided identification with either of the two major political parties
and
gives generously to both. Indian-Americans raised $4 million on behalf
of political candidates for the 1992 election, and the figures are
almost
certainly significantly higher today.14 "By their engagement and their
aggressiveness," Brownback has observed, "they're able to influence
things
beyond their numbers."15
Indian-American organizations now deliberately reach out to their
Washington
representatives. Professional groups, such as the American Association
of Physicians of Indian Origin, increasingly invite leading
congressional
supporters to address their meetings. The Indian American Friendship
Council-to
take but one example-sponsors a legislative conference in Washington
each
year, which prominent U.S. lawmakers are invited to address. The July
1999
conference, for instance, was attended by nearly 40 U.S. lawmakers and
featured speeches by House Minority Leader Gephardt; House
International
Relations Committee Chair Benjamin Gilman (R-NY); and Doug Bereuter
(R-NE),
chairman of the House Asia subcommittee.
These congressional addresses do not always feature careful or
measured
discussion of U.S.-Indian ties. Instead, these events encourage an
outpouring
of praise for India, condemnation of Pakistani policies and devotion
to
strong Indian-American ties. The U.S.-Indian relationship, Gephardt
told
council members at the 1999 conference, is possibly the most important
bilateral relationship in the world. Though perhaps harmless, such
exuberance
may serve to mislead members of the IndianAmerican community about the
current state or future direction of U.S. policy.
An important development for the clout of the Indian-American
community
on Capitol Hill occurred following the 1992 elections. That autumn,
Representative
Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY) fell victim to redistricting and lost his
congressional
seat. The influential chairman of the House subcommittee on Asia had
been
widely regarded as India's most energetic advocate in the Congress,
and
over the years had, almost alone among his congressional colleagues,
raised
large sums of money in the Indian-American community. Solarz's defeat
opened
the door for a junior New Jersey Democrat, Frank Pallone, who up to
this
time had displayed no particular interest in either American foreign
policy
or the Indian-American community.
At first the loss of Solarz was seen as a blow to the community's
influence,
but Pallone was a shrewd politician who had a need and recognized an
opportunity.
The need arose from the vicissitudes of redistricting, which had
thrown
a large Indian-American population into his new congressional
district.
The opportunity arose from the vacuum created by Solarz's departure. A
few weeks after the 1992 elections, Pallone enlisted six other
Democrats
and Florida Republican Bill McCollum to organize the Congressional
Caucus
on India and Indian Americans. One of the first congressional caucuses
devoted to promoting relations with a single country, the group grew
far
more rapidly than Pallone could have envisioned in even his wildest
fantasies.
By mid-1999, the India caucus, as it was invariably called, boasted a
membership
of 115 members, over a quarter of the entire House of Representatives.
Galvanized by Pallone's energetic leadership and considerable skills
for
publicizing both the caucus and his own role in Indian-American
affairs,
the organization aggressively argued the case for better U.S.-Indian
relations.
Pallone's office established an effective information and
communications
network and made certain that caucus members knew whenever the House
was
slated to vote on issues of interest to the Indian-American community@
The caucus distributed talking points, enlisted floor speakers and
lined
up votes. It provided India, for the first time, with an institutional
base of support on Capitol Hill and, according to one analyst, an
"anchor
to windward."
The Pakistani-American community
The Pakistani-American population is only one-tenth the size of the
IndianAmerican
community. Not surprisingly, it lags far behind its larger rival in
its
visibility and its clout on Capitol Hill. Pakistan has no
congressional
equivalent of the India caucus. Various efforts to organize a Pakistan
caucus have foundered on congressional indifference and the hard
political
reality that publicly aligning themselves with Pakistan holds few
political
incentives for most members of the U.S. Congress.
Throughout the 1980s and the close Pakistani-American partnership
against
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Texas Democrat Charlie Wilson
was
an energetic and effective advocate for Islamabad in the House of
Representatives.
