Home | NYU School of Law
International Law Outline
Fall 2009
Philip Alston
I. Session One – International Law Generally 2
II. Session Two – Evolution of International Law 2
III. Session Three – Treaties 4
IV. Session Four – Customary and Soft Law 5
V. Session Five – States (Actors, Part One) 9
VI. Session Six – INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Actors, Part Two) 11
VII. Session 27 – Legitimacy of International System (Conceptual Challenges, Part One) 14
VIII. Session 7 – International Law in the Domestic Arena 16
IX. Section 8 – Domestic Law v. Int’l Law (or, Int’l Law in Domestic Arena, Part Two) 19
X. Session 9 – International Law in US Courts (or Int’l Law in Domestic Arena, Part Three) 24
XI. Session 10 - Domestic Law in the International Arena 28
XII. Session 11 – Domestic Law in the International Arena, Part 2 33
XIII. Session 12 – Civil and Political Rights (Individual International Rights, Part One) 36
XIV. Session 13 – International Human Rights Treaties (Individual International Rights, Part Two) 40
XV. Session 14 & 15 – Fact-Finding in International Law and Peacekeeping – DRC 42
XVI. Session 18 – International Law and Fact-Finding in Practice – Israel and Gaza 45
XVII. Session 16 – International Criminal Law (Individual International Rights, Part Three) 46
XVIII. Session 19 – International Criminal Court (Individual International Rights, Part Five) 49
XIX. Session 17 – International Humanitarian Law (Individual International Rights, Part Four) 52
XX. Session 24 & 25 – Evolution of Use of Force (Use of Force, Part One) 54
XXI. Session 26 – Humanitarian Intervention (Use of Force, Part Two) 59
XXII. Session 20 –Ozone Layer (International Environmental Law, Part One) 62
XXIII. Session 21 –Climate Change (International Environmental Law, Part Two) 65
XXIV. Session 22 –Balancing Trade and Environment (International Economic Law, Part One) 67
XXV. Session 23 – Investment Dispute Resolution (World Economy, Part Two) 71
XXVI. Session 28 – War on Terrorism (Conceptual Challenges, Part Two) 73
I. Session One – International Law Generally
A. Development of American Perspective
1. Monroe Doctrine (1823)
a. Declare that American continents are not to be considered as subject for future European colonization
i. Policy of staying out of European affairs except for self-defense
A) Not interfere in internal concerns
B) Consider gov’t de facto as legitimate gov’t
ii. Neutrality towards Spain and former colonies
b. History – Napoleonic Wars. Colonies seizing opportunity to declare independence. UK wants to maintain trading rights with South America.
c. Traditional – only state actors, etc. – foreign office model
i. US, UK only really relevant actors. Latin American countries as passive recipients
ii. CONSENT of nations.
d. Non-traditional – not a treaty or agreement, just a statement
2. Roosevelt Corollary (1904)
a. In Western hemisphere – adherence to Monroe doctrine may force US to exercise “international police power” in “flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence”
3. Susan Rice – UN Ambassador (2009)
a. Transnational security threats/effective multilateral cooperation
b. Can’t ignore poverty, hunger in other countries – “troubles that ravage fragile states can ultimately menace sturdy ones.”
c. UN is imperfect but also indispensible
i. No substitute for legitimacy UN can impart
ii. Widest possible coalitions.
B. Norms:
1. Right to self-defense
2. Right to independence
a. non-intervention
b. Non-interference
c. Territorial integrity
3. Neutrality
4. Right to self-determination
5. Respect for status quo
6. Preference for democracy
C. DRC
1. Issues
a. Sexual violence
b. Motivated by mineral riches/illegal mining
c. Bastion of military hutism
d. Rebels in other countries who have to give up their guns (Burundi)
II. Session Two – Evolution of International Law
A. Development of International Law
1. Werner Levi (5-7)– no single philosophical underpinning for int’l law, nor historical consensus.
2. GROTIUS (7-8) – “father of int’l law”
a. Built on natural law theories (preexisting/overarching human law) BUT adopted SECULAR approach
i. Had to argue int’l law from non-religious perspective
b. Began with focus on a few narrow issues
i. Laws of war (even just wars)
ii. Freedom of the seas
A) Natural law. Sea different because you don’t have (can’t) occupy.
B) OR, working for dutch east indies company. Developed theory which benefited his guys.
iii. Extraterritoriality of ambassadors
3. ANAND (9-10) (go back and point to diverse origins) v. OPPENHEIM (8-9) (focused on Christian Europe as heart of origins)
4. 19th century
a. Shift from focus on MONARCH to focus on STATE
b. Shift from CUSTOMARY law to TREATY law
i. Positivist law –CONSENT-based. Should look to evidence of consent, like TREATIES.
ii. pacta sunt servanda – agreements will be respected/must be kept
iii. WHY? – doesn’t this just reward the powerful bargainers?
c. Countershift – jus cogens. Some things you can’t bargain around.
5. Colonialism
a. When have focus on states and consent, how do you dominate these new countries?
b. Colonialism! Say no law exists here, or law is so alien you can’t form proper legal relationships.
c. Has always been here
i. Before was “naturalism” – one law from God that rules we spread it.
ii. Then, positivism – consent, and focus on evidence and law.
iii. Then, pragmatism.
d. Ideas continue – IMF, World Bank – Anghie (10-11)
B. Chad/Libya
1. Border fixed by treaty, but not between Chad/Libya
a. 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness
2. “traditional” view of international law
a. Parties invoked legal arguments to assert title
b. Agreed to allow judicial body to resolve dispute solely by recourse to legal rules
c. Traditional international legal disagreement
i. Actors – states
ii. Disputed resource – territory
iii. Legal instruments at issue – treaties
iv. Formal arguments – traditional ideas dating back centuries
3. Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) – ICJ – 1994 (12-15).
a. Focus on TREATY. Very formalistic, traditional view. Ignores situation on the ground, history of colonialism, etc.
b. Terrified of consequences of overruling these colonial treaties. Would lead to massive border disputes.
4. Why would they agree to take to ICJ?
a. Allows Libya (authoritarian regime) some way to get out of responsibility?
C. Compare Sudan (North and South)
1. Territorial dispute between state (Gov’t of Sudan) and Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) – in South.
2. NON-STATE officer – can’t go to ICJ.
3. Classic outcome. N got access to oil fields (which it deemed necessary), S got more territory (but it emphasized tribal lands of Dinka and ability to move across the area that are important to ITS self identity).
a. Rather than application of traditional rules
b. EQUITABLE/POLITICAL allocation
D. Rainbow Warrior affair
1. French decide to destroy Greenpeace’s vessel while docked in New Zealand. New Zealand wants to seek damages. French retaliate by restricting NZ exports.
2. UN Sec.Gen releases “binding ruling” (20-22) – but really negotiated compromise?
3. Development of int’l law
a. France should be able to ride all over little, powerless NZ. But int’l norms strong enough to pressure them to some sort of compromise.
b. Provided framework
c. Vindicated some norms
d. Provided process for some sort of reconciliation
III. Session Three – Treaties
A. TYPES
1. Treaties
2. Customary Law
3. Soft Law
4. General Principles
5. Judicial Decisions
6. Scholarship
7. International Pressure
a. Some argue that international law creates norm that once there is a “credible allegation” – that gov’t has to investigate
b. Others say – IL norms are meaningless unless PUBLIC OPINION is invoked such that other states place pressure on a state
i. What kind of “law” is that?
B. Treaties more specifically
a. Title doesn’t matter. Apply Vienna Convention to see if it’s a treaty.
b. WHY do states enter into treaties?
i. Establish credibility/responsibility amongst each other
ii. Establish credibility on a world scene.
iii. Security in someone else's word.
iv. Reduction of transaction costs in future interactions
v. Crystallize custom – two types of treaties
A) Law-making treaties. Agree to some broader norms re: trade and commerce of neighboring states
B) Contract treaties. US lets Canadian trucks through.
vi. Domestic uses
A) Screw/assuage political opponents.
B) Bind future leaders.
vii. Lipson (41-42)
c. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (44, 46, 49-50, 58, 61-2, 66-7)
i. US has never ratified. Don’t want to privilege way of interpreting treaties over SCOTUS’ decision.
ii. But it might be CUSTOM – US might be bound.
A) If not, how would they analyze the thousands of treaties to which the US is a party?
iii. They never internationally contest the VC – treat it as if, in its entirety, it reflects customary law
A) Not a party, by treaty, but get clarity and precision anyway.
C. Cyprus Conflict
1. Turkish minority on Island wants to merge with Turkey. Several agreements (Basic Structure, Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance). Cyprus became independent, but Turk minority received tons of power.
a. Treaty of Guarantee Article IV
i. If there’s a breach, Greece, Turkey and UK will “undertake to consult together” to decide what’s next. If can’t come up with “common or concerted action” each has the right to “take action” to re-establish the status quo.
b. Why do they want to create these treaties?
i. Turkey and Greece – advantage to having it clarified.
ii. UK – get out of colonialist situation, but protect security interests
iii. Cypriots – get independence!
2. Civil disorder erupts. Greece stages coup. Turkey invades, and occupies northern third of line. Creates current line of demarcation.
3. Turkey tries to justify action by relying on Treaty of Guarantee
a. Greek Cypriots say all 1960 treaties invalid for lack of representation.
i. Makarios – said he was coerced
b. General argument – UNEQUAL TREATIES.
i. West says – no unequal treaties. We’re all equally sovereign.
4. Does Treaty of Guarantee article IV conflict with UN Charter, article 103 (prohibition on use of force?)
a. UN Charter always TRUMPS.
5. Lyndon Johnson writes letter, but nothing public. Wants it all – keep relationship with turkey, don’t alienate the Greeks, don’t want to undermine its own ability to use force, but wants to uphold treaty law
IV. Session Four – Customary and Soft Law
1. Customary Law
a. Consistent practice on the part of states which occurs in the belief that the states are actually obligated to act in this way
i. Very circular argument
ii. BUT – focus is that it evolves from state practice
iii. Custom is HARD, BINDING law.
b. Also features notions of “progressive development”
i. Treaties which - Identify rules which you aspire to make universal, but, for the time, only applies to those states that ratify the treaty.
ii. When do those become customary?
c. Allows states to get custom and precision of treaty structures w/o actually signing on
i. US and Vienna Convention
ii. US and Law of the Sea – US accepts as customary law all the provisions that are important to them, but hasn’t ratified treaty
d. TWO ELEMENTS
i. State Practice
A) Verbal
1) Does not include international court decisions (but a court finding that customary law exists could be persuasive evidence to that effect)
B) Physical
1) Includes inaction
ii. Opinio Juris – YOUR opinion of law – people’s subjective idea of what their int’l responsibilities are
A) Acting a particular way because you think you’re legally obligated to
B) Whether it’s essential is VERY contested concept – TWO VIEWS:
1) Look at OJ, if didn’t think you were legally obligated, no custom. No matter how “extensive” the state practice. (i.e. no one thinks they’re LEGALLY OBLIGATED to roll out red carpet).
2) Woven in as part of evaluation of state practice
C) What happens when you have radical change in customary law?
1) Ex. Truman post-WWII declared that countries had rights to continental shelves on their borders. Bunch of other countries agreed. But couldn’t have thought it was dictated by law as required by OJ.
e. Paquete Habana – SCOTUS – 1900 (81)
i. When does CONSISTENT practice become LAW?
A) Cuban fishing vessel captured and sold by US. Can US capture these non-military boats?
ii. "ancient usage among civilized nations…gradually ripening into a rule of international law" – fishing vessels are exempt from capture as prize of war
iii. Reviews treaties, then practice, then scholars
A) Limited range of states looked at, limited range of scholars
B) Limited to European nations with a bit of US, Mexico thrown in
f. Torture? – customary norm against it, but 80-90% of states engage in it. States say it’s rare, however, and practiced only by those deviating from the norms.
i. International courts will generally FIND NORM, and then try to pressure contrary practices to conform
g. Goldsmith & Posner (86) – people don’t believe they are actually obligated. They just recognize that it’s mutually beneficial in situations like Paquete Habana to not attack each other’s fishing vessels.
i. No customary norms emerging, just self-interested action of governments
h. JURISDICTIONAL LAW.
i. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
i. Statement of good intent, nothing binding.
ii. Then, try to develop legal norms/treaties to give it some bite.
j. Helskinki Act – discussed below.
k. Protocol I to Geneva Conventions – neither US nor Israel has signed, but have taken it into consideration when making decisions.
i. Recognized in Report to Prosecutory by Committee established to review NATO bombing campaign against FRY – 2000 (570)
2. Soft Law
a. Closely related to custom, but more controversial
i. Idea is that soft law crystallizes into custom at some point, and then becomes HARD, BINDING law.
b. “declared norms of conduct understood as legally nonbinding by those accepting the norms”
c. Two perspectives
i. Formalist/positive. Either things are laws or they’re not. No such thing as soft law (i.e. no such thing as partial pregnancy).
ii. Process-oriented. In order to understand what states do and why they do it at the int'l level, one has to take account of a much broader process of interaction and relationships among and between states. Sometimes the process hardens into a treaty. Sometimes it doesn’t, but people still behave by virtue of that process. Have to identify that.
d. Advantages of soft law
i. Has advantage in that legally binding mechanisms (like treaty/custom) preclude more flexible but technically nonbinding approaches
A) Hard law is Also generally limited to STATES
ii. Int’l agreements are difficult to get, some agreement is better than none
A) Also, this is PRAGMATIC. Def times when govts want to make statements but couldn’t put them in treaties (US Senate is a disaster, for example)
B) Chinkin (95-96)
iii. Why some actors might prefer
A) Shelton (96-97)
1) May reflect respect for hard law
2) Good for when concerned about non-compliance
3) Can induce states to participate, pressure non-consenting states to conform
4) Can be adopted faster – quickly amended/replaced
e. Criticism of soft law
i. What law does BEST is take life’s complexity and make it into binary oppositions/workable notions
A) Best when binding Klabbers (95, as discussed in Chinkin)
ii. COMMODIFICATION of int’l law – use when it’s useful, ignore when it’s not and use something else
f. Examples of soft law
i. Helsinki Final Act of 1974 (93) – best example of soft law
A) 35 european governments gathered to create three sets/baskets of principles
1) Expressly understood to be legally nonbinding, but have been invoked to challenge nonconforming behavior by other states.
B) Became OSCE.
C) REFERENCED in Georgia EU Report as if it was BINDING.
ii. GA resolutions, administrative decisions by agencies of international organization, codes of conducts, interpretive statements regarding treaties
iii. World Bank attempts to create nonbinding guidelines re: FDI
iv. GA Res. 1514 (124-24) – on granting independence to colonies
A) Called a declaration.
B) Came to define basic principles which states had to abide by.
A. Reaction to ICRC Determination of Custom of Humanitarian Warfare
1. Says that it doesn’t reflect novelty of war on terrorism. Backwards looking.
2. GENERAL objections
a. Retain flexibility
b. Retain ability to hold OTHER states to these norms.
c. By staking its claim and trying to allow itself an out, both sides are happy.
i. ICRC can simply say they disagree, and promote their compilation.
3. Does same thing with World Bank soft-law suggestions re: FDI
a. Subverts efficacy by creating BITs – which have greatly proliferated
B. Foreign Direct Investment
1. Transfer of capital from country X investor to country Y, with claim any income generated by that capital.
a. History of colonialism – let developing countries exploit resources of colonies as they wanted
b. As decolonization occurs, incidents of developing states “expropriating” foreign assets on large scale
i. Notably, nationalization of Western oil company holdings
2. Development of debate
a. US v. Mexico – post 1917 revolution
i. Mexico denies it has int’l legal obligation to pay compensation
ii. HULL DOCTRINE (76) – Mexico obligated to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation
A) Just a letter. Then became a standard, then reflected in int’l law.
b. 1962 – GA Resolution 1803 – Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (76)
i. Pay appropriate compensation according to DOMESTIC law. If unable to agree, dispute should be settled through arbitration or int’l adjudication.
A) At this point, former colonies still vastly outnumbered by western states
c. 1973/1974 – GA Resolutions 3171/3281 (77)
i. Affirms State sovereignty over their own resources, affirms right of states to determine compensation and mode of payment, according to domestic law
A) Much more pro-South position
1) Arab oil embargo on US and Israel worked well. Gave developing countries some confidence.
d. US Company (SEDCO) v. Iran – 1986 (87-89)
i. Evaluates GA resolutions – not binding, and not generally evidence of customary law
A) May be regarded as evidence or can contribute to creation of such law
ii. Decides 1803 and NOT 3171/3281 that reflects CURRENT int’l law
iii. Rules for FULL compensation, as US requests
e. US Co. (TEXACO) v. Libya – 1978 (89-92)
i. Also dismissive of later GA resolutions – though passed by large margins
A) Notes that several developing countries abstained, and western companies abstained/voted against
ii. Can we imagine a more NUANCED argument?
A) Could say 1803 was adopted with more consensus because people were unaware of post-colonial issues at the time. Since then, understand more.
iii. Upholds Western position, and Libya complies by entering SETTLEMENT.
f. World Bank efforts to regulate FDI?
i. Sees itself as forum through which North and South can mediate
ii. Puts out set of “soft law” principles
A) US objects.
B) Again, WB does it anyway, and hopes the principles gather enough use and support to become customary law.
iii. Instead, US encourages development of BITs (bilateral investment treaties)
A) All of US bits formalize their opinion on the matter.
V. Session Five – States (Actors, Part One)
A. STATES
1. Historically, only actors that mattered were states
a. Pre-Westphalia – borders set by wars
b. Treaty of Westphalia – in theory, recognition of existing borders, but can still increase territory through warfare
c. 19th century – colonialist grab for land throughout the world (terra nullius – empty land, i.e. not under the control of any state)
d. WWI ends – strong effort to enhance stability of borders through use of int’l law.
i. New enunciated principle of self-determination
ii. Instead of winning powers taking colonies of losing powers – haunting language
A) Article II of Covenant of League of Nations (118) – very paternalistic, colonial
1) though step forward – saying that colonies should be treated with dignity
B) Mandate system – new colonization
e. Collapse of USSR – West was all about independence.
f. Since things settled, now more emphasis on INTERNAL AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
i. Ala Quebec
ii. Envisioned in Friendly Relations Declaration
2. States emerged on scene through:
a. Decolonization – becoming independent from self-identified colonial empires
i. Peaceful transfer of power OR wars of independence
b. Secession – breaks off from non-imperial state to form new state
i. Peacefully or through armed conflict
ii. Since WWII, rare (other than Bangladesh, Eritrea, maybe Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)
iii. Generally, recognized secessions include those where seceding state proved able to control their territory by force
c. Dissolution – state dissolves into two or more states, with former state ceasing to exist
i. Yugoslavia, USSR and Czechoslovakia (maybe Somalia’s in the middle of this)
d. Merger – creation of one state by union of two states
i. North and South Yemen (become new entity – Yemen), FRG and GDR (absorbed into second – German)
e. Peace treaties – emerged from peace settlements after major wars
i. Creation of new Eastern European states after WWI
3. Is it purely about objective criteria, or does it depend on other states?
a. Traditional (declaratory) view – if you meet the criteria of statehood – enjoys rights and duties of state regardless of views of other states
i. MONTEVIDEO Convention
ii. More consistent with practice of states
b. Contrary (constitutive) view – recognition is one of the elements of the statehood
i. Actual determination as to whether states get TREATED as states depends on other states
A) Whether other states accept their password
4. Self-determination and statehood?
a. Traditional criteria – statehood is about power/effective control
i. Recognized right of state to defend itself against internal threats to its unity
ii. STRONG presumption in favor of the continuity of states
5. What does it mean to be “sovereign state”
a. Henkin (64-65) – sovereignty obscures more than it reveals.
B. Sweden and the Aalanders
1. Aland Islands, see themselves as Swedish, seek plebescite from Finland. Finland and Sweden bring
2. Aaland Islands Questions: Report Submitted – 1921 (121) Decision being made by
a. independent jurists – lawyers convened for this purpose
i. Self-determination NOT a rule of positive law
ii. Possible link to human rights – if “manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power”
b. governmental committees of rapporteurs
i. what do you do when confronted by claims of SD from area where you don’t want to encourage it.
ii. Also setting up out-clause if significant element of oppression.
A) If F doesn’t make concessions we deem appropriate, revisit the situation
C. Yugoslavia – Dissolution of State, or Secession from Yugoslavia?
1. Badinter Commission (126-28)
a. Rules that it’s DISSOLUTION
b. Then rules – Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have right to SD?
i. No, only entitled to rights accorded to minorities. But, might give them right to choose their nationality.
ii. Self-determination can only occur along PRE-EXISTING borders
c. Then discusses borders – uti possidetis – is recognized as CUSTOMARY law.
2. Get outcome which works for greater int’l world –recognize key boundaries in dispute, but avoid breaking down into greatly fragmented tiny units.
3. Declaration on Guidelines on Recognition of New States (1992) (139)
a. Adopt common position on process of recognition of new states
i. Respect UN Charter
ii. Respect for minorities
iii. Respect frontiers
iv. Accept all disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation agreement
v. Commitment to settle by agreement all questions re: succession and regional disputes
b. Same with Declaration on Yugoslavia
c. New countries sent in applications for recognition. Approved of Slovenia and Croatia.
i. Bosnia-Herzegovina – problems with Serbian minority. Thus, not enough evidence that people want SRBH to be established
A) EC foreign ministers recognized B anyway.
ii. Macedonia – Greece objected to name and flag. Feared that Macedonia would make claim to portion of Greece called Macedonia. Accepted recognition, asserting that they make no neighboring claim on neighboring states.
