Authors: Robert M Hathaway



Authors:                  Robert M Hathaway

Volume:                   30

Issue:                    1

Pagination:               7-14

ISSN:                     0196125X

Subject Terms:            Sanctions

                          International relations-US

                          Nuclear tests

                          Arms control

Geographic Names:         United States

                          US

                          India

                          Pakistan

Abstract:

Earlier convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance, by the end

of 1999 US lawmakers had turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of

non-proliferation policy. Lawmakers' refusal to impose sanctions against India and Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests is examined.

Copyright Arms Control Association Jan/Feb 2000

Full Text:

Earlier convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance, by the end

of 1999 U.S. lawmakers had turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of

nonproliferation policy.

May 1998 was not a good month for U.S. non-proliferation efforts. On

May 11 and 13, India detonated five nuclear devices, its first nuclear

tests in nearly a quarter century Not to be outdone, its bitter rival

Pakistan conducted six nuclear tests of its own toward the end of the month.

These

sudden developments, long feared but nonetheless catching American

officials

and intelligence analysts by surprise, effectively blew U.S. policy

toward

the South Asian subcontinent to smithereens and laid down a direct

challenge

to the global non-proliferation regime.

Within the U.S. Congress, non-proliferation advocates like

Representative

Edward Markey (D-MA) and India-bashers such as Representative Dan

Burton

(R-IN) voiced outrage and called for the immediate triggering of

sanctions

under Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, universally known as

the Glenn amendment. New Delhi's actions were "reckless, shameful and

irresponsible,"

Markey insisted. Burton urged his House colleagues to "stop

subsidizing

India's nuclear progress" by cutting U.S. economic assistance to New

Delhi.

"India took a terrible, terrible step yesterday," Senator Tom Harkin

(D-IA)

told the Senate the day after India's first round of tests.

Paraphrasing

Franklin Roosevelt, the Iowa Democrat declared that "yesterday is a

day

that will live in infamy for the Nation of India."'

Of greater interest was the response of those who earlier had been

among

India's most vocal supporters. Representative Frank Pallone (D-Nj),

perhaps

New Delhi's leading champion on Capitol Hill, expressed regret at the

tests

but insisted they should not derail the U.S.-India relationship. But

other

lawmakers usually sympathetic to India were less supportive. Many of

the

leading members of the House's India caucus remained noticeably

silent,

and some privately suggested that the caucus publicly condemn India.

Several

legislators, including House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO),

canceled

plans to visit India. "In light of the nuclear tests," a Gephardt

spokesman

explained, "we did not want there to be the appearance of business as

usual.

The situation was exacerbated 17 days later, when Pakistan conducted

its

own tests. Aside from the expected condemnations of Pakistan and

criticism

of the Clinton administration for allowing events to get so out of

hand,

a number of members voiced anxiety that South Asian tensions could

spiral

out of control. "This is the most serious situation since the Cuban

missile

crisis," Senator John McCain (R-AZ) warned, a judgment seconded by

Senator

Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) .3

Only days after the tests, President Bill Clinton responded as he was

legally

obligated under the Glenn amendment, slapping wide-ranging economic

and

military sanctions on New Delhi and Islamabad. Yet no sooner had

Washington

taken this stand on behalf of global non-proliferation norms than it

began

to walk back from its position. Within 18 months, the U.S. Congress

swung

from applauding strict sanctions to urging the president to waive not

only

the Glenn amendment, but also the Pressler and Symington amendments,

which

mandate further penalties for states engaged in certain nuclear

activity.

(For more information on this legislation, see text box on p. 11.)

Earlier

convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance as an object lesson

for

other nuclear threshold states, by the end of 1999 U.S. lawmakers had

completely

turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of non-proliferation policy.

Congressional anger over the South Asian tests had given way to

acceptance,

even understanding. Congress, it would appear, had abandoned 25 years

of

non-proliferation activity.

The U.S. Congress was trying to achieve multiple objectives that were

not

entirely compatible. Concerned about proliferation and wanting a voice

in foreign policy that would compete with the execufive branch, it had

mandated the sanctions. But when faced with post-Cold War national

interests,

the growing influence of the domestic South Asian-American community

and

an increasing interest in the subcontinent by U.S. business, the

legislators

moved non-proliferation to the back burner and renounced with dizzying

speed the sanctions on India and Pakistan they had so recently

supported.

The impact of these steps on the non-proliferation regime is not yet

clear.

But what is apparent is that Congress' love-hate relationship with

sanctions

as a tool of foreign policy is far from over.

The Retreat

Discomfort with the Glenn amendment sanctions surfaced shortly after

they

were imposed on Pakistan and served to trigger a broader discussion of

the utility of sanctions in general. It was time "to engage in a

serious

debate on the merits of using unilateral economic sanctions to achieve

foreign policy goals," Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) declared.