But since Wilson's retirement from Congress in 1996, no one has
stepped
forward to take his place. The situation is slightly more favorable
for
Pakistan in the Senate, where several members, including Brownback,
Harkin
and Robert Torricelli (D-Nj), are viewed as particularly sympathetic
to
Islamabad. Pakistan's marginally stronger position in the Senate has
influenced
the legislative strategy of the Clinton administration as it has
sought
statutory relief from congressionally mandated sanctions against
Islamabad.
In both 1998 and 1999, with Brownback I and II, the administration
focused
its efforts on securing adoption in the Senate. Since the equivalent
House
measure contained no comparable provision, a Senate-House conference
committee
resolved the issue, neatly sidestepping the potential obstacle
represented
by a separate House vote and a mobilized India caucus.
The U.S. business community
Constituent pressure, of course, constitutes only one of many sources
of
influence on members of Congress as they deal with South Asian issues.
In recent years, since India began opening up its economy in 1991,
economic
considerations and the American business community have also assumed a
larger role on matters pertaining to the subcontinent. Although its
promise
still far exceeds its actual performance, the Indian market, with its
alluring
prospect of several hundred million middle-class consumers, has
increasingly
attracted the attention of both Wall Street and Main Street.
This new business interest has been reflected on Capitol Hill. Many
members
of Congress, constantly on the lookout for fresh sales and investment
opportunitieswhich
can mean more jobs for constituents and greater profits for local
businessesfind
their gaze more and more drawn to South Asia and to India above all.
Paeans
to India's economic reforms have replaced denunciations of Nehruvian
socialism
as standard congressional rhetoric. Traveling legislators, who once
shunned
the subcontinent, now regularly pass through New Delhi, the financial
center
of Mumbai (Bombay) and the Indian Silicon Valley in Bangalore.
Private groups such as the U.S.-India Business Council and the India
Interest
Group lobby individual members of Congress on behalf of sanctions
relief
and U.S. government credits and investment guarantees, According to
several
of Capitol Hill's most knowledgeable South Asia experts, U.S. business
and agricultural groups were "key" to the July 1998 rollback of some
of
the Glenn amendment sanctions. 16 These same organizations also
supported
the 1998 and 1999 Brownback amendments that further loosened
legislative
restrictions on India and Pakistan. Combined with a larger, more
politically
active Indian-American community, American business interests over the
past seven or eight years have pushed the U.S. Congress to pay more
attention
to South Asia and, most strikingly, to foster a more cordial U.S.-
Indian
relationship.
New threats to American security
Security considerations have contributed as well to this newfound
interest
in U.S.-Indian partnership. For many years, most members of Congress
saw
the region primarily in terms of the Cold War competition with the
Soviet
Union. Pakistan was a valued ally, while India, for reasons most
legislators
found utterly inexplicable, was entirely too cozy with Moscow. With
the
disappearance of the Soviet threat, however, congressional anxieties
have
increasingly centered on two other potential challenges to American
security:
China and Islamic fundamentalism. The result has been a shift in
attitudes
toward India and Pakistan.
Confronted with the grim scenes from Tiananmen Square at the very
moment
the Cold War was coming to a close, many members of Congress, both
conservatives
and liberals, almost effortlessly replaced their concerns about a
Soviet
threat to American ideals and interests with similar worries about the
People's Republic of China. In the eyes of some, India took on a new
importance
as a hedge against a China turned aggressive. Others asked if the
world's
largest democracy and its most powerful democracy did not share a
value
system fundamentally at odds with that espoused by the communist
regime
in Beijing. Brownback, for one, is outspoken in his criticism of the
manner
in which the Clinton administration has handled relations with China
and
India. The White House, he charged in a speech to the U.S.-India
Business
Council in June 1999, has consistently rewarded China, "a country that
has openly and continually challenged U.S. interests and values,"
while
"first ignoring, and now punishing" India. "The inequity in this
situation,"
he contended, "is both striking and counterintuitive. Why reward the
country
which is aggressively working against everything we stand for, and at
the
same time punish and blackmail a country with which we share basic
values
and interests?"
A growing concern about terrorism sponsored by radical Islamic groups
matched
this uneasiness about the future course of U.S. relations with China.