A) EC foreign ministers did NOT recognize Macedonia. Still disputed.
D. Quebec
1. Supreme Court of Canda – addressing legality of unilateral secession
a. Difference between INTERNAL self-determination and EXTERNAL self-determination
b. If gov’t respects all citizens, and respects S-D within, entitled to international protection of its territorial integrity
E. Kosovo
1. Right to SD is now HUMAN RIGHT
a. But catch: right inheres in PEOPLE, and people has never been fully defined
2. Ahtisaari – propose process that leads to Kosovan independence. Russia opposes.
a. Let Kosovo declare independence – doesn’t directly confront Russia
3. Declaration of Independence (2008) (Packet I – p. 17-19)
4. SC Resolution 1244 (Packet I – 19) – adopted under Chapter VII
a. Saying it’s not a precedent
i. Russia worried about Chechnya
5. What happens if ICJ says Kosovo’s declaration invalid?
a. It’s a fait accompli. all it would do is raise legal questions.
i. More likely – place element on recognition. Say, Russian provinces trying to break away aren’t RECOGNIZED, but Kosovo is.
F. South Ossetia and Abkhazia
1. Elements of Georgia, seeking independence. Russia invaded S. Ossetia, and gained control of the area. Russian president signed decree recognizing independence of both entities.
a. Only one state has recognized – Nicaragua.
G. Burkina Faso/Mali border dispute
1. Uti possidetis – determine territory of new states by pre-independence colonial borders
2. Both countries agreed border dispute should be settled by UP, but disagreed about where.
a. Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) ICJ – 1983 (131-33)
VI. Session Six – INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Actors, Part Two)
A. Brought about by desire for institutionalized form of cooperation
B. Many different types
1. Focusing on Intergovernmental organizations
a. Primary arena for multilateral treaty making
2. Private international organizations
a. We skip these – very little involvement with governments
i. Codex Alimentarius, ICAN (runs the internet), Olympic Anti-Doping Committee
b. Fulfill essential regulatory functions
C. Broader questions
1. Governance
a. Most IGOs have annual conference, regular meetings, secretariat (officials who staff the organization who, hypothetically, lose their national affiliation)
b. Voting procedures
i. VETO MODEL – security council
A) Makes some states more valuable than others
B) Unclear why people are there?
1) UK, France? Why not Germany?
2) No African (Nigeria? (largest); South Africa? (wealthiest); No Latin American(Brazil?)
C) Rationalization? – those who can ENFORCE peace and security should have a larger say
D) UN Charter Article 23 (179) – five permanent members, and then 10 elected GA members (for two years) , paying attention to CONTRIBUTION to int’l peace and security and equitable geographic distribution
1) Elements of financial contribution model
ii. FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION – imf
A) Outgrowth of colonialism
B) Means 2/3 of all decisions are American/European
iii. ONE STATE, ONE VOTE – general assembly
iv. CONSENSUS – osce – and nothing they decide is legally binding on members
A) GATT
2. Legal Personality
a. Traditional international law – only states have rights and obligations
b. What’s the legal capacity/ability of an IGO?
i. Similar legal questions as domestic systems faced when corporations emerged
c. Bernadotte Case
i. Swedish Count sent to mediate between Israel and Arab states following Israeli Declaration of Independence. His Car was blown up in Jerusalem.
ii. Traditional int’l law – state whose national is injured in another state has right to bring claim against latter.
iii. GA asks iCJ for advisory opinion – can UN bring action as well as member state (for damages to ORG and/or damagers for victim’s heirs)?
iv. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations – ICJ – 1949 (181-83)
A) UN exercises functions and rights which can only be explained if have international personality
1) Thus, it is an international person. NOT the same as a state, thus, not the same legal personality/rights/duties as state. Instead, subject of int’l law and CAPABLE of possession int’l rights and duties.
B) Can bring claim for damage to ITSELF
C) Can bring claim for damage to HEIRS – agents of the organization need to feel that they have protection of ORG, and not rely on protection by own state – might compromise independence/might vary depending on how weak or strong the agent’s state is
D) Functional opinion – leaves open possibility of other actors beyond IGOs, leaves open evolving path of IGOs also
D. How does UN handle domestic situations?
1. 1948-abolition in 1990s – governmental policy of racial separation and discrimination
a. UNUSUAL because enshrined in CONSTITUTION
2. SA – member of UN. Resource rich – significant economic ties with other states. Allied with West during Cold War
3. UN campaign to end apartheid
a. What does UN do about fact that Charter does not resolve conflict between:
i. Obligation to protect and promote human rights AND
ii. Obligation not to interfere in domestic affairs (article 2, sec. 7)
b. GA Res. 44 – 1946 (184) – responded to complaint by India that Indians were mistreated in SA. Mildly worded statement saying they should be treated according to agreements.
i. Traditional diplomacy – India declaring rights of ITS citizens.
c. GA Res 616B – 1952 (185) – Declares that UN is supposed to promote HR, and says they’re “best assured” when legislation and practice ensure equality, and claim that gov’t policies that perpetuate discrimination are inconsistent with the Charter (Article 56), and calls on members to bring policies into conformity
i. Vote 24-1-34 – abstentions include:
A) Western states that don’t to include apartheid on agenda
B) Eastern bloc
C) Developing states that wanted stronger measures
d. SC Res 134 – 1960 (185-86) – in response to Sharpville Massacre (gov’t troops opened fire on peaceful black protesters) – says situation in SA might endanger int’l peace and security
i. "incident theory" of int'l law - incidents which may be fairly limited in scope can have disproportionate impact, and the extent to which popular opinion is shaped.
e. GA Res 1761 – 1962 (187-88) – SANCTIONS
i. Calls on states collectively or independently to break off diplomatic relations, close ports to SA vessels, boycott all SA goods
A) GA can only RECOMMEND.
ii. requests SC to take appropriate measures, including sanctions
A) developing countries trying to hold SC to account
f. SC Res 181 – 1963 (188-89) –
i. Hedges – doesn’t declare that int’l peace and security are ENDANGERED, just DISTURBED
ii. Not adopted under Chapter VII, so no binding enforcement
A) Calls on states to cease shipment of arms/ammunition
g. 1973 – Developing countries try to draft multilateral treaty to criminalize apartheid.
i. New convention – Int’l Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid – 1973 (195)
A) Western states south to block or alter convention
1) Saw as opportunity for USSR to embarrass west for commercial dealings with SA
a) Was somewhat political. USSR and US competing for African affections. US refusal to sign hurts US in US, and US in Africa.
2) Provisions too broad – particularly criminalization provisions
B) None ever signed or ratified.
C) EXAMPLE – treaty whose signers never thought it would come into force
1) Trying to use like soft law –delegitimize.
h. Movement to strip South Africa of UN membership
i. Developing countries have no other options – SC has shut them down.
ii. Credentials Committee Report – 1974 (189-90)
A) Decides 5-3-1 to accept credentials of all states except SA
iii. GA Res. 3207 – 1974 – approved Report, asked SC to review relationship between UN and SA in light of SA violations of Charter and UDHR
iv. SC Res to expel SA – vetoed by France, UK, and US
v. GA debates significance of rejection of credentials.
i. SC Res 418 – 1977 (192-93) – unanimously tightens arms embargo – UNDER CHAPTER VII
j. Notes about development
i. Arms embargo starts in GA, then moves to SC, then is strengthened by SC.
4. Conor Cruise O’Brien – UN’s real power is to move people, emotionally and morally, not to “act.”
a. PA’s response – UN early on began questioning legitimacy of SA gov’t. Set up various committees which publicized their laws, produced annual reports, forces debate at national and international level
E. Judicial/quasi-judicial settlement of disputes
1. 1900 – Permanent Court of arbitration. Not a court – mechanism for creation of ad hoc arbitral tribunals.
2. 1921 – Permanent Court of International Justice (under League of Nations) – permanent court to sit at Hague
3. International Court of Justice – also permanent court to sit at Hague
a. Hears two kinds of cases:
i. Advisory proceedings to UN organ/agency
ii. Cases between states that are party to STATUTE
A) Treaties where both stares are parties that provide for settlement of disputes in ICJ
B) Special agreement of parties to send dispute to ICJ – a compromis
C) Declaration given by both parties where accept compulsory jurisdiction
1) 2006 – 68 states have consented. US has NOT.
iii. Court often finds way to avoid ruling on the merits
iv. Most common cases – land and maritime boundary disputes (Libya/Chad, Burkina Faso/Mali)
b. SC has power to enforce ICJ decisions (though rarely does)
VII. Session 27 – Legitimacy of International System (Conceptual Challenges, Part One)
A. UN over the past 60 years
1. UN Charter framework has changed
a. Adopted/reflected new demands, approaches, values that have emerged in 60+ years
i. Emphasis on human rights
ii. Broader participation – more states, acknowledgement of individuals
b. Actors
i. UN agencies/branches have exponentially increased
ii. Courts emerging – impugning governments, though supposed to be about individuals
iii. Bodies created by Treaties
iv. Economic actors – WTO, IMF, World Bank
A) Setting up new standards, setting up their own norms of participation, transparency and accountability
v. Everyone in dialogue (or should be)
B. Security Council
1. Context greatly affects it. Cold War – useless.
a. International focus on cooperation, consulation
2. Secrecy – critical issues decided by P5 before the public meetings.
3. Reform Security Council
a. Unlikely
i. Open-Ended Working Group – met since 1992, nothing concrete
b. Better – delegitimize/constrain SC
i. Canadian suggestions
A) Restrict veto to chapter VII decisions
B) No veto in discussions re: genocide, CAH, war crimes
C) Force explanation/justification for veto
C. Pursuit of Libyan Terrorists
1. 1988 – Pan Am 103 explodes over Locherbie, Scotland.
2. 1991 – US jury indicted Libyan nationals, and Scotland also presses charges.
a. Neither US nor UK has extradition treaty. Demand Libya turn them over
b. Libya responds it doesn’t have to under Montreal Convention (965-66) – extradite or prosecute
i. Classic IL treaty – emphasizes territorial rights
3. Security Council
a. SC Res 731 (1992) – urges Libya to provide full/effective response.
b. SC Res 748 (1992) – CHAPTER VII - SANCTIONS – relatively targeted.
i. Affect Libyan economy, but well constructed to be easily enforceable
4. Libya brings suit
a. Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United States) – 1992 (968-69)
i. Provisional measures request
A) ICJ could have said – SC is supreme, we surrender.
1) Instead – clarifies that not ruling on facts/law
2) Article 103 – UN obligations prevail over any other int’l agreement, including Montreal Convention
a) Not appropriate for provisional measures.
ii. WEERAMANTRY Dissent – ICJ has separate role in determining legality under Charter.
A) We’re a court, we play a different role.
B) Concludes SC must act consistently with UN charter, and consistently wwith int’l law
1) BUT, determination of breach of peace under article 39 is entirely at their discretion.
C) Agrees re: Article 103, but disagrees re: provisional measures – Court COULD have come up with order directing parties not to aggravate dispute, without running counter to Resolution 748.
5. SC Res. 883 (1993) – tightened sanctions.
6. Libya responded – might accept trial before Scottish court
7. OAU Resolution – 1994 (971-972) – calls for reconsideration of SC resolutions 731, 748 and 883
8. 1998 – ICJ renders judgment on jurisdiction
a. Dispute under Montreal Convention before Court
i. Discontinued proceedings – settled.
9. ICJ defendants tried.
D. ICJ Judicial Review
1. Certain Expenses of the United Nations – 1962 advisory opinion – member states required to pay $ incurred in peacekeeping operations
2. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of S.Africa in Namibia – 1971 advisory opinion – upholding GA resolution finding SA’s presence in Namibia illegal
a. Schwebel (American judge) – no textual support for ICJ judicial review
i. Original intent argument
b. Franck (974) – everyone agrees there must be some limits to SC power, cannot be left to SC to interpret
i. Court might be last-resort defender of system’s legitimacy
c. Jose Alvarez (975-76) –
i. Don’t think this is comparable to domestic system, to Marbury
A) Lots of ways that Court can subtly delegitimize SC actions
1) Put out principles w/o confronting – some form of judicial review
E. SC bound by int’l HR law?
1. Never said for sure.
2. Permitted SG to make concessions, particularly re: IHL
a. “bulletin” – all UN agents respect/are bound by IHL
b. Not endorsed by SC, but couldn’t happen w/o their approval
3. Kady – European mid-level appellate court – said SC resolution under Chapter VII can’t violate jus cogens norm
a. In relation to actions taken in fight on terrorism – had to adopt broad norm of right to property.
b. Upon appeal – stepped back. Not judging SC. Look to national level measures adopted, make sure they conform.
4. Canon of interpretation? – apply strong presumption in looking at its decisions that it didn’t intend to violate HR
5. US Courts – focus on enacting national legislation, ignore SC
6. UK House of Lords – Article 103 - state itself cannot be held responsible for any human rights violations that follow from doing what SC requires
7. ECHR – almost totally deferential to SC
VIII. Session 7 – International Law in the Domestic Arena
A. Within state, who has authority to make treaties, and under what circumstances?
1. United States
a. Three issues: Separation of Powers (exec v. leg), federalism, court supervision of US conduct in foreign affairs
b. US international agreements
i. Article II treaties – made by P with A&C of 2/3 f S
A) Arms control and human rights agreements – always treaties
ii. Congressional-executive agreements – either w/ authorization or subsequent approval of majority of C.
A) Greatly increased over time – particularly ECONOMIC agreements.
B) Always hard to get 2/3 (time consuming, large use of political capita) – now, with rise in int’l community/participation, need to enter into some sort of agreements
1) More PRAGMATIC and PRACTICAL
C) Debates about validity
1) May 1945 – House approved const amend that would provide for treaty approval by majority vote.
2) Interchangeability thesis – C-E agreements legally equivalent to Art III treaties
a) Tribe (282-83) – clearly a distinction.
b) Clinton Administration (283) – some borderline between Art II treaties and C-E’s – deal with by “friendly cooperation” rather than “constitutional definition”
D) why use C-E instead of just SE?
1) more presumptively valid w/ Cong assent, esp if have to be enforced against states
iii. Sole executive agreements – w/o congressional participation
A) Similar issues to C-E agreements
B) Examples of controversial SE agreements
1) Iran Hostage Crisis
2) SOFA – status of forces agreement (Packet I – 22)
a) Concludes these agreements where US forces are deployed, grant them right to enter and move into country, exempt them from taxes, and exempt them from local jurisdiction
b) Critique of Iraq SOFA – goes beyond traditional scope
i) Grants authorities over military operations to committee and specification of timetables for military operations and withdrawals
ii) Argues that this is military work – needed congressional consent
3) ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation – 2009 (Packet I – 22)
a) Secretary of State Clinton signed. Senate – unprecedented for US to accede to “treaty” w/o A&C of S. but recognized it was largely limited to “general pledges of diplomatic cooperation”
c. Treaties are supposed to be “supreme law of the land” but divide into two categories
i. Self-executing – provisions will be given effect
ii. Not self-executing – domestic legislation must be created to give force to treaty
d. Missouri v. Holland – SCOTUS – 1920 (274-76)
i. US enters into treaty with GB re: Canada. Restricts and regulates migratory bird hunting.
A) States say MO can’t tell states what to do with their birds.
ii. HOLMES – federal branch has power to make the treaty.
A) Effort put into making a NATION. Need to transcend certain states rights to function internationally and really become a nation.
B) Here, in particular – state has rights over birds re: its inhabitants. But particularly small claim to title because these are MIGRATORY birds anyway.
e. EFFORTS TO OVERTURN Missouri
i. Bricker Amendment – 1950s – amend Constitution to overrule Missouri
A) Southern senators concern with UN Charter and UDHR. Worried it would give Congress power
f. Reid v. Covert – SCOTUS – 1957 (277-79)
i. Woman killed sergeant husband on airbase in England. Tried by military authorities under Uniform Code of Military Justice.
ii. Response to Bricker Amendment – in terms of Bill of Rights, int’l treaties can’t trump.
A) Distinction between INDIVIDUAL rights and STATE rights (thus distinguishing Missouri)
1) Also distinguishes by saying there was no SPECIFIC conflict of laws in Missouri
B. Monist v. Dualist
1. Monist – executive and judiciary are bound by int’l law. In conflicts of law – int’l law wins.
2. Dualist – domestic law and international law are separate. State has right to determine how it articulates/integrates international law.
a. Governs different actors and issues
i. Int’l law – relations AMONG states
ii. Domestic law – relations between state and citizens, or among citizens
3. Most states – somewhere on spectrum in between
C. NAFTA – C-E agreement
1. 1992 – NAFTA negotiated between US, Canada, and Mexico
2. Executive (pushing for free trade – better access to markets) v. Domestic NGOs/States (worried this will jeopardize their production)
a. Unlikely that Senate will provide supermajority for US to ratify and make this Article II Treaty.
3. 1993 – both House and Senate pass NAFTA, signed into law.
4. Made in the USA Foundation v. United States – 11th Cir – 2001 (284-85)
a. District Court – even if NAFTA is “treaty” – Treaty Clause is not exclusive means of enacting int’l commercial agreements, given Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce
b. 11th Circuit – political question doctrine – broad authority has been given to P and C in conducting foreign affairs – thus, narrow role for judiciary.
i. In context of int’l comm agreements + Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce + lack of judicial standards to determine when agreement is a “treaty” = nonjusticiable political question
D. Iran Hostage Crisis – SE agreement
1. 1979 - US lets Shah in for medical treatment. Iranian students seize US embassy and take them hostage.
a. Carter halted all oil imports, froze Iranian assets.
b. US filed suit against Iran in ICJ – provisional order to release hostages.
2. 1980 - Carter’s disastrous rescue attempt mission.
a. Iran starts to want to negotiate – but refused to negotiate directly with US. went through Algerian diplomats.
3. 1981 – Algiers Accords put into place a day before Reagan entered office
a. Declarations by Algerian gov’t to be “adhered to” by Iran and United States
b. Settlement of Claims – create international arbitral tribunal to decide claims
c. Includes termination of all litigation against IRAN
4. Dames & Moore v. Regan – SCOTUS – 1981 (289-92)
a. Challenges implementation of Algiers Accord
i. Can President suspend claims in US Courts against Iran as part of SE agreement?
ii. Youngstown – three levels of Presidential authority (w/Congressional authorization – height of power. Against C authorization – “at lowest ebb.” In ABSENCE – “zone of twilight”)
iii. REHNQUIST Majority
A) finds that no direct legislation authorizes P’s suspension of claims, but legislation is still relevant to “general tenor” of Congressional opinion
1) Failure of C to delegate authority doesn’t mean congressional disapproval, particularly in areas of foreign policy/national security
B) History of SE agreements to settle claims of nationals
1) C has thus implicitly approved this practice
2) Created International Claims Commission (now Foreign Claims Settlement Commission) – executive AGENCY – thus approving this type of procedure
C) “tenor” of direct legislation that’s not quite on point + past practice = Presumption that congressional INACTION is ACQUIESCENCE and then CONSENT.
b. Does not adopt political question doctrine ala Made in the US – instead gives liberal authority to President
IX. Section 8 – Domestic Law v. Int’l Law (or, Int’l Law in Domestic Arena, Part Two)
A. Domestic law v. international legal obligations
1. Vienna Convention, Article 27 – can’t invoke domestic law as justification for failing to perform treaty
B. Mexico-US clashes re: nationals sentenced to DP
1. Background
a. US background – domestically, federalist issue. Federal government supports DP, but allows states to decide.
b. International background – EU longstanding opponent to DP, targets US as “uncivilized”
c. Mexican-US background – Historically Anti-DP, and high immigration flows to US.
2. Breard
a. Paraguayan citizen arrested, not informed of Vienna Convention Consular Relations rights (on arrest, right to contact consulate, and have consular officials notified of arrest.) Found guilty, sentenced to death. Didn’t raise VC at trial, appeal or state habeas. Raised in federal habeas – denied.
i. Procedural default rules –don’t HAVE these in civil law systems.
ii. AEDPA – tries to reinforce procedural default.
A) Serious problem when initial proceedings are pro-forma and lacking.
b. Paraguay files suit – asks for provisional measures telling US not to execute Breard pending determination of case.
i. ICJ rules that Breard not executed pending final decision. Breard and Paraguay seek relief from SCOTUS
c. US Secretary of State writes to VA governor – requests stay of execution
d. Dep’ts of State and Justice – amicus brief to SCOTUS – deny Breard’s petition
i. Provisional measures are not binding
ii. Even if they were, order doesn’t require SCOTUS to stop Breard’s execution – federalism.
A) Federal measures can only include PERSUASION and not judicial COMPULSION.
e. Breard v. Greene/Paraguay v. Gilmore – SCOTUS – 1998 (296-97)
i. Clear rule of int’l law – procedural rules of forum state govern implementation of treaty in that state
ii. Last-in-time rule – act of congress that comes AFTER treaty nulls treaty to extent of conflict
A) AEDPA (1996) – prevents Breard from establishing violation of Vienna Convention (1969) rights
B) Not addressed - Should ICJ’s 1998 order trump AEDPA?
f. VA governor – ICJ has no authority to interfere with criminal justice system
g. Paraguay withdraws request for ruling on the merits
i. Suggestion – threatened to impose trade sanctions on Paraguay for alleged failure to protect IP – withdrew that threat in exchange for discontinuing ICJ action.