Observing

that the threat of sanctions had deterred neither India nor Pakistan

from

testing, he worried that U.S. sanctions could destabilize a Pakistan

already

burdened with enormous economic and political problems. "An unstable

Pakistan

with nuclear weapons," he added, "is not in our interests."4

Other comments focused more narrowly on U.S. economic interests.

"Pakistan

is not a trading partner we can afford to lose," cautioned the

chairman

of the House Agriculture Committee, Robert Smith (ROR), reflecting

sentiment

especially pronounced in wheat-growing areas of the Pacific Northwest.

"There is no leverage in cutting off our sales," complained Senator

Mitch

McConnell (R-KY). "It does not make a difference on the dinner table

in

Islamabad, but it sure will in Topeka."5

Recognizing this widespread dissatisfaction with sanctions, the Senate

leadership created a special 18-member task force, headed by McConnell

and Joseph Biden (D-DE), to examine both the way the India and

Pakistan

sanctions were working, and the larger question of how effective

sanctions

are in influencing the behavior of other nations. "There's a feeling

on

both sides of the aisle that perhaps the proclivity to place economic

sanctions

on countries around the world and with not a clear way of ending those

has become a problem," explained Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) in

what

was clearly an understatement. 6

It did not take long for this uneasiness over the Glenn amendment

sanctions

to translate into congressional action. The initial breach in the

sanctions

regime came in early July, less than two months after the first Indian

test. The impetus behind this move was readily apparent. Pakistan was

the

leading foreign buyer of U.S. white wheat, and the third largest

overseas

purchaser of all U.S. wheat. But unless Congress acted to permit

export

financing, U.S. farmers would be unable to participate in winter wheat

auctions in Pakistan, scheduled for mid-July.

"We are six days away from a disaster," warned Senator Ron Wyden (D-

OR)

in early July. "Farmers around the country are staring an economic

train

wreck in the eye."' The full Senate apparently agreed, rushing through

legislation without the normal committee review and voting 98-0 to

give

both India and Pakistan a one-year exemption from Glenn amendment

restrictions

on Department of Agriculture financing for the purchase of

agricultural

commodities from U.S. farmers.' The Senate bill originally contained

authority

for the president to waive other sanctions as well, but a filibuster

threat

by Senator John Glenn (DOH), author of the Glenn amendment and perhaps

the Senate's leading non-proliferation expert, succeeded in getting

this

provision dropped.

Action in the House was equally swift and revealing of congressional

priorities.

Representatives Robert Livingston (R-LA) and David Obey (D-WI), the

chairman

and ranking minority member, respectively, of the House Appropriations

Committee, urged a more considered approach, but not even these senior

power brokers could slow the stampede. This legislation, its

supporters

argued, did not indicate any lessening of the U.S. commitment to

nonproliferation.

To the contrary, by crafting a more focused sanctions policy, it would

help secure the domestic base for maintaining sanctions.

Such elaborate rationalizations could not hide the actual intent of

most

members, however. Hardly a word about nonproliferation figured in the

House

debate. No one displayed anger at India or Pakistan for violating

long-standing

international norms against testing. Instead, the debate was all about

helping the U.S. farmer, about not losing markets or penalizing

American

wheat growers. The House's leading non-proliferation proponents were

noticeably

absent during the debate. Not surprisingly, the House followed the

Senate's

lead and adopted the measure in time for American farmers to take part

in the Pakistani wheat auction.9

This modest step was quickly followed by others. The day after the

House's

approval of the wheat relief bill, the Senate, with the blessing of

the

administration, adopted the Brownback amendment. The Brownback

amendment-named

for its author, Kansas Republican Sam Brownback, chairman of the

Senate

subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian affairs-provided the

president

with the authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn,

Symington

and Pressler amendment sanctions, except for those pertaining to

military

assistance, dual-use exports and military sales.

Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), chairman of the Foreign Relations

Committee,

complained that the Senate had "rushed forward, willy nilly," without

adequate

review or committee hearings, but chose not to block passage.10 Glenn,

who might have been expected to protest this gutting of his namesake

legislation,

was conveniently away from Washington training for the space shuttle

flight

he was to make later in the year. Recalling Glenn's absence sometime

afterward,

one insider conceded that while not deliberately planned, Senate

action

on the legislation at the very moment its primary opponent was

preoccupied

with other matters was more than simply a happy coincidence.

The Brownback amendment (formally known as the India-Pakistan Relief

Act

of 1998) was incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations

bill

and signed into law in October 1998. Following its adoption, President

Clinton quickly restored funding for U.S. military training programs

in

India and Pakistan, as well as government-backed financing and credit

guarantees

for U.S. firms doing business there. Clinton also lifted restrictions

on

U.S. commercial loans and credits to both countries and announced that

Washington would support a pending Pakistani request before the

International

Monetary Fund. Encouraged by the absence of opposition to these steps,

Clinton then moved to eliminate another long-standing irritant in the

U.S.-Pakistani

relationship by agreeing to pay Islamabad $325 million in cash and

$140

million in goods as compensation for 28 F-16 aircraft that Pakistan

had

earlier bought, but whose delivery had been prevented by the 1990

triggering

of the Pressler amendment. Once more, Capitol Hill acquiesced

virtually

without dissent.

