Further Evidence on the Relation between



Further Evidence on the Relation between

Analysts’ Forecast Dispersion and Stock Returns

Orie E. Barron

Associate Professor

Pennsylvania State University

Smeal College of Business Administration

University Park, PA 16802-1912

814-863-3230

Mary Stanford

Associate Professor, Nobel Faculty Fellow

Texas Christian University

M.J. Neeley School of Business

Fort Worth, TX 76129

Yong Yu

Pennsylvania State University

Smeal College of Business Administration

University Park, PA 16802-1912

September 29, 2005

(This is a preliminary revised draft of a manuscript requiring a major revision for publication. Please do not quote without permission)

We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of I/B/E/S International Inc. for providing earnings per share forecast data, available through the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System. These data have been provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings expectation research.

For their helpful comments we thank Richard Schnieble and workshop participants at the CUNY Baruch and Penn State University.

ABSTRACT

Previous research finds a negative association between the level of dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and subsequent stock returns. This finding can be consistent with either unsystematic uncertainty that is priced positively because it increases a firm’s option value (Johnson, 2004) or overpricing due to a lack` of consensus among investors that limits the short sales of the most pessimistic traders (Diether et al, 2002). We use the Barron et al. (1998) framework to measure the two theoretical variables that can both cause dispersion and cause it to be priced. These are (1) uncertainty or (2) a lack of consensus (i.e., a relatively high level of private information among analysts). A high level of uncertainty may be priced positively or negatively depending on whether it is systematic or unsystematic. In contrast, the private information that causes a lack of consensus is likely to be priced negatively because it reflects information asymmetry and a higher cost of capital (Botosan, Plumlee, and Xie 2004).

The evidence we report helps distinguish between the different explanations for forecast dispersion and what drives its relation to stock returns. We find that (1) changes in dispersion capture primarily changes in consensus (or changes in information asymmetry) whereas the level of dispersion captures primarily the level of unsystematic uncertainty (and not the level of information asymmetry), and (2) the uncertainty in forecast dispersion is negatively associated with future stock returns, but the lack of consensus (or information asymmetry) is positively associated with future stock returns. These findings support Johnson’s option value explanation but do not support Diether et al.’s overpricing explanation because lower levels of consensus do not lead to lower future returns.

In addition, our evidence that levels and changes in dispersion reflect fundamentally different constructs reconciles the evidence on changes in dispersion presented by L’Her and Suret (1996) with the conclusions of Diether et al.(2002) and Johnson (2004), both of which are inconsistent with L’Her and Suret’s argument that forecast dispersion represents uncertainty that is priced negatively. We find that increases in forecast dispersion coincide with more negative stock returns because there is less consensus (and thus more information asymmetry that adversely affects firms’ cost of capital).

1. Introduction

Prior research posits opposing explanations for the empirically documented relation between dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and stock returns. Diether et al. (2002) argue that the negative relation between dispersion levels and future returns is due to overpricing resulting from investor disagreement and limits on short sales that lead to optimistic current stock prices and lower future stock returns. Johnson (2004) presents a model suggesting that this negative relation may also be due to the uncertainty (or risk) reflected in dispersion which, although unsystematic in nature, increases the option value of the firm and leads to lower future returns. Further clouding the issue, Deither et al.’s arguments suggest a positive relation between changes in dispersion and contemporaneous stock returns. This is contrary to evidence presented by L’Her and Suret (1996) that increases in forecast dispersion are negatively associated with stock returns.

Using the Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) (hereafter BKLS) decomposition of dispersion into uncertainty and lack of consensus we are able to distinguish between these opposing explanations. Our evidence provides increased empirical support for Johnson’s conclusion that the level of dispersion analysts’ forecasts reflects unsystematic risk (uncertainty). In addition, consistent with L’Her and Suret’s (1996) findings, we find a negative relation between changes in dispersions and stock returns, which we show is likely caused by increased information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors reflected in a decrease in consensus.

Diether et al. (2002) argue that when investors disagree, limitations on trading, e.g., short sale limitations, result in prices that reflect the views of optimists but not pessimists. This suggests a negative relation between dispersion levels and future stock returns when the overpricing is corrected and a positive relation between changes in dispersions and stock returns. In addition, based on tests explaining dispersion with several measures of risk Diether et al. conclude “…our results strongly reject the interpretation of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as a measure of risk.” (p 2115).

By contrast, Johnson (2004) provides a pricing model in which the negative relation between dispersion levels and stock returns may be due to a form of information risk (uncertainty) where dispersion reflects nonsystematic risk (idiosyncratic uncertainty) that increases the option value of the firm and lowers expected future returns. However, as the author notes, his model is not inconsistent with Diether et al.’s overpricing argument, i.e., both may explain the relation between dispersion and returns.

We begin by empirically separating dispersion into its theoretical components. Theoretically, in order for dispersion in analysts’ forecasts to exist there must be both (1) some uncertainty regarding future performance and (2) some lack of consensus due to the diversity of private information (Barry and Jennings 1992; Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia 1995; Barron, et al. 1998). Thus, it is unclear the degree to which forecast dispersion reflects uncertainty or a lack of consensus. Finding that dispersion levels reflect uncertainty rather than consensus would provide some support for Johnson’s (2004) hypothesis that dispersion levels reflect information risk. Finding that changes in dispersion reflect changes in consensus would serve to increase understanding of the findings of L’Her and Suret (1996) and to reconcile these findings with those of Johnson (2004) and Diether et al. (2002).

We provide evidence on whether dispersion in analysts’ forecasts reflects uncertainty or a lack of consensus using the BKLS empirical proxies for these theoretical constructs. We examine both the level of dispersion prior to an earnings announcement and the change in dispersion around earnings announcements.[1] We find that the level of pre-announcement forecast dispersion reflects primarily uncertainty rather than a lack of consensus. By contrast, changes in forecast dispersion reflect primarily changes in consensus rather than changes in uncertainty.

Our finding that levels of dispersion reflect uncertainty is consistent with Johnson’s (2004) conclusion that the negative relation between dispersion levels and future stock returns is driven by uncertainty. In further analysis, we examine market data to determine whether the level of forecast dispersion reflects primarily systematic or unsystematic uncertainty about future performance. We show that higher levels dispersion are associated with higher idiosyncratic risk and lower future returns. This combined evidence provides support for Johnson’s argument that the negative relation between future returns and dispersion is due to investors’ unsystematic uncertainty and not overpricing.

Although this evidence lends support to Johnson’s theory it does not completely rule out Deither et al.’s (2002) conclusion that the negative relation results from overpricing due to investor disagreement. However, Deither et al.’s argument that dispersion is negatively associated with future returns implies a positive (negative) relation between consensus (lack of consensus) and future stock returns because dispersion increases as consensus (lack of consensus) decreases (increases). In contrast to the positive relation implied by the overpricing argument, we find a negative (positive) relation between consensus (lack of consensus) and future returns. This finding also increases understanding of L’Her and Suret’s (1996) evidence that increases in dispersion coincide with decreases in stock returns. Specifically, we show that increases in forecast dispersion coincide with decreases in consensus that reflect information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors and that increases in dispersion coincides with decreases in stock returns. Because low consensus stocks have high information asymmetry, this is also consistent with the positive relation between information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital hypothesized in Amihud and Mendelson (1986 and 1989), King et al. (1990), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), among others, and documented in previous studies (see Barron et al. 2005 for further discussion). Uninformed investors demand a return premium to compensate for their risk of trading with privately informed investors. This risk is not diversifiable since uninformed investors are always at a disadvantage relative to informed investors (O’Hara 2003) and demand to be compensated with higher expected future returns.

This evidence is of interest to accounting and finance researchers wishing to understand the relation between forecasts dispersion and stock returns. For example, understanding that levels and changes in dispersion reflect different theoretical constructs can help researchers choose the appropriate proxy. In addition, to the extent that dispersion is easily measured by investors while the BKLS measures are more complex and cannot be measured ex-ante our evidence allows investors as well as researchers to more precisely interpret the meaning of levels versus changes in forecast dispersion.[2]

The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical proxies and research design as it relates to the strength of the associations between both levels of and changes in forecast dispersion, analysts’ uncertainty, and analysts’ lack of consensus (or diversity of information). Section 3 investigates the relation between the two components of dispersion levels and future stock returns then provides evidence on the relation between dispersion levels and both systematic and unsystematic risk. Section 4 reconciles our evidence on changes in dispersion with prior research. Section 5 discusses robustness checks on the BKLS measures and alternate specifications. Finally, section 6 contains our conclusions.

2. Forecast Dispersion: Earnings Uncertainty or Lack of Consensus

BKLS show how one can measure the theoretical constructs uncertainty and consensus by exploiting the fact that forecast dispersion and error in analysts’ forecasts reflect these theoretical constructs differently. The intuition underlying their results stems from the fact that forecast dispersion and error differentially reflect error in analysts' common and idiosyncratic information. The BKLS empirical proxies for consensus and uncertainty are:

DISPERSION = V(1-ρ) (1)

CONSENSUS = ρ = 1-D/V (2)

Where:

|D = |dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, i.e., the sample variance of the individual forecasts (FCi )|

| |around the mean forecast ([pic]), measured as [pic], where n is the number of forecasts. |

|V = |Uncertainty, i.e., the mean of the squared differences between individual analysts’ forecasts |

| |(FCi ) and reported earnings per share (EPS) measured as[pic].[3] |

From equation (1), dispersion is the product of uncertainty (V) and lack of consensus (1-ρ). Thus, forecast dispersion is simultaneously determined by both uncertainty and lack of consensus.

To understand the intuition for these measures it is helpful to consider the extreme examples where CONSENSUS is zero or one and a large number of forecasts (n) exist as described in Barron, Harris, and Stanford (2005). With a large number of forecast, the difference between the mean forecast ([pic]) and realized earnings per share (EPS) only reflects error due to common information because idiosyncratic error is averaged out of the mean. When the mean forecast equals realized earnings CONSENSUS equals zero and D/V = 1. When this is true, the BKLS model suggests that forecasts are based entirely on private information because all forecast error is idiosyncratic. The difference between individual forecasts (FCi) and the mean forecast ([pic]) reflects error due to private information. When all individual forecasts are exactly equal to the mean forecast CONSENSUS equals one and D/V = 0. When this is true, the BKLS model suggests that forecasts are based entirely on common information because all forecast error is common. Consistent with V reflecting overall uncertainty, if all forecasts exactly equal realized earnings then V is equal to zero, consistent with perfectly accurate information, i.e., no uncertainty.

We investigate both the level of dispersion prior to earnings announcements and the change in dispersion estimated around earnings announcements and non-announcement dates. Specifically, we estimate the following models and use a Vuong test to compare the explanatory power of equation (3) and (4) to determine whether the level of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is more highly associated with lack of consensus or uncertainty prior to the earnings announcement. Similarly, comparing the explanatory power of equations (5) and (6) tests whether the change in dispersion around earnings announcements is better explained by changes in consensus or changes in uncertainty.

Log(D/P) = b0 + b1Log(V/P) + ε (3)

Log(D/P) = a0 + a1Log(1-CONSENSUS)+ ε (4)

Δlog(D/P) ’ d0 + d1 ΔLog(V/P) + ε (5)

Δlog(D/P) ’ c0 + c1 ΔLog(1-CONSENSUS) + ε (6)

where

Log(D/P) = natural log of dispersion D scaled by the stock price P. D is pre-announcement dispersion in analysts’ forecasts measured as the variance of analysts’ earnings forecasts issued within 30 days prior to the earnings announcement;

Log(V/P) = natural log of overall uncertainty V scaled by the stock price P. V is pre-announcement uncertainty estimated with equation (2) using forecasts issued within 30 days prior to the earnings announcement

Log(1-CONSENSUS) = natural log of one minus pre-announcement consensus (i.e., lack of consensus) estimated with equation (1) using forecasts issued within 30 days prior to the earnings announcement

Δlog(V/P) = change in natural log of overall uncertainty V scaled by the stock price P, estimated with equation (1) using forecasts issued within the 30-day pre-announcement window and a 30-day post-announcement window.

Δlog(D/P) = change in the log-transformed dispersion D scaled by the stock price P, measured as the variance of the annual earnings forecast issued within the 30-day pre-announcement window and a 30-day post-announcement window;

Δlog(1-CONSENSUS) = change in the log-transformed lack of consensus (1 minus consensus), where consensus is estimated with equation (1) using forecasts issued within the 30-day pre-announcement window and a 30-day post-announcement window;

Reported results scale dispersion (D) and uncertainty (V) by the stock price (P) measured at the end of the prior fiscal quarter. We take the natural log of the variables for two reasons: first, BKLS demonstrates that dispersion is equal to the product of uncertainty and lack of consensus (i.e. D=V(1- CONSENSUS)). Thus, it is natural to make this relation linear by taking the natural log; the second purpose is to mitigate skewness problems with dispersion and uncertainty. [4]

2.1. Sample Selection and Empirical Results

The sample consists of quarterly and annual earnings per share forecasts from 1986 to 2003. Analysts’ earnings forecasts and actual earnings per share data are obtained from Institutional Brokers Estimate (I/B/E/S).[5] Earnings announcement dates and other financial data are obtained from the quarterly COMPUSTAT Primary, Supplementary, or Tertiary file. We investigate one-quarter-ahead forecast and two-year-ahead forecasts. The one-quarter-ahead sample consists of quarterly forecasts measured within 30 days before the current quarterly earnings announcement. The two-year-ahead sample consists of annual earnings forecasts measured within 30 days before the prior annual earnings announcement.[6] To be included in the pre-announcement (levels) sample, two or more individual analysts must have issued forecasts within a 30-day pre-announcement window. To be included in the change sample two or more individual analysts must have issued forecasts within a 30-day pre-announcement window and these same analysts must have revised their forecast within a 30-day post-announcement window.

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and tests of the determinants of the level analysts’ forecast dispersion measured for one-quarter- and two-year-ahead forecasts. From panel A, the quarterly forecast sample consist of relatively large firms with a mean (median) market value of equity $6,073 ($1,450) million. The annual forecast sample, although still large, exhibits a slightly wider range of firm size with a mean (median) market value of equity of $5,667 ($1,288) million (Panel B). With respect to the variables of interest, both dispersion and uncertainty are less at the median for the quarterly forecast sample (0.001 and 0.002) than for the annual forecast sample (0.011 and 0.157). This is consistent with dispersion and uncertainty increasing with the forecast time horizon. Note that the standard deviation of the log-transformed uncertainty (D/V) is much smaller than the raw variable, e.g., 2.516 versus 85.535 for the quarterly forecasts. Thus, in addition to being the correct empirical specification given the multiplicative relation between dispersion, consensus and uncertainty suggested by BKLS, the log transformation corrects for the fact that uncertainty is not naturally scaled. Finally, consensus (ρ), which ranges from zero to one, is lower for the quarterly sample, 0.530 versus 0.912, at the median. This is consistent with analysts’ relying on common, i.e., public information for longer range forecasts.

In Table 1, Vuong’s (1989) Z-statistic tests which independent variable exhibits a greater association with the dependent variable. We use the procedures outlined in Dechow (1994) to compute the Z-statistic; a positive (negative) Z-statistic indicates that lack of consensus (uncertainty) has a greater association with the dependent variable. Panel A reports results of estimating equations (3) and (4) for the one-quarter ahead sample. As expected, the coefficients on pre-announcement consensus (measured as lack of consensus, 1-ρ) and preannouncement uncertainty are both significantly positive. The adjusted R2 for the model with preannouncement uncertainty is 55.30% while the adjusted R2 for the model with prior consensus is 3.99%. The Vuong’s Z-statistic is -68.92 (α = 0.001) indicating that the level of preannouncement uncertainty explains more of the variation in preannouncement dispersion levels than variation in consensus for quarterly forecasts. Panel B leads to the same conclusion for the annual forecast sample. Specifically, the adjusted R2 for the model with preannouncement uncertainty is 38.04% while the adjusted R2 for the model with prior lack of consensus is 7.20%. The Vuong’s Z-statistic is -29.13 (α = 0.001) indicating that preannouncement uncertainty levels explain more of the variation in preannouncement dispersion levels than variation in consensus for both long- and short-range forecasts.

Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and tests of the determinants of changes in analysts’ forecast dispersion around both quarterly and annual earnings announcements. The requirement that the same analysts that provided a forecast prior to an earnings announcement revise that forecast within 30 days after the announcement results in a much smaller sample of relatively large firms. Panel A describes the sample of quarterly earnings forecast updates around quarterly earnings announcements (n=10,150). Dispersion, uncertainty and consensus all decline after quarterly earnings announcements at both the mean and median. Panels B describe the sample of annual earnings forecast updates around annual earnings announcements (n=4,493). Consistent with the quarterly results, dispersion, uncertainty and consensus all decline after annual earnings announcements at both the mean and median. The decrease in consensus is consistent with that reported by Barron, Byard, and Kim (2002). They argue that consensus declines because analysts have incentives to use their own private knowledge to create private information (or private interpretations) from earnings announcements (see also Kim and Verrecchia 1994; 1997 and Fischer and Verrecchia 1998).

Panel A of Table 2 also reports the results of estimating equations (5) and (6) for quarterly earnings announcement. As expected, the coefficients on both changes in uncertainty and change in lack of consensus are significantly positive. The adjusted R2 for the model with change in uncertainty is 14.21% while the adjusted R2 for the model with change in lack of consensus is 51.79%. The Vuong Z-statistic is 23.07 (α = 0.001), indicating that changes in analysts’ lack of consensus explain more of the variation in changes in dispersion in analysts’ forecasts than changes in uncertainty. Panel B reports the results of estimating equations (5) and (6) for the annual earnings announcement. The results are consistent with those in Panel A with changes in lack of consensus explaining approximately 74% of changes in dispersion.

Overall, the evidence indicates that pre-announcement levels of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts proxy much more for pre-announcement uncertainty levels than for pre-announcement levels of lack of consensus, which supports the arguments in previous studies (e.g., Barron and Stuerke 1998; Johnson 2004). In contrast, changes in forecast dispersion around earnings announcements dates proxy much more for changes in analysts’ lack consensus than for changes in uncertainty, which supports the conjectures in Ziebart (1990).

Whether cross-sectional variation in forecast dispersion levels is driven primarily by cross-sectional variation in uncertainty levels or variation in consensus levels was an empirical issue that, from an ex-ante perspective, could have gone either way. Ex-post, the descriptive evidence that cross-sectional variation in uncertainty is relatively high compared to cross-sectional variation in consensus largely explains why cross-sectional variation in forecast dispersion levels is mostly attributable to variation in uncertainty levels. For example, in panel A of table 1 cross sectional variation measured by the standard deviations of log transformed dispersion (D), uncertainty (V), and lack of consensus (1-ρ) is 2.214, 2.516, and 1.717, respectively. Cross-sectional variation in annual forecast sample is similar for dispersion and uncertainty but somewhat higher for lack of consensus.

From an ex-ante perspective it was reasonable to expect that the evidence might differ for dispersion changes versus levels. This is due to the nature of the information analysts’ acquire over time. As a forecasted event approaches, analysts acquire information that is either common (public) or private in nature (perhaps because it is complementary to publicly conveyed information). Although both types of information reduce uncertainty, private information decreases consensus while common information increases consensus. This suggests that uncertainty levels trend steadily downward over time as the forecast event approaches due to the arrival of both types of information. By contrast, consensus levels can increase for some firms and decrease for others depending on the nature of the information analysts acquire during a particular time period. As a result, cross-sectional variation in changes in uncertainty may be quite small compared to cross-sectional variation in changes in consensus. Descriptive statistics presented in table 2 are consistent with this. In panel A of table 2, the cross-sectional variation in changes in uncertainty (standard deviation) is 1.391which is lower than the cross sectional variation in changes in lack of consensus, 1.855. To underscore these statistics we conducted supplementary analyses of the correlation between the relative position of individual firms’ uncertainty within the distribution of all firms’ uncertainty before and after earnings announcements. This correlation is 0.93, which suggests that around earnings announcements changes in the relative positions of firms’ uncertainty is minimal. In contrast this same correlation for lack of consensus is 0.37, suggesting there is a lot of jumbling in firms’ consensus around earnings announcements. Thus, the cross sectional variation in both changes in analysts’ lack of consensus and changes in dispersion are greater around earnings announcements than the variation in changes in uncertainty. This suggests why changes in consensus explain most of the cross-sectional variation in changes in dispersion.

3. Evidence on Forecast Dispersion Levels: Revisiting Johnson (2004) and Diether et al. (2002)

Evidence in the previous section shows that the level of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts primarily reflects uncertainty. In this section we present three sets of analyses. First, in order to differentiate the two competing explanations in Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004) we examine whether the negative relation between dispersion levels and stock returns is due to uncertainty or lack of consensus. We do this by separately examining the relation between returns and uncertainty and returns and consensus. Next we examine the relation between returns and each component of dispersion after controlling for the other. Finally, we investigate whether the uncertainty reflected in dispersion levels is systematic (non-diversifiable) or unsystematic (diversifiable).

3.1 Are stock returns associated with uncertainty or consensus?

In this section we replicate the analysis in Diether et al. (2002) after replacing dispersion with it components, uncertainty and lack of consensus. Diether et al. argue that investor disagreement and costly arbitrage lead to overpricing because current stock prices are optimistic and that when this is corrected prices fall resulting in a negative association between dispersions and future returns. In contrast, Johnson (2004) poses an alternate explanation for the negative relation between forecasts dispersion and returns. He suggests that dispersion reflects information uncertainty (also referred to as parameter risk) that is idiosyncratic in nature and that this risk is priced because it increases the option value of the firm. Our evidence that the level of dispersion primarily reflects uncertainty is consistent with Johnson’s arguments. However, we cannot, ex ante, rule out the possibility that the much smaller explanatory power of the consensus component drives the negative relation between dispersion and stock returns.

In order to replicate Diether et al. (2002)’s we follow their sample selection and portfolio analyses.[7] We obtain stock returns from CRSP monthly stock file, and analysts’ annual forecasts from the unadjusted IBES database. Each month we assign stocks to 5 quintiles based on dispersion in the previous month. Dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of earnings forecast scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast. If the mean earnings forecast is zero, then the stock is assigned to the highest dispersion category. We calculate the monthly portfolio return for each quintile as the equal-weighted average of the returns of all the stocks in the portfolio. In untabulated analyses, the monthly return on the low minus high dispersion strategy is 0.74 percent (t=2.94), which is very similar to the 0.79 percent (t=2.88) reported in Diether et al. (2002). We also find results very similar to Diether et al. (2002) when we assign stocks based on size and then dispersion.

To investigate whether uncertainty or consensus drives these results we repeat Diether et al.’s (2002) portfolio analyses replacing dispersion first with uncertainty (V) and then with CONSENSUS. We scale uncertainty by the square of the mean forecast.[8] Table 3 reports the results of replicating Deither et al.’s analysis substituting uncertainty for forecast dispersion. Consistent with Diether et al., we find a strong negative relation between uncertainty and future stock return. The monthly return on the low minus high uncertainty strategy is 1.87 percent per month. Also consistent with finding in Deither et al., this strategy is more profitable among smaller stocks with a return of 3.65 percent.

Table 4 reports the results of replicating Deither et al.’s analysis substituting CONSENSUS for forecast dispersion. Note that the analyses reported in Tables 1 and 2 explained dispersion with uncertainty and lack of consensus (1-ρ) because dispersion increases as lack of consensus increases. In Table 4 we use consensus (ρ) because the negative relation between dispersion levels and future returns implies a positive (negative) relation between consensus (lack of consensus) and future stock returns because dispersion increases as consensus (lack of consensus) decreases (increases). In contrast to the positive relation implied by the overpricing argument in Diether et al., we find a negative (positive) relation between consensus (lack of consensus) and future returns. On average the stocks in the lowest consensus quintile outperform those in the highest consensus quintile by 1.33 percent per month.[9]

3.2 Further evidence on Dispersion Levels and Uncertainty

It is possible that negative (positive) relation between consensus (lack of consensus) and future returns documented in Table 4 might be driven by the positive correlation between consensus and uncertainty. To investigate this, in Panel A of Table 5, each month we assign stocks to one of five quintiles based on uncertainty in the previous month. Then we rank stocks in each uncertainty quintile into five further quintiles based on consensus in the previous month. After controlling uncertainty, there is a negative relation between consensus and future returns. In Panel B, each month we assign stocks to one of five quintiles based on consensus in the previous month. Then we rank stocks in each consensus quintile into five further quintiles based on uncertainty in the previous month. The negative relation between uncertainty and future stock returns still holds after controlling for consensus.

To provide further evidence in addition to the portfolio tests in Table 5, we estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions to test the relation between one dispersion component and future stock return after controlling for the other:

[pic]

In each month, all the stocks are assigned a quintile rank (1-5) based on uncertainty (V), lack of consensus (1-ρ) and size independently. The cross section of monthly stock returns ([pic]) is regressed on the quintile ranks of uncertainty ([pic]) and consensus ([pic]) and size ([pic]) which are measured as of the previous month. Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions are run every month for totally 216 continuous months from January 1983 till December 2000. T-statistics in parentheses are calculated using the coefficients from monthly regressions and also adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey-West standard errors. Table 6 reports the results with and without controlling for size. The coefficient on lack of consensus (disagreement) is significantly positive after controlling for uncertainty, which is consistent with the portfolio results in Table 4 where returns decrease as consensus increases.

In summary, interpretation of the evidence of a negative relation between dispersions levels and stock returns is clouded by the fact that dispersion reflects both uncertainty and a lack of consensus. We show that this negative relation is driven by uncertainty rather than lack of consensus. This is an important finding because it allows us to begin to differentiate between the two explanations for this relation suggested in the finance literature. Evidence in Table 3 supports Johnson’s argument that the negative relation between dispersion and future returns is due to investors’ uncertainty. Evidence in Table 4 of a positive relation between lack of consensus and stock returns is inconsistent with Diether etl al.’s overpricing explanation for the negative relation between dispersion and returns. Evidence in Tables 5 and 6 strengthens our conclusion that the level of dispersion mainly reflects the level of uncertainty and that this uncertainty drives the relation between dispersion and returns.

3.3 Does forecast dispersion reflect systematic or unsystematic uncertainty/risk?

To provide further evidence on the relation between analysts’ forecast dispersion and firm risk, we explore how firms’ systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk explains the variation in dispersion. We use market beta as a proxy for systematic risk and mean squared errors (MSE) - from the estimation of the market model as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk. Dispersion is measured as before, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts to the absolute value of the mean forecast for each firm month. We estimate the market model to obtain beta and mean squared errors using a minimum of 36 month and a maximum of 60 months of return data prior to each firm month when we measure forecast dispersion. To mitigate the high skewness problem in dispersion and mean squared errors, we log transform these two variables in our regression. Our sample covers all the firm months with valid earnings forecasts from IBES and monthly return data from CRSP and consists of 382,789 firm-month observations.

In Table 7, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression and Panel B reports correlations between these variables. The variables, Dispersion and MSE, are highly skewed and the log transformation avoids this problem. Dispersion is positively correlated with both beta and MSE (p-values < 0.001), suggesting that both systematic and idiosyncratic firm risks may be determinants of dispersion. In Panel B, we regress log-transformed dispersion on beta and log-transformed MSE separately (Model 1 and 2) and then on both variables together (Model 3). We find that beta, MSE and both variables explain 2.5%, 5.8% and 5.9% of the variation in dispersion respectively. The small change in adjusted R2, from 5.8% to 5.9%, when MSE is added to the model with beta indicates that systematic risk has very little incremental explanatory power for the variation in dispersion.[10]

Finally, we perform a robustness check using a rank regression framework. Each month, we rank all the firms into deciles based on dispersion, beta and MSE independently. We regress decile ranks of dispersion on decile ranks of beta and MSE. The results are reported in Panel C. Again, we find that beta provides almost no incremental explanatory power for dispersion over MSE.

In summary, the evidence in Tables 3 through 6 suggests that the negative relation between dispersion levels and stock returns documented in prior studies reflects a relation between uncertainty levels and returns rather than a lack of consensus. The evidence in Table 7 suggests that this uncertainty is idiosyncratic firm risk rather than systematic risk. Both results support the conclusions in Johnson (2004).

4. Reconciling evidence on Changes versus Levels of Dispersion

This section reconciles our evidence on changes in dispersion with prior research. In addition, because we find that changes in dispersion reflect analysts’ lack of consensus rather than uncertainty we discuss the link between consensus and stock prices.

L’Her and Suret (1996) document a negative relation between changes in dispersion and contemporaneous stock returns (as dispersion increases stock returns decrease). L’Her and Suret interpret this as evidence that increases in dispersion reflects increased uncertainty which is priced negatively. We replicated their finding in a supplementary analysis. Recall that our primary results show that changes in dispersion mainly reflect changes in analysts’ lack of consensus. Thus, it is not surprising that our supplementary results reveal that increased lack of consensus is (significantly) negatively associated with contemporaneous stock returns.

To the extent that increases in lack of consensus reflect increases in information asymmetry risk that is not diversifiable, uninformed investors demand a return premium for their risk of trading with privately informed investors (O’Hara 2003). In other words, increases in dispersion coincide with negative stock returns because increased dispersion reflects increased information asymmetry that adversely affects firm cost of capital. This is consistent with other evidence on the relation between consensus, trading volume and cost of capital. Barron, Harris, Stanford (2005) document a negative relation between changes in consensus and trading volume; as consensus decreases, and lack of consensus increases, trading volume increases. Because consensus declines when private information increases, this trading volume suggests that some investors develop private information that increases information asymmetry (See Holthausen and Verrecchia’s 1990).

Finally, our evidence in Panel A Table 4 indicates that low levels of consensus are associated with higher returns, i.e., lack of consensus is paid a premium. This is consistent with evidence in Botosan, Plumlee, and Xie (2004). They show that the level of analysts’ consensus is negatively related to firms’ cost of equity capital. Both results are consistent with relatively high levels of private information among analysts (low consensus levels) leading to greater information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors that results in a higher cost of capital. Botosan et al. document a relation between analysts’ consensus and expected cost of capital. We find a similar relation between analysts’ consensus and realized cost of capital.

In summary, our evidence helps interpret the negative association between changes in dispersion and stock returns documented in L’Her and Suret (1996). We find that changes (increases) in dispersion reflect changes (increases) in analysts’ lack of consensus and that it is these changes in consensus that explain L-Her and Suret’s (1996) results. To the extent that increases in analysts’ lack of consensus reflect increases in information asymmetry a negative relation with stock returns is expected, i.e. a higher cost of capital.

5. Robustness

The BKLS measures assume that analysts issue forecasts simultaneously without any time dispersion (variation). Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) argue that differences in analysts’ forecasting dates may affect the validity of the uncertainty and consensus proxies. We investigate this issue using the variance of analysts’ forecasting dates as a proxy for differences in analysts’ forecasting dates. When we estimate equations (3) through (6) with this variable in all our samples, we find that it adds very little explanatory power of to any of the models and does not change any of the inferences. We also investigate the explanatory power of the variance of forecasts dates with respect to cross-sectional variation in forecast dispersion, uncertainty and consensus in univariate regressions. The adjusted R2 for each of these regressions is less than 0.05%, suggesting that differences in analysts forecast dates has almost no explanatory power for analysts’ dispersion, consensus or uncertainty. Overall, contrary to concerns raised by Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004), we find that time variation in analysts’ forecasts does not affect any of our results and explains almost none of the cross-sectional variation in forecast dispersion levels, dispersion changes, analyst uncertainty, or analyst consensus. This finding suggests that the validity of BKLS measures is not affected by the assumption that analysts issue forecasts simultaneously.

To generalize our results, we replicated our analyses of both the changes and levels for samples of two-quarter- and two-year-ahead forecasts, all results and inferences remain the same. In addition, we investigate the changes in analysts’ forecast dispersions around non-earnings announcement dates. Particularly, we select the midpoint of two consecutive earnings announcements as a non-announcement date. To be included there must be no earnings announcements during this 60 day window. Untabulated results of estimating equations (5) and (6) for a non-announcement dates at the mid-point of two consecutive quarterly or annual earnings announcements are consistent with those reported in Table 2, indicating that changes in consensus explain more of the variation in changes in dispersion.

We also replicate our analyses using analysts’ sales forecasts and cash flow forecasts and obtain similar results (untabulated) with only one exception: for the dispersion change test using quarterly sales forecast updates around the midpoint of two consecutive quarterly earnings announcements. The adjusted R2 is 36% for model (5), and 26% for model (6), suggesting that the change in consensus explains less the change in dispersion than the change in uncertainty. However, this difference is not statistically significant (Vuong’s Z= - 0.76) and the sample size is only 221. One possible reason for this different result is large measurement errors and the lack of power for the test. On the other hand, this inconsistent result also shows that out test is not merely capturing a mechanical relation between dispersion, lack of consensus, and uncertainty.

Overall, these alternate specifications lead to the same conclusions as the tabulated analyses and provide support for the validity of the BKLS measures.

6. Conclusion

Using the empirical proxies developed by BKLS we provide evidence that changes in consensus better explain changes in dispersion whereas the level of uncertainty is better explains the level of dispersion. We also show empirically that the negative association between the level of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and future stock returns documented in prior research is most likely due to the fact that forecast dispersion reflects unsystematic uncertainty (or risk) that is part of the option value of stocks. This finding provides strong support for Johnson (2004) and lends little support for Deither et al.’s (2002) argument that dispersion reflects stock overpricing due to differences of opinion. In addition, our finding that changes (increases) in dispersion reflect changes (increases) in analysts’ lack of consensus helps reconcile L-Her and Suret’s (1996) findings that changes in forecast dispersion are negatively associated with contemporaneous stock returns with other research. To the extent that increases in analysts’ lack of consensus reflect increases in information asymmetry a negative relation with stock returns is expected, i.e. a higher cost of capital.

Finally, our evidence may be useful to investors who want to know how to interpret forecast dispersion. That is to say, the evidence suggests that levels of forecast dispersion reflects option value due to unsystematic uncertainty (or risk) and not overpricing and changes (increases) in forecast dispersion reflect changes (decreases) in analyst consensus and changes in information asymmetry,

Appendix 1:

Papers published in the Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Contemporary Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis between 1990 and 2004 using dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts as an empirical proxy.

1. The Accounting Review (14 papers)

|Authors |Year |

|Heflin, F., K R Subramanyam and Y. Zhang |2003 |

|Bowen, R., A. Davis and D. Matsumoto |2002 |

|Bamber, L., O. Barron and T. Stober |1997 |

|Ho, L., C. Liu and R. Ramanan |1997 |

|Lang, M. and R. Lundholm |1996 |

|Bamber, L. and Y. Cheon |1995 |

|Barron, O. |1995 |

|Baginski, S., E. Conrad and J. Hassell |1993 |

|Brown, L. and J. Han |1992 |

|Imhoff, E. and G. Lobo |1992 |

|Morse, D., J. Stephan and E. Stice |1991 |

|Ajinkya, B., R. Atiase and M. Gift |1991 |

|Swaminathan, S. |1991 |

|Ziebart, D. |1990 |

|Elliott, J. and D. Philbrick |1990 |

2. Journal of Accounting Research (11 papers)

|Authors |Year |

|Bens, D. and S. Monahan |2004 |

|Clement, M., R. Frankel and J. Miller |2003 |

|Leuz, C. |2003 |

|Lang, M., K. Lins and D. Miller |2003 |

|Kinney, W., D. Burgstahler and R. Martin |2002 |

|Affleck-Graves, J., C. Callahan and N. Chipalkatti |2002 |

|Barron, O., D. Byard, C. Kile and E. Riedl |2002 |

|Gebhardt, W., C. Lee and B. Swaminathan |2001 |

|Botosan, C. and M. Harris |2000 |

|Aboody, D. and B. Lev |1998 |

|Wiedman, C. |1996 |

3. Journal of Accounting and Economics (7 papers)

|Authors |Year |

|Brown, S., S. Hillegeist and K. Lo |2004 |

|Palmrose, Z., V. Richardson and S. Scholz |2004 |

|Farrell, K. and D. Whidbee |2003 |

|Gu, Z. and J. Wu |2003 |

|Francis, J., D. Hanna and D. Philbrick |1997 |

|Atiase, R. and L. Bamber |1994 |

|Kross, W., G. Ha and F. Heflin |1994 |

4. Journal of Finance (4 papers)

|Authors |Year |

|Johnson, T. |2004 |

|Bailey, W., H. Li, C. Mao and R. Zhong |2003 |

|Diether, K., C. Malloy and A. Scherbina |2002 |

|Loderer, C., J. Cooney and L. Drunen |1991 |

5. Journal of Financial Economics (5 papers)

|Authors |Year |

|Flannery, M., S. Kwan and M. Nimalendran |2004 |

|Lowry, M. |2003 |

|D’Avolio, G. |2002 |

|Thomas, S. |2002 |

|Krishnaswami, S. and V. Subramaniam |1999 |

6. Review of Accounting Studies (5 papers)

|Authors |Year |

|Copeland, T., A. Dolgoff, and A. Moel |2004 |

|Liang, L. |2003 |

|Gode, D. and P. Mohanram |2003 |

|Chambers, D., R. Jennings, and R. Thompson |2002 |

|Soffer, L., T. Ramn, and B. Walther |2000 |

7. Contemporary Accounting Research (7 papers)

|Authors |Year |

|Hope, O. |2003 |

|Roulstone, D. |2003 |

|Barron, O., C. Kile and T. O’Keefe |1999 |

|Healy, P., A. Hutton and K. Palepu |1999 |

|Marquardt, C., and C. Wieldman |1998 |

|L’Her, J., and J. Suret |1996 |

|Elliot, J., D. Philbrick and C. Wieldman |1995 |

8. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (3 papers)

|Authors |Year |

|Kim, D. and M. Kim |2003 |

|Denielsen, B. and S. Sorescu |2001 |

|Chung, K. and H. Jo |1996 |

References:

Aboody, D. and B. Lev, 1998. The Value Relevance of Intangibles: The Case of Software Capitalization. Journal of Accounting Research 36, p161 – 191.

Affleck-Graves, J., C. Callahan and N. Chipalkatti, 2002. Earnings predictability, information asymmetry, and market liquidity. Journal of Accounting Research 40, p 561 – 583.

Agrawal, A., and S. Chadha, 2002. Who is afraid of Reg FD? The behavior and performance of sell-side analysts following the SEC’s Fair Disclosure. Working paper, University of Alabama.

Ajinkya, B., R. Atiase and M. Gift, 1991. Volume of trading and the dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, The Accounting Review 66, p389 – 401.

Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson. (1986). “Asset Pricing and the Bid-ask Spread.” Journal of Financial Economics 17, 223-249.

Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson. (1989). “The Effects of Beta, Bid-Ask Spread, Residual Risk and Size on Stock Returns.” Journal of Finance 44, 479-486.

Atiase, R. and L. Bamber, 1994. Trading volume reactions to annual accounting earnings announcements: The incremental role of predisclosure information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17, p309 – 329.

Baginski, S., E. Conrad and J. Hassell, 1993. The effects of management forecast precision on equity pricing and on the assessment of earnings uncertainty. The Accounting Review 68, p913 – 927.

Bailey, W., H. Li, C. Mao and R. Zhong, 2003. Regulation Fair Disclosure and Earnings Information: Market, Analyst, and Corporate Responses. Journal of Finance 58, p2487 – 2514.

Bamber, L. and Y. Cheon, 1995. Differential price and volume reactions to accounting earnings announcements. The Accounting Review 70, p417 – 442.

Bamber, L., O. Barron and T. Stober, 1997. Trading volume and different aspects of disagreement coincident with earnings announcements. The Accounting Review 72, p575 – 598

Barron, O., 1995. Trading volume and belief revisions that differ among individual analysts. The Accounting Review 70, p581 – 598.

Barron, O., D. Byard and O. Kim, 2002. Changes in analysts’ information around earnings announcements. The Accounting Review 77, p821 – 846.

Barron, O., D. Byard and Y. Yu, 2004. Further evidence on the information role of analysts as it relates to earnings announcements. Working paper.

Barron, O., O. Kim, S. Lim, and D. Stevens, 1998. Using analysts’ forecasts to measure properties of analysts’ information environment. The Accounting Review 73, p421 – 433.

Barron, O., D. Byard, C. Kile and E. Riedl, 2002. High-technology intangibles and analysts' forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 40, p289 – 312.

Barron, O., C. Kile and T. O’Keefe, 1999. MD&A quality as measured by the SEC and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 16, p75 – 109.

Barron, O., and P. Stuerke, 1998. “Dispersion in Analysts’ Forecasts as a Measure of Uncertainty,” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, Vol. 13 (summer 1998), pp. 245-274.

Barry, C. and R. Jennings, 1992. Information and Diversity of Analysts Opinion, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27, p 169-183 .

Bens, D., and S. Monahan, 2004. Disclosure quailty and the excess value of diversification. Journal of Accounting Research 42, p691 – 730.

Botosan, C. and M. Harris, 2000. Motivations for a Change in Disclosure Frequency and Its Consequences: An Examination of Voluntary Quarterly Segment Disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 38, p329 – 353.

Botosan, C., M. Plumlee, and Y. Xie, 2004. The role of informaiton precision in determining the cost of equity capital. Review of Accounting Studies 9, p233 – 259.

Bowen, R., A. Davis and D. Matsumoto, 2002. Do conference calls affect analysts’ forecasts? The Accounting Review 77, p285-317.

Brickley, J., 2003. Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: a discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, p 227 – 233.

Brown, L. and J. Han, 1992. The Impact of Annual Earnings Announcements on Convergence of Beliefs. The Accounting Review 67, p826-875

Brown, S., S. Hillegeist and K. Lo, 2004. Conference calls and information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37, p343-366.

Chambers, D., R. Jennings, and R. Thompson, 2002. Excess return to R&D intensive firms. Review of Accounting Studies 7, p133 – 158.

Chan, L., J. Karceski and J. Lakonishok, 2003. The level and persistence of growth rates. Journal of Finance 58, p643 – 684.

Chung, K., and H. Jo, 1996. The impact of security analysts’ monitoring and marketing functions on the market value of firms. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, p493 – 512.

Clement, M., R. Frankel and J. Miller, 2003. [pic][pic][pic]Confirming management earnings forecasts, earnings uncertainty, and stock return. Journal of Accounting Research 41, p653 – 679.

Copeland, T., A. Dolgoff and A. Moel, 2004. The role of expectations in explaining the cross-section of stock returns. Review of Accounting Studies 9, p149 – 188.

D'Avolio, G., 2002. The market for borrowing stock. Journal of Financial Economics 66, p 271 – 306.

Danielsen, B., and S. Sorescu, 2001. Why do option introductions depress stock prices? A study of diminishing short sale constraints. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, p451 – 485.

Dechow, P., 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: the role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18, p3 – 42.

Diamond, D., and R. Verrecchia. (1991). “Disclosure, Liquidity and the Cost of Capital.” The Journal of Finance 46, 1325-1360.

Diether, K., C. Malloy and A. Scherbina, 2002. Differences of Opinion and the Cross Section of Stock Returns. Journal of Finance 57, p2113 – 2141.

Elliot, J., D. Philbrick, and C. Wiedman, 1995. Evidence from archival data on the relation between security analysts’ forecast errors and prior disclosure revisions. Contemporary Accounting Research 11, p919 – 938.

Elliott, J. and D. Philbrick, 1990. Accounting changes and earnings predictability. The Accounting Review 65, p157 - 174.

Farrell, K. and D. Whidbee, 2003. Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, p165 – 196.

Fisher, P. and R. Verrecchia, 1998. Correlated forecast errors. Journal of Accounting Research 36, p91 – 110.

Flannery, M., S. Kwan and M. Nimalendran , 2004. Market evidence on the opaqueness of banking firms' assets. Journal of Financial Economics 71, p 419 – 460.

Francis, J., D. Hanna and D. Philbrick, 1997. Management communications with securities analysts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, p363 – 394.

Gebhardt, W., C. Lee and B. Swaminathan, 2001. [pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic]Toward an implied cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research 39, p135 – 176.

Givoly, D. and J. Lakonishok, 1984. Properties of analysts’ forecasts of earnings: a review and analysis of the research. Journal of Accounting Literature 3, p117 – 152.

Goyal, V., K. Lehn and S. Racic, 2002. Growth opportunities and corporate debt policy: the case of the U.S. defense industry. Journal of Financial Economics 64, p35 – 59.

Gode, D., and P. Mohanram, 2003. Inferring the cost of capital using the Ohlson-Juettner Model. Review of Accounting Studies 8, p399 – 431.

Gu, Z. and J. Wu, 2003. Earnings skewness and analyst forecast bias. Journal of Accounting and Economics 35, p5 – 29.

Healy, P., A. Hutton and K. Palepu, 1999. Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increase in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research 16, p485 – 520.

Heflin, F., K R Subramanyam and Y. Zhang, 2003. Regulation FD and the financial information environment: early evidence, The Accounting Review 78, p1 – 37.

Ho, L., C. Liu and R. Ramanan, 1997. Open-Market stock repurchase announcements and revaluation of prior accounting information, The Accounting Review 72, p 475-487.

Holthausen, R., and R. Verrecchia, 1990. The effect of informedness and consensus on price and volume behavior. The Accounting Review 65, p 191 – 209.

Hope, O., 2003. Accounting policy disclosures and analysts’ forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 20, p295 – 321.

Imhoff, E. and G. Lobo, 1992. The Effect of Ex Ante Earnings Uncertainty on Earnings Response Coefficients. The Accounting Review 67, p427 – 439.

Irani, A. and I. Karamanou, 2003. Regulation Fair Disclosure, analyst following, and forecast dispersion. Accounting Horizons 17, p15 – 28.

Johnson, T., 2004. Forecast dispersion and the cross-section of expected returns. Journal of Finance 59, p1957-1978.

Karpoff, J., 1986. A theory of trading volume. Journal of Finance 41, p1069 – 1087.

Kahl, M., 2002. Economic Distress, Financial Distress, and Dynamic Liquidation. Journal of Finance 57, p135 - 168.

Kasznik, R. and M. McNichols, 2002. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research 40, p727 – 750.

Kim, O. and R. Verrecchia, 1991. Trading volume and price reactions to public announcements. The Accounting Review 29, p 302 – 322.

Kim, D., and M. Kim, 2003. A multifactor explanation of post-earnings announcement drift. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, p383 – 398.

Kinney, W., D. Burgstahler and R. Martin, 2002. [pic][pic][pic]Earnings surprise “materiality” as measured by stock returns. Journal of Accounting Research 40, p1297 – 1329.

King, R., G. Pownall and G. Waymire. (1990). “Expectations Adjustment Via Timely Management Forecasts: Review, Synthesis, and Suggestions for Future Research.” Journal of Accounting Literature 9, 113-144.

Krishnaswami, S. and V. Subramaniam, 1999. Information asymmetry, valuation, and the corporate spin-off decision. Journal of Financial Economics 53, p73 – 112.

Kross, W., G. Ha and F. Heflin, 1994. A test of risk clientele effects via an examination of trading volume response to earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18, p67 – 87.

Lang, M. and R. Lundholm, 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. The Accounting Review 71, p467 – 493.

Lang, M. , K. Lins and D. Miller, 2003. ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: Does cross listing in the United States improve a firm's information environment and inrease market value? Journal of Accounting Research 41, p 317 – 345.

Leuz, C., 2003. IAS versus US GAAP: information asymmetry-based evidence from Germany’s new market. Journal of Accounting Research 41, p445 – 472.

L’Her, J., and J. Suret, 1996. Consensus, dispersion and security prices. Contemporary Accounting Research 13, p209 – 228.

Liang, L., 2003. Post-earnings announcement drift and market participants’ information processing biases. Review of Accounting Studies 8, p321 – 345.

Loderer, C., J. Cooney and L. Drunen, 1991. The Price Elasticity of Demand for Common Stock. Journal of Finance 46, p621 – 651.

Lowry, M., 2003. Why does IPO volume fluctuate so much? Journal of Financial Economics 67, p3 – 40.

Marquardt, C. and C. Wieldman, 1998. Voluntary disclosures, information asymmetry, and insider selling through secondary equity offering. Contemporary Accounting Research 15, p505 – 537.

Mohanran, P., and S. Sunder, 2002. Has Regulation Fair Disclosure affected financial analysts’ ability to forecast earnings? Working paper, New York University.

Morse, D., J. Stephan and E. Stice, 1991. Earnings announcements and the convergence or divergence of beliefs. The Accounting Review 66, p376 – 388.

O’Hara, M., 2003. Liquidity and price discovery. Journal of Finance 58, p1335 – 1364.

Palmrose, Z., V. Richardson and S. Scholz, 2004. Determinants of market reactions to restatement announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37, p59 - 89.

Payne, J., and W. Thomas, 2003. The implications of using stock-split adjusted I/B/E/S data in empirical research. The Accounting Review 78, p1049 – 1067.

Roulstone, D., 2003. Analyst following and market liquidity. Contemporary Accounting Research 20, p551 – 578.

Soffer, L., T. Rmn, and B. Walther, 2000. Earnings preannouncement strategies. Review of Accounting Studies 5, p5 – 26.

Swaminathan, S., 1991. The impact of SEC mandated segment data on price variability and divergence of beliefs. The Accounting Review 66, p23 – 41.

Thomas, S., 2002. Firm diversification and asymmetric information: evidence from analysts’ forecasts and earnings announcements. Journal of Financial Economics 64, p373 – 396.

Utama, S. and W. Cready, 1997. Institutional ownership, differential predisclosure precision and trading volume at announcement dates. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, p129 - 150.

Vuong, Q.H., 1989. The likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypothesis. Econometrica 57, p307 – 333.

Wiedman, C., 1996. The relevance of characteristics of the information environment in the selection of a proxy for the market's expectations for earnings: An extension of Brown, Richardson, and Schwager (1987). Journal of Accounting Research 34, p313 – 324.

[pic][pic][pic]

Ziebart, D., 1990. The association between consensus of beliefs and trading activity surrounding earnings announcements. The Accounting Review 65, p477 – 489.

TABLE 1

Test of the Determinants of

Pre-Announcement Dispersion in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts a

Panel A: Descriptive statistics and tests for quarterly earnings forecasts measured within 30-days before the current quarterly earnings announcement (N=47,782)a

|Variable b |Mean |Median |Standard Deviation |

|D (log(D/P)) |0.056 (-10.614) |0.001 (-10.763) |6.065 (2.214) |

|V (log(V/P)) |1.197 (-9.318) |0.002 (-9.500) |85.535 (2.516) |

|ρ (log(1-ρ)) |0.416 (-1.296) |0.530 (-0.765) |0.508 (1.717) |

|Size ($ millions) |6,073 |1,450 |18,499 |

|Dependent |Intercept |Log(V/P) |Log(1-ρ) |Adjusted R2 |Vuong’s Z b |

|Variable | | | | | |

|Log(D/P) |-4.517 |0.654 | |55.30% |-68.92 |

| |( ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download