Historiography: the causes of the Great War

[Pages:6]'fhe responsibility of Francewasthat it gaveRussiaassurancesof support beforethe July Crisis.

Britain

Britain wasdivided over whether to fight Germany or not. The Foreign SecretaryE, dward Grey,wanted to, and there hasbeencriticism of his and Britain's ambiguousposition in the |uly Crisis.Somehistorians arguethat Britain should havemade it clearto Germany that it would stand'shoulder to shoulder'with the French,and this might havedeterredthe Germansfrom pursuing the SchlieffenPlan.YetGreyhimself did not liave a mandateto rnakehis position clear,due to the mixed opinions of parliament. The violation of the neutrality of Belgium led to somepopular demandsfor war with Germany,and gavethe British governmentgrounds,basedon the treaty of 1g39,to declare war.The responsibility of Britain for the start of the war wasthat it should havemadeits position clearerduring the July Crisis. Iohn Lowe alsomakesthe following point: "'the mostseriouschargeagainstBritain, however,is that her naval talks with Russiain 1914 convincedthe Germanchancellorthat the ring of encirclementaround her wasnow complete, Greyifake denial of thesesecrettalks alsodestroyedhiscredibilityasa mediatorin German eyesin theluly crisis. From RobertPearceand fohn Lowe,Rivalry and Accord:International Relations1g70-I9l42OOl

Historiographyt:he causesof the GreatWar

{ 'ThetriumphofCultureai cartoonfromPunch.

TIID TRILiTtPH OIJ '.(It:LTUIIU."

Cartoon analysis whatisthemessagoefthiscartoonw,hichwaspublisheodn26Augus1t 914f,ollowing Germanyisnvasioonf Belgium?

-

-I--aI--

IHE UAUSESOFWORLDWARI

Jr

Central Powers TheCentraPl owerws ere thecountrietshatfought a g a i n stth e e n t e n t e powersn,amelyGermany, Austria-HungaTruyr,key andBulgariTa.heywere calledtheCentraPl owers dueto theirgeographical positioninCentraEl urope

Responsibilityfor causingWorld War I wasplacedon the Central powersby the Versailles settlementin 1919.In the war guilt clauseof the Treatyof Versailleswith Germany (futicle 231),Germanyhad to acceptresponsibilityasone of the aggressors(T. his is discussed in more detail in chapter a.) while the Tieaty of versailleswasbeing drawn up by the victorious powbis, the German Foreign Office wasalreadypreparing documentsfrom their archivesattempting to prove that all belligerentstateswereto blame.To this end, between 1922and 1927the Germansproduced 40 volumesof documentsbackingup this claim.

Other governmentsfelt the needto respondby producing their own volumes of archives. Britain published I I volumesbetween 1926and 1938,Franceits own version of eventsin 1936'Austria produced 8 volumes in 1930and the SovietUnion brought out justificatory publicationsin l93l and 1934.Germany'sargumentgainedinternationalsympathyin the 1920sand 1930sT. herewasa growingsentimentthat the war had beencausedby the failure ofinternational relationsrather than the specificactionsofone country. Lloyd Georgew, riting in his memoirsin the 1930se, xplainedthat'the nationsslitheredoverthe brink into the boiling cauldron of war.'

I

I

*

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I

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e

po,

in grt wi de' sul Fr<

Fis

a

S.B.Fayand H.E. Barnesweretwo American historianswho, to someextent,supported

the revisionist argumentsput forward by Germanyregardingthe causesof World War I.

Barnesarguedin his 1927book, TheGenesisof the war,that serbia,Franceand Russia

weredirectlyresponsiblefor causingthe war,that Austro-Hungarianresponsibilitywas

far less,and that leastresponsiblewereGermanyand Britain.He supportedthis view by

A

arguingthat the Franco-Russiaanlliancebecameoffensivefrom 1912,and their joint plans

intendedto manipulateany crisisin the Balkansto provokea Europeanwar.Both countries decidedthat Serbiawould be centralto their war plansand earlyin 1914officersin the SerbianGeneralStaffplottedthe assassinatioonfFranz FerdinandT. he Russianand French

motivesfor startinga Europeanwar wereto attaintheir keyobjectivest:he seizureof the DardanellesStraitsand the return of Alsace-Lorrainew, hich could only be realizedthrough war.

Sir Ge Fir bo H( pir

in

An Italian historian,Luigi Albertini, wrote a thoroughand coherentresponseto the

art

revisionistargumentin the 1940sA. lbertini'sargumentfocusedon the responsibilityof

5U.

Austria-Hungaryand Germanyin the immediateterm:Austriafor the ultimatum to Serbia,

frc

and Germanyfor its'naivety'in demandinga localizedwar.Overall,Germanywasin his

w(

view fundamentallyto blame,asit wasclearthat Britain could not haveremainedneutralin a war ragingon the continent.

Or

Jt

FriIzFischer

M

In 1961,historianFritz FischerpublishedGermany\Aims in the FirstWorld l4lar;this was

alt

latertranslatedinto English.Fischer'sargumentfocusedresponsibilitybackon Germany.

inr

He discovereda documentcalledthe'septemberprogramme'writtenby the German

for

chancellor,Bethmann-HollwegT. his memorandum,which wasdated9 septemberl9l4

TT

(afterwar had started),setout Germany'saimsfor domination of Europe(seechapter

h'

3 for more discussionof this aspiration).Fischerclaimedthat the documentprovedthat

an

the ruling elite had alwayshad expansionistaims and that a war would allow them to

un

fulfil these.War would alsoconsolidatetheir power at home and dealwith the threat of

de

socialism.Fischerwent on to arguein another book that the War Council of lgl2proved

mi

that Germanyplannedto launcha continentalwar in 1914.At this war council, von

an

Moltke had commentedthat'in my opinion war is inevitableand the soonerthe better.'

N(

Fischer'sargumentis persuasivea,she links longer-termpoliciesfrom 1897to short-term

we

and immediate actionstaken in the ]uly crisis. In short, he is ableto explain why war

thr

began.

pr,

gsdliwGtnureoieiblllnuliiaebscoetdtyepnas,raotmnwahnwttehaideaeiltlcllcresyfmhaomhnchveasueeaearsedtdnsetouetiadhnfrtsltheeerosherevfereaiiAttsshhdaupkieybssoolwltetnyfordoaoscr.iria-ctcblsodraoleret-lysnhrribfeawrtlueiisnaciaetpytnhdtowliwiaonimittannshtirgiihtbneaeeRidnlriiuo1tmdoyfsu9,ormss1irnlico4aian-rthcihn-saeaeedelrncows[cFtotudoahrntaanrobdnnfisrniigcedteieeaEoeor,knnhuofof'ierofryo9r)riopil0gewge5etar'h,dnundiIierce9rremhrr0aascGgmiltl'aitwwetuynairnaasdrmtvrry.bAoai1nselnsv9uayii1p1ierbg1ae9wrm]r1o,wor4onara.lrendsityy, FromFritzFischetG, ermany'Asimsin the FirstWorldWar,l967

Fischer'sargumentshavebeencriticized in the following ways:

' Fischerargues'backwards'fromthe German'septemberwar aims'.Thereis limited

r

evidenceto proveGermanyhad specificexpansionisat imsprior to september1914.

The Decemberwar Council imperial Chancellor wasnot

is alsolimit present.

ed

evide

ncei;t

s

im;o

rtance

is

debatableast

he

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F19is1c4h'Herohwoledvsethr,Be edtohmmeasntinc-cHrioslilswinegGdeisrmmiasnsyeadwscaer natsraasltoolwuthioynwtaortwheasritsreigogfesroecdiianlism. It could be arguedthat Germanpolicy rackedcoherencyin the decadebefore19r4. Fischerfocusestoo much on Germany;this priority leadsto an emphasison German

actionsand he neglectsthe role playedby other powers

AfterFischer

lseinrmceaFnisrcehsepro'snthseibsielistoync. oGnesremrvaantgivueiGlt,ehrimstaonrihainssthoarivaencsosunctihnauseGdteorhdaerbdaRteitttheerdreejgerceteeodf

saipHbFnurioiovgsmtowohucmkteeheaod|evelufre"rrolG'Iorysvtl,tfeeihche1arriewnim9ssmb1tiianhsea4n,eatejtdohnehnroedvowicteu1tyiuhdng9oameth6fstlt0teyhihhtsnaiaisaw,sstttlsaswolteuhesradonitrashtutdennoegedsotGwharhtmIraaenmotrrieunmGmtchni aeenardonrsgntmudshtuhageeaeerhsnlwiGailptrayohreeosrgteilropsiuidcraspmdynp.rtehooeoofewlnfieficlttdnaoysddtgn"tohihoerpyffeeedslwoFekretmeeiehts.vilapactitpthitsouiGoecintolarehbi,notlreyilmik,ysspaaFatiunntsinsubddocyalttmfiphhthsileieoheal rinihiy1tnraeai9rgnrodda2iatllh0yees .

from the crisiswhich widenedthe crisisfrom an EasternEuropeanone world war' (Ruth Henig, TheOrigins of the FirstWorld War, 1991,

to

a

continentaland

other historianshavestresseddifferentissuesin explainingthe outbreakof war,however.

JohnKeegan

fiaMnoletrilhivttohiatueargyEbhluhetrih'sIoentporfeeraiawacntene,rwfcoeoahlonrnnwoKgma-esyteeu'pgrnlmualisknaferonolcdyyudsashule,oeinsortttone_tlttlheheerecmitentuvetaeenlarnsdntioseionprfseetinhnligedEiefouunurlcyosaetpcinnerdik,sw"ciasbo.r.oHtwpweae.essraiu'ntgitfoghaneecnsntentatscohteitaostnsas.ry amduahTnennihiggdtddeehheijrtkltemsriegashaiyhtlanoalttlveoisunaetesdKnhbotvcheeeefeeeefnowangmtnscilatei.atmhn'taKch'iGnshtetaheoieetndetgtrehohmatreorenyaysrKhau:ni'sTeagyloth,wgihtscheeaeeaasKslrlhttaassatlacufehifdkspadaeo5itptrrfoh0.o.Ic.asptt.ohdeewimendAotaoepmutshslsAceuectoaurnacinsdailracttv-irrsatHiioiasiotuslii-n,ononHp.ngfgauhdnnraiugmgirrc1yaikn4-raeyg.cm.d'st.taehorfndeeosdilut/mululnycemldtiytnaeatcndhdprceaiiisaepettithecoseeen.layHodd,ctfeehitdpanealntwoponaeterr,

No country usedthe communicationsavailableat the time, rmation pwthraeosbuallertirmmivawintaugsmftihtftauotllseye,arcabhniandawwtaiaossnnafolawtilaoeyndset'oitnhccaoot mmthpmeleuEtnueirclToaphteeeaictsnrpiasoiimswtsheardstuhfroainldlqoewtxhepedecctrhtiesedisea:xnpdirtahteiokneyof

THECAUSESOFWORLDWARI

r Austria-Hungary had wanted to punish Serbia,but lackedthe courageto act alone.They did not want a generalEuropeanwar.

e Germany had wanted a diplomatic successthat would leaveits Austro-Hungarian ally strongerin Europeaneyes.It did not want a generalEuropeanwar.

r Russiadid not want a generalEuropeanwar,but had not calculatedthat support for Serbiawould edgethe dangerof war closer.

o Francehad not mobilized, but wasincreasinglyworried that Germanywould mobilize againstit.

o Britain only awoketo the real dangerof the crisison Saturday25 |uly, and still hoped on Thursday 30 july that Russiawould toleratethe punishment of Serbia.It would not, however,leaveFrancein danger.

None of the Europeanpowershad communicated their objectivesclearlyin the fuly Crisis. Therefore,for Keeganit wasthe eventsof 3l ]uly that werethe turning point. The news of Russia'sgeneralmobilization and the German ultimatum to Russiaand Francemade the issueone of peaceor war. The Great Powerscould stepback from the brink, but a withdrawal would not be compatiblewith the statusof eachasa Great Power.The Serbs,a causeof the crisis in the first place,had beenforgotten.

JamesJoll

|oll attemptsto link impersonal forces- factorsbeyond the specificcontrol or influence of an individual leader,regime or government- to personalor man-made forces.He suggests an atmosphereof intensetension wascreatedby impersonal forcesin the long and short terms, and personaldecisionsmade in the fuly Crisis led to war. |oll explainsthe outbreak of war in termsof the decisionstakenby the political leadersin 1914,but arguesthat these decisionswereshapedby the impersonalfactors,which meantthat the leadershad only limited optionsopento them in the final daysof the crisis.

PersonaFl orces expansionaisimt s w a rp l a n s calculated ecisions

VS

lmpersonaFlorces

capitalism i n t e r n a t i o n aaln a r c h y alliances

Marxist historianshavefocusedon the role of capitalismand imperialismasthe keycauses of World War I, but a limitation with focusingon impersonalfactorsis that they do not seemto explainwhy the war brokeout when it did. Joll'sargumentlinks the impersonal factorsto the personaldecision-makingtakingplaceduring the fuly Crisis,and thus, apparently,overcomesthis problem.

NialFl erguson

ln ThePity of War (2006),Niall Fergusonsuggeststhat Germany wasmoving awayfrom a militaristicoutlook prior to World War I, and highlightsthe increasinginfluenceof the SocialDemocratPartythere.The GermanSocialDemocratPartywasfoundedasa socialist parry with a radical agendafor Germany.By l9l2 they had gainedthe most votesin the Reichstagand their influence increasinglyalarmedthe Kaiser'sregime. Fergusonsees Britain asheavilyimplicated in the causesof war,particularly Sir Edward Grey.Britain misinterpretedGermanambitionsand decidedto act to impedeGermanexpansionism. Fergusondoesnot seewar asinevitablein 1914,despitethe forcesof militarism, imperialism and secretdiplomacy.

__o

Drawup a gridsummarizinthgeviewsofthekeyhistorianthsatyouhavereadaboutinthis chapteAr.lsoincludetheviewsofthehistorianinsthestudenst tudysectionbelow. Documentanalysis StudythesourcebselowA. syoureadd, ecidewhatfactoer achhistoriainsstressinaqsthekev causeforwar. DocumentA TheFirstworldWarwosnotinevitobleA.lthoughit is essentitoolunderstandtheundertyinfgactors thatformedthebackgrountdo theJulyCrisisit,isequallyessentitaol seehow theimmediate circumstanceosfthecrisisfit intothisbackgrounidn aparticulara,ndperhapsuniquew, oy.Europe wasnotapowderkegwoitingtoexplodeo;necrisidsid notleadnecessartiolyanotheirn an escolatinsgerieosfconfrontationtshatmodewormoreandmoredifficultoavoidE. uropenao successfuwllyeathereadnumberof stormisn therecentpastt;healliancews erenotrigidtyfixed; thewarplanswereolwaysbeingreviseadndneednotnecessoriclyomeintoplay.tt isdifficulto imagineo crisiisn theFarEasti,n NorthAfricaorin theMediterraneatnhatwouldhoveunleashed theserieosfeventsthatarosefromtheassossinatiionnsarojevaT.heFirswt orldwarwasi,n thefinalanalysisfo, ughtforthefutureoftheneareastw; hoevewr on thisstrugglewoutdi,t was believedb,ein apositiontodominateollofEuropeG. ermanaynd herallymodethebidfor control; Russiaondheralliesresolvetdo stopthem. FromGordonMartelT, heOriginsofthe FirsWt orldWar,19g7 DocumentB [ForGermany.].warseemedtooffer... a solutiontobothdomestiacndforeignantogonyms. Andif thatwarcouldbemodeappealingtoall sectionosfthepopulation- asa waragoinsTt sarist nRoudsosuimabotthstacteGrtearimnlaywnloeuolddbeerws,eevreepntroeapradreendfotsrowcaiarilnisl-t9stlh4eannsdoemxupclohittheedthbeectrtiesri.soTfhJeucrnaeen)bueu |9l4 tobing it about.. .JusatstheGermanssoughto increasteheirpowers, oBritainandFrance psoouwgehrstfooucognhtttaointirty,btoyrmesilittoorretyhmeebaanlasinf nceeocfpeosswaerlrnyto.tEhiusrsoepnes.iet couldbearguedthatboth Countriews entto warbecousteheybelievetdhattheycouldachievemorethroughwarthanby diplomoticnegotiationandthatif theystoodasidetheirstatuassgreatpowerswouldbegravety affected... FromRuthHenig,TheOriginsofthe FirsWt ortdWar,1993 DocumentC It usedtobeheldthatthesystemofalliancews osinitselfsufficienetxplanatiafnor theoutbreaokf woLmattheveryexistencoef twocampsmadewarinevitablesooneorrlaterB. utthisapprooch phraims,faorrytpwuorrpeoasseoofnthsoe,naollviaenr-cseimws apsaledpepfreencsiaivt.ei.o.Sonfetchoeninddt,hivewidauyatalhllaiatwnacrealsnc.ttuhaelfliybrsrpot lkaecoeu,ttbhoere littlerelationto treatyobligations... Therewereh, owevetrw, owaysin whichtheolliancedsidaffectinternationarel lationasnd contributetothegrowthoftensionin Europien thedecadebeforeIgl4. First,heyprovidedthe linksacrosswhichcrisecsouldspreadfromperipheraal realsikeNorthAfricaandthetsatkantso Mthoermoaccioarpncoriwseeosrsfth1e9m06soenldvteN9s1o.1rwmearlelayt,lhloedwaendtgoefirzswzeleoreuste.Beuantna,dstthheecsoenqnueecntcoioef necsvuet;nhteasnt'cteetrhe Saraievsohowedonlytooclearlyt,hemeonsexistedwherebaylocalconflicct ouldbetransformed tntoa continentawl or.secondt,healliancehsada directbearingonthearmsraceand the developmenotf military schedlues. FromStephen). Lee,AspecotsfEuropeaHnistory| 789_9t 80l,gg} Question R e a dD o c u m e n tAs,Ba n dC .B r i e f lsyu m m a r i zt hee p o i n t sm a d ei n e a c hs o u r c ec.o m p a r ea n d contrasttheseargumentwsiththoseofthehistoriandsiscusseodn pp.32-34.