And
fears about Islamic terrorism served to promote anxieties about Muslim
Pakistan and, in some quarters, new support for India. More and more,
U.S.
legislators equated Pakistan with an Islamic fundamentalism that, in
their
view, posed a serious threat to American interests at home and abroad.
Islamabad's support for the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir and,
even
more, for the radical Taliban in Afghanistan only reinforced such
concerns.
Congressional backing for Israel entered into the equation as well.
Some
of Israel's friends on the Hill voiced concern that Pakistan might
share
its nuclear knowhow with Iran or other Arab states hostile to Israel.
Shortly
after Pakistan's nuclear tests, a group of legislators circulated news
reports highlighting a visit to Pakistan by Iran's foreign minister,
and
pointedly speculated whether the trip, coming on the heels of
Islamabad's
nuclear tests, was mere coincidence. "We believe it is vital for the
Congress
to learn the full story about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and
any
possible illegal transfers of information and technology to Iran,"
they
wrote. Robert Menendez (D-Nj) warned his House colleagues that
"Pakistan's
decision to test a nuclear weapon has raised the frightening specter
of
an 'Islamic bomb' being directed at Israel." 17
Limits to U.S. Sanctions
The net effect of this rapid shift on sanctions policy toward South
Asia
is difficult to determine. At the most basic level, it is hard to
escape
the conclusion that U.S. non-proliferation policy toward South Asia-
the
policy of the executive branch as well as of the Congress-has utterly
failed
if success is defined as keeping nuclear weapons out of the region. A
quarter
century of American threats, blandishments and exhortations deterred
neither
India nor Pakistan from moving forward on a nuclear weapons program.
The
certainty of sanctions did not stop either country from conducting
nuclear
tests. And having crossed that nuclear Rubicon, neither New Delhi nor
Islamabad
was compelled to roll back its weapons program because of U.S.
sanctions.
These bald judgments, however, demand qualification. The fact that
U.S.
policy ultimately failed to keep nuclear weapons out of South Asia
does
not mean that it was without impact. Absent U.S. opposition, India and
Pakistan might well have accelerated their weapons programs. The South
Asian nuclear race might have heated up far sooner, and with results
far
more dangerous, had the United States not invested considerable time,
energy
and diplomatic capital in trying to prevent the spread of nuclear
weaponry
to the subcontinent. In truth, definitively evaluating the success or
failure
of America's non-proliferation policies in South Asia is not as easy
as
it may first appear.
Moreover, in gauging the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions-both the
threat
and their actual imposition-in influencing the behavior of Islamabad
and
New Delhi, one must also recognize that the United States never
attempted
to wield the full force of its economic might. Glenn amendment
sanctions
were perhaps more notable for their gaps than their comprehensive
nature.
India, for instance, had been scheduled to receive $54.3 million in
development
assistance in fiscal year 1998. Of this total, $36.3 million was for
activities
exempt from the Glenn amendment sanctions--child survival projects,
health
and family planning programs, environmental projects, and related
programs.
U.S. food aid to India, which totaled approximately $92 million a
year,
was also permitted under the Glenn amendment. Ultimately, India lost
only
$12 million in direct aid and $9 million in housing loan guarantees
from
its 1998 aid package, and $4-5 million in deobligations from money
appropriated
in earlier years. Even U.S. opposition to World Bank loans was hedged,
as Clinton administration officials argued that the ban did not extend
to humanitarian assistance. Pakistan similarly escaped many of the
more
draconian aspects of a full aid cutoff.18 For all the hue and cry
about
inflexible sanctions, the Glenn amendment proved remarkably flexible.
In part, this reluctance to use all the means at its disposal to wreck
the economies of India and Pakistan reflected a U.S. recognition that
as
important as non-proliferation was, the United States had other
critical
interests in South Asia that deserved protection as well. India and
Pakistan
occupy a strategic corner of the globe, and regional instability could
threaten American political and security interests in the Middle East,
central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Important U.S. economic interests
required
safeguarding. Washington sought to promote economic development for
the
region and to address pressing social needs. Good governance and the
strengthening
of democratic institutions were key American objectives. Fostering
regional
cooperation and combating terrorism and narcotics trafficking were
other
priorities. In other words, no one objective, no matter how worthy,
was
so vital as to justify jeopardizing Washington's ability to pursue its
many interests in the region.
