HANCHON class** - WikiLeaks



Total Manpower Strength46,000 SUBMARINES78FRIGATES3CORVETTES4FAST ATTACK CRAFT348PATROL CRAFT58MINESWEEPERS24AIR0LANDING CRAFT (including approx. 100 NAMPO crafts that carry up to 30)200+/- KONGBANG HOVERCRAFT (Carry 35-55)30 Source – Jane’s World Navies Issue 3 – 2009 / Military Periscope 2009SummaryPrimarily a coastal defense force; ill-equipped (mostly outdated Russian equipment) and ill-suppliedLimited capability in terms of total coastal defense outside of 12 miles off the coast and for special operations insertions into S. Korean territory – cannot defend coast/territorial waters out to 200 m out to seePast decade it has a constant combat ship strength of cca. 840 vessels – with economic problems degrade training/operations capabilities as well as maintenance due to lack of purchasing power for parts, with 20-30 percent of surface fleet in engine/hull repair or in dry docks or graving docks, with an additional 10-15 percent of the surface fleet is stored on land; in the open and tunnels, meaning that major repairs would need to be completed to make them operationalSubmarine forces in better condition/state of readiness, however numbers are declining due to aforementioned problemsNavy responsible for sinking S.Korean ship last March – submarine torpedo actionHindering factors for the Korean People’s Navy (KPN)Limited trainingObsolescing equipmentPoor material materiel condition of combat shipsUnsophisticated Electronic Warfare equipmentShortage of modern equipmentInefficient/inadequate logistics systemToo much bureaucracyPoor command and controlModerate moraleWere the KPN to engage in a conflict, it would be able to conduct limited short-term and defensive operations, namelyDeploy attack surface and submarine attack forces to the Yellow and East Seas to disrupt commercial shipping to ROK and Japan/serve as an obstacle to an attackerInterdict into Japan’s eastern ports with midget and coastal submarinesConduct special operations landingsConduct two-batallion-brigade and multiple company-battalion sized amphibious lift ops to ROKPatrol sized crafts can’t operate outside of 50 miles off the coastIn a conflict with ROK and US, the vast majority of KPN surface ships however submarines would be able to continue to fight longerEQUIPMENT DEC05 DEC06 JAN08 JUL09 SHIPS Attack Submarines 22 20 20 22 ROMEO-class attack (China/North Korea) 21 21 6 21 37-meter special ops midget SANG-O-class) (most in reserve) # 36 36 36 YUGO type 20-meter special ops midget # # N/A N/A 8.6-meter special ops (North Korea) Frigates 1 1 1 1 SOHO class (w/4 SS-N-2A Styx SSM) 2 1 1 2 NAJIN class (w/2 SS-N-2A Styx SSM) Patrol Boats 15 7 7 10 SOJU-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (Russian Osa-I type) 6 5 5 6 SOHUNG-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (Russian Komar class) 4 4 N/A 4 HUANFENG-class guided-missile 8 8 N/A 8 OSA-II-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (ex-USSR) 40 63 63 40 SIN-HUNG class torpedo (some w/ hydrofoils fitted) (North Korea) 60 60 N/A 60 KU SONG-class torpedo 13 13 6 13 TAECHONG-class patrol (Chinese HAINAN class design) 6 6 N/A 6 HAINAN-class patrol (China) 18 18 18 33 SINPO-class patrol (North Korea) 4 4 2 5 SARIWON-class patrol (Russian TRAL class) 12 12 N/A 12 SHANGHAI II-class patrol (ex-Chinese) 15 N/A 4 18 S.O. 1-class patrol (Russian/North Korea) 3 2 N/A N/A CHODO-class patrol (North Korea) 3 2 N/A N/A FSU SHERSHEN w/ 533-mm TT 14 14 54 CHONG JIN class 2 6 CHONGJU-class patrol 18 59 CHAHO-class patrol (North Korea) 10 10 TB-11PA-class harbor patrol (North Korea) Mine Warfare 23 18 19 24 Yukto-I/II-class MCM (North Korean 24-m design) Amphibious 10 4 4 10 HANTAE-class medium landing ship (North Korean 50-m design) 100 60 60 96 NAMPO-personnel landing craft (North Korean 27.7-m design) 15 4 4 4 HANCHON-utility landing craft (North Korean 35.7-m design) 40 40 40 Kong Bang-series personnel landing craft Infiltration # 7 7 7 Hand Grenade-class infiltration launches (U.S.) # # # # infiltration submersibles (Korea) # # infiltration craft (Korea) # 8+ 8+ 8+ Cluster OSPREY semi-submersible craft (Korea) Auxiliary # 1 1 1 KOWAN-class submarine rescue ship MISSILES Surface-to-Surface # # # # SS-N-2A Styx (Russian 4K40 Termit) ARTILLERY Coastal Defense Guns # # # # 152-mm M-1937 # # # # 130-mm SM-4-1 towed # # 130-mm M-1992 # # # # 122-mm M-1931/M-1937 Anti-Submarine # # RBU 1200 MISSILES Coastal Defense Surface-to-Surface # # # # SSC-2B Samlet # # # # HY-2 (6 sites) (China) # # # # SS-N-2 StyxOrder of BattleCommand and ControlKPN (HQ Pyongyang) is under the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF), along with Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) and the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Commander of the Navy: Admiral Kim Yun-Sim – subordinate to Chief of the General Staff DepartmentCommander of the Navy serves three functions:Helps to formulate policy at MPAF-levelCommands the KPN through Naval Command Head Quarters Naval StaffCoordinates naval ops with other armed forces branchesCoordination and Support Units – one coastal defense unit Maritime DepartmentMerchant MarineCoastal Defense ArtilleryCoastal Security UnitsSubordinates to the Commander of the Navy are:East/West Sea Fleet CommandersChief of Naval StaffDeputy Political CommanderDeputy Technical CommanderDeputy Rear Services CommanderDeputy Navigation CommanderMilitary Prosecution OfficeMilitary Justice OfficeNaval Medical Center (Navy Medical Hostpital)Kim Chong-suk Nval Technical Training CenterNaval Officers SchoolNavy Petty Officers SchoolNaval Technical Training CenterNumerous ship building and repair facilitiesFleets do not exchange vessels/mutual support non-existent due to geographic/infrastructure/financial mander West Sea Fleet (also Yellow Sea Fleet – Namp’o): Rear Admiral Jyung Myung-Do – subordinate to Commander of the NavySix Squadrons (three names known – according to Jane’s Defense 09, 6 squadrons, according to Military Periscope, 5)8th Naval Squadron [Sagon-ni (37 49’ 23” N; 125 20’ 57”E), Hwanghae-Namdo ()]11th Naval Squadron (Namp’o)12th Naval Squadron (Yomju-gun, Pyongan-butko)3 Unknown Squadrons1 Navy Sniper Brigade\Pip’a-got is the primary location for SubmarinesNamp’o is primary repair and logistics base11th Naval Squadron HQ is Namp’o, but subs are located usually at Pip-a-gotCoastal Security Bureau provides an additional 50-60 vesselsCommander East Sea Fleet (T’oejo-dong, Nagwon-up): Rear Admiral Park Won-Shik – subordinate to Commander of the Navy10 Squadrons (Unknown)includes the 4th Squadron tasked to insert Navy Sniper Brigade in war to JapanCoastal Security Bureau – 70 to 80 additional vessels in East Sea1 Navy Sniper BrigadeCh’aho, Mayang-do and Yukt’ae-tong (across from Mayang-do) are the primary submarine bases for Sang-o Class and Yugo class SSM; reported at Hwangt’do, Kosong-up and T’oejo-dongRole of bases: organizational/logistics centerMost KPN patrol craft are in small ports, with 6-12 patrol craft, apparently Organization of SquadronsHQBatallionsCompaniesSquadron Structure (Eg. 12th Naval Squadron - West Fleet)HQ Battalion11 Batallions7 Batallions with nine small inshore patrol craft (suspected to be pontoon)2 Battalions for transport (of Snipers)1 Torpedo boat battalionAll vessels commanded by a 1st lieutenant or sub-LieutenantAll missile-armed fast attack craft are commanded by lieutenant commandersOperations/Tactical DoctrineInfluenced by ex-USSR/ChinaFocus on support of military/spec ops via infiltration operations and amphibious landings, supported bySubmarinesMissile craftNaval rocket bombardmentMinelayingLimitations:Aging equipmentParts shortages (or non-access)Lack of Electronic Warfare equipmentWear and tear of shipsCommunications of KPN relies on ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications, in addition to using other military branch communications or civilian networksKPN bases rely on fortified underground facilities for protection and concealmentShip deployment to smaller FOB’s and civilian portsKnown base location coordinatesCh’aho 40 12’ 26” N; 128 38’58” EMunch’on 39 