Chapter 6 Draft:



10/6/08 TNC- As I reread esp. Dan’s additions, I find them all suggestive hypotheses. Rather than quibble, I applaud their specificity. We can now focus on much more precise and informed data analysis. This will keep lots of us busy for some time!

Would just add that Eric R and I also had some more email points, maybe others too? Sam. I don't see them pasted here, but presume Dan largely incorporated them in this draft.

Edited by TNC with MS Word Tracking in Red in my version of tracking.

September 22, 2008

I am sending this rough editing to Dan for quick additions, hopefully, such as the name / file of the schools item he found, and how to write up—Dan can search on his name and find a few questions like this.

Also to Eric R, Sam B, and Francisco as you are reading and commengint, as well as preparing data analysis of these same idea, so you need this ASAP.

This is short and brief, given the complexity of the topic and the amount of work we have already done on it. And most of the propositions are fairly general, compared to chapter 5,which has more specific guides for data analysis. This implies that we can start with what is here, and build on our previous work, esp. the Workshop on Migration which presented some preliminary results. And we can rewrite/ add more specifics as we add results from regressions, etc. Or other memos that we have floating around that bear on these themes.

And we can draw on the Chap 5 analyses which include many of the same dependent variables that we are using for this chapter, then we can discuss the results in the ends of the current drafts of chap 5 or 6 depending on how we choose. What if we tentatively stress Patents and maybe Rent and Jobs in cha 5, then most of the changes in population by age cohort can go here. TNC

Chapter 6 Draft:

Scenes and Neighborhoods: how the way we consume influences where we live.

In Chapter 5, we began to develop and test empirical propositions about the impact of scenes. We argued that scenes are one factor that fosters creative cities, operating in interaction with a number of other factors. In the present chapter, we develop hypotheses about the influence of scenes not directly on innovation but on location decisions and the composition of neighborhoods. That is, we are asking about how the way individuals consume impacts where and with whom they live.

This topic in part flows naturally from much of the literature discussed in chapter 5. To the extent that spatial concentrations of human performance and ingenuity drive success in the creative economy, what attracts individuals to and retains them in a given location becomes increasingly important. If people do not simply follow jobs, but jobs also follow people, then understanding the movements of people is vital.

Our concern with the relationship between scenes and residential relations, however, runs deeper than providing businesses with strategies for attracting “the creative class” to the detriment of everybody else. For the fact that scenes seem to be independent factors in economic development, not reducible to social class or other social background characteristics, leads to the following more general sociological proposition: scenes are becoming increasingly institutionalized as powerful and relatively autonomous components of advanced societies. sources of identity. People’s The sort of consumption relations are distinctly important in addition to their jobs. Consumption and scenes hips persons pursue plays a significant part in defining personal identity, who they are, in addition to their jobs, their political affiliation, their professional and educational interests, their families, and even redefining their ascriptive ties to primordial places and communities. E

If this is true, then scenes are increasingly staking out differentiated arenas of social interaction for persons to cultivate their expressive capacities are similarly important, , and not only their productive, political, or cognitive capacities. Some have even termed this an “expressive revolution” (Parsons).

One powerful index of these changes is their impacts on the degree to which a potential source of identity is becoming institutionalized and internalized is its capacity to affect residential decisions, where people choose to live. and channel the movement of populations. Thus, this chapter turns to the effects of scenes on residential decisions and neighborhood composition to assess in order to understand the impact of scene dynamics, controlling for the other factors identified in past work on extent to which something like an “expressive revolution” is underway (Parsons). residential location. We ask: It asks: how much do scenes affect who lives where; do scenes impact the movements of different sub-groups in different ways; if so, who, how, where, and why? This chapter proposes a set of mechanisms and causal linkages that joins consumption and residence.

Theoretical Background. If scenes affect residential relations, they do not do so in isolation. We can understand their impacts through analogies to and in interaction with the way other major processes of differentiation in modern societies. have been tied to migration and residence. We first outline how the emergence and institutionalization of employee, professional, and political roles have altered individuals’ decisions about where and with whom to live, especially in reference to “traditional” factors like family and primordial communities. We then discuss what it means to add the expressive roles of scenes to this set of factors, before turning to our empirical analysis.

Jobs. The industrial revolution involved was more than factories. It also institutionalized involved the institutionalization of the role of “employee.” This process was closely tied to the differentiation of a separate employee/worker identity from the peasant and craftsman household, in which work, family, consumption, celebration and more were all fused (de Vries, many others). The emergence of labor markets signaled and heightened these changes, loosening ascriptive connection to families and places by encouraging children to move to new regions in search of work. Identities outside of the extended family household arose. Sons and their wives could go off to a different town in search of work and the opportunity to make their own families. Workers might develop solidarities across ethnic and religious lines. These are core themes for Adam Smith and Karl Marx as well as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and many others. (add many refs)

DThe differentiation of the “employee” role permits substantial is closely linked to changes in residential life. IStated in propositional form, the more strongly work relations are institutionalized, the more strongly employment opportunities predicts migration and and occupation patterns predict residential patterns. That is, if my job were “everything” about who I am, I would move to wherever the best paying job is, regardless of family, friends, or nation; where and how I work would determine where and with whom I live. MOVE ELSWERHERE: To the extent that Marx’s notion of the “means of production” trumping all else is rooted in empirical observation, it may be linked with the fact that in England workers tended to live near factories, rather than in ethnic communities (cites, note how it was different in Chicago).