Pakistan's precarious political and economic situation also placed
limits
on how hard Washington could lean on Islamabad. Ever mindful of the
fact
that an economic or political collapse in Pakistan might contribute to
the rise of Islamic radicalism, U.S. officials drew back from actions
that
might push Pakistan over the edge. Augmenting these fears, moreover,
was
the concern that an impoverished Islamabad might look for ready cash
by
selling its nuclear technology to Iran or other "rogue" nations,
thereby
contributing to the very proliferation Washington sought to block.
Finally, the refusal of the international community to follow the
American
lead in imposing penalties on India and Pakistan undercut the impact
of
U.S. sanctions and reduced congressional incentives for plugging the
loopholes
in the American sanctions regime. Japan and several European nations
did
suspend loans and grants or apply other economic sanctions following
the
May 1998 tests, but like U.S. sanctions, the global regime was
noteworthy
more for its exceptions than its inclusiveness.
This combination of circumstances has led most South Asian experts-
though
not necessarily non-proliferation specialiststo conclude that a U.S.
policy
built around the threat or use of sanctions has failed to advance the
American
national interest.19 This judgment reflects the congressional
consensus
as well. In a speech on April 3, 1999, Representative Gary Ackerman
(DNY),
who had replaced Pallone as the Democratic co-chair of the Indian
caucus
earlier that year, spoke for many of his congressional colleagues when
he observed, "Sanctions are too blunt a weapon to be used by us
against
a sister democracy such as India. Sanctions aren't good for India; and
they aren't good for America either."
Not even new Indian and Pakistani provocations slowed Capitol Hill's
headlong
repudiation of sanctions. The publication by India in mid-1999 of a
draft
nuclear doctrine envisioning the creation of a nuclear triad of air-,
sea-
and groundlaunched nuclear weapons-a plan roundly condemned by the
Clinton
administration and a handful of legislators-had absolutely no effect
on
congressional support for Brownback 11. Instead, India partisans such
as
Pallone took the publication of the draft doctrine as another
indication
of New Delhi's transparency and political maturity. India, Pallone
insisted,
had good reason to seek a credible deterrent, considering the
provocations
of Pakistan and China.20
Similarly, Pakistan's reckless involvement in and responsibility for
the
Kargil incursion, which in the summer of 1999 briefly revived fears of
a full-scale conflict between South Asia's nuclear-armed rivals,
failed
to derail congressional approval for Brownback 11. Tests of nuclear-
capable
ballistic missiles by both countries went largely unnoticed on the
Hill.
Finally, the October 1999 coup in Islamabad did not halt the drive to
free
Pakistan from Pressler as well as Glenn amendment restrictions.
Congress,
it would seem, was hell-bent on lifting sanctions on its South Asian
friends,
come what may.
The Sanctions Paradox
Given the remarkable backpedaling that so rapidly followed the
imposition
of the Glenn amendment sanctions, one might reasonably ask why
Congress
adopted legislation mandating such sanctions in the first place. Few
regional
specialists believe Washington's nuclear-related sanctions have
worked.
Most contend that congressional legislation has produced faulty policy
based on a failure to understand South Asia's regional dynamics.
Sanctions,
many would add, have even been counterproductive to the achievement of
U.S. non-proliferation objectives. So has the South Asian experience
disillusioned
Congress about the utility of sanctions as a foreign policy tool?
On the contrary, there has been a dramatic increase in sanctions
legislation
in recent years. From a congressional perspective, sanctions and the
threat
of sanctions are not the illogical or misinformed initiatives many
foreign
policy experts assume. Such measures meet various congressional needs.
First, they give Congress a voice in determining U.S. foreign policy,
in
a sphere in which the executive branch wields most of the power. To
complain,
therefore, that sanctions are a blunt instrument, as many critics do,
misses
the point. They are better than no instrument at all.