3. LaGrand
a. German citizens, not advised of VC rights at time of arrest. Convicted and sentenced to death. Reject VC claims, invoking procedural default.
b. Executed Karl, Germany files action in ICJ night before Walter scheduled to be executed.
i. ICJ grants provisional measures “all measures at disposal” again.
ii. Germany v. US – SCOTUS – 1999 (298) – SCOTUS rejects attempts to enforce ICJ order – execute Walter.
c. La Grand Case (Germany v. United States) – ICJ – 2001 (299)
i. Germany doesn’t discontinue, ala Paraguay
ii. Court holds – failure to notify violated US obligations under Vienna Convention
A) Procedural default rule in THIS case violated Vienna Convention
B) Decides right to consular notification and access is INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
1) Later US cases – open question OR NOT a judicially enforceable right
iii. IMPORTANT – decides provisional order is BINDING, and creates LEGAL OBLIGATION
4. Medellin
a. Mexican citizen arrested for brutal rape and murder. Not advised of Vienna Convention rights at time of arrest. Confession admitted into evidence, convicted of capital murder, and sentenced to death. Appeals, but does not raise claim re: failure to advise of treaty rights. THEN, MX officials learn of his arrest, detention, trial, conviction and sentence.
i. Files state habeas petition, alleging violation of Vienna Convention rights. Denied at trial level, and appellate level – barred because not raised previous.
ii. Files federal habeas. District court rules procedural default (fails to raise) AND that Vienna Convention does not create judicially enforceable rights. Appellate court rejects also (bound by Breard, notwithstanding recent ICJ decisions)
b. Medellin v. Dretke – SCOTUS – 2005 (303-05)
i. Dismisses writ as improvidently granted – TX court will probably provide M with review he seeks pursuan to Avena
ii. O’CONNOR Dissent – would remand to 5th circuit for consideration of
A) Whether ICJ judgment is binding on US courts
B) Whether Article 36 creates judicially enforceable individual right
C) Whether article 36 might sometimes require state procedural default rules to be set aside to give treaty “full effect”
c. Ex Parte Medellin – TX State Appellate Court – 2006 (Packet I – 30-32)
i. Applies Sanchez-Llamas – says ICJ decisions not binding. Thus, M can’t show Avena requires them to set aside state procedural default rule and reconsider Vienna Convention Claim.
ii. President Memo 2005 – directs state courts to give effect to Avena in accordance with the 51 nationals.
A) Holds that President exceeds constitutional authority – intruding on JUDICIARY
1) SE agreements okay. But not SE orders, memos, or directives.
a) Memo – did not act in second Youngsburg category with “express/implied authorization of Congress”
2) No opinion if SE agreement providing for state court compliance would preempt state law.
d. Medellin v. Texas – SCOTUS – 2008 (Packet I – 33-45)
i. Is Avena enforceable as domestic law in state court? AND Does Presidential Memo require states to review and reconsider claims w/o regard for state procedural rules?
ii. ROBERTS -
A) NEITHER is federal law that PREEMPTS state limitations on habeas petitions.
B) Self-executing v. non-self-executing
1) Say that neither Optional Protocol, UN Charter, or ICJ statute are self-executing, and no implementing legislation exists – SO, not automatically binding domestic law.
a) OP – bare grant of jurisdiction
b) UN Charter, article 94 – comply with judgments – commitment for POLITICAL branches to comply. NOT a directive to domestic courts
i) Entirely discretionary
ii) Why would one ever take a state to ICJ? Ridiculous interpretation.
C) Judgment recognizing commercial/property dispute different than enforcing INJUCTIVE relief
D) President’s Memo
1) Authorized by Optional Protocol and UN Charter? NO. responsibility for making non-self executing treaty into domestic law is on CONGRESS.
a) Thus, falls into third Youngstown category
b) Note – P can’t make it self-executing, but COURT can make non-self executing.
2) Exercise of foreign affairs authority (like SE agreement?) – distinguishes Dames & Moore as being backed up by historical practice.
a) Here, no historical precedent
iii. STEVENS Concurrence
A) Cost of Texas complying is MINIMAL
B) Cost of refusing to respect ICJ are significant.
C) Leave up to TX – because Court’s judgment doesn’t foreclose future appropriate action by THEM
iv. BREYER Dissent
A) History of cases – self-executing treaty provisions are not uncommon or peculiar.
1) Very few treaties DO speak clearly on matter, so majority’s saying that the instruments don’t is ridiculous.
2) Cases suggest practical, context-specific criteria the court has used before.
B) Would find treaty provisions self-executing
1) Language supports direct judicial enforceability in both OP and UN Charter
2) OP speaking to Vienna Convention individual right
3) Judgment re: meaning of self-executing treaty provision is going to be binding/final
4) This approach has negative practical implications for all the other treaties with ICJ dispute resolutions
5) This particular judgment is well suited to direct judicial enforcement
6) Finding these obligations self-executing doesn’t interfere with other branches, doesn’t involve judicial overreaching, doesn’t involve creation of new cause of action
7) President and Congress unconcerned with this direct judicial enforcement – in fact, President
5. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. USA) – 2004 (300-01)
a. Mexico files suit – violations of Vienna Convention in case of Medellin and 53 other Mexican nationals. Requests annulment of convictions/sentences, and declaration that procedural default rules not be applied to prevent redress of VC violations.
i. Jurisdiction – Vienna convention sets up compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.
b. 2003 – Provisional measures – order US to take “all measures necessary” to prevent executions of nationals in coming months
i. Court trying to narrow grounds, and come up with reasonable prescription for US
ii. Orders “review and reconsideration” of cases to see if they suffered ACTUAL prejudice – taking into account breach of Vienna Convention
A) US tries to say that clemency procedures can take this into account – but super strong presumptions against clemency
6. Subsequent Cases
a. Torres – Mexican national covered by ICJ provisional measures. Not advised of VC rights.
i. Clemency Petition - Mexican Ambassador, State Department, and parole Board advise clemency.
ii. Appellate court orders evidentiary hearing re: prejudice
A) Chapel decision – bound to give full faith and credit to Avena decision (US has looked to ICJ to provide binding resolution of disputes under VC, and enforced such decisions)
B) Governor commuted sentence on same day
iii. Trial judge – Torres WAS actually prejudiced.
iv. On appeal – three pronged test for prejudice:
A) Did D know he had right to contact consulate AND
B) Would he have availed himself of such right if he knew AND
C) Is it likely consulate would have assisted them
b. 2004 – US withdrew from Vienna Convention Optional Protocol – gave ICJ jurisdiction in Paraguay, LaGrand, and Avena
c. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon – SCOTUS – 2006 (Packet I, P. 23-30)
i. ROBERTS Majority -
A) EXCLUSIONARY rule – total suppression of confession because never advised of Vienna Convention Rights.
1) ER is uniquely American.
a) But, in many countries, failure to respect certain rights might nullify prosectution
2) Here, treaty not specifically requiring this remedy. If treaty were specific (and self-executing) – would trump.
B) Reiterates Breard argument re: procedural default rule.
1) Avena decision deserves “respectful consideration” but not enough to reconsider Breard
a) Though note – Sanchez-Llamas was not one of the 51 nationals covered by Avena
C) ICJ – nothing to suggest its interpretations are binding on COURTS.
1) Its decisions not even binding on ICJ itself.
a) Now that US has withdrawn from Optional Protocol – CERTAINLY not binding.
ii. GINSBURG Concurrence – concedes atty knew Vienna Convention rts at trial
iii. BREYER Dissent
A) Does believe there is an individual right
1) Language in treaty, nature of right, and ICJ’s interpretation SO STRONGLY point to intent to confer enforceable rights, TRUMPS Executive interpret.
B) State Procedural Default
1) Applies UNLESS D’s failure to raise right is traced to failure of police AND state law provides no other way for D to raise the issue
2) Treaty REQUIRES effective remedy
3) Distinguishes Breard as FEDERAL procedural default rule, rather than STATE procedural default rule – receive different treatment under Supremacy Clause
d. ICJ level
i. Mexico filed complaint – saying that its citizens request for “review and reconsideration” were being denied.
A) 2008 – issued provisional measures – “take all measures necessary” that individuals not be executed pending judgment
ii. 2009 – found that Mexico’s’ request involved dispute over domestic effects of ICJ judgments – NOT within scope of 2004 judgment in Avena, and not within terms of Article 60 proceeding.
A) BUT found US breached provisional measures order – and reaffirmed binding character of Avena on US
C. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Mission to United Nations
1. 1917 – Headquarters Agreement between UN and US, which declares that federal/state authorities will not impose impediments to transit to/from UN headquarters for those invited on official business. 1974 – UN invited PLO to observe. 1987 – Anti-Terrorism Act – declares PLO a terrorist organization.
2. GA Res 42/229A – US is under “legal obligation” to enable PLO Mission to maintain its premises and carry out official functions
3. USA v. Palestine Liberation Organization – S.D.N.Y – 1988 (307-09)
a. Day after ATA passed, filed to close mission.
b. Treaty v. Statute – only where treaty is irreconcilable with later enacted statute AND C clearly intended to supersede it, does the statute take precedence.
c. Decide ATA/legislative history don’t manifest Congress’ intent to abrogate long-standing practice under Headquarters Agreement
i. Don’t mention Mission or Headquarters Agreement in ATA
ii. Says notwithstanding provisions of LAW, but not any TREATY
iii. No member of congress expressed clear intent to supersede HA
A) Those who did speak denied there would be a conflict – but because they misinterpreted HA to not give PLO any right to maintain an office.
D. Spector v. Norweigian Cruise Line – SCOTUS – 2005 (310) – interpret acts of Congress to AVOID CONFLICT with earlier treaty provisions
1. Title III might require removal of access barriers. Court said – can’t require those removals if it would bring vessel into noncompliance with Int’l Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
E. Garcia-Mir v. Meese – 11th Cir. – 1986 (311-12)
1. 1980 – Mariel Cuban boatlift. Group One – guilty of crimes in Cuba, or deemed mentally incompetent, and denied parole. Group Two – granted parole, but REVOKED. Detained all of them.
a. Congress has broad constitutional authority to refuse to admit certain classes of aliens. But usually have right to hearing to determine inadmissibility. Executive branch has authority to grant parole, pending hearing on removal.
i. What happens if EXECUTIVE acts in violation of int’l law?
2. Held that statute doesn’t RESTRICT executive power to detain aliens indefinitely. But has there been AFFIRMATIVE legislative grant of authority to detain?
a. First group – yes, sufficient evidence.
b. Second group – NO affirmative legislative grant.
i. Controlling executive act?
A) Trial court – Attorney General’s termination of status review plan/decision to incarcerate indefinitely
1) Try to challenge – Paqute Habana – controlling executive act can only be PRESIDENT, not subordinates. Court says that’s incorrect summary of Paquete.
B) Constitution provides for executive departments – executive act IS SUFFICENT for affirming trial court’s finding that int’l law DOES NOT CONTROL.
F. Self-Executing Treaties
1. Foster and Elam v. Neilson – SCOTUS – 1829 (313) – roots of “self-executing” distinction. Court decided Spanish grants to Ps not valid as domestic law until C passes legislation confirming grants.
a. Treaty addressed to POLITICAL, not judicial department
2. US v. Percheman – SCOTUS – 1833 (313) – found same treaty self-executing
3. US v. Postal – 5th Cir – 1979 (313-14) – boarded ship outside of 12-mile zone of jurisdiction.
a. Whether treaty is self-executing – CONTRACT INTERPRETATION for courts to decide
i. Discern INTENT of parties
ii. Since Convention on High Seas multilateral treaty which has been signed by some states that DO NOT recognize treaties as self-executing, hard to ascribe common intent.
4. Carlos Vazquez (315) – four situations where treaty is going to be deemed non-self-exec
a. When parties intended treaty to be effected through domestic legislation
b. When address issue that constitutionally requires domestic legislation (like criminalization)
c. Treaties that are advisory/encouraging a certain course
d. Treaties that do not create a private cause of action
X. Session 9 – International Law in US Courts (or Int’l Law in Domestic Arena, Part Three)
A. Use of international law to interpret constitutional provisions?
1. Bowers v. Hardwick – 1986 (324) – rejected constitutional challenge to GA law criminalizing sodomy. BURGER Concurrence – proscriptions against sodomy have ancient roots – Judeo-Christian philosophy, Roman law, English law, etc.
2. Lawrence v. Texas – 2003 (324) – Court overruled Bowers – Burger’s references don’t take into account recent international law pointing the other way
a. Parliament – repealing punishment for homosexual conduct; ECHR invalidating Irish laws, etc.; other nations as well
b. FIRST TIME – SCOTUS relied on decision of int’l tribunal to interpret scope of individual liberties
i. SCALIA Dissent – constitutional entitlements don’t come about when foreign nations decriminalize conduct
3. Roper v. Simmons – 2005 (324-25) – Court overturned DP for juveniles.
a. Recognized that US is only country in world that gives official sanction to juvenile DP
i. SCOTUS long referred to laws of other countries as helping interpret “cruel and unusual”
ii. Not saying we’re CONTROLLED by them, only that we acknowledge and respect
b. Waldron – should consider int’l law – but here using int’l law the US has not ratified (Convention on Rights of the Child).
4. Arguments for using int’l law?
a. BREYER (325-26) – US and foreign judges confront similar issues – US judges benefit from seeing how foreign courts address these issues.
i. Canadian Supreme Court Justice L’Heureux-Dube (326) – idea of judicial dialogue
A) This is something judges are DOING.
B) European courts by definition bound up in dialogue –ECJ, ECHR
b. Issues like int’l human rights are of international, COMMON concern
5. Counterarguments to using int’l law?
a. Cultural relativism?
i. Scalia – it’s respect for different cultures that lets you recognize that they create different legal SYSTEMS
b. it’s issues like human rights where we MOST have to protective, we have different rules
i. juvenile DP, abortion
ii. US has VERY different take on criminal justice
iii. Free speech laws – we value much more.
6. House Resolution – tries to FORBID consideration of international “judgments, laws, or pronouncements.”
B. Bringing International Human Rights Claims in Domestic Courts
1. Many countries – “universal jurisdiction”
a. For crimes like torture or war crimes – ICC
i. Straightforward way of getting at these guys, so don’t need alien tort
b. US unsure how it feels about UJ – have not ratified ICC
i. But, have terrible stories
A) Paraguayan torturer, then PLO torturing innocent Israeli civilians.
ii. Respond with 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)
A) An individual of any nation who tortures or kills extrajudically under color of law is liable to that individual/their legal representative.
iii. NOW, moving from individual offenders to CORPORATIONS for COMPLICITY with foreign government
2. Alien Tort Statute – 28 USC § 1350.
a. Part of Judiciary Act of 1789
i. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction of civil actions by alien for tort, committed in violation of “law of nations” or US treaty.
b. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala – 2d. Cir – 1980 (328-30)
i. F kidnapped and tortured to death by P, Inspector General of police in Paraguay. P entered US on visitor’s visa – was served, using ATS as basis of jurisdiction.
A) District Court – dismissed, saying “law of nations” does not govern state’s treatment of its own citizens.
ii. CUSTOMARY LAW– right to be free from torture
A) UN Charter, UDHR, GA Declaration on Protection of All Persons from Torture
B) Universal renunciation in usage and practice of nations
iii. Doesn’t define “torture”, doesn’t evaluate state practice in way we discussed
iv. EXTRAORDINARY Case
A) Jurisdiction of US court accepted at request of two individuals, not gov’t
B) Jurisdiction over non-US national for wrong occurring in third country
C) Two nationals of same country involved, with no transnational element involved
D) Court applies CUSTOM w/o treaty or other US law connection
c. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic – D.C. Cir. 1984 (330-31)
i. PLO members took civilian Israelis, Americans, Dutch out of cars, shot, tortured and murdered them. Victims filed suit in federal district court under ATS
ii. Court DISMISSED complaint for lack of jurisdiction
iii. BORK Concurring –
A) Dismisses idea that federal common law provides cause of action for violations of int’l law
1) Federal common law – rule that is non-statutory and non-constitutional
a) Doesn’t necessarily include international law. More, historical stuff like common law of contract and tort, which itself affords right of action.
b) Not recognizing that “customary int’l law” might be common law. Why limit to “traditional common law”?
2) Inadvisable to expand – judiciary should stay out of international law – state and political question doctrine.
iv. Congress – does not take this distinction up – passes TVPA (1991)
A) Remember, Congress could get rid of ATS at any moment, because NOT constitutional – it’s statutory.
d. Other circuits – 2nd, 9th, 11th – found ATS provided cause of action
e. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain – 2004 (333-38)
i. Mexican national accomplice to murder of undercover DEA agent. DEA approves abduction of A-M to US to stand trial.
A) US rejects argument that kidnapping divests US of jurisdiction.
B) A-M acquitted.
ii. A-M files suit to recover damages from abductors under ATS.
iii. SOUTER Majority
A) ATS creates SOME causes of action. Just not this one.
B) Defining “law of nations” in 1789
1) Allows re: violation of safe conduct, infringement of ambassador rights, piracy
C) Argues we can’t freeze it at those three – but judicial RESTRAINT in allowing new ones. Why restraint?
1) Common law has changed since 1789. Doesn’t exist in vacuum, as we used to think. Now recognize that new right of action is being CREATED.
2) Rethinking of role of federal courts re: fed common law. ERIE.
3) Creating private right of action is better left to legislature in vast majority of cases.
4) Judiciary should be restrained because it has potential implications re: foreign relations, where legislative and exec branch have great discretion
a) Worry about suits that tell other countries how to treat their citizens
5) No congressional mandate to define new violations of law of nations
a) Did get one with TVAP – but well-defined
D) Quarter century since Filartiga – no legislation forbidding, or saying courts shouldn’t do this.
E) A-M gets nothing – no case here.
1) Reject argument that there is customary law prohibiting arbitrary arrest
a) His argument is too broad – saying any time officially sanctioned action exceeds its positive authorization to detain under its own law
2) Single day of illegal detention followed by transfer of custody to lawful authorities and prompt arraignment – violates no norm of customary international law.
3) PA – could have looked at ICCPR – norm against arbitrary detention (thought we haven’t signed), UN working group on arbitrary detention, ICTY jurisprudence)
iv. SCALIA Concurrence in Part and in Judgment – not a question of what congressional act would PREVENT courts from applying “law of nations”, but what act AUTHORIZES exception from Erie holding that general federal common law does not exist.
3. Ferdinand Marcos – Philippine Torture Victims
a. Relevance – governments (states, and their instrumentalities) have immunities in courts
i. Can’t sue state – except under Sovereign Immunities Act
ii. Thus, have to explore other routes.
b. Marcos declares martial law, and harshly represses all political dissent – including use of torture. Also engaged in widespread, systematic theft. Deposed, and flew to HI.
i. Several lawsuits filed in US courts for HR violations.
A) 30 for named individuals.
1) Some got default judgments
B) Several class action suits.
1) Some got exemplary damages.
C) Philippines itself filed action in CA state & federal court, and NY, NJ, TX federal courts to recover $ Marcos stole from treasury
4. Other ATS Cases
a. Doe v. Unocal (339) – alleged multinational cop aid/abet HR abuses in Burma.
i. Clinton – adjudication of the claims wouldn’t affect US foreign relations with Burma
ii. Bush – recognizing this claim would diminish economic engagement
iii. Eventually settled.
b. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talismanic Energy – SDNY – 2005 (339) – Sudan and TE (Canadian firm) accused of crimes against humanity.
i. Canadian gov’t – objected to US jurisdiction over Canadian corp for activities that took place outside of US, and that US was interfering in their foreign policy w/Sudan
c. In re South African Apartheid Litigation (Packet I – p. 46) – claims that several corps aided/abetted apartheid regime.
i. Difficult questions re: aiding and abetting under ATS
ii. 2009 - D’s motion to dismiss granted in part, denied in part
d. Sarei v. Rio Tinto (Packet I – p. 46) – P alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, racial discrimination and environmental torts from D’s mining activities. D.C. – cognizable ATS claims, but dismissed as political question. 9th Cir – erred in dismissing complaint on political question grounds, remanded for consideration of other issues. 9th Cir en banc- remanded for failure to exhaust local remedies.
e. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell (Packet I – p. 46) – Shell complicit in HR abuses against Ogoni people. 2nd cir reversed DC’s dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, and denied motion to dismiss. SETTLED.
f. Bowoto v. Chevron (Packet I – p. 46-47) – Nigerians seized Shell platform. Chevron brought in Nigerian security, whose removal attempts led to two deaths and many arrests. Argued Chevron was vicariously liable for torture and other cruel treatment done by security forces. Jury found for DEFENDANTS.
i. One of two ATS corporate cases to reach a jury.
g. Al Shimari v. CACI (Packet I – p. 47) – prisoners held at Abu Ghraib against private contractors. Court found claims against gov’t contractors TOO NOVEL (not up to customary law norm) to satisfy Sosa test for ATS jurisdiction.
h. Ibazzaz v. Blackwater (Packet I – p. 47) – Claims filed on behalf of two Iraqis killed when B employees opened fire on crowd of Iraqi civilians. Motion to dismiss pending.
5. 2005 – US and Palestinian HR org filed suit against former IDF commander re: Qana (567)
a. Under ATS and TVPA – alleged Ya’alon participated in decision to shell UN compound at Qana, and had command responsibility for attack
b. Accuses Y of war crimes, CAH, and other offenses.
XI. Session 10 - Domestic Law in the International Arena
A. Jurisdiction
1. Three types of int’l jurisdiction
a. Jurisdiction to prescribe (legislative jurisdiction or prescriptive jurisdiction) – promulgate law applicable to persons or activities
i. Territorial principle
ii. Additional bases for prescriptive jurisdiction?
A) Nationality principle – exercise jx over nations, no matter where they are
1) Blackmer v. US – SCOTUS - 1932 (377) – US laws apply to US citizen living in france
a) Jus soli (birth in state’s territory) or Jus sanguens (birth to national parents)
2) But what about determining nationality of corporations/entities?