18’ 00” N; 127 23’ 54” E Mayang-do 39 59’ 54” N; 128 12’ 50” ENajin 42 09’ 24” N; 130 12’ 04” ENamp’o (Chinnamp’o) 38 42’ 59” N; 125 23’ 12” EPip’a-got 38 35’ 29” N; 124 59’ 29” ESagon-Ni (Sa-got) 37 49’ 23” N; 125 20’ 57”ECh’o-do 38 32’ 09” N; 124 52’ 39” ECh’ongjin 41 46’ 34” N; 129 49’ 54” EChakto-dong (Chakto-ri) 39 48’ 58” N; 127 39’ 33” EHaeju 37 59’ 47” N; 125 41’ 59” EHodo-ri 39 21’ 00” N; 127 32’ 00” EHwangt’o-do 39 10’ 00” N; 127 32’ 01” EKosong up (Changjon-ni) 38 44’ 25” N; 128 11’ 25” EKwangyang-ni 38 44’ 25” N; 125 13’ 30” EOhang-ni 39 18’ 52” N; 127 25’ 59” EPuam-dong 41 19’ 34” N; 129 45’ 49” ESinch’ang-nodongjagu 40 08’ 11” N; 128 28’ 10” ESongjin (Kimch’aek) 40 39’ 32” N; 129 12’ 27” ESongjon-pando 39 21’ 56” N; 127 27’ 08” ESunwi-do 37 46’ 10” N; 125 20’ 18” ET’oejo-dong (Nagwon-up) 39 54’ 13” N; 127 46’ 29” EWonsan 39 09’ 10” N; 127 26’ 37” EYoho-ri 39 52’ 20” N; 127 47’ 05” EYongdok 39 36’ 47” N; 124 37’ 52” EYongam-ni (Yongamnichung-ch’on) 40 24’ 35” N; 128 54’ 28” EYongamp’o 39 56’ 05” N; 124 22’ 23” EYukt’aedong-ni 40 01’ 29” N; 128 09’ 35” ETrainingOfficer TrainingConducted at Kim Chong-suk Naval University, the Naval Officers School and Navy Petty Officers SchoolEnlisted trainingConscript basic training conducted at KPN recruit centers at Wonsan and Namp’o, to be assigned to a training unit at a duty assignment upon completion of basic training – recruits that excel in their training unit/duty unit can be sent to the Navy Technical Training Center at Najin for advanced technical trainingNavigationGunneryMissilesRadio CommunicationEngine maintenanceEtc.DoctrineAll training based on the USSR/Chinese navy doctrineIdeological/political indoctrinationFocus on physical fitness and basic military skillsThe famine/economic crisis in the 1990s turned training more towards ideological/political indoctrination, resulting in a loss of capabilitiesJune 1999 losses in skirmishes around Yonp’yong-do Island caused the KPN to re-focus on afloat exercises, which, tapered down over time to a consistent pace since 2007Use of defensive minefields in case of warResearch and DevelopmentKONGBANG Class HovercraftCapacity – 35-5050km speedLight armor50mm and 30mm machine guns at sternAllegedly newer craft have been developed, with speeds up to 90 km an hourSame specsSOURCESources Area: 122,762 sq. km. (47,918 sq. mi.), about the size of Mississippi.Cities: Capital--Pyongyang. Other cities--Hamhung, Chongjin, Wonsan, Nampo, Sinjuiju, and Kaesong.Terrain: About 80% of land area is moderately high mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys and small, cultivated plains. The remainder is lowland plains covering small, scattered areas.Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid, ernment Type: Highly centralized communist state.Independence: August 15, 1945--Korean liberation from Japan; September 9, 1948--establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K., or North Korea), marking its separation from the Republic of Korea (R.O.K., or South Korea).Constitution: 1948; revised in 1972, 1992, 1998, and 2009.Branches: Executive--President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly (chief of state); Chairman of the National Defense Commission (head of government). Legislative--Supreme People's Assembly. Judicial--Central Court; provincial, city, county, and military courts.Subdivisions: Nine provinces; two province-level municipalities (Pyongyang, Nasun, also known as Najin-Sonbong free trade zone); one special city (Nampo), 24 cities.Political party: Korean Workers' Party (Communist).Suffrage: Universal at 17.Economy*GDP (2008 estimate): $24.8 billion; 46.2% in industry, 32.2% in services, 21.6% in agriculture and fisheries.Per capita GDP (2008): $1,800.Agriculture: Products--rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, cattle, pigs, pork, and eggs.Mining and manufacturing: Types--military products; machine building; chemicals; mining (gold, coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, etc.); metallurgy; textiles; food processing.Trade (2008): Exports--$ 2.06 billion (South Korean Trade and Investment Promotion Agency): minerals, non-ferrous metals, garments, chemicals/plastics, machinery/electric and electronic products, animal products, wood products, vegetable products, and precious metals. The D.P.R.K. is also thought to earn hundreds of millions of dollars from the unreported sale of missiles, narcotics, and counterfeit cigarettes and currency, and other illicit activities. Imports--$3.58 billion: minerals, petroleum, machinery/electronics, vegetable products, textiles, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, plastics, vehicles, and animal products.Major trading partners (2008): (1) China, (2) R.O.K., (3) Singapore, (4) India, and (5) Russia.*In most cases, the figures used above are estimates based upon incomplete data and ERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONSNorth Korea has a centralized government under the rigid control of the communist Korean Workers' Party (KWP), to which all government officials belong. A few minor political parties are allowed to exist in name only. Kim Il-sung ruled North Korea from 1948 until his death in July 1994. Kim Il-sung served both as Secretary General of the KWP and as President of North Korea. The latter post was abolished following Kim Il-sung’s death and the title of the Eternal President of the Republic was established and given to Kim Il-sung.Little is known about the actual lines of power and authority in the North Korean Government despite the formal structure set forth in its constitution. Following the death of Kim Il-sung, his son, Kim Jong-il, inherited supreme power. Kim Jong-il was named General Secretary of the KWP in October 1997, and in September 1998, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) reconfirmed Kim Jong-il as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and declared that position as the "highest office of state." However, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Yong-nam, serves as the nominal head of state. North Korea's 1972 constitution was amended in late 1992, September 1998, and April 2009.Three key entities control the government of the D.P.R.K. The cabinet, formerly known as the State Administration Council (SAC), administers the ministries and has a significant role in implementing policy. The cabinet is headed by the premier and is the dominant administrative and executive agency. The National Defence Commission (NDC) is responsible for external and internal security, and under the leadership of Kim Jong-il the NDC has assumed a significant role in influencing policy. The Politburo of the Central People’s Committee is the top policymaking body of the KWP, which also plays a role as the dominant social institution in North Korea.Officially, the D.P.R.K.’s legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), is the highest organ of state power. Its members are elected every 4 years. Usually only two meetings are held annually, each lasting a few days. A standing committee elected by the SPA performs legislative functions when the Assembly is not in session. In reality, the SPA serves only to ratify decisions made by the ruling KWP.North Korea's judiciary is "accountable" to the SPA and the president. The SPA's standing committee also appoints judges to the highest court for 4-year terms that are concurrent with those of the Assembly.Administratively, North Korea is divided into nine provinces and two provincial-level municipalities--Pyongyang and Nasun (also known as Najin-Sonbong). It also appears to be divided into nine military districts.Principal Party and Government Officials Kim Jong-il--General Secretary of the KWP; Supreme Commander of the People's Armed Forces; Chairman of the NDC; son of North Korea's founder Kim Il-sungKim Yong-nam--President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly; titular head of stateHan Song-ryol--Ambassador to the D.P.R.K. Permanent Mission to the UNPak Ui-chun--Minister of Foreign AffairsKim Jong-un--General of the People’s Armed Forces, Vice-Chairman Central