In October 1999, Congress took a further step by adopting, as part of

the

defense appropriations bill, another, more sweeping Brownback

amendment-sometimes

called Brownback II. This measure gave the president permanent

authority

to waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, all the provisions of

the

Glenn amendment. In addition, it authorized the president to waive the

Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions, which had prohibited

almost

all U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan since 1990.

Finally,

the legislation stated that the "broad application" of export controls

on Indian and Pakistani government agencies and private companies

suspected

of having links to their country's nuclear or missile programs (the

so-called

"entities list") was "inconsistent" with U.S. national security

interests.

Instead, the lawmakers urged the executive branch to apply U.S. export

controls only to those agencies and companies that made "direct and

material

contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and

only

to those items that can contribute to such programs."

Brownback II represented an extraordinary reversal of American policy.

The measure handed the president the authority to lift all sanctions

imposed

upon India and Pakistan as a result of their 1998 nuclear tests. More

remarkably

yet, Congress abandoned even those sanctions it had placed upon

Pakistan

prior to Islamabad's tests. Seventeen months after its nuclear

detonations,

Pakistan found itself far better off vis-a-vis American nuclear

non-proliferation

law than it had been at any time since 1990. Finally, with its

statement

on export controls, the U.S. Congress appeared to condemn rigorous

steps

to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology that might be used in

the

nuclear weapons or missile programs of India or Pakistan, and

implicitly

authorized the export of materials that might indirectly assist those

programs.

It was a stunning retreat from Capitol Hill's decades-long reliance on

punitive measures to block the spread of weapons of mass

destruction.11

Never happy about being forced in 1990 to trigger the Pressler

amendment,

the executive branch saw Brownback II as the achievement of a long-

desired

objective. Administration officials were pleased with the measure in

another

respect as well. An earlier draft of the legislation would have

suspended

for five years the Glenn, Symington and Pressler sanctions, whereas

Brownback

II, as finally adopted, gave the president the latitude to lift the

sanctions

only when and if he saw fit. This flexibility, the State Department

believed,

would strengthen the president's hand in subsequent negotiations with

India

and Pakistan.

The timing of these proceedings also merits mention. A House-Senate

conference

committee adopted the defense appropriations bill containing Brownback

II on October 11, 1999. The following day the Pakistani military

dismissed

the civilian government in Islamabad and seized power. On October 13

and

14, the House and Senate respectively took up the defense bill. Both

houses

adopted the measure by substantial majorities. The military coup in

Pakistan

was all but ignored during debate over the bill, with only one member

of

either house troubling to go to the floor to express skepticism about

the

wisdom of a wholesale abandonment of sanctions against Pakistan at the

very moment the Pakistani military was throwing out a democratically

elected

government. True, Brownback 11 was but one small provision in a huge

bill

appropriating over one-quarter of a trillion dollars. Nonetheless,

this

silence about contemporaneous events in Islamabad suggests just how

far

Congress had traveled since the South Asian tests 17 months earlier.

South Asia in the Congressional Mindset

All in all, it had been a remarkable year and a half. The United

States

had imposed extensive sanctions and then just as quickly lifted not

only

Glenn amendment sanctions, but Symington and Pressler amendment

restrictions

as well. Initially expressing concern for the global non-proliferation

regime, Congress, in less than 18 months, had moved to the position

that

it should not jeopardize other interests in pursuit of unobtainable

non-proliferation

objectives. How does one explain this dramatic transformation in

congressional

attitudes and actions?

The Indian-American community

Part of the explanation is political. As the 1990s unfolded, South

Asia,

and India in particular, gained increasing prominence on the

congressional

agenda. This new politically inspired concern for the region partly

reflected

changes in the Asian-American community. As recently as 1980, there

were

only 387,000 IndianAmericans in the United States. But the next two

decades

saw a dramatic increase in the size of this community. By 1997, this

number

had more than tripled, to 1,215,000. (The total U.S. population during

the same period grew by 17.8 percent.) By the later date, the Indian-

American

community comprised the third largest Asian-American population in the

country, surpassed only by Chinese- and Filipino-Americans.

Numbers tell only part of the story. The Indian-American community is

also

highly educated and prosperous. Fiftyeight percent of the adult

community

has at least a bachelor's degree. A larger percentage of the Indian-

American

work force holds a managerial or professional position than any other

group

in the country, with especially high representation among well-paid

doctors,

engineers, scientists, architects and computer professionals. As a

result,

the Indian-American per capita income exceeds that of every other

group

in the country, including whites.12

[IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH] Captioned as: A Nebraska wheat farmer harvests his

field

in summer. U.S. wheat farmers would have faced significant economic

consequences

had Congress not waived the nuclear testing-related sanctions imposed

on

Pakistan, which is the third-largest importer of U.S. wheat.

