Beleaguered



USAWC PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH

The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait:

An

Eyewitness Account

By

LTC FRED L. HART JR.

[pic]

Professor Doug Johnson

Project Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those

Of the author and do not necessarily reflect

The views of the Department of Defense or any

of its agencies. This document may not be

released for open publication until it has

been cleared by the appropriate military

service or government agency.

U.S. Army War College

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

Author: Fred L. Hart Jr. (LTC) USA

TITLE: The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account

FORMAT: Personal Experience Monograph

DATE: 1 May 1998 PAGES:56 CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

This personal experience monograph (PEM) is based on the author's personal experience, first hand knowledge, and witnessing of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Assigned to Kuwait as an advisor to the Kuwaiti Land Forces on 1 August 1989, the author was involved in the events leading up, during, and after the invasion by Iraqi forces. This PEM provides an historical account of the experiences and actions taken by the United States Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK), which was based out the American Embassy Kuwait. It also documents our beleaguered status in Kuwait and Baghdad, Iraq, from August 1990 to 10 December 1990. The photograph of Iraqi Republican Guard T-72 on the title page was taken from Chief Dave Forties apartment which was located along Gulf Road in Kuwait City, Kuwait, note the date on the photograph: Aug 4 1990.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This purpose of this Personal Experience Monograph (PEM) is to provide an account of events leading up to the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent ordeal that eleven military members and their families endured from 2 August 1990 to 10 December 1990. The account is based on my personal experience, notes, and diary that I maintained through the crisis. I want to acknowledge all the members of the United States Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK). They displayed the highest degree of courage, ingenuity, initiative, and dedication to duty. In my opinion USLOK was a major factor in the ability of U.S. embassies in Kuwait and Iraq to function smoothly and remain capable of executing their diplomatic mission throughout the crisis.

I want to recognize Chief Warrant Officer 4 Dave Forties for his skill and courage in operating on the streets, alleyways and back roads of Kuwait and Baghdad searching for foodstocks. Chief Forties more than any other coordinated, procured, and arranged for all the foodstocks that allowed Ambassador Nathaniel Howell and his staff the capability to thwart the Iraqi siege on the embassy compound. He repeated this performance while detained in Baghdad. His cunning, initiative, and ingenuity ensured both embassy compounds had ample foodstocks in order to sustain themselves during the entire crisis.

I would like to thank the members of the Individual Terrorist Awareness Course (INTAC) at Ft. Bragg, NC for their outstanding instruction that contributed significantly to my ability to deal with the hostage situation my family and I found ourselves in.

The USLOK organization received two meritorious unit citations; one Army and one Joint for performance during the invasion and while detained in Kuwait and Iraq. This account will endeavor to tell the USLOK story and shed new insights on the events that occurred in Kuwait and Baghdad.

BACKGROUND

On 1 August 1989, my family and I arrived in Kuwait City. It was over 104 degrees outside at 2100hrs. Leaving the modern air-conditioned international terminal and walking outside was literally like walking into a blast furnace. I had arrived to begin serving a two year accompanied tour. My job was to be an advisor (logistics, maintenance, and training) to the Kuwait Land Forces and manage foreign military sales (FMS) cases.

I was assigned to a joint organization called United States Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK) which was based out of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City. I worked Sunday through Thursday from an office at the Kuwait Land Forces, Director of Technical Affairs. Technical Affairs was essentially the Supply and Maintenance Directorate for the Kuwait Army. Our joint office at the embassy provided central management for all FMS cases, and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The total organization consisted of approximately 22 personnel, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and a few DoD civilians. The Army members made up a technical assistance field team (TAFT), and our Chief of USLOK was an Army O-6.

The entire organization worked for U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) based at MacDill AFB, FL. The Chief was part of the embassy Country Team and worked for both CENTCOM and Ambassador Nathaniel Howell. The USLOK office interfaced almost daily with the CENTCOM J4/7 on matters concerning our mission of providing security assistance and FMS management to the Government of Kuwait.

The U.S. Army’s security assistance program was focused on logistical support to the Kuwaiti Land Forces through several FMS cases, mainly for support of U.S. purchased equipment. We also worked several active International Military Education Training (IMET) cases. These programs were small in comparison to Saudi Arabia, primarily because Kuwait maintained only three active brigades, a small Air Force, and Navy. The Kuwaiti’s were comfortable with this small force and felt they had no real cause to have a large or modernized Armed Forces. Many of us had often heard from Kuwaiti Army officers that the ruling family (Sabahs) realized that a small poorly trained and equipped force was less of a threat. Land Force officers also felt that the Air Force got more defense dollars because you can’t occupy a palace with a fighter jet. I speculate that there might have been some truth in all this. The Kuwait Army also had a manpower problem and no true Kuwaiti would ever be a NCO or worst yet an enlisted man. Without exception all officers were genuine Kuwaiti’s and almost all Colonels and above had ties to the royal family or members of prominent families. The Warrant officer and Non Commissioned Officer corps was non-full citizen Kuwaiti's or Bedouins.[i] Enlisted personnel were a mixed bag of Bedouins, and third world nationals. Interesting to note that many in the NCOs and enlisted ranks were also of Iraqi origin and assisted the Iraqi Army as it invaded Kuwait.

Prior to 2 August 1990, Kuwait was an obscure oil rich Gulf-Arab state about the size of New Jersey. They were uncomfortably sandwiched between Iraq and Iran. Prior to the Iraqi invasion, most Americans had only a passing knowledge of Kuwait. Perhaps their only frame of reference was in regards to the reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers under the US operation called “Earnest Will” (1987-1988) during the Iran/Iraq War (1980-1988). Once that ended both Kuwait and the U.S. had little interest in binding political relationships with each other. Unfolding events in the former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw pact was overshadowing most events occurring in the region (1989). After all, the Iran/Iraq war had ended and the region was ready for peace.

Our observations in the region indicated in early 1990 that storm clouds were gathering, but most in DoD and State Department had little interest in the ensuing inter-Arab dispute between Kuwait and Iraq. Even the CENTCOM J-2 threat update was focused on Iran as the major regional threat. The embassy was focused on monitoring the Russians in country and the extent of their military programs with Kuwait. There was interest in the internal Kuwaiti problems regarding a popular move to bring back the National Assembly. The Amir had dissolved the assembly a few years earlier when too much dissension was occurring. However, on the surface everything appeared to be peaceful.

Prior to the Gulf War, Kuwaiti Armed Forces were generally equipped and trained by the British. This was due to the long historical ties between Kuwait and the British. By the late eighties, the Kuwaitis had begun a modest program to upgrade their three Land Force brigades. The United States and western European nations had lost out when the Kuwaiti's decided, in early 1988, to buy Russian BMP IIs and Yugoslavian M-84s, (T-72 variant). This was attributed to the inexpensive deals both countries were offering in comparison to buying the more expensive and sophisticated U.S. and Western European armaments. Kuwait also had a tendency to engage several countries for arms deals, their way of spreading the wealth around. Their Army consisted of equipment from the U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, Yugoslavia, and many others. It was a strategy to maintain friendship ties with many and show no favoritism towards one particular country[ii]. The result for their military was an absolute nightmare for interoperability. The Kuwait Government also required that U.S. military personnel wear no uniforms or openly acknowledge their presence, an arrangement that would pay dividends for us during the Iraqi invasion.

In the months proceeding the invasion, USLOK team members began monitoring the situation between Kuwait and Iraq. While working out in the field with the various units and at the Land Forces Headquarters, we began getting indicators as early as March 1990 that the relationship Kuwait shared with its neighbor to the north (Iraq) was taking a turn for the worst. However, in most diplomatic and military circles, it was felt that it was nothing more than bellicose chest pounding and posturing by Saddam Hussein. Many in the diplomatic circles felt the problem would eventually go away by the Kuwaiti's throwing millions of dollars at the disgruntled Iraqi leader, who had bankrupted his country after eight years of war with the Iranians and had nothing to show for it. At our Headquarters, CENTCOM J-2 and J-3 remained focused on Iran, and felt Iraq was too disorganized after the war with Iran to pose any near term threat in the region. Iranian radical fundamentalism and support of terrorism was believed to be far more threatening to the region. The Iran/Iraq war had cost Saddam Hussein dearly and he felt he had done the Gulf oil sheikdoms a favor by fighting the Iranians and stopping the spread radical Shia Islam.[iii] In hindsight, it’s easy to see that the war did nothing to improve Iraqi operational military prowess. His country was broke, his oil production was too low to get the economy back on its feet, and the Iraqi people had suffered tremendously.

In early 1990, the Arab League held a summit in Baghdad and Saddam initiated his political attacks against Kuwait and to a lesser degree on other Gulf nations. Kuwait specifically was accused of waging economic war against Iraq and slant drilling to steal oil from Iraqi fields along the border. When the summit ended most Arab nations felt Kuwait and Iraq would reach some type of monetary settlement. However, the problems continued to fester in the coming months as Iraq stepped up its propaganda war and launched significant personal attacks on the Kuwaitis and the ruling family.

By early June 1990, several senior Kuwaiti officers told us of the outlandish propaganda broadcast from Baghdad. They were extremely concerned and agitated because the language used in the broadcast was Arabic that one only uses when compromise is unattainable and the only recourse is to fight. They openly acknowledged that they were unprepared for any confrontation and the Kuwait government seemed to be unwilling to take any preparatory actions. Many also informed us that the Iraqi Army was conducting an unusually high number of exercises in southern Iraq. In mid-July 1990, the Kuwaiti military went on their first and only alert status, but after one week and evidence of Iraqi troop movements became clearer, the Kuwaiti's quickly called off their haphazard alert for fear of provoking Saddam Hussein. On a regional level President Hosni Mubarak (Egypt) and King Hussein (Jordan) attempted to persuade Iraq to at least meet with the Kuwaitis to discuss their problems. Both heads of state received assurances from Iraq that a peaceful solution could be found. At our embassy, there was interest in monitoring the situation, but with President Mubarak, and King Hussein's assurances most felt the problem would be settled, and Kuwait would reach a monetary settlement with Iraq. The Kuwaitis genuinely felt they had a chance to reach an agreement, but were bound and determine not to give up territory or completely forgive the war debt Saddam owed them. That essentially sealed their fate and made the meeting in Jeddah an Iraqi ploy to demonstrate they had left no stone unturned in trying to settle a dispute in a Arab brotherly fashion. Also, now known, was the fact that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie had met with Saddam in mid-July and essentially conveyed to him that the U.S. had no interest in his dispute with Kuwait and no defense treaties. Department of State (DOS) also conveyed this same message just weeks before the invasion in congressional testimony.