Politics. Where we live involves more than jobs and economically productive activities. Political affiliations are also significant. Modern democratic revolutions sought to differentiate political relationships from class, religious, and family backgrounds (Tocqueville). The importance of civic identity increased (Habermas 1962), as did government responsiveness to the wishes of citizens. (Terry to add cites). Subjects became citizens (cites). Persons became not simply workers or peasants or “from this village” – they were citoyens as well, as articulated in Rousseau’s conception of the general will. They found common identity in national symbols like flags and songs rather than local folkways (Lie). Subjects became citizens with increasing “rights” linked to the modern welfare state ( TH. Marshall, Michael Mann), .

The institutionalization of citizenship and civic identity was closely linked with newly differentiated residential patterns. The term foreigner came to refer to non-nationals or non-citizens (Torpey 2000, in Lie). Non-citizens found it increasingly difficult to maintain residences in now foreign territories. Not only was there residential sorting between citizens and non-citizens, but as civic life has become more internally differentiated by and responsive to ideological and issue driven disputes about collective goals, residential relations have in turn become increasingly sorted in terms of differences in political ideology ( as elaborated in our chapter 7? Bishop, Chris to add others). Increasingly, as citizen roles become more deeply internalized, residential relations become shaped not only by primordial attachments to a place, ethnicity, occupation, or even national identity, but also by internal differences in political ideology. There are democratic neighborhoods and republican neighborhoods in the U.S., conservative, liberal, and social democratic neighborhoods in Canada (cites). Political affiliations and ideologies are likely significant factors in influencing residential organization. Politics needs to be taken into account as we assess the impact of scenes on residential relations. [not here; separate chapter Chris to add a good box]

Professions. For many social scientists, the industrial and the democratic revolutions encompass what modernization is “all about” (Hobsbawm, others). Talcott Parsons and others (cites) argued that the “educational revolution” in mass tertiary education was just as significant. Parsons based his observation on the explosion of higher education in the United States, arguing that this was one of the primary factors which made the United States, for a time, into the “lead society” of modernity. As much recent research has documented, this trend has diffused globally, even into countries like Great Britain where access to college education had been strongly determined by class. Most past related work stresses the “knowledge economy” ( economists) or “post industrial society” (Bell Touraine), or “human capital” (Becker) which mainly link the contribution of education to production. But distinct from these is education’s impact on citizens and consumers, that is people in all their not directly economic roles. These are hugely important and demand analysis apart from the direct contribution to the economy. Quote some trends about rise of college educated in U.K, Germany, China, Brazil, and more.

The educational revolution involves more than increased knowledge production. , however. More fundamentally, it led to the institutionalization and increasing influence of organizations devoted to the training and maintenance of knowledgeable persons. Amateurs became professionals. Intellectual dilettantes became professors, affiliated with organizations like the American Sociological Association; amateur doctors became certified physicians, certified by the American Medical Association and bound by their codes of ethics and best practices.

Professions are not merely jobs; they are callings (Koehn 1994, Weber, Simmel, Parsons). Professions have ethical codes that are meant to constrain economic considerations. Though there is no guarantee that such codes will be followed, a lawyer or journalist can appeal to professional ethics over and against governmental power or the profit motives of their clients and employers. Professionals apply specialized knowledge that cannot simply be ordered from above. Their associations are collegial rather than bureaucratic. Department chairs rarely issue commands to their colleagues.

Success in the profession may interact with economic concerns when it comes to residential decisions. Rather than move to, say, a small town where her real wages might be higher, a doctor may prefer to move to a place where she can interact with top researchers, go to seminars, and stay true not only to (narrow) economic imperatives but to vocational imperatives. Lawyers may be motivated by the opportunity to participate in fundamental questions of legal authority in addition to market success. Professors may seek professional connections and collaboration over and above dollars. Thus, we would expect professional interests, in addition to employment and political interests, to shape location choices and to interact with scenes in forming new residential compositions. [This section could use some quick refs to empirical studies showing that professional concerns influence migration. Could also add box from Chronicle of Higher Education Forums where many post about hard choices of higher real wages in the middle of nowhere vs. professional advancement—ok good idea for a box, maybe a result of refusing job offers. Some Florida’s Rise of the Creative Class like an editor who refused to leave Greenwich Village but worked on contract for Microsoft; lets look a few for our own like this or similar statistics.].

Traditional Community Elements. The increasing impact of employee, political, and professional roles on residence can be understood as part and parcel with the corresponding revolutionary transformations in social structure – industrial, democratic, and educational -- that have figured prominently in the making of modern societies. However, these have always operated in reference to and interaction with a number of more traditional community elements—such as . These involve the stability and regeneration of communities, as well as primordial ties to place and heritage.

Besides In addition to jobs, professional advancement, and political ideology, more domestic concerns about raising children or caring for elder family members certainly impact where and with whom individuals live. Access to quality primary education, low crime, and clean streets are often cited as important indicators of attractive communities (cites). Living surrounded by others who belong to a collectively held tradition, a mutual understanding of how to live, or some shared ethnic or religious background might also signal an integrated solidary community (Berger). Communitarian critics have claimed that industrialization, urbanization, professionalization, and politicization have threatened such communities (Nisbet, many others). Others have suggested that diversity, not homogeneity, can be a source of community solidarity (Jacobs, Alexander). In any case, it would be surprising if factors like religious and ethnic homogeneity vs. heterogeneity, crime rates, sanitation, place of birth, and school quality did not shape residential patterns. SIf scenes are impact ing location decisions, but their operation in conjunction with these various factors is complex. We analyze several data sets in an effort to capture some of these below. they likely do so in interaction, and perhaps competition, with such considerations.

Scenes. In introducing scenes as new independent factors shaping new neighborhood structures we aresuggest proposing that the expressive sphere constitutes another major arena of social life that is becoming increasingly differentiated and institutionalized in urban spaces. In the the earlymid-19th century, cooks left the aristocratic households and opened restaurants (ref). Sumptuary laws that restricted consumption based on class, religion, and status declined (ref). Cafés were focal points for public discussion and lively interactions, more freewheeling and less determined by class and family background (Habermas). In the 20th century, the share of typical household income devoted to voluntary consumption like restaurants or music rather than basic sustenance and clothing has dramatically increased (Robert FVogel, include one of his tables? Yes or at least summarize bit of it, a note or small box).

Drinking in pubs, going to sipping coffee in cafes, listening to music in concert venues, viewing art in museums and galleries, dancing in nightclubs – these relatively new practices further extended and institutionalized consumption in spaces beyond the household (refs documenting these). It is increasingly difficult to discern a person’s job or place of birth based on what she wears or what his tastes in music or restaurants are –accountants by day; dj’s by night. Locksmiths and lawyers trade dining tips on public television’s successful program Check Please. Chinese and American punk musicians transcend national and ethnic differences and form new cross-cultural solidarities by opening up what they call a “Brave New Scene” (BOX: ON OPENING UP CHINESE PUNK SCENE, HOW MUSIC SCENE CROSSES POLITICAL BORDERS, BUILDS DISTINCT KIND OF SOLIDARITY—this is in BA by John Thompson that we can put a little bit of in a box). Spaces of sociable consumption become increasingly freed to unfold under their own expressive logics driven by common sentiment and affect, much like market relations, professional relations, and political relations which have their own logics, all operating in interactions with and constrained by one another. Who I am on the scene – what sorts of restaurants, music clubs, movies, cafes, sports, etc. I attend and affirm – is becoming another significant part of who I am.

Thus, scenes likely impact residential decisions of individuals and are shifting residentialtransforming residential relations in neighborhoods. Living near a scene and surrounded by individuals who participate in similar scenes may rival considerations about jobs, family, profession, schools, and so on. Do I move to a place with good jobs, but no scene?; other lawyers or engineers, but no scene?; other democrats/republicans, but no scene?; my family or more generally safe and secure bedroom communities, but no scene? That these are even questions to which “no” might be the answer shows that scenes may well both shape where people live and also redefine the bonds that hold communities together.

To be sure, all of these registers can come into conflict with one another. Jobs and work can tear families apart. Political differences can turn neighbors against one another. Professional disputes can strain friendships. Likewise, scenes can cause family conflict and interfere with work roles. Extreme examples: youth may become deadheads or float around the folk music circuit, becoming estranged from their families. Others may find themselves so caught up in edgy urban scenes that they never “get a job.”

Scenes dimensions and work locations vary across locations. One classic difference is the European, esp. German pattern of locating workers’ residences next to factories. This spread to much of the world, especially where socialist ideals of mobilizing the working class were dominant (East Europe, Russia, China), since following Marx, history would progress faster if primordial ties were broken. In the early years of industrialization, the US represented the opposite pattern: it was settled by immigrants from separate countries who sought to preserve their language and tradition by living in ethnically-distinct neighborhoods, not adjacent to their work places. But in recent decades, esp. since 1989, there has been more free movement of population and more independence from jobs, even in China where Communism remains the official ideology.

Unique historical trajectories are too complex to trace, but we can distinguish some core elements: 1.the degree of proximity of work and residence 2. The degree of ethnic/religious/occupational/income homogeneity of a neighborhood or broader area 3. The degree of open or closed character of neighborhoods and social relations (such as tapped by migration rates). We may hypothesize that individualistic scenes dimensions (like self-expression and glamour) will have less autonomy, and less explanatory power in more “traditional” locations, where work and residence are closer, social cohesion is greater, and neighborhoods are more closed. By contrast traditional scenes dimensions such as neighborliness should be stronger in these locations.

HERE? Move? Tradition is more than demography. That is race, class, and gender are widely used to measure primordial ties. But neighborhoods vary in the meaning of these. A 100% Mexican-American neighborhood can be highly traditional or not. Los Angeles has dozens of variations of these. Again history can “explain” such patterns, but our concern is to indent some key analytical elements that are left by the hand of history. One way to do so is to combine our “traditional” scenes indictors with demographic measures like % Mexican-Americans. That is demography plus values (from our scenes values measures) should be more powerful than demography or values alone.

Alas we are limited by census items for major migration data, and the census provides breakdowns by classic demographic items like race, class, and gender, but omits the more subtle items that we combine into our scenes mousers. Given this inevitably less-than-tight fit between concepts and data, we seek to spell out some major sconces concepts in other chapters, and briefly here, and then test a subset of them as best we can given the data limitations we and all researchers face.

Consumption relations are thus not necessarily conflict-free or consensual. Nevertheless, scenes may support political ideologies, community solidarity, and economic productivity. In chapter 5, we saw that scenes contribute to success in the creative economy. A scene can also enhance a neighborhood’s attractiveness by adding family-friendly restaurants, theater, parks, festivals, and films to its schools, safety, and cleanliness. [Box about Terry’s example of planting flowers in small town in Illinois].

DRAFT of BOX Flowers Celebrate Scenes

Lindenhurst, Illinois - a Chicago suburb with a population just over 12,500 - was recognized as a 2006 UII award recipient for its “Golden Daffodil Project.” Lacking a downtown district or any historic buildings or landmarks, Lindenhurst was a town that felt it had no identity.

So to mark its 50th anniversary, the village adopted the daffodil as its “official” flower, and planted over 50,000 daffodil bulbs in public and private spaces. While the goal was to develop a community identity through this beautification process, the village also accomplished perhaps a more important achievement; in the process of working together to plant the daffodil seeds, and care for the flowers, residents began working closely together, getting to know their neighbors and develop a sense of community.

Source: MuniNet Guide article: Scenes Contribute to the Growth and Decline of Communities.

Scene activities can These may bring families and communities together in new ways in new institutions, enhancing rather than competing with traditional practices [Box about Ave Maria Florida as Catholic Scene vs. Hassidic Jews moving to NY suburbs]. Scenes may also energize political affiliations, adding to ideologies left and right the ambiance of revolutionary bookstores, “coffee served right” at the “The Conservative Café,” the chance to “dress consciously” at “The Natural High Lifestyle Boutique, as well as politically infused concerts, galleries, and the like. Consumption may complement or compete with other factors that shape neighborhood compositions. [Box on the Conservative Café. . Their slogan: coffee served right. The owner wanted to “to turn his love of coffee and his moral thinking into a business.” Also Box on Natural High Lifestyle Boutiques. . Their motto: “A company with a purpose, Natural High has set out to redefine the way we as individuals spend our time, and how we as a collective manage the limited resources of planet earth. Drawing influence from California culture, we focus on three essential elements: yoga lifestyle, surf culture, environmental awareness Our mission is to continue to raise awareness regarding the importance of choosing sustainable, renewable, and biodegradable resources, while inspiring consciousness through surfing, yoga and meditation”.]

Great scene box ideas.

Transcending neo-Marxism and Post-Modernism: The New Chicago School, not New York or L.A. It has been difficult for social scientists to acknowledge or even study potentially scene-driven population movements. Many tend to view those elements of individuals’ identities formed through consumption relationships as less real than other sources of identity. Researchers steeped in New York’s distinctive history and others raised on Marxism the world over have tended to focus on class as the primary and fundamental source of social cleavage and social connection. Economic and class explanations are stressed, while culture, ethnicity, individual initiative, neighborhood dynamics, and politics are played down relative to other approaches (Such theorizing was stressed by Henri Lefebvre and Manuel Castells in Paris, in Logan and Molotch, Mollenkopf and Castells, Fainstein, Douglas John Kain, William Julius Wilson, Massey and Denton, K.Wong, Robert Wood, Sassen, John Friedmann, Richard Sennett). Even loft living enjoys a Marxist interpretation in Zukin (1982). From this perspective, scenes naturally look like super-structure and false consciousness. Pubs and football are a distraction from class interests. The family is a bourgeois construct. Art galleries reproduce class hierarchies.

By contrast, post-modernist urban research growing out of, but not restricted to, Los Angeles, as well as earlier Chicago school authors like Louis Wirth, took the ethnic neighborhood or small town as the primary source of social connection. But cars and highways and telephone wiped these out, they theorize, suggesting that w. What remains are atomized, blasé, aggressive individuals. The individualism of LA is documented powerfully by Robert Putnam in new measures of trust in leaders, trust in friends, trust in family and social capital—on all of which LA falls near the lowest of any of the 48 U.S. cities surveyed by Putnam et al. on website Scandinavian Journal Diversity paper or DeLeon and XX in UAR Howard Garfinkel in the 1960s pushed inquiry back inside the head of each person, and questioned the very grounds of any scientific observation in his close conversational analyses. More popular was the anthropology/philosophy/religious world-view of Carlos Castenada, who brought a dreamy, drug-inspired subjectivism from the Mexican deserts to LA.

These themes combine in the post-modern outlook that Michael Dear, Mike Davis, and others termed the LA School: neo or pseudo-Marxist economic determinism (including Groucho-like “kinko capitalism”), highly subjectivist individualism, deliberately semi-articulate statements that blend the language and mood of high-on-dope dreams and scenes (Baudrillard). From this perspective, amenities and scenes naturally look like “simulacra” – hazy pseudo-communities thrown up by fragmented individuals to put a veil of Maya over their anomie or to escape into a commodified fantasy world of Disney and Nike.

Post-modernist “simulacra,” Wirthian “anomie,” and Marxian “false-consciousness” are structurally similar: they give pride of place to one single aspect of modern identity, and treat the rest as false and fleeting. By contrast, we consider the social connections developed in scenes to be just as real as those that can develop with co-workers, colleagues, political party members, and neighbors. None is “really real.” Social life is not “all about” any one thing.

Better, we contend, to be multi-dimensional; to see work, politics, primordial community, professional ties and scenes in interaction. We continue to follow the Old Chicago School by analyzing places and spaces in addition to individuals. Yet, by adding scenes, we move beyond nostalgia for the Village in the City. This is the New Chicago School (elaborated in Clark 2008, new Chicago school)..

Empirical Analysis. How can we empirically test and demonstrate that scenes add to other factors driving residential patterns and thus speak to a genuine component of modern social identity? We can treat each of the above standpoints as offering a theory as to what “really” drives location decisions, and translate those theories into variables to include in multiple regression analysis. This allows us to begin to determine whether, in what contexts, for what sub-groups, and to what extent consumption relations influence neighborhood compositions and conflict with or enhance other factors.

a. What Independent Variables (in addition to the core)? Several of these are in the core now; just label in terms of these categories (per capita income, voting, % college grads, crime, etc.)

i. For Industrial/Employment Factors: total jobs, per capita income

ii. For Political Factors: Party ID, DDB issues. Others from Chris? Fold in some of Chris’s work here.

iii. For Educational/Professional Factors: % college grads no post-grad; % professional/doctorate grads; university ranking; research-ranked hospitals, constitutional law firms (or firms that deal with “big” questions that make it to the Supreme Court, or state supreme courts). I don't see an easy way to get big law firms; maybe from D & Bradstreet data that we got but never used, but it is by state, so a pain to aggregate up. Leave as a later task unless someone thinks of an easy way to get such law firm data. Bizzip only has # of employees in law in a zip code, not size of firm, and certainly not quality. Same for research ranked hospitals? EASIER AND we should add is High School Quality, which Dan found and we have not seriously analyzed. Dan do you remember the name of the magazine, like Frantera? I don't find but could search my Hard Drives with a better name.

iv. For traditional community elements: school quality, crime rates, % white/black/Hispanic; % catholic or protestant; sanitation; distance from place of birth

v. For scenes: our dimensions, plus specific indexes of theoretical interest.

b. What dependent variables?

i. Change in total population

ii. Change in 18-24 year old share of population

iii. Change in 25-34 year old share of population

iv. Change in Baby Boomer share of population

v. Change in Retiree share of population

vi. Change in college graduate share of population

vii. Change in white/black/Hispanic share of population

viii. Change in democrat/republican share of population

Then run regressions, first including the “classic” variable (jobs, politics, education, schools & safety.), as well as the rest of the core regression model, then adding in scenes dimensions, asking if scenes are significant, and for whom. Model on the old Migration Seminar discussion.

We can combine the above discussion about key factors in shaping residential patterns with these measures to generate a set of testable hypotheses, both about the direct effects of scenes on residential patterns, and second about how scenes interact with other factors.

Dan these are exactly the sort of specific propositions we need to focus modeling of regressions. I have several comments and suggestions, but these are generally great to have. Even if we cannot test all, they add a lot to above. WE are now at a phase where we can take a few days for others to react too, before start data analysis. Then can divide up analyses—so if Eric, Sam, Kendrick, Francisco, Meghan, Jason can comment and critique our ideas below, using where possible specific variables that we can use to test competing interpretations with , this would be splendid. TNC

[DV: change in total population] The Life is Complicated Thesis. No single factor should explain changes in total population. Social life is not “all about” any one thing.

• Therefore, none of these variables should significantly predict changes in total population.

[DV: change in % 18-24, 25-34 year old]. The Sow Your Wild Oats Thesis: As the period of youth extends longer, delaying marriage and children, more young adults are able to experiment with alternative and transgressive lifestyles. Spaces that signal rule-breaking, more than those signaling opportunities for refined self-expression, ought to contain rising number of youth. Thus, Counter-cultural scenes should be attractive among this group, net of the availability of jobs or cheap rents or political affiliation, and both rootedness in the local and the legitimacy of traditions should be less attractive.

• Thus, though we would expect total # of jobs, lower rents, and democratic areas to predict increases in 25-34 year olds, transgressive amenities and social climates should also attract this demographic.

• Transgressive amenities should also predict more 18-24 year olds, but, since large #’s of this group are likely in college, jobs should be less important. Conversely, amenities signaling rationalistic scenes, like universities and research centers, should also contain increasing numbers of 18-24 year olds.

1. This effect should be heightened in areas in which the most counter-cultural amenities cluster, as measured by our “badboy” index of tattoo parlors, body piercing studios, beer bars, night clubs, bail bonds, adult entertainment, and adult book stores.

• Transgressive scenes should be strongly linked with young adults than self-expressive scenes.

• Conversely, 25-34 year olds should be declining in areas with more family-friendly amenities and few transgressive amenities (as measured by my “familyfriendlynobadshare” variable).

• They should also be declining in areas with amenities signally high levels of local authenticity and traditional legitimacy.

[DV: change in % baby boomers, change in %25-34, change in % college grads]. The Varieties of Various Experience Thesis. Richard Peterson’s influential idea of the rise of the cultural omnivore suggests that not elite vs. popular but wide vs. narrow tastes are rising in salience, with especially upper status, younger, college educated persons favoring variety as a good in itself. A counter-thesis suggests that “variety” as such is empty in that there are multiple types of wide-ranging experience, and that these “varieties of various experience” might be attractive, or unattractive, to different groups.

• If omnivorousness, or variety, is attractive as such, it should not impact different groups in different ways, and its effects should not be altered by the content of the experiences signaled by different collections of heterogeneous amenities.

o Neighborhoods with highly diverse restaurant scenes (measured by my “restaurantdiversity” variable) should attract younger, wealthier, more educated residents. Variations in the scenes dimensions should not alter these effects.

• If omnivorousness, or variety, admits of various experiences, it should impact different groups in different ways, and its effects should be altered by the content of the experiences signaled by different collections of heterogeneous amenities.

o We might expect that, though a diverse array of restaurants might indicate rising numbers of both younger (25-34) and college educated individuals – both groups might well find diversity attractive. However, younger individuals might be more likely to prefer to live in a scene in which that diversity mixes with other, more transgressive amenities (like tattoo parlors and body piercing studios and night clubs and beerbars) to generate a generally rebellious mood; college educated individuals, especially those with professional careers and families, might prefer to live in a scene in which that diversity mixes with other, more expressive and aesthetic, less explicitly or obviously anti-establishment, amenities (like art galleries, performance art centers, design studios, theaters, pottery classes).

▪ Thus, “restaurantdiversity” should predict more college grads, more 25-34 year olds, but it should combine with “self-expressive” legitimacy to attract the former, and with “transgressive” theatricality to attract the latter.

o By contrast, even if more restaurant diversity might be less attractive to older individuals, they might prefer to live in a scene with few restaurants but a strong sense of local identity, rooting them in this place, with its own bounded, coherent identity.

▪ Thus, if “restaurantdiversity” should predict fewer baby boomers, it should not explain away the attractiveness of local authenticity to this group; in fact, local authenticity should become more significant as restaurant diversity deceases.

▪ If this effect is a function of family status, that is, if boomers married with children move to “boring” zips with a narrow range of restaurants, the adding %married with children to the model should explain away the effects of restaurant diversity on changes in boomer population. If not, this would suggest that there is something attractive about the ethos of coherence and single-mindedness signaled by few different types of restaurants and high local authenticity scores.

o Another baby-boomer related idea, maybe not for here, but not sure where: the second BZ factor I would interpret as a Renoir’s Loge, Theater Box Scene: it’s main dimensions are highest on glamour and exhibitionism and charisma, then self-expression, and also tradition, and low on state, utilitarian, and transgression. One of the highest scoring zips on this factor is: Chelsea in New York! A high-end art, cocktail party, classical, formal style scene. In these scenes, college grads and baby boomers are rising (younger people are declining); however, boomers are dropping where the single dimensions self-expression and glamour are rising. But this combination of glamour, expression, exhibition, tradition, and non-transgressiveness, non-utilititarian, seems to generate a different feel (while restaurant diversity still predicts decline in boomers). Maybe add somewhere to make point about difference between single dimensions and whole scene?

[DV: change in % college grad]. The Express Yourself! Thesis: Student protestors in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s protested against a university system that was overly rationalistic, too cognitively-oriented, and not sufficiently attuned to expressive and emotional experience. Since then, universities have increasingly included programs designed to encourage students to express their unique personalities, with even the University of Chicago grudgingly making itself more “fun.” As the number of persons with college education increases, scenes composed of amenities signaling self-expressive legitimacy and glamorous theatricality should increasingly attract college graduates, net of jobs, race, politics and other controls. Though younger college educated individuals might well cluster in more transgressive scenes, the taste for self-expression and glamour runs through the life course and need not be particularly rebellious, thus we would not expect transgressive scenes to attract college graduates per se. Scenes favoring traditionalistic, communitarian qualities ought to be less attractive to this more individualistic group. In general, if more education increases the salience of lifestyle and taste, scenes dimensions should explain behavior of college grads more than that of other sub-groups.

• Self-expressive and glamorous scenes, across all our data sources, should predict increasing college grad population.

• The R2 for models predicting changes in college grads should be higher than for other demographic groups. TNC: this depends just on the specific model ; should only hold if our model is biased toward explaining Berkeley type behavior and values. DS SAYS: I took this idea from YOUR comments in the migration seminar paper, which I think you should review, where you note that, if scenes do become more salient as education rises, then models about the effects of scenes on college grads should be more robust. Doesn’t seem biased to Berkeley to me, but to the notion that education is linked with increased liklihood to “move to culture” or “move to scenes,” WHATEVER they are. Remember: we’re talking SPECIFICALLY about residence here, not about generally valuing culture or individualism or whatever, but about MOVING to scenes.

• Living near many jobs should be less important to this group than the opportunity to live in a self-expressive scene. Total jobs should not significantly predict increases in college grads.

o Corollary? The City for Job, Scene for Living Thesis: Do people move to cities for jobs, but pick where to live for the scene? If so: employment at the county level should explain away the county level aggregated effect of scenes on changes in county population, while changes in zip code population should be more strongly predicted by scenes than jobs. Interesting; lets pursue. Nice to switch levels and phases of decisions, and is a key way to resolve the conflict between scenes and materialistic interpretations.

• Transgressive scenes, and the badboy index, should not significantly predict changes in college grad population. Traditionally legitimated scenes, as well as our “communitarian” factor, should predict declining levels of college graduates; conversely the “urbane” factor should predict growth in college grads. OK But too simple; try to combine with other factors like the above to explain TYPE of college enrollment; e.g. Jr colleges vs. Universities; we could try to dig this out but I don't think we have type of college in file now. What else could shift this model? Things from our Boho analysis, or say Boho Bliss TIMES college enrollment or similarly multiplicative interaction terms? FINE, I WAS JUST STICKIKNG WITH EASY DATA.

[DV: change in % college] Expression, Education, and Political Tolerance. College educated persons tend to be more pluralistic and tolerant; their numbers should be rising in democratic areas, falling in areas with high “state authenticity” scores. This connection should be heightened in more self-expressive scenes.

• Interacting self-expression with % democrat should predict greater increases in college grads than self-expression of % democrat would separately.

[DV: % religious practitioners, change in % religious practitioners. IV of interest: ethnic homogeneity]. Self-expression and Religion as Personal Resource. [I know this is directly residence as an outcome, but might still be relevant, if framed as residence in self-expressive scenes as a condition for other outcomes] As expressions of individuality rise in salience, persons’ relationship to religious practice are likely to alter. Religiosity is more likely to be experienced as personal resource to draw on, rather than an expression of group identity. Thus, we would expect that in more self-expressive scenes, race would predict the level of religious participation less than it does in less self-expressive scenes. The opposite relationship should obtain in more traditionalistic scenes.

• In the bottom quintiles of self-expressive legitimacy, race should strongly predict % church attendance and adherence; the higher the quintile, the weaker this connection should become, eventually reaching insignificance in the top quintile.

• . very interesting! A bit complex but should be testable with our data. DS: I ALREADY HAVE TESTED, AND IT HOLDS.

The Father Knows Best Thesis. Though new urbanites favor dense, walkable neighborhoods, diversity, and buzzing expressivity, many prefer to live in a scene composed of amenities signaling familial and domestic values. For these persons, a family-friendly scene adds value to their residential environment, beyond the safety of their streets or the quality of their schools. They are likely to be married with children, as well as retirees, and to have conservative political attitudes. They may also favor traditional family roles, and thus be likely to live in less egalitarian, more hierarchical social climates.

• The family-friendly index (Dan’s syntax—Dan where can we find items like this that you reference? All in one place or multiple places? Esp. your types of scene indexes IN MY SYNTAX. I CAN SEND?) should predict more baby boomers, married couples with children, retirees, whites, and republican voting.

• Its explanatory power should increase in counties with less egalitarian DDB scores (use quintiles).

• Interacting it with school quality and safety should increase the explanatory power of both.

[DV’s: % non-white, change in % non-white; IV’s of interest: utilitarian legitimacy, corporate and rational authenticity; religious organizations]. The Ethnic Neighborhood Thesis. Our theoretical discussion has suggested that scenes rise under conditions of heightened social contingency and differentiation, where individuals’ activities and attitudes are less straightforwardly determined by primordial group attachments, and social consumption outside the home in scenes, based on affirming shared tastes and affinities rather than shared backgrounds, rises. The contrary of this thesis should also hold: where primordial group attachments are strong and rising, scenes that signal “non-necessary,” contingent meanings should be weaker; amenities outside of home and church in these neighborhoods should be less expressive and glamorous, while stressing utilitarian values, like convenience and efficiency, and the standardization that comes with corporate authenticity. At the same time, religious and ethnic homogeneity signaling a common world-view, as well as eating at home with family and friends, should be more attractive.

• Churches (or church participation, or % same denomination), utilitarian legitimacy, and corporate authenticity should predict more ethnic homogeneity (or more non-white population? Or use heritage data to create measure of % same ethnicity per neighborhood).

• Expressive and glamorous scenes should predict declines in this group.

• They should be rising where more people are eating with family and friends at home (DDB).

• Employment opportunities should be more important than expressive opportunities, so # of jobs should predict more non-whites than scenes should.

• Not sure if this fits, but I noticed that: in least populous zips (by quintiles), non-whites are increasing most in white, democratic areas, but not much else is significant. As population goes up, democratic/republican becomes less significant, and churches become the most important. So maybe in rural America, signal that non-whites are “welcome” is that they are democratic, but then in urban america, since most big cities are democratic anyway, ethnic churches are the main hub?

TNC: I will post Migration workshop files in one zip (1.849 Mb) on my Apple site



; it is also on Chalk now under #89 Scenes MS.

Look esp at the Abstract and Brief Commentary on Results; these variables are largely superseded by our current core, but you get the flavor of the analysis from what is there. And a style and content for summarizing the empirical/ regression results.

Also look at interactions among these variables – that is, if we add education to jobs and scenes, or add politics to jobs and scenes and education, or add community to jobs and scenes and politics, do their impacts change? Try all permutations. Try also to add conflicting or enhancing scenes. That is, add “family-focused” scene index (DS has constructed already) to traditional community elements. Does that enhance their impacts more than safety and schools alone? Add also “family-unfriendly” scene to see if this weakens traditional community elements (DS has constructed – adult clubs, tattoos, body art, etc.). Draw from Chris’s texts about interaction effects of scenes and political affiliation on residence. Don't try to duplicate Chris; he has lots of work in progress on the politics part.

This is potentially huge; we cannot run everything. Lets try some basics with the variables we can find in ONE week of looking, no more, and analyze them. Then we can add variables in later rounds.

We need more sharp theory to specify specific interactions, etc. it is too hard on Eric or Sam or Francisco or others to do all –but let’s all give these a first whirl and see what we come up with . then we can discuss the RESUTLS and see where to go next. But Eric or Sam or others, don't feel you have to look for days just find one variable before you run regressions. Lets’ get results then discuss them. And refine.

Review Suzanne Smith paper after she finishes new draft on how effects vary by size/ urbanity of city.

Our next step in Chaps 5 and 6 after we see enough results to be satisfied to proceed, is to write up / integrate the results into the chapters. Dan what are your thoughts on who might try this? Do you want to lead? We can ask Eric to help coordinate writing too, or is this too hard, as it may involve Sam/Francisco or others?

A more standard option is for each person to write a memo with his results and how they fit with the chapter? A version of their Log file, as in the past.

We also need help on 1. Boxes – filling in these suggested above, and adding others that might be useful if others suggest some new boxes 2. Editing/commenting on the text. We all need critique and help on refining our ideas. 3. Looking up references for citations in text but messing detail. 4. Soon- making tables in attractive manner, after we get some basic results that seem quasi-publishable.

TNC: why the opposition between Transgression and Self-expression; is not Trans. A form of Self expression esp. for youth who are punching against their established mentors, but also a means for trying out multiple alternatives, possibly linked to identity, to career, to mobility, to discovering who I am and what I might like to do, and where and how to do it. This is broader than Transgression. Maybe try to add a bit more on which youth would be more tempted by Transgressions, while others would be more on Self Expre, others by Tradition or very different views of life. For instance those in societies and with parents who were or were perceived as authoritarian would generate more anti parent revolt. Parents who demand more of children and give them less love; parents in a society where Self Expression is valued will generate more SE children. Consider Korea vs. Japan. Both have strong tradition, but Japanese have more close parents who are hugely attentive to their children’s needs and concerns. Even if not much western style love. The Koreans are more authoritarian with their children, they list Deference to Parents as more valued in the WVS. But the children revolt more and are more transgressive. Similarly, the N. European protestants value self expression, individualism and had a huge counter culture in the 1960s which continues in subdued manner. The S. European Catholics were more family orientated, have children live with parents longer, don't push them out, continue the welfare state model of paternalism—and tiny counter culture in the 1960s. more now. Australia had and has tiny counterculture, which US and Canada in middle; UK had huge counterculture in the 1960s and it continues today with massively alienated youth and lower status persons, higher dissent—and the strongest paternalist style and welfare state. Even Tony Blair would openly promote policies that would “change values” of dissenting youth to be more positive toward middle class and engages in less dissent and crime. This would have been impossibly politically incorrect in the more individualistic US. The too heavy-handed authority leads to dissent and the movement away of the young to do their own thing is a big theme in much of our book. It fits with Was Tocqueville Wrong and the French migration to South results. But the lack of Tocqevueilian engagement leading to legitimacy or trust in Korea. What you add here Dan is age-specific/cohort effects, which is an interesting ideas to pursue, which we could try with the WVS and other values type data, DDB. This is getting us down the path to modeling in causes of scenes which we want to try to avoid being tempted by , but let’s think of three are some basic ideas, simple, we might test there that would frame your unqualified propositions esp. re Transgression and provide context, framing them.

DS response:

• 1) As developed theoretically in “A Theory of Scenes,” transgression is NOT a form or sub-type of self-expression. They are different dimensions of scenes. In particular, transgression is a form of theatricality, a mode of self-display. Self-expression is a form of legitimacy, a way of justifying what you are doing. Transgressive self-displays CAN be legitimized through appeals to individual self-expression, but they don’t have to be. They can also be legitimized, for example, through appeals to tradition, as in: The South Shall Rise Again.

• 2) Your discussion is much richer than mine by bringing in cross-national comparisons. But I was trying to frame the empirical hypotheses in terms which are testable by our data. We have: % change in 18-24 year olds, % change in 25-34 year olds, and so on. Those were the terms I was thinking in. Also, your discussion drifts from EFFECTS of scenes, to CAUSES of scenes (why is one scene more transgressive or self-expressive than another, is what you are discussing). As such, it does not belong in this chapter, but in my draft ch. 8 (which, if it gets good and rich enough, we might consider moving up in the book, since they, logically, we’d be discussing: 1. the ways scenes manifest and can be measured 2. their sources/causes 3. their consequences. I’ve been reading Elazar, and this fits his recommendation about the best way to proceed when it comes to discussing culture).

• 3) I have consistently found in my analyses that self-expressive scenes (as signaled BOTH by YP and Bizzip) significantly predict increases in college grads but NOT in 18-35 year old age groups. I have also consistently found that transgressive scenes DO significantly predict increases in 18-35 year olds, but NOT significantly in college grads. I would strongly disagree with what you say about Bohemian scenes being purely transgressive – they combine many elements. When we say “transgressive scenes lead to X” we have to be clear about what we’re saying. We’re talking about # of people LIVING in zip codes with lots of tattoo parlors, body art studios, bars, tobacco stores, bail bondsmen, night clubs, NOT with arts orgs, galleries, graphic design, interior design, computer design, etc. –- those latter are what we are picking up with the “self-expression” variable.

• So, the finding is that, in those places with SPECIFICALLY transgressive-signalling amenities, college grads may be rising, but not because they are college grads, but because they are young (there may be many college grads, but it is not significant, and youth knocks it out); at the same time, the self-expressive places may have young people, but not because they’re young, but because they are college educated. These seems intuitively plausible: people who are 35 are less likely to LIVE around the the adult book stores asd tattoo parlors (especially if they have kids), even if they still positively value transgression. At the same time, there may be a positive valuation of youth as a time to experiment with drugs, live in dangerous settings, test the limits – not only to value these things, but to live surrounded by them.

• It strikes me that we might try to tease out differences between attitudes and residence, then. That is: maybe transgressive attitudes stay relatively strong through the life course (if you have them), but RESIDENCE in transgressive scenes does not. If this were the case, then DDB attitudinal scores for transgression and self-expression should NOT have significantly different effects, but BZ and YP zip-code level amenities socres SHOULD. That is, 40 year old educated folks might live near galleries, art studios, design centers, yoga studios, etc., VALUE transgression, but only go to the transgressive scenes at night or on weekends. This could also mean that COUNTY level transgressive vs. self-expression should be less important than ZIP level.

COMMENTS FROM JASON FINKES:

The Life is Complicated Thesis.

Be sure to vary order of blocking intelligently

Compare R2 to those of simple models

The Sow Your Wild Oats Thesis: As the period of youth extends longer,

delaying marriage and children, more young adults are able to

experiment with alternative and transgressive lifestyles.

Does this assume that transgressive and alternative lifestyles are

deviance safety valves in response to the institutions of marriage and

the family or only possible GIVEN nothing to "tie you down"? If so, so

that a valid assumption to make? Or is this a question of "Causes of

scenes" and as such not for this portion of analysis? Would coming at

transgressive behavior from the angle of deviance safety valves yield

different possibilities for analysis?

Proposition: Transgressive amenities should also predict more 18-24

year olds, but, since large #'s of this group are likely in college,

jobs should be less important. Conversely, amenities signaling

rationalistic scenes, like universities and research centers, should

also contain increasing numbers of 18-24 year olds.

Issue: Isn't college the larger indicator of location? And the

transgressive elements would arise in an attempt to captivate the

audience Causal relationship here seems backwards and poorly

constructed.

Is it true that 25-34 should be declining in family-friendly

amenities?There should be a way to better couch this proposition, as

25-34, regardless of the longer time taken to have kids or get married

still seems about the age where people would be moving to those family

friendly areas to start families. Maybe control for traditional or

some other

The Express Yourself! Thesis: "Scenes favoring traditionalistic,

communitarian qualities ought to be less attractive to this more

individualistic group."

I'm not certain of the truth of the preceeding proposition. I would

consider bohemianism to be in general relativisticly traditionalistic

and communitarian as well as self-expressive? Perhaps I don't quite

know the subtleties of the dimensions in question?

Corollary? The City for Job, Scene for Living Thesis:

This seems promisingly spot on.

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