Superior Court, State of California



DATE: Thursday, 10 February 2022

TIME: 9:00 A.M.

This Department prefers that litigants use Zoom for Law and Motion and for Case Management Calendars. Court Call is also acceptable.

All Courts of California celebrate the diversity of the attorneys and the litigants who appear in our Courts. Do not hesitate to correct the Court or Court Staff concerning the pronunciation of any name or how anyone prefers to be addressed. As this Court is fond of saying, “with a name like mine, I try to be careful how I pronounce the names of others.” If your client is with you, please inform the Court how your client would prefer to be introduced. The Court encourages the use of diacritical marks, multiple surnames and the like for the names of attorneys, litigants and in court papers.

You may use these links for Case Management Conferences and Trial Setting Conferences without Court permission. Informal Discovery Conferences and appearances on Ex Parte applications will be set on Order by the Court.

|Join Zoom Meeting |Join by phone: |One tap mobile |

| (669) 900-6833 |+16699006833,,961 4442 7712# |

|NFBpSjlEam5xUT09 |Meeting ID: 961 4442 7712 | |

|Meeting ID: 961 4442 7712 | | |

|Password: 017350 | | |

PLEASE READ THIS PAGE IN ITS ENTIRETY AS SOME OF THE PROTOCOLS HAVE CHANGED.

Please check this Tentative Rulings page before making any appearance.

Whether appearing in person or on a virtual platform, the usual custom and practices of decorum and attire apply.

For new Rules of Court concerning remote hearings and appearances, please review California Rules of Court, rule 3.672.

This Court expects all counsel and litigants to comply with the Tentative Rulings Procedures that are outlined in Local Civil Rule 7(E) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308. If the Court has not directed argument, oral argument must be permitted only if a party notifies all other parties and the Court at (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party's intention to appear. A party must notify all other parties by telephone or in person. A failure to timely notify this Court and/or the opposing parties may result in the tentative ruling being the final order in the matter.

Please notify this Court immediately if the matter will not be heard on the scheduled date. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1304(b). If a party fails to appear at a law and motion hearing without having given notice, this Court may take the matter off calendar, to be reset only upon motion, or may rule on the matter. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1304(d). A party may give notice that he or she will not appear at a law and motion hearing and submit the matter without an appearance unless this Court orders otherwise. This Court will rule on the motion as if the party had appeared. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1304(c). Any uncontested matter or matters to which stipulations have been reached can be processed through the Clerk in the usual manner. Please include a proposed order.

All proposed orders and papers should be submitted to this Department’s e-filing queue. Do not send documents to the Department email unless directed to do so.

APPEARANCES.

While the Court will still allow physical appearances, all litigants are encouraged to use the Zoom platform for Law & Motion appearances and Case Management Conferences. Use of other virtual platform devices will make it difficult for all parties fully to participate in the hearings. Please note the requirement of entering a password (highlighted above.)

As for personal appearances, protocols concerning social distancing and facial coverings in compliance with the directives of the Public Health Officer will be enforced. Currently, facemasks are required in all courthouses. If you appear in person, it will be helpful if you wear a disposable paper mask while using the courtroom microphones so that your voice will not be muffled.

Individuals who wish to access the Courthouse are advised to bring a plastic bag within which to place any personal items that are to go through the metal detector located at the doorway to the courthouse.

Sign-ins will begin at about 8:30 AM. Court staff will assist you when you sign in. If you are using the Zoom virtual platform, it will helpful if you “rename” yourself as follows: in the upper right corner of the screen with your name you will see a blue box with three horizontal dots. Click on that and then click on the “rename” feature. You may type your name as: Line #/name/party. If you are a member of the public who wishes to view the Zoom session and remain anonymous, you may simply sign in as “Public.”

The Santa Clara County Superior Court has established listen-only telephone Lines to allow remote access to public court proceedings. To listen to a public court proceeding in Department 20, you may dial 888-251-2909. When prompted, enter the access code number 4362730 when prompted, followed by the pound or hashtag (#) sign.

COURT REPORTERS.

This session will not be recorded. No electronic recordings, video, still photography or audio capture of this live stream is allowed without the expressed, written permission of the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara. State and Local Court rules prohibit photographing or recording of court proceedings whether in the courtroom or while listening on the Public Access Line or other virtual platform, without a Court Order. See Local General Rule 2(A) and 2(B); California Rules of Court, rule 1.150.

This Court no longer provides for Court Reporters in civil actions except in limited circumstances. If you wish to arrange for a court reporter, please use Local Form #CV-5100. All reporters are encouraged to work from a remote location. Please inform this Court if any reporter wishes to work in the courtroom. This Court will approve all requests to bring a court reporter. Counsel should meet and confer on the use of a court reporter. Occasionally each side will retain a court reporter which leaves this Court in a conundrum as to which reporter will be the official reporter for the purposes of the hearing.

PROTOCOLS DURING THE HEARINGS.

During the calling of any hearing, this Court has found that the Zoom video platform works very well. But whether using Zoom or any telephone, it is preferable to use a landline if possible. IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS TO SPEAK SLOWLY. Plaintiff should speak first, followed by any other person. All persons should spell their names for the benefit of Court Staff. Please do not use any hands-free mode if at all possible. Headsets or earbuds of good quality will be of great assistance to minimize feedback and distortion.

The Court will prepare the Final Order unless stated otherwise below or at the hearing. Counsel are to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.

Troubleshooting Tentative Rulings.

To access a tentative ruling, move your cursor over the line number, hold down the “Control” key and click. If you see last week’s tentative rulings, you have checked prior to the posting of the current week’s tentative rulings. You will need to either “REFRESH” or “QUIT” your browser and reopen it. Another suggestion is to “clean the cache” of your browser. Finally, you may have to switch browsers. If you fail to do any of these, your browser may pull up old information from old cookies even after the tentative rulings have been posted.

Tentative Rulings Are Continued Below. Full Orders Are On The Following Pages.

This Court's tentative ruling is just that—tentative. Trial courts are not bound by their tentative rulings, which are superseded by the final order. (See Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1374-1375.) The tentative ruling allows a party to focus his or her arguments at a subsequent hearing and to attempt to convince the Court the tentative should or should not become the Court's final order. (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 907, 917.)

If you wish to challenge a tentative ruling, please refer to a specific portion of the tentative ruling to which you disagree.

|LINE # |CASE # |CASE TITLE |RULING |

|LINE 1 |2012-1-CV-218983 |Louis R. Chiaramonte v. Leonard Marrero |Order of Examination of Annette Gonzalez. |

| | |Mezzetti Financial Services, Inc., Assignee. |CONTINUED FROM 09 DECEMBER 2021. The parties were ordered back to |

| | | |today’s date and time. |

| | | |This Court was the trial judge in the underlying unlawful detainer |

| | | |proceeding. This Court has also been a customer of Chiaramonte’s |

| | | |Delicatessen. |

| | | |Unless the parties agree otherwise, both parties are to appear in |

| | | |Department 20 at 9:00 AM. Social Distancing Protocols will be in |

| | | |effect, including the use of appropriate facial masks. As an |

| | | |alternative to appearing in Department 20, the parties are strongly |

| | | |urged to appear virtually whereby the appropriate oath will be |

| | | |administered by the Court and the parties may conduct the examination |

| | | |off-line and report back to the Court. The parties may meet and |

| | | |confer on how to conduct the examination remotely. |

| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 2 |21CV382884 |Brigitte Ann Barron v. Lisa Cook |Motion of Lisa Cook To Quash Service of Summons and Complaint. |

| | | |Specially-appearing defendant Cook’s motion to quash plaintiff |

| | | |Brigitte Barron’s service of summons and complaint is GRANTED. |

| | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 3 |21CV383387 |Arturo Angeles v. East Bay Fire; Tisco Fire System; |Demurrer of Defendants To Plaintiff’s Complaint. |

| | |Naveen Thukral |Defendants’ demurrer to the first through ninth causes of action in |

| | | |plaintiff Angeles’s complaint on the ground that the pleading does not|

| | | |state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code Civ. |

| | | |Proc., §430.10, subd. (e)] is OVERRULED. |

| | | |Defendants’ demurrer to the tenth through twelfth causes of action in |

| | | |plaintiff Angeles’s complaint on the ground that court has no |

| | | |jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the |

| | | |pleading [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (a)] and on the ground that |

| | | |the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of |

| | | |action [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (e)] is OVERRULED. |

| | | |Defendants will have 10 days from the filing and service of this order|

| | | |within which to ANSWER. |

| | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 4 |19CV351584 |William Girard, Shira Burns v. Office Depot, Inc. |Motion of Plaintiff to Compel Defendant to Provide Responses to |

| | | |Plaintiff’s Second Set of Special Interrogatories. |

| | | |Defendant filed opposition to the motion. Plaintiffs did not file any |

| | | |reply papers. |

| | | |This Court has previously ruled that the report in question is not |

| | | |subject to discovery. The motion is DENIED. |

| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 5 |21CV379196 |Rachele Piazza v. ON Semiconductor Connectivity |Motion of Defendants to Compel Plaintiff to Provide Further Responses |

| | |Solutions, Inc.; Quantenna Wireless Systems, Inc.; |to Discovery Etc. and for Monetary Sanctions. |

| | |Chris Swanson |Defendant served the discovery at issue here was on 16 June 2021 |

| | | |plaintiff requested and defendant granted extensions of time within |

| | | |which to respond. Appropriate meet and confer took place in which |

| | | |plaintiff indicated a response to the meet and confer letter would be |

| | | |received by 15 October 2021 and granted two additional weeks for |

| | | |defendant to bring a motion to compel responses/further responses. |

| | | |That time came and went. Further attempts by defendant went |

| | | |unrequited. |

| | | |Plaintiff asserts and defense counsel recognizes (and, for that |

| | | |matter, so does this Court) that plaintiff and counsel have had |

| | | |certain personal challenges which have arisen in the past few months. |

| | | |However, the discovery in question was served a long time ago and the |

| | | |information sought is not particularly complicated nor does counsel |

| | | |for plaintiff represent that it is. |

| | | |The motion to compel further responses is GRANTED as follows: |

| | | |Plaintiff is to produce verified code compliant responses without |

| | | |objections to General Form Interrogatories Nos. 6.5, 8.7, 9.1, and |

| | | |9.2; Employment Form Interrogatories Nos. 210.2, 210.3, 212.5 and . |

| | | |213.1; Special Interrogatories Nos. 15 and 26; and Requests for |

| | | |Production Nos. 1-10, 12-23, 25-35, 37-42, 43-46, 48-51) within 20 |

| | | |days of the filing and service of this order. |

| | | |The request for monetary sanctions is code compliant as it identifies |

| | | |the party against whom the request for sanctions is requested along |

| | | |with citation of appropriate authority. The court will award monetary |

| | | |sanctions against plaintiff in the amount of $3,690.00 within 20 days |

| | | |of the filing and service of this order. |

| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 6 |21CV381025 |Northpoint Capital Fund, LLC v. Eagle Home Loans and |Motion of Plaintiff to Compel Defendants to Provide Responses to Form |

| | |Investment, LLC; Iron Springs Development, LLC; Saul |and Special Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents, That|

| | |Flores; James McClenahan; |Request for Admissions to Be Deemed Admitted, and for Monetary |

| | | |Sanctions. |

| | | |The motion is unopposed. The motion is GRANTED in its entirety. |

| | | |Defendants are to provide code compliant responses without objection |

| | | |to form and special interrogatories, and request for production of |

| | | |documents within 20 days of the filing and service of this order. The |

| | | |request for admissions are deemed ADMITTED. Defendants are to pay the |

| | | |sum of $2,508.00 to counsel for plaintiff within 20 days of the filing|

| | | |and service of this order. |

| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 7 |16CV297293 |American Anchorpoint Academies, Inc. v. Bethany Sulan |Motion of Defendant to Enforce Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Code |

| | |Liou, et al |of Civil Procedure, § 664.6. |

| | | |There is no opposition to this motion. The motion is GRANTED. Counsel|

| | | |for moving party is to prepare an appropriate order and judgment and |

| | | |submit the documents to this Department via the clerk’s e-filing |

| | | |queue. |

| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 8 |19CV357022 |Stephen Ganley v. Apple, Inc. |Motion of Jeffrey D. Janoff, Esq. To Withdraw As Attorney for |

| | | |Plaintiff. |

| | | |The motion is unopposed. |

| | | |The motion is GRANTED. Good cause has been shown in the declaration of|

| | | |Mr. Janoff. |

| | | |The motion of defendant for summary judgment, filed on 21 January |

| | | |2022, is currently calendared for 02 June 2022 at 9:00 AM in this |

| | | |Department. Good cause appearing, this Court will order that the |

| | | |motion for summary judgment be ADVANCED to 07 April 2022 at 9:00 AM in|

| | | |this Department. This Court will modify the proposed order of |

| | | |withdrawal to reflect that date. |

| | | |The current trial date of 09 May 2022 at 8:45 AM is to REMAIN AS SET. |

| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 9 | 21CV387631 | Fuzu Li vs GEICO General Insurance Company |Motion of Defendant GEICO General Insurance Company to Dismiss/Stay |

| | | |and to Compel Appraisal. |

| | | |The motion of GEICO General Insurance Company to dismiss/stay this |

| | | |action is GRANTED as follows: the action will be STAYED until the |

| | | |arbitration provision contained in the policy of insurance is |

| | | |completed according to the terms of the policy. |

| | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 10 |2015-1-CV-283498 |American Express Bank FSB v. Jack Hansen |Motion of Plaintiff to Vacate the Dismissal and Enter Judgment against|

| | | |Defendant. |

| | | |The motion is GRANTED. Counsel for moving party is to prepare an |

| | | |appropriate order and judgment and submit the documents to this |

| | | |Department via the clerk’s e-filing queue. |

| | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 11 |18CV323876 |SLC Cold Storage v. Harvest King Trading USA, Limited |Motion of Cross-Defendant/Cross-Complainant SLC Cold Storage LLC for |

| | | |Terminating Sanctions. |

| | | |This Court has had insufficient opportunity to review the supplemental|

| | | |briefs and requests that counsel meet and confer and agree on a time |

| | | |to further discuss this motion on the afternoon of Monday, Tuesday or |

| | | |Wednesday 14-16 February 2022 between 1:30 PM and 4:30 PM. |

| | | |NO FORMAL TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 12 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 13 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 14 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 15 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 16 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 17 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 18 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 19 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 20 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 21 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 22 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 23 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 24 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 25 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 26 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 27 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 28 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 29 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

|LINE 30 | | |SEE ATTACHED TENTATIVE RULING. |

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 1

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 2

| | |

|SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |

|COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |

| | |

|DEPARTMENT 20 | |

| | |

|161 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 | |

|408.882.2320 · 408.882.2296 (fax) | |

|smanoukian@ | |

| |(For Clerk's Use Only) |

|CASE NO.: |21CV382884 |Brigitte Ann Barron v. Lisa Cook |

|DATE: 10 February 2022 |TIME: 9:00 am |LINE NUMBER: 2 |

|This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 20 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. |

|Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 20 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM on 09 February 2022. Please |

|specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and Counsel. |

|---oooOooo--- |

|Order on Specially Appearing Defendant Lisa Cook’s |

|Motion to Quash Plaintiff Brigitte Barron’s |

|Service of Summons and Complaint. |

I. Statement of Facts.

On 10 June 2019, plaintiff Brigitte Ann Barron (“Barron”) slipped and fell on property located at 1425 Magnolia Avenue in Redding owned by defendant Lisa Cook (“Cook”). (Complaint, page 2.)