Once it was realized that a compromise would not be reached, and the Iraqi leader's demands were unyielding, (this timeframe was the week prior to the invasion), Kuwaiti's began talking of the Iraqi's seizing the contested northern (Rumaylla) oilfields and the two tiny islands (Warba/Bubiyan) near the mouth of the Shatt al Arab, entrance way into the Arabian Gulf. There had been a historical precedent for this during a 1961 Kuwait/Iraq border dispute that was quickly resolved when the British committed a small force to stymie the Iraqi incursion. Now the situation was different, Iraq at last had a sizable force, and Kuwait no longer had any western defense pacts or treaties. In fact, the one defense treaty that Kuwait participated in was the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council). However, the GCC would take virtually no action to dissuade Saddam from his intentions. The purpose of the GCC was to protect one another from precisely happening before their very eyes. The United Arab Emirates acted on their own and requested United States assistance’s in late July 1990 when Saddam began including the U.A.E. in his threats. Nevertheless, the GCC proved to be virtually paralyzed, unwilling, and unable to deal with Saddam. During the weeks proceeding the invasion, the GCC did not even meet in session. Even the Peninsular Shield force, a GCC reaction force of roughly brigade size, was not utilized or alerted during the entire crisis. The value of the GCC as a defense pact proved to be worthless.

We watched knowing that something would happen and hoping Kuwait would pay off Saddam Hussein. A week before the invasion a former Kuwaiti officer and friend who worked at a Kuwaiti bank informed me that the Kuwait government had to put a stop on all overseas electronic fund transfers. The problem was as the crisis unfolded; many Kuwaitis began transferring all their accounts to banks in the U.S. and Great Britain out of fear of an Iraq invasion. In addition, by the last week of July, all international and regional domestic flights were sold out. The panic within the populace had begun, but the government would not acknowledge there was a growing problem. At our last official embassy country team meeting, 29 July 1990, we were all cautioned to stay close to home and insure our Motorola radios were working properly. Our state department diplomats also assured us that they would see to our hasty evacuation well before any hostilities started. Our Chief had suggested that the women and children go on to Saudi Arabia as a precaution, but the Ambassador ruled that out, stating he felt the Kuwaiti’s would resolve the problem at the Jeddah meeting scheduled for 1 August 1990. Before the meeting adjourned the Ambassador assured everyone that this was typical Arab bluff and talk, he really doubted the Iraqis would invade Kuwait.

CW4 Dave Forties and I managed to conducted one last check of each Kuwaiti brigade the week preceding the invasion and found them in their normal summertime routine (majority of the leadership on summer leave) and little to no activity. In fact, it was difficult to find anyone above the rank of major around.[iv] Since the stand down from alert status in mid July all units had authorized personnel to continue with their normal summer leave program.

Now the stage was set. By the last week of July 1990, the Iraqi's had placed their lead Republican Guard division along Kuwait's northern frontier. Forties and I made our last trip to the Land Forces Sixth brigade on 28 July 1990. The brigade officers that were present reported that Iraqi formations were within sight of the border. We were being told that well over 100,000 troops had massed in the southern region of Iraq and were within minutes of the border.[v] Still the Kuwait government was unwilling to request U.S. Assistance and the U.S. had already sent signals in late July 90 that we had no defense agreements with Kuwait.

The bottomline was if Kuwait wanted assistance, they would have to ask for it. CENTCOM did dispatch a courier with satellite Intel photos to provide the Ambassador and the Kuwait government with further proof that the Iraqi forces posed along their border were ready to strike, noting the only missing piece of the puzzle was that Iraqi Artillery had not been brought forward. The Kuwaitis reviewed the data but made no commitment or request for assistance.

Invasion

Now Kuwait was completely on her own and a meeting was scheduled with the Iraqis in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 31 July 1990. The evening of 1 August, we all watched the local English news broadcast which showed the Kuwaiti Crown Prince return from Jeddah with the news that Iraq walked out of the talks when Kuwait was unwilling to meet Saddam Hussein's demands. The Kuwaitis were hopeful that another meeting would be scheduled. The Kuwaiti newspaper delivered to our villa 2 August had this headline: Jeddah Talks end…more needed - US concerned but hopeful of efforts to defuse crisis through diplomacy.[vi]

We all knew that this was the turning point and short of a miracle the Iraqi hordes would invade, an as a minimum capture the northern oil fields, Warba and Bubiyan island.

By 2300 hours 1 August 1990, the Chief of USLOK Col. John Mooneyham began receiving telephonic reports from U.S. Westinghouse technicians manning a radar observation balloon position just north of Mutla ridge. Their reports were very pointed in that they described the radar paint as a mass armor formation resembling an iron pipe several kilometers long and rolling down hill. They were advised to cut the tether and move out smartly. By 0100, 2 August 1990 the Iraqi formation was rapidly moving south along the Abdaly highway totally unopposed. I went up to the roof of our villa around 0030hrs and could see a few flares on the northern horizon, but heard no distant sounds of artillery. The royal families had received their advance notification and were executing their plans for a hasty departure. The sad note here is the fact that the ruling family and top officials in the ministries never bothered to send out any kind of notification or instructions to the armed forces. To make matters worst, 2 August was on the Islamic equivalent of the New Year and one the hottest days of the year. So most good Kuwaitis that were still around during the sweltering heat of August had no plans of going to work. By 0500hrs, 2 August the Iraqi formation was on the outskirts of Doha and word had spread quickly of the invasion. The Amir and his entourage were well on their way to Saudi Arabia. A few officers from the western brigade, 35th Bde about 10-15 kms from Ali Salem air base managed to get a battalion (+/-) out the gate and headed towards Jahra. From the vicinity of Jahra, Kuwaiti 35th Bde led by Col. Salem Al Srour led his units in a futile delaying action along Jahra road to just outside the gates of the Kuwait Armed Forces Headquarters, some 10 kms.[vii] His assembled battalion of old British Chieftain tanks, engaged the Iraqis for several hours until out of ammunition, and almost encircled. The Kuwaiti Air Force did not fare much better, but they did manage to launch A-4 sorties out of Al Jaber Airbase. Once the airfield became untenable, they generated sorties from the roadway near the airbase. They too were eventually overwhelmed by the Iraqi juggernaut and flew to Saudi Arabia.

Much has been said about the performance of the Kuwait military. One thing is certain, the Kuwait government failed to alert the military or take any preparatory actions. The government instead chose to accept the fact that their tiny Armed Forces were no match for the Iraqi Republican Guards. Instead, they believed a diplomatic solution would be found and their friends and allies would come quickly to their aid. They were wrong about the diplomatic solution and unprepared to realize that help would take many months of coalition building and diplomatic wrangling.

By 0500hrs we had all been notified telephonically or awakened by low flying fighter bombers and the distinct sound of artillery fire. At 0515hrs I went outside and immediately recognized the smell of cordite in the air and could hear the sounds of war getting closer. Looking to the southwest from my two-story villa rooftop, I could see Kuwait international airport 5-7kms away under bombardment by Iraqi fighter bombers. Strangely enough, the main highway just to the rear of my quarters appeared normal, complete with Kuwaiti bus service still operating. Now the whole family was up and LTC Tom Funk had telephoned us and confirmed our worst fears, Iraq had invaded. We closed all the curtains and our maid came into our villa. I told my wife and children to remain downstairs close to center of the villa near a interior storage room for safety in the event of shelling, which was growing louder and closer as each hour went by. LTC Funk had informed me that he had been in touch with the embassy and they were instructing all of us to remain put in our quarters and monitor the embassy radio net. I could tell by monitoring my radio that the embassy was in total panic and it was not the place to be. At 0600hrs I called CW4 Dave Forties, to check out his status, he informed me that the lead elements of the Republican Guard invasion force were already streaming down the Gulf road highway in direct view from his quarters along Gulf road. CW4 Forties also told me his neighbors (foreigners) had remarked to him they were really impressed how quickly the Kuwaitis had mobilized, so he had to convince them that the forces they were seeing were not Kuwaiti, but Iraqis.[viii] They quickly gathered their belongings and took off for the border to Saudi.

We also considered loading up the families and making a dash for the border. However, after checking with LTC Funk and monitoring COL Mooneyham's request to the embassy for us to convoy out, we learned that the Ambassador had denied his request. Since all the military and their families held diplomatic passports, the Ambassador informed COL Mooneyham that we had to follow his orders. This became an area of contention throughout the crisis. We went ahead and made plans and began pre packing necessities and foodstuffs, just in case the order was reversed and we were allowed to leave. In hindsight, we all know now that the border along Kuwait/Saudi remained porous until 11 August and we probably could have made it out. On the morning of 12 August, the Iraqis sealed the border. They also shot and kill a British citizen attempting to cross that day. The embassy's decision was final and we followed the Ambassadors orders.

Apparently, when the Iraqi armor/mechanized forces made it to Kuwait City, they decided to push their tanks and tracked vehicles through the city, only to become bogged down and often lost. This operational error of not bypassing Kuwait city permitted the bulk of the Kuwaiti 15th Bde, located south of the city near the Al Ahmadi oil fields to escape to Saudi Arabia. It also bought time for the southern air base Ahmed al Jaber to partially mobilize and actually launch sorties throughout the day. By nightfall, all organized Kuwaiti military resistance had come almost to a stand still.

Throughout the first day of the invasion, we stayed in telephonic contact with each other. CW4 Dave Forties and I spoke with disillusioned, confused and frustrated Kuwaiti officers who were calling our homes and requesting help, advice and assistance. There wasn't much we could tell them, other than destroy what they could, and get the hell out there. Even the remnants of the Kuwait government contacted the US Embassy in the early hours of the invasion and finally requested U.S. help; by then it was far too late.

There was no doubt the pre dawn invasion of 2 August 1990 had been calculated and coordinated well in advance. Nevertheless, by no means was it a precision operation as suggested by some analyst, Iraqi forces did have the advantage of surprise, only because the Kuwait Government chose to ignore all the indicators. From our perspective, it appeared as though they took the high-speed avenue of approach, namely the Abdaly highway and rapidly advanced south, completely bypassing and cutting off the northern Kuwait 6th Brigade. Meeting only light resistance from the few sparse elements of the Kuwait 35th Brigade and the Commando unit located near Doha, they pressed the attack into Kuwait City only to become bogged down. We figured they were in downtown Kuwait City at approximately 0600hrs. They quickly became entangled for several hours, before pushing south and consolidating their hold on Kuwait. This gave the Kuwait airbases time to launch aircraft and the southern 15th Brigade time to head for the Saudi border. It is our belief that the perceived threat to Saudi Arabia was largely due to Iraqi forces pursuing fleeing Kuwait army elements into the neutral zone. We are lucky that Saddam Hussein and his generals never realized the fact that the Saudi western province was virtually defenseless. It would have been easy for him to press the attack right into Dhahran since the Saudi Army only lightly defended the area. Although he had probably reached his culminating point at the Kuwait/Saudi border, several other facts became apparent that indicated the lack of coordination required to conduct an operation on this scale. First, radio and television remained operational until late evening 2 August. Telephone communications, to include international calling also remained operational and was never totally brought under Iraqi control until late August. I placed several phone calls home on 2 August and received several international calls. Operationally, attacks on the Amir's Bayan palace, Kuwaiti airfields, and other key installations appeared to be uncoordinated and haphazard. We were to find out later while detained in Baghdad that the operation to seize the Amir of Kuwait had failed because Iraqi planners failed to coordinate the one hour time difference between Kuwait City and Baghdad, resulting in an uncoordinated attack by Iraqi Special Forces units and Republican Guard ground forces.