Military Commission; son of Kim Jong-IlDEFENSE AND MILITARY ISSUESNorth Korea has one of the largest armies in the world. It has an estimated active duty military force of up to 1.2 million personnel, compared to about 680,000 in the South. Military spending is estimated at as much as a quarter of GNP, with up to 20% of men ages 17-54 in the regular armed forces. North Korean forces have a substantial numerical advantage over the South (around 2 to 1) in several key categories of offensive weapons--tanks, long-range artillery, and armored personnel carriers. The North has one of the world's largest special operations forces, designed for insertion behind the lines in wartime.North Korea’s navy is primarily a coastal navy, with antiquated surface and submarine fleets. Its air force has twice the number of aircraft as the South, but, except for a few advanced fighters, the North's air force is obsolete.The North deploys the bulk of its forces well forward, along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Several North Korean military tunnels under the DMZ were discovered in the period from the 1970s to the present day. Over the course of several years, North Korea realigned its forces and moved some rear-echelon troops to hardened bunkers closer to the DMZ. Given the proximity of Seoul to the DMZ (some 25 miles), South Korean and U.S. forces are likely to have little warning of attack. The United States and South Korea continue to believe that the U.S. troop presence in South Korea remains an effective deterrent. North Korea's attempts to develop a nuclear weapons program has also been a source of international tension (see below, Reunification Efforts Since 1971; Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula).In 1953, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was created to oversee and enforce the terms of the armistice. North Korea has sought to dismantle the MAC in a push for a new "peace mechanism" on the peninsula. In April 1994, it declared the MAC void and withdrew its representatives.Nations/Alliances/Geographic RegionsAsia -- North KoreaNavyArmed Forces StructureEquipmentDeploymentIssues and NotesPlans and ProgramsArmed Forces StructureOVERVIEWThe North Korean navy is divided into the Yellow Sea Fleet (West Coast Fleet) and the East Sea Fleet (East Coast Fleet). The Yellow Sea fleet, headquartered at Nampo Dong, contains five operational commands; the East Sea Fleet, headquartered at Toejo, contains seven operational commands. The fleets do not exchange vessels because geographical limitations make mutual support almost impossible. The navy, in conjunction with the army and air force, operates one coastal defense artillery and missile regiment on either coast. Amphibious operations are conducted by the special forces command in conjunction with naval personnel. There is no naval air arm. Most navy vessels are small patrol-size craft unable to operate over 50 nautical miles from the coast, but are capable of policing the DPRK's territorial waters. The navy's most-capable weapons systems are their guided-missile patrol boats equipped with the SS-N-2A Styx anti-ship missile. Though their small size limits operations to coastal waters and calm seas, they have the capability to quickly respond to ships approaching the coast. The largest part of the navy consists of small combatants, including torpedo boats, patrol boats, patrol craft, fast attack craft and small amphibious landing craft. Nearly half of the torpedo boats were built in North Korea. The DPRK also has indigenously produced over 200 personnel landing craft. This includes approximately 100 NAMPO personnel landing craft that would spearhead any clandestine landings directed against South Korea. Each NAMPO can carry approximately 30 personnel. PERSONNEL STRENGTHThe North Korean navy has an active force of 46,000 personnel. Equipment(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database. Equipment is of Russian origin unless otherwise noted. # denotes an unknown quantity) DEC05 DEC06 JAN08 JUL09 SHIPS Attack Submarines 22 20 20 22 ROMEO-class attack (China/North Korea) 21 21 6 21 37-meter special ops midget SANG-O class) (most in reserve) # 36 36 36 YUGO type 20-meter special ops midget # # N/A N/A 8.6-meter special ops (North Korea) Frigates 1 1 1 1 SOHO class (w/4 SS-N-2A Styx SSM) 2 1 1 2 NAJIN class (w/2 SS-N-2A Styx SSM) Patrol Boats 15 7 7 10 SOJU-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (Russian Osa-I type) 6 5 5 6 SOHUNG-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (Russian Komar class) 4 4 N/A 4 HUANGFENG-class guided-missile 8 8 N/A 8 OSA II-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (ex-USSR) 40 63 63 40 SIN HUNG-class torpedo (some w/ hydrofoils fitted) (North Korea) 60 60 N/A 60 KU SONG-class torpedo 13 13 6 13 TAECHONG-class patrol (Chinese HAINAN class design) 6 6 N/A 6 HAINAN-class patrol (China) 18 18 18 33 SINPO-class patrol (North Korea) 4 4 2 5 SARIWON-class patrol (Russian TRAL class) 12 12 N/A 12 SHANGHAI II-class patrol (ex-Chinese) 15 N/A 4 18 S.O. 1-class patrol (Russian/North Korea) 3 2 N/A N/A CHODO-class patrol (North Korea) 3 2 N/A N/A FSU SHERSHEN w/ 533-mm TT 14 14 54 CHONG JIN class 2 6 CHONGJU-class patrol 18 59 CHAHO-class patrol (North Korea) 10 10 TB-11PA-class harbor patrol (North Korea) Mine Warfare 23 18 19 24 Yukto-I/II-class MCM (North Korean 24-m design) Amphibious 10 4 4 10 HANTAE-class medium landing ship (North Korean 50-m design) 100 60 60 96 NAMPO-personnel landing craft (North Korean 27.7-m design) 15 4 4 4 HANCHON-utility landing craft (North Korean 35.7-m design) 40 40 40 Kong Bang-series personnel landing craft Infiltration # 7 7 7 Hand Grenade-class infiltration launches (U.S.) # # # # infiltration submersibles (Korea) # # infiltration craft (Korea) # 8+ 8+ 8+ Cluster OSPREY semi-submersible craft (Korea) Auxiliary # 1 1 1 KOWAN-class submarine rescue ship MISSILES Surface-to-Surface # # # # SS-N-2A Styx (Russian 4K40 Termit) ARTILLERY Coastal Defense Guns # # # # 152-mm M-1937 # # # # 130-mm SM-4-1 towed # # 130-mm M-1992 # # # # 122-mm M-1931/M-1937 Anti-Submarine # # RBU 1200 MISSILES Coastal Defense Surface-to-Surface # # # # SSC-2B Samlet # # # # HY-2 (6 sites) (China) # # # # SS-N-2 StyxDeploymentThe West Coast Fleet is reported to operate from nine bases, while the East Coast Fleet has 12 bases; the fleets maintain approximately 420 and 570 vessels, respectively. A small number of coastal defense surface-to-surface missile batteries are operated by each fleet. Sixty percent of the navy's combat forces are forward-deployed. Navy Headquarters Pyongyang Yellow Sea Fleet Headquarters Nampo Bases: Pipa Got Sagon-ni Chodo-ri Pupo-ri Tasa-ri Sohae-ri Sunwi-do Yogampo-ri East Sea Fleet Headquarters Toejo Dong Bases: Najin Wonsan Chaho Muchon-up Songjon Kimchaek Ksong-up Namer-ri Puam-Dong Pando Sanjin-dong Songjon YohoriIssuesRussia has denied reports that it has helped North Korea with developing a sea-based nuclear program. The North Korean navy has been regularly implicated in the transshipment of narcotics and counterfeit currency. There have been sporadic naval engagements between North and South Korea for years, usually over their disputed maritime boundary. In 2004, North Korea warned that if the South Korean navy continued to engage in "serious provocation," naval warfare could ensue. Incursions continued to be reported in 2009. The navy was observed stepping up its amphibious landing training in June 2009, sparking South Korean concern over a possible invasion. Plans and ProgramsThe North Korean fleet is rapidly aging. Given the economic and political situation, it is likely to receive little or no modernization, driving down Pyongyang's already limited combat potential. LATEST UPDATE: 1 July 2009? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. Retrieved 110215 4:50PM----- class**EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Ships -- Amphibious COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: North Korea **US/NATO code name or designation SHIP LIST 4 HANCHON-class UTILITY LANDING CRAFT (LCU)DESCRIPTIONLittle is confirmed about these utility landing craft except that they have a bow ramp, two machine guns, and are believed capable of carrying two tanks or up to 200 troops for a short distances. Characteristics are estimated. STATUSFour units remain in active service. DISPOSALS: Five other units have been stricken. BUILDER(S) North KoreaUSERS/PLATFORMS North Korea NavyCHARACTERISTICS Displacement: 145 tons full load Dimensions: length 117 ft 2 in (35.70 m) overall beam 25 ft 9 in ( 7.90 m) draft 3 ft 9 in ( 1.20 m) maximum Propulsion: 3 Russian type 3D12 diesels; 600 total bhp; 2 shafts Performance: speed 10 knots range 600 nm at 12 knots Manning: 16 total Military lift: 2 tanks or 200 troops Combat Systems: guns 2 14.5-mm machine guns radar 1 Zarnitsa (Skin Head**) surface searchISSUES AND NOTESNone. OPERATIONAL NOTESNone. LATEST UPDATE: 1 February 2009------- (PTG) class**EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Ships -- Small Combatants COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: North Korea **US/NATO code name or designation SHIP LIST 7 SOJU-class GUIDED MISSILE PATROL CRAFT (PTG)DESCRIPTIONA total of 15 to 17 units of this class were completed during 1981-1993. Vessels in this PTG class are North Korean-built versions of the Russian OSA-I class .** They have the same propulsion system, missile armament, 30-mm twin gun mounts and the electronics as the Russian OSA-Is. STATUSAll seven craft are believed to be active. BUILDER(S) North KoreaUSERS/PLATFORMS North Korea NavyCHARACTERISTICS Displacement: approx. 220 tons full load Dimensions: length 141 ft 1 in (43.0 m) overall beam 24 ft 6 in ( 7.5 m) draft 5 ft 9 in ( 1.8 m) maximum Propulsion: 3 type M-503A diesels; 12,000 total bhp; 3 shafts Performance: speed 34 knots Manning 40 max. total Combat Systems: missiles 4 Styx (SS-N-2A)** SSM missile launchers guns 2 twin 30-mm/60 cal. (AK-230) AA radar 1 Rangout (Russian Square Tie**) surface search/ missile target acquisition 1 MR-104 Rys' (Russian Drum Tilt**) gun fire controlISSUES AND NOTESNone. OPERATIONAL NOTESNone. LATEST UPDATE: 1 June 2006? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. -------(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- Pegas---- Shark Gill**---- Tamir---- HerkulesEQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Sensors/Electronics -- Sonars COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia **US/NATO code name or designation DESCRIPTIONSurface Ships The early Soviet surface ships of the post-World War II period largely utilized the Tamir-5 series of high-frequency, hull-mounted sonars. They were succeeded from the mid-1950s by the Pegas-2 series sonars and then, after the late 1950s, by the Herkules series. Subsequently, various improved sonars were developed for the Soviet warships that began joining the fleet in the 1960s. By the 1960s, as the Soviet navy became more concerned with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and submarine detection, there was an effort to reduce frequencies. For at least the next two decades, the frequencies were reduced from the 20-30 kHz range to about 2-15 kHz. Bow-mounted sonars were mounted in some later surface classes, providing the optimum hull-mounted sonar position (i.e., away from machinery and propeller noises), while also providing some "d ampening" effect in rough sea operations. In addition, active bistatic detection became possible with the installation of variable depth sonar (VDS) in several surface combatants, beginning with the MOSKVA-class helicopter ships (operational in 1967). Towed sonar arrays have been sighted on Russian ships in the development and evaluation stage, but no deployment has been confirmed. Submarines Early post-World War II submarines with "new" sonar installations were primarily equipped with the Tamir-5L set. Submarines were subsequently fitted with active-passive Herkules and passive Feniks sonars. Beginning with the VICTOR III class** attack submarine (operational in 1978), the Soviets and Russians have deployed towed passive sonar arrays. Such systems seemed to have narrow-band processors, greatly enhancing their capability. Other submarine classes were fitted with similar towed arrays, inc luding the SIERRA-class,** AKULA-class ** and YANKEE-class** ballistic missile submarines converted to an attack submarine configuration. A Shark Gill ** low-frequency sonar was identified in newer submarine classes, including the MIKE**, SIERRA** and possibly OSCAR** classes. Aircraft Soviet fixed-wing ASW aircraft and helicopters carried air-dropped, expendable sonobouys that could provide active or passive submarine detection. These dipping sonars were adopted for smaller surface combatants (see below). Seafloor installations The Russian navy also employs moored, sea-floor acoustic systems in coastal and regional seas. These do not appear to have the range or capability of the U.S. Navy's SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System). STATUSFirst developed between 1949 and 1953 for ZULU- and NOVEMBER-class submarines. Initial operational capability (IOC) 1953. In service in North Korea. BUILDER(S) Vodtranspribor, St Petersburg, Russia (design and serial production)USERS/PLATFORMS North Korea Navy submarines ROMEO class (Project 033)ISSUES AND NOTESNone. OPERATIONAL NOTESNone. LATEST UPDATE: 1 October 2010? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. ----- Korea: Pyongyang Says No More Military MeetingsFebruary 10, 2011The North Korean military says it will no longer meet with delegations from the armed forces of South Korea, Agence France-Presse reports. The statement was released on the North's official news agency. Two days of colonel-level talks with the South Korean military broke down on Wednesday when the northerners unilaterally walked out of the meeting. Seoul has called for an apology for the sinking of a South Korean warship and the shelling of a disputed border island. The statement from Pyongyang said that the South Korean military is only interested in maintaining high tension on the peninsula.-------South Korea: Indigenous Cruise Missiles May Deploy EarlyFebruary 09, 2011The South Korea may field an indigenous ship-launched cruise missile ahead of schedule in response to the North Korean threat, says a military source cited by the Korea Herald. The Cheonryong (Sea Dragon) missile, with a range of more than 300 miles (500 km), could be deployed this year on Choong Moo Gong Lee Soon Shin-class destroyers, which are also known as the KDX-II class, said the unnamed source. Pyongyang has deployed anti-ship missiles along its western coast, which threaten South Korean warships, said the source. The navy sees the Cheonryong missiles as a counter to that threat. The deployment plans were reportedly accelerated after North Korea launched an artillery attack on South Korea's Yeonpyoeng island last November. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the Choong Moo Gong Lee Soon Shin class at: Korea: Delegation From Pyongyang Leaves Talks in PanmunjomFebruary 09, 2011Talks between North and South Korea ended abruptly on Wednesday after the delegation from Pyongyang walked out, CNN reports. The rivals were meeting for the first time in four months. The two sides did not reach an agreement about setting up high-level military discussions during this preparatory session held in the border area of Panmunjom. After less than five hours, the North Koreans left the table in a "unilateral" move, said the South Korean Defense Ministry. Pyongyang was said to be demanding a comprehensive agenda from both sides on possible military actions. Seoul wanted to limited discussion to last year's attacks by the North on a South Korean warship and a disputed border island.------ Korea: Drills With U.S. Expected To Emphasize N. Korean WMDsFebruary 07, 2011South Korea and the United States have agreed to strengthen a military exercise involving the simulated removal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), reports the Yonhap News Agency. Participants in this year's Key Resolve exercises, scheduled for March, will practice finding and destroying North Korea's nuclear weapons and other WMDs, according to an unnamed military source. The focus of the joint drills was narrowed after Pyongyang in November revealed its uranium-enrichment facility. A group of specialists from the 20th Support Command in Maryland will take part in the exercise, said the source.