Until recently, this wealth and status had not translated into

political

clout, but that is rapidly changing. Since the community is widely and

relatively evenly distributed throughout all parts of the country, few

congressional districts are without at least a handful of Indian-

American

families. Even in states such as Kansas, where the Indian-American

community

is negligible, Senator Brownback notes that they make their presence

felt.13

The largest concentrations, however, reside in the major industrial-

urban

states of New York, New Jersey, California, Pennsylvania, Michigan,

Ohio,

Illinois, Texas, Florida and Massachusetts. As a whole, the community

has

avoided identification with either of the two major political parties

and

gives generously to both. Indian-Americans raised $4 million on behalf

of political candidates for the 1992 election, and the figures are

almost

certainly significantly higher today.14 "By their engagement and their

aggressiveness," Brownback has observed, "they're able to influence

things

beyond their numbers."15

Indian-American organizations now deliberately reach out to their

Washington

representatives. Professional groups, such as the American Association

of Physicians of Indian Origin, increasingly invite leading

congressional

supporters to address their meetings. The Indian American Friendship

Council-to

take but one example-sponsors a legislative conference in Washington

each

year, which prominent U.S. lawmakers are invited to address. The July

1999

conference, for instance, was attended by nearly 40 U.S. lawmakers and

featured speeches by House Minority Leader Gephardt; House

International

Relations Committee Chair Benjamin Gilman (R-NY); and Doug Bereuter

(R-NE),

chairman of the House Asia subcommittee.

These congressional addresses do not always feature careful or

measured

discussion of U.S.-Indian ties. Instead, these events encourage an

outpouring

of praise for India, condemnation of Pakistani policies and devotion

to

strong Indian-American ties. The U.S.-Indian relationship, Gephardt

told

council members at the 1999 conference, is possibly the most important

bilateral relationship in the world. Though perhaps harmless, such

exuberance

may serve to mislead members of the IndianAmerican community about the

current state or future direction of U.S. policy.

An important development for the clout of the Indian-American

community

on Capitol Hill occurred following the 1992 elections. That autumn,

Representative

Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY) fell victim to redistricting and lost his

congressional

seat. The influential chairman of the House subcommittee on Asia had

been

widely regarded as India's most energetic advocate in the Congress,

and

over the years had, almost alone among his congressional colleagues,

raised

large sums of money in the Indian-American community. Solarz's defeat

opened

the door for a junior New Jersey Democrat, Frank Pallone, who up to

this

time had displayed no particular interest in either American foreign

policy

or the Indian-American community.

At first the loss of Solarz was seen as a blow to the community's

influence,

but Pallone was a shrewd politician who had a need and recognized an

opportunity.

The need arose from the vicissitudes of redistricting, which had

thrown

a large Indian-American population into his new congressional

district.

The opportunity arose from the vacuum created by Solarz's departure. A

few weeks after the 1992 elections, Pallone enlisted six other

Democrats

and Florida Republican Bill McCollum to organize the Congressional

Caucus

on India and Indian Americans. One of the first congressional caucuses

devoted to promoting relations with a single country, the group grew

far

more rapidly than Pallone could have envisioned in even his wildest

fantasies.

By mid-1999, the India caucus, as it was invariably called, boasted a

membership

of 115 members, over a quarter of the entire House of Representatives.

Galvanized by Pallone's energetic leadership and considerable skills

for

publicizing both the caucus and his own role in Indian-American

affairs,

the organization aggressively argued the case for better U.S.-Indian

relations.

Pallone's office established an effective information and

communications

network and made certain that caucus members knew whenever the House

was

slated to vote on issues of interest to the Indian-American community@

The caucus distributed talking points, enlisted floor speakers and

lined

up votes. It provided India, for the first time, with an institutional

base of support on Capitol Hill and, according to one analyst, an

"anchor

to windward."

The Pakistani-American community

The Pakistani-American population is only one-tenth the size of the

IndianAmerican

community. Not surprisingly, it lags far behind its larger rival in

its

visibility and its clout on Capitol Hill. Pakistan has no

congressional

equivalent of the India caucus. Various efforts to organize a Pakistan

caucus have foundered on congressional indifference and the hard

political

reality that publicly aligning themselves with Pakistan holds few

political

incentives for most members of the U.S. Congress.

Throughout the 1980s and the close Pakistani-American partnership

against

the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Texas Democrat Charlie Wilson

was

an energetic and effective advocate for Islamabad in the House of

Representatives.

But since Wilson's retirement from Congress in 1996, no one has

stepped

forward to take his place. The situation is slightly more favorable

for

Pakistan in the Senate, where several members, including Brownback,

Harkin

and Robert Torricelli (D-Nj), are viewed as particularly sympathetic

to

Islamabad. Pakistan's marginally stronger position in the Senate has

influenced

the legislative strategy of the Clinton administration as it has

sought

statutory relief from congressionally mandated sanctions against

Islamabad.

In both 1998 and 1999, with Brownback I and II, the administration

focused

its efforts on securing adoption in the Senate. Since the equivalent

House

measure contained no comparable provision, a Senate-House conference

committee

resolved the issue, neatly sidestepping the potential obstacle

represented

by a separate House vote and a mobilized India caucus.