LTC Funk, Chief Forties, and I collectively had enough military experience to make some observations of the vaunted Republican Guard during the first week of the invasion. They by no means reflected the discipline of a well-trained combat hardened army; in fact during the first week they reflected the characteristics of a motley force without orders and a total lack of basic tactical tenants and discipline. For the most part Iraqi soldiers milled around, scavenged for food and water, and seemed to be generally at a loss for what to do next, often looting and stealing bedding items for their hastily constructed fighting position, complete with beach umbrellas for overhead protection from the searing summer sun. Without a doubt, Saddam forces had reached their logistics culminating point and his units would have to live off the land. Fuel was not a problem, but food and water would be scavenged from the locals. Within days of the invasion, Iraqi forces occupied all the major supermarkets in order to procure foodstocks. Kuwaitis where permitted entry, but for males this could mean being taken into custody. This was often true for westerners.

The first day of the invasion 2 August, our neighborhood remained quiet until around 1300hrs when the Iraqis launched their final assault on the Bayan palace just a few kilometers from our quarters. Their artillery was positioned along Gulf road and was now firing directly over our neighborhood. The Amiri Guards at the Bayan palace put up a fight all morning. Their return fire often landed in and around our neighborhood resulting in many of our Kuwaiti neighbors fleeing the area. By 1400hrs, Bayan Palace was captured, and I could see from my rooftop that Iraqi armored forces had occupied the palace grounds. I spoke by phone to COL Mooneyham several times while the assault on the Palace was taking place. He had moved his family to the nearby Japanese embassy to ensure their safehaven since his neighborhood was being overrun with Iraqi forces. He was also instructed to go to the Japanese embassy, but chose to remain in his quarters to continue assisting other U.S. citizens via the telephone.

The day now seemed to creep by and we stayed glued to the radio trying to listen to BBC and VOA. Both were broadcasting all the Iraqi propaganda about turning Kuwait into a mass graveyard if anyone intervened.

Meanwhile things at the embassy seemed to settle down a little, but still an eerie tension was felt over the airwaves when communicating or listening to the embassy. Everyone on the outside began telephone networking with other Americans, trying to calm fears, pass along factual information and compile listings of Americans who were present in Kuwait.[ix]

By the end of the day things began to quite down, but from my rooftop I could observe that many of the Kuwaiti governmental buildings were burning or smoldering. The highway (Fahaheel expressway) was littered with wrecked or shot up cars. Occasional gunfire could be heard and Iraqi mounted patrols were now enforcing dusk to dawn curfew that had been broadcast both on radio and television. The first TV broadcast the Iraqis began to run was that the invasion was the result of a Kuwaiti coup that had overthrown the ruling family for being corrupt and the new government had requested the assistance of the Iraqi government. Needless to say, the story did not wash.

By late afternoon, many Kuwait officers whom I had worked with were still calling and asking for help. They were desperate and at the national level, no command and control structure existed any longer. Their hope was for members of USLOK to arrange for U.S. military support. The Kuwait Land Force were by now gone or nonfunctional as a coherent organization. If any resistance was to be forthcoming, it was going to depend solely on individual actions and initiatives.

The Iraqis slowly tighten their grip and continued the propaganda campaign. As stated earlier, Chief Forties and LTC Funk lived along Gulf road just south of the embassy and were able to monitor the flow of troops and equipment as they headed out of Kuwait City. On the third day of the invasion, Chief Forties ventured out to the local Sultan center (a large western style supermarket) which had been taken over by Iraqi soldiers. He had heard from neighbors that the Iraqis were still allowing controlled civilian access. The shoppers were in pandemonium and staples were going fast. Chief returned to his quarters without incident but saw that the Iraqis were establishing check points at all major road junctions. By this time the Kuwaitis and westerners were all in a state of shock after seeing the country fall so quickly and the international community at a stand off with Saddam Hussein.

The embassy finally started responding to our radio calls. We initiated procedures for daily call in checks and monitoring windows. Through our monitoring of the embassy net we learned that the Iraqi's had started systemic round up of westerners from the major hotels and complexes that housed westerners. We also learned that our British military counterparts had been rounded up, specifically the ones that lived on a compound south of the city near Fahaheel along the coast. Their senior officers immediately went into hiding with Kuwaitis and managed to stay hidden for four months. Two British Officers were seized by Iraqi Secret Police; both were severely beaten, tortured, and interned for several months. With this news, our situation, also being military, became even more complicated. We all took measures to hide our identities by destroying our identification cards, military clothing, papers, or anything else that may link us to the U.S. military. We felt we could rely on our diplomatic passports and status to preclude us from arrest. This worked initially because of several measures implemented for all military personnel being assigned to high threat areas. We wore civilian clothes on a daily basis, relaxed grooming standards and we all lived scattered throughout Kuwait City (not lumped together on a compound), and we were all assigned with diplomatic passports and status. We also had a back-up means of communications (portable radios) with the embassy. All this contributed to our safety and the Iraqis inability to locate and apprehended us.

My contact with a former Kuwaiti officer was a great help in determining what was going on in and around the city. He would come by our quarter's everyday bringing milk and diapers for our children. Then he would tell me of the efforts underway within Kuwaiti resistance. They had already begun to organize resistance groups within neighborhoods. By 4 August, the Resistance had started taking down street signs and house numbers to further confuse the Iraqi special units that were canvassing neighborhoods for westerners, high-ranking Kuwaiti officials, and military officers. The Kuwaiti resistance groups were first organized by groups of Shiite Kuwaitis. Since these Shiites already had a somewhat underground bond and the Iraqis had inadvertently freed the leading Shiite radicals from Kuwaiti prison, they naturally banded together and immediately began resisting the Iraqi invaders. The movement quickly caught on and by mid-August, the Kuwaiti resistance was doing daily damage to the Iraqi war machine. An interesting side note to this was the fact that when the Iraqis deployed around the city, they were in a perimeter facing outward toward the sea as if to thwart an amphibious attack. However, after the resistance began their drive by shooting and fire bombing campaign on the positions facing outward, the Iraqis quickly reversed all the position so that they now were facing inward towards the city with their backs to the sea for self-protection.

By 5 August, we all realized we were stuck and no political solution was going to change the current situation anytime soon. Saddam Hussein was employing all the classic bluffs we have become all too familiar with, and the world community was taken in by the Iraqi smoke screen.

Telephone lines were either out or being monitored by the Iraqis, so communications were becoming much more difficult and risky. The U.S. embassy established a radio net by providing the other embassies around town with spare radios it had on hand. These established a somewhat secure means to exchange information on the situation around town and maintain contact with us.

The flow of refugees and westerners to Saudi Arabia, either through the border crossing or across the desert had all but ceased by 11 August. The Iraqis began sealing the border, trapping those who had not taken advantage of the early confusion following the invasion. All embassies, Voice of America and BBC radio broadcast were now advising all western nationals to stay put in their homes. We all knew now that we were in for the long haul. Being part of a military organization gave us the edge in dealing with this situation; even our family members seemed better prepared to deal the uncertainty and fear. They had now experienced the horrors of war first hand, and had their baptism of fire. I guess we all knew from tours in places like Germany and Korea that war was a distinct possibility and you always had that hidden thought process on what to do if the proverbial balloon went up. Our challenge now was to help calm the fears of the many American civilians we were now communicating with.

The USLOK organization kept a tight telephone network going during that first week, but our contacts with each other dwindled when the embassy staff ordered several of our members into the Japanese embassy for safehaven. Our Chief of USLOK was ordered there also but refused to go, opting to send his family, while he remained home to continue the network with the trapped U.S. citizens. Most of the embassy staff lived in close proximity to the embassy and therefore the majority of the staff and their families had relocated into the embassy compound for safehaven by 3 August. In addition, on 3 August we monitored via VOA radio broadcast that Saddam Hussein had declared he would make the Arabian Gulf "a graveyard for all those who think of committing aggression, starting with these cowardly American navies." The broadcast also applauded the "glorious national uprising in Kuwait." I also noted in my diary a broadcast from 5 August "Provisional Government of Kuwait warns outside countries to remember that they have interest and nationals in Kuwait and if they resort to punitive measures their nationals would suffer gravely." This type of radio broadcast became particularly troublesome for all the foreign nationals trapped in Kuwait. LTC Tom Funk and I would spend many hours conversing with American citizens on the phone trying to calm their fears and reassure them that the U.S. would eventually come to our aid.

As word continued to spread of Iraqi soldiers looting and rounding up westerners, we continued our escape planning and actions should Iraqi officials show up at our door. A real morale booster occurred when we heard on the short wave radio that the Saudis had asked for U.S. help and an USAF Fighter Squadron and the 82nd Airborne were now on the way.

Meanwhile we heard on Iraqi radio that Saddam had told the U.S.Charge' in Baghdad that the occupation of Kuwait is irreversible. Then we hear of UN Security Council Resolution 661 imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq. This becomes the "tic for tat" diplomacy that evolves in the upcoming months. Usually good news followed by more bad news.

BELEAGUERED

Now the U.S. and British embassies were reporting over the radio net that westerners were being rounded up and transported to Baghdad, Iraq. Ambassador Howell made the decision for all of us to prepare to relocate into the U.S. embassy compound for diplomatic safehaven. On the evening of 6 August, LTC Funk telephoned about how to handle breaking off the telephone network with the U.S. citizens who have come to depend on us for information and guidance. One US citizen whom I had been working with decided to come to my villa, obtain one of the spare Motorola radios I had so he could monitor the embassy, and keep his American network informed. Once he arrives the next morning 7 August, I told him how to use the radio and briefed him on some possible escape routes. LTC Funk also coordinates for another citizen to send an itemized list of Americans over to me since the family and I will be heading into the embassy ahead of him. I had received a radio transmission the evening of 6 August and was told to prepare to relocate into the embassy, and to bring all the foodstuffs we could get into the car. My family and I prepared for the potentially hazardous trip into the embassy, which was some 12 kms from our quarters, right through downtown Kuwait. We all knew there would be Iraqi roadblocks to traverse and the embassy was encircled by Iraqi troops. We had also monitored over the radio several other families drive into the embassy and so far, they had all made it without incident. When early morning 7 August came we received no instructions to leave, so we continued our routine of inventorying our property. We would only be allowed two pieces of luggage, so we had to decide what we could carry out and what had to be left behind. This was a difficult task and still impacts our lives today. We also heard from VOA that Saddam vows to "pluck out the eyes" of anyone who attacks Iraq, he went on to argue that the invasion was designed to correct the flawed borders drawn by imperialist powers.

At approximately 1130hrs a civilian man, westerner in appearance showed up at our villa gate, announced he is from the U.S. Embassy, and had come to escort us in. I had been assigned at the embassy for a year and I knew all the personnel assigned to the post, and I did not recognize this individual. I immediately radioed the embassy and they verified his identity. I then recognized the foreign national driver who was with him, so once we got that straighten out I called CW3 Gene Lord, a close neighbor to coordinate a link-up with him and his family so that we all could convoy in together. The USLOK administrative NCO, who was a neighbor of ours, also joined in the trek into the embassy. We began our journey into the embassy with great trepidation of what was waiting for us. Our plan was to use the foodstuffs, cigarettes, and alcohol as bribes to get through the roadblock. I had also taken the precaution to hide the American citizen listing that had been brought to me. The list contained over 500 names and addresses of U.S. citizens living and working in Kuwait. As we pulled out of the Salwa neighborhood, my wife and children were shocked at the destruction that was so close to our house, now they could understand all the shelling, booming and rattling of windows for two days and most importantly why they had to remain away from windows. As we rode in, almost every official Kuwait government building along the route had been shelled, torched, or destroyed. Wrecked and smoldering vehicles littered the highway some with the charred remains present. The once well manicured and green medians were now brown, dried up and trashed. As we came to First ring road Iraqi soldiers and tracked vehicles formed a checkpoint but our lead vehicle, with the Palestinian foreign national who worked for the embassy, spoke with what appeared to be an Iraqi officer. After the brief stop and exchange, the Iraqi road guards waved us through. We turned off First ring just short of the Kuwait International hotel and down a back street to the embassy's rear entrance. Iraqi soldiers and combat vehicles had the entire compound surrounded. Strangely, the Iraqis were now manning the guard post the Kuwaiti National Guard troops had previously occupied. Our embassy foreign nationals told me that the Kuwaiti guards literally stripped off their uniforms and fled when they spotted the Iraqis on the morning of 2 August. We were allowed to proceed and the anxiety did not subside until we crossed over the steel barrier gate and into the enclosed parking lot. The embassy security officer informed us that we would be billeted in the Marine house. This was the small complex used as the living compound for the five Marine guards stationed at the embassy. They were now living and working full-time in the Chancellery building, since some twenty families now occupied their quarters. After unloading the car, we carried our bags to an athletic storage room we had been assigned. I then proceeded to the Chancellery building, specifically, the USLOK administrative offices. The place was in a shambles, in the Chief's office an U.S. CENTCOM messenger was asleep on the couch and the USLOK administrative NCO was sitting behind the Chief’s desk eating a MRE. I asked SFC Vellekoop who was in charge, and what was the current situation. He started to answer, when a Navy LT.CDR Schwarz, who was a TDY officer, came in and stated he was in charge. Since he was not an actual member of USLOK, I challenged his authority. He promptly went to the Deputy Charge of Mission (DCM), second in charge after the ambassador. She immediately summoned me to her office where she proceeded to tell me that the military chain of command was no longer valid and I now worked for the State Department and the USLOK organization was defunct.

I returned to the USLOK office where the CENTCOM courier and the USN TDY officer informed me that the communications link with CENTCOM was compartmentalized classification and no one from USLOK would be permitted access. I have since learned from books by Gen. Schwarzkopf's, "It Doesn't Take A Hero" and US News and World Report, "Triumph Without Victory" that Maj. John Feeley (CENTCOM courier) had used the communication link as a means to report information in the context of first hand knowledge. They were using the communications link to CENTCOM to send intelligence reports that were collected by the USLOK team and others. Interestingly enough, Maj. Feeley had never left the embassy Chancellery building once he ran across the street from the Kuwait International hotel in the early morning hours of 2 August 90. Nevertheless, he is quoted in the two referenced books as being the sole source from inside Kuwait and was recognized by Gen. Schwarzkopf as a hero and received an Army Legion of Merit for his actions. This was unsettling to the members of USLOK who knew that Maj. Feeley's actions were highly questionable and based almost solely on the actions, information and risk taken by the USLOK members and other embassy staff. We all recognize the fact that Maj. Feeley did the right thing by contacting U.S. CENTCOM, but what we object to, is he alone took credit or was given credit for all intelligence gathering, when in fact he took little to no risks and never ventured outside the compound during our beleaguered status in Kuwaiti. The two referenced books give a false picture of how the actual collecting of HUMINT was taking place and leads the reader to believe that Feeley alone was the sole source for vital intelligence.

Since we never saw the reports that Feeley and Schwarz sent, there seems to be some question as to just what they reported and who they attributed the collected information.[x] Since we had become disgusted with the actions of Feeley, we used an alternative source to pass HUMINT, the embassy chief of station (COS), who was much more receptive and knowledgeable of the real situation. His office had begun continuous operations just prior to the invasion and maintained this until ordered to leave the embassy on 23 August. Moreover, we felt he would ensure vital information was accurate and reached the appropriate intelligence levels.

I briefed LTC Funk when he arrived on what was going on with the situation in the USLOK office and with the DCM. He ran into the same story that I did in his meeting with the DCM and Maj. Feeley.

We still had half of our USLOK member's safehavened at the Japanese embassy, to include our USLOK Chief. LTC Funk decided to organize the group that was present. Using the offices not occupied by Feeley, we began to assess the situation. The first thing we noticed was that the USLOK Assistance Administrative NCO had failed to destroy and shred all the USLOK classified files. It was disturbing to find that all the personnel files complete with strip maps to our quarters were still intact. If the embassy had been taken, the Iraqis would have had a wealth of information on our organization and the location of all USLOK personnel. We immediately shredded all classified files contained in four filing cabinets.

The evening of 8 August we got an ugly reminder that the Iraqis had the compound surrounded. At 2045hrs automatic weapons fire began arching over the embassy compound. The Marine guards immediately alerted everyone to head for the Chancellery vault. Apparently, the embassy was being caught in a crossfire between Iraqis and Kuwaiti resistance fighters. However now the feeling was the Iraqis were attempting to take the compound. Once in the vault Chief Forties and I realized that there were no embassy or USLOK personnel at the Marine house in which most of the women and children were being housed. We asked the Ambassador for permission to leave the vault and go to the Marine House. He approved and we headed out of the Chancellery building. The weapons firing had slacken but tracers were still criss-crossing over the compound. We raced across the compound, once inside the Marine house we noticed the wives had followed the instruction we had given to them, turn off all lights and assemble everyone in the game room for safety. Most had settled down; but several Filipino maids were in a state of hysteria and it took several minutes to calm them down, their fear was particularly unsettling for the children.

Immediately following this event, the Ambassador ordered the Marine Guards out of uniform and instructed the embassy security officer Chip Bender to destroy all weapons and the USLOK secure communications. The COS refused to destroy his secure communications links, as was his right to do so, since secure communications remain under the agency and not DOS. We were never given a reason for this action, but speculated that the Ambassador did not want to give the Iraqis any reason to take the compound. As for the USLOK communications equipment, we suspected the Ambassador was not pleased with information being sent out of the embassy without his approval. It was also believed that if the Iraqis were to enter the compound by force the Ambassador was going to surrender, instead of making a futile attempt to defend the embassy.

By 13 August the remainder of the USLOK team had made it to the compound. We thought finally, COL Mooneyham would square away Feeley and Schwarz and then get things in order again. I never knew the whole story, but for some reason after COL Mooneyham arrived the Ambassador would not permit him to do anything. So, we continued at the task at hand to at least organize things around the compound and continue our efforts to find and collect food. USLOK followed the old military standards of continuously improving on your defensive posture.

Logistics

Since we were now faced a potential food crisis within the compound, we took it upon ourselves (USLOK) to get things organized, since guidance was not forthcoming. This was not an easy task since most of the DOS staff and family members had no training or background experiences for dealing with crisis situations, most of the male DOS staff did not even have prior military experiences. This also carried over to the spouses; many DOS spouse felt the military spouse would know what to do and how to handle the situation. The embassy Security officer Chip Binder was the most organized and experience DOS staff member but even he was having a difficult time dealing with the Ambassador’s immediate staff. Binder had done an exemplary job at controlling the Marine guards and organizing the Chancellery for the worst case scenario. However, outside the Chancellery the compound had turned into a lose organization with no structure or plan for surviving a potential assault or siege.

The initial compound occupants (2-7 August) had all but exhausted what food was available from the embassy snack bar and Marine MREs. LTC Funk, Chief Forties, and I met to discuss the situation within the embassy compound on 8 August. LTC Funk, Chief, and I first determined that we needed a structured organization. LTC Funk would man the USLOK office and coordinate actions with the embassy staff, Chief who had the most experience in Kuwait and over three years knowledge of the city and country would handle class I (food) supplies, I would assist Dave and do operations and plans. We had three priorities right off:

First was to get the food stocks built. We were down to virtually nothing and personnel were continuing to come into the embassy grounds.

Second the buildings housing the families and children needed to be fortified.

Third, we had to develop contingency plans for possible rescue operations, evacuation, or exfiltration.

We all set out to accomplish various tasks in a coordinated manner. The military personnel kept each other informed on the projects we were working on a day to day basis. Chief Forties was the only military besides LTC Funk who attended the Ambassador’s country meetings. These meetings did not offer much in the way of guidance, information, or comfort to community at large, but primarily served as a means to let the Ambassador know that something was being done for everyone. In fact, we all had to demand that the Ambassador or his DCM tell us as a group what was going on. On one occasion, the Ambassador told us that we knew as much as he did because we were still able to watch CNN off the satellite dish in the embassy compound.

As we began to organize things, the wives (majority military spouses) took on the task of preparing meals and running the living quarters. Two principle buildings were used to house all the people present in the compound, but we literally had people sleeping everywhere from offices, meeting rooms, and storage rooms. Some 175 people with children and pets were occupying a compound designed to only to quarter the Ambassador and a 6 man Marine detachment. The COS wife ran the kitchen and meals for the residence and personnel working 24-hour shifts in the Chancellery and several military wives ran the operation in the Marine house. Chief Forties and I would survey the two kitchens and the stocks in the snack bar and make a list of what foodstocks we needed to obtain when we went out on a foraging around the city for food supplies. Chief knew his way around and I would ride shotgun for him.

We had over 175 people to feed daily. Each morning Chief Forties and I would set out in his Chevy Blazer to canvas Kuwait City for foodstocks. Chief had several Kuwaiti contacts that helped arrange a clandestine meeting with the Kuwaiti who owned the largest supermarket chain in Kuwait, know as the Sultan Center. The Kuwaiti owner had gone underground and was attempting to get his assets out of Kuwait before the Iraqis could find them. After several days, we finally managed to link up with him at a discrete location. We then followed him to an underground warehouse in the vicinity of the Kuwait International Airport. Chief Forties struck a deal with him for credit payment via the State Department, but we had to act quickly since it was only a matter of a few days or a week at best before the Iraqis would discover the warehouse. That evening, the Ambassador agreed to Chief's plan and payment was arranged.[xi] We returned the next day and surveyed the warehouse; the primary foodstocks consisted of canned tuna and frozen turkeys. We also took everything he had in the way of medical supplies, paper products, canned drinks, and cereals. Most of the products where near the limit of there shelf life or had recently expired dates. We spent several days hauling the food stocks to the Embassy. During one of our last visits an Iraqi patrol showed up at the underground entranceway, the Kuwaitis quickly moved us to a back storage area, bribed the patrol with Pepsi cola, and canned tuna. Shortly after our last trip to the warehouse, the owner decided to abandon it and make his way out of Kuwait. We had one day left to get all we could from the warehouse. Chief Forties briefed the Ambassador on the situation and we got the approval to make one last run using the embassy's stake bed truck, which could haul three times the amount of the Blazer. We rounded up tarps to cover the cargo and made three trips. During our last trip back we were stopped at an Iraqi checkpoint, we managed to convince the guards that this was a relief mission to the Philippine Embassy, and handed them some cigarettes, they agreed to let us pass. We did in fact make one additional run for the Philippine embassy, since they had literally several thousand Philippine nationals camped outside their embassy compound. By the time of our departure for Baghdad on 23 August we had sufficiently stocked the embassy with several months worth of tuna and frozen turkeys. Chief had also managed to acquire a dozen or so 50 lbs. bags of rice and some beef from his contacts at various hotels. The wives prepared three meals a day, light breakfast of cereals, and fruit juices, tuna salad for lunch, and boiled turkey for evening meal. Children were fed first and then adults, no food was thrown out. Adults ate all the children's leftovers or it was used for the next meal. Fresh vegetables and fruit were the hardest to find and usually only in small quantities. We managed with what we had and many lost weight due to the unbalanced meals and stress. I myself had lost over 10 lbs. since 2 August.

With the approaching Iraqi deadline of 23 August to close all foreign embassies in Kuwait, Chief Forties and I made our last logistics run on 22 August. During that trip, we noticed the Iraqis were in the process of withdrawing the Republican Guards and replacing them with reserve units from Iraq. This swap out occurred over a three-day period and we observed convoys headed back to Iraq with the spoils of war. We saw hundreds of cars from Kuwaiti car dealerships being transported on Iraqi HETs, T-72s towing boats from the Kuwaiti yacht basin, and military trucks loaded down with booty. In less than two weeks the Republican Guards had collected their war booty and were now headed home with the spoils of the crushing defeat of the Kuwaitis.

We made one last inventory of foodstocks and briefed the DCM on where and how food was cached on the compound. We felt the stay behinds; some 20-30 people would have enough food for at least six months, not much variety, but at least subsistence. Since we knew that on 23 August the Iraqis would cut off water and power, the wives pre-cooked as many turkeys as time would permit. The compound had a generator with a 500-gal tank and we managed to scrounge a few 55-gal drums of diesel for extra fuel.

Just prior to our departure on 23 August, we also filled every empty container with water. When the Iraqis eventually cut the power and water lines, they missed an old water line so the embassy was able to retain one small line of fresh water that they could use for drinking. Pool water and stored water would later be used for cooking, bathing and operating the toilets.

LTC Rhoi Maney and Chief Durmon anticipated the need for additional refrigeration and went out to various USLOK quarters and removed freezers and refrigerators, along with whatever food was left in the homes. Chief Lord and MSGT Allen began working on fortifying the buildings the families were all housed in. They covered over windows, placed barricading materials near potential entry ways, organized and designated an area were families could move to in the event of shelling or gun fire into the compound. They also began conducting motor stables on all vehicles in the compound and cross leveling of tires, batteries, tools, and other vehicle items in the event, we had to make a hasty escape overland by automobile.

By now, all of the embassy staff and USLOK personnel had made it to the embassy for safehaven. The compound had grown to some 175 personnel. Small quantities of American citizens were allowed into the compound, primarily those with skills the embassy thought were needed to sustain embassy operations. The largest group permitted in was a number of Americans who had been stranded at the Kuwait International Airport. All other Americans who had been living and working in Kuwait were told to stay home and stay tuned to their radios for information from Voice of America and BBC broadcast. This was much the same story at the other western embassy that had large populations living and working in Kuwait.

On the political and diplomatic side, 8 August turned out to be a watershed day; President Bush announced that "a line has been drawn in the sand”, Iraq now has over 200,000 troops in Kuwait and declares Kuwait is the 19th Providence…”eternal merger…will be the pride of the Arabs." The UN also passes Resolution 662 null and voiding the Iraqi claim on Kuwait. Iraq also sends notification to all embassies in Kuwait that the borders are sealed and all diplomatic missions must close by 24 August 1990. We now begin to realize that we are all truly beleaguered, so we shifted our focus to sustaining the compound and protecting ourselves from possible Iraqi seizure of the compound.

During all our foraging we would return each day and debrief the embassy COS and provided CENTCOM with reports on what we had seen and located. We also linked into the Kuwaiti underground via our contacts with several Kuwaiti nationals. One in particular, named Adel Safar, was brought into the embassy for debriefs. Through Adel we also shared information and provided him with techniques for sabotaging Iraqi equipment and positions. Kuwaiti Resistance grew stronger everyday and by September, they were well-organized and inflicting daily damage to the Iraqi war machine. They also were key players in hiding and aiding many of the trapped foreign nationals. I personally knew several British Officers who were hidden by Kuwaiti Resistance for four months and then secretly turned over when all trapped foreign nationals were allowed to depart Kuwait and Iraq in mid December 1990.

On the lighter side, Chief Forties had been asked by the DCM to go to her quarters just outside the compound and obtain some additional clothing for her. While in her quarters he could see were Iraqi soldiers had entered and attempted to make a meal in the kitchen. A frying pan was on the stove and next to it was an empty box of Gaines Burger dog patties. Apparently the Iraqis had mistaken the Gaines burgers for hamburger patties and fried them in the skillet for a quick meal.

Ambassador Howell notes in The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: American Reflections, "that the Kuwait embassy out lasted the longest embassy siege on record "55 Days at Peking".[xii] I would like to think that the food collection efforts of Dave Forties and myself was the major contributing factor to sustaining the Embassy during the Iraqi siege. No small task, after almost three weeks of foraging, scrounging and arranging food pick-ups, we acquired hundreds of cases of tuna, rice, canned goods, and medical supplies. Done at daily risk of avoiding Iraqi checkpoints, roadblocks and roaming bands of Iraqi soldiers and repeated the same feat while detained in Baghdad, Iraq.

The Road to Baghdad

Ambassador Howell informed us that a deal was in the works to get all nonessential personnel out by 24 August, but we would have to go to Baghdad to obtain exit visas. We also learned on 20 August that President Bush had declared all trapped U.S. citizens as "Hostages." He also issued a stern warning to Iraq "that the U.S. Government will not tolerate any further mistreatment of American citizens.” We knew from radio news reports that Americans were being rounded up and the Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz stated that these were precautionary measures to prevent attack on Iraq. At this point, the "Human Shield" episode began and Iraq began systematically rounding up and placing foreign nationals at various "strategic" sites throughout Iraq and Kuwait. We all knew that at some point we would be required to leave either in our vehicles or taken by the Iraqis. That being the case USLOK took the lead for developing evacuation and convoy plans. We immediately organized all the vehicles on the compound, checked over each vehicle, and began making first aid kits and food packages for each car. Water was a prime concern and we used all available receptacles for water bottles and placed several gallons in each car. We took one other measure by marking all the roofs of the vehicles with an X made of a reflective type of duct tape. We transmitted that back to Washington so that overhead satellites could spot our vehicles along the congested route to Baghdad. COL Mooneyham called a meeting for all military and we discussed our duties and obligations as military officers in regards to the Code of Conduct. He also issued guidance to all of us regarding our status. His words were reassuring, but ominous in a strange way, because we had no idea of what lay ahead.

By 22 August the British, Japanese, and French begin to evacuate their nonessential personnel. Baghdad issued another warning to the US embassy on 23 August stating "that failure to close embassy will be considered and act of war." We also notice an increase of Iraqi troops and tanks surrounding our embassy. The Iraqis then inform the Ambassador that on the morning of 24 August they will cut off all power and water to the embassy.

On the evening of 22 August, LTC Funk and I briefed our plans and convoy route to the Ambassador, after he approved it we briefed each driver and arranged the cars for our early morning departure. Everyone was rounded up around 0230hrs 23 August and told prepare to leave. We were told an Iraqi official would come to the embassy and provide escort to Baghdad. Finally around 0300hrs and Iraqi Army officer appeared at the back gate and told the Ambassador that he had instructions to allow 57 personnel to depart. That was incorrect and the Ambassador pointed out that it was to be 57 diplomats and their dependents. The Iraqi official would have no part of that - his orders said 57 and 57 was all he would take. At that point, the Ambassador called off the convoy. He communicated this to State Department and everyone went back to bed. By 0600 hrs we got word that an U.S. diplomat from the American embassy in Baghdad would be arriving to provide escort for us to Baghdad. Around 0900hrs, he showed up and we hastily gathered women, children and pets for a rapid departure before the Iraqis change their minds. Ambassador Howell decided to escort us to the border with Iraq. The Ambassador led the first serial with his Black Cadillac complete with US flags flying. The U.S. diplomat from Baghdad led the second serial. The others followed, but the Ambassador had set to fast a pace and the convoy was strung out. Now on the road to Baghdad, all 23 vehicles with families, food, and pets are headed for Baghdad, Iraq. I might point that some of the pets did not survive the ordeal and died from heat exhaustion. Ambassador Howell had requested we take his dog, unfortunately it succumbed from the extreme heat. One area we failed to brief everyone on was the conditions outside the embassy. Most people had been inside the compound since the first week of August and did see all the destruction and large concentration of Iraqi soldiers and equipment, therefore as they drove towards the border many drivers did not focus on the convoy and attempted to view their surroundings. This resulted in a terrible rear end collision as the convoy "yo-yo" effect took hold. Three of our cars collided with each other when our COS swerved to avoid hitting an Iraqi soldier who had jump out into the roadway waving an AKM (rifle). The car behind him immediately braked and was rear-ended by the trailing car resulting in several injuries, one serious enough to warrant immediate medical attention. LTC Tom Funk and Marine Hudson got to the accident scene and treated the victims. Tom realized that the seriously injured woman required immediate medical attention. At that point Tom and the Marine made the decision to load her in their car along with her husband and headed back to the embassy where a doctor was present. The doctor at the embassy diagnosed her to have a broken hip and told Tom she would have to go to a Kuwaiti hospital, (which are now occupied by Iraqis). They got her there and in to see a doctor, at that point Tom and the Marine slipped out of the hospital and drove to catch up with the convoy.

The rest of us finally made it to the border crossing at Safwan, after four grueling hours of stop and go traffic, caused by military convoys, which had priority on the roads. Once at the border crossing Ambassador Howell was made to return to the embassy. Iraqi officials met us and refused to allow us to park our vehicles in the shaded area along side the customs building, instead we all had to park on the huge asphalt parking lot with no cover. Temperature that day was in excess of 120 degrees and the black asphalt pavement made it soared well above 120 degrees. Now we began another four-hour ordeal of checking passports, cars, questions, and phone calls to Baghdad. We sat in the parking lot with engines idling to keep the car air conditioners running, but after an hour or so most cars began overheating and we had to shut off all the cars. Our concern now was for the women, children, babies, and pets that were with us. The heat was oppressive and many were beginning to show signs of heat exhaustion. Using our drinking water, we continuously poured water on the children and babies to keep them cool. As this situation began to worsen, we finally appealed to the Iraqis to allow us to move under the shade area. It was interesting to note that only Americans and third country nationals (TCN) were being treated so harshly. While many of the European nationals particularly the ones that had not yet committed to condemning Iraq were permit quick passage and no harassment.

Finally, after four hours, we are permitted to depart for Baghdad. As we left Safwan one embassy official decides to lead his serial into a gas station a few kilometers from the border crossing. They ended up getting stuck by Iraqi military vehicles. The remaining convoy pulled off the road to wait for them. After thirty minutes columns of Iraqi foot soldiers begin route stepping by our vehicles parked along side the road and as they passed, they begin banging on our cars. Fearing this situation could get ugly myself and a few others walk back to the gas station to tell the DOS person in charge that we are going to drive further down the road and will wait for them at a checkpoint we had established on our convoy maps. He reluctantly agreed and half the convoy departed for a checkpoint just south of Nasiryah. Nasiryah had been the planned first fuel stop so as we waited we topped off all our vehicles. Almost two hours passed and still no sign of the remaining convoy so we decide to press on to the checkpoint outside of Nasiryah. While waiting outside Nasiryah, droves of Iraqi citizen's start coming out of their homes. They came up to our cars and start trying to look in the cars, and tapping on windows. Finally some four hours later the remaining convoy caught up with us. We had all now been up since 0300hrs and it is nearing 1800hrs. The traffic had thinned out and as we passed several Iraqi military camps. It was easy to tell they were all abandoned. We reached the next major city Samawah around 2100 hrs and are stopped at the outskirts by Iraqi military checkpoint. We wait an hour or so for them to get the OK from Baghdad to allow us to proceed on. They escorted us through the city and the convoy again got split up due to traffic. We stopped outside of Samawah and waited another hour to reassemble the convoy before heading on. We were still several hours from Baghdad. Most drivers are near exhaustion from no sleep, and many of us were operating on pure adrenaline. We stopped one more time at Diwaniyah for fuel and a short rest, at that point I had my wife take over driving, the children were asleep and I was at the point to where I could no longer drive safely. Chris agreed and drove the final 50 kms to Baghdad. As we neared the outskirts of Baghdad (0130hrs 24 August) the road turned into a four-lane highway. As we enter the highway, we see the Charge of the U.S. embassy Iraq alongside the road. Charge Joe Wilson escorts us all into the embassy compound in downtown Baghdad. His remaining staff of 6-8 personnel help get all the vehicles lined up along the street and quickly began getting people to the staff resident quarters for sleep. The Embassy in Baghdad was a small three story building without a wall or security fence around it, so our vehicles with our belongings had to be left parked on the street curb. The foreign nationals that worked for the U.S. embassy guarded our vehicles until morning. The embassy collected our passports and we all went to various quarters where everyone literally crashed.

Around 0900hrs 24 August, we were all awakened and told the news that there was a glitch and we might not be allowed to proceed on to Jordan. With that news, everyone went back too sleep, to exhausted to do anything else. The Charge made no progress with the Iraqis all that day. Apparently, they informed him that the US had reneged on the deal and was keeping the embassy in Kuwait open, therefore we would not be allowed to leave until the US closed the embassy in Kuwait. We all knew that would never happen. That evening the Charge organized a get-together at the empty Marine house. Once everyone was assembled, there he informed us that DOS was working the problem, but to hunker down and wait it out. Now everything seemed like deja vu, except this time we were in Baghdad. Needless to say, we nearly cleaned out the Marine House liquor locker and everyone let off a little pressure.

WOMEN AND CHILDREN - FIRST

The evening of 24 August almost seemed surreal. Families gathered and discussed all the “what ifs” of the current situation. We knew we were stuck again, except now we were all trapped right in the heart of enemy territory, downtown Baghdad, Iraq. We had not heard any news since leaving Kuwait on 23 August. The Charge had told us that so far, Ambassador Howell and his stay-behind crew were still safe and the Iraqis had made no overt moves to close the embassy. Several news reporters were allowed into the Marine house and we all spent time talking with them about conditions inside Kuwait and requested that they not reveal that 11 of us were military personnel. We had already been told that the Iraqis were requesting that all military be turned over to them. Fortunately we all had diplomatic passports and were on the accredited list of the Kuwait Ministry of Foreign Affairs as US Embassy personnel. We did have a couple of military TDY personnel whom we covered by preparing documentation attesting to the loss of their diplomatic passports, so far it had worked. The reporters by and large were very good about protecting our status and as I recall, they never revealed our presence in any news reports.

As dawn approached on the 26 August, COL Mooneyham met with all of us and informed us that arrangements were underway to allow the women and children to leave, but some of us may have to drive them to the Iraqi border at Zakhu, Turkey. The Charge had gotten word that the route to Jordan and the border area there was a total shambles with thousands of refugees massed in the border area. Safety being our prime concern, it was decided that the Zakhu border crossing in Turkey was less threatening and a safer place for exiting Iraq. We went to work preparing the cars again and organizing another convoy. By late evening, 26 August, the Charge informed us that the Iraqis had agreed to release the women and children, but refused to provide escort or assistance in getting to the border. They also refused to allow any of the personnel from Kuwait (males) to accompany them. We had to brief the women on driving and designated pairs to travel together. We were permitted to have a few embassy foreign nationals lead the convoy and assist at the border. We also decided to send the stake bed truck to carry the luggage and some pets.

At 0230 hrs 27 August we all assembled at the embassy compound to load cars, review the route and say our farewells. That early morning farewell was the hardest good-bye I had ever had with my family. To make matters worst it was our wedding anniversary. Nevertheless, my wife, children, and I hugged and kissed one another a last time before the signal to leave was given. I was devastated, but had a sense of well being; knowing they would make it home safely and I would not have worry about them being stuck in Baghdad, Iraq. Although we all had tremendous apprehension over their journey to the Turkish border, we all felt a certain relief in knowing the women and children were getting out. What we did not know was the ordeal they would endure on their 18-hour drive to the border crossing.

Once they were underway, we all went back to raid the Marine house liquor locker one last time. Their convoy endured an 18-hour trek complete with Iraqi harassment and stall tactics. My wife (Chris) related one humorous story from her ordeal. Our youngest at the time still in diapers had to be changed while driving, so our oldest daughter Natasha (7yrs) would change her and then Chris took the soiled diaper and threw it out the window of the car, Natasha complained to her mother that littering was bad, Chris quickly retorted “ it was perfectly OK to litter in this country (Iraq), but nowhere else.” It was remarkable how these women meet every obstacle and completed their journey with pride, dignity, and purpose. Three male teenagers who were 18 or older were not allowed to cross and were returned to Baghdad. Iraqi law considered them adults so they were not allowed to leave.

We sat on pins and needles until we finally got the word that they were under US control and on the way to the NATO base at Diyarbakir, Turkey. They finally made it to the US on 29 August on a specially chartered 747 out of Incirlick, Turkey and touched down at Andrews Air Force Base the afternoon of 29 August. We learned later that when they arrived at the border the Iraqis detained them for 3 hours. While detained at the border the Iraqis informed them that all vehicles without diplomatic plates would not be allowed to cross. They then had to remove all belongs from those vehicles and reload the cars with diplomatic plates. They then drew straws among the women who could operate standard shift to see who would drive the embassy stake bed truck across the border, a daunting task considering the circumstances. Once permitted to leave, they started towards the bridge across no mans land, the Iraqis stop them one more time and made them get out of the cars and line up along the bridge guardrail, some women panic, thinking the Iraqis were going to shoot them or beat them before they would transverse the last 100 meters to freedom. Their fears were warranted since many Arab men viewed western women as loose and dirty. Their treatment was appalling considering they all were carrying diplomatic passports. Finally, by 0300hrs, they crossed over into Turkey where officials from the US Embassy Turkey had arranged bus transport to the NATO base at Diyarbakir. Their ordeal was finally over and they were now under US control.

After we celebrated their return to freedom, we took on the task of operating an evacuation center at the embassy for any other American citizens (women & children only) whom might be interested in departing Iraq. We usually processed 30-40 women and children a day, most of whom had US passports and were married to Iraqi citizens. In addition, by this time over 350,000 refugees had fled Kuwait and Iraq, most were Arabs, and Asians third country nationals.

Thieves of Baghdad

On the evening of 30 August, Reverend Jesse Jackson came to the embassy to meet with the Charge. He also requested a meeting with all of us to inform us that he was going to meet with Saddam Hussein in attempt to secure our freedom. We informed the Rev. Jackson we wanted no part of his release plan if it involve compromising US principles, position, or any requirements by us to make statements. Needless to say, no one from Baghdad gained release under Rev. Jackson's deal with Saddam Hussein. Rev. Jackson did manage to get a few out from the American Embassy Kuwait and the woman whom was injured during our convoy to Baghdad. Prior to Rev. Jackson's departure, he met with us one last time in an attempt to get us to understand the Iraqi position vis-a-vis the rich Gulf Arab states. We argued with him for an hour or so, and his group decided we were a hopeless cause and they left. This would become a typical drill in the months ahead as various foreign dignitaries came to Baghdad to get their nationals released. It became so common place we referred to it as "Bargaining for Bodies". Generally Saddam would release a few to each dignitary who would issue a statement prior to his/her departure condemning the US and UN resolutions.

We were increasingly becoming part of the politics of diplomacy as the US embassy in Baghdad became the focal point of both the US and Iraqi government's exchange of demarches, political barbs, and views on the crisis at hand. We maintained an open phone with State Department 24 hours a day and established a 24-hour watch officer shift to monitor the phone line. We used the phone to keep Washington and ourselves instantly appraised of events as they unfold in Baghdad, Washington, and the UN. I often spoke with the former US Ambassador April Glaspie when she would inquire on conditions in Baghdad. Washington was pressing to obtain information on the effects of the embargo. Chief Forties again was having good success with slipping out of the embassy and obtaining food stocks on the local economy. During his outings it became obvious that Iraq had done a thorough job of pillaging Kuwait, Dave would often return with food items clearly marked with Kuwaiti price tags and marking from Kuwaiti shops. I went with Dave one afternoon to a local souk (marketplace) where hundreds of vendors were peddling everything from food to electronics all from Kuwait. We even saw cars, furniture, and clothes from Kuwait. One merchant even had a US Navy hat from the USS Reid, a Navy cruiser which had visited Kuwait a few months early and allowed US citizens in Kuwait to visit the ship, so without a doubt the hat had come from an American’s home which had been looted by the Iraqis. A fate which many of our homes in Kuwait would be subjected to. We also learned from the foreign nationals that worked at the embassy that the Iraqi government was issuing visitation permits to the 19th Province. These were essentially licenses to steal. On several occasions we saw where local Iraqis who lived near the embassy would depart in old beat up cars and return a few days latter with new Chevrolet Caprices with Kuwaiti tags and loaded down with booty. It had become obvious to us that it would be a long time coming before the embargo would take hold. The Iraqis did implement food rationing in early September with a stern warning that any violators would face capital punishment. We even stood in a few bread lines and quickly learned the bread they were handing out was not worth the wait. By mid September food rationing was not the problem; blackmarket and inflation became the primary concern. We had a limited amount of Iraqi dinars and dealing on the blackmarket was punishable by death. This made it extremely dangerous for Chief Forties to find, purchase, and keep our food supplies adequate. He nevertheless accomplished the task at great personal risk. We also had to have him lay low for a few days at a time because the Iraqi secret police had already attempted to arrest him.