------ Korea: More Nuclear Sites Suspected In North, Says ReportFebruary 01, 2011A confidential U.N. report prepared is said to indicate that North Korea may have developed secret nuclear facilities, the Washington Post reports. The White House had also expressed the belief that North Korea has additional nuclear sites beyond its Yongbyon plant. The U.N. panel of experts reportedly concluded that Yongbyon is just the visible face of a larger nuclear program. A visiting nuclear scientist who recently visited Yongbyon said he suspected that the facility's 2,000 centrifuges were built elsewhere.-------- Korea: Talks With N. Korea May Begin Next MonthJanuary 26, 2011South Korea has urged that preliminary military talks with North Korea be held next month, Agence France-Presse reports. The two sides have recently agreed in principle to hold high-level military talks as way to ease high tensions sparked by North Korean attacks against a South Korean warship and a South Korean island in disputed territory The Defense Ministry said it sent a message to North Korea suggesting a Feb. 11 meeting at the border village of Panmunjom. That meeting, should it take place, would attempt to set the date for higher-level military talks.------- Korea: S. Korea Warned To Cancel Its Planned Artillery DrillDecember 17, 2010North Korea has warned South Korea to cancel a planned live-fire artillery exercise or face an even deadlier attack than last month's barrage of Yeonpyeong Island that killed two civilians and two marines, reports MSNBC. Earlier this week, Seoul announced plans for exercises between Saturday and Tuesday on Yeonpyeong, which was shelled on Nov. 23. North Korean official news agency KCNA said the "intensity and scope" of its actions will be worse than the previous attack. The South has said its military activities are part of "routine, justified" exercises.------- Korea: Seoul Plans Artillery Drills For Yeonpyeong IslandDecember 16, 2010The South Korean military has announced plans to hold artillery exercises on the island recently shelled by North Korea in November, Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports. Live-fire exercises will take place between Dec. 18 and Dec. 21 on Yeonpyeong island, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Thursday. That island was hit by dozens of North Korean shells and rockets on Nov. 23, killing two South Korean marines and two civilians. Around 20 U.S. military personnel are expected to provide medical and communications support during the drills.------- Korea: Preparations Noted For Possible Nuclear TestDecember 15, 2010Activity at a North Korean nuclear test site in Punggye-ri in North Hamgyong province may indicate that preparations for a third nuclear test are underway, South Korea's Chosun Ilbo reports. The North has reportedly dug a tunnel more than 500 meters (1,640 feet) deep, said South Korean intelligence officials cited by the paper. At this rate, the North should reach a depth of 1 kilometer (0.62 miles) between March and May. It is possible to conduct nuclear tests at that depth, according to experts. There is also ongoing construction of a new building at North Korea's main nuclear site in Yongbyon, intelligence officials said. The construction at both sites appears to be continuing at a steady pace despite winter conditions, said the sources.-------*********North Korea: Midget Subs Feature Torpedo Tubes, Say Sources In SouthDecember 08, 2010South Korean intelligence sources maintain that North Korea's newest midget submarines are equipped with torpedo tubes, reports the JoongAng Daily. The Daedong-B mini-subs are fitted with 13-foot (4-m) torpedo tubes, according to satellite imagery examined by South Korean and U.S. intelligence officials cited by the unnamed sources. The subs are said to be 56 feet (17 m) long, 13 feet (4 m) wide and 7 feet (2.2 m) high, with a ramp-shaped aft section to enable personnel to enter and exit the vessel. North Korea conducted intense exercises with the new boats in July as well as during the recent joint U.S-South Korean drills, according to a South Korean intelligence official.------ Korea: Another Attack By N. Korea Will Result In Airstrikes, Says New Defense ChiefDecember 03, 2010The four-star general just named South Korea's new defense minister says Seoul will hit back with airstrikes against North Korea if it attacks the South again, the New York Times reports. In a parliamentary confirmation hearing, Defense Minister-designate Kim Kwan-jin said the military had "failed to carry out its basic duty" in defending against recent North Korean attacks. Kim said more aggressive rules of engagement were being prepared to allow for quicker and deadlier responses. "If the enemy attacks our people and territory again, I will use force to punish the enemy to make sure it doesn't even dare think about it again," he said Friday. A North Korean submarine was blamed for sinking a South Korean warship in March, killing 46 sailors. Last month, the North launched an artillery attack on South Korea's Yeonpyeong island, killing four people.------: N. Korean Missile Obtained By Tehran, Says Leaked CableNovember 29, 2010American intelligence assessments suggest that Iran has obtained 19 advanced missiles from North Korea that could hit Moscow and Western Europe, Bloomberg News reports. The intelligence information is contained in a massive release of documents by WikiLeaks. The North Korean BM-25 missiles, based on the Russian R-27, might give Iran the "building blocks" for producing long-range missiles, according to a cable dated Feb. 24, 2010. The cable was given to the New York Times, but the paper declined to publish it at the Obama administration's request. The cables, which WikiLeaks began posting Sunday, seem to indicate that Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments began pressing the U.S. in 2008 to attack Iran. Washington denounced the leaks as potentially threatening ties with foreign governments. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the R-27 at: Serb** SLBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- R-27 (Russian designation)---- RSM-25 Zyb (manufacturer's designation)---- mobile land-based SS-N-6 (possible North Korean variant)---- SS-NX-13** (radio command guidance variant)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Nuclear/Biological/Chemical -- Nuclear Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Strategic COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia PICTURES OF: SS-N-6 Serb** SLBM**US/NATO code name or designation DESCRIPTIONThe SS-N-6 Serb** (Russian designation R-27) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is a single-stage, storable liquid-propellant missile designed for the Yankee-class nuclear submarine. It was developed in three main variants: The first three used an inertial guidance system, while the fourth variant (see Variants, below) used radio command guidance. Each Yankee-class SSBN carried 16 SS-N-6 missiles. The missiles could be launched while the Yankee was submerged and underway -- with a reaction time of about 15 minutes when under normal patrol status and in one minute at peak alert status. The submarine could maintain peak alert status for up to one hour. The design of the SS-N-6 is particularly notable for the placement of the rocket engines inside the fuel tank, reducing the external dimensions of the vehicle. The squat, cylindrical body of the missile was made of aluminum alloys, with the oxidizer and fuel tanks having a common bottom. A hermetically sealed container in the lower interior of the oxidizer tank contained the command and control systems, which eliminated the need for an instrument module. The sensors of the command system were placed on a gyro-stabilized platform. A single-chamber