Second, sanctions can represent a legitimate effort to warn foreign
governments.
not to take particular actions or cross certain lines. Few people in
1985
thought that the Pressler amendment would ever be triggered. Its
principal
purpose was to caution Islamabad not to push its nuclear development
too
far.
Third, sanctions sometimes reflect a congressional distrust of the
executive
branch. Congress might legislate non-proliferation sanctions, for
instance,
because it believes that the White House is not giving this issue
sufficient
priority.
[IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH] Captioned as: Citizens protest the U.S.-imposed
sanctions
on India ky dumping Coke and Pepsi down a drain in 1998. The Indian-
American
community helped pressure Congress into lifting the sanctions in 1999.
Finally, the enactment of sanctions can serve political or partisan
needs.
By including a presidential waiver in sanctions legislation, Congress
can
in effect have it both ways. Legislators can appear to be taking a
tough
stand on an issue while actually placing ultimate responsibility upon
the
president for imposing sanctions and for the negative consequences the
sanctions might produce.
Although South Asian developments suggest that some members of
Congress
have now begun to rethink the wisdom of this wholesale reliance on
sanctions,
particularly those of a unilateral nature, legislation threatening
sanctions
meets too many congressional needs to be removed from the legislative
arsenal
in the near future. Indeed, in the very month that Clinton imposed
Glenn
amendment sanctions on India and Pakistan, the House adopted the
International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998, which by some estimates could result in
new sanctions on as many as 75 countries.21
So we are left with something of a paradox. Congress appears to have
little
stomach for maintaining sanctions against India or Pakistan, either to
punish them for their tests, to coerce them into reversing the
direction
of their nuclear programs, or more generally, to send a message to
other
nuclear threshold states that may be tempted to emulate the Indian and
Pakistani examples. Nor does the Hill appear prepared to hold out for
a
deal in which the United States would lift sanctions in exchange for
specific
Indian or Pakistani steps short of a complete nuclear rollback, such
as
signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Legislators
are
unwilling to pay the domestic price sanctions frequently entail,
particularly
since sanctions hold no assurance of success in achieving U.S. non-
proliferation
objectives. Members, moreover, have a legitimate fear that a punitive
approach
toward Islamabad and New Delhi will preclude the achievement of other
important
U.S. objectives in South Asia, strain Washington's relations with
friends
and allies, or push Pakistan over the precipice into the clutches of
Islamic
radicalism.
Nonetheless, members of Congress will almost certainly continue to
insist
on their right and responsibility to exercise a voice in the conduct
of
the nation's foreign policies, as indeed they should. With different
political
constituencies and constitutional duties than the president, they will
frequently disagree with the executive in their definition of the
national
interest, and in their judgments as to the best means for preserving
and
promoting that interest. And they will remain attracted by the
apparent
advantages sanctions legislation offers.
So the paradox is likely to remain, recalling the old adage that
everybody
wants to go to heaven, but no one wants to die. Congress will continue
to encroach upon the executive's freedom of action, to mandate
sanctions-and
to recoil at the consequences. U.S. policy, in short, is likely to
replay
the strange gyrations that marked congressional efforts in 1998 and
1999
to fashion a policy to meet both the new nuclear realities of South
Asia
and the new political realities of Washington. Whether American policy
will also advance the global nonproliferation agenda is rather more in
doubt.
KEY LEGISLATION
Symington Amendment
Adopted 1976. Sec. 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec.
669
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.
Prohibits most U.S. assistance to any country found trafficking in
nuclear
enrichment equipment or technology outside of international
safeguards.
President Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symington
amendment
in 1979 because of Islamabad's clandestine construction of a uranium
enrichment
plant. U.S. aid to Islamabad was possible between 1982 and 1990 only
through
the use of presidential waivers.
Adopted 1977. Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly
Sec.
670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.
Prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as
defined
by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) that, among other things,
detonates
a nuclear explosive device. President Bill Clinton imposed Glenn
amendment
sanctions against India on May 13, 1998, two days after New Delhi
broke
its self-imposed 24-year moratorium on nuclear testing. On May 30,
1998,
Clinton invoked similar sanctions against Pakistan, following
Islamabad's
six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30.