B) Protective principle – exercise jx against anyone who commits crime against security of state
1) Joyce – House of Lords – 1946 (378-79) – US citizen lied to get British passport. Left for Germany and committed treason. Appealed conviction on grounds that can’t try alien under British law for offense in third country. House of Lords – no country has to ignore crime of treason, even if outside of its country
2) US v. Pizzarusso – 2d Cir – 1968 (379) – Canadian citizen convicted for lying on visa application. Upheld jx because gov’t has ‘legitimate interest’ in getting info from people trying to enter US
3) US v. Romero-Galue – 11th Cir. 1985 (379) – US could prosecute foreign nationals on foreign vessels on high seas for possession of narcotics
C) Passive personality principle – apply its law if VICTIM was its national
1) Series of treaties on hijacking/terrorism provides for this
2) US v. Bin Laden – SDNY – 2000 (380) – defendants were indicted for conspiracy to kills US national sabroad
D) Universal jurisdiction – jx over individuals who commit certain horrible offenses
1) Has become part of treaty law – Torture Convention, ICC
a) Rationale - prohibited acts are of international character, and of serious concern to WHOLE international community
2) Crimes accepted: piracy, war crimes, genocide, slave trade
3) Attorney-General of State of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann – Supreme Court of Israel – 1962 (380-82) – state which prosecutes is acting as “organ and agent of the international community”
4) German Court – refused to exercise jx against Rumsfeld and other US officials for unlawful acts against detainees at Abu Ghraib under German Code of Crimes Against International Law
a) Claims that it’s just to be used when no other system will prosecute, and no indication that US are/would refrain from punishing such violations
5) Hissene Habre – Senegalese court charged Habre (ruler of Chad who fled to Senegal) with torture and crimes against humanity. Highest court decided he could not be tried in Senegal for crimes abroad.
a) 2005 – Belgian judge issued international arrest warrant. Senegal’s Court of Appeals ruled it could not decide whether he should be extradited
i) Immunity as former head of state?
b) 2006 - AU leaders created Committee of Eminent African Jurists to recommend where Habre should be tried
i) Reported that Senegal should exercise jx.
c) 2007-08 - Senegal passed legislation and amended constitution to allow prosecution of past genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
i) Said they would require $ to hold a trial. Countries indicated they would provide $, but no prosecution has commended.
d) Belgium v. Senegal – ICJ. Belgium alleges Senegal has violated obligations under Torture Convention to prosecute or extradite.
b. Jurisdiction to adjudicate – subject persons or things to judicial processes
c. Jurisdiction to enforce – induce or compel compliance with law through its courts
d. These norms are largely CUSTOMARY – states are hesitant to resolve these by treaty
2. Lotus Case
a. 1926 – French boat collided with Turkish boat and sank it. Allegedly caused by gross negligence of Lotus watch officer. WO put under arrest and charged with manslaughter in Turkey. Despite argument that they had no jurisdiction, found guilty, and sentenced. Countries agree to let PCIJ hear case a compromis.
b. S.S. Lotus (France/Turkey) – Permanent Court of Int’l Justice – 1927 (356)
i. Does jurisdiction have to be BASED somewhere, or does it exist UNLESS contradicted?
A) Court argues that, while int’l law won’t allow state to exercise jurisdiction outsides its territory – within its territory can exercise jurisdiction about acts which took place abroad.
B) Here, the offense had EFFECTS on Turkish vessel, and then in place assimilated in Turkish territory.
ii. Also, ship flying a particular flag – placed in same position as national territory
A) So, if act produces effects on vessel flying another flag, same principles apply
iii. PERMISSIVE view of IL – only a few restrictions, otherwise free to adopt principles you think best.
iv. Responses
A) Western private actors concerned – worried that wealthy vessels get into accidents in South, and then subject to laws of other (less civilized) countries
B) Dislike of uncertainty about what law is/will be.
C) This favors ship OWNERS.
D) Concerns about concurrent jurisdiction
1) Int’l association of mercantile marine officers
2) Int’l maritime committee (IMC) private body organized by maritime lawyers
3) 1933 Oslo Conference Resolution – proceedings should only arise as to where person is national OR what flag that ship was flying
4) 1940 Montevideo Conference – Latin American states adopte International Penal Law treaty – crimes only punished in state of flag of ship
5) 1942 Brussels Conference – adopte Int’l Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matter of Collision – only punished in state of flag of ship
6) 1958 – Convention of the High Seas – first major effort to codify oceans law
a) Flag state OR state where person is national
E) Basically REVERSE Lotus judgment
B. Jurisdiction to Prescribe
1. Development of Jurisdiction Law
a. “territorial principle” – state has jurisdiction to make law applicable to anyone/thing in territory
i. In 19th century – thought to LIMIT ability of states outside their territory
A) The Apollon – SCOTUS – 1824 (360) – US customs law does not reach vessels outside US waters
b. US Courts changing attitudes
i. American Banana v. United Fruit – SCOTUS - 1909 (363) – reaffirmation of territorial supremacy. Can’t interfere with another sovereign.
ii. US v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) – 2d Cir. -1945 (364-65)
A) gov’t attempting to break up Alcoa’s holdings, and limit participation of Alcoa and Aluminum Limited (Canadian corp) from working with European aluminum cartel.
B) Establishes EFFECTS test – Court acknowledging changing economic circumstances
iii. Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America – 9th Cir. 1976 (366-68)
A) Tries to refine the effects test – recognizes that “at some point the interests of the United States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for restraint too strong” to justify finding jurisdiction
B) Tripartite analysis
1) Some effect (actual or intended) on American foreign commerce
2) must have effected some cognizable injury, and therefore, civil violation of antitrust laws
3) whether US interests are sufficiently strong.
a) This is where “direct and substantial” test has been confusing
b) Multi-factor test: consider
i) Degree of conflict with foreign law/policy
ii) Nationality of parites
iii) Locations of corp’s/PPB
iv) Extent to which enforcement is likely to achieve compliance
v) Relative significance of effects on US as compared to other places
vi) Extent to which explicit PURPOSE to harm/affect US commerce
vii) Foreseeability of harm/affect US commerce
C) Applying test – dismissed claims.
iv. Hartford Fire Insurance v. California – SCOTUS – 1993 (368-72)
A) London reinsurers only offered insurance to US insurers if they changed their forms accordingly. Does US antitrust law govern British reinsurers giving reinsurance in London relating to US insurers?
1) Parliament has created COMPREHENSIVE regulatory regime over reinsurers
B) SOUTER Majority – clearly has jurisdiction.
1) Question is now – conflict of domestic law/foreign law which counsel restraining from exercising jurisdiction because of comity
2) Only thing that matters is London reinsurers aren’t REQUIRED by British law to do anything against American law.
3) Professor Damm – argues that four ways to resolve these conflicts:
a) Persuasion (make the other jx change laws to fit with US)
b) Negotiation
c) Threaten sanctions
d) Impose American law (argues that’s what’s happening here)
C) SCALIA Dissent –
1) Two questions – jurisdiction AND reach of Sherman Act
a) Limits on “jurisdiction to prescribe” – CANONS:
i) Legislation meant to apply w/I territory (unless other intent shown)
ii) Construed not to violate law of nations if any other construction remains.
2) PRESCRIPTIVE COMITY – have to respect other sovereigns
a) Just because you have some BASIS for jurisdiction, doesn’t mean you shouldn’t refrain when it would be UNREASONABLE
D) CURRENT LAW
v. F. Hoffman LaRoche v. Empagran – SCOTUS – 2004 (372)
A) Foreign purchaser brought suit for harm in foreign markets – not REASONABLE because would interfere with foreign nation’s ability to regulate
c. European alternative?
i. Re Wood Pulp Cartel – ECR – 1988 (373-75) – similar “implementation” test
A) Consider where agreement intended to influence, not where agreement was made
1) Effects – “direct and perceivable consequences of “conduct””
B) Conduct includes not only principals, but subsidiaries and agents
C) Conduct is two parts:
1) Formation of agreement AND implementation
d. Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger
i. 1996 – merger would combine last two commercial jet airplane manufacturers in US, and create world’s largest aerospace company, second largest defense supplier. Would be largest US exporter, and leading supplier to Pentagon and NASA. Only rival – Airbus. Owned by France, Germany, UK, and Spain.
A) 1997 – notified US FTC and EC of merger, as required of any merger with “community dimension”
1) If EC dislikes, company must offer remedies. Company can appeal adverse findings to ECJ.
B) EC asserted authority to fine new company, and/or fine European companies that bought Boeing (thus, shutting it out of European markets). Particularly bothered by long-term sole-source contracts.
C) FTC – acquisition wouldn’t affect competition or market.
ii. Nations worked out agreement (1997)
A) Boeing doesn’t enforce exclusivity clauses in sole-source contracts with three large airlines, keep MDC’s commercial aircraft division separate for ten years, license technology it might get from MDC military contracts.
e. Progression of these antitrust issues:
i. International groups of international lawyers/commissions
ii. Ships/industries themselves
iii. International law – becomes part of int’l convention
f. Jurisdiction over internet issues
i. Serious jurisdictional issues – what makes online company present in jurisdiction? What about IP laws? If content is uploaded where it’s legal, but can be downloaded where It’s not, is the person who uploads liable?
ii. Dow Jones v. Gutnick – Australian Court – 2002 (384) – allegedly defamatory article posted on DJ’s US website.
A) lower court – defamation occurred when article downloaded in Australia. DJ argues Internet publisher should only have to conform to law where it maintains web servers (unless that place was chosen opportunistically). High Court – internet publishers KNOWINGLY make materials available worldwide.
B) Dow Jones filed complaint with UN Human Rights Committee
1) Argued that AU litigation violated writer’s ICCPR right of free speech
2) SETTLED.
C) Bangoura v. Washington Post – Canadian Court – 2005 (386-87) – WP accused UN employee of having been accused of sexual harassment, nepotism, and financial impropriety. Court ruled for NEWSPAPER, and
1) distinguished Gutnick
a) Gutnick was well-known Austrialian resident at time, while UN employee did not live in Canada
b) DJ had 1700 subscribers in AU, WP only had 7 subscribers in CA
iii. LICRA v. Yahoo! – French Court – 2000 (385) – French NGOs sued Yahoo for sale of Nazi related goods. Court found Yahoo had “sufficient contacts” with france to allow jx, ordered Yahoo to eliminate French citizen access to such materials. Yahoo said that was impossible, but court ruled it was.
A) Yahoo! sought declaratory judgement with US D.C. that French order was not cognizable/enforceable under US law.
1) Yahoo v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et Antisemitisme – N.D. Cal. 2001 (385) – First Amendment precludes enforcement w/I US of French order
2) NINTH CIRCUIT REVERSED, and ordered case dismissed.
XII. Session 11 – Domestic Law in the International Arena, Part 2
A. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate/Enforce
1. Does the process protect INDIVIDUALS or STATE SOVEREIGNTY?
a. Originally – emphasis on sovereignty
b. With particularly horrendous crime, some notion emerges that there must be SOME qualifications on sovereignty
c. Now, cases suggesting that we have to focus on rights of individuals
B. Abduction/Luring/Rendition
1. Attorney-General of State of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann – Supreme Court of Israel – 1962 (400-02)
a. Israeli agents kidnapped Eichmann in Argentina and forcibly brought him to Israel to stand trial.
b. Court ruled on Eichmann’s argument that Israel lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
i. STATE SOVEREIGNTY – no mention of individual rights.
A) If argentina doesn’t have a problem, then neither does the individual.
ii. Israel and Argentina had settled dispute over this, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 4349.
A) SC Res – pre-6-Day War (wouldn’t get a resolution like this today). Warning Israel not to do it again, but not using Chapter VII magic language
iii. Eichmann writes statement of acceptance of jx. Even if wasn’t coerced – at this point, wouldn’t matter. All about STATES still.
c. Hannah Arendt – Israel using Eichmann trial as pedagogical teaching tool.
i. Is that part of International Criminal Tribunals also?
ii. When we have ICT’s, where we know we won’t be able to charge, much less convict the tiniest percentage of offenders, what are the motivations?
A) Establishing quota of proof
B) Send message of deterrence
C) Educate country about what happened
D) Build int’l legal system
iii. Arendt says – what about INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE? Have to be seen as respecting rule of law, and these other agendas might get in the way.
2. Extradition Treaties?
a. US v. Alvarez-Machain – SCOTUS – 1992 (404)
i. Mexican doctor AM indicted in US for participation in murder of CS, undercover DEA officer. Forcibly kidnapped by MX nationals from office and flown to TX, where arrested by DEA.
A) AM complained abduction violated extradition treaty between US and Mexico
ii. Underlying cases
A) US v. Rauscher – 1886 – doctrine of specialty - prohibited prosecution of R for crime OTHER than the crime for which he had been extradited (according to proper procedures in extradition treaty)
B) Ker v. Illinois – 1886 – D forcibly abducted from Peru, and then tried and convicted in IL. Proper warrant had been issued, but messenger chose to forcibly kidnap instead.
1) Distinguished from R – not according to process, decided K had no right under extradition treaty to be RETURNED. Found once you’re in jx, you’re subject to trial – can’t contest legality of abduction.
iii. Can you distinguish Ker because gov’t wasn’t involved there, but involved here?
iv. REHNQUIST Majority – Textual
A) Must first establish whether abduction violated extradition treaty. If NO, Ker applies, and court doesn’t look to how AM got before it.
1) In construing treaty – look to terms and implied terms. Here, saying treaty doesn’t specify that extradition is ONLY way one country can get custody of other’s national.
2) Rejects state’s rights idea – Court of Appeals said state had to lodge former protests.
B) Decision of whether to return is EXECUTIVE decision. Since it didn’t violate treaty, Ker rule applies re: not inquiring into how jx was attained.
1) Ignores fact that every other jurisdiction would deem this a violation of int’l law
v. STEVENS Dissent – Purposive
A) Treaty only makes sense if interpret it as REQUIRING each signatory to comply with these procedures
B) Fails to distinguish between private conduct and gov’t authorized conduct
b. Responses to AM?
i. Domestically
A) Nothing changed language of Treaty (though Bush promised no more abductions)
B) 1992 – created Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions with MX, but this has never been submitted to S for A&C.
ii. Internationally
A) Everyone rejects – governments, UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Organization of American States
B) BUT, when other states make extradition treaties, still using the same language
1) Implicit acceptance of AM decision?
2) OR, would give ridiculous decision credence if changed anything?
c. Other jurisdictions?
i. R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, Ex Parte Bennett – English Court – 1993 (410) – PERSUASION. English police convinced South African police to arrest New Zealand defendant and return forcibly to England under pretext of deporting him to NZ. Court held English courts have DISCRETION not to exercise jx if English police have disregarded extradition procedures.
A) Dissent – proper remedy for executive branch wrongdoing is civil/criminal proceeding against wrongdoers, not denial of jx.
ii. Levinge v. Director of Custodial Services – Australian Court – 1987 (411) – held that judges have discretion to refuse to exercise jx over D who have been brought in irregularly
A) New Zealand has also adopted discretionary approach
iii. State v. Ebrahim – South African Court – 1991 (411) – two men falsely identifying as SA cops seized SA citizen in Swaziland, brought to SA and charged with treason. Swaziland did NOT protest abduction.
A) Court concluded it lacked jx to try person brought before it by state-sponsored abuduction.
1) Individual must be protected from unlawful acts, and state sovereignty must be protected.
B) NOTE – SA Constitution REQUIRES it to abide by int’l law
iv. State v. Beahan – Zimbabwean Court – 1991 (412) – Court “should decline” to compel person to undergo trial when appearance facilitated by state-facilitated abduction, even though act did not involve “force or deception”
A) can’t declare otherwise, bcs saying ends justify the means.
v. Ocalan v. Turkey (Packet I, p.49)
A) O taken to Kenya. K alleged he entered improperly, and as driving him to airport, car takes him to Turkish officials. Arrested and flown to Turkey, convicted of terrorist acts.
B) Found no violation of European Convention on Human Rights because Kenya didn’t perceive arrest as violation of sovereignty
3. Capture of Slavko Dokmanovic – Croatian Serb and President of Vukovar Municipality
a. Commanded Yugoslav national Army and Serb paramilitaries to kill 260 men evacuated from Vukovar Hospital where they were seeking refuge. Greatest single massacre of 1991 War in Croatia, where Croatian Serbs rose up against newly declared independent Croatian government.
b. 1996 – D indicted by ICTY. Order for arrest transmitted to UN. D holed up in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. RUSE to get him to UN vehicle, and get him across Danube/FRY checkpoint into Croatia. There, arrested.
c. ICTY Trial Chamber – declared D entered into Croatia of his own free will, and thus ruse did not constitute “forcible abduction or kidnapping”
i. Absent extradition treaty, luring is not abuse of suspect’s right or abuse of process.
ii. Since D’s arrest was justified and legal, didn’t opine on jx if D illegally arrested.
d. Committed suicide before ICTY Appeals could rule.
4. Other ICTY abduction cases
a. Prosecutor v. Todorovic – Bosnian Serb abducted from Serbia by four armed, masked men, and smuggled to Bosnia&Herzegovina.
i. Struggled to get information related to arrest – trial chamber ordered NATO-led Stabilization Force to provide him with evidence
ii. Immediately – plea deal. T pleads guilty to ONE count of CAH, and they drop the 27 other charges. T also withdraws all motions re: arrest circumstances.
b. Prosecutor v. Nikolic - ICTY Appeals – 2003 (413-14)
i. Reviews case law – two principles emerge:
A) Special character of the offenses – good reason for not setting aside jurisdiction
B) Absent complaint by state whose sovereignty was breached (or in event of diplomatic resolution of breach
ii. WEIGH state sovereignty concerns against damage to HR/humanitarian concerns
A) Individual rights of accused v. essential rights of the state/int’l community
iii. As balancing test applied here – court can exercise jurisdiction
A) Is this return to Eichmann? Made slightly more sophisticated?
1) Eichmann wasn’t limited to particular offenses/categories of law.
iv. Certain things will affect balance
A) Can’t torture someone to get them into jx.
c. Prosecutor v. Tolimir – ICTY Trial Chamber (Packet I, p. 49) – D abducted from Serbia, taken to Republicka Srpska and surrendered to ICTY. T.C. said only irregularity was removal from his apartment in Serbia, and no evidence that NATO nor ICTY Prosecution was involved – not enough of an HR violation to decline jx.
d. Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor – ICTR Appeals Chamber (Packet I, p. 49) – adopted Nikolic standard.
i. D arrested in Benin, though no arrest warrant issued. Balancing test – found dismissal of jx “disproportionate.” Better remedy – reduction in accused’s sentence.
5. Other extraordinary rendition issues
a. Rendition of terrorists to states that employ harsh interrogation techniques?
i. US domestic law provides they won’t – can rely on “diplomatic assurances” from state that won’t subject to torture.
b. El-Masri v. US – 4th Cir. 2007 (Packet I, p. 50) – German citizen rendered by CIA.
i. Court upheld government’s state secrets privilege – dismissed action
A) To prevail, EM would have to produce evidence about how CIA supervises, organizes, and staffs super sensitive intelligence operations.
c. Arar v. Ashcroft – 2d Cir. 2008 (Packet I, p. 50) – Canadian rendered to Jordan, driven to Syria. Tortured in Syria, despite US diplomatic assurances that Arar would not be tortured.
i. Dismissed – litigation would necessitate disclosure of classified information.
A) Problem with federal subject matter jurisdiction
d. Obama Executive Orders
i. Special interagency task force reviewing rendition practices.
XIII. Session 12 – Civil and Political Rights (Individual International Rights, Part One)
A. Historical Development of individual rights in international law
1. Traditionally – obligation to treat foreign nationals in jx with minimum standard of justice
a. No obligation to ADMIT, but once admitted, must act accordingly
b. Foreign nationals must also accept legal regime of state they’re in
i. If state injures foreign national, state may incur international responsibilities, but can’t be claimed by individual, only by their state.
ii. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. UK) – PCIJ – 1924 (442) – only states are subject to int’l law and thus capable of exercising rights and accepting responsibilities under it – thus, injuries to individuals only violate int’l law if viewed as injury to their state).
2. WWI – beginnings of development. imposed treaties on certain states to maintain fair treatment of minorities. ILO developing treaties to protect workers and their families.
a. No general body of int’l HR law, term “human rights” not in use
i. US – “civil rights”; France – “rights of man”
3. WWII – reassessment of individuals under international law
a. Realize that doesn’t deal with atrocities committed by state against OWN nationals
4. 1945 – UN CHARTER ADOPTED
a. Human rights provisions in charter
i. Does not resolve fundamental contradiction between commitment to protect HR, and insistence on non-interference in state domestic affairs (2(7))
b. Article 68 – contemplates formation of UN Human Rights Commission
i. 1946 – HRC formed.
A) INSTITUTIONAL technique – now we have a body, it can start doing things.
ii. Starts drafting INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS
iii. 1948 - UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A) Classic role of customary law – set them up as non-binding, but then people start to invoke these soft, non-binding principles
1) Indians in Apartheid Case
B) Article 29 - Some limitations on rights (i.e. free speech)
1) Trying to determine limits – determined by law – securing due recognition for others rights, and meet “just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”
2) Very general terms – huge jurisprudence around them
iv. 1950 – European Convention on Human Rights – focused on undue state interference with CPR – strong implementation mechanisms
c. Bricker Amendment (1953) – isolationist sentiment post WWII, concern from Southerners re: HR treaties. Eisenhower gives in and says no HR treaties will be considered.
d. BUT continuation of use as customary law
5. Genocide Convention – first HR treaty adopted by GA.
a. No implementation, no oversight body created.
