Land Patent



Land Patent

When this land was originally settled, the colonists brought themselves under the Crown of England. Thereby, all of the land in the colonies was considered to be the property of the Crown. This legal theory meant that the King could let anyone he wished to live on the land and even may have granted an equitable title to such a subject. However, in equity there is discretion, and at the discretion of the King, the equitable title holder could be dispossessed and the land taken back for the Crown.

One of the sorest points for the colonists in their decision to throw off the King’s yoke was the King’s propensity to take advantage of his discretionary power to seize lands at his caprice. After the War for Independence, the founders of the new nation of the United States decided to make use of the instrument of the Land Patent to sever the land from the control of the administration of government. This was the main purpose on utilizing the Land Patent in this country. While subsequently settled lands could be patented, the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent peace treaty operated as the original Land Patent for the previously settled land in the original 13 colonies.

Because of the early exploits of America’s brave pioneers in the lands west of the Mississippi, it had been realized long before the war that the continent of North America was of considerable geographic size, and it was, thus, greatly desired by the people that the enormous expanse of the Public Lands of the United States be made available for settlement. Congress agreed that that was an excellent idea since the land would be put into productive use and that the whole country would consequently benefit. The individual willing to work the land by and for his own direct benefit, it was thought, would be the best choice to carry out this goal. It was with this belief in mind that Congress passed the statutes granting public lands. See Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U.S. 483, 487 (1890).

In order that this distribution of Public Lands could be carried out expeditiously and according to the desire to prevent the current, or any future, administration of government from invading property rights (as had the King), Congress placed the Land Patent of the United States in positions above all other conveyances of property, by exempting lands granted under the Land Patent from debt incurred prior to the patenting. Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104, 107 (1918).

“Acting within its discretion, Congress determined that in order to promptly dispose of public lands and bring about their PERMANENT occupation and development, it was proper to create the designated exemption; and we are unable to say that the conclusion was ill-founded or that the means were either prohibited or not appropriate to the adequate performance of the high duties which the legislature owed to the public.” (emphasis added)

The effect of this legislation was to give to the patentee, once the patent was perfected via proper procedure, an ability to hold title that is nearly absolute. Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U.S. 447, 454 (1882).

“As we said in the case of Smelting Company v. Kemp; “It is this UNASSAILABLE character [of the patent] which gives it its chief, indeed its only value, as a means of quieting its possessor in the enjoyment of the lands it embraces.”” (emphasis added)

The validity of the patent could not be attacked except under fraud or clerical error and either of these circumstances has to be proven in a court of law, and the challenge must be brought within six months of the granting of the patent. In fact, in a court of law, the patent is the conclusive proof of legal title. Id. 452

“It is among the elementary principles of the law that in actions of ejectment the legal title must prevail. The patent of the United States passes that title. Whoever holds it MUST recover against those who have only unrealized hopes to obtain it, or claims which it is the exclusive province of a court of equity to enforce. However great these may be, they constitute no defense in an action at law based upon the patent. That instrument must first be got out of the way, or its enforcement enjoined, before others having mere equitable rights can gain or hold possession of the lands it covers. This is so well established, so completely embedded in the law of ejectment that no one ought to be misled by any argument to the contrary.” (emphasis added)

See also Johnson v. Christian, 128 U.S. 374, 382 (1888) and Carter v. Ruddy, 166 U.S. 493, 496 (1897).

In an action of ejectment (now called eviction or forcible entry and detainer) the right to the possession of the property must be positively proven by a legal title. Fenn v. Home, 21 How. 481, 483 (1858).

“That the plaintiff in ejectment must in all cases prove a legal title to the premises in himself, at the time of the demise laid in the declaration, and that evidence of an equitable estate will not be sufficient for a recovery, are principles so elementary and so familiar to the profession as to render unnecessary the citation of authority in support of them… This legal title the plaintiff must establish either upon a connected documentary chain of evidence, or upon proofs of possession of sufficient duration to warrant the legal conclusion of the existence of such written title.”

In the case of lands granted under a Land Patent, a “connected documentary chain of evidence” is on public record at the Recorder of Deeds for the county in which the land is located. Even the sovereign States themselves do not have the power to overturn Land Patents and their effects upon the land, namely, the severance from the interference in them by the administration of government. Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 102 (1871).

“In the Federal Courts, where the distinction between legal and equitable proceedings is strictly maintained, and remedies afforded by law and equity are separately pursued, the action of ejectment can only be sustained upon the possession by the plaintiff of the legal title…in the action of ejectment in the Federal Courts, the legal title must prevail, and the patent, when regular on its face, is conclusive evidence of that title.

So also in the action of ejectment in the State courts, when the question presented is whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the superior legal title from the United States, the patent must prevail. For, as said in Bagnell v. Broderick, ‘Congress has the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of titles emanating from the United States; and the whole legislation of the Federal government in reference to the public lands declares the patent the superior and conclusive evidence of legal title…’” (emphasis added)

Furthermore, the states may not legislate a superior, or even an equal, instrument to the Land Patent. Bagnell et. al. v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436, 451 (1839).

“…we deny that the states have any power to declare certificates of purchase of equal dignity with a patent. Congress alone can give them such effect.”

“No more can private property be so taken away by judicial decision and handed over, gratis, to the State. ‘The touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government.’” Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294-298 (1967); California ex rel. State Lands Commission v. United States, No. 89 Original (June 18, 1982); Waterman v. Smith, 13 Cal. 373 (1859); Chipley v. Farris, 45 Cal. 527 (1873); Cassidy v. Carr, 48 Cal. 339 (1874); Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. Thompson, 117 Cal. 594, 49 P. 714 (1897), aff’d sub nom. Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co., 180 U.S. 71 (1901); Leese v. Clark, 18 Cal. 535 (1861);

“It [the patent] passes whatever interest the United States may then have possessed in the premises. It operates in consequence as an absolute bar to all claims under the United States having their origin subsequent to the petition.

But the patent has a still further operation and effect. It is not merely a deed of the United States, conveying whatever interest they may have held in the premises at the institution of the proceedings before the Land Commission. It is also a record of the Government, showing its action and judgment with respect to the title of the patentees at the date of the cession…This instrument, as we have stated, is the record of the Government upon the title of the patentee to the land described therein, declaring the validity of that title and that it rightfully attaches to the land. Upon all the matters of fact and law essential to authorize its issuance, it imports absolute verity; and it can only be vacated and set aside by direct proceedings instituted by the Government, or by parties acting in the name and by the authority of the Government. Until thus vacated it is conclusive, not only between the patentee and the Government, but between parties claiming in privity with either by title subsequent.” 18 Cal. 571-572 (citation omitted).

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979).

United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924).

“Where questions arise which affect titles to land it is of great importance to the public that when they are once decided they should no longer be considered open. Such decisions become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their change. Legislatures may alter or change their laws, without injury, as they affect the future only; but where courts vacillate and overrule their own decisions on the construction of statutes affecting the title to real property, their decisions are retrospective, and may affect titles purchased on the faith of their stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once decided, should be considered no longer doubtful or subject to change.” 265 U.S. at 486-487. (citations omitted)

As early as 1898 this Court was able to say:

“[I]f there is any one thing respecting the administration of the public lands which must be considered as settled by repeated adjudications of this court, it is that the decision of the land department upon mere questions of fact is, in the absence of fraud or deceit, conclusive, and such questions cannot thereafter be relitigated in the courts.” Johnson v. Drew, 171 U.S. 93, 99 (1898). More v. Steinbach, 127 U.S. 70, 83 (1888). Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354 (1942). [ambiguity] Heath v. Wallace, 138 U.S. 573 (1891); French v. Fyan, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 169 (1876); Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 447 (1882);

interpretation of a federal land conveyance is determined by federal law.

Shively v. Bowlby, (1894) 152 U.S. 1, 9-10; 38 L.Ed. 331. 335; 14 S.Ct. 548. Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 22, [80 L.Ed. 17-18. United States v. o’Donnell, 303 U.S. 509.

settlement of titles:

Knight v. U.S. Land Association, 142 U.S. 184, [35 L.Ed. 982;] Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. 489, [18 L.Ed.]

The patent serves to protect the patentee’s land from all incursions of administrative power. United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525, 535 (1864).

“A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive as against the Government, and all claiming under junior patents of titles, until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal [because of fraud or other ministerial impropriety at the time of the patenting].”

See also United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 111 (1935).

Finally, these doctrines concerning the Land Patent are still effective. Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Commission & City of Los Angeles, 466 U.S. 198, 80 L.Ed. 2nd 237, 104 S.CT. 1751; USSC 82-708, US Law Week, 4/17/1984.

“We hold that California cannot at this late date assert its public trust easement over petitioner’s property, when petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest had their interest confirmed without any mention of such easement in proceedings taken pursuant to the Act of 1851. The interest claimed by California…must have been presented in the patent proceeding or be barred.”

The “petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest” are, of course, the original patentee of the land and all of the assignees of that patent through the intervening time.

In summary, the intent of the Land Patent was to forever sever any control, over the land so patented, by any agency of government. Congress passed legislation on several occasions to fulfill that intent and the courts have concluded that it was well within its power to do so. All other interest, equitable in nature, is presumed inferior to that of a Land Patent and, so, in any action to recover as against patented land, the holder of the patent must prevail. In demonstration of which we refer to the statutes of the State of Illinois as an example, at 110 pp. 8-1208, and 1120 pp. 8-1209 which read as follows, to wit:

“8-1208. Official Certificate-Land Office.

pp. 8-1208. Official Certificate-Land Office. The official certificate of any register or receiver of any land office of the United States to any fact or matter on record in his or her office, shall be received in evidence in any court in this State, and shall be competent to prove the fact so certified. The certificate of any such register, of the entry or purchase of any tract of land within his or her district, shall be deemed and taken to be evidence of title in the party who made such entry or purchase, or his or her legatees, heirs or assigns, and shall enable such party, his or her legatees or assigns, to recover or protect the possession of the land described in such certificate, in any action of ejectment or forcible entry and detainer, UNLESS A BETTER LEGAL AND PARAMOUNT TITLE BE EXHIBITED FOR THE SAME. The signature of such register or receiver may be proved by a certificate of the Secretary of State, under his or her seal, that such signature is genuine.” Amended by P.A. 83-707, pp. 1, eff. Sept. 23, 1983. (emphasis added)

“8-1209. Patents for land.

pp. 8-1209. Patents for land. A PATENT FOR LAND SHALL BE DEEMED AND CONSIDERED A BETTER LEGAL AND PARAMOUNT TITLE IN THE PATENTEE, HIS OR HER LEGATEES, HEIRS OR ASSIGNE, THAN THE OFFICIAL CERTIFICATE OF ANY REGISTER OF A LAND OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, OF THE ENTRY OR PURCHASE OF THE SAME LAND.” (emphasis added)

Amended by P.A. 83-707, pp. 1, eff. Sept. 23, 1983.

Property tax – Unconstitutional – Land Untaxable by State.

The original constitution of Wisconsin provided that the lands of Wisconsin are untaxable. Article II, Section 2, reads as follows:

“Sec. 2. The propositions contained in the act of Congress, are hereby accepted, ratified and confirmed, and shall remain irrevocable without the consent of the United States, and it is hereby ordained that this state shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil within the same, by the United States, nor with any regulations congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to bona fide purchasers thereof; AND NO TAX SHALL BE IMPOSED ON LAND,” (emphasis added)

Sargent v. Herrick & Stevens, 221 U.S. 404, 55 L.Ed. 787;

Northern P.R. Co. v. Truitt County, 115 U.S. 600, 29 L.Ed. 477;

Town of St. John v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 665 NE 2d 965 (1996).

Patent Unassailable

Sanford v. Sanford, 139 U.S 642, 35 L.Ed. 290

Right to Possess in Patentee

Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 20 L.Ed. 534

Evidence of Title

U.S. v. Stone, 2 U.S. 525, 17 L.Ed. 768

Patent as Legal Title

Minter v. Crommelin, 18 U.S. 87, 15 L.Ed. 279

Johnson v. Christian, 128 U.S. 374, 32 L.Ed. 412

Doe v. Aiken, 31 Fed 393

Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Peters (U.S.) 408, 10 L.Ed. 264

Patent as Estopple

Beadle v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 52 L.Ed. 849

Priority in general, for liens see;

26 U.S.C.A. § 6323

S. & S. Gasket Co. Inc. v. U.S., 635 F.2d 568

Mantovani v. Fast Fuel Corp., 494 F. Supp. 72

MDC Leasing Corp. v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass’n., 450 F. Supp. 179, affirmed 603 F. 2d 213

U.S. v. Hage, 417 F. Supp. 74

Matter of Fisher, 7 B.R. 490

26 U.S.C.A. § 7426

Peterson v. U.S., 511 F. Supp. 250

Angelos v. Maryland Cas. Co., 380 A. 2d. 646, 38 Md. App. 265

United States v. Champaign County, Fed. Supp. 474, 1958

For Public Land Cases

Cent. Dig. 119, 121, 314, 316, 322, 324, 332-335, 461-465, 481, 720

Cases of attack on United States Land Patents and the land so covered have been appealed to the U.S. S. Ct. 139 times and it has held each time, that, if a claim against the land is not made before the patent is issued, no claim made thereafter may be recognized by a court and no Act of Congress can place such land in jeopardy to the owner. The above case cited is: Summa Corporation v. California ex rel. State Lands Commission & City of Los Angeles.

“When Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law, …”

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485; 48 S. Ct. 564, 575; 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (dissenting opinion).

Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1354; 79 L.Ed. 2d. --- (1984), (Stevens J. dissenting).

Interests by states must have been presented in the patent proceedings or be barred

Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 21 S.Ct. 690, 45 L.Ed. 963

U.S. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 41 S.Ct. 621, 68 L.Ed. 1110

U.S. v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472, 41 S.Ct. 378, 65 L.Ed. 736, pp. 1755-1758. 31 Cal. 3d 288, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 644 P.2d 792, reversed and remanded.

Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Commission & City of Los Angeles, 466 U.S. 198, 80 L.Ed. 2nd 237, 104 S.Ct. 1751; USSC 82-708, US Law Week, 4-17-1984

Title 43 U.S.C. 59, established that duly certified copies of Federal Land Patents shall be evidence in all cases where the originals would be evidence. Section 83 of Title 43, covers the evidentiary effect of Certified Federal Land Patents for all States and all the courts in the United States must take Judicial Notice of the Federal Patents and their evidentiary effect under these Federal Statutes. All judges in all States shall be bound as to the power and validity of the patents.

U.S. v. Debell, (1915 CA8 SD) 227 F. 760

Patent as foundation of Title at Law

Fenn v. Holmes, 21 Howard 481

Immunity from Collateral Attack

Collins v. Bartlett, 44 Cal 371

Webber v. Pere Marguette Boom Co., 62 Mich. 6262, 30 NW 469

Surget v. Doe, 24 Miss 118

Pittsmont Copper Co. v. Vanina, 71 Mont. 44, 227 Pac. 46

Green v. Barker, 47 Neb. 934, 66 NW 1032

Neff v. U.S., 91 CCA 241

Paterson v. Ogden, 74 P. 443, 141 Cal. 43, 99Am. St. Rep. 31

Judicial Opinions of Form of Declaration of Land Patent

Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U.S. 488, 30 L.Ed. 1039 USCT

Scheimer v. Conway, 23 How. 235, 16 L.Ed. 452 (1860) USCT

Summa Corp. v. California ex rel., 104 S.Ct. 1751 (1984) USCT

Fiedler v. Pipes, 107 So. 2d. 409 (1958) Louisiana

Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How 691

Land Patent as prima facie Conclusive Evidence of Unassailable Legal Title

Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 20 L.Ed. 534

State v. Crawford, 13 Ariz. App. 225, 475 P. 2d. 515

Texas, etc. R. R. v. Smith, 159 U.S. 68, 40 L.Ed. 78, 15 S.Ct. 935

Miller v. Grunsky, 66P. 858, 141 Cal. 441, reversed (1903) 75 P. 48

Ejectment against a defendant in possession cannot be maintained in Federal court on an equitable title, gained by entry made with the register and receiver, though the State statutes otherwise provide.

Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 U.S. 83, 84. 8 S.Ct. 431

Carter v. Ruddy, 56 Fed. 544, 15 U.S. App. 129 or 429

Le Beau v. Armitage, 47 Mo. 139

Johnson v. Christian, 128 U.S. 382, 33 L.Ed. 415, 9 S.Ct. 90

Doe v. Aiken, 31 Fed. 393

Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 106 U.S. 417, 27 L.Ed. 226

Ejectment not maintainable on State Certificate of Purchase

Kircher v. Murray, 60 Fed. 52, 23 U.S. App. 214

affirming S.C. 54 Fed. 626

Harrest v. Kinney, 44 Mich. 460, 7 N.W. 64

Moran v. Moran, 106 Mich. 12, 58 Am. St. Rep. 465, 63 N.W. 990

Headley v. Coffman, 38 Neb. 72, 56 N.W. 702

Clagett v. Kilbourne, 1 Black. 350, 17 L.Ed. 216

Wilson v. Fine, 14 Sawy. 35, 36. 38 Red. 790, 791

Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U.S. 579, 37 L.Ed. 856, 13 S.Ct. 939

Abbott v. Union, ect., Ins. Co., 127 Ind. 73, 26 N.E. 154

Estoppel has been sustained as against a municipal corporation (county)

Beadle v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 52 L.Ed. 849

See Title 43, Sections 83 and 43 USC 57-59

Diversity of Citizenship, 28 USC 1331, 1332, 1343

Treaties, 8 Stat. 80, 8 Stat. 200, 8 Stat. 218, 9 Stat. 869, 10 Stat. 1031

Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199

Lead Case Louisiana Purchase States

Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511

On ultra vires

1st Nat. Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, 69 SE 1123

Norton Grocery Co. v. Peoples Nat’l Bank, 144 SE 501

Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. L. Herisson, 33 F.2d. 841

Am. Exp. Co. v. Cit. St. Bank, 194 NW 427

Ashley v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 410 F. Supp. 1389

Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571, 44 L.Ed. 20 S.Ct. 222

Davidson v. Lovett, 446 F. Supp. 1171

Florida Cent. & Pen. R.R. v. Bell, 176 U.S. 321, 44 L.Ed. 486, 20 S.Ct. 399

Hanford v. Davies, 163 U.S. 273, 41 L.Ed. 157, 16 S.Ct. 1051 (1896)

Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 273, 41 L.Ed. 157, 16 S.Ct. 478 (1906)

Kirklin v. Ellerbe, 225 F. 168

Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561

Nolan v. Cal. Coast. Comm., 177 Call. App. 3d 719, 722 (1986) 55 U.S.L.W. 5145

First English Evan. Luth. Church of Glendale v. Co. of L.A. 55 U.S.L.W. 4781

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d. 266

Davis v. Pima County, 590 P. 2d. 459 (1978)

Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P. 2d. 513 (1986)

Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d. 587 (1976)

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621

U.S. v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114

Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)

Loretta v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)

Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898)

Candid Ent. Inc., v. Grossmont Union H.S. Dist., 39 Cal. 3d. 878, 890 (1985)

Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. Ap. 3d. 317, 325 (1981)

Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. App. 3d. 110, 128 (1973)

Strumansky v. San Diego Co. Emp. Tetirement Assoc., 11 Cal. 3d. 28, 32 (1974)

Avco Community Dev. Inc. v. South Caost Regional Comm., 17 Cal. 3d. 785 (1976)

Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979)

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)

Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa, 69 Cal. App. 3d. 74, 78 (1977)

PennCentral, 438 U.S. 124

Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)

Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, U.S. 102 Reporter, p. 2858, 28 June, 1982. Art. I v. Art. 3 usage, Does not have force of law. V 104, Supra Reporter, 175-1, April 17, 1984.

31 Cal. 3d. 288; 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 644 p. 2d. 792, 104 S.Ct. 1751 (1984)

U.S. Circuit Court will enforce new equity created by State statute

Wisconsin etc., R.R. v. Wisconsin, et., Land Col, 71 Wis. 102, 36 N.W. 841

State v. Hewit Land Co., 134 Pac. Rep. 474

Hogan v. Page, 2 S.Ct. 605, 69 U.S. 605, 17 L.Ed. 854 98 Stat. 1671

Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Price County

Bagnell et al. v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 450

Raestle v. Whitson, 582 P.2d. 170

Walliker v. Escott, 608 P.2d. 1272

Litchfield v. Register and Receiver, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 575, 19 L.Ed. 681

U.S. v. Steenerson, et al, 50 Fed 504, CCA 552, 4 US App. 332

Jenkins v. Gibson, 2 La. Ann. 203, Louisiana 18 How. 87

Minter v. Crommelin, 18 U.S. 87, 15 L.Ed. 279

King v. McAndrews, 11F 860, 50 CCA 29

Davis v. Fell, 211 P. 30, 59 Call. App. 438

Thompson v. Thompson, 155 P. 1190, 79 Or. 513

Vanderheyden v. Crandall, 2 Denio (N.Y.) 21

Backus v. McCoy, 3 Ohio 221, 17 Am. Dec. 585

Tate v. Jay, 31 Ark. 579

Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 492

Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis., 367

Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 498, 10 L.Ed. 264

Wineman v. Gastrell, 54 Fed. 810

U.S. v. Cherokee Nations, 474 F.2d. 628 (1973)

Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918)

Desenroth v. Dodge, 350 Il. App. 20, 11 NE 2d. 575 (1953)

Lomax v. Pickering, 173 U.S. 26, 43 L.Ed. 601

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