4 Causesp, racticesa,nd effectsof wars

Acfivttyt

Whatcausedthe FirstWorld War?

SydneyBradshawFay

TheOriginsof the WorldWon 1929

Faywaswritingin responsteo thefindingof theParisPeaceConferenctheatCermanwv as solelyresponsibfloertheoutbreaokf thewar.Faymaintainetdhatit wasa comDlex assortmenotf causesn,otablyimperialismm,ilitarismandalliancetsh,atpushedEuropeinto w a r . . No n ec o u n t rpy l o t t e d . aang g r e s s iwv ea ra n dm a n yi,n c l u d i ntgh eU Ka n dc e r m a n y , madegenuinet,houghunskillede,ffortsat mediatintgheJulyCrisiil.n somewaysr,ayand thosewhoagreedwhhhimarepartof thelargemr ovementto reintroducCeermanivo the communitoyf nationsin thesamewaythatthespiritof Locarnwo as(seepp.62-3).

FriEFischer

In thewakeof the SecondWorldWar,CermanhistorianFriaFischerre-evaluatehdis

Craspfor WorldPower, r951

scoouungthrayt 'nsroalgeginrecsasuisvwienagtrhoef eFxirpsaWt nosrilodiWn 1a9r.I1n4c.coenrtmraastntoywFaasysF, uisrcrohuefnroduenbddythhaoisCtielerman' y,l

countrieasndhereconomyc,ultureandinfluencien deciineA; successfwularof expansion

w14o'ulhl-edsoJulvly.teChreissieswpraosbdleelmibaesnradtwelmaysathneargeefdtoorpethloistetendda.nFdisecnhceomruaiaingteaidnintehtdehtaetathressl9el2-

, l

attitudesanddesireswerenotheldsolelybya maleficenatnddeludedleadershipA.fter

examininagbroadcrosssectionof Cerman'socieinty1914,Fischecroncludetdhatthese

attitudeasndaimshadbroadsupporftrombusinesisnterestas,cademicasndallpolitical

partie_insCgrmaryl.t is notdifficulto post-SeconWd orldWarCermany.