6. US – Johnson makes integration, civil rights key domestic policy. Black organizers in US working with international organizations
a. Does not block racism convention
i. 1964 - Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racism and Discrimination (CERD)
7. 1966- Adoption of the INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS
a. ICCPR
i. Article 2 – respect and ensure rights of indivs within its territory, subject to its jx
A) Cox v. Canada – UN HRC – 1994 (452) – unconscionable to let state violate covenant on territory of another state that it couldn’t do in its own state
B) Compare to ECHR – Bankovic and Others v. Belgium – 2001 (453) – ECHR applies extraterritorially only in exceptional circumstances, doesn’t apply to claim that NATO members violated right to life in bombing FRY radio station during Kosovo conflict. (didn’t have control over area)
1) Argument that this is too narrow – NATO does have jx over aircraft/decision to bomb
2) Al Skeini v. Sec. of State for Defence – British Court – 2003 (453) – Bankovic exceptional circumstances did not apply – took place in Iraw, outside area of “effective control.” But British military prison operating in Iraq falls within the exception.
ii. Article 4 – DEROGATION
A) In times of (officially proclaimed emergency), can derogate from some obligations
1) Not all obligations (certain rights are non-derogable)
a) Right to life, ban on torture, slavery, etc.
2) Only to extent strictly required
3) Can’t be inconsistent with other int’l law obligations
4) Can’t involve discrimination
iii. Includes implementation mechanisms (unlike UDHR)
8. Other treaties
a. Treaty against torture?
i. 1974 - GA issues soft declaration
ii. NGOs start calling for binding convention, and governments initially resented.
A) UNESCO convention in mid-70s to address issue of torture, governments upset by implication, UNESCO cancelled.
iii. 1983 – drafting blocked. Countries unhappy with idea of universal jurisdiction.
A) US reservations at the time were about barbarous latin American countries (not the reservations it has today)
B) Argentina – Alphonsine elected, publicly and loudly proclaimed that it was an embarrassment that this treaty was being blocked. SHAME for key countries.
iv. 1984 – Torture Convention
A) Strengthens existing norms against torture – requires state parties to present reports, and creates expert committee to review and make recommendations
1) Includes optional individual complaints procedure
2) REQUIRES states EITHER to prosecute OR to extradite.
B) Why would states ratify this?
1) Assume it means nothing.
2) Domestic constituency is pushing for it/will be pleased.
3) Prove you’ve turned the corner (i.e Argentina)
4) Bind your successors.
5) Maybe, truly altruistic state
C) 141 states are party to convention.
D) Very narrow definition of torture (Article 1) – limited to state officials acting that way for particular purposes. Where’s the value?
1) General and specific REQUIREMENTS – huge range of remedies/specific steps that must be taken (education (art 10), systematic review (art 11))
2) Starting VICTIM’S RIGHTS movement (Artil
B. Israeli Position on Torture
1. Has policy allowing “moderate physical pressure” in interrogation of suspected terrorists
a. History
i. General Security Service- responsibility for combating terrorist attacks
A) Use techniques like shaking, awkward and painful positions, very tight handcuffs, sleep deprivation.
ii. 1987 – Landau Report – government-appointed commission of inquiry
A) Concluded GSS were entitled to apply MPP to elicit information required to save human lives
iii. Israeli Penal Code – 1977
A) Clearly doesn’t meet CAT article 2 requirements
B) Article 34(ii) – blanket exemption - runs into direct confrontation with CAT provisions
b. Number of domestic and international complaints against GCC
2. Israel became party to ICCPR and Torture Convention in 1991.
a. Article 7 (ban on torture) is nonderogable article under Article 4
3. Consideration of Reports Submitted by Israel – 1994 (454-55)
a. Recommend that CAT be incorporated into domestic law, that interrogation practices be published in full, re-education of officials, end current practices, compensate and rehabilitate victims
b. Israeli Response (455-56) – points out other countries that use moderate pressure, details safeguards in place, and then list of things that have been PREVENTED (i.e. this WORKS).
i. cites Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom – ECHR – 1978 (457-58)
A) UK admitted it violated int’l HR law.
B) Court still considered legality of actions under ECHR
1) Said “inhuman and degrading” but not torture –illegal under ECHR, but not CAT
C) Context of this case – first interstate case before ECHR
D) Creates SEVERITY TEST – can do one or more of these things, but at some point, they add up to torture.
1) HIGHLY criticized. Sleep deprive for 15 hours, but at the 16th hour, it’s torture?
c. In response – HR orgs have created PURPOSE TEST (harkens back to CAT)
i. If applied for CAT purposes, and undertaken by state, it’s TORTURE.
A) But, what about parading someone naked? Doesn’t cause severe pain or suffering (fails CAT PURPOSE TEST), but violates “inhumane and degrading”
4. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel - Israeli Supreme Court - 1999 (458-61)
a. Differentiate from techniques that could cause bodily harm (i.e. shaking), and other techniques that COULD be carried out humanely
b. NECESSITY DEFENSE – not source of general authority (only a DEFENSE)
c. Passes buck to legislature. We’re judges, but we’re also Israelis. Don’t want to limit the authorities, but must respect rule of law.
i. Ticking time bomb – pragmatism v. morality
C. Torture in “War on Terrorism”
1. P. 462-472
a. US ratified CAT in 1994 – various reservations and understandings
i. Understood cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment – consistent with 5, 8, 14 amend.
ii. Very specific definition of torture
iii. Enacted 18 USC 2340 – give effect to Convention obligations.
b. 2002 OLC Yoo Memorandum – US doesn’t violate War Crimes Act if doesn’t give detainees all protections owed POWs under Geneva Conventions
i. Customary international law has no binding effect – not federal law as recognized by C
c. 2002 OLC Bybee Memorandum re: definitions of torture – VERY narrow.
i. Unconstitutional to apply 2340A to President acting as commander in chief
d. Subsequent OLC Memorandum – interrogation methods that comply with 2340 don’t violate CAT obligations
e. 2003 Romig Memo – disagrees with Bybee about exceptionally broad concept of “necessity”
f. 2004 OLC Memo – supersedes 2002 Bybee Memo
g. 2004 Schlesigner Commission – Abu Ghraib abuses – a few brutal sadists, not authorized policy
i. But some failures in training and command contributed to abuses
h. 2005 – Detainee Treatment Act
i. Bush signing statement – construe DTA in manner “consistent with constitutional authority of President”
ii. Graham Amendment – strips courts of habeas jurisdiction
i. 2005 – US CAT report due. (Packet I, p. 52)
i. Argues that CAT was not meant to apply to armed conflicts
ii. Recommendations
A) Disagree that CAT doesn’t apply during armed conflicts
B) Rejected US argument that CAT provisions are geographically limited – reinforced idea of “de facto effective control”
C) Worry about withdrawal of jurisdiction
j. 2006 – Military Commissions Act (MCA) – barring invocation of Geneva conventions, still limiting judicial review, amends 18 USC 2241 and definitions of torture and CI&D treatment
XIV. Session 13 – International Human Rights Treaties (Individual International Rights, Part Two)
A. Reservations to Human Rights Treaties
1. Can make reservation IF reservation is NOT PROHIBITED by treaty and is compatible with OBJECT and PURPOSE
2. Generally – not that many reservations to multilateral treaties – and they concern provisions that aren’t about substance (i.e. dispute resolution mechanisms)
a. HR treaties – MANY reservations
i. Problem – failed to address issues of reservations in systematic, rational way
A) OPTIONS they COULD have chosen:
1) Forbid all reservations. Convention of Law on the Sea.
2) Spell out TYPE of reservations
3) Create a system for working through issues re: reservations.
b. Remember, there were clearly no reservations in bilateral treaties – this is clearly outgrowth of MULTILATERAL treaties.
3. Reservation Examples
a. Genocide Convention -
i. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – ICJ advisory opinion – 1951 (70-72)
A) HR treaties have to be flexible
1) This treaty is SPECIAL – “humanitarian and civilizing purpose”
B) it’s ESPECIALLY important to permit reservations to HR & humanitarian treaties – need as many states as possible
B. US Reservations to ICCPR
1. Didn’t ratify ICCPR until 1992
a. Has ratified very few
i. Genocide Convention (1988), CAT/CERD (1994)
b. Hasn’t ratified ICESCR, or CEDAW (Women), or CRC (right of child)
2. When ratified ICCPR in 1992 – 5 reservations, 4 understands, 4 declarations (477)
a. Reservations – limit provisions
i. War propaganda and hate speech – conflicts with 1st amend
ii. Capital punishment
iii. CI&D treatment – as defined by 5, 8, 14th amend
iv. Reduction of penalties for criminal offenses
v. Segregation of juveniles and adults
b. Understandings – state US interpretations of
i. Nondiscrimination – “other status” worrisome. In US only prohibitions on discrimination for specific statuses, and some exceptions (i.e. discriminating for Age, between citizens and non-citizens, among categories of non-citizens)
ii. Compensation for unlawful arrest
iii. Segregation of accused and convicted persons
iv. Purposes of incarceration
v. Rights to counsel, compelled witness attendance, prohibition of double jeopardy
vi. Federal-state relations
c. Declarations – how states implement obligations
i. Declaration one: Declares articles 1-27 to be NON-SELF execution
A) Covenant DOES NOT CREATE private cause of action in US courts.
ii. Declaration three: accepts competence of UN HRC to consider claims that states aren’t fulfilling Covenant obligations
d. Doesn’t matter if R, U, or D – any of them can be considered “reservation”
C. HRC’s crazy grab for power re: ICCPR RUDs
1. General Comment 24 – 1995 (480-82)
a. Define what could be compatible with OBJECT and PURPOSE of ICCPR
i. If it offends peremptory norms – not compatible
ii. Similarly, subjects of customary international law
A) Lists rights that cannot be reserved (assuming they’re customary norms?)
iii. Then, says can’t reserve supportive guarantees like providing remedies, etc.
iv. Also says problem with reservations that render effective any covenant right that requires change in national law.
b. VIENNA CONVENTION has definition of reservations – but inappropriate to address reservations on HT treaties
i. Falls to COMMITTEE to determine whether specific reservation is compatible w/O&P of Covenant
A) Inappropriate for STATES
c. Two grabs of power – can define what rights are covered, and who has the right to adopt what reservations
2. US ,UK object
a. Agrees state can’t exempt itself from peremptory norm by making reservation. But, state can choose to exclude one means of enforcement of particular norms, but reserving against inclusion of those norms in Covenant obligations.
3. HRC reflections on reservations
a. Reaction to ICCPR initial report – criticized extent of US reservations
b. Kennedy v. Trinidad & Tobago – 1999 (484) – committee decided T&T reservation to right to life did not strip them of jx to consider petition of man on death row.
i. found T&T in violation of ICCPR.
D. US execution of Juveniles
1. Domingues v. State of Nevada – 1999 – US Brief
a. Reservation where President/Senate have concurred CONTROLS as matter of domestic law.
i. Since none of the states that have objected to US’ reservation have indicated ICCPR is not in force between them, reservation is valid as matter of treaty law under Vienna Convention
b. What about argument that because right is nonderogable, it’s so fundamental no reservation may be taken?
i. No necessary correlation as such. If wanted to prohibit such reservations – could have done so under Vienna Convention Article 19(b).
E. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
1. ICESR – 1966 (491-92)
2. Right to Food
a. General Comment 12 (496-98)
F. US reservations to CERD
1. CERD (Packet I, p. 57-60)
2. US RUD’s to ICERD (1994) (Packet I, 60-61)
a. Does not accept article 4/7 provisions that restrict rights of freedom, expression or association
b. No obligation to enact legislation against private conduct under 2, 3, 5
c. Convention is not self-executing
3. First US report – concluding observations (Packet I, 61-64)
a. Advises US to consider discriminatory IMPACT
i. Particularly in criminal defense
b. Advises broadening protection against discrimination by private actors
c. Combat racial profiling at federal and state levels
d. Address underlying causes of de facto segregation
e. Rights of non-citizens to be treated as equal to citizens under article 5
f. Rights of detainees!
g. Eliminate police brutality and excessive use of force against minorities
h. Disenfranchisement of minorities
4. Inequities of UN Comm on Elimination of Racial Discrimination – Heritage Foundation Article – 2008 (Packet I, p. 64-66)
a. Didn’t take into account US’s lengthy report
i. Instead, used US Human Rights Network “shadow report” which coordinated several NGO reports
b. Breached ITS obligations to US, by attempting to erode US sovereignty
XV. Session 14 & 15 – Fact-Finding in International Law and Peacekeeping – DRC
A. International Fact-Finding Generally
1. Implies there’s some sort of objective truth – facts to FIND.
2. UN Peacekeeping
a. Not in UN Charter – foresaw establishment of UN force
i. UN mandated force v. UN commanded force – when UN creates an operation, western states refuse to put their troops under UN command
b. Three generations of peacekeeping
i. First generation – military personnel under UN command get between warring armies to monitor ceasefire and report violations
A) Only with CONSENT of warring parties
1) Provides legal basis for deployment of armed forces to foreign territory
a) Distinguishes from PEACE ENFORCEMENT – involves Chapter VII military force to create peace
2) Reduces physical risk to lightly armed peacekeepers
B) Do not deal with underlying issues about conflicts
1) Create political space for others to find diplomatic solutions
ii. Second generation – actively seek to assist in implementation of political settlements
A) Sometimes referred to as peaceBUILDING
B) Responds to internal conflicts as well as interstate conflicts
C) Involves more actors – political parties, regional organizations, NGOs, guerillas, civilians, int’l financial institutions, private foundations, UN agencies, foreign investors, academic institutions
D) Promote democracy, elections, ensure justice systems work, etc.
iii. Third generation? – reflected in MONUC
A) Particular obligation to protect CIVILIANS
B) Gigantic mandate – lets UN use LETHAL FORCE
c. History of peacekeeping
i. Successes – Libya, El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia
ii. Failures? – Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda
A) US gets cold feet post-Somalia, but now reembracing that role.
B. EU does Fact-Finding
1. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Vol. 1, Sept. 2009 (Packet II, p. 1-4)
a. Focuses on how fact-finding was done.
i. Fact-finding always leads to issues of process – who’s appointed to do it, and with what authority.
ii. Also, funding? – here, had 1.6M euros (about 2.5M) – fairly generous.
A) Used to hire 20 experts to write reports, set up senior advisory board
b. First fact-finding mission in history of EU
c. No formal statement of applicable law – but referring to Helsinki Statement of 1975 and subsequent statements as if they were binding law (remember, at the time, said they would not be). Here, not getting much resistance.
i. Transformation of status of document.
d. Stating specifically that these findings should NOT be used by courts
i. Distinction between factfinding and judicial notions of standard of proof
ii. However, if you brought this to ICJ, of course you would use this.
A) Hearsay more admissible in ICJ – not dealing with individual indictments.
1) Even in ICTY/ICTR – not the same standards as US
e. Report now goes to SECURITY COUNCIL
i. Unlikely it will be endorsed
ii. Will have to wait to see what impact will be informally
A) Probably more it’s denounced by both sides, more likely it will be taken into account
C. Democratic Republic of the Congo Fact-Finding Mission
1. 1999 – Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement – called for creation of UN force to be deployed
a. Congo – vast territory, over 60M people, third poorest country in the world, one of the most corrupt, mineral resources – thus, exploited, porous borders in all directions
i. There is no incentive for most involved actors to end the turmoil
b. SC authorized UN Mission in DRC – MONUC
i. SC Res 1856 (2008) (Packet II, p. 14-22)
A) Mandate – PROTECT civilian lives (third generation peacekeeping)
1) Monitor ceasefire and investigate violations
2) Develop plan for disengagement, disarmament, demobilization, resettlement of warring factions and withdrawal of foreign forces
a) But problem – condemning factions, and then bringing them in and making them part of the army!
3) Release of prisoners
4) Facilitate humanitarian aid and HR monitoring.
B) Strong, but internally inconsistent, mandate
ii. Use of armed force allows – none of SC resolutions governing MONUC mandate SPECIFICALLY say its actions are governed by international humanitarian law
A) SC Res 1565 – 2004 (Packet II, p. 23) – mentions IHL in context of bringing perpetrators to justice, and obligations of ALL parties to respect IHL
c. ALSTON Press Statement – 2009 (Packet II, p. 24-31)
i. UN Special Rapporteur
A) Supposedly “independent” but supported by UN on the ground, travel in UN vehicle, insist on UN security
B) But, makes comments about MONUC they won’t like
ii. How do you set up such a mission?
A) Some are fully organized by UN
B) PA – balance between UN “advice” and other things
C) Serious problems with security
1) Wants to go to NE, see LRA. Gov’t says they’re finished, not a threat anymore. Everyone else says they are. Gov’t doesn’t want him to go NE, UN has mixed feelings.
2) Used to be able to go anywhere. When UN lost High Commissioner of Human Rights in Iraq in 1993, MUCH more cautious.
D) Interpretations are a problem
iii. Issue press statement – take opportunity of only formal opportunity to speak to press – preliminary report
A) UN doesn’t like this – wants him to reserve judgment
B) Here – addressed to international community, because gov’t showed no interest/capacity to take up these issues
1) June – visited Colombia – very interested in taking up the issues. So press statement had tone of cooperation.
d. Issues addressed
i. Radical privatization – not part of his mandate, but heart of issue if gov’t is to equip itself to handle anything.
A) Military not paid at lower ranks - $ confiscated by superiors. Assumption is that they HAVE to steal from community
1) UN talking about guaranteeing payment, through mobile PHONES.
a) But why would commanders participate in this scheme, when salaries will drop so dramatically?
2) Biggest threat to civilians in many areas
a) No food, no discipline, no identification, no system of military justice
b) PA –LABEL THEM – people question efficacy, but interesting first step
i) Simple, cheap and achievable
B) Ineffectual justice system – leads to popular justice
1) Police are seen as corrupt and thieves
2) Don’t follow up on lynching/mobs, etc.
C) Lack of public prisons
1) No inside guards, run by prisoners.
2) Can buy your way out.
3) Any individuals who help run it – for personal profit
a) When food brought in, wardens take half for themselves
4) No political interest in prisoners – these people are scum
D) Massive corruption – 300+ permits to conduct business.
E) Needs to set up system of taxation
ii. MONUC operation
A) Problem of being peacekeeping and HR monitoring
1) Some natural conflict in those positions
B) MONUC is party in Kivu conflict
1) Conflict of interest in investigating FARDC
2) Assisting FARDC, but they’re part of the problem – haven’t fully integrated CNDP, not well-trained
a) Large-scale killings by FARDC units, and opportunistic murder by individual soldiers
3) Also FEEDING and HOUSING the army (trying to build them barracks, but no one can agree where)
C) EU controversial initiative – CENSUS of military. Produce biometric card for each soldier – but FARDC moving soldiers and battalions, not helping.
D) In all peacekeeping, hard to integrate HR concerns – role is to MAKE PEACE
1) UN – bad luck with this
a) Sierra Leone – 2000 – initially suggested might grant some amnesty to those accused of grave crimes. Had to backtrack
2) Here – still having problem that UN officials still think it’d be inappropriate to arrest accused war criminals.
a) President Kabila – PEACE FIRST, JUSTICE LATER
i) Message in terms of IMPUNITY is terrible
iii. LRA
A) Gov’t says no longer a threat. Embarassed because they’re Ugandan. Invited Ugandan army in to help defeat LRA, but embarrassing for sovereignty of Congolese to have them. And hate Ugandans anyway.
1) By saying LRA is defeated, can tell them to go home.
B) Some say – interest of a lot of people to allow presence of LRA
1) Allows Congolese to have large military operations, something to do with militia
2) Allows Rwanda/Uganda to continue longstanding intervention, including some exploitation of resources
3) Can justify US building up military presence
C) How do you take into account that many people are particularly afraid for semi-spiritual reasons? (fear of witchcraft)
iv. Government killings in Ba-Congo – couldn’t meet with witnesses
v. Sexual violence
A) President says “zero-tolerance” policy –but clearly not occurring
B) Why not simply outlaw any sexual relations between military and civilians?
1) They say – contrary to policy. Trying to win over “hearts and minds” of the community
2. UN fact-finding generally
a. Resource limitations
i. Investigation into Sri Lankan extrajudicial execution video
A) UN says no money for forensic video experts
b. HRW has experienced military advisers, UN does not
XVI. Session 18 – International Law and Fact-Finding in Practice – Israel and Gaza
A. Goldstone Commission
1. Report submitted to HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
a. Has to satisfy a group with varying perspectives.
2. Process – group named by head of HRC, which is an elected position
a. But, can CHANGE terms of reference
i. When asked to lead this report by HRC (strong anti-Israeli violation), insisted on looking at violations of BOTH sides.
3. Netanyahu – wants to change humanitarian law
a. Admits they are violating it as currently exists
b. Ignorant re: creation of IHL – needs to develop it or need new treaty(ies)
B. Israel/Palestine – entity claiming statehood is not CLAIMED by any other state
C. Fact-Finding
1. Israel refused to COOPERATE.
2. Focus on year between ceasefire (June 2008) through HR/IHL violations related to/consequence of military operations after they ended (July 2009).
a. Looked at historical context
b. Used general int’l law, UN Charter, IHL, Int’l HR law, int’l criminal law.