The U.S. business community

Constituent pressure, of course, constitutes only one of many sources

of

influence on members of Congress as they deal with South Asian issues.

In recent years, since India began opening up its economy in 1991,

economic

considerations and the American business community have also assumed a

larger role on matters pertaining to the subcontinent. Although its

promise

still far exceeds its actual performance, the Indian market, with its

alluring

prospect of several hundred million middle-class consumers, has

increasingly

attracted the attention of both Wall Street and Main Street.

This new business interest has been reflected on Capitol Hill. Many

members

of Congress, constantly on the lookout for fresh sales and investment

opportunitieswhich

can mean more jobs for constituents and greater profits for local

businessesfind

their gaze more and more drawn to South Asia and to India above all.

Paeans

to India's economic reforms have replaced denunciations of Nehruvian

socialism

as standard congressional rhetoric. Traveling legislators, who once

shunned

the subcontinent, now regularly pass through New Delhi, the financial

center

of Mumbai (Bombay) and the Indian Silicon Valley in Bangalore.

Private groups such as the U.S.-India Business Council and the India

Interest

Group lobby individual members of Congress on behalf of sanctions

relief

and U.S. government credits and investment guarantees, According to

several

of Capitol Hill's most knowledgeable South Asia experts, U.S. business

and agricultural groups were "key" to the July 1998 rollback of some

of

the Glenn amendment sanctions. 16 These same organizations also

supported

the 1998 and 1999 Brownback amendments that further loosened

legislative

restrictions on India and Pakistan. Combined with a larger, more

politically

active Indian-American community, American business interests over the

past seven or eight years have pushed the U.S. Congress to pay more

attention

to South Asia and, most strikingly, to foster a more cordial U.S.-

Indian

relationship.

New threats to American security

Security considerations have contributed as well to this newfound

interest

in U.S.-Indian partnership. For many years, most members of Congress

saw

the region primarily in terms of the Cold War competition with the

Soviet

Union. Pakistan was a valued ally, while India, for reasons most

legislators

found utterly inexplicable, was entirely too cozy with Moscow. With

the

disappearance of the Soviet threat, however, congressional anxieties

have

increasingly centered on two other potential challenges to American

security:

China and Islamic fundamentalism. The result has been a shift in

attitudes

toward India and Pakistan.

Confronted with the grim scenes from Tiananmen Square at the very

moment

the Cold War was coming to a close, many members of Congress, both

conservatives

and liberals, almost effortlessly replaced their concerns about a

Soviet

threat to American ideals and interests with similar worries about the

People's Republic of China. In the eyes of some, India took on a new

importance

as a hedge against a China turned aggressive. Others asked if the

world's

largest democracy and its most powerful democracy did not share a

value

system fundamentally at odds with that espoused by the communist

regime

in Beijing. Brownback, for one, is outspoken in his criticism of the

manner

in which the Clinton administration has handled relations with China

and

India. The White House, he charged in a speech to the U.S.-India

Business

Council in June 1999, has consistently rewarded China, "a country that

has openly and continually challenged U.S. interests and values,"

while

"first ignoring, and now punishing" India. "The inequity in this

situation,"

he contended, "is both striking and counterintuitive. Why reward the

country

which is aggressively working against everything we stand for, and at

the

same time punish and blackmail a country with which we share basic

values

and interests?"

A growing concern about terrorism sponsored by radical Islamic groups

matched

this uneasiness about the future course of U.S. relations with China.

And

fears about Islamic terrorism served to promote anxieties about Muslim

Pakistan and, in some quarters, new support for India. More and more,

U.S.

legislators equated Pakistan with an Islamic fundamentalism that, in

their

view, posed a serious threat to American interests at home and abroad.

Islamabad's support for the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir and,

even

more, for the radical Taliban in Afghanistan only reinforced such

concerns.

Congressional backing for Israel entered into the equation as well.

Some

of Israel's friends on the Hill voiced concern that Pakistan might

share

its nuclear knowhow with Iran or other Arab states hostile to Israel.

Shortly

after Pakistan's nuclear tests, a group of legislators circulated news

reports highlighting a visit to Pakistan by Iran's foreign minister,

and

pointedly speculated whether the trip, coming on the heels of

Islamabad's

nuclear tests, was mere coincidence. "We believe it is vital for the

Congress

to learn the full story about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and

any

possible illegal transfers of information and technology to Iran,"

they

wrote. Robert Menendez (D-Nj) warned his House colleagues that

"Pakistan's

decision to test a nuclear weapon has raised the frightening specter

of

an 'Islamic bomb' being directed at Israel." 17

Limits to U.S. Sanctions

The net effect of this rapid shift on sanctions policy toward South

Asia

is difficult to determine. At the most basic level, it is hard to

escape

the conclusion that U.S. non-proliferation policy toward South Asia-

the

policy of the executive branch as well as of the Congress-has utterly

failed

if success is defined as keeping nuclear weapons out of the region. A

quarter

century of American threats, blandishments and exhortations deterred

neither

India nor Pakistan from moving forward on a nuclear weapons program.