Pressler Amendment
Adopted 1985. Sec. 620E[e] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as
amended.
Originally banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistan
unless
the U.S. president certified, on an annual basis, that Pakistan did
not
possess a nuclear explosive device, and that the provision of U.S. aid
would significantly reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing such a
device.
In October 1990, President George Bush was unable to issue this
certification,
which triggered the Pressler amendment prohibitions. In 1995, the
Brown
amendment exempted most forms of economic assistance from the Pressler
amendment prohibitions.
Brownback I
Adopted 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated into
the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277).
Provides the president with authority to waive, for a period of one
year,
Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions on India and
Pakistan,
except for those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use exports
and
military sales.
Brownback II
Adopted 1999. Incorporated into the fiscal year 2000 defense
appropriations
bill (Public Law 106-79).
Gives the president indefinite authority to waive, with respect to
India
and Pakistan, all the provisions of the Glenn, Symington and Pressler
amendments.
States that the "broad application" of export controls on Indian and
Pakistani
government agencies and private companies suspected of having links to
their country's nuclear or missile programs is "inconsistent" with the
national security interests of the United States, and urges the
application
of U.S. export controls only against agencies and companies that make
"direct
and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile
programs
and only to those items that can contribute to such programs."
NOTES
1. Edward Markey, draft letter to President Clinton, May 12, 1998; Dan
Burton, Dear Colleague letter, May 12,1998; Tom Harkin, Congres
sional Record, May 12, 1998, p. S4680.
2. Congressional Record, May 12,1998, p. H3081; Eliza Newlin Carney,
"Another
Kind of Arms Race," National journal, June 6, 1998, p. 1306.
3. Jim Abrams, "Asia: U.S. Says Situation Serious, Calls for Global
Efforts,"
Associated Press, June 1,1998.
4. Richard Lugar, Dear Colleague letter, June 4, 1998.
5. Robert Sn-dth, Congressional Quarterly, June 6, 1998, p. 1544;
Mitch
McConnell, Congressional Quarterly, July 11, 1998, p. 1891.
6. Tom Raum, "Senate Panel to Study Effectiveness of U.S. Sanctions,"
Associated
Press, June 27,1998.
7. Congressional Quarterly, July 11, 1998, p. 1891.
8. In addition, the legislation permanently removed medicines, medical
equipment and fertilizer from the application of sanctions.
9. Public Law 105-194, the Agriculture Export Relief Act. U.S. wheat
farmers
won the contract.
10. Congressional Record, July 15, 1998, p. S8184.
11. The export control provision of this measure was even more
startling
for coming at a time when congressional Republicans were inflamed over
possibly illegal transfers to China that might have assisted Beijing's
missile development efforts.
12. Sharon M. Lee, "Asian Americans: Diverse and Growing," Population
Bulletin,
June 1998; Karen Isaksen Leonard, The South Asian Americans (Westport,
CT Greenwood, 1997). The author is indebted to Joanna Yu for her
research
assistance in compiling these statistics.
13. Author interview with Senator Sam Brownback, August 3, 1999.
14. Carney, "Another Kind of Arms Race," p. 1306.
15. Brownback interview.
16. Barbara Leitch LePoer, et al., "India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests and
U.S.
Response," CRS Report for Congress, November 24, 1998, p. 35;
Brownback
interview.
17. Gary Ackerman, et al., Dear Colleague letter, June 11, 1998;
Robert
Menendez, Dear Colleague letter, June 16, 1998.
18. LePoer, et al., pp. 22-26.
19. See, for example, Richard N. Haass and Gideon Rose, eds., A New
U.S.
Policy Toward India and Pakistan (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations,
1997); and Richard N. Haass and Morton H. Halperin, eds., After the
Tests:
U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations,
1998).
20. Aziz Haniffa, "Pallone Hails New Delhi's Transparency," India
Abroad,
August 27, 1999,
21. Public Law 105-292.
Robert M. Hathaway, who served for 12 years on the professional staff
of
the House In ternational Relations Committee, is director of the Asia
Program
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.
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