3. “inclusive approach” to gathering information
a. Public hearings, field visits, analysis of video and photography
b. Focus on first-hand evidence – use second-hand information as CORROBORATION
D. Tried to come up with evenhanded report – upset that people are ignoring offense committed by Palestine
1. Really hoping GA accepts report – more fairly, even-handed.
XVII. Session 16 – International Criminal Law (Individual International Rights, Part Three)
A. Historical Development
1. International law generally addressed to states
a. Not addressed to individual violators
b. Some domestic law punishing violations of laws of war
i. Lieber Code (535-37)
2. Post-WWI – renewed emphasis on individual responsibility.
a. Treaty of Versailles – four articles providing for punishment of those who violated laws/customs of war by Allied military tribunals
i. Never held any trials
3. Post-WWII – Americans pushed for criminal trial over Russian and British calls for summary executions.
4. 1945 – LONDON CHARTER – International Military Tribunal
a. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg – 1945 (611)
i. Defines three charges – crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity
ii. United States v. Joseph Alstoetter, et al. – 1948 (612-14)
A) Leading Nazi judges and prosecutors accused of using court system against Jews, political prisoners and others, often leading to death sentences, claimed protection under nullum crimen sine lege
B) SEVERAL justifications -
1) Clarifies that rules about ex post factos couldn’t apply in same way – no international sovereign to enact statutes in the same way
a) Product of “multipartite treaties, conventions, judicial decisions, and customs which have received int’l acceptance/acquiescence”
b) Germany had signed Kellogg-Briand pact, which prohibited using war as national policy
i) Should individuals be held accountable for treaty signed by STATE?
2) Ridiculous to say you didn’t know what you were doing was wrong
a) And, though can’t try because illegal in Germany, can’t be defense when act committed WAS punishable under his own domestic law.
3) Intention to prosecute these crimes announced by states at war with Germany (some sense of notice)
4) Treaty of Versailles – principle of personal responsibility had been noted
iii. IMT – tried 22, all but three convicted of at least one charge.
b. Also set up International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
c. Legacies of Nuremberg?
i. Substantive law, particularly on crimes against humanity and war crimes
ii. Nothing re: procedure/evidence
5. Cold War – nothing until ICTY established in 1993
a. Force majeure – large powers embarrassed not to have done anything in Rwanda or former Yugoslavia
6. Since then:
a. International Criminal Court (ICC) – permanent court
b. Courts established by UN Security Council under Chapter VII – claiming that the establishment of these tribunals was required for int’l peace and security
i. ICTY
ii. ICTR
c. Sierra Leone – hybrid tribunal
d. Cambodia – hybrid tribunal, even more domestic
e. Lebanon – just beginning, looks like Cambodia (domestic tribunal, with some int’l part)
B. OFFENSES
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – 1948 (615-16)
a. Article II – “national, ethnical, racial or religious group” – does NOT include economic, social or political groups0021
b. Article VI – trial in “competent” domestic tribunal” or international penal tribunal
i. Indicated intent to set up international criminal court
c. VERY LITTLE IMPACT for 40 years after adoption
i. US signed in 1984
d. Never sued Cambodia in ICJ, but three other cases under Convention
i. Bosnia v. FRY
ii. Croatia v. FRY
iii. DRC v. Rwanda
2. Crimes Against Humanity
a. Definitions
i. First, IMT Charter, now also domestic law, tribunal statutes, draft international criminal codes, ICC Statute.
ii. Nuremberg charter – CAH as acts in connection with crime w/I jurisdiction of tribunal
A) Related to crimes against peace or war crimes, and thus related to ARMED CONFLICT
b. Statute of the International Criminal Court – 1998 (622)
i. BROAD definition of CAH
A) In some way, compensating for NARROW view of Genocide
ii. No longer linked to armed conflict, not even linked to GOVERNMENT action
C. Role of International Criminal Tribunal
1. UN acting under Chapter VII – still have HUGE problems getting domestic cooperation with carrying out arrest warrants, producing witness subpoenas, orders for gov’t to produce evidence, access.
2. Jurisdiction limited
a. Subject-matter – traditional crimes
b. Temporally
c. Geographically
3. Nexus to International Human Rights
a. Official mandate – HUMANITARIAN law, judges regard HR as part of the mandate.
i. Due Process?
A) Very little coverage of due process at Nuremberg
B) Cite decisions of UN HRC, ECHR, IACHR
1) Due process
2) Issues of fair trial
C) Early on, naïve hope that Hague/Geneva Convention and commentaries would supply corpus of international criminal law
1) Instead, painful slow process of creation USING judicial gloss to int’l humanitarian law norms
2) BUT, now have created viable, credible body of int’l criminal humanitarian law, accepted by academic community
b. Helps develop aspects of int’l HR law that hold INDIVIDUALS accountable
4. Legitimacy
a. Relationship to Customary International Law
i. Very respectful of customary int’l law – want to ensure not punish for something not a crime at time of commission (norm against retroactive punishment)
A) Decide every case to apply not only statute, but customary law
1) This avoids tricky questions
B) Nullem crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege – no crime w/o law, no punishment w/o law
1) Constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws, rules of judicial construction, Int’l HR treaties rules, etc.
ii. By this point, many of the main issues have been decided. Built up enough precedent.
b. Prosecutor v. Tadic – 1995 (653)
i. Defendant challenged legitimacy of Tribunal
A) Court finds that situation in former Yugoslavia was threat to peace
1) Then, SC has broad discretion to create appropriate remedy
B) Clearly not under Article 42 – military use
1) But, perfect under Article 41 – “measures not involving the use of force”
5. International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda
a. Why are domestic tribunals less capable of handling cases in situations of gross violations of HR, particularly in states undergoing transition from authoritarian to democratic rule?
i. Judicial system might have totally inadequate physical resources, not enough trained judges and lawyers
ii. Gov’t in power might use judicial system as weapon against political enemies
iii. Domestic prosecutors might refuse to prosecute/judges might be afraid to hear cases against powerful governmental officials, former official, their supporters
b. Rwandan “gacaca” – traditional Rwandese method of conflict resolution
i. Most judges have no legal or HR background
ii. Appointments very political
iii. Appellate process – even more political, less effective when get away from local, community level.
6. Results
a. Deterrence? – unclear, but some evidence that they might
i. Effective deterrence requires COMMITMENT, CAPABILITY and CREDIBILITY
A) Worst part – spotty record of West regarding intervention
b. Reconciliation? – also unclear
c. HAVE established principles of individual accountability, and helped limit impunity
7. Relationship with primary UN court ICJ?
a. Tribunals often cite to ICJ, and they’ve been citing the tribunals
b. Should be MORE – it enhances everyone’s authority to cite each other, rather than reinvent the wheel each time.
i. Some ICC judges resist that
ii. Sierra Leone tribunal – frequently citing tribunals
D. International Criminal Law at its best?
1. Tapping into the legitimacy associated with law
a. However, RESOURCE limitations
i. End up focusing on individuals
A) Obscuring accountability for governments, organizations, senior leaders, non-governmental entities
1) Non-governmental entities also do not have same pressure to conform to int’l humanitarian law or maintain int’l reputation
ii. Have to focus on DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS of all war criminals at all times
E. Khmer Rouge in Cambodia
1. Communist party of Kampuchea (CPK)/Khmer Rouge – overthrew Cambodian government, and replaced with Khmer Republic.
2. 1975 – renamed country Democratic Kampuchea
a. Caused deaths of 1.5-1.7M through forced population movements, forced labor, inhumane living conditions, attacks on “enemies” (including ethnic minorities).
b. Years of low level border war with Vietnam, then ten years civil war (khmer rouge v. Vietnamese former khmer rougers).
3. 1986 – consideration of ICJ suit against Democratic Kampuchea
a. Draft accused DK for violations of Geneva Convention and customary int’l HR law
i. Jurisdiction based on Genocide Convention Article IX (disputes to ICJ) and/or Cambodian acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction
b. Can agree genocide committed against minority Cham, ethnic Vietnamese, Chinese, Thai, and Buddist monks
i. What about atrocities against general Cambodian population?
A) Khmer are “national group” – problem of INTENT.
c. Problem of Genocide Convention – mass killing of one segment of a group by another segment of that same group
4. 1991 – everyone agreed to peace agreement.
a. NO ONE PRESSES CHARGES
i. “peace before justice” again.
XVIII. Session 19 – International Criminal Court (Individual International Rights, Part Five)
A. International Criminal Court
1. 70% of world lives in countries not covered by ICC jurisdiction
a. Even those who participate, fail to cooperate fully (i.e. South Africa)
b. CRITICISM – Court for AFRICA.
i. Majority of countries we’re concerned with have signed
ii. Exception – SUDAN. Before court through SC.
2. But better because no temporal or geographical restraints ala the ad hoc tribunals
3. May not issue many indictments, but effect might be useful if threat of ICC prosecution can be deterrent
B. Establishment of ICC
1. Intended to establish post-Nuremberg
a. Gave job to International Law Commission to develop standards – codify and progressively develop int’l law
b. Finally, shamed in the 90s into putting proposal for standing body to community
2. Issues during Negotiation
a. Consent to jurisdiction?
b. Who can initiate investigation/prosecution?
i. States party to Statute? Security Council? Court’s Prosecutor?
c. How does Court operate in face of domestic proceedings over same facts/
3. Statute of the International Criminal Court [ROME STATUTE] – 1998 (659-61)
a. July 1, 2002 – entered into force. May 2006 – 100 parties
i. Have adopted staff, P&I of staff, financial regulations, procedural and evidential rules
b. no crimes of “aggression” – just genocide, war crimes, and CAH
i. US worried about such crimes
ii. All crimes defined BROADLY
c. Article 12
i. Voluntary opt-in allowed – BUT, once you’ve opted-in, you open yourself up to investigation of any war crimes, including after the specific event you opted-in about is over.
ii. US proposed “consent” approach – state of nationality would need to consent every time. VERY traditional. Rejected.
d. Article 15 – trying to limit power of prosecutor.
i. Can do initial investigations – but doesn’t want to leave too much of a paper trail because ICC rules give defense access to all of this information
ii. Then, goes to pre-trail chamber of judges, “reasonable basis”
e. Article 16 – allows UN security council to postpone
i. US thought it was good idea
ii. Other side – 12 month deferral isn’t great, but unlikely politically they’ll be able to use too often.
f. Article 17 – this is supposed to COMPLEMENT what’s being offered domestically.
i. Moreno Ocampo’s Statement – focusing on complementarity.
4. Have adopted definitions of the crime
a. Using customary law
C. Ongoing Cases
1. Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo has initiated three situations (as of 2006)
a. DRC – human rights situation in Ituri province
b. Uganda – activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army
c. Sudan – Darfur
2. At play in situations in – Guinea, Israel/Gaza (trying to sign on to Rome Statute), Colombia, Kenya,
D. US objections to ICC
1. During Negotiations
a. Wanted traditional “consent” approach (state of nationality MUST consent) – rejected.
b. Dislikes complementarity – someone’s going to come in and say US decision not to investigate or prosecute isn’t appropriate?
c. William Lietzau – US suggestions for proposals such that it could ratify statute
i. Distinguish between jus ad bellum (laws of just war) v. jus in bello (laws of war)
A) This is going to be used as revenge, bitterness tactic
d. John Bolton (US representative to UN) – tried to set up barriers and obstacles.
i. Idea that US is UNIQUE – we’re the ones who protect internationally seriously.
2. DID SIGN – as did Iran and Israel
a. ACTIVE OPPOSITION
i. 2002 – withdrew consent – no legal obligations from signature
ii. Vetoed renewal of peacekeeping mission in Bosnia/Herzegovina when other members didn’t exempt UN peacekeeping forces from ICC jurisdiction
iii. Actively seeking agreements with states not to turn over US nationals to ICC (article 98 agreements)
iv. American Servicemembers Protection Act – 2002 – will not cooperate with ICC AT ALL “Hague Invasion Act”
b. Abstained from SC resolution referring Darfur for ICC prosecution (rather than veto)
c. Recent commission revisited
i. Not going to ratify, BUT should roll back some of these oppositions
A) Repeal Hague Invasion Act
B) Revisit Article 98 agreements
E. Darfur – Al-Bashir case – biggest ongoing case
1. Prosecutor’s Application – 2008 (Packet IV, p. 1-5) -
a. Darfur situation referred to Prosecutor by UN Sec Res 1593 (2005) – justice and accountability critical to achieving lasting peace and security in Darfu
b. Complementarity considerations – this case is not investigated/prosecuted by Sudan
c. Charge Al-Bashir with genocide, CAH, and war crimes – sitting head of state.
i. Unaddressed but important issue – head of state immunity?!
ii. Statute says – no immunity for heads of state
2. Chinese article – charges manifest neo-colonialism
3. Martin Shaw – 2009 (Packet IV, p. 6-9)
a. Pre-trial chamber dropped genocide allegations.
i. Distinction between ethnic cleansing and genocide?
ii. “special intention”
A) How can you say CAH of extermination, but no genocide
iii. Back to genocide (narrow, technical definition)
A) No intent to DESTROY as group, in whole or in part
b. Counterargument – EFFECT is what matters. Let’s move beyond Holocaust notion of genocide.
4. Peace v. justice concerns – does charging Al-Bashir risk fragile peace agreement and transition to democracy?
5. African Union Panel on Darfur Recommendations – 2009 (Packet IV, p. 12-14)
a. Heads of state upset that head of state is being made into scapegoat
b. Wants to have hybrid criminal court – more domestic action
XIX. Session 17 – International Humanitarian Law (Individual International Rights, Part Four)
A. Historically
1. Ancient roots – Sun Tzu, Bible, Roman Law
2. As warfare became more destructive in 18th and 19th century, development of more detailed codes of conduct
a. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (LIEBER CODE) – 1863 (535-37)
i. Defined “military necessity”
ii. All direct destruction of ARMED enemies, and other persons whose destruction is UNAVOIDABLE
A) Allows all destruction of property, withholding sustenance, appropriation
iii. No cruelty. Deception okay, but no act of hostility which makes return to peace too difficult.
A) Study shows that all counterinsurgency wars WON, involve winning “hearts and minds” of the other side
1) Lincoln looking to aftermath of war – can’t make peace with South unless fight according to rules that gather some respect
3. 1860s – creation of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
a. Dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflict
b. Henry Dunant, Swiss guy, bringing attention to soldiers left to die on battlefield
4. 1864 – Geneva Convention on the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field
a. Continues to draft conventions/convene conferences to make them treaties
5. Numerous subsequent Geneva Conventions
a. 1949 – best-known Geneva Conventions – addressing non-combatants/former combatants
i. Wounded and scik members of armed forces
ii. Wounded, sick, shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea
iii. Prisoners of war
iv. Civilian non-combatants
6. 1907 – Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
a. PA – weird conflict. Some weapons are outrageous and should never be used (landmines), but other than that, free for all.
b. “humanization” of war?
c. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons – ICJ – 1996 (540)
i. Number of states, driven by NGOs, try to get nuclear weapons declared illegal.
ii. Advisory opinion from ICJ – though body not happy about it.
A) French judge – reject request organized/manipulated by NGOs instead of “real states”
iii. Rule 7-7 – threat of nuclear weapons is “generally” against laws of war, especially int’l humanitarian law.
A) BUT, unclear if would be lawful if used in extreme circumstance of self-defense
7. Don’t forget- substantial body of customary int’l law governing conduct of armed conflict emerging at same time.
a. ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law publication (Co-Author discussing customary law at Packet I, p. 11-13)
8. 1977 – Protocols to Geneva Convention in reaction to Vietnam War, new wars
a. Protocol I – international armed conflicts
i. Includes national liberation struggles in the name of SD as int’l armed conflicts
ii. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (PROTOCOL I) – 1977 (561-63)
A) Distinguish between civilian and military
B) Civilian population CAN NOT be subject to attack
1) What about indiscriminate attacks? – forbidden.
2) Article 51, Section 5(b) – proportionality principle – too many civilians, too excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
3) STATES TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT. Legal & popular opinion in these situations considered.
a) NEITHER US nor Israel has signed this, but have considered – assume CUSTOMARY LAW.
b) US – didn’t kill Mullah Muhammed Omar
C) Can’t use shielding/hostages
b. Protocol II – internal armed conflicts
B. Qana Incident
1. 1996 – Israel shelled UN compound in Qana (southern Lebanon)
a. Unclear whether it was mistake (as claimed by Israel) or not an accident (Van Kappen’s report)
2. UN Report (Secretary-General’s Military Adviser concerning the shelling of the UN compound at Qana) – 1996 (555-59)
a. Fact-finding
i. Secretary General gets military adviser – in this case, Dutch General.
b. Dispute
i. Two types of fuses – impact (explodes on impact – good at destroying things), proximity (explodes in air – scatter the results and kill more people)
A) Proximity fuses used near UN compound
B) Impact fuses – houses south of Un compound, middle of UN compound.
C) Improbable that the fuses were employed in random order
ii. Two distinct concentrations of fire – Israel claiming guns were converged, should only be one.
A) Shift in weight of fire from mortar site to UN compound
iii. Helicopters and remotely piloted vehicle seen in area – Israel denies
3. Israel responds
a. Says its map was inaccurate, pattern of shells consistent with guns which are out of sync, denied it knew civilians were there,
4. UN Addendum – 1996 (560)
a. Notes Israeli arguments
b. Says it still doesn’t address first four of the findings
5. W. Michael Riesmann, Lessons of Qana – 1997 (566-67)
a. In reality, countries won’t apply proportionality, because they value the lives of THEIR citizens above others.
6. 2005 – US and Palestinian HR org filed suit against former IDF commander re: Qana (567)
a. Under ATS and TVPA – alleged Ya’alon participated in decision to shell UN compound at Qana, and had command responsibility for attack
b. Accuses Y of war crimes, CAH, and other offenses.
C. Kosovo Bombings
1. NATO conducted extensive bombing campaign against FRY
2. Independent Int’l Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report – 2000 (568-69)
a. Four weeks of bombing military targets, expanded target set to include media and transportation cites (bridges, highways, airports).
i. Destroyed main telecommunications transmitters, 2/3 of main industrial plans.
ii. Led to Serbian civilian suffering.
b. Mistakes led to civilian casualties
i. Chinese embassy bombing, Korishe/Korisa civilians bombed.
3. Amnesty criticism
a. High-altitude bombing – made it impossible to distinguish civilian/military
i. Bankovic and Others v. Belgium – 2001 (453) – ECHR applies extraterritorially only in exceptional circumstances, doesn’t apply to claim that NATO members violated right to life in bombing FRY radio station during Kosovo conflict. (didn’t have control over area)
b. Used cluster bombs and depleted uranium shells
4. ICTY considers charges
a. Unusually, prosecutor hands it off to committee for consideration.
i. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the FRY – 2000 (570-72)
A) “military objective” – notes that Protocol I is generally accepted as CUSTOMARY LAW
1) Looks to WWII bombing campaigns which intended to affect morale of enemy civilian population
B) “principle of proportionality” – determination must be that of a “reasonable military commander”
C) Findings. NATO attempting to attack legitimate military objectives
D) PA – generally troubling argument that IHL is judgment call except for EXTREMES
b. Prosecutor follows advice, doesn’t bring charges
i. Canadian prosecutor deciding not to scrutinize Western coalition bombings
ii. ICTY receives most support from US and other NATO countries…conflict of interest?
XX. Session 24 & 25 – Evolution of Use of Force (Use of Force, Part One)
A. When can force be used?
1. Individual self-defense
a. Has to be immediate
i. Otherwise, you would have time to go to SC
b. Subject to restraints – “necessary” and “proportionate”
c. Must be in response to armed attack
d. Article 51 – must report to SC immediately
2. Collective self-defense
a. Nominally includes individual self-defense, but may also include a third-party
3. Security Council acting under Chapter VII
a. How is this power held in check?
i. Has to declare it’s doing it to maintain/restore int’l peace and security
A) Who evaluates that claim?
4. Customary Law exception – imminent risk to hostages
5. Humanitarian intervention/”responsibility to protect”
a. If there’s a major HR threat, possibility that int’l community could intervene w/o SC authorization in order to protect large numbers of civilians?
B. Pre-1945
1. Malanczuk – Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (877-79)
a. Just war – means of obtaining reparation for prior illegal act they did to you
i. Also, wars against unbelievers and heretics
b. 16th-18th century – just wars (bellum justum) began to extend – no limits on right of states to resort to war
c. 19th century – balance of power system made wars rare – not worth fighting because expense, destruction and duration were too much
i. But this is true only in Europe. Looting and pillaging everywhere else.
d. WWI – war NOW regarded as evil
i. 1928 – Kellogg-Briand Pact – General Treaty for Renunciation of war
C. UN Charter – 1945 (879-81)
1. Article 2 (4) – refrain from threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state
a. 2(6) – non-membership in UN won’t help you
2. Article 24 (2) – council must act in accordance with principles/purposes of UN
a. Ongoing debate – to what extent is SC bound by provisions of Charter generally
i. And what about bound by customary international law?
ii. General international law?
b. Arguments that SC is POLITICAL body.