The

certainty of sanctions did not stop either country from conducting

nuclear

tests. And having crossed that nuclear Rubicon, neither New Delhi nor

Islamabad

was compelled to roll back its weapons program because of U.S.

sanctions.

These bald judgments, however, demand qualification. The fact that

U.S.

policy ultimately failed to keep nuclear weapons out of South Asia

does

not mean that it was without impact. Absent U.S. opposition, India and

Pakistan might well have accelerated their weapons programs. The South

Asian nuclear race might have heated up far sooner, and with results

far

more dangerous, had the United States not invested considerable time,

energy

and diplomatic capital in trying to prevent the spread of nuclear

weaponry

to the subcontinent. In truth, definitively evaluating the success or

failure

of America's non-proliferation policies in South Asia is not as easy

as

it may first appear.

Moreover, in gauging the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions-both the

threat

and their actual imposition-in influencing the behavior of Islamabad

and

New Delhi, one must also recognize that the United States never

attempted

to wield the full force of its economic might. Glenn amendment

sanctions

were perhaps more notable for their gaps than their comprehensive

nature.

India, for instance, had been scheduled to receive $54.3 million in

development

assistance in fiscal year 1998. Of this total, $36.3 million was for

activities

exempt from the Glenn amendment sanctions--child survival projects,

health

and family planning programs, environmental projects, and related

programs.

U.S. food aid to India, which totaled approximately $92 million a

year,

was also permitted under the Glenn amendment. Ultimately, India lost

only

$12 million in direct aid and $9 million in housing loan guarantees

from

its 1998 aid package, and $4-5 million in deobligations from money

appropriated

in earlier years. Even U.S. opposition to World Bank loans was hedged,

as Clinton administration officials argued that the ban did not extend

to humanitarian assistance. Pakistan similarly escaped many of the

more

draconian aspects of a full aid cutoff.18 For all the hue and cry

about

inflexible sanctions, the Glenn amendment proved remarkably flexible.

In part, this reluctance to use all the means at its disposal to wreck

the economies of India and Pakistan reflected a U.S. recognition that

as

important as non-proliferation was, the United States had other

critical

interests in South Asia that deserved protection as well. India and

Pakistan

occupy a strategic corner of the globe, and regional instability could

threaten American political and security interests in the Middle East,

central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Important U.S. economic interests

required

safeguarding. Washington sought to promote economic development for

the

region and to address pressing social needs. Good governance and the

strengthening

of democratic institutions were key American objectives. Fostering

regional

cooperation and combating terrorism and narcotics trafficking were

other

priorities. In other words, no one objective, no matter how worthy,

was

so vital as to justify jeopardizing Washington's ability to pursue its

many interests in the region.

Pakistan's precarious political and economic situation also placed

limits

on how hard Washington could lean on Islamabad. Ever mindful of the

fact

that an economic or political collapse in Pakistan might contribute to

the rise of Islamic radicalism, U.S. officials drew back from actions

that

might push Pakistan over the edge. Augmenting these fears, moreover,

was

the concern that an impoverished Islamabad might look for ready cash

by

selling its nuclear technology to Iran or other "rogue" nations,

thereby

contributing to the very proliferation Washington sought to block.

Finally, the refusal of the international community to follow the

American

lead in imposing penalties on India and Pakistan undercut the impact

of

U.S. sanctions and reduced congressional incentives for plugging the

loopholes

in the American sanctions regime. Japan and several European nations

did

suspend loans and grants or apply other economic sanctions following

the

May 1998 tests, but like U.S. sanctions, the global regime was

noteworthy

more for its exceptions than its inclusiveness.

This combination of circumstances has led most South Asian experts-

though

not necessarily non-proliferation specialiststo conclude that a U.S.

policy

built around the threat or use of sanctions has failed to advance the

American

national interest.19 This judgment reflects the congressional

consensus

as well. In a speech on April 3, 1999, Representative Gary Ackerman

(DNY),

who had replaced Pallone as the Democratic co-chair of the Indian

caucus

earlier that year, spoke for many of his congressional colleagues when

he observed, "Sanctions are too blunt a weapon to be used by us

against

a sister democracy such as India. Sanctions aren't good for India; and

they aren't good for America either."

Not even new Indian and Pakistani provocations slowed Capitol Hill's

headlong

repudiation of sanctions. The publication by India in mid-1999 of a

draft

nuclear doctrine envisioning the creation of a nuclear triad of air-,

sea-

and groundlaunched nuclear weapons-a plan roundly condemned by the

Clinton

administration and a handful of legislators-had absolutely no effect

on

congressional support for Brownback 11. Instead, India partisans such

as

Pallone took the publication of the draft doctrine as another

indication

of New Delhi's transparency and political maturity. India, Pallone

insisted,

had good reason to seek a credible deterrent, considering the

provocations

of Pakistan and China.20

Similarly, Pakistan's reckless involvement in and responsibility for

the

Kargil incursion, which in the summer of 1999 briefly revived fears of

a full-scale conflict between South Asia's nuclear-armed rivals,

failed

to derail congressional approval for Brownback 11. Tests of nuclear-

capable

ballistic missiles by both countries went largely unnoticed on the

Hill.