On 10 June 2021[1], plaintiff Barron filed a handwritten complaint against defendant Cook.

On 29 October 2021, specially appearing defendant Cook filed the motion now before the court, a motion to quash service of summons and complaint.

II. Motion to Quash.

“A defendant is under no duty to respond in any way to a defectively served summons. It makes no difference that defendant had actual knowledge of the action. Such knowledge does not dispense with statutory requirements for service of summons.” (Weil & Brown, et al., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: CIV. PROC. BEFORE TRIAL (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶4:414, p. 4-69 citing Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466 (Kappel) and Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808 (Ruttenberg).) “[N]otice does not substitute for proper service. Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Ruttenberg, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.) “[I]n California, ‘...the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.’” (Id. at p. 809.)

Appellant was under no duty to act upon a defectively served summons. The requirement of notice ‘is not satisfied by actual knowledge without notification conforming to the statutory requirements’ [citation]; it is long-settled that methods of service are to be strictly construed and that a court does not acquire jurisdiction where personal service is relied upon but has not in fact taken place.

(Kappel, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1466 – 1467.)

A “defendant’s first line of attack normally is a motion to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1). … The same motion is used to attack defects in the manner in which summons was issued or served.” (Weil & Brown, et al., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: CIV. PROC. BEFORE TRIAL (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶3:376, p. 3-110.) “Without valid service of summons, the court never acquires jurisdiction over defendant. Hence, the statutory ground for the motion to quash is that the court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant.” (Id. at ¶4:413, p. 4-69 citing Code Civ. Proc. §418.10, subd. (a)(1).) Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1) states, in pertinent part:

A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.

“[W]here a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.” (Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211.) “Although the defendant is the moving party, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.” (Weil & Brown, et al., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: CIV. PRO. BEFORE TRIAL (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶3:384, p. 3-112 citing Floveyor International, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 793 (Floveyor), et al.) “[T]he burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Evangelize China Fellowship, Inc. v. Evangelize China Fellowship, Hong Kong (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 440, 444 (Evangelize).) “Where a motion to quash is made, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction, by declarations, verified complaint or other evidence.” (2 Witkin, California Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, §211, p. 775 – 776.)

III. Analysis.

A. Specially appearing defendant Cook’s motion to quash service of summons and complaint is GRANTED.

On 16 June 2021, plaintiff Barron filed a Judicial Council form proof of service of summons and complaint indicating conflicting methods of service. The proof of service declares Julien Paul Wilber Barron “mailed (by first class, postage-prepaid) copies of the documents to the person to be served at the place where the copies were left (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20). I mailed the documents on: 6/16/2021 from Palo Alto.” Thereafter, box 5(c) is checked indicating proof of service by mail and acknowledgment of receipt of service. Finally, the proof of services declares the “Notice to the Person Served” (on the summons) was completed as follows: On behalf of son of the plaintiff.”

On 8 October 2021, plaintiff Barron filed another Judicial Council form proof of service of summons and complaint. In this second proof of service, Julien Paul Wilber Barron declares he personally served Lisa Cook on “10/1/2021 at 1pm,” but also checks the box stating he left the documents “in the presence of a competent member of household (at least 18 years of age) at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the party.” Written across the first page is “5th attempt in person.”

In opposition to defendant Cook’s motion to quash, Julien Paul Wilber Barron submits a declaration stating, in relevant part, “I had tried to serve Lisa Cook on 5 separate occasions. The last attempt was on 10/1/2021. Because Lisa Cook had refuse to open her door to be serve, my mother filed a copy of the 5th attempt with a line through it for ‘Example purpose only.’ … ‘proof of service’ in question, you will find a line across the page because it was meant as an example for all of the attempts made to serve Lisa Cook.”

The proofs of service filed 16 June 2021 and 8 October 2021 contain conflicting statements and, therefore, do not establish valid proof of service of the summons and complaint on defendant Cook. The declaration submitted in opposition is similarly unclear and seemingly concedes the declarant was unable to personally serve defendant Cook.

Based on the evidence submitted, the court finds plaintiff Barron has not met her burden of proving facts requisite to the effective service of summons and complaint upon defendant Cook. Accordingly, specially-appearing defendant Cook’s motion to quash plaintiff Brigitte Barron’s service of summons and complaint is GRANTED.

IV. Tentative Ruling.

The tentative ruling was duly posted.

V. Case Management.

The matter will be placed on this Court’s Dismissal Review Calendar for 29 September 2022 at 10:00 AM in this Department.