undentandwhythiswasa

contentioupsositionin

E r i cH o b s b a w m

TheAgeof Empires, r987

Writingin theMarxishtistoricatrladitionE,ricHobsbawmdoesnotfindthecauseosf thewar Inanyonecountryor personb, utratherin thesystemof industriaclapitalismthat dominatetdheeconomieosf WesternEuropeH. obsbawmarguetshaiindustriaclapitalism,s cinesnattuiaryWb.lhehuilnetgheisfronrereedswoausrc".eatsenmdmpoarraksrelialtyfskueedbllyetdthhee"NscerwaImmbplfeeorriaAlfirsimcoaf t'ih,t seotognihbrought E u r o p e acno u n t r i eisn t oc o n f l i c tF. u r t h ewr ,i t h i ni n d u s t r i aplo w e r st,h i sc o m p e t i t i orne q u i r J d a closep.artnershbipetweenthegovernmenatndarmsproducerfso,rwhompeacetrme profitshadto be maintaineTdh. eseprofitswererequiredsothattheindustrwy ouldbe aarloonuenb,dfuotrathlseonineixntwduasr,atrwiacalarpinawcihtByic.yhasrtrgeunin$gahwsoyusltdebmeicmcaeuasseoufrtehndeowtianrm,Hiolibtasrbsyatrwemn" gth tahnedcoothuenrtMrieasorx,riwshthisicthocroiaunnbstrriniegwsaedreeginrveoeolvf iendteh,veiiyabbeiliiiteoyvtethheewsayrs.Rteerng"awrdolueholsdafsvwehcaoulesded a wareventually.

NiallFerguson ThePig of Wor:

NiallFergusolnik, eFischebr,lamesonecountryin particulaFr.orFergusorna,thetrhan Germany,.responsirbeilsityswiththeactionsa,ndin somecasesinJctiono,f theUK

i

ExploiningWorldWar t, r999

sSlFeeeaacrndgrgeeub-drstsli.ope.bnhl,osoeapmefldilueaavlcnienyhnstgtaehhdadteostiFordinalivftyewfeedramrveseawnnncrieyonednRasi&s.aEptthuuharteeotahlspane,entmia-dcmnatohiinnalitfttalaGircieintstfrshwmrmoaaamtsB1nr9ryiasi0ntiinJ5sagthpihnnoedEliUituniKcrfoa'awapclneetbwrdyemoro1uilr9li"dt1ha4iirhv,yuen',ri.

violatedBelgianneutralittyhemselvehsadGermanynotdoneit first Furtherh,e maintaini

thatthe.UKmisinterpretecedrmanintentiongseeingthemasNapoleonricathetrhanas : essentialldyefensive',Thelseeadersmisledthe Britishparliamenint toa declaratioonf war. l

JohnStoessinger JohnStoessingfeinrdsliability.fothrewarlargeliyn thepersonafal ilingosf thosetryingto

WhyNotionsGo To Wor,1974

managetheJulyCrisisH. ebelievetshateachof theleaderasctedouiof anover-inflaied senseof boththeirowncountry'wseaknesasndtheirenemy'strengthF.urthetrh, e supremeleaderisn Austria-HungaarnydCermanfyailedto exercise'sufficiceonnttrool ver tEhueriorspuebaownradrr.nOantcewesth,hoea"cirtoivnedliyc.ec"wonesrepcitraoespdtrn,oovnoekoeaf tthleealesaat dreegrhiioandatwhl eanrief nrvoettaog6erdneerraal haltto themobilizatioenv, enthoughthiswasa completelvyiableoptionH. addifferent personalitibeesenin positionosf authoritiyn July1914t,freremayneverhavebeena war.

I Whichhistoriahnasthe mostconvincintghesisW? hy?

2 Addyourownrowto theabovechartw. hatdo youberievceausedthewar? Howmightit havebeenavoided?

Howmight heerain whicheachof theabovehistorianwsaswritinghaveaffectetdheirviews? Whyis it imPortanfot r studentosf historyto understanthdecontexiinwhichhistorianwsrite?

215

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