Finally, the October 1999 coup in Islamabad did not halt the drive to

free

Pakistan from Pressler as well as Glenn amendment restrictions.

Congress,

it would seem, was hell-bent on lifting sanctions on its South Asian

friends,

come what may.

The Sanctions Paradox

Given the remarkable backpedaling that so rapidly followed the

imposition

of the Glenn amendment sanctions, one might reasonably ask why

Congress

adopted legislation mandating such sanctions in the first place. Few

regional

specialists believe Washington's nuclear-related sanctions have

worked.

Most contend that congressional legislation has produced faulty policy

based on a failure to understand South Asia's regional dynamics.

Sanctions,

many would add, have even been counterproductive to the achievement of

U.S. non-proliferation objectives. So has the South Asian experience

disillusioned

Congress about the utility of sanctions as a foreign policy tool?

On the contrary, there has been a dramatic increase in sanctions

legislation

in recent years. From a congressional perspective, sanctions and the

threat

of sanctions are not the illogical or misinformed initiatives many

foreign

policy experts assume. Such measures meet various congressional needs.

First, they give Congress a voice in determining U.S. foreign policy,

in

a sphere in which the executive branch wields most of the power. To

complain,

therefore, that sanctions are a blunt instrument, as many critics do,

misses

the point. They are better than no instrument at all.

Second, sanctions can represent a legitimate effort to warn foreign

governments.

not to take particular actions or cross certain lines. Few people in

1985

thought that the Pressler amendment would ever be triggered. Its

principal

purpose was to caution Islamabad not to push its nuclear development

too

far.

Third, sanctions sometimes reflect a congressional distrust of the

executive

branch. Congress might legislate non-proliferation sanctions, for

instance,

because it believes that the White House is not giving this issue

sufficient

priority.

[IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH] Captioned as: Citizens protest the U.S.-imposed

sanctions

on India ky dumping Coke and Pepsi down a drain in 1998. The Indian-

American

community helped pressure Congress into lifting the sanctions in 1999.

Finally, the enactment of sanctions can serve political or partisan

needs.

By including a presidential waiver in sanctions legislation, Congress

can

in effect have it both ways. Legislators can appear to be taking a

tough

stand on an issue while actually placing ultimate responsibility upon

the

president for imposing sanctions and for the negative consequences the

sanctions might produce.

Although South Asian developments suggest that some members of

Congress

have now begun to rethink the wisdom of this wholesale reliance on

sanctions,

particularly those of a unilateral nature, legislation threatening

sanctions

meets too many congressional needs to be removed from the legislative

arsenal

in the near future. Indeed, in the very month that Clinton imposed

Glenn

amendment sanctions on India and Pakistan, the House adopted the

International

Religious Freedom Act of 1998, which by some estimates could result in

new sanctions on as many as 75 countries.21

So we are left with something of a paradox. Congress appears to have

little

stomach for maintaining sanctions against India or Pakistan, either to

punish them for their tests, to coerce them into reversing the

direction

of their nuclear programs, or more generally, to send a message to

other

nuclear threshold states that may be tempted to emulate the Indian and

Pakistani examples. Nor does the Hill appear prepared to hold out for

a

deal in which the United States would lift sanctions in exchange for

specific

Indian or Pakistani steps short of a complete nuclear rollback, such

as

signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Legislators

are

unwilling to pay the domestic price sanctions frequently entail,

particularly

since sanctions hold no assurance of success in achieving U.S. non-

proliferation

objectives. Members, moreover, have a legitimate fear that a punitive

approach

toward Islamabad and New Delhi will preclude the achievement of other

important

U.S. objectives in South Asia, strain Washington's relations with

friends

and allies, or push Pakistan over the precipice into the clutches of

Islamic

radicalism.

Nonetheless, members of Congress will almost certainly continue to

insist

on their right and responsibility to exercise a voice in the conduct

of

the nation's foreign policies, as indeed they should. With different

political

constituencies and constitutional duties than the president, they will

frequently disagree with the executive in their definition of the

national

interest, and in their judgments as to the best means for preserving

and

promoting that interest. And they will remain attracted by the

apparent

advantages sanctions legislation offers.

So the paradox is likely to remain, recalling the old adage that

everybody

wants to go to heaven, but no one wants to die. Congress will continue

to encroach upon the executive's freedom of action, to mandate

sanctions-and

to recoil at the consequences. U.S. policy, in short, is likely to

replay

the strange gyrations that marked congressional efforts in 1998 and

1999

to fashion a policy to meet both the new nuclear realities of South

Asia

and the new political realities of Washington. Whether American policy

will also advance the global nonproliferation agenda is rather more in

doubt.