sustainer and a dual-chamber control engine comprise the propulsion system. Rather than the usual arrangement of four thrust chambers aligned on the stabilization axis of the missile, the SS-N-6 oriented the thrust chambers of the attitude control engine at an angle of 45 degrees from the axis. These design innovations, when combined with a lack of aerodynamic stabilizers and the metallic-rubber shock absorbers used to cushion the missile during loading, gave the entire launch tube smaller dimensions, assisting in fitting the system into the Yankee-class subs. To fire the missile, the tube was flooded and a gas bubble created by the docking adapter cushioned the hydraulic shock caused by igniting the engine in the tube. The missile's warhead contained a single 1-megaton multi-stage thermonuclear device. The missiles could be launched singly in 8-second intervals or as two volleys of eight missiles each. PICTURES INCLUDEPICTURE "" \* MERGEFORMATINET STATUSThe SS-N-6 began deployment on March 13, 1968, and achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in early 1969. The missile was seen by the public for the first time during a parade in Moscow in 1967. The missile and its variants were withdrawn from Soviet/Russian service in 1993 with the deactivation of the last Yankee-class SSBN. Studies to develop the SS-N-6 missile were based on a 1961 proposal to develop a launch system with a light, single-stage missile for use against strategic land targets. The project was authorized on April 24, 1962. The first phase of testing consisted of 12 pop-up tests prior to 1966. In June 1966, a 10-month series of tests successfully completed 12 launches out of 17 attempts from a ground platform. Finally, six successful live launch tests were conducted from Yankee-class submarines of the Soviet Northern Fleet. The D-5 launch system, designed for the SS-N-6, was the most successful system for launching SLBMs in the Soviet Union's arsenal. Over a period of 20 years there were 429 successful missile firings in 492 attempts. BUILDER(S) Makeyev OKB, Russia (design bureau)USERS/PLATFORMS North Korea (possible; see below)CHARACTERISTICS WEIGHTS All Variants Missile 41,667 lb (18,900 kg) Throwweight 1,500 lb ( 680 kg) DIMENSIONS All Variants Configuration thick cylinder with smaller rounded re-entry vehicle (RV) on Mod 1, fuller section RV on Mod 3 Length 32 ft 10 in (10.00 m) Diameter 5 ft 11 in (1.80 m) PROPULSION All Variants Engine single-stage liquid-fuel rocket Power 50,740 lb (23,000 kg) initial thrust PERFORMANCE All Variants Trajectory altitude 339 nm (390 mi, 628 km) max CEP 1.0 nm (1.2 mi, 1.9 km) Launch depth 131-164 ft (40-50 m) Launch sea state 5 max Launch latitude up to 85 deg N Launch sub speed 4 kts max SS-N-6 Mod 1 Range 1,300 nm (1,497 mi, 2,409 km) SS-N-6 Mod 2/3 Range 1,600 nm (1,842 mi, 2,965 km) WARHEAD SS-N-6 Mod 1/2 Warhead 1 x 1 Mt multi-stage thermonuclear device SS-N-6 Mod 3 Warhead 3 x 200 kt nuclear RVs SENSORS/ELECTRONICS Guidance inertialVARIANTSSS-N-6 Serb Mod 1Initial production variant. Later replaced in Yankee-class boats by Mod 3. SS-N-6 Serb Mod 2The Mod 2 was an upgrade that used more powerful engines and an improved guidance system. In Russian service, the missile was designated R-27U. Although designed to carry both single and multiple warheads, the Mod 2 carried only single devices. The upgrade to the missile was authorized on June 10, 1971. SS-N-6 Serb Mod 3Introduced MRV warhead to Soviet SLBMs. There was some debate as to the number of RVs carried, either two 600-lb RVs or three 400-lb RVs. The existence of a two-RV Mod 3 variant has not been confirmed by Russian sources. SS-NX-13Radio command guidance variant. Designated in Russian service as the R-27K, the SS-NX-13 had a nose cone with a terminal guidance system designed for use on both coastal radio-control installations and mobile targets at sea. It was tested in 1974, but never deployed. North Korean land-based mobile IRBMIn 2003, reports from North Korea indicated that Pyongyang was preparing to show a new missile at a military parade. Although the missiles were not displayed, reports by South Korean media in 2004 indicated the missiles were being deployed on mobile launchers staging out of two new bases. U.S. intelligence reportedly believes the new missile is based on the former Soviet SS-N-6 design, according to South Korean military sources. North Korea is believed to have obtained information and technology from Russia in the 1990s, U.S. officials said. There is no indication that Russia has been involved in the new North Korean program. If these reports about a North Korean missile are accurate, it would represent a significant advancement in North Korean missile development and design, given that the SS-N-6 is considered more sophisticated than other North Korean missiles. Pyongyang is also experimenting with a sea-based variant of the missile, for placement on and launch from ships and submarines, according to the July 30, 2004 issue of Jane's Defense Weekly. Such a development would give North Korean leaders a long-sought after way of striking at the continental United States. The land-based version of the North Korean SS-N-6 is said to have a range of 1,350-2,160 nm (1,550-2,485 mi, 2,500-4,000 km). The sea-based variant reportedly has a range of 1,350 nm (1,550 mi, 2,500 km). ISSUES AND NOTESThe SS-N-6 was the forerunner of marine liquid-propellant rockets and incorporated many design and engineering innovations, including the following: all-welded missile body missile propulsors arranged in propellant and oxidizer tanks absence of empty (fuel-free) compartment use of metallized shock absorbers the missile is fueled with storable propellants and then enclosed automated control of pre-launch preparation and salvo firing Some SS-N-6 engines may have been kept for use in space launches. OPERATIONAL NOTESThe SS-N-6 was the first "modern" strategic SLBM deployed in Soviet submarines. In October 1986, an SS-N-6 exploded on board a Yankee-class SSBN near Bermuda. The submarine sank or was scuttled three days after the explosion when salvage attempts failed. The accident underscored the danger of using liquid propellant in SLBMs, a risk Soviet SLBM designers accepted in order to achieve greater range and throwweight than their solid-fuel technology at the time could provide. LATEST UPDATE: 1 September 2004? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. ------- Korea: Report Reveals Pyongyang's Arms Trade, Including Nuclear WeaponsNovember 12, 2010The government of North Korea has exported around US$100 million worth of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons technology a year despite sanction imposed by the United Nations, says a new report cited by the Chosun Ilbo (South Korea) The arms exports have gone to several rogue nations, CNN reports. The 75-page report was compiled by a seven-member panel reporting to the United Nations Security Council. The study identifies Iran, Syria and Burma as recipients of Pyongyang's nuclear assistance. North Korea has been using overseas entities and shell companies to mask the financial transactions and get around U.N. sanctions, says the report. The release of the report this week had been delayed for six months by China, a U.N. diplomatic source said. The North Korean government had no immediate response.--------- Korea: Pyongyang Offers To Provide Torpedo SamplesNovember 02, 2010North Korea has offered to provide samples of its torpedoes in an attempt to back up its denial of responsibility for the sinking of a South Korea warship in March, Reuters reports. A team that included experts from the United States, Australia, Britain and Sweden concluded there was "overwhelming evidence" that Pyongyang was behind the sinking of the Cheonan, reported Agence France-Presse. Parts of a torpedo recovered at the scene were consistent with a North Korean weapon that Seoul had obtained seven years earlier, said the experts. In a statement, the National Defense Commission said it would provide a steel-alloy sample of one of its torpedoes to show it was different from aluminum-alloy torpedoes used by other countries and in the attack.--------North Korea: Iranian Missile Technology Shows Up In PyongyangOctober 20, 2010Weapons on display in Pyongyang show that Iran may be providing missile technology and know-how to North Korea, reports Aviation Week & Space Technology. This is the reverse of the traditional pathway from Pyongyang to Tehran On Oct. 10, for example, the BM25 Musudan missile -- already in Iranian service, according to Israeli officials -- was shown in a North Korean military parade in Pyongyang. This represented the first time that the road-mobile, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile had been shown beyond the North Korean military. The missile is a derivative of the Russian SS-N-6 submarine-launched missile, though lengthened for increased range. Also displayed was a No Dong ballistic missile with a tri-conic nose cone typically associated with Iran's Shahab-3 missile. Analysts suggested that the missile's configuration indicates that technical information acquired in Iranian test flights is being provided to Pyongyang. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the SS-N-6, No Dong and Shahab-3 at: SS-N-6 Serb** SLBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- R-27 (Russian designation)---- RSM-25 Zyb (manufacturer's designation)---- mobile land-based SS-N-6 (possible North Korean variant)---- SS-NX-13** (radio command guidance variant)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Nuclear/Biological/Chemical -- Nuclear Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Strategic COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia PICTURES OF: SS-N-6 Serb** SLBM**US/NATO code name or designation DESCRIPTIONThe SS-N-6 Serb** (Russian designation R-27) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is a single-stage, storable liquid-propellant missile designed for the Yankee-class nuclear submarine. It was developed in three main variants: The first three used an inertial guidance system, while the fourth variant (see Variants, below) used radio command guidance. Each Yankee-class SSBN carried 16 SS-N-6 missiles. The missiles could be launched while the Yankee was submerged and underway -- with a reaction time of about 15 minutes when under normal patrol status and in one minute at peak alert status. The submarine could maintain peak alert status for up to one hour. The design of the SS-N-6 is particularly notable for the placement of the rocket engines inside the fuel tank, reducing the external dimensions of the vehicle. The squat, cylindrical body of the missile was made of aluminum alloys, with the oxidizer and fuel tanks having a common bottom. A hermetically sealed container in the lower interior of the oxidizer tank contained the command and control systems, which eliminated the need for an instrument module. The sensors of the command system were placed on a gyro-stabilized platform. A single-chamber sustainer and a dual-chamber control engine comprise the propulsion system. Rather than the usual arrangement of four thrust chambers aligned on the stabilization axis of the missile, the SS-N-6 oriented the thrust chambers of the attitude control engine at an angle of 45 degrees from the axis. These design innovations, when combined with a lack of aerodynamic stabilizers and the metallic-rubber shock absorbers used to cushion the missile during loading, gave the entire launch tube smaller dimensions, assisting in fitting the system into the Yankee-class subs. To fire the missile, the tube was flooded and a gas bubble created by the docking adapter cushioned the hydraulic shock caused by igniting the engine in the tube. The missile's warhead contained a single 1-megaton multi-stage thermonuclear device. The missiles could be launched singly in 8-second intervals or as two volleys of eight missiles each. PICTURESSTATUSThe SS-N-6 began deployment on March 13, 1968, and achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in early 1969. The missile was seen by the public for the first time during a parade in Moscow in 1967. The missile and its variants were withdrawn from Soviet/Russian service in 1993 with the deactivation of the last Yankee-class SSBN. Studies to develop the SS-N-6 missile were based on a 1961 proposal to develop a launch system with a light, single-stage missile for use against strategic land targets. The project was authorized on April 24, 1962. The first phase of testing consisted of 12 pop-up tests prior to 1966. In June 1966, a 10-month series of tests successfully completed 12 launches out of 17 attempts from a ground platform. Finally, six successful live launch tests were conducted from Yankee-class submarines of the Soviet Northern Fleet. The D-5 launch system, designed for the SS-N-6, was the most successful system for launching SLBMs in the Soviet Union's arsenal. Over a period of 20 years there were 429 successful missile firings in 492 attempts. BUILDER(S) Makeyev OKB, Russia (design bureau)USERS/PLATFORMS North Korea (possible; see below)CHARACTERISTICS WEIGHTS All Variants Missile 41,667 lb (18,900 kg) Throwweight 1,500 lb ( 680 kg) DIMENSIONS All Variants Configuration thick cylinder with smaller rounded re-entry vehicle (RV) on Mod 1, fuller section RV on Mod 3 Length 32 ft 10 in (10.00 m) Diameter 5 ft 11 in (1.80 m) PROPULSION All Variants Engine single-stage liquid-fuel rocket Power 50,740 lb (23,000 kg) initial thrust PERFORMANCE All Variants Trajectory altitude 339 nm (390 mi, 628 km) max CEP 1.0 nm (1.2 mi, 1.9 km) Launch depth 131-164 ft (40-50 m) Launch sea state 5 max Launch latitude up to 85 deg N Launch sub speed 4 kts max SS-N-6 Mod 1 Range 1,300 nm (1,497 mi, 2,409 km) SS-N-6 Mod 2/3 Range 1,600 nm (1,842 mi, 2,965 km) WARHEAD SS-N-6 Mod 1/2 Warhead 1 x 1 Mt multi-stage thermonuclear device SS-N-6 Mod 3 Warhead 3 x 200 kt nuclear RVs SENSORS/ELECTRONICS Guidance inertialVARIANTSSS-N-6 Serb Mod 1Initial production variant. Later replaced in Yankee-class boats by Mod 3. SS-N-6 Serb Mod 2The Mod 2 was an upgrade that used more powerful engines and an improved guidance system. In Russian service, the missile was designated R-27U. Although designed to carry both single and multiple warheads, the Mod 2 carried only single devices. The upgrade to the missile was authorized on June 10, 1971. SS-N-6 Serb Mod 3Introduced MRV warhead to Soviet SLBMs. There was some debate as to the number of RVs carried, either two 600-lb RVs or three 400-lb RVs. The existence of a two-RV Mod 3 variant has not been confirmed by Russian sources. SS-NX-13Radio command guidance variant. Designated in Russian service as the R-27K, the SS-NX-13 had a nose cone with a terminal guidance system designed for use on both coastal radio-control installations and mobile targets at sea. It was tested in 1974, but never deployed. North Korean land-based mobile IRBMIn 2003, reports from North Korea indicated that Pyongyang was preparing to show a new missile at a military parade. Although the missiles were not displayed, reports by South Korean media in 2004 indicated the missiles were being deployed on mobile launchers staging out of two new bases. U.S. intelligence reportedly believes the new missile is based on the former Soviet SS-N-6 design, according to South Korean military sources. North Korea is believed to have obtained information and technology from Russia in the 1990s, U.S. officials said. There is no indication that Russia has been involved in the new North Korean program. If these reports about a North Korean missile are accurate, it would represent a significant advancement in North Korean missile development and design, given that the SS-N-6 is considered more sophisticated than other North Korean missiles. Pyongyang is also experimenting with a sea-based variant of the missile, for placement on and launch from ships and submarines, according to the July 30, 2004 issue of Jane's Defense Weekly. Such a development would give North Korean leaders a long-sought after way of striking at the continental United States. The land-based version of the North Korean SS-N-6 is said to have a range of 1,350-2,160 nm (1,550-2,485 mi, 2,500-4,000 km). The sea-based variant reportedly has a range of 1,350 nm (1,550 mi, 2,500 km). ISSUES AND NOTESThe SS-N-6 was the forerunner of marine liquid-propellant rockets and incorporated many design and engineering innovations, including the following: all-welded missile body missile propulsors arranged in propellant and oxidizer tanks absence of empty (fuel-free) compartment use of metallized shock absorbers the missile is fueled with storable propellants and then enclosed automated control of pre-launch preparation and salvo firing Some SS-N-6 engines may have been kept for use in space launches. OPERATIONAL NOTESThe SS-N-6 was the first "modern" strategic SLBM deployed in Soviet submarines. In October 1986, an SS-N-6 exploded on board a Yankee-class SSBN near Bermuda. The submarine sank or was scuttled three days after the explosion when salvage attempts failed. The accident underscored the danger of using liquid propellant in SLBMs, a risk Soviet SLBM designers accepted in order to achieve greater range and throwweight than their solid-fuel technology at the time could provide. LATEST UPDATE: 1 September 2004? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. No Dong MRBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- No Dong 1 MRBM (variant) ---- Ro Dong 1 MRBM (alternate designation) ---- Scud-D MRBM (alternate designation) ---- Shahab-3 MRBM (Iranian designation) ---- No Dong 2 (Upgraded variant)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Land Attack/Theater Nuclear/Biological/Chemical -- Nuclear COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: North Korea PICTURES OF: No Dong MRBMDESCRIPTIONThe North Korean No Dong is a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), also variously identified as the Ro Dong-1 and the Scud-D. Variants are also in service with Pakistan (designated Ghauri, see separate record) and Iran (designated Shahab-3). The No Dong was based on the Scud series of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), but represents a significant departure from the North Korean practice of incremental improvements in weapons systems. North Korea developed the No Dong by adapting technology used in the entire variety of Scud-series SRBMs. The steel tankage of the Scud-A, the improved Isayev engine from the Scud-B and the lengthened cylinder for greater fuel capacity from the Scud-C are all combined in a single design. Although p lagued by early technical and financial problems, North Korea has designed a missile that is quite capable in the MRBM role and attractive to other states as an export product. Using a single-stage liquid-propellant rocket, the No Dong carries a conventional or chemical weapon-capable warhead. It may also be designed to carry a nuclear warhead, though the existence of such a warhead with the No Dong or its variants is unconfirmed among its users. The engines use TM-185 fuel, which is a mixture consisting of 20 percent gasoline and 80 percent kerosene. It also uses AK-27I for an oxidizer, which consists of 27 percent dinitrogen tetroxide and 73 percent nitric acid with an iodium inhibitor. The propellant feed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The startup and shutdown valves, initiated with pyrotechnic charges, are one-shot devices. To improve accuracy, the engine is equipped with mechanical controls for correct thrust level and mixture ratio. Tank pressurization is performed by air stored in a toroidal high-pressure bottle in front of the missile's guidance section and heated by the turbine exhaust gases. Before launch, the missile is placed on a trajectory plane that will hit its target. As a result, the missile depends on the guidance system to keep the missile on its correct plane. Three body-mounted gyros are used for attitude and lateral acceleration control. A pendulum integration gyro assembl y controls the speed. Thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes. The No Dong is launched from a specially designed cross-country transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). PICTURESSTATUSCurrently in low-rate production and in service with North Korea. Variants are in service with Iran and Pakistan. Development officially began in 1988, though work undoubtedly commenced earlier in the 1980s. Design objectives focused on: the creation of a missile capable of delivering a 2,205-3,307 lb (1,000-1,500 kg) warhead to a range of 540-810 nm (621-932 mi, 1,000-1,500 km); the establishment of a basic s ystem for future development of MRBMs and ICBMs; and the creation of a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. Flight Test TimelineMay 1990 - U.S. intelligence observed the first prototype No Dong on a launch pad at Musudan-ri, North Korea. No missile launch was detected. Later, satellite photographs showed what appeared to be large scorch marks, possibly indicating a catastrophic test failure. June 1992 - More test activity was detected at Musudan-ri, but no flight test occurred. Japanese military sources indicate a second launch cancellation or failure. April 1993 - U.S. intelligence detected test activity at Musudan-ri. May 29-30, 1993 - First test flight of a No Dong missile as part of a four-missile launch operation. The other three missiles were Hwasong-5 and/or Hwasong-6 SRBMs. The No Dong flew 270 nm (311 mi, 500 km) to a target buoy in the Yellow Sea. Iranian and Pakistani observers were present for the tests. April 1994 - U.S. intelligence detected preparations for a test at Musudan-ri. Activity ceased for unknown reasons, but may have been due to North Korean negotiations with the U.S. underway in Geneva. Oct. 1996 - Another planned flight test by North Korea was cancelled. April 6, 1998 - Pakistan tested its first Ghauri 1 missile, later identified as a North Korean-produced No Dong. Pakistan claimed the missile had a range of 810 nm (932 mi, 1,500 km). North Korean observers may have been present for the test. July 22, 1998 - Iran conducted a first test of the Shahab-3, which was later identified as a No Dong. The missile exploded about 100 seconds into the flight. April 14, 1999 - Pakistan tested a Ghauri 2 missile with a claimed range of 1,080 nm (1,243 mi, 2,000 km). The missile was again identified as a North Korean No Dong. July 4, 2006 - North Korea launched at least one No Dong missile during a barrage of testing that saw Pyongyang fire seven missiles, the first of which took off minutes after the Discovery space shuttle lifted off from Cape Canaveral, Fla. All the missiles, which included a long-range Taepo Don g-2, landed in the Sea of Japan. The six medium-range missiles -- a combination of Scud and No Dong missiles -- were fired from Anbyon in Kangwon province. Estimates of the number of No Dong missiles in North Korean service vary widely. Japanese sources suggest from 15-100 missiles. A South Korean military source said North Korea had nine No Dongs deployed by early 1999. A paper in the 1998 Rumsfeld report indicated that North Korea had fielded only s mall numbers of the missile. Iran has approximately 20 Shahab-3s. U.S. inspection teams stationed in Iraq reported in 2003 that the country had been in unsuccessful negotiations with North Korea between 1999 and 2002 to purchase No Dong missiles and/or technology. There have been unverified reports that Egypt not only ordered No Dong missile assemblies and components to produce 50 missiles, but also conducted test flights in 2002. The estimated number of No Dongs in the North Korean inventory in 2006 generally ranged between 100 and 200 missiles. However, according to , the South Korean National Intelligence Service estimated in 2006 that North Korea had either deployed or produced at least 450 No Dongs. Some experts have reported that Syria has acquired the No-Dong medium-range ballistic missile from North Korea. Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and Libya are all reported to have approached North Korea to procure the missile, however, there is no reported confirmation of exports, according to Jane's Strateg ic Weapons Systems, dated January 2009. BUILDