Engagement CP Answers: China



Engagement CP Answers: China TOC \o "1-3" \u Engagement CP Answers: China PAGEREF _Toc48298576 \h 1***SOLVENCY*** PAGEREF _Toc48298577 \h 1Generic: 2AC PAGEREF _Toc48298578 \h 1Generic: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48298579 \h 1China Says No: 2AC PAGEREF _Toc48298580 \h 1China Says No: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48298581 \h 1China Says No: Senkaku Islands PAGEREF _Toc48298582 \h 1China Says No: Ideological Inflexibility PAGEREF _Toc48298583 \h 1No Verification/Enforcement: 2AC PAGEREF _Toc48298584 \h 1No Verification/Enforcement: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48298585 \h 1Military Competition PAGEREF _Toc48298586 \h 1***TURNS*** PAGEREF _Toc48298587 \h 1Alienates Allies: 2AC PAGEREF _Toc48298588 \h 1Alienates Allies: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48298589 \h 1US Credibility: 2AC PAGEREF _Toc48298590 \h 1Chinese Adventurism: 2AC PAGEREF _Toc48298591 \h 1Chinese Adventurism: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48298592 \h 1US Weakness: 2AC PAGEREF _Toc48298593 \h 1***PERMUTATIONS*** PAGEREF _Toc48298594 \h 1Unilateral Concessions: 2AC PAGEREF _Toc48298595 \h 1Plan = Pre-Requisite: 2AC PAGEREF _Toc48298596 \h 1Plan = Pre-Requisite: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48298597 \h 1***SOLVENCY***Generic: 2ACShort term grand bargain with China isn’t necessaryThe Diplomat, 8-6-15(“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFNThird, as its recent stock market crash makes all too obvious, China remains a “fragile superpower,” to quote Susan Shirk. Many factors in its domestic political situation—corruption, growing wealth disparities, and many forms of civil challenges to government legitimacy—make it an unpredictable player. Nor is China showing meaningful signs of political liberalization. There’s so much brewing underneath the surface in China that dealing with China today as if it were a hegemon tomorrow assumes too much, and grants China too much credit too soon.Generic: ExtensionsUS-China grand bargain doesn’t solve for all the causes of Asian instability The Diplomat, 8-6-15(“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFNSecond, and as I’ve written about extensively elsewhere, Asia is rife with security concerns that have nothing to do with China directly, so any understanding reached with China would leave unresolved many of the region’s latent sources of potential conflict. Sino-U.S. grand bargain proponents forget that China and the United States only have real conflicts of interest by proxy. Every conceivable conflict scenario involves China and some other Asian state—Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Korea. The United States only becomes part of the picture because of a commitment to regional order, including its alliance network.Grand bargain theory has been discredited The Diplomat, 8-6-15(“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFNFourth, there’s a defunct theory that’s been smuggled into arguments about changing Chinese behavior through U.S. accommodation. Political scientists call it “neofunctionalism,” a term rarely used these days, even though its spirit is pervasive in grand bargain arguments. Neofunctionalism came about in the 1950s as a failed way to account for and push for European integration. The basic idea involved an assumption that low level and innocuous types of cooperation would “spillover” into still more and better quality cooperation. Comity among nations, it was thought, would be the eventual outcome of mundane socioeconomic interactions. But by the 1970s, the theory had become largely discredited.China Says No: 2ACChina says no because they believe they can get a better deal later Lewis, CSIS Senior Vice President, 7-31-20(James Andrew, “Take Me to the Cleaners: Negotiating with China,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFNIt was always difficult to extract concessions from China, and now it is even more so. The Chinese believe that the United States and the West are in decline and they are in the ascendant, so there is less incentive for them to agree now, since they will get a better agreement later as they wait for the United States to weaken. This creates a complex negotiating landscape. The possibilities for agreement are shaped by these Chinese expectations of changes in relative power. China's ability to advance its own interests in any negotiation, often in ways that are not obvious, should never be discounted.China Says No: Extensions China says no to negotiations on strategic issues Lewis, CSIS Senior Vice President, 7-31-20(James Andrew, “Take Me to the Cleaners: Negotiating with China,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFNThe first is process. Most diplomats would argue that it is always better to have a negotiating process even if there is no expectation of agreement in the near term. It creates a mechanism for authoritative discussion (countless Track II dialogues with China are not a substitute). It is not clear that the Chinese are willing to begin such a process, however. When a Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) negotiator was asked recently if China would consider “mil-to-mil talks,” he replied that the PLA was not ready whether the talks were formal or informal. The current trade talks seem to be an exercise in fending off U.S. demands by making minimal concessions on peripheral issues. While the Russians are eager to engage since it reinforces their status as a great power, the Chinese are much more cautious. At times in previous negotiations, it appeared that the Chinese recognized Western impatience and would simply delay in the hopes that as an administration came to its end the American side would make more concessions. Engaging with the Chinese has value in itself but offers no near-term possibility for agreement on strategic issues.China Says No: Senkaku Islands China says no to bargaining over the Senkaku Islands Glaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN Second, and probably more worrisome, China’s actions could reflect an increase in the value that its leadership places on achieving its goals. The shift in China’s framing of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute implies a reduced willingness to compromise on this issue. Although this could simply reflect the reduced risks of ?fighting, it could also result from an increase in the value that China places on prevailing. China appears to have largely abandoned its “peaceful rise” strategy, which was intended to avoid scaring neighboring countries and, in turn, to avoid generating military buildups and the formation and deepening of opposing alliances.52 China’s recent actions suggest that it now places lower priority on avoiding provoking other states.China Says No: Ideological Inflexibility Negotiating a meaningful agreement with China is impossible due to ideological inflexibility Lewis, CSIS Senior Vice President, 7-31-20(James Andrew, “Take Me to the Cleaners: Negotiating with China,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFNThere are periods in international relations when meaningful negotiation is not possible. The 1930s with Germany and the 1950s with the Soviet Union are examples. Authoritarian regimes who believe they are in the ascendant and their opponents are weak are not predisposed to agree to self-constrain, which is the essence of agreement. We are in such a period now. China’s Communist Party shares the authoritarian heritage of the Germans and the Soviets. Anyone who has not negotiated in an official capacity with China may have an overly rosy view of the possibilities of reaching agreement with them. They are shrewd, tough, sensitive to perceived slights, and when pushed sufficiently, they can be chauvinistic and in some instances ideological. From a negotiator's perspective, these are compliments. China has some of the best diplomats in the world. Putting aside the current generation of wolf-warrior diplomats, many senior Chinese negotiators are experienced and skilled. They are sometimes known in the West as "foreign devil handlers" given that one key function is to deflect Western criticism or demands. Party officials and military officers can be less urbane and more dogmatic, and in some negotiations, there is a palpable fear of displeasing the Party and suffering the consequences hanging over the Chinese side (especially those who are more junior). This can introduce a degree of rigidity in Chinese negotiating styles that can also make reaching agreement difficult.No Verification/Enforcement: 2ACChina will ignore the deal when it’s no longer in their interest Lewis, CSIS Senior Vice President, 7-31-20(James Andrew, “Take Me to the Cleaners: Negotiating with China,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFNAnother dilemma for negotiation is the Chinese penchant for ignoring an agreement when it is no longer in their interest (and when there are no consequences for doing so). China's World Trade Organization (WTO) access has been accompanied by two decades of willfully ignoring commitments. The solemn agreement with the United Kingdom on “one country, two systems” for Hong Kong is no longer convenient and is now gone. The 2015 Agreement with the United States to end commercial espionage lasted a matter of months before economic and political necessity drove China to ignore it. Absent compulsion, the Chinese do not feel bound to observe their commitments.No Verification/Enforcement: Extensions Lack of verification and enforcement means any agreement with China is meaningless Lewis, CSIS Senior Vice President, 7-31-20(James Andrew, “Take Me to the Cleaners: Negotiating with China,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFNThe second is verification. Any agreement with an antagonistic opponent where verification cannot be measured in concrete terms is useless. Some analysts suggest an accord where China agreed to “review” its human right practices in exchange for concessions on decoupling might be sufficient as part of a larger deal on technology. Concrete verifiable measures, in contrast, would involve observable change and measurable commitments, such as closing the reeducation camps in Xingjian or restoring the status quo ante in Hong Kong. China would never agree to these, but that only highlights the uselessness of any vague commitment. The third is consequences. When China entered the WTO in 2000, it accepted a large number of commitments but honored very few. It has (until recently) never been held accountable for this. It is a mistake to go into any negotiation without first considering what will be verified and enforced, and the United States has only begun to develop consequences, such as the sanctions on Huawei, for China’s misbehavior.Military Competition Grand bargains don’t solve for US-China military competition The Diplomat, 8-6-15(“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFNBut grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises. China’s concerns will only be assuaged when the United States divests of the military force structure that makes it possible to project power globally, uphold its commitments, and bolster the regional order. The U.S. military will be unable to pursue such a course as long as China maintains openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions and a force structure designed to achieve it. Competition, it seems, is the logic of the situation. We ignore that at our own peril.***TURNS***Alienates Allies: 2ACUS-China grand bargain inherently alienates US allies The Diplomat, 8-6-15(“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFNFirst, any proposal for a Sino-U.S. solution to regional problems is by definition taking a great power view of Asia that marginalizes the agency and strategic relevance of U.S. allies and the region’s middle powers. In the brief period (five to ten years ago) when a G-2 concept was taken semi-seriously in Washington, allies—especially South Korea and Japan—chafed. The region’s middle powers would be unlikely to simply follow the joint dictates of China and the United States without being part of it, and attempting a G-2 could ironically create a more fragmented order as a result. Including others, at any rate, is antithetical to the concept of a Sino-U.S. G-2 arrangement. As early as the 1960s U.S. officials tried to rely on China to deal with regional issues spanning from North Korea to Vietnam. It was almost always to no avail.Alienates Allies: Extensions US-China grand bargain hurts US relations with Europe, India, and AustraliaDi Lieto, Monash Univ. Senior Lecturer, 2-28-19(Giovanni, “What’s worse than the US-China trade war? A grand peace bargain,” accessed 8-7-20, ) JFNBut far worse for Australia, and its Asia-Pacific neighbours, could be a deal to end the trade war, especially if it involves a grand geopolitical bargain between the US and China. Bilateral world order Considering the US administration’s hard-line approach, for a truly comprehensive deal to occur China would have to subscribe to a serious restructuring of its industrial system. This would ultimately mean phasing out covert state subsidies, liberalising its financial markets and giving up on meaningful technological competition in security-sensitive sectors. But out of fear an ongoing trade war will harm its export-driven economic progress, and also as an expedient step for advancing its regional hegemony, China might eventually agree to all this as part of a grand bargain. Essentially, a grand bargain with an “America First” US administration makes sense on the mutually beneficial assumption it would lay the foundations for a bilateral world order. As part of the deal the US would dramatically reduce its strategic footprint from the Middle East through to the Korean peninsula. The advantage would be it could focus resources on limiting China’s naval role across Indo-Pacific trading routes. Retreating to a more sustainable role as the indispensable maritime power across the Pacific and Indian oceans would leave China free rein to exert its weight on land in Eurasia. The US might see that as advantage. Chinese regional hegemony inland would give Russia more to think about on its south-eastern border, rather than causing problems for US allies in eastern Europe. It would also put extreme pressure on India to finally evolve into a subsidiary power to the US maritime empire, one of the wildest strategic dreams in Washington. The downside would be that Russia might end up as a subservient commodity supplier to China’s regional empire. Russia’s geo-economic downgrade would strengthen European resolve to run independently of the US, one of the worst nightmares in Washington. For China, the prize would be achieving the main strategic ambitions of its Belt and Road Initiative, ultimately controlling land trading routes from Beijing to Venice. The strategic cost would be abandoning its maritime ambitions. Where this leaves Australia Where would this bilateral world system vision leave Australia? Certainly worse off than the current situation. With interlocking spheres of influence across the Indo-Pacific rim (US) and the Eurasian landmass (China), at best Australia would become a marginal economic and security appendage of the two hegemons. Relegated to the role of a price- and rule-taking commodity supplier to China, Australia would remain only nominally a US ally. It would be a rather disposable buffer state at the frontier of two empires, caught between the economic and security crossfire of proxy conflicts.East Asian countries would bitterly oppose a US-China grand bargain Goh, Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University, 16(Evelyn, “Is a ‘Grand Bargain’ the Way Forward in Northeast Asia?,” December 2016, accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN Within China, a debate is growing slowly but steadily away from Deng Xiaoping’s taoguang yanghui policy of biding time to develop comprehensive national power, towards questions of what kind of great power China should be and whether China ought to support or challenge the existing order. But this is still a gradual awakening, and without more coherence in narrowing down the parameters of this struggle for identity, power sharing with the US cannot be an option seriously favored by opinion leaders in the face of growing popular nationalism within China. Other countries in East Asia, meanwhile, either sustain national security identities that feed upon the assurance of continued US primacy, ground their national security strategies upon at least some degree of US-China rivalry, or seek to retain some strategic autonomy by forestalling great power domination. For all three reasons, any new bargain premised upon a potential US-China condominium is distasteful. Looking beyond Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, it is hard to imagine effusive support for the concert of great powers that White suggests, which would by definition exclude the majority of these small states. This was already evident in ASEAN’s successful attempts to undermine an earlier Australian initiative to construct an Asia-Pacific Community centered on the major powers. Once again, picking out Indonesia as a sub-regional power only elicits alarm and resistance from this collection of states that have expended so much political and institutional effort to create for ASEAN a driving seat in regionalism precisely in order to avoid great power dominance that would undermine their autonomy.US Credibility: 2ACGrand bargain with China eviscerates US credibility and global influence Auslin, Hoover Institute Research Fellow, 8-3-17(Michael, “A grand bargain with China could remove North Korea’s nuclear threat — but it would destroy America’s global influence,” LA Times, accessed 8-8-20, ) JFNBut in reality, a grand bargain with China is likely to destroy America’s global influence, making it impossible for Washington to maintain stability in strategic areas, particularly in Asia and Europe. Indeed, merely proposing an agreement of this sort would make the U.S. into a paper tiger and compromise American credibility in Asia and around the world. A grand bargain would effectively transfer America’s dominance to China. No matter how the White House spun such a deal, world leaders would infer that the U.S. had gone hat in hand to China. Recognizing China as the true foreign power on the peninsula, South Korea and other Asian nations would tilt inevitably toward Beijing. It’s also possible that South Korea and Japan, among other countries, would decide that they had no choice but to develop nuclear weapons for their own national defense. Moreover, having seen the U.S. kowtow, Beijing would likely take a more assertive posture in the South China Sea and push Washington further, demanding a more comprehensive drawdown of American military forces from East Asia. Even if Washington refused to buckle, Sino-U.S. relations would enter a period of heightened tension and antagonism, undoubtedly encouraging both Moscow and Tehran to double down on their destabilizing behavior. In short, a bargain would spell serial diplomatic failure for the U.S. As frustrating as it may seem, our long-standing strategy of containment and deterrence toward North Korea remains our best hope. This strategy will test our patience, but there are a few policies the White House can adopt to make its position more credible.Chinese Adventurism: 2ACGrand bargain increases Chinese adventurism and aggression Easley, Scranton College International Studies Prof., 16(Leif-Eric, “Correspondence,” International Security, 3-1-16, accessed 8-7-20, p. EBSCOhost) JFN Rather than alleviate frictions, a grand bargain would likely motivate beliefs that China could eventually dismantle the U.S. security architecture in Asia, emboldening actors on the Chinese side to pursue their interests more assertively. U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would entail repealing the Taiwan Relations Act, ending the legal basis for defense cooperation and arms sales, immediately undermining deterrence, and steadily degrading Taiwan’s defense capabilities in ways difficult to reverse.14 Meanwhile, China’s salami tactics, in combination with its ability to quickly redeploy military assets it might agree to pull back and its demonstrated long-term approach to the East China and South China Seas, make any such deal as Glaser suggests not credible. Chinese official documents give no reason to believe that Beijing would be conciliatory on other claims if the United States accommodated China on Taiwan.15 Taipei also claims sovereignty over the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Beijing’s legal claim to these islands, which it calls the Diaoyu Islands, heavily relies on the history of the Republic of China and the status of “Taiwan Province.”16 Meanwhile, Taiwan maintains troops and recently upgraded its facilities on Taiping/Itu Aba, the largest naturally occurring feature of the disputed Spratly Islands, where China has been engaged in land reclamation and construction on features it controls. U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would likely make Chinese decision makers believe they could strengthen their claims in the East China and South China Seas by coercing Taipei to consolidate its positions with those of Beijing. Chinese Adventurism: ExtensionsGrand bargains give the CCP leadership cover to blame the US for any domestic failures Zhao, Univ. of Denver Foreign Policy Prof., 19(Suisheng, “Engagement on the Defensive: From the Mismatched Grand Bargain to the Emerging US–China Rivalry,” Journal of Contemporary China, accessed 8-7-20, p. Taylor & Francis Online) JFN But American pressure could provide a cover for President Xi to blame America for the inevitable slowdown in China’s economy and other problems and call for the Chinese people to rally behind the state. External hostile pressure has historically helped mobilize Chinese nationalism against any concessions that could be regarded as surrender to foreign powers. Along with the escalation of the trade war, the Chinese media has portrayed the economic friction as part of an American conspiracy and even a grand strategy to contain China. Pursuing the ‘China Dream’ of restoring China to wealth and power on the basis of some valid historical grievances and considerable resources, many Chinese people have accepted the government position because, on top of the trade war, the broader anti-China trend in US politics has been an intensely unwelcome surprise to the Chinese people.60US Weakness: 2ACDeal with China is unlikely and China views the US requesting talks as a sign of weakness Lewis, CSIS Senior Vice President, 7-31-20(James Andrew, “Take Me to the Cleaners: Negotiating with China,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFNAny negotiation with the Chinese has to be approached with an understanding that success is a distant possibility. A good thought exercise is to ask what concessions could reasonably be demanded and obtained from Nazi Germany in the 1930s. There were none that would deflect the authoritarian regime from its intended course. Despite some similarities, China is not Nazi Germany. But authoritarian regimes that hold a grudge (and China believes it has been denied its rightful place at the center of the world stage), disrespect opponents and reject their values, are engaged in a military buildup, and believe that the international order must be restructured to serve its interests are not good candidates for agreement. The United States does not want to be the “demandeur” in these circumstances. China will see our requests as a sign of weakness they can exploit to obtain concessions.***PERMUTATIONS***Unilateral Concessions: 2ACGrand Bargains can be implemented via smaller increments, including unilateral concessions Glaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN Another way to balance feasibility and benefits, therefore, could be to look for a path that divides the grand bargain into smaller, more attainable increments. One can imagine a series of steps, including the United States ending its arms sales to Taiwan and China ending its use of force to advance its maritime claims, that could be implemented sequentially to create a phased grand bargain. This approach would enable the United States to revert to its current Taiwan policy if China failed to uphold its side of the phased agreement. Another possibility might include partial resolution of the maritime disputes. An agreement that delayed resolution of the sovereignty disputes far into the future, or indefinitely, while settling the resource disputes would be more feasible to achieve than a full resolution. This type of agreement could be possible because, for the most part, the sovereignty disputes can be separated from the resource disputes. In fact, China and Japan reached this type of arrangement in 2008, although it has yet to be implemented.111 The United States could pursue a variant of this staged approach that would enable it to try to push the diplomatic process forward. In this more proactive model, the United States would make its initial concession unilaterally, while explaining that further concessions would hinge on China’s reciprocation of its initial move.Plan = Pre-Requisite: 2ACPlan is a pre requisite to a successful grand bargain Etzioni, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 17(Amitai, “Toward a Grand Bargain With China,” Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly, accessed 8-7-20, p. ProQuest) JFN A Buffer Zone The United States formed military alliances with, signed agreements allowing the placement of American troops and other military assets in, and conducted joint military exercises with many of the countries neighboring China. The United States views these arrangements as agreements between sovereign nations, a way of burden sharing, and part of a drive to contain or "counter-balance" China; however, China perceives these moves as an attempt at Cold War-era encirclement. China has also sought military alliances of its own with neighboring countries, adding to tensions in the region. These moves position American and Chinese military forces closer to each other, a proximity that could potentially lead to accidental clashes and conflicts. This risk has been highlighted by multiple incidents, including the April 2001 collision of a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft with a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fighter jet over the South China Sea approximately 65 miles southeast of China's Hainan Island, and an encounter between a PLAN Jianghu III-class frigate and an American surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea near South Korea nine days earlier.v Moreover, the various treaties and understandings between countries in East and Southeast Asia and either China or the United States have given several states in the region "a finger on the trigger" of a gun belonging to their superpower sponsor by stipulating that if the nation in question enters a war with one superpower, the other superpower will come to its aid. Some treaties explicitly entail such a commitment (e.g., the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, which is said to cover the Senkaku Islands). Others are ambiguous and easily misconstrued by the countries involved (e.g., the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines and the relationship between China and North Korea). It is therefore particularly troubling that some of these smaller states have engaged in provocative behavior. Such provocative behavior could not only lead to war between them and other states in the region but could also drag both superpowers into a confrontation with each other. A grand bargain might include an agreement to treat states that share land borders with China similarly to the way Austria was treated during the Cold War: as a buffer zone. (One additional model is that of East Germany following reunification; a 1990 agreement between Germany and the USSR stipulated that although the former East Germany would be given the status of NATO territory, neither NATO troops nor nuclear weapons would be stationed in these parts.vi) Both powers would be free to continue engaging these countries economically by investing, trading, and providing foreign aid, to share information, and to promote educational programs. However, neither the United States nor China would be permitted to extend any new military commitments to countries in the buffer zone, and both would be required to gradually phase out existing military commitments. The grand bargain could also stipulate a limit to joint military exercises and the placement of military assets in this zone. Above all, both powers would make it clear to their allies that they should not assume the automatic, guaranteed involvement of the United States or China if they engage in armed conflict or war with either of these two powers. Plan = Pre-Requisite: Extensions Plan is what China wants in a grand bargain with the US Goh, Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University, 16(Evelyn, “Is a ‘Grand Bargain’ the Way Forward in Northeast Asia?,” December 2016, accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN Second, there is a discourse in China on what a strategic bargain with the US might look like, particularly since the emergence of talk of a possible G2 and President Xi’s notion of “a new model of major power relations.” In a fairly typical liberal vein, Wu Xinbo argues that “it is time for China and the United States to try to reach an understanding on the evolving regional architecture through candid dialogue,” encompassing “more equal relations between the two sides of the Pacific.”17 The theme of a more equal exchange is echoed in a recent project by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences on US-China relations, which states that China would support a “positive leadership role” for the US if the latter would also support a “more positive and vigorous role in East Asia” that “leaves more room for maneuver for China in terms of claiming territorial rights and military development.” Specifically, the US needs to “recognize China’s sovereignty claims within its historical rights,” “avoid getting involved in the territorial disputes between China and its neighbors” and “should never interfere militarily in the disputes and crises between China and its neighbors.” ................
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