Global frameworks for environmental justice:



Attachment To:

COMMUNITY QUESTIONS, GLOBAL ANSWERS, AND THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY.

LECTURE NOTES –

GLOBAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:

SEARCHING FOR GLOBAL RESPONSES TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS

BY AMOS NASCIMENTO, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

INTRODUCTION

THIS PAPER INTRODUCES CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AS GLOBAL QUESTIONS THAT REQUIRE GLOBAL ANSWERS. FIRST, IT PRESENTS TWO GLOBAL FRAMEWORKS THAT ARE ALREADY ATTEMPTING TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON A GLOBAL SCALE: THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM (UNEP) AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC). THE SECOND PART INTRODUCES CONTEMPORARY ISSUES ON ETHICS, CRITICIZES INDIVIDUALIST APPROACHES TO ETHICAL DILEMMAS, AND SHOWS THE LIMITS OF THREE PRINCIPLES THAT HAVE BEEN ADVOCATED AS POSSIBLE NORMATIVE CRITERIA FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: RESPONSIBILITY, PRECAUTION, AND SUSTAINABILITY. AFTER REVIEWING SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF THESE CONCEPTS, ESPECIALLY THE AMBIGUITIES IN THE IDEA OF SUSTAINABILITY, THE THIRD PART PROPOSES A CONCEPT OF GLOBAL COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY BASED ON THE DISCOURSE ETHICS OF KARL-OTTO APEL AND ON PETER FRENCH’S DEFINITION OF COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING. THIS LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE NEED TO GO BEYOND MERE SUSTAINABILITY AND DEFEND COLLECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A BETTER CONCEPT TO INVOLVE PEOPLE IN GLOBAL ACTIONS CONCERNING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND PROMOTE THE IDEA OF A GLOBAL AND RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP.

KEYWORDS: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS; PRECAUTION; SUSTAINABILITY; RESPONSIBILITY; GLOBAL; JUSTICE; CITIZENSHIP; COMMUNICATION; CO-RESPONSIBILITY.

THE LECTURE

1. GLOBAL QUESTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

THE RECOGNITION THAT WE FACE AN ECOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS AND THE AWARENESS OF ITS GLOBAL SCALE LED TO THE EMERGENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AS A NEW FIELD THAT NOW RECEIVES GROWING ATTENTION. RECENT DEBATES IN THIS FIELD CLEARLY REFER TO A “GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT” AND CORRESPONDING GLOBAL PROBLEMS THAT REQUIRE A GLOBAL ETHICS TO ORIENT GLOBAL RESPONSES.[1]

HOW CAN WE ADDRESS THESE ISSUES, MOTIVATE BALANCED ACTIONS, PROMOTE CONCRETE SOLUTIONS, AND RESPOND TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS? THE FIRST OBSTACLE IS THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF ETHICS AS CONCERNED MAINLY WITH INDIVIDUAL ANSWERS TO MORAL DILEMMAS. AS ROBIN ATTFIELD STATES, WE NOW “NEED TO SUSTAIN PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT ACTION AND OF VALUE” ADEQUATE TO THE SCOPE OF PROBLEMS WE FACE.[2] THUS, GLOBAL PROBLEMS REQUIRE GLOBAL APPROACHES. IT IS IN ANSWER TO THIS CHALLENGE THAT MANY INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN PROPOSED SUCH AS HANS KÜNG’S GLOBAL ETHICS PROGRAM, VANDANA SHIVA’S ECOFEMINISM, AND ENRIQUE DUSSEL’S PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS GLOBAL POVERTY.[3] IN WHAT FOLLOWS, I WILL SIMPLY REFER TO THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM (UNEP) AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) AS TWO INSTANCES THAT ATTEMPT TO OFFER A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS.

THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM (UNEP) WAS CREATED IN 1972 AS A RESULT OF THE UN CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT HELD IN NAIROBI, KENYA. AS ESTABLISHED BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2997 (XXVII) OF 15 DECEMBER 1975, THE MANDATE OF UNEP “IS TO COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CONSENSUS BY KEEPING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT UNDER REVIEW AND BRINGING EMERGING ISSUES TO THE ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR ACTION.”[4] ONE OF THE RESULTS OF THE WORK BY UNEP WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) IN 1988. AS AN INDEPENDENT BODY OF SCIENTISTS FROM AROUND THE WORLD WHO PROVIDE REPORTS AND ASSESSMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AT REGULAR INTERVALS, THE IPCC HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN PROMOTING THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC) IN 1992, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL IN 1997, AND THE COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE IN 2009. MOREOVER, THE IPCC HAS BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN ARTICULATING AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK THAT INVOLVES WORKING GROUPS DEALING WITH THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES; STUDIES ON IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY OF NATURAL SYSTEMS; AND PROPOSALS FOR THE MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE.

THE IPCC REPORT IN 2007 IS ONE OF THE BEST EXAMPLES OF A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK THAT CAN HELP US TO UNDERSTAND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, GATHER THE BEST AVAILABLE SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION ON ITS IMPACT, AND ARTICULATE PROPOSALS FOR A GLOBAL PLAN WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS. AT THE LEVEL OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES, THE IPCC MODEL (AR4) CENTERS ITS ATTENTION ON CHANGES THAT AFFECT THE ENERGY BALANCE OF THE EARTH AND MEASURES THE AVERAGE INPUT AND OUTPUT OF ENERGY OVER THE GLOBE AND OVER A LONG TIME PERIOD.[5] AT THE LEVEL OF IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, THE IPCC REPORT CONFIRMS THAT “THE LARGEST GROWTH IN GHG EMISSIONS BETWEEN 1970 AND 2004 HAS COME FROM ENERGY SUPPLY, TRANSPORT, AND INDUSTRY.”[6] MOREOVER, THE REPORT ALSO INDICATES THAT “CONSERVATION” ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH: A 60 TO 80% REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS WILL BE NECESSARY WITHIN THE NEXT CENTURY, WHICH “WOULD COME FROM ENERGY SUPPLY AND USE IN INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES.”[7] FINALLY, AT THE LEVEL OF HUMAN INTERACTIONS WITH THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS THE AR4 MODEL INCLUDES ANTHROPOGENIC IMPACTS AND HEALTH EFFECTS.[8] THESE DIMENSIONS ARE BROUGHT TOGETHER IN AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK THAT INDIRECTLY RAISES A MORAL QUESTION CONCERNING THE “MITIGATION,” “ADAPTATION,” AND REDUCTION OF CO2 EMISSIONS (BY REDUCING ENERGY CONSUMPTION), BUT DOES NOT DIRECTLY CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR GLOBAL ETHICS, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP. IN THE END, HOWEVER, ANY HUMAN RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS WILL DEPEND ON HOW WE CONCEIVE OF ETHICS, JUSTICE, AND CITIZENSHIP.

THE IPCC FRAMEWORK SHOWS THE “VERY LIKELY” ANTHROPOGENIC CAUSES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, BUT IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE ETHICAL QUESTIONS ON WHY AND HOW HUMANS SHOULD RESPOND TO THIS CRISIS. [9] TO RESPOND TO THIS GLOBAL PROBLEM WE NEED TO CONSIDER ISSUES SUCH AS THE HUMAN INABILITY TO GRASP THE EXTENT AND IMPACT OF OUR INTERACTIONS OTHER HUMANS, WITH DIFFERENT FORMS OF LIFE, AND WITH NATURAL SYSTEMS. HOWEVER, ADDING ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS TO THIS GLOBAL FRAMEWORK IS NOT TRIVIAL. ON THE ONE HAND, IT IS DIFFICULT TO DEFEND GLOBAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ACTION WITHOUT FALLING INTO AUTHORITARIAN RULES, UNIVERSALISM, RIGORISM, ETHNOCENTRISM, INSENSITIVITY TO DIFFERENCES AND ABSTRACTIONS. PHILOSOPHERS SUCH AS ALASDAIR MCINTYRE AND BERNARD WILLIAMS HAVE FORCEFULLY PRESENTED CRITIQUES OF ABSTRACT AND UNIVERSAL APPROACHES AND QUESTIONED THE VALIDITY OF GENERAL PRECEPTS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND LIMITED COLLECTIVE SITUATIONS.[10] ALONG THESE LINES, MANY ADVOCATE A NEW SET OF VIRTUES AS THE BEST WAY TO PROMOTE JUST ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIONS BY CONCERNED CITIZENS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS POSSIBLE TO ARGUE THAT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS CANNOT BE REDUCED TO “PARTICULARIST” CONTINGENCIES OR DILEMMAS OF INDIVIDUAL LIFE OR GIVEN COMMUNITIES.[11] WHAT WOULD THEN BE THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF A “GLOBAL” ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS THAT AVOIDS THESE TWO EXTREMES? RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS INDICATE THREE PRINCIPLES AS CENTRAL TO A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: RESPONSIBILITY, PRECAUTION, AND SUSTAINABILITY. IN WHAT FOLLOWS, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS OF THESE THREE PRINCIPLES. I WILL REVIEW THEM AND EVALUATE THEIR REACH BY CONSIDERING HOW THEY HELP US TO COPE WITH THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES WE FACE TODAY.

2. THREE PRINCIPLES FOR A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

RECENT DEBATES ON ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS REVEAL MANY PROPOSALS FOR PRINCIPLES, CRITERIA, AND APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION. I WILL FOCUS ON THREE PRINCIPLES THAT ARE CONSIDERED THE MOST RELEVANT FOR OUR PURPOSES.

A) PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY

ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT NECESSARILY A NEW TOPIC. HANS JONAS WAS ONE OF THE FIRST TO PROPOSE THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY AS A WAY TO COPE WITH THE ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS GENERATED BY TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETIES. IN DAS PRINZIP VERANTWORTUNG [THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY], ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN GERMAN IN 1979, HE REVIVES THE EARLIER ONTOLOGICAL ETHICS OF VIRTUE FROM ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY, CRITICIZES HUMAN INTERACTIONS WITH NATURE FOR BEING BASED SOLELY ON TECHNÉ, OBSERVES THAT ETHICAL PRINCIPLES HAVE NOT KEPT UP WITH TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES AND, PROPOSES A NEW IMPERATIVE: “ACT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF YOUR ACTION ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE PERMANENCE OF GENUINE HUMAN LIFE ON EARTH.”[12] THIS PRINCIPLE IS NECESSARY, HE ADDS, BECAUSE TECHNOLOGY, PROGRESS, AND UTOPIA HAVE DESTROYED NATURE, MANIPULATED HISTORY, AND SUBMITTED HUMANS TO SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS. THIS CREATED AN “ETHICAL VACUUM” THAT NOW MAKES NECESSARY A NEW THEORY ORIENTED TOWARDS FUTURE LIFE AND BASED ON A PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY.[13]

JONAS STARTS BY DEFINING RESPONSIBILITY AS ASCRIBED TO PAST ACTIONS THAT REQUIRE AN INDIVIDUAL ABILITY OR POWER [MACHT].[14] AS HE GOES OVER THE JURIDICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS CONCEPTION, HE DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN FORMAL SUBSTANTIVE, NATURAL, CONTRACTUAL, POLITICAL, AND PARENTAL FORMS OF RESPONSIBILITY. HE ALSO PROVIDES EXAMPLES OF IRRESPONSIBLE ACTS.[15] OUT OF THESE DIFFERENTIATIONS HE CONCLUDES THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF POLITICIANS AND PARENTS REPRESENT TWO PARADIGMATIC CASES THAT CAN SERVE AS BASIS FOR A NEW ETHICS, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE THEY ASSUME TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOMEONE’S LIFE IN TERMS OF FUTURE OBLIGATIONS.[16] IN A SOMEWHAT DARWINIAN SENSE, JONAS ARGUES THAT THIS RESPONSIBILITY IS MOTIVATED BY THE DRIVE FOR SURVIVAL, INSOFAR AS “THE BIRTH OF EACH NEW CHILD GIVES HUMANITY THE PERSPECTIVE TO BEGIN ANEW IN FACE OF MORTALITY.”[17] BECAUSE THE SURVIVAL OF THE HUMAN SPECIES IS IMPEDED BY EGOISM, DESTRUCTION OF NATURE, AND CATASTROPHES THAT LEAD TO GLOBAL CRISES, JONAS CONCLUDES THAT WHAT WE NEED IS AN ONTOLOGICAL AFFIRMATION OF LIFE, EXISTENCE, AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.[18] AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, HE IS FORCED TO TAKE A DETOUR TO CONSIDER THE COMPLEXITIES OF TELEOLOGY IN BOTH HUMAN HISTORY AND NATURAL ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT. HE ALSO REVIEWS A SERIES OF POSITIONS IN ETHICS - FROM KANT THROUGH HEGEL TO MARX -,[19] CRITICIZES THEIR UTOPIAN IDEAS,[20] AND PROPOSES A NEW PRINCIPLE: “OPPOSED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF HOPE WE PROPOSE THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY, NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF FEAR.”[21]

THIS CONCLUSION IS JUSTIFIED BY JONAS’ PREVIOUS TWO CONCLUSIONS, NOW TAKEN AS PREMISES: RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES NOT ONLY A POWER OR CAPABILITY TO GUIDE ONE’S OWN ACTIONS BUT ALSO THE RECOGNITION OF AN OBLIGATION - WHICH IS BEST SEEN IN THE PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLES OF THOSE PARENTS WHO TAKE CARE OF THEIR CHILDREN AND THE POLITICIANS THAT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR CITIZENS. THUS, THE CARE FOR THE “LIFE OF OTHERS” IS THE ETHICAL BASIS UPON WHICH HE PLACES RESPONSIBILITY. HOWEVER, TO ARRIVE TO THIS CONCLUSION HE ASSUMES ONTOLOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND CONSERVATIVE CLAIMS THAT MAY CONTRADICT OTHER IMPORTANT ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, SUCH AS FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS. JONAS SIMPLY PROPOSES THE MAINTENANCE OF LIFE, WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS MAY ALSO REQUIRE US TO LIMIT OR EXPAND THE CONDITIONS OF HUMAN LIFE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS, AND THE FLOURISHING OF DIFFERENT VALUES. MOREOVER, HE GIVES THE EXAMPLES OF VIRTUOUS PARENTS AND POLITICIANS WITHOUT REALIZING THAT IN A GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY DECISION-MAKING IS SO COMPLEX THAT INDIVIDUALS CANNOT ALWAYS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR ACTIONS ALONE – THUS, PARENTS SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR CHILDREN WITH SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS AND INSTITUTIONS. FINALLY, IN HIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO SOCIETY, JONAS FAILS TO ADDRESS THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL. THESE ISSUES PROMPT US TO PROCEED AND CONSIDER OTHER CANDIDATES IN OUR SEARCH FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLE APPLICABLE TO GLOBAL ETHICS.

B) PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

THE HISTORY OF THE “PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE” - IN ITS ECOLOGICAL OR ENVIRONMENTAL SENSE - CAN BE TRACED BACK TO ANCIENT METAPHYSICAL VIEWS, ESPECIALLY THE ETHICAL VIRTUE OF “PRUDENCE” - THE PRACTICAL WISDOM DEFINED IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY AS PHRONESIS.[22] THIS VIRTUE COULD BE UNDERSTOOD EITHER AS AN INSTINCT THAT TELLS US TO REFRAIN FROM WHAT CAN BE DANGEROUS OR AS PRINCIPLE OF JUDGMENT THAT GUIDES A PERSON IN HER CHOICES CONCERNING THE PURSUIT OF HER GOOD LIFE.[23] THUS, A PERSON OF VIRTUE WOULD CHECK THE SITUATION, CAUTIOUSLY DELIBERATE ON WHAT TO CHOOSE AND WHAT TO AVOID, AND EVEN OPT FOR SUFFERING OR HUMILIATION FOR THE SAKE OF A GREATER GOOD.

IN ITS MORE RECENT APPLICATIONS, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IS A FRUIT OF THE 19TH CENTURY.[24] THIS PRINCIPLE BECAME MORE RELEVANT IN THE 20TH CENTURY, AS RACHEL CARSON’S SILENT SPRING, THE STUDY FOR THE CLUB OF ROME PUBLISHED IN 1972 ON THE LIMITS TO GROWTH, AND A GROWING NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS INSISTED ON THE NEED OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES. HOWEVER, IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL TERNS, THIS PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN APPLIED MORE CONSISTENTLY IN EUROPE.[25] AVOIDANCE OF “HARM” BY INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS HAS BEEN A CENTRAL CATEGORY IN ETHICAL THEORIES, BUT IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE THIS IDEA WAS EXPANDED AS TO BE INTERPRETED MORE RADICALLY AS A “THREAT” OR “RISK” TO THE LIFE OF WHOLE COMMUNITIES – HUMAN OR BIOTIC. THIS STRATEGY SHIFTS THE FOCUS OF THE DISCUSSION, AS PRECAUTION IS NOW CONSIDERED ALMOST IN AN EPISTEMIC SENSE, AS IT CLAIMS THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES IS LIMITED, UNCERTAIN, OR UNWARRANTED, SO THAT IT MAY AFFECT THE LIFE OF COLLECTIVITIES.[26]

A RESULT OF THIS ASSUMPTION WAS THE REQUIREMENT – INCORPORATED IN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – THAT ANY NEW INITIATIVE NEEDS TO PROVIDE A PREVIOUS INDEPENDENT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT BEFORE BEING IMPLEMENTED.[27] THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH WAS ADOPTED IN STRONG VERSIONS IN SUPRANATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AS WELL. ONE EXAMPLE IS THE LONDON DECLARATION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NORTH SEA, IN 1987, WHICH AUTHORIZED PRECAUTIONARY ACTION REGARDING TOXIC SUBSTANCES “WHEN THERE IS REASON TO ASSUME THAT CERTAIN DAMAGE OR HARMFUL EFFECTS ON THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SEA ARE LIKELY TO BE CAUSED BY SUCH SUBSTANCES, EVEN IF THERE IS NO SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO PROVE A CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN EMISSIONS AND EFFECTS.”[28] WEAKER FORMULATIONS CAN BE SEEN IN UN RESOLUTIONS AND IN DOCUMENTS IN THE AMERICAS.[29] FINALLY, THERE IS THE JURIDICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, WHICH EMERGED OUT OF THE GERMAN VORSORGEPRINZIP AND WAS INCLUDED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. ACCORDING TO THIS PRINCIPLE, WHENEVER THE DEFINITION OF “SUSTAINABLE” IS CONTENTIOUS, POLICIES SHOULD BE CONSERVATIVE AND OPT FOR A PREVENTIVE ACTION, INSTEAD OF WAITING FOR SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. THE LOOSE COMBINATION OF THESE – ETHICAL, TELEOLOGICAL, EPISTEMIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL – ELEMENTS CHARACTERIZES CURRENT VERSIONS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE. IN THEIR DEFINITION OF WHAT CORRESPONDS TO THE “CORE” OF THIS PRINCIPLE CAROL RAFFENSBERGER AND JOEL TRICKNER AFFIRM:

IN ITS SIMPLEST FORMULATION, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE HAS A DUAL TRIGGER: IF THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR HARM IN ANY ACTIVITY AND IF THERE IS UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE IMPACTS OR CAUSALITY, THEN ANTICIPATORY ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO AVOID HARM.[30]

THIS DEFINITION CLEARLY INCLUDES ETHICAL, TELEOLOGICAL, AND EPISTEMIC ELEMENTS, BUT ITS STATUS IS STILL PROBLEMATIC. COMMENTING ON THIS DEFINITION, STEPHEN GARDINER PRESENTS A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE.[31] HE DIFFERENTIATES VERSIONS OF PRECAUTION AND DEFENDS A “CORE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE” THAT ADDRESSES SOME DIFFICULTIES RELATED TO EPISTEMIC CONDITIONS, REALISTIC OUTCOMES, AND TAMES THE “WORST CASE SCENARIOS” ACCORDING TO GIVEN SITUATIONS.[32] IN FACT, THE UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE IPCC RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTICIPATORY MEASURES, THE PROBLEMS REGARDING SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY, AND THE NEED TO MOTIVATE RIGHT ACTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ADOPTS THE SAME KIND OF LANGUAGE AND IS CAUTIONARY IN ITS VERY WORDING AND FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

HOWEVER, DESPITE ITS SOPHISTICATION, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE CAN STILL BE CRITICIZED IN MANY FRONTS. ONE ARGUMENT IS THAT IT SIMPLY SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND REQUIRES NEW EVIDENCE ABOUT THE LACK OF RISKS, ALTHOUGH IT CANNOT PROVIDE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS OWN CASE. ANOTHER CRITIQUE APPLIES THE SAME CRITERION USED BY THE DEFENDERS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AGAINST THEM: IF THE ARGUMENT IS CENTERED ON THE PREMISE THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO CERTAINTY, NO ONE IS ENTITLED TO DEMAND CERTAINTY ABOUT ANYTHING EITHER. SIMILARLY, CASS SUSSTEIN CRITICIZES THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE FOR BEING VAGUE AND INNOCUOUS, THUS RESULTING IN PARALYSIS: WHEN IN DOUBT, JUST DO NOTHING![33] FINALLY, ONE COULD ALSO ARGUE THAT THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IS SO DEPENDENT ON COUNTERFACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT IT CANNOT SERVE AS GUIDANCE FOR ACTIONS REGARDING CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS. FOR SUCH PROBLEMS, PRECAUTION IS SIMPLY TOO LATE. THIS PROBLEM MAY EXPLAIN THE SUCCESS OF ANOTHER PRINCIPLE THAT HAS GAINED MORE ATTENTION: THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY.

C) SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLE

EVEN MORE SUCCESSFULLY THAN THE IDEA OF PRECAUTION, THE CONCEPTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY HAVE BEEN USED BY ENVIRONMENTALISTS FOR SOME DECADES ALREADY AS A CRITERION FOR SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, LEGAL AND COMMUNITARIAN ACTIONS. THE KEY DEFINITION OF SUSTAINABILITY, REGISTERED IN THE BRUNDTLAND REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1987, ARGUED THAT DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH WERE COMPATIBLE WITH ECOLOGICAL DEMANDS, PROVIDED THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENT BE “SUSTAINABLE.” MOREOVER, THE DOCUMENT STATES THAT “SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT MEETS THE NEEDS OF THE PRESENT WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE ABILITY OF FUTURE GENERATIONS TO MEET THEIR OWN NEEDS.”[34] BECAUSE THIS DOCUMENT ADDS A COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENT ABOUT FUTURE SITUATIONS AND GENERATIONS, BUT NEGLECTS OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS, A LATER UNEP REPORT, CARING FOR THE EARTH, ADDS THAT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AIMS AT “IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE WHILE LIVING WITHIN THE CARRYING CAPACITY OF SUPPORTING ECOSYSTEMS.”[35] NEVERTHELESS, “SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT” STILL SEEMS TO BE A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS.[36]

THE ABOVE PROBLEMS LEAD TO AN EMPHASIS ON SUSTAINABILITY. THE STRONG PRINCIPLE BEHIND SUSTAINABILITY SEEMS TO BE THE IDEA OF HUMAN SURVIVAL AND MAINTENANCE OF CURRENT CONDITIONS. IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE ROOM, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR RESTORATION, REVISION, OR REPARATION. IT MEANS THAT HUMANS ARE ENTITLED, FOR INSTANCE, TO KILL OTHER SPECIES TO PROVIDE FOR FOOD OR EVEN TO GENERATE RICHES THAT AIM AT MAINTAINING OR WARRANTING THE SURVIVAL OF FUTURE GENERATIONS. THIS COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENT OPENS THE DOOR TO OTHER CLAIMS FOR JUSTICE AND SOLIDARITY FOR THOSE WHO CANNOT SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, SO THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ARGUING FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION, ANIMAL RIGHTS, ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, BIOTIC COMMUNITIES, AND NATURAL ENTITIES WOULD BE JUSTIFIABLE.[37] THIS LEADS TO NEW DIFFERENTIATED AND PRECISE CONCEPTS SUCH AS SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY, INTERGENERATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY.[38]

SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY INCLUDES THE CARE FOR HUMAN NEEDS - AND THUS THE ADDRESSING OF PROBLEMS SUCH AS HUNGER, POVERTY, VIOLENCE, AND QUALITY OF LIFE THAT HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AS WELL.[39] THE CONCEPT OF INTERGENERATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY INCLUDES THE DISCUSSION ABOUT POPULATION GROWTH AND FUTURE GENERATIONS, WHICH BRINGS THE RISK OF AFFIRMING PROBLEMATIC MALTHUSIAN PLANS OF POPULATION CONTROL, BUT AT THE SAME TIME INCLUDES THE REALIST PROVISO THAT THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH NATURAL RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT STANDARD OF LIFE INDEFINITELY. AS ALTERNATIVE, ROBERT GOODLAND PROPOSES THE IDEA OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY, WHICH MEANS THAT IT IS THE SUPPORT SYSTEMS THAT SUSTAIN GLOBAL LIFE THAT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED INDEFINITELY, AS THEY PROVIDE THE CONDITIONS FOR HUMANS AND OTHER SPECIES TO SURVIVE.[40] THIS DEFINITION OF SUSTAINABILITY GIVES PRIORITY TO BROADER CATEGORIES, SUCH AS ANIMALS’ NEEDS, ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS, AND DIFFERENT ECOLOGIES. THUS, THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABILITY GAINS A DIFFERENT MEANING, BEING USED TO STRESS THE SURVIVAL OF THE HUMAN BEING ALONG AND WITH DIFFERENT SPECIES. THEREBY THE CRITERION IS NOT MERELY AN ECONOMIC BALANCE ANYMORE, BUT RATHER THE MORAL COMMITMENT OF HUMANS TO MAINTAIN PLURAL FORMS OF LIFE AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT, BECAUSE THESE FORMS OF LIFE FORM AN ECOLOGICAL COMMUNITY.[41]

BEYOND MERE “SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,” THE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF SUSTAINABILITY ATTEMPT TO BE MORE INCLUSIVE, BUT SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED FOR BEING “WEAK” AND OVERTLY “ECONOMISTIC.” THUS, BRYAN NORTON FOLLOWS BRIAN BARRY AND PROPOSES STRONG SUSTAINABILITY AS AN INTEGRATIVE, PLURAL, PRAGMATIC, AND NORMATIVE CONCEPT THAT INCLUDES BOTH THE “VALUES” OF WELFARE AND FAIRNESS IN RELATION TO DIFFERENT GENERATIONS AS WELL AS THE “FACTS” REFERRING TO NATURAL “STUFF” AND ECOLOGIES. [42] AS HIS MAIN CRITERION, NORTON ARGUES THAT “A COMMUNITY WILL HAVE FALLEN INTO UNSUSTAINABILITY IF THE SUCCESSORS OF ITS MEMBERS, WHO CARRY ON IN THEIR PLACE, FACE A NARROWED AND POORER RANGE OF OPTIONS THAN THEY DO.”[43] THIS CONCEPT DESERVES A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, INSTEAD OF GETTING INTO FURTHER DETAILS, WE CAN CONCLUDE WITH A SIMPLE CRITICISM. THE CRITERION PROPOSED BY NORTON SEEMS VALID ONLY EX POST FACTUM, WHICH MAY BE TOO LATE. AS JENNIFER WELCHMAN ARGUES, UNLESS WE ADDRESS GLOBAL ISSUES OF POVERTY, JUSTICE, AND EQUITY TODAY, THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT WE WILL EVER BE ABLE TO PROMOTE SUSTAINABILITY IN THE FUTURE.[44] MOREOVER, MANY TIMES, INSTEAD OF MAINTAINING OR SUSTAINING, CERTAIN SITUATIONS REQUIRE A REDUCTION, RESTORATION, OR CORRECTIVE MEASURE FOR SPECIFIC COMMUNITIES WHILE ALLOWING THE DEVELOPMENT OF OTHERS. THEREFORE, SUSTAINABILITY CANNOT BE LIMITED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO, BUT NEEDS TO ADDRESS ISSUES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND EQUALITY AS WELL.

3. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

THE THREE PRINCIPLES WE HAVE REVIEWED ADVANCE IMPORTANT IDEAS THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED. THEY SEEM TO MOVE BEYOND AN INDIVIDUALISTIC OR ATOMIST FRAMEWORK - WHICH UNDERPINS ALTRUISM, HEROIC VIRTUE, AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM -, BUT STILL HAVE SHORTCOMINGS THAT REQUIRE FURTHER JUSTIFICATION. IN VIEW OF THESE LIMITATIONS, I PROPOSE THAT WE CONSIDER THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AS A WAY OF APPROACHING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS WHILE AVOIDING THE PROBLEMS OF OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES. TO DEFEND THIS IDEA, I WILL FOCUS ON PETER FRENCH’S DEFINITION OF “COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING” AND KARL-OTTO APEL’S PROPOSAL OF A DISCOURSE ETHICS AND A “PRINCIPLE OF CO-RESPONSIBILITY.”

A) PETER FRENCH ON COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

FRENCH’S POINT OF DEPARTURE IS THE ARGUMENT FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS, WHICH WAS EXPANDED IN THE BOOK COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY. [45] HIS VIEWS ARE ALSO CONNECTED TO THE TRADITIONAL DEBATE ON FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, AS SHOWN IN A BOOK HE EDITED IN 1991, THE SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBILITY.[46] IN SUBSEQUENT PUBLICATIONS, HE CONTINUED TO QUESTION THE ATOMISM THAT ORIENTS THE DEBATES ON RESPONSIBILITY AND PROPOSED A SHIFT TO COLLECTIVE ENTITIES AND COLLECTIVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.[47] ONE OF HIS MAIN GOALS IS TO ASCRIBE “INTENTIONALITY” TO COLLECTIVES, SUCH AS CORPORATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS, IN THE SAME WAY WE WOULD CONSIDER THE INTENTIONALITY AND ACTIONS OF AN INDIVIDUAL. MOREOVER, HE STATES THAT CORPORATIONS PROVIDE US WITH CONCRETE DOCUMENTAL EVIDENCE OF THEIR INTENTIONALITY.

THE ESSAY “THE CORPORATION AS A MORAL PERSON” PROVIDES A GOOD BUT OVERLOOKED CONNECTION TO OUR DISCUSSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS. IN THIS ARTICLE, FRENCH REVIEWED TOM WICKER’S BLAMING OF GULF OIL CORPORATION AS THE MAJOR COMPANY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OIL CRISIS IN THE 1970S. IN FRENCH’S ANALYSIS, CORPORATIONS ARE INTENTIONAL ENTITIES SIMILAR TO COMMUNITIES, WHICH ARE NOT REDUCIBLE TO THE INTENTIONAL ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL PERSONS.[48] AFTER CLASSIFYING TYPES OF RESPONSIBILITY, FRENCH FOLLOWS JOHN AUSTIN’S SPEECH ACTS THEORY AND ADDS THAT “RESPONSIBILITY RELATIONSHIPS ARE CREATED IN A MULTITUDE OF WAYS, E.G. THOUGH PROMISES, CONTRACTS, COMPACTS, HIRING” AND OTHER FORMS OF AGREEMENT.[49] THIS COMMUNICATIVE LINK PROVIDED BY AUSTIN SEEMS TO PROVIDE A GOOD JUSTIFICATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AS OUR “ABILITY TO ANSWER.” INDEED, FRENCH DEFINES THE CORPORATE INTERNAL DECISION STRUCTURE (CID STRUCTURE) OF CORPORATIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR COMMUNICATIVE ORGANIZATION, WHICH INCLUDES MEMOS OR REPORTS AND NOT ONLY ESTABLISHES ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, AUTHORITY, AND RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT ALSO SUBORDINATES INDIVIDUAL INPUTS TO DIALOGUE AND PEER REVIEW: YOU ALWAYS RESPOND TO SOMEONE! AFTER A SERIES OF CASE STUDIES – ON TRIBES, THE MEDICAL PROFESSION, THE MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORPORATION, AND THE MOUNT EREBUS ACCIDENT IN THE ANTARCTIC – FRENCH PROPOSES THE EXTENDED PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY (EPA) AND THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIVE ADJUSTMENT (PRA) AS A WAY OF ASCRIBING RESPONSIBILITY TO SPECIFIC INTENTIONAL ACTIONS.[50] IT IS IN LIGHT OF THIS EMPIRICAL COMMUNICATIVE STRUCTURE THAT CORPORATIONS ARE CAPABLE OF INTENTIONAL ACTION, THUS BEING RESPONSIBLE TO THE MORAL COMMUNITY.

FRENCH DEVELOPS HIS POSITION IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS, BUT WE CAN LIMIT OUR ANALYSIS TO THIS IMPORTANT ARTICLE. ALTHOUGH HE BRIEFLY MENTIONS THE “ABILITY TO RESPOND” AS RELATED TO THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY, HE ENDS UP EMPHASIZING THIS ABILITY AS POWER AND CONTROL, LEAVING OUT THE ETHICAL ASPECT OF COMMUNICATION. HE RIGHTLY INSISTS ON THE NEED TO OVERCOME THE EMPHASIS ON METHODICAL INDIVIDUALISM, BUT DOES NOT SPELL OUT A STRONG PRINCIPLE THAT COULD FULFILL THIS TASK AND PROVIDE A MORE ROBUST DEFINITION OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY. THIS IS WHERE KARL-OTTO APEL’S DISCOURSE ETHICS CAN BE HELPFUL.

B) KARL-OTTO APEL’S ETHICS OF CO-RESPONSIBILITY

KARL-OTTO APEL’S PHILOSOPHY COMBINES CLASSIC GERMAN PHILOSOPHY WITH THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. BRINGING TOGETHER THESE TWO PERSPECTIVES, HE DEFINES TRANSCENDENTAL HERMENEUTICS, TRANSCENDENTAL PRAGMATICS, AND TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTICS AS THREE BRANCHES OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRAM.[51] BASED ON THIS TRIPLE AXIS, HE CRITICIZES SOLIPSISM AND DEFINES THE INTERSUBJECTIVE INTERACTION OF REAL HUMAN BEINGS PROJECTED TOWARDS THE FUTURE IN AN “IDEAL UNLIMITED COMMUNITY OF COMMUNICATION” AS AN A PRIORI CONDITION FOR SCIENCE AND ETHICS.[52] THE CRITIQUE OF SOLIPSISM IS SIMILAR TO FRENCH’S, BUT THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT APEL EXPLORES THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF COMMUNITY. BASED ON THESE PREMISES HE DEVELOPS HIS “DISCOURSE ETHICS,” INCLUDES ENVIRONMENTAL QUESTIONS, AND PROPOSES A PRINCIPLE OF CO-RESPONSIBILITY.[53]

ONE OF THE FIRST STEPS TAKEN BY APEL IS A CRITIQUE OF HANS JONAS AND HIS VIEWS ON RESPONSIBILITY.[54] BEYOND THE TRADITION CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY, APEL WANTS TO ESTABLISH A PRINCIPLE THROUGH WHICH INDIVIDUALS OVERCOME SOLIPSISM, RECOGNIZE OTHERS AS EQUALS, AND ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS THAT ENABLE THEM TO CRITICIZE SOCIETY FOR NOT HAVING ACCOMPLISHED THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF ETHICAL AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. THEREFORE, HE ACCEPTS JÜRGEN HABERMAS’ FORMULATION OF COMMUNICATIVE REASON AND DISCOURSE ETHICS, ESPECIALLY THE UNIVERSALIZATION PRINCIPLE (U), WHICH DEMANDS THE CONSIDERATION OF ALL AFFECTED PERSONS AS PART OF AN ONGOING DISCUSSION.[55] AT THE SAME TIME, APEL SAYS THAT (U) SERVES ONLY AS A PRINCIPLE TO TEST OUR CLAIMS - I.E., TO CHECK IF WE DID NOT FORGET ANYBODY OUT OF THE DISCUSSION -, BUT DOES NOT NECESSARILY WORKS AS A PRINCIPLE TO MOTIVATE ACTION. IS THIS A MATTER OF INTENTIONALITY? APEL DOES NOT THINK SO. FOR HIM, WE NEED A PRINCIPLE FOR ACTION [HANDLUNGSPRINZIP (UH)], WHICH ENABLES US TO CONSIDER THE RATIONAL PROBABILITY OF ACTUALLY APPLYING ANY OTHER PRINCIPLES WITH SUCCESS.[56] IN MANY SITUATIONS, HE ADDS, IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE – ESPECIALLY WHEN OTHERS DEPEND ON OUR ACTION – TO ACT ACCORDING TO THE MAXIMS OF UNIVERSALIZATION IN A CONTEXT THAT IS VERY ADVERSE TO IT, AS E.G. WHERE HUMAN INTERACTION IS ORIENTED BY MEANS OF STRATEGIC ACTIONS. ONE NEEDS TO THINK ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF ONE’S ACTIONS. THUS, APEL REMINDS US OF THE TENSION BETWEEN AN ETHICS OF CONVICTION [GESINNUNGSETHIK] AND THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY [VERANTWORTUNGSETHIK][57] AND POSTULATES A THIRD POSSIBILITY: A SUPPLEMENTARY PRINCIPLE [ERGÄNZUNGSPRINZIP E] THAT REQUIRES COMMUNICATION AMONG THE MEMBERS OF A COMMUNITY, WHO RECOGNIZE EACH OTHER AS CO-SUBJECTS ENGAGED IN COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES IN ORDER TO DECIDE THE RIGHT COURSE OF ACTION.[58]

WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS THEORY OF RECIPROCAL CO-RESPONSIBILITY, APEL EXPLORES THE TASKS OF A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS.[59] THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ONGOING DEBATE IN A COMMUNITY OF COMMUNICATION ABOUT THE SOCIAL, SCIENTIFIC, OR POLITICAL SITUATION IS NOT ANYMORE A MATTER OF CONVENIENT PRIVATE CHOICE OR INDIVIDUALISM, BUT OF COLLECTIVE CO-RESPONSIBILITY [MIT-VERANTWORTUNG] OF GLOBAL CITIZENS. CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS ARE OF SUCH MAGNITUDE THAT NO PERSON CAN OR SHOULD ADDRESS THEM INDIVIDUALLY, AS WE CAN NEITHER ABSTRACT FROM OTHER PERSONS NOR DENY THAT IT IS UNAVOIDABLE TO RECOGNIZE OUR INTERDEPENDENCE. THUS, APEL’S DEFINITION OF COLLECTIVE CO-RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTS FOR THE INTUITIVE DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITY AS “ABILITY TO RESPOND” BECAUSE HE DEFINES THIS CONCEPT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A THEORY OF COMMUNICATION. THIS CAN BE CONNECTED TO THE DISCUSSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUESTIONS, AS DISCOURSE ETHICS PROVIDES US WITH A FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR A GLOBAL ETHICS THAT REQUIRES OUR COLLECTIVE RESPONSE TO GLOBAL QUESTIONS.

4. CONCLUSION

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS REQUIRE GLOBAL AND COMPREHENSIVE ANSWERS. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT CLAIM TO HAVE ESTABLISHED DEFINITE ANSWERS, I DO HOPE TO HAVE PROVIDED A GENERAL FRAMEWORK THAT HELPS US TO ARTICULATE A SERIES OF POSITIONS THAT SEEM TO BE AT ODDS WITH EACH OTHER OR ONLY LOOSELY RELATED. I HOPE TO HAVE SHOWN THE PROMISES AND PROBLEMS OF THREE RELEVANT PRINCIPLES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: RESPONSIBILITY, PRECAUTION, AND SUSTAINABILITY. HOWEVER, THESE PRINCIPLES ARE STILL OPEN TO A SERIES OF OBJECTIONS AND PROBLEMS. AFTER REVIEWING THESE POSITIONS, I TURNED TO DISCUSSIONS ON COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND PRESENTED TWO AUTHORS - PETER FRENCH AND KARL-OTTO APEL - WHO TURNED TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE, CRITICIZE METHODICAL INDIVIDUALISM, ADVOCATE COMPLEX PRINCIPLES OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND RELATE THESE PRINCIPLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS.

THE PRINCIPLES OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY ADVOCATED BY FRENCH AND APEL ARE COMPLEX, AND COULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN MUCH DETAIL. HOWEVER, WE WERE ABLE TO SEE HOW FRENCH DERIVED THE EXTENDED PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY (EPA) AND THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIVE ADJUSTMENT (PRA) OUT OF HIS CONSIDERATIONS, WHILE APEL DERIVED THE UNIVERSALIZATION PRINCIPLE (U), A PRINCIPLE TO MOTIVATE ACTION (UH), AND A SUPPLEMENTARY PRINCIPLE (E) THAT ALLOWS AND REQUIRES THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIES FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION. EVEN WITHIN THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THIS PAPER, IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THERE ARE MANY PARALLELS IN THEIR POSITIONS. IN REGARDS TO THE ORIGINAL INTUITION THAT RESPONSIBILITY IS THE “ABILITY TO ANSWER,” FRENCH INITIALLY ADOPTS AUSTIN’S SPEECH-ACTS THEORY, BUT HE PROGRESSIVELY LEAVES THIS PERSPECTIVE UNATTENDED. APEL, ON THE OTHER HAND, USES THE SPEECH ACTS THEORY TO INSIST ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF TALKING ABOUT ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT FIRST ACKNOWLEDGING THE FOUNDATIONAL ROLE OF EVERYDAY LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION IN HUMAN ENDEAVORS. THUS, HE PROVIDES US WITH STRONGER REASONS TO AFFIRM THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AS A PROCESS OF RESPONDING TO OTHERS IN A CONTEXT OF OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION. HOWEVER, WHILE HE DOES INCLUDE THE INTERACTION AND COMMUNICATION AMONG HUMANS IN A GLOBAL SCALE, HE FAILS TO ADDRESS ISSUES RELATED TO THE INTERACTION BETWEEN HUMANS AND OTHER SPECIES OR ECOSYSTEMS. THEREFORE, THIS DIMENSION STILL NEEDS TO BE WORKED OUT.

FRENCH AND APEL PROVIDE US WITH MATERIALS TO WORK ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE BASED ON A PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY. THE STRUCTURES AND EXAMPLES THEY PROVIDE ESTABLISH CONNECTIONS WITH A SERIES OF CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL ISSUES AND ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL CHALLENGES RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT. THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK FOR A FUTURE PROJECT WOULD BE TO SEE IF THE ETHICAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON THEIR VIEWS COULD PROVIDE ETHICAL ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS THAT ARISE AS A RESULT OF THE WORK DEVELOPED BY UNEP AND THE IPCC.

WE NEED TO SEE OURSELVES AS CITIZENS THAT PARTICIPATE IN A LARGER COMMUNITY, IN WHICH MEMBERS NOT ONLY PERCEIVE, RECOGNIZE, AND INTERACT WITH EACH ORDER, BUT ALSO LOOK FOR COLLECTIVE ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER HUMANS, THE ENVIRONMENT, DIFFERENT SPECIES, AND ECOSYSTEMS. I BELIEVED THAT GLOBAL ETHICAL ANSWERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES CAN BE DEVELOPED IN DIALOGUE AND WITH THE INVOLVEMENT OF MANY CONSTITUENCIES, THUS OPENING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR COLLABORATION IN THE PURSUIT OF A GLOBAL PRINCIPLE AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK. THIS FRAMEWORK COULD GUIDE US IN TWO POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS: (1) TO HELP US TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE INTERPELLATION OF ALL THOSE PEOPLES, SPECIES, FORMS OF LIFE, AND NATURAL RESOURCES THAT ARE IMPACTED BY THE CURRENT GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS; AND (2) TO MOTIVATE US PROPOSE ADEQUATE ANSWERS TO THEM. A GOOD WAY OF ARTICULATING THE ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND CO-RESPONSIBILITY IS TO AFFIRM THAT COMMUNICATION IS AN ABSOLUTE NECESSARY CONDITION – THOUGH NOT FULLY A SUFFICIENT CONDITION – TO PROVIDE GLOBAL RESPONSES TO GLOBAL QUESTIONS.

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[1] R. ATTFIELD, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, POLITY, CAMBRIDGE, 2003, PP. 1, 181.

[2] IBID., P. 6.

[3] SEE H. KÜNG, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY. IN SEARCH OF A WORLD ETHIC, SCM PRESS, LONDON, 1991; V. SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT, ZED, ATLANTIC HIGHLANDS, 1989; E. DUSSEL, ÉTICA DE LA LIBERACIÓN, MADRID, EDITORIAL TROTTA, 1998.

[4] UNEP, UNITED NATIONALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, VIEWED ON 5 JUNE 2009, . SEE ALSO UNEP, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, NAIROBI, UNEP DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION, 2008, P. 3.

[5] IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [SOLOMON, S., D. QIN, M. MANNING, Z. CHEN, M. MARQUIS, K.B. AVERYT, M. TIGNOR AND H.L. MILLER (EDS.)], CAMBRIDGE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007, PP. 95-99, 133-137, 600. (AR4, WG I, 1.1-1.2, 2.2, 8.2)

[6] IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007. SYNTHESIS REPORT. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GENEVA: IPCC, 2007, P. 36.

[7] IBID., P. 68 (AR4/SYR, 5.5).

[8] IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007. IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC [M.L. PARRY, O.F. CANZIANI, J.P. PALUTIKOF, P.J. VAN DER LINDEN AND C.E. HANSON (EDS.)], CAMBRIDGE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007, PP. 359-361 AND 396. (AR4, WG II, 7.1.1-7.1.4 AND 8.2 WG II, 7.1.1-7.1.4 AND 8.2.1). SEE P. CRUTZEN, “HUMAN IMPACT ON CLIMATE HAS MADE THIS THE „ANTHROPOCENE AGE‟,” NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, VOL. 22, 2 (2005), PP. 14-16.

[9] IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007. IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC [B. METZ, O.R. DAVIDSON, P.R. BOSCH, R. DAVE, L.A. MEYER (EDS.)], CAMBRIDGE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007, PP. 751-752 (AR4, WG III, 13.1.2). SEE ALSO S. GARDINER, “ETHICS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,” ETHICS 114 (APRIL 2004), PP. 555-600 AND J. GARVEY, THE ETHICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: RIGHT AND WRONG IN A WARMING WORLD, NEW YORK, CONTINUUM, 2008.

[10] A. MCINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?, NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS, 1985; B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY, CAMBRIDGE, MA, HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1991.

[11] A GOOD OVERVIEW OF THESE CHALLENGES CAN BE SEEN IN R. SANDLER AND P. CAFARO (EDS.) ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE ETHICS, OXFORD, ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD, 2005.

[12] H. JONAS, DAS PRINZIP VERANTWORTUNG, FRANKFURT, SUHRKAMP, 1979, P. 36.

[13] IBID., P. 52. SEE ALSO V. HÖSLE, PHILOSOPHIE DER ÖKOLOGISCHEN KRISE, MUNICH, BECK, 1991. A. KREBS, “DISCOURSE ETHICS AND NATURE” IN ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES, VOL. 6, 1997, PP. 269-280.

[14] IBID., P. 172.

[15] IBID., P. 177.

[16] IBID., P. 199.

[17] IBID., P. 241.

[18] IBID., PP. 248-249.

[19] IBID., PP. 256-286.

[20] IBID., PP. 327-387.

[21] IBID., P. 390. SEE ALSO U. MELLE, “RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CRISIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION: A HUSSERLIAN MEDITATION ON HANS JONAS,” HUMAN STUDIES, VOL. 21/4 (OCTOBER 1998), PP. 329-345.

[22] SEE S. GARDINER (ED.) VIRTUE ETHICS: OLD AND NEW, ITHACA, CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005. SANDLER & CAFARO, OP. CIT..

[23] COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUES: THE USES OF PHILOSOPHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE, NEW YORK, MACMILLAN, 2001, PP. 30-37.

[24] HARREMOES ET AL., ET ALLI. LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (1896-2000), COPENHAGEN, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, 2001.

[25] R. CARLSON, SILENT SPRING, BOSTON: HOUGHTON MIFFLIN, 1962.

[26] A. DEVILLE AND R. HARDING, APPLYING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, SYDNEY, THE FEDERATION PRESS, 1997.

[27] A. BEDER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION, LONDON, EARTHSCAN, 2006, P. 48.

[28] R. ATTFIELD, OP. CIT., P. 144.

[29] P. HAY, A COMPANION TO ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHT, EDINBURGH, EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2002, PP. 230-233.

[30] C. RAFFENSBERGER AND J. TRICKNER (EDS.), PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, WASHINGTON, DC, ISLAND PRESS, 1999, P. 1.

[31] S. GARDINER, “A CORE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE,” THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 14/1, MARCH 2006, P. 36.

[32] S. GARDINER, OP. CIT., P. 47.

[33] C. SUSSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, CAMBRIDGE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005.

[34] WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE [BRUNTLAND REPORT], OXFORD, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1987.

[35] UNEP, CARING FOR THE EARTH: A STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE LIVING, GLAND, (SWITZERLAND), IUCN, UNEP, AND WWF, 1991.

[36] R. ATTFIELD, OP. CIT., PP. 132-144.

[37] SEE R. ATTFIELD, OP. CIT., PP. 126-137 AND G. VARNER, IN NATURE’S INTERESTS? INTERESTS, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, OXFORD, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1998.

[38] H. DALY, ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY AND ETHICS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A STEADY-STATE ECONOMY, SAN FRANCISCO, FREEMAN, 1980; AND “SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: AN IMPOSSIBLE THEOREM” IN DEVELOPMENT, SID 3/4, 1990. R. GOODLAND, “THE CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY,” ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECOLOGY AND SYSTEMATICS 26 (1995), PP. 1-24.

[39] C.REDCLIFT AND J. WOODGATE, OP. CIT..

[40] R. GOODLAND, OP. CIT..

[41] SEE A. LEOPOLD, A SANDY COUNT ALMANAC, OXFORD, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1949; B. CALLICOT, IN DEFENSE OF LAND ETHIC: ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, ALBANY, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS, 1989.

[42] B. NORTON, SUSTAINABILITY: A PHILOSOPHY OF ADAPTIVE ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, CHICAGO, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 2005, PP. 304-316.

[43] IBID., P. 517.

[44] J. WELCHMAN, “NORTON AND PASSMORE ON VALUING NATURE,” JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND AGRICULTURAL ETHICS, VOL. 20 (2007), PP. 353-363.

[45] P. FRENCH, “THE CORPORATION AS A MORAL PERSON” IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, VOL. 16, NUMBER 3 (JULY, 1979), PP. 207-215; COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, NEW YORK, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1984.

[46] P. FRENCH, THE SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBILITY, NEW YORK, ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, 1991. THE BOOK BRINGS TEXTS FROM ARISTOTLE THROUGH AUSTIN AND JEAN-PAUL SARTRE TO JOHN FISCHER AND LARRY MAY.

[47] P. FRENCH, RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS, LAWRENCE, KS, UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KANSAS, 1992; AND P. FRENCH AND H. WETTSTEIN (EDS.) FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY [MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, VOL. XXIX], MALDEN, MA, BLACKWELL, 2005.

[48] P. FRENCH, “THE CORPORATION AS A MORAL PERSON,” P. 207. SEE ALSO RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS, P. 139.

[49] IBID., P. 212.

[50] P. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, P. 134.

[51] K.-O. APEL, SELECTED ESSAYS, ATLANTIC HIGHLANDS, NJ, HUMANITIES PRESS, 1994, PP. 233-238.

[52] K.-O. APEL, TRANSFORMATION DER PHILOSOPHIE, FRANKFURT, SUHRKAMP, VOL. 2, P. 376.

GLOBAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

[53] K.-O. APEL, DISKURS UND VERANTWORTUNG, FRANKFURT, SUHRKAMP, 1988, P. 38 AND “DISCOURSE ETHICS AS A RESPONSE TO THE NOVEL CHALLENGES OF TODAY’S REALITY TO CO-RESPONSIBILITY,” THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION 73, 4 (OCT. 1993), PP. 496-513.

[54] K.-O. APEL, “THE PROBLEM OF A MACROETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FUTURE IN THE CRISIS OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION: AN ATTEMPT TO COME TO TERMS WITH HANS JONAS‟ „PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY‟” IN MAN AND WORLD, 20 (1987), PP. 3-40.

[55] J. HABERMAS, THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS, FRANKFURT, SUHRKAMP, VOL. 2, PP. 259-261, MORALBEWUßTSEIN UND KOMMUNIKATIVES HANDELN, FRANKFURT, SUHRKAMP, 1983, PP. 63, AND ERLÄUTERUNG ZUR DISKURSETHIK, FRANKFURT, SUHRKAMP, 1991, 119-226.

[56] K.-O. APEL, DISKURS UND VERANTWORTUNG, PP. 123F.

[57] IBID., PP. 141F., 178F.

[58] IBID., P. 142.

[59] ALSO, HERE, SEE K.-O. APEL, “THE PROBLEM OF A MACROETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FUTURE IN THE CRISIS OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION: AN ATTEMPT TO COME TO TERMS WITH HANS JONAS‟ „PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY‟.” SEE ALSO A. KREBS, “DISCOURSE ETHICS AND NATURE.”

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