VI. Order.

Specially-appearing defendant Cook’s motion to quash plaintiff Brigitte Barron’s service of summons and complaint is GRANTED.

|___________________________ |______________________________________________ |

|DATED: |HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN |

| |Judge of the Superior Court |

| |County of Santa Clara |

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 3

| | |

|SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |

|COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |

| | |

|DEPARTMENT 20 | |

| | |

|161 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 | |

|408.882.2320 · 408.882.2296 (fax) | |

|smanoukian@ | |

| |(For Clerk's Use Only) |

|CASE NO.: |21CV383387 |Arturo Angeles v. East Bay Fire Systems, Inc., et al. |

|DATE: 10 February 2022 |TIME: 9:00 am |LINE NUMBER: 3 |

|This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 20 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. |

|Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 20 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM on 09 February 2022. Please |

|specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and Counsel. |

|---oooOooo--- |

|Order on Defendants’ Demurrer |

|to Plaintiff’s Complaint for Damages. |

I. Statement of Facts.

On or about May 2018, plaintiff Arturo Angeles’s (“Angeles”) employment with defendants East Bay Fire Systems, Inc.; Tisco Fire System, Inc.; and Naveen Thukral (collectively, “Defendants”) began and continued, on and off, until 20 March 2020 when plaintiff Angeles’s employment was terminated by Defendants. (Complaint, ¶23.) During plaintiff Angeles’s employment with Defendants, plaintiff Angeles was employed as a full-time non-exempt employee. (Complaint, ¶24.)

During the entire period of plaintiff Angeles’s employment with Defendants, Defendants maintained and implemented a uniform pattern of unlawful wage policy and practice that denied accurate compensation to plaintiff Angeles for all hours worked, including overtime hours through the intentional enforcement of the following policies:

(a) requiring plaintiff to work more than eight (8) hours in any workday or more than 40 hours in the workweek but failing to provide him with adequate compensation or overtime pay;

(b) misclassifying plaintiff’s status as an “exempt” employee when in fact plaintiff was not exempt and compensating him for wages in a lump sum amount regardless of the number of hours worked;

(c) requiring plaintiff to report to work but failing to pay him for all hours, including overtime hours, during which he worked and/or was subject to Defendants’ control;

(d) requiring plaintiff to travel distances to various assigned jobsites and between jobsites but failing to pay him for travel time;

(e) requiring plaintiff, routinely and on a daily basis, to work off the clock and through his interrupted breaks while deducting time from his daily hours for lunch breaks which were interrupted, resulting in a failure to properly compensate for all hours, travel time, including overtime, plaintiff worked and/or was subject to Defendants’ control. (Complaint, ¶28.)

Defendants required plaintiff to bear necessary job expenses and failed to indemnify or reimburse plaintiff for such expenses including, but not limited to, (a) purchasing and laundering plaintiff’s uniforms; (b) cost of plaintiff’s personal safety and protection in performing his normal job duties; (c) cost and expenses relating to plaintiff’s use of his personal vehicle in performing normal job duties; (d) cost and expenses relating to plaintiff’s use of his personal cell phone as necessary for the performance of his normal job duties, communicating with his managers/ supervisors and timekeeping; and (e) cost of tools necessary for plaintiff to perform his normal job duties. (Complaint, ¶37.)

On or around the end of 2019, plaintiff injured his hand and thumb while performing his normal job duties for Defendants. (Complaint, ¶41.) Plaintiff timely informed Defendants of his injury and requested medical care, but Defendants failed to open a worker’s compensation claim for this injury and refused to send plaintiff to receive medical care. (Id.) Defendants denied plaintiff modified work duties or co-worker assistance and failed to engage in a good faith interactive process with plaintiff to explore accommodation of his medical condition/ disability. (Id.) Instead, Defendants required plaintiff to work subject to his normal schedule and regular duties which included heavy lifting, repetitive bending and twisting, and substantial time on his feet, without accommodation which exacerbated plaintiff’s condition. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants ended on or about 20 March 2020. (Complaint, ¶46.) Defendants terminated plaintiff without good cause or prior notice. (Id.) On information and belief, Defendants terminated plaintiff due to his protected status and engagement in protected activities, i.e., as a direct result of plaintiff reporting workplace injuries and seeking medical treatment and subsequently seeking reasonable accommodation. (Id.)

On 2 June 2021[2], plaintiff Angeles filed a complaint against Defendants asserting causes of action for:

1) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages

2) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages and Secret Underpayment of Wages

3) Failure to Indemnify for Expenses and Losses in Discharging Duties

4) Failure to Provide Meal Periods

5) Failure to Provide Rest Periods

6) Failure to Provide and Maintain Accurate Itemized Wage Statements

7) Failure to Pay Wages Due Upon Termination

8) Unfair Business Practice

9) Retaliation/ Wrongful Termination

10) Wrongful Termination

11) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation

12) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

On 29 October 2021, Defendants filed the motion now before the court, a demurrer to plaintiff Angeles’s complaint.

II. Demurrers in General.

A complaint must contain substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising the defendant of the issues to be addressed. (See Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is properly sustained where the complaint or an individual cause of action fails to “state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.10, subd. (e).) “[C]onclusionary allegations . . . without facts to support them” are insufficient on demurrer. (Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 531, 537.) “It is fundamental that a demurrer is an attack against the complaint on its face, it should not be sustained unless the complaint shows that the action may not be pursued.” (Yolo County Dept. of Social Services v. Municipal Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 842, 846-847.)

“It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s conduct. A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213.) “It ‘admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint . . .; the question of plaintiff's ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 213-214; see Cook v. De La Guerra (1864) 24 Cal. 237, 239: “[I]t is not the office of a demurrer to state facts, but to raise an issue of law upon the facts stated in the pleading demurred to.”)

III. Analysis.

A. Request for Judicial Notice.

In support of their demurrer, defendant Wells Fargo requests judicial notice of 39 documents. In ruling on a demurrer, a court may consider facts of which it has taken judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) The request for judicial notice in support of defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s demurrer to first amended complaint is GRANTED insofar as the court takes judicial notice of the existence, not necessarily the truth, of matters asserted therein. (See Evid. Code, §§452, subd. (c), (d), and (h); 453; Ingram v. Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285, fn. 3; Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265; Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 263, 288; People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 455.)

B. Settlement/Release.

“A general demurrer will lie where the complaint has included allegations that clearly disclose some defense or bar to recovery.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1421; punctuation and citation omitted.)

“‘[A] demurrer based on an affirmative defense will be sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that the action is necessarily barred by the defense.’” (Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 191 [213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 850]; accord, Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 [151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827, 292 P.3d 871] [application on demurrer of affirmative defense of statute of limitations based on facts alleged in a complaint is a legal question subject to de novo review]; Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 189, 224 [115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274] [“‘It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint [and matters of which the court may properly take judicial notice], the right of action is necessarily barred.’”].)

(Heshejin v. Rostami (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 984, 992-993 (Heshejin).)

Here, Defendants contend the first nine causes of action (wage claims) being asserted by plaintiff are barred because plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement wherein he released the claims now being asserted. However, the settlement agreement Defendants refer to is not disclosed by the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint nor by any judicially-noticed matter. Instead, Defendants proffer the declaration of defendant Thukral to introduce this extrinsic evidence. Such extrinsic evidence is not allowed on a demurrer.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the first through ninth causes of action in plaintiff Angeles’s complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (e)] is OVERRULED.

C. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.

Under California law "an employee must exhaust the . . . administrative remedy" provided by the Fair Employment and Housing Act, by filing an administrative complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) (Gov. Code, § 12960; cf. id., § 12901, 12925, subd. (b)) and obtaining the DFEH's notice of right to sue (id., § 12965, subd. (b)), "before bringing suit on a cause of action under the act or seeking the relief provided therein . . . ." (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 65, 88 [276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373] [dictum]; cf. Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 211, 213-214 [185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912]; Denney v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 1232 [13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170]; Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1121 [257 Cal. Rptr. 665]; Miller v. United Airlines, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal. App. 3d 878, 890 [220 Cal. Rptr. 684].) To exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to a particular act made unlawful by the Fair Employment and Housing Act, the claimant must specify that act in the administrative complaint, even if the complaint does specify other cognizable wrongful acts. (Yurick v. Superior Court, supra, 209 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1121-1123.) We have recognized, in the context of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, that "[t]he failure to exhaust an administrative remedy is a jurisdictional, not a procedural, defect," and thus that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for a defense summary judgment. (Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 174 Cal. App. 3d at p. 890.)

(Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1724.)

“A demurrer may properly be sustained based on the failure to adequately plead exhaustion of administrative remedies. [Citation.] In order to withstand a demurrer for failure to allege exhaustion of available administrative remedies, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that he did exhaust administrative remedies or facts showing that he was not required to do so. [Citation.]” (Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 156 (Tejon).)

In the complaint, plaintiff Angeles alleges, in relevant part:

Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. On or about June 01, 2021, Plaintiff filed the charges of harassment, hostile work environment, wrongful termination, discrimination and retaliation against Defendants. On June 1, 2021, the Department of Fair Housing and Employment issued the Notice of Case Closure/Right-to-Sue Letter. A Copy of the Complaint and Notice of Right to Sue is attached hereto, as Exhibit "1".

(Complaint, ¶22.)

In demurring, Defendants apparently contend plaintiff Angeles did not comply with Title 2, California Code of Regulations, section 10005 which authorizes “Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an employment practice made unlawful by the FEHA [to] forgo having the department investigate a complaint and instead obtain an immediate right-to-sue notice.”

“An immediate right-to-sue notice may be obtained by submitting a right-to-sue complaint via the department's automated right-to-sue system accessible on the department's Web site at dfeh., U.S. mail, electronic mail, facsimile, or in person.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10005.)

“To obtain an immediate right-to-sue notice via the department's automated right-to-sue system or by submitting a completed right-to-sue notice packet to the department, an aggrieved person shall file a right-to-sue complaint with the department containing” a list of nine enumerated requirements. According to Defendants, plaintiff did not fulfill some of these requirements in filing a right-to-sue complaint.

Again, the problem with Defendants’ argument is that on a demurrer, the court must accept the allegations as true. The purported deficienc(ies) that Defendants assert do not appear on the face of the pleading or through matters of judicial notice.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the tenth through twelfth causes of action in plaintiff Angeles’s complaint on the ground that court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (a)] and on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (e)] is OVERRULED.

D. Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity.

California’s workers’ compensation scheme was developed early in the 20th century as a result of the inadequacy of the common law that often denied injured workers any recovery for work-related injuries. (Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) 170 Cal. 686, 693; see Matthews v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 6 Cal.3d 719, 728-734—describing the history and development of California’s worker’s compensation law.)

The workers’ compensation law applies to employee injuries “arising out of and in the course of the employment” when the statutorily specified “conditions of compensation concur.” (Lab. Code, §3600.) Generally, it is the exclusive remedy for such injuries. (Id., §§ 3600, subd. (a), 3601.) “The legal theory supporting such exclusive remedy provisions is a presumed compensation bargain, pursuant to which the employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability. The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort.” (Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Tutor-Saliba Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 632, 637 [internal quotations omitted].)

Defendants demur additionally to the tenth through twelfth causes of action on the ground that the claims asserted by plaintiff are barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. “Where the complaint affirmatively alleges facts indicating coverage by the workers’ compensation laws, if it fails to state additional facts negating application of the exclusive remedy provision, no civil action will lie and the complaint is subject to a general demurrer.” (Colombo v. State of California (1991) 3 Cal.App.4th 594, 599.)

However, as plaintiff Angeles points out in opposition, the California Supreme Court in City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1158 (Moorpark) held that Labor Code “section 132a[3] does not provide an exclusive remedy and does not preclude an employee from pursuing FEHA and common law wrongful discharge remedies.” The Moorpark court rejected an argument by the defendant there that workers’ compensation provided the exclusive remedy.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the tenth through twelfth causes of action in plaintiff Angeles’s complaint on the ground that court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (a)] and on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (e)] is OVERRULED.

IV. Tentative Ruling.

The tentative ruling was duly posted.

V. Case Management.

The Case Management Conference currently set for 03 May 2022 at 10:00 AM in this Department will REMAIN AS SET. The parties are expected to commence discovery and begin discussions concerning Alternate Dispute Resolution.

VI. Order.

Defendants’ demurrer to the first through ninth causes of action in plaintiff Angeles’s complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (e)] is OVERRULED.

Defendants’ demurrer to the tenth through twelfth causes of action in plaintiff Angeles’s complaint on the ground that court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (a)] and on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (e)] is OVERRULED.

Defendants will have 10 days from the filing and service of this order within which to ANSWER.

|___________________________ |______________________________________________ |

|DATED: |HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN |

| |Judge of the Superior Court |

| |County of Santa Clara |

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 4

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 5

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 6

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 7

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 8

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 9

|SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |

|COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |

| | |

|DEPARTMENT 20 | |

| | |

|161 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 | |

|408.882.2320 · 408.882.2296 (fax) | |

|smanoukian@ | |

| | |

| |(For Clerk's Use Only) |

|CASE NO.: | 21CV387631 | Fuzu Li vs GEICO General Insurance Company |

|DATE: 10 February 2022 |TIME: 9:00 am |LINE NUMBER: 09 |

|This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 20 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. |

|Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 20 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM on 09 February 2022. Please |

|specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and Counsel. |

|---oooOooo--- |

|Order Motion of Defendant GEICO General Insurance Company |

|to Dismiss/Stay and to Compel Appraisal. |

I. Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff filed this complaint in propria persona on 20 August 2021.[4]

The First Amended Complaint was filed on 04 January 2022. In that complaint, the following causes of action:

1. Breach of Insurance Contract;

2. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Insurance Bad Faith);

3. Fraud and Intentional Deceit;

4. Conversion;

5. Declaratory Relief; and

6. Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Laws (“UCL”); California Business & Professions Code, §§ 17200, et seq.

Plaintiff alleges that on 15 June 2013 he purchased a new BMW model 320I with a total cost of $35,445.72. On 13 January 2018 plaintiff’s wife and GEICO entered into a contract of insurance for the vehicle. The vehicle was damaged in an automobile accident on 26 August 2019 in a collision with an uninsured motorist who fled the scene. Plaintiff then filed a claim with GEICO for the damaged automobile.

Plaintiff and defendant have become involved in a dispute over the value of the automobile in question. GEICO takes the position that the vehicle was rendered a total loss, meeting not economically feasible to repair. Consistent with the terms of the policy, GEICO offered to pay to plaintiff the full actual cash value (“ACV”) of the vehicle, based on the cost of comparable vehicles in the market. GEICO contends that this is the well-accepted method in the insurance industry and under the applicable insurance regulations.

II. Motion To Compel Appraisal.

Defendant GEICO General Insurance Company filed this petition on 16 November 2021.

Plaintiff contends that he had not planned to sell his vehicle and therefore GEICO was precluded from using the value of comparable vehicles to calculate his own vehicle’s ACV. The policy also contains the following language concerning “Appraisal”:

“If we and the insureds do not agree on the amount of loss, either may, within 60 days after proof of loss is filed, demand and appraisal of the loss. In that event, we and the insured will each select a competent appraiser. The appraisers will select a competent and disinterested umpire. The appraisers will state separately the actual cash value and the amount of the loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit the dispute to the umpire. An award in writing of any to will determine the amount of loss. We and the insured will each pay his chosen appraiser and will bear equally the other expenses of the appraisal and umpire. [¶] We will not waive our rights by any of our acts relating to appraisal.”