3. Chapter VI – article 33 – pacific settlement of disputes
4. Chapter VII – article 39 – SC determines threat to peace, breach of peace, acts of aggression
a. Article 41 – measures NOT involving use of armed force
b. Article 42 – force, as necessary to maintain or restore int’l peace and security
5. Article 51 – rights of INDIVIDUAL or COLLECTIVE self defense if ARMED ATTACK occurs. Should be immediately reported to SC
a. Customary international law requirements for self-defense
i. US (1842) Caroline case -
A) may be justified only in cases in which the "necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation"
1) basically NECESSARY and PROPORTIONATE
a) three schools of thought re: NECESSITY
i) necessary (defined temporally) = only anticipatory self defense
ii) all uses of self-defense
iii) necessity – any force must be last resort.
b) Proportionality – only use force necessary to repel attack or restore status quo
c) Case Concerning Oil Platforms – ICJ – 2003 (903) – Iranian missiles hit US vessels. US then attacked certain oil platforms.
i) Court found it unclear that Iran was responsible, and did not find the incidents armed attack sufficient to trigger SD
ii) Not necessary and proportionate – didn’t complain first to Iran
ii. now, US argues – totally different type of war.
b. Question – When can you use customary right of self defense in absence of SC action?
i. Franck & Patel (894-95) – self-defense is subsumed. Otherwise, Article 2(4) won’t mean much. Defend UN structure.
ii. Rostow (895-96) – if UN doesn’t get its act together, we can do whatever we want under customary law.
iii. Chayes (896) – if UN is following reasonable process, inappropriate to invoke self-defense to get around them. If they’re paralyzed (ala Cold War), no other option but look to customary law.
6. Biggest change is OUTLAWING all uses of force against territorial integrity or political independence of state
a. UNLESS authorized by SC OR taken in self-defense
b. HUGE SHIFT – presumption against the use of force.
7. Farer – Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention (882-83)
a. Ways in which people tried to expand scope of unilateral uses of force beyond 2(4)
i. When SC paralyzed – states recover broad right to self-help
b. Competing doctrines put forth to justify movement
i. Brezhnev Doctrine – USSR can intervene on behalf of int’l proletarian interests. “sphere of influence” doctrine - Socialist countries (i.e. Eastern Europe) subject to attempts to destabilize by the West. Right to go to assistance of socialist comrades wherever there is a significant threat to their internal stability.
ii. US invasion of Cuba and Dominican Republic
A) Argued authorization could be after the fact and/or induced by silence of SC
B) Reagan Doctrine – builds on Monroe “sphere of influence” doctrine.
iii. Developing states – support national liberation movements
D. Post-Cold War
1. SC Military Interventions
a. Kuwait – expulsion of Iraqi forces
b. Somalia – delivery of humanitarian assistance
c. Bosnia - delivery of humanitarian assistance
d. Haiti – restoration of democratically elected head of state
e. Rwanda – termination of Genocide
E. Iraq
1. History of Iraqi-Kuwait relations
a. 1922 – Britain decided current borders of disintegrated Ottoman Empire. Deliberately denied Iraq viable access to Persian Gulf. Iraq periodically laid claim to some/all Kuwait.
b. 1963 – Iraq reached agreement with Kuwait – acknowledged its independence.
c. 1979 – Hussein comes to power, goes to war with Iran.
d. 1990 – Iraq begins complaining that Kuwait is exceeding OPEC production quotas. Also claims Kuwait is slant-drilling and stealing oil.
i. Efficacy of Iraq’s claims that Kuwait is really its?
A) uti possidetis – “as you possess” – boundaries have already been determined
ii. August 2 – invades Kuwait, announced annexation.
A) What did this accomplish?
1) Effectively cancelled its enormous debt to Kuwait
2) Positioned itself to control Kuwait’s enormous oil wealth
3) Signaled neighboring Gulf states they could be attacked if they didn’t accommodate Iraq’s oil price policies
4) Eliminated Iraq’s historical territorial grievance and got full access to Gurlf
2. Leading up to War
a. August 3 – US invoked International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose broad economic sanctions
i. Prohibited trade, froze property and interests, prohibited travel, and barred grant of credits/loans
ii. Eventually – debate about allowing more time for sanctions to WORK.
A) Jan. 12 – Congress voted to support Bush Administration’s decision to use force.
b. August 2 – SC Res. 660 (1990) – condemned invasion as BREACH of international peace and security, demanding immediate withdrawal
c. August 6 – SC Res. 661 (1990) – imposed broad economic sanctions
i. Affirming “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence”
ii. Under article 51 and chapter VII
d. August 9 – SC Res. 662 (1990) – denounced Iraq’s “annexation” – called on states not to recognize
e. August 18 – SC Res. 664 (1990) – demanded Iraq permit departure of third-country nationals, and allow diplomacy and consular missions to continue with full immunity
f. Fear Iraq would attack Saudi Arabia
i. US began sending troops to SA
g. Saddam’s statement
i. Creating illegitimate national v. non-national distinction
A) Though military v. civilian distinction okay
h. August 25 – SC Res. 665 (1990) – permitted member states to use “measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” to halt shipping and enforce embargo
i. Didn’t formally use words allowing force
A) But understood that US would so argue
i. Sept. 25 – SC Res. 670 (1990) - Prohibited air traffic to and from Iraq
j. October – SC Res. 674 (1990) – stated Iraq would be responsible for any mistreatment of hostages and any damages resulting from invasion
k. Nov. 29 – SC Res. 678 (1990) – demands that Iraq comply with SC Res 660 by Jan. 15, and authorizes member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement it if they don’t.
3. 1991 Gulf War
a. Jan. 12 – Congress votes to support Administration’s decision to use force
i. Despite voices calling for sanctions to work
ii. National Security Directive 54 (892-93) – means to be employed to achieve policy goals
b. Jan. 16 – Operation Desert Storm – six weeks of punishing air assault
c. Feb. 22 – Operation Desert Sabre – brief but massive ground assault
d. Feb. 27 – Bush orders ceasefire – stopping short of drive to Baghdad
i. Announced terms for ceasefire
e. What was the role of IL in determining course of events?
i. Minimal - US only concerned with protecting oil reserves. Made use of the SC, played the game, but the national security directive made clear that whatever happened, it was going to take action, and just conveniently got approval at the end. But circumvented sanctions regime in the meantime.
ii. Counter: US went to the SC - bringing states along, but went through the system. The norms on the use of force came out formally vindicated. First bush administration very conscious of significance of getting a consensus, and trying to build on broader support. Including fact that invasion PAID for by other states!
A) GB's decision not to go to Baghdad was dictated not only by prudence (which W didn't share) but taking account of rules of IL. Can use proportionate force, but can't take authorization for use of force to achieve larger goals like regime change.
4. Intermediary Period
a. Mar. 3 – SC Res. 686 (1991) (898) – demands that Iraq implement 12 prior resolutions, rescind claims on Kuwait, cease hostilities with member states, etc.
i. Iraq accepts.
b. Apr. 13 – SC Res. 687 (1991) (899-900) – demand Iraq account for detainees, accept responsibility for all harm on foreign states and nationals, return property, renounce terrorism
i. Established Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission
ii. Directed Iraq to dismantle WMD, and allow UN to MONITOR/INSPECT weapons production facilities.
c. Iraq resists efforts to monitor WMD programs
i. Dec. 16, 1998 – US and British forces – Operation Desert Fox – limit Iraq military capability and limit Iraq’s ability to threaten neighbors
d. BUT, sanctions causing humanitarian crisis – countries beginning to oppose
e. May 14 – SC Res. 1409 (2002) – revise sanctions regime. Allow consumer goods, maintain restrictions on military goods.
f. Sept. 13 – UN Sec-Gen Annan – announces Iraq continues to defy mandatory resolutions
g. Sept. 16 – Iraq agrees to let UNMOVIC and IAEA back in
i. US/UK want stronger restrictions, stricter verification procedures, shorter deadline
ii. France/Russia/China – compromise resolution – toughen inspection regime, but omit language authorizing use of force
h. Oct. 16 – US gets AUMF against Iraq (906-07)
i. Nov. 8 – SC Res. 1441 (2002) (905-06) – Iraq has been and is in “material breach” – final opportunity to comply with obligation.
j. Dec. 7 – Iraq gives 12K pages of documents
i. People unsure, but still think not enough
k. 2003 inspections – found ballistic missiles, NO CONCLUSIVE evidence of WMDs.
5. 2003 Gulf War
a. Feb. 5, 2003 – SC convenes to discuss Iraq’e non-compliance.
i. UN refuses to authorize force w/o more evidence
b. US “coalition of the willing”
i. US also woos/bullies SC countries to get votes for resolution
c. Mar. 19 – US starts Operation Iraqi freedom – ground offensive
d. Apr. 14 – took control of central Baghdad – major combat operations over.
6. Legality of 2003 war
a. Unlawful
i. Iraq committed no armed attack permitting use of force in self-defense
ii. Resolution 678 couldn’t justify use of force so many years later.
b. Lawful
i. SC resolutions 678, 687, 1441 provide authorization
ii. Legitimate exercise of preemptive self-defense
c. Did Res. 687 provide continuing authority?
i. What about continuing US struggles to get further grants of authority? Why would they do that if they had the authority all along?
F. Nicaragua
1. History
a. 1979 – Sandinistas overthrew President Anastasio Somoza.
i. Provided safe haven for other Marxist rebels seeking to overthrow gov’t in El Salvador
b. 1981 – Reagan begins to support contras in efforts to overthrow Sandinistas
i. Supplied financial, political and military assistance
2. ICJ Proceedings
a. Proceedings brought by American lawyers in 1984.
b. Asserted jx under 36(2) under ICJ statute, and under 1956 Treaty between the countries
i. US attempted to modify ICJ 36(2) jx, and eventually terminated
c. BUT, ICJ can’t render default judgment
i. Considered based on US public position
A) Had supplied contras with $, training, intelligence, and other assistance
B) Based on COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
d. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) – 1986 (918-24)
i. Certain US measures definitely violated anyone’s norms of self defense
A) Mining the harbors
ii. But, to what extent can El Salvador retaliate to Nicaraguan interference? And is US justified in helping them?
A) If El Salvador acting in SD – why wasn’t it reported to SC?
B) No formal declaration of help needed
iii. Court adopting HIGH threshold for armed attack – hard to get to Article 51 rights.
G. Democratic Republic of the Congo
1. Buildup
a. Lusaka Agreement – 1999
i. Ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign forces, int’l peacekeeping force
b. SC Res 1304 (2000) – condemns fighting by Ugandans and Rwandans in DRC and demands the forces desist, and withdraw
2. IRC Proceedings
a. Charges of armed aggression
b. 2000 – preliminary measures – directed both DRC and Uganda to prevent and refrain from ANY action
c. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) – ICJ – 2005 (928-932)
i. Applying Nicaragua – strict test
A) No one reporting SD under article 51 again``
B) Imply there are other ways Uganda could protect itself
ii. DRC had consented – when did consent END
A) First complaint of DRC
XXI. Session 26 – Humanitarian Intervention (Use of Force, Part Two)
A. Historical Humanitarian intervention
1. Protect religious minority
2. Stop governments engaging in widespread atrocities (generally also for self-interested reasons)
a. 1971 – India invaded E. Pakistan
b. 1978 – Vietnam invaded Cambodia
c. 1979 – Tanzania invaded Uganda
d. Never relied on humanitarian intervention – instead – SELF-DEFENSE
3. Cold War – didn’t want to formally accept doctrine of HI – feared it would be liable to abuse
a. When Cold War came to end – SC is back!
B. Possible justifications for humanitarian intervention (use of force to protect another state’s citizens from serious and widespread abuse of HR)
1. Humanitarian intervention not directed against state’s territorial integrity or political independence, and thus doesn’t violate Article 2(4)
2. States exist to further rights of their citizens – when they attack/fail to protect them, they forfeit the legal protections of statehood
3. When SC is deadlocked, preexisting customary int’l law right of humanitarian intervention should revive
4. Theory of necessity permits use of force as lesser of two evils
C. Security Council Led HI
1. Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, DRC, Libera, Sudan, Haiti, Sierra Leone
2. Determined each case posed threat to int’l peace and security.
a. Even though many of these cases were internal conflicts.
3. Most states accept Council has broad authority to respond to humanitarian disaster, including use of force
D. Kosovo
1. NATO, not UN, intervenes with use of force.
a. Supporters
i. Numerous SC resolutions determining there was a threat to int’l peace and security
A) SC Res. 1160 – demanded Belgrade withdraw its “special police”
B) SC Res. 1199 – demanded Belgrade cease hostilities and negotiate political settlement
ii. Rejected SC resolution to condemn bombing campaign
A) Legally – this doesn’t mean anything
B) Politically – useful.
iii. SC Res. 1244 – welcomed politicaion settlement
b. Detractors
i. Violated 2(4) of Charter
A) Violate design of charter – cost-benefit analysis
1) Risk of escalating interstate conflict inherent in weakening restraints on use of force outweigh possible benefit of exceptions for grave humanitarian need where SC can’t authorize military intervention
B) Uphold state sovereignty AND complete prohibition on use of force
ii. No self-defense
A) Kosovo is not independent state. Non-governmental entity can’t call for assistance
B) Other states aren’t “directly” affected
C) Where’s report to SC under article 51?
2. International views on NATO’s decision
a. NATO Javier Solana (941-42)
i. Avoids relying on single legal justification
A) Not waging war
B) Necessary – no alternative
C) Regional concerns
D) Humanitarian, HR concerns – de facto HI argument?
ii. Doesn’t want to get tied down on particular argument – aware of power of IL norms.
A) “humanitarian catastrophe” not “humanitarian intervention”
1) Still nervous about Russian use of these options.
b. UN Kofi Annan (942)
i. Politically – can’t alienate P5, but still asserting respect for law
ii. Criticizes Yugoslav authorities
iii. Opens door – times when use of force might be legitimate in pursuit of peace
A) As led by SC.
c. US James Rubin (942-43)
i. Serbia has committed such serious violations – don’t need international justification
A) NATO is the only regional organization with such weight (don’t worry about Commonwealth)
ii. Again, refusing to commit to specific legal doctrine – fear the doctrine being used by other states with different interests
A) Neither HI nor individual/collective SD, nor R2P
B) WHY? US has SC veto power!
1) All it needs is way to get around SC when it has to.
3. Legality of Use of Force Application of FRY (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) – ICJ - 1999 (944-45)
a. FRY joins right before bringing action
b. Throwing in everything – civilians killed, civilian targets hit, inappropriate weapons
i. Wrapped in framework of genocide convention – most important ground for jx.
4. Yugoslavia v. Belgium (Belgium Oral Pleadings)- ICJ - 1999 (946-47)
a. FRY has no jx – when they joined, it was post-NATO proceedings
b. State of necessity
i. Justifies violation of binding rule to protect values higher than those that have been breached
A) We say no rule breached – but if so – rule prohibiting use of force
ii. Weighted against humanitarian catastrophe
A) Right of jus cogens
1) Is prohibition on use of force ALSO jus cogens?
iii. Proportionate – directed against war machine, and military-industrial complex.
c. PA’s response – “necessity is the last resort of scoundrels.” – ILC working on more restrictive, specific notion of necessity.
5. Court decision – JURISDICTION
a. Events happened before FRY accepted ICJ jx
b. NATO’s acts not enough to get jx under genocide convention
6. Scholarly Reactions
a. Ruth Wedgwood (950) – must be some flexibility.
i. Ensemble of justifications added up to legal justification
ii. NATO is “responsible multilateral organization”
b. Richard A. Falk (951-52) – genocide can’t be shielded by sovereignty, but claims can’t be overridden by unauthorized uses of force delivered in excessive and inappropriate manner.
i. Reliance on legalism unfortunate for future of int’l law.
c. Bruno Simma (953) – relies on legalism. NATO can’t make breaches of UN Charter part of its mandate – destructive impact on collective security.
i. can’t turn exception into policy
d. Antonio Cassese (953) – clear violation. Have to figure out how to deal with this.
i. Argues it was ethical but not legal.
e. Christine Chinkin (953-54) – HYPOCRISY. West would not have intervened in Africa (Rwanda?). Claims of legitimacy thus tainted.
i. Response to her: now that we have precedent, perhaps easier to convince west to go into Africa next time? Some precedent better than none?
7. Norm Entrepreneurship
a. UN Secretary General says something must be done
i. SG’s Address to the General Assembly – 1999 (954-55)
A) on the one hand, better ot have intervened in Rwanda?
B) Danger of intervention undermining UN security system?
C) Saying THIS IS A MESS.
b. Canadian Gov’t – set up International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
i. First version of R2P
ii. “avoidable catastrophe” – larger idea, very human rights based
A) Sovereignty as linked to responsibility to your population.
c. SG converts to currency – creating panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which echoes ICISS
i. Emerging norm – collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by SC.
ii. Proposed guidelines – five criteria of legitimacy
A) Seriousness of threat
B) Proper purpose
C) Last resort
D) Proportional means
E) Balance of consequences
d. Focus on SC
i. Maybe some sort of work to limit SC veto in situations like this?
A) This is why US not in favor R2P
e. Jeremy Sarkin (Packet IV, p. 26-27) – calling on Australia to adopt R2P
f. Jose Alvarez (Packet IV, p. 27-34)
i. Much more cautious
ii. Worried about ability to abuse r2p
A) Michael Chertoff – surely we have R2P to protect from terrorism. Gives us right to invade countries harboring terrorists.
XXII. Session 20 –Ozone Layer (International Environmental Law, Part One)
A. International Environmental Law
1. 1941 – Trail Smelter arbitration – single known source of pollution causing geographically limted and easily identified environmental damage
2. 1950s – UN GA resolutions re: effects of nuclear radiation
a. But, for the most part – considered pollution a LOCAL problem
b. Domestically, however – Silent Spring by Rachel Carson (1963) – domestic environmental movements beginning to grow
3. 1970s – concern over acid rain
a. Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) – 1979 (783)
i. regional framework to control and reduce transboundary air pollution
ii. no reductions required – information sharing and collaborative research
4. 1972 – Stockholm meeting – adopt soft law standards – adopt Trail Smelter principle
B. Ozone
1. Ozone critically protects life from toxic effects of ultraviolet radation
a. Certain industrial chemicals destroy ozone when released into the atmosphere.
i. CFCs suspected – circulate around the globe.
2. Ozone Treaties
a. Preparation for negotiation in Vienna
i. Business community reject link between CFC and ozone
ii. CFC producers/users worry about liability
A) One company decides not to use – rush to capture market of environmentally conscious consumers – US market for CFC fell by 2/3
B) US EPA banned CFC
iii. US then, pushing for similar global ban.
A) EC opposed restrictions on consumption – argued for restrictions on PRODUCTION.
1) Since Europe has majority of existing production facilities, will benefit if stop creation of NEW production facilities.
b. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer – 1985 (785-87)
i. About PROCESS, less about substance
ii. Amendments – no distinction re: developed/developing or consumers/producers
c. Preparation for negotiation in Montreal
i. More studies come out confirming CFC danger; more corporations willing to work on substitutes
ii. Still production (EU) v. consumption (US debate)
d. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer – 1987 (790-93)
i. Focusing provisions on developing countries – try to include strong incentives to join (article 3 and 4)
A) Deferral of responsibilities, assistance, plus trade measures that punish you if you don’t sign on
B) Creating incentives for developed states to export only to Protocol signers.
ii. STILL EXISTING FRAMEWORK – meets every four years-ish
e. Results of Montreal?
i. Industry reacted – changed their incentives, and unleashed race to create substitutes.
ii. Scientific evidence suggested, even with perfect adherence/global participation, CFCs will still increase
iii. Further North-South issues
A) Developing countries like China – much greater CFC consumption
B) China and india (40% of world’s population) not joining
1) Hadn’t caused the problems, so unwilling to forgo use of products or use more expensive substitute chemicals
2) Need to spend $ on serious issues like poverty, hunger, and disease not CFC abatement
f. London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol – 1989 (795-96)
i. Accelerate Montreal Protocol’s phaseout schedules, increased which CFCs were covered, accelerated halon phaseout
A) “financial mechanism” to help developing states meet obligations
1) Multilateral fund – managed by
a) World Bank – representing developed countries
b) Un Environment Programme – for science
c) UN Development Programme – agency responsible for giving $ to developing countries. Perceived as working for developing countries.
2) Negative precedent to inducing cooperation with $?
3) Bad to eliminate pressure on developing countries to deal with issues in efficient fashion?
B) But also increase sanctions on those that haven’t signed
g. 1991 – list of goods containing CFCs that could only be imported from parties
i. Number of developing states that joined regime nearly doubled.
ii. Experts – trade restrictions even more important than ozone fund in motivating developing states.
A) Are they consistent with international trade law?
3. Promoting Compliance
a. Problems emerge
i. Russia – phaseouts coincided with economic crises
ii. Black market CFCs smuggled into the west
b. Interim Non-Compliance Procedure – 1990 (799)
i. One party can submit concerns about another party in writing
ii. Implementation committee established – review submissions, informations and observations and then report to Meeting of the Parties
iii. Only interim because some parties wanted more rigorous NCP.
c. Revised Non-Compliance Procedure – 1992 (799)
i. Expanded IC from five to ten
ii. Adopted measures that might be taken in response to NC
d. Russia not about to meet compliance – not entitled to Multilateral Fund assistance
i. Outside bodies stepped up to help Russia.
C. Precautionary Principle
1. Can’t use lack of scientific certainty to postpone putting into place cost-effective measures to protect the environment
a. Is it a legal norm?
b. Can it be usefully operationalized?
2. EC banned use of certain hormones in livestock production, and importation of meat from livestock made with those hormones
a. US v. EC – WTO dispute settlement proceedings (1998) (806-07)
i. Does EC’s rationale for ban have sufficient “scientific justification” under WTO Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)?
ii. WTO – unnecessary to take position on whether PP is customary law
iii. Look at relationship between PP and SPS
A) PP not written into SPS
B) PP doesn’t override principles of treatyinterpretation re: SPS
iv. Concludes PP doesn’t override provisions of SPS
3. Southern Bluefin Tuna
a. 1985 – Japan, Australia and NZ – informal agreement on quotas re: SBT
b. 1994 – formalized into Convention for Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CSBT)
i. 1998-99 – no agreement re: allowable catch.
ii. Decided to Set up collaborative experimental fishing program – but couldn’t agree
iii. Japan set one up anyway – and exceeded 1997 allocation.
c. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea – AU and NZ bring arbitration
i. Under UN Convention on Law of the Sea
ii. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (NZ and Aus v. Japan) – 1999 (ITLOS)
A) Parties should act with CAUTION, and considering scientific uncertainty
B) Each should refrain from experimental fishing programme unless they can either agree, or make it part of their own quota
C) LAING Concurrence – still unclear if PP is part of customary law
1) BUT, adopting precautionary APPROACH is good. Imports flexibility.