KEY LEGISLATION

Symington Amendment

Adopted 1976. Sec. 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec.

669

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.

Prohibits most U.S. assistance to any country found trafficking in

nuclear

enrichment equipment or technology outside of international

safeguards.

President Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symington

amendment

in 1979 because of Islamabad's clandestine construction of a uranium

enrichment

plant. U.S. aid to Islamabad was possible between 1982 and 1990 only

through

the use of presidential waivers.

Adopted 1977. Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly

Sec.

670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.

Prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as

defined

by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) that, among other things,

detonates

a nuclear explosive device. President Bill Clinton imposed Glenn

amendment

sanctions against India on May 13, 1998, two days after New Delhi

broke

its self-imposed 24-year moratorium on nuclear testing. On May 30,

1998,

Clinton invoked similar sanctions against Pakistan, following

Islamabad's

six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30.

Pressler Amendment

Adopted 1985. Sec. 620E[e] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as

amended.

Originally banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistan

unless

the U.S. president certified, on an annual basis, that Pakistan did

not

possess a nuclear explosive device, and that the provision of U.S. aid

would significantly reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing such a

device.

In October 1990, President George Bush was unable to issue this

certification,

which triggered the Pressler amendment prohibitions. In 1995, the

Brown

amendment exempted most forms of economic assistance from the Pressler

amendment prohibitions.

Brownback I

Adopted 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated into

the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277).

Provides the president with authority to waive, for a period of one

year,

Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions on India and

Pakistan,

except for those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use exports

and

military sales.

Brownback II

Adopted 1999. Incorporated into the fiscal year 2000 defense

appropriations

bill (Public Law 106-79).

Gives the president indefinite authority to waive, with respect to

India

and Pakistan, all the provisions of the Glenn, Symington and Pressler

amendments.

States that the "broad application" of export controls on Indian and

Pakistani

government agencies and private companies suspected of having links to

their country's nuclear or missile programs is "inconsistent" with the

national security interests of the United States, and urges the

application

of U.S. export controls only against agencies and companies that make

"direct

and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile

programs

and only to those items that can contribute to such programs."

NOTES

1. Edward Markey, draft letter to President Clinton, May 12, 1998; Dan

Burton, Dear Colleague letter, May 12,1998; Tom Harkin, Congres

sional Record, May 12, 1998, p. S4680.

2. Congressional Record, May 12,1998, p. H3081; Eliza Newlin Carney,

"Another

Kind of Arms Race," National journal, June 6, 1998, p. 1306.

3. Jim Abrams, "Asia: U.S. Says Situation Serious, Calls for Global

Efforts,"

Associated Press, June 1,1998.

4. Richard Lugar, Dear Colleague letter, June 4, 1998.

5. Robert Sn-dth, Congressional Quarterly, June 6, 1998, p. 1544;

Mitch

McConnell, Congressional Quarterly, July 11, 1998, p. 1891.

6. Tom Raum, "Senate Panel to Study Effectiveness of U.S. Sanctions,"

Associated

Press, June 27,1998.

7. Congressional Quarterly, July 11, 1998, p. 1891.

8. In addition, the legislation permanently removed medicines, medical

equipment and fertilizer from the application of sanctions.

9. Public Law 105-194, the Agriculture Export Relief Act. U.S. wheat

farmers

won the contract.

10. Congressional Record, July 15, 1998, p. S8184.

11. The export control provision of this measure was even more

startling

for coming at a time when congressional Republicans were inflamed over

possibly illegal transfers to China that might have assisted Beijing's

missile development efforts.

12. Sharon M. Lee, "Asian Americans: Diverse and Growing," Population

Bulletin,

June 1998; Karen Isaksen Leonard, The South Asian Americans (Westport,

CT Greenwood, 1997). The author is indebted to Joanna Yu for her

research

assistance in compiling these statistics.

13. Author interview with Senator Sam Brownback, August 3, 1999.

14. Carney, "Another Kind of Arms Race," p. 1306.

15. Brownback interview.

16. Barbara Leitch LePoer, et al., "India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests and

U.S.

Response," CRS Report for Congress, November 24, 1998, p. 35;

Brownback

interview.

17. Gary Ackerman, et al., Dear Colleague letter, June 11, 1998;

Robert

Menendez, Dear Colleague letter, June 16, 1998.

18. LePoer, et al., pp. 22-26.

19. See, for example, Richard N. Haass and Gideon Rose, eds., A New

U.S.

Policy Toward India and Pakistan (New York: Council on Foreign

Relations,

1997); and Richard N. Haass and Morton H. Halperin, eds., After the

Tests:

U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan (New York: Council on Foreign

Relations,

1998).

20. Aziz Haniffa, "Pallone Hails New Delhi's Transparency," India

Abroad,

August 27, 1999,

21. Public Law 105-292.

Robert M. Hathaway, who served for 12 years on the professional staff

of

the House In ternational Relations Committee, is director of the Asia

Program

at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.

Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.

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