III. Analysis.

Section III of the policy contains provisions and definitions regarding the collision coverage. ACV is defined as the replacement cost of the auto property less depreciation or betterment. The policy refers to ACV in several other respects.

“Although California has a strong policy favoring arbitration (see Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th l, 9; Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1344), our courts also recognize that the right to pursue claims in a judicial forum is a substantial right and one not lightly to be deemed waived. (Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1501, 1507; Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 632, 643.) Because the parties to an arbitration clause surrender this substantial right, the general policy favoring arbitration cannot replace an agreement to arbitrate. (Boys Club of San Fernando Valley, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1271; American Home Assurance Co. v. Benowitz (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 192, 200.)

Thus, the right to compel arbitration depends upon the contract between the parties, (Blatt v. Farley (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 621, 625; Baker v. Sadick (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 618, 623) and a party can be compelled to submit a dispute to arbitration only where he has agreed in writing to do so. (Boys Club of San Fernando Valley v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1271.) The agreement to arbitrate need not be contained in the contract at issue, but may be contained in a collateral document which is incorporated by reference. (Ibid.; Chan v. Drexel Burham Lambert, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 639.)” (See generally Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 250, 254-255.)[5]

Under Code of Civil Procedure, § 1281.2, a court shall order parties to arbitrate if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists, unless it finds that (a) the right to compel arbitration has been waived by the moving party, (b) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or (c) a party to the arbitration is also a party to a pending court action with a third party arising out of the same transaction. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Browne George Ross LLP (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 749, 762.)

Thus, a party seeking to compel arbitration meets its burden by “providing the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence[.]” (Engella v. Permanente Med. Grp., InC. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 (1997). The inquiry concludes upon the demonstration 0f the existence of an arbitration agreement; questions of the agreement’s scope “are for the arbitrators and not for the court to resolve.” (Felner v. Meritplan Ins. CO. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 540, 543.)

Once that initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration, Who must establish one of the limited statutory exception to arbitrability in sections 1281.2(a)-(d).) (Engella v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., supra.)

Plaintiff does not dispute that the vehicle was insured with GEICO, that it was rendered a total loss, and that that he rejected the amount offered by GEICO. It appears to this Court that he is disputing the amount of the offer because the offer of GEICO is based on the value of other vehicles, not the value of his vehicle to him.

This Court agrees with GEICO that the valuation of the vehicle must precede any other action. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED as follows: the action will be STAYED until the arbitration provision contained in the policy of insurance is completed according to the terms of the policy.

Nothing in this order is intended to preclude plaintiff from asserting any method of valuation he believes is in compliance with the insurance policy in question.

IV. Tentative Ruling and Hearing.

The Tentative Ruling was duly posted.

V. Case Management.

This Court will set a ADR Review date of 22 September 2022 at 10:30 AM in this Department. The Case Management Conference currently set for 31 May 2022 at 10:00 AM in this Department is VACATED.

VI. Conclusion and Order.

The motion of GEICO General Insurance Company to dismiss/stay this action is GRANTED as follows: the action will be STAYED until the arbitration provision contained in the policy of insurance is completed according to the terms of the policy.

|____________________________________ |_________________________________________________________ |

|DATED: |HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN |

| |Judge of the Superior Court |

| |County of Santa Clara |

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 10

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 11

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 12

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 13

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 14

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 15

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 16

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 17

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 18

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 19

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 20

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 21

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 22

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 23

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 24

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 25

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 26

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 27

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 28

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 29

---oooOooo---

Calendar Line 30

---oooOooo---

-----------------------

[1] This Department intends to comply with the time requirements of the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Government Code, §§ 68600–68620). The California Rules of Court state that the goal of each trial court should be to manage limited and unlimited civil cases from filing so that 100 percent are disposed of within 24 months. (Ca. St. Civil Rules of Court, Rule 3.714(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2)(C)

[2] This Department intends to comply with the time requirements of the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Government Code, §§ 68600–68620). The California Rules of Court state that the goal of each trial court should be to manage limited and unlimited civil cases from filing so that 100 percent are disposed of within 24 months. (Ca. St. Civil Rules of Court, Rule 3.714(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2)(C)

[3] Labor Code section 132a states, in part, “It is the declared policy of this state that there should not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment. (1) Any employer who discharges, or threatens to discharge, or in any manner discriminates against any employee because he or she has filed or made known his or her intention to file a claim for compensation with his or her employer or an application for adjudication, or because the employee has received a rating, award, or settlement, is guilty of a misdemeanor and the employee’s compensation shall be increased by one–half, but in no event more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), together with costs and expenses not in excess of two hundred fifty dollars ($250). Any such employee shall also be entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by the acts of the employer.”

[4] This Department intends to comply with the time requirements of the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Government Code, §§ 68600–68620). The California Rules of Court state that the goal of each trial court should be to manage limited and unlimited civil cases from filing so that 100 percent are disposed of within 24 months. (Ca. St. Civil Rules of Court, Rule 3.714(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2)(C).

[5] In Marsch, the Court of Appeal held that the trial properly denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration since the agreement contained no arbitration provision and no collateral document containing one was ever incorporated by reference into the agreement.

................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download