XXIII. Session 21 –Climate Change (International Environmental Law, Part Two)
A. Collective Action Problem again
1. Mechanisms used in ozone:
a. incentives, using soft compliance mechanisms, framework conventions and general ratcheting up, distinctions between developed/developing
B. Greenhouse Gases
1. GHG absorb some of the sun’s energy which passes through the atmosphere, is absorbed by the earths’ surface, and emitted as infrared radiation. GHGs keep some of the IR in, warming planet to reasonable temperature.
a. GHGs increasing – keeps too much IR in, warms planet too much.
i. Alters earth’s climate, declines in plant and animal population, rise in sea levels destroying low-lying areas, contaminate fresh water supplies, more frequent/extreme weather patterns, harm public health.
b. Great disparity in production of GHGs
2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – authoritative international scientific body assessing technical and socioeconomic issues associated with climate change
C. Development of Climate Regime
1. Discussions in 1970s
a. 1979 - World Climate Conference
b. 1988 – states created IPCC
c. 1990 – IPCC released first scientific assessment report
i. Powerful effect on policymakers and public
ii. Led to UN GA negotiations over climate change treaty to be made in Rio
2. Preparing for Rio
a. EU – binding emission reduction targets and timetables
b. US – opposed targets and timetables – more RESEARCH
c. Developing states – rejected anything that slowed economic growth
i. Argued not responsible for climate problem
ii. DIVIDE
A) Small island states/low-lying states – pushed for major cuts by developed states
B) Oil producing states – opposed mandated cuts, wanted int’l fund to compensate for any loss due to reduced oil demand
C) Amazon basis states – objected to forest conservation/carbon sink measures which would allow responsibility to shift to developing states
3. United Nations Framework Agreement on Climate Change [Rio]– 1992 (814-15)
a. FRAMEWORK convention again.
i. Developed countries take the lead.
A) This has been problematic. China/India? – US wants to hold them to account. Need THIRD category.
ii. Reference to “future generations”, reference to “equity” (does it mean anything? In int’l law/)
iii. References Precautionary Principle
A) Still controversial, but IPCC helps take pressure off PP.
b. Are countries obliged to DO anything?
i. One side – yes, they have to adopt SOME policies, and they have to have a particular leaning.
c. Just trying to get process running.
i. Included Conference of the Parties (COP)
ii. These commitments to commit – deadlines actually seem to WORK. Force parties to develop policies, come with suggestions, etc.
d. Entered into force in March 1994 – 189 states ratified by Feb. 2006
4. After Rio, pre-Kyoto
a. COP meeting in Berlin (March 1995)
i. Majority of developed states aren’t going to meet GHG goals – but even if they did, it wouldn’t be low enough.
ii. BERLIN MANDATE - Agreed to begin process to strengthen commitments through binding targets/timetables.
A) Agreed no new commitments for developing states.
b. Lead up to Kyoto
i. US – would support binding targets/timetables
ii. July 1997 – US Senate – non-binding resolution – US should not enter into treaty mandating limits/reduction on GHGs UNLESS developing countries also had to limit/reduce AND the treaty didn’t result in “serious harm to the economy”
iii. Fight over targets
A) European states/US – uniform target for all annex I
B) Aus, Japan, Iceland, Norway, etc. – differential targets considering disparities in natural resources, energy use and consumption
iv. Once agreed on individual targets – NEGOTIATIONS. No set formula.
5. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – 1997 (816-18)
a. Article 3 – individual targets – but understood emissions reductions would be costly, so created FLEXIBILITY in meeting the targets
i. Financial incentives for Annex I states – use/improve natural resources to absorb emissions
A) if you create project that reduces emissions, you can then trade/sell that off
B) Annex I states working together (Article 6)
ii. Developed countries can invest in developing countries to help them meet emissions goals, and get credit towards their own compliance (article 12)
iii. Emissions trading (article 17)
b. Trying to up compliance - Reporting requirements expanded, expert-review teams
6. Post-Kyoto
a. 1999 – Buenos Aires – work plan over remaining issues
i. Extent to which Annex I states can meet commitments by trading/undertaking projects in other states?
A) EU wants to cap trading at 50% of required reductions
B) US and others – no limits in text about trading
1) Helps meet goals most efficiently
ii. Are reduction mechanisms really going above and beyond what would have occurred absent trade/investment?
A) Russian economic crisis – going to have a lot of excess credits. Should we be able to buy them?
iii. What to do about noncompliance?
A) Legally binding OR political approach?
b. 2000 – Hague meeting
i. Unable to reach agreement
c. 2001 – US announces US won’t ratify Kyoto Protocol
i. United countries around Kyoto, galvanized into action.
d. 2002 – Bonn Convention
i. Adopted rules governing CDM
ii. Created executive board to oversee CDM
iii. Supplemental mechanisms (CDM, international emissions trading, and JI regime) must be less than domestic actions
iv. Created Compliance Committee
A) Facilitative branch and enforcement branch
e. Marrakesh Accords – set out agreements reached in Bonn.
f. 2005 – Kyoto entered into FORCE, and became legally binding.
i. Only four developed states have not ratified – Australia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and US
ii. BUT, since US is absent, and control lacking over developing countries – applies to LESS THAN A THIRD of global emissions
g. Copenhagen – Dec. 2009
i. Problem is MONEY.
ii. Not going to come to resolution here, but climate change IS on int’l agenda
XXIV. Session 22 –Balancing Trade and Environment (International Economic Law, Part One)
A. Historical Development of International Economic Law
1. 1945 – UN Charter
a. Premised on idea that economic development would eliminate conflict, contribute to improved standards of living
2. 1947 – Havana Conference
a. Established plan to create International Trade Organization (ITO), supposed to have extensive functions
b. Adopted General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
3. US doesn’t like GATT, ITO never established
a. However, GATT then turned into organization
i. SOFT organization
A) Set up PANELS to resolve disputes
1) Only binding if adopted by ENTIRE GATT executive body – CONSENSUS
4. 1980s – Uruguay Round – rolling negotiations to try to liberalize world trade rules
a. Had to wait until end of Cold War.
5. 1994 – WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION created.
a. Panel decisions binding and Appellate body rulings binding
i. UNLESS rejected by consensus
B. Premise of Trade Law
1. There will always be reasons why states want to restrict trade. A lot of those reasons are purely political and manipulative. Every country has domestic protectionists. The trade law assumption says these pressures are ALWAYS bad, and should ALWAYS be rejected. If they are, overall common good will be promoted.
a. There may be a few marginal issues where free trade should be subjected to something else, but VERY few.
2. Problem – we manipulate OTHER areas of law through trade law
a. Ozone
b. Climate
c. Human rights??
3. Lots of protests – focus on trade at expense of other important concerns like redistribution, equity, human rights, labor rights, environment
4. Two responses
a. Set up complete protection for trade law and say that we cannot jeopardize this with other little concerns.
b. Now, move away to interpretation which says standards are evolving, we now need to build completely different consciousness INTO trade law, while still retaining solid core, and resisting unwarranted intrusions of various activists
C. Tuna-Dolphin Dispute
1. Background
a. Challenged US’s Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), US had to fish in dolphin safe manner. Amended to require foreign states to adopt comparable regulatory program to import to US
b. US was reluctant to enforce, but Earth Island filed federal court action
i. Order required government to enforce MMPA
ii. US enforced tuna embargo, and Mexico brought GATT dispute settlement proceedings
c. GATT law
i. Article XI – no prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas…or other measures, shall be instituted/maintained on imports from other GATT members
ii. Article III – products imported from GATT parties – no less favorable treatment than like products of nat’l origin
iii. Article XX – except for arbitrary/unjustifiable discrimination, any party can take measures to prevent human, animal or plant life or health, or measures relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources
d. US made two arguments
i. argued that these were “regulations” under Article III, not quotas governed by Article XI
ii. argued that fell within Article XX exception
2. US- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphin I) – GATT - 1991 (849)
a. Article III – PRODUCT distinction, not PROCESS
i. US obliged to treat all TUNA the same
b. Import ban violates Article XI
c. Article XX –
i. Analyze XX text, drafting history, purpose, and consequences of each proposed interpretation – strict constructionism
ii. Decide – does not meet requirement of “necessity”
A) US hasn’t exhausted all options to protect dolphins through GATT-combatible means (ala negotiation of int’l cooperative arrangements)
B) Honestly – scared about what happens when environment gets brought in. how do you choose which environmental issues are more necessary than others? We’re a GATT panel – we’re about free trade.
3. US neither lifts embargo, nor amends MMPA
4. US-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphin II) – GATT – 1992 (853)
a. Challenged MMPA’s “intermediary nation” provision, banning imports from such nations unless they also ban tuna imports from nations under direct embargoes.
b. Found IN embargoes violated Article XI
c. Rejected Article III argument under product/process distinction
d. Again, not under scope of Article XX
5. Blocks adoption of report, and maintains embargo
6. What follows?
a. 1992 – La Jolla Agreement – schedule to reduce total dolphin takes
i. US and many affected countries
b. Amendments to MMPA
i. Implement La Jolla agreements?
ii. International Dolphin Conservation Act instead – lifted US embargo for nations that agreed to five year moratorium on fishing techniques that threatened dolphins
A) No nation concluded such an agreement
iii. However, foreign fleets followed the La Jolla agreement
c. 1995 – Panama Declaration – formalized La Jolla into binding international agreement
i. Permanent mortality limit
ii. Lifting of US embargos on tuna caught in compliance with La Jolla
iii. Congress implemented in 1997!
7. INCREDIBLY successful – high rate of compliance, reduction of dolphin mortality by 99%
8. Role of the law here?
a. Did it provide a framework and impel a certain outcome, or did it merely provide a forum/language for discussion
D. Shrimp-Turtle Dispute
1. Sea turtles now endangered due to shrimp trawls. US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) developed Turtle Excluder Devices (TED)
a. 1983 – tried to encourage US shrimp vessels to voluntarily use.
b. 1987 – regulations requiring TEDs.
i. Shrimpers complained they were at competive disadvantage with foreign competitiors.
ii. Environmentalists – TEDs for US has no impact – has to be done through entire migratory range
c. 1989 – Congress – required gov’t to initiate foreign negotiations re: sea turtles
i. Prohibited shrimp importation harvested from nations w/o similar regulatory regime
ii. Only applied to certain countries (in migratory path)
iii. Only way state could export shrimp – national certification.
2. Earth Island v. Christopher – US Court of INt’l Trade – 1995 (848)
a. NGOs filed suit challenging Administration’s application of statute only to shrimp in Caribbean/west Atlantic region.
i. Administration limited – would affect imports too drastically
ii. No statutory basis however for limiting
iii. Ordered them to prohibit ALL shrimp wherever harvested in sea turtle land
3. 1996 – revised guidelines prohibit from all uncertified nation, unless exporter certifies conditions under which shrimp were harvested
4. Earth Island Institute v. Christopher – US Court of INt’l Trade – 1996 (849)
a. Guidelines inconsistent with Section 609 (original law), because allowed shrimp imports from noncertified countries
i. Prohibited import of shrimp from noncertified harvesting nations
b. Vacated on procedural grounds
5. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - WTO panel– 1998 (854)
a. US embargo inconsistent with Article XI
b. Rejecting argument that fell within scope of Article XX
i. Similar to GATT reasoning – threatening success of treaty
6. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products(Shrimp-Turtle I) – WTO Appellate Body – 1998 (855-57)
a. Several arguments
i. Interpret treaty in light of contemporary concerns
ii. Use preamble, concept of sustainable development
iii. Make terms “effective” of particular objectives (but what objectives)
iv. Balance of rights and obligations
A) HUGE SHIFT. GATT about trade, not about balance.
b. Compromise
i. Upholds American principles re: take into account emerging environmental issues under Article XX
ii. US didn’t do it correctly – needs to negotiate, ensure non-discrimination
7. In between Shrimp-Turtle I and II
a. US develops new guidelines
i. Maintains embargo – but also maintains shipment-by-shipment approach
ii. Initiated efforts to negotiate sea turtle conservation treaty
8. 2000 – Malaysia goes back to WTO
a. Panel holds – US can keep embargo, as long as it demonstrates good faith efforts to reach multilateral agreement
b. Shrimp-Turtle II – WTO Appellate Body – 2001 (857-58)
i. Finds for US
ii. Can’t require multilateral agreement because any country would then have veto over whether US could fulfill WTO obligations
A) In light of good faith efforts, Section 609 now not applied unjustifiably/arbitrarily
iii. Distinction between conditioning market access on adoption of SAME program and on adoption of program comparable in effectiveness
9. Development of Dispute
a. Attempts at voluntary domestic compliance; domestic regulations; domestic hesitation to enforce; NGO calls of accountability; COURT enforcement; enforcement of those regulations on other countries; international consideration; compromise court decision; win for US
b. Old GATT panels, non-binding, WTO panels/Appellate body
i. But US shows – not a legal regime which forces it to switch course
E. SELF-CONTAINED LEGAL REGIMES
1. Should be interpreted by itself, and not with range to broader int’l law principles
2. Entirely different set of issues, comprehensive rules, etc.
a. Biggest example – TRADE LAW. Others?
i. European Community law
ii. Human rights law – some argue it’s “different”
3. International lawyers distrust, but here it made re: trade law still.
4. BUT, WTO AB – increasingly brought general int’l law principles into decisions.
F. FRAGMENTATION
1. because int'l law lacks formal, centralized decisionmaking structure, what has occurred is the evolution of a range of different regimes, forums, etc. which are not necessarily consistent with one another (and, at the extreme, are not put into any hierarchy)
a. problem if range of bodies interpreting the same norm very differently.
XXV. Session 23 – Investment Dispute Resolution (World Economy, Part Two)
A. Development of Foreign Direct Investment
1. Remember – dealt with FDI and development of “soft law”
2. Want to invest in other countries, but need to be protected from their legal regimes
a. Set up separate external legal framework for the resolution of disputes, outside of their national legal system
3. Current FDI is different from past FDI
a. Focus on manufacturing (60s), oil (70s), SERVICES
b. Growth in cross-border mergers and acquisitions
B. Loewen Group
1. Canadian funeral service provider. Purchased MS funeral homes. MI insurance company owner had contracted with MS funeral home to provide only their insurance. After Canadians purchased, discontinued.
a. MS state court – breach of contract. Then added fraud, tortious interference, breach of good faith, unfair trade. Counsel portrayed Canadians as racist foreigners
b. Verdict for P – HUGE awards (well in excess of Loewen value).
i. MS requires appellants to post bond of 125% of the judgment. Loewen couldn’t post it – asked for it to be reduced. MS law permits reduction for “good cause” but motion was denied.
c. Loewen settled “under extreme duress”
2. Files claim under Chapter 11
a. Claims
i. testimony introduced at trial violated “national treatment” obligation
ii. Trial proceedings – substantive denial of justice, procedural denial of justice, and denial of “fair and equitable treatment”
iii. Verdict- expropriation.
b. Tribunal – trial judge’s conduct so flawed “manifest injustice”
i. No due process
ii. BUT rejected Loewen’s claim – under local remedies rule – had obligation to exhaust reasonably available domestic remedies
A) Did not pursue appeal to state supreme court or SCOTUS
c. Also failed – filed for bankruptcy and it was reorganized as US corp
i. NAFTA claim now held by US entity
A) “continuous nationality” rule – continuous national identity from events through resolution
C. NAFTA CHAPTER 11
1. Five key principles
a. National treatment and most favored nation (MFN) treatment
i. Treat foreign investors no less favorable than its own investors
ii. Treat foreign investors no less favorable than investors of any other party/non-party
b. Minimum standard of treatment – fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security
i. Customary int’l law norms regarding minimum standard of treatment of foreign investment
c. Prohibition on performance requirements
d. Free transfers
e. Int’l standards on expropriation and compensation
2. Extensive provisions re: dispute settlement
a. Right to file direct actions against host gov’ts to enforce their rights and NAFTA obligations
3. Case Examples – US wins them all
a. Metalclad v. Mexico – 2000 (864) – US investor sought to purchase and operate waste facility plant. Obtained permits, and as construction neared completion, municipality claimed they had to get permit, and then refused to grant it, for environmental reasons.
i. Violation of “fair and equitable treatment”
ii. Canadian court – set aside award in part
A) Misstated applicable law to include “transparency obligations”
B) Upheld finding that ecological decree constituted expropriation.
b. S.B. Myers v. CA – 2000 (865) – US investor wanted to transport contaminated waste from Canda to US. Canada banned export of contaminated waste to non-US countries. US banned import/export of contaminated waste for disposal, but gave EPA discretion to waive. Investor got EPA permission to import Canadian waste – but then Canada banned export of the waste. But wait, then they repealed the export ban, 16 months later. Myers claimed Canada’s temporary export ban violated Chapter 11
i. Tribunal – violated “fair and equitable treatment” because motivated by selfish reasons
c. Methanex v. US – 2005 (866) – Canadian investor is largest producer of methanol, used to produce MTBE, known animal carcinogen/possible human carcinogen. MBTE contamination is serious concern in CA – governor signed executive order requiring phaseout of MBTE. Methanex says – not based on scientific evidence.
i. Tribunal – lacked jurisdiction over M’s claim. Let them submit amended claim.
A) BRIBERY – ethanol company. When banned MBTE, then indicated ethanol as preferred replacement
ii. Tribunal
A) no violation of “national treatment” - CA ban had same effect on American investors/investments in methanol
B) not expropriation – made for public purpose, was non-discriminatory, done with due process
C) ordered reimbursement of arbitration and legal costs
4. weird public/private overlap
D. Other FDI dispute mechanisms
1. Lump-sum agreements – pay negotiated sum to claimant state. State then distributes funds according to domestic processes.
a. US – Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.
2. ICSID – International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
a. Closely association with World Bank
b. Trying to get away from government rules
i. Careful about getting too far from public voices, which enhance legitimacy
c. Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania – 2007 (Packet IV, p. 17-25)
i. NGOSs entering as amicus curiae
A) Benefits from particular knowledge – written submission
B) However, not given access to documents filed by parties in the arbitration
C) Not allowed to attend oral hearings
1) But reserves right to ask them specific questions, and request further written submissions
3. Iran-US claims tribunal and other bilateral claims tribunal
4. UN Compensation Commission – created in 1991
a. More administrative body than adjudicatory tribunal
XXVI. Session 28 – War on Terrorism (Conceptual Challenges, Part Two)
A. Ontological Challenge – is international law really law?
1. Skeptics
a. Only domestic systems have characteristics of TRUE legal systems
i. Legislature, executive and judiciary, each with authority
ii. w/o such institutions, can be morally persuasive, but not LAW.
b. Lack of centralized authority to guarantee compliance – doesn’t really control/affect state behavior
i. ICJ never a major player in int’l affairs
ii. States ignoring important treaties
B. War on Terrorism
1. 9/11 occurs. Accuse Al Qaeda, and Afghanistan – makes demands.
a. Pays of UN.
2. International responses – US getting as much as it can out of each of these resolutions
a. SC Res. 1368 (2001) (987-88) – condemns – recognizing right of individual or collective self-defense
b. GA Res. 56 (2001) (988) – international cooperation
c. SC Res. 1373 (2001) (988) – Chapter VII – broad sanctions resolutions for TERRORISTS
d. NATO – attack against US – action covered by Washington Treaty, which considers attack on one member attack against all.
e. OAS – strongest – emphasis on harboring, THOSE states that are COMPLICIT
3. War with Afghanistan
a. Oct. 7 – massive air strikes against Afghanistan
i. Neither SC nor GA adopted any GA.
ii. Wrote to SC – said committed act under Article 51.
b. By December – Northern Allicance and allies in control of most of the country
4. Recovery
a. Nov. 14 – SC Res. 1378 (2001) – new governmentof Afghanistan
C. Lawfulness of US military campaign?
1. Self-Defense under Article 51
a. Waited four weeks, then deployed massive amount of force
i. Arguments it was unlawful:
A) Non-state actors committed criminal act, not state committing armed attack
1) Criminal acts on US soil – clear violations of US law and international criminal law.
B) Link between attackers and state not sufficiently close to impute responsibility to Afghanistan
1) US argues – by harboring terrorists, state commits armed attack.
2) Nicaragua – ICJ held that acts of contras imputed to US only if latter had issued specific instructions to them
3) Tadic – ICTY held that acts of Bosnian Serbs can be imputed to Serbia if Serbia exercises “overall control” over former.
4) Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia – ICJ – 2007 (Packet IV, p. 35-36)
a) rejects Tadic and reaffirms Nicaragua – “effective control” specifically, not generally
5) UN International Law Commission –Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts – 2001 (996)
a) Also supports Nicaragua test (if issued specific instructions)
i) Unlikely Taliban would have met this test.
6) States may have SOMe affirmative duties regarding non-state actors
a) Montreal Convention – extradite or prosecute.
C) Failed to exhaust nonmilitary alternatives
D) Delay in use of force makes legitimate act of self-defense an illegal act of reprisal
E) Use of force was not proportional
b. Jonathan Charney (997) Should have disclosed FACTUAL basis
c. Thomas Franck (997) – unreasonable to expect that
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