As political and diplomatic barbs continued, the diplomatic community just as in Kuwait, established a tight circle of cooperation and met routinely to discuss how to handle the Iraqi actions aimed at driving wedges in the building coalition. The Iraqis also set up a protest group that would form outside the embassy every other day. The same group would assemble and after 10 minutes buses would show up and discharge school children, university students or factory workers all being led by government cheerleaders chanting “Death to the US and down with Bush”. The embassy’s information officer would go out and greet the protesters, take their petitions and then stand back while they shouted for 30 minutes.

We also invited the press to attend the morning country team meetings, this allowed them to see the difficulties we faced in dealing the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In turn the press would provide updates to us on the home front. Charge Joe Wilson was a master at using the press to get our messages out and he often leveraged them to pressure the Iraqis to allow us to obtain food or make phone calls home. We learned that once you are up front with the press, they will reciprocate and actually become useful in your efforts to tell your story.

ARABIAN NIGHTS

As we approached the one-month mark in Baghdad we often passed the evenings on the roof of our quarters, it offered a grand view of Baghdad and a small respite from the long hot days. We tuned the radio to a Iraqi propaganda broadcast called “Flashes in the Gulf”, we recognized it for what it was, but it did offer some news of the home front complete with contemporary music. The rooftop evenings also gave us insights on the local Iraqis living nearby. We knew the Iraqi secret police had moved into the house across the street and we often saw them watching us with binoculars. In the predawn hours, we would observe them picking up our trash. We began a deception game of placing crudely drawn maps with military symbols on them in an attempt to deceive the Iraqis on the nature of the US forces buildup. After several mornings of the neighbor coming over to pick up our trash, Dewight Durmon a Hawk Missile Warrant decided to make his job a little easier and began carrying the trash across the street and depositing it at his doorstep. We would also occasionally talk with the Iraqi guards who were young men that appeared very nervous about their job. Sometimes we would approached a guard, pause and begin looking up to the sky and pointing, in our poor Arabic we would say “Shoof-Look” and the guard would ask what are we looking at? We’d respond “Stealth Plane”. After a few episodes of this, we would occasionally see the guards walking their post and pausing every now and then, to look skyward. We also knew that the phone calls we were permitted to make were monitored and we all exercised utmost caution and OPSEC when talking with our families. We knew if they discovered we were military personnel with diplomatic passports they would take us into custody.

By mid-September, President Bush and Saddam Hussein had exchanged videotaped addresses to be aired on television. The US tape arrived via diplomatic pouch courier and the Charge delivered to the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarqi Aziz. We watched it the following evening on Iraqi television. They first introduced the tape with a commentary, and then broadcasted it in its entirety. They followed up with a closing commentary about how the tape was not supported by any brotherly Arab nations which were now being forced by the US to allow infidel soldiers to enter holy Islamic sites and mosques. The day following the videotape broadcast, Iraqi demonstrators showed up outside the embassy compound for our routine demonstration. The situation appeared to be in complete stalemate. Iraq was determined to stop any coalition building and began offering free oil to any nation that would stand with them against the US. King Hussein of Jordan arrived in Baghdad and attempted to gain freedom for the hostages as a personal favor to President Bush, his efforts failed. The King of Jordan, with a huge Palestinian population to contend with, reluctantly gave weak support to Saddam Hussein and departed Baghdad. With prospects of release growing dimmer every day we continued our programs of evacuating American citizens, tracking the Americans who were brought to Baghdad for movement to Iraqi Strategic sites, devising plans for escape and continuous building of our foodstocks. Iraq announced on 18 September that any foreigners caught violating food rationing would be hung. Our Charge was enraged at this pronouncement and immediately prepared and delivered a demarche to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. Since the Iraqis were not providing their guest with any food, the only alternative they had was to use the blackmarket to obtain supplies. For us this meant it would become much more dangerous to obtain food on the local economy.

On 21 September, Iraq declared persona non-gratis all western Defense attaches. Our COS and COL Richie, the DAO, had two days to get out of town. We helped them pack out their quarters and took all their foodstocks. They also carried with them a wealth of knowledge on our contingency plans and the situation around Baghdad. We would attempt to fill the gap and continue efforts to collect HUMINT. CENTCOM was not happy with any plans of escape and had told us to wait out the situation, for fear that an escape plan that went wrong would cost lives and impact any diplomatic efforts. We ceased official plans but continued to explore options in the event war did break out. Things also got a little shaky after Iraq had violated the sovereignty of several western embassies in Kuwait. We prepared for the possibility that they might attempt to enter the embassy compound in Baghdad. Again the Iraqis pressed the Charge for another listing with occupation of all Kuwait embassy personnel whom were now being housed in the American embassy Baghdad. We quickly devised a plan to go to other western embassy compounds in Baghdad if they decided to take us into custody. We still could not understand why the Iraqis had not figured out that 11 of us were active duty military, our cover continued to hold but we became increasingly concerned that they would eventually figure it out and take us into custody. Our President had already declared us "Hostages" and the Iraqis called us "guests". All we knew was our situation was tenuous as best, and we were not being treated like guests, so our best option was to do our duty and look for a way out should the inevitable occur.

TAKE THE LONG WAY HOME

By early October 1990, approximately seven UN Resolutions were in place against Iraq. As always, there are ways around embargoes, and sanctions. The Iraqis were very resourceful and showing no signs of weakening. As much as we could observe, the spoils being brought from Kuwait and the open highway with Jordan were mitigating the effects of the embargo. We could see some impact on the economy by the rapid rise in inflation and the quality of food products. For example, fresh beef and poultry was becoming harder to find but were still available, although the quality was somewhat questionable. Many shop keepers told us that Iraqi diary farms were slaughtering off their herds due to lack grain and poultry farmers were also slaughtering off their laying hens for the same reason.

We began sensing nervousness throughout the city. The US buildup to "Desert Shield" was well underway and the GOI knew US troop strength and the coalition was rapidly growing. Hence the Iraqis began preparing the populace for air attacks by in placing antiaircraft guns on many of the city's government buildings and occasionally sounding the air raid sirens. The GOI efforts were not new to the populace, they were quick to inform us they had been through air, and missile attacks during the war with Iran. The locals that we spoke with just would not believe that attacks by the US would be far more devastating. They had a real mindset that they would survive and somehow Saddam would protect them.

The GOI also began publicizing how their "Human Shields" would help protect key strategic sites and ensure peace. Military checkpoints already present began showing up randomly throughout the city. Gasoline rationing went into effect, although there was no shortage of gas, many felt it was a measure to keep the populace from traveling very far from Baghdad. Often during the evening hours, while on our rooftop, we would observe antiaircraft fire and tracers arching upward in the night skies. It was becoming more difficult to move about Baghdad and we could tell the Iraqi secret police had doubled their efforts in surveillance, and stepped up efforts to follow us around.

While performing watch officer duties on 12 October, I took a call from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). They requested the Charge immediately come down for a meeting. I notified the Charge and he proceeded to the Iraqi MFA to inquire as to why he was being summoned. He was informed by the MFA that the Government of Iraqi (GOI) took exception to a Voice of America broadcast which quoted a US diplomatic stating that Saddam Hussein was insane and they wanted to know what the US government was going to do about it. The Charge informed them that he would inquire with DOS to see if the U.S. would issue a demarche or position on Saddam's sanity. The Charge departed and we heard nothing else from the GOI or the MFA.

On the diplomatic front pressure was mounting on the GOI to release all hostages and all diplomats that were brought from Kuwait and detained in Baghdad. Baghdad's responses was a demand for all foreigners in Iraq and the 19th Providence (Kuwait) to immediately come forward and register with the Iraqi MFA. Our embassy in Baghdad was again requested to provide by diplomatic note a listing of all personnel being housed in the embassy and the resident quarters. They claimed a complete listing was needed to properly process personnel for future release. The Charge refused to comply, because a note had been previously provided in September and he knew the Iraqis were attempting to identify military personnel. Since the crisis began the GOI never really appeared concern with UN Resolution until the diplomatic community starting talking about "war crimes". Once word was leaked to the GOI that UN Resolution 674, "war crimes" was in the works and would soon be passed, they finally began to talk about possible release of hostages. This started another round of "Bargaining for Bodies", as former British Prime Minister Heath came to Baghdad and other notables from Ramsey Clark to Cat Stevens. We began working a releasable list of diplomats/US citizens with medical problems or over age sixty. Finally by 23 October, the Charge was successful in obtaining release of 12 people from our group and two from the American citizen's safehavened at Amb. Glaspie's residence.

As mid-October approached, a decision was made at the national level to implement a plan to get some members of our group out before hostilities began. I was told in early October that I was being considered for participation in an exfiltration operation out of Baghdad. I was concerned because the plan was only for a handful of people and I did not want to leave my comrades. I approached COL Mooneyham and asked him why I was selected, he side stepped the question, but made it clear to me that I must volunteer and go along with the plan.

Our Kuwait COS devised and coordinate the operation. The mission was risky and dangerous but offered the first plan with a reasonable high chance of success. I learned later that an Escape Committee formed in Washington to review possible escape plans, rescues, and other methods for retrieving the trapped diplomats and key personnel. The committee approved our plan after several meetings and detail reviews. The decision was finally made to execute the planned escape.

We conducted hurried training and recons of the pick-up location. The plan was simple, we would have papers, and documents that indicated we had valid exit visas and had been released to return home. This was not too irregular, since exit visas were being granted on case by case bias.

Everything seemed in place. We would be permitted one small type gym bag to carry a change of clothes, shaving kit, toothpaste, etc. We also placed in each bag ample cigarettes, and a few bottles of liquor to be used as pay off to any checkpoint guards who became too suspicious. After a few trial runs, we finally got the signal to go. We had setup a system to cover our absence by staying in the embassy compound for several days running. I was working a night shift so my absences from our living quarters would be less obvious to the Iraqi secret police. The embassy also implemented strict OPSEC and no other members of our group knew who or when any of us would be leaving. They would be told a few days after we left. COL Mooneyham had also prohibited phone calls and DOS messages to be sent until we had safely made it out of Iraq.

We departed on a cloudy evening with a slight drizzle coming down. The first leg was our pick-up and trip to a safe house. Pick-up went without a problem and we headed to a secure area. Once there we met the people who would assist with our escape. That night we were given our documents, discussed the route, possible danger areas, and actions to be taken if we ran into trouble. About 0500hrs the next morning, we refueled the car from a 55-gal drum that was stored at secure area. Once out of Baghdad, we hit our first military checkpoint. Our driver showed our papers and we were waved through, one down and many more to go. A lead vehicle had gone ahead of us by several hours to recon checkpoints and position our refuel point on a barren stretch of road. We made it to the refuel point by late afternoon and pulled off the road several kilometers to make our final refuel. While refueling, an Iraqi Bedouin walked up to our refuel operation. We quickly began offering him cigarettes and liquor. After a few minutes of small talk, he wondered off. We had to move quickly out of fear that he would inform any Iraqi patrols about our activities or our presence in the area. We headed down the road for several more miles when our lead vehicle came back and signaled us to pull over. He had observed the next checkpoint and noted that the Iraqis were being very tough on vehicles coming through the checkpoint. We made the decision that everyone would pretend to be asleep as we went through the checkpoint and let our guide do all the talking if question. We took some of the liquor and poured it on our clothes and around the car’s interior. Our driver would explain that we had all passed out from drinking too much in celebration of returning home. When we reach the checkpoint, the guards took our papers. After five minutes they returned and instructed our driver to get out of the car. He broke out some cigarettes and started small talk in Arabic with the guards, after a few laughs they told him he could leave, but he should not allow drinking and driving. He thanked them in the profusely Arabic manner and we quickly departed.

As we closed on the crossing area, our lead vehicle appeared again. We pulled over and were told that the Iraqi customs agent were being very thorough and confirming all exit visas with Baghdad. This was a huge disappointment. Our friends had already patterned the crossing area, but as always "Murphy" hits when least expected. We had now gone too far to turn back. We knew our papers and documentation were good and had worked through many checkpoints, but this crossing area would be much tougher. We all discussed the options and decided again to try pretending to have drunk too much and let our escort do the all the talking. We would act somewhat intoxicated and not respond if questioned. We would wait for our escort to intervene and handle the situation.

As we pulled into the checkpoint area, we were instructed to get out of the car and submit our bags for inspection. Since the custom officials spoke little English, we pretended not to understand them when they spoke to us. As expected they confiscated what cigarettes and liquor we had left and then moved us to a building. As suspected, they wanted to confirm with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Baghdad that our exit visas were still valid. The Iraqis all through this crisis would sometimes issue exit visa and then revoke them at the last minute. This perhaps was one of the most dangerous periods of our journey, had the Iraqis decided to interrogate us we would have been exposed and imprisoned. Furthermore, traveling under this cover would probably have gotten us all a death sentence. Our luck held and we endured the wait with extreme high anxiety. Our guide handled all the talking and after almost an hour of waiting they finally agreed to allow us to pass. We would have to walk across no man's land. Our guide would have to leave and since he was not allowed to escort us across. We picked up our bags and headed across. About a fourth of the way into the no man's land, an Iraqi guard called out for us to halt. We were not sure if they had changed their minds. We thought about making a dash for it, but we quickly realized we could not outrun their automatic weapons. We halted and the Iraqi guard approached me and asked for a cigarette, I more that willingly handed him a fresh pack and gestured for him to keep it, he nodded and motioned us on.

We stepped into freedom after some 80 days of detention. Two more guides linked up with us and would transport us to another location. We would retain our cover and travel incognito. The escape would not be publicized or revealed at anytime, so as not to expose anyone that assisted us, and not spoil any other planned exfiltrations.

Our next leg would be a journey to link-up with US officials. After a three-days of travel, we finally left for the United States aboard an USAF Gulfstream II jetliner. Once in the US we were taken to Camp Peary near Williamsburg, Va. Upon arrival there, our wives or family members were present to greet us. After a few days at Camp Peary for debriefings, we were released to go home.

I finally returned home without fanfare and just glad the ordeal was done. I still had great apprehension over leaving behind my friends and comrades. Nevertheless, our test of this potential pipeline to get folks out had proved viable. Before any others could be brought out via the same method, the GOI had a change of heart and allowed all western hostages to begin departing Iraq and Kuwait in early December. By mid-December, the embassies in Kuwait, and Baghdad closed and all remaining hostages were freed by the GOI. The Baghdad embassy remains closed to this day and the American Embassy Kuwait was reopened in early March 1991 shortly after the ground war ended.

As a military officer caught up in an invasion and hostage situation the most difficult task was ensuring my family's safety while duty bound to perform the task I had been trained to do. Once family members were allowed to leave that conflict was resolved. All that I served with during this crisis performed with dedication, professionalism, and distinction, even when caught between two masters, DOS, and DoD. It is my belief that the military group serving at the U.S. Embassy Kuwait and subsequently at the embassy in Baghdad had a direct and positive influence in sustaining and maintaining the operations of those compounds, perhaps more so than any other group detained within those compounds. Our contributions to morale, welfare, logistics, and day to day operations help to ensure the national goals and objectives were meet in regards to operating a diplomatic post during a time of crisis.

After everyone returned, we all faced the task of putting our lives back together and dealing the total loss of our household goods. The Army required that we go through the standard claims procedure to account for our losses, this was a daunting task and took us nearly a year to complete the paper work, only to realize that almost everything we had was depreciated on the average of 40%. Most of us got duty stations of our choice and nearly 30 days of administrative leave to get our families and lives back in order.

By January 1991, some of us were asked to return to Desert Shield. Of the original group of 11 military 5 of us returned to help the Kuwaitis reconstitute their Armed Forces, but that’s another story. Prior to my return, my local hometown paper interviewed me. During the interview I was asked how long a ground war with Iraqi would last, I ponder the question for a few seconds and then respond based on my first hand observations of the vaunted Republican Guards. I first told the reporter that I had no respect for the Iraqi Army, then provided this response:

"If war breaks out, I expect it to last about two weeks, I think our Air power would be decisive enough to turn the Iraqis around and convince them it's a hopeless cause. His Air Force would be gone in a day or two…I think after our Air power finished, they would largely begin to capitulate, to surrender, or withdraw their forces. Our ground forces would then be in a mop-up operation, not heavy combat actions. Either now or later Saddam must be dealt with, I would think he would heed the lesson for a while, but continue either clandestinely or however obtaining nuclear, biological and chemical weapons…if he remains in power… You will see him raise his ugly head again". (6 January 1991).[xiii]

This was what all of us had summarized after witnessing the invasion and conduct of the Republican Guards. When we all returned no one in the military intelligence community wanted to hear that or believe that was true. We knew better from direct observation and interaction with Iraqi military. Lastly, if anyone had bothered to do any superficial research of the performance of the Republican Guards during the Iran/Iraq war they would quickly summarize that they were a large fourth rate Army that was poorly led and trained.[xiv]

I hope that some useful insights can be gained from this document and serve as a history of a small military organization caught-up in a world crisis.

USLOK MEMBERS [xv]

2 August - 10 December 1990

Military

Col John Mooneyham

LTC Tom Funk

LTC Rhoi Maney

Maj Fred Hart

CPT Bill Schultz

CW4 Dave Forties

CW3 Dwight Durmon

CW3 Gene Lord

MSG Alfred Allen

SFC Laruen Vellekoop

CPO Ray Galles

USMC Embassy Detachment

GYSGT Jim Smith

SGT Gerald Andre

CPL Dan Hudson

CPL Paul Rodriguez

CPL Mark Royer

CPL Mark Ward

Civilians (DoD)

Veron Nored

Wayne Coyne

Bobby Higgins

ENDNOTES

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[i] Kuwaiti citizenship was based on a family's lineage; full citizenship was based on ancestry prior to Kuwait's independence. All others received citizenship in varying degrees. Bedouins or stateless nomadic peoples had the lowest form of citizenship and state sponsored amenities.

[ii] The Arabs have a saying,"Enemy of my enemy is my friend", and we often thought this drove much of their diplomacy.

[iii] All the oil rich Gulf states had growing minority Shiite populations that were influenced by radical Shia Fundamentalism which was often linked to Iran.

[iv] August is normally the hottest month of the year and the traditional vacation time for Kuwaitis, something the Iraqis were well attuned to.

[v] Embassy and CENTCOM message traffic the week prior to the invasion provided estimates of the Iraqi troop build-up along the border area.

[vi] Arab Times (Kuwait City), 2-3 August 1990

[vii] Reuters news service, 12 January 1995, interview with Col. Srour

[viii] Kuwait had an extremely large expatriate work population; several hundred thousand would attempt to flee during the first week of the invasion. Unfortunately most were turned back at the Iraq and Saudi borders because their passports were retain by their Kuwaiti sponsors. This became a problematic for many Americans who were in Kuwait on work visas.

[ix] The US embassy maintained a Warden roster, similar to a military Non combatant evacuation (NEO) plan and had conducted a meeting with some of the Wardens the week prior to the invasion. Unfortunately in the rush to shred documents during the invasion the emergency evacuation plan was destroyed. In addition, the loss of the embassy phone lines by late evening 2 August complicated the situation.

[x] The intent is not self-serving, but merely an attempt to set the record straight. As stated, Feeley did the right thing in getting the intelligence to CENTCOM. However, in both books, he is identified as the sole source and this is a misrepresentation of the facts. Feeley merely reported the intelligence with his personal spin on it. This would also be the case once when we got to Baghdad. From our point of view Feeley and Schwatz had taken very little risk when compared to the USLOK team members. Another troubling piece of information cited in Triump without Victory, is the assertion that Feeley is the sole Middle Eastern expert at the embassy. The truth was Chief Forties had the most expertise, he spoke Arabic, and had been in Kuwait for over three years and had previous military tours to Morocco and Lebanon. In reality, Feeley had practically no Middle Eastern experience or expertise.

[xi] During the first day of the invasion, all US currency on hand in the Embassy was shredded. The Ambassador through cable message traffic had DOS transfer funds to Mr.Sultan's stateside banking account.

[xii] Richard P. Stevens, editor, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: American Reflections, International Education and Communications Group, Washington D.C. April 1993, a composite of various stories by Americans that were trapped in Kuwait and Iraq during the crisis.

[xiii] Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, interview with Major Fred Hart, 6 January 1990, section D-1.

[xiv] I read two books about the Iran/Iraq war prior to the invasion. What had prompted me to read up on the Iraqis was a Marine Colonel guest speaker while I was attending Air Command and Staff College, 1988-1989. He had made a few remarks about how the Iraqi Army was the only modern army in the last ten years to maneuver Corps and execute operational campaigns. He assessed correctly that the Iraqis were probably more of a threat than the Iranians. However, his assessment that they were well trained, equipped, and capable of complexed Corps level operations proved untrue. For further insights on the Iraqi Army I recommend the following two books: Dilip Hiro, The Longest War:The Iran-Iraq Conflict, New York: Routledge, 1991 and John Bulloch & Harvey Morris, The Gulf War: It's Orgins, History and Consequences, London: Methuen 1989.

[xv] The names listed are not inculsive, several USLOK members were out of country. The civilians include some TDYers who happen to be in country when the invasion occurred. I may have overlooked a few civilian names since my list of personnel is incomplete. Also Maj John Feeley was a CENTCOM courier and not a member of USLOK. One other individual was Navy LT CDR Mike Schwartz who was also a TDYer and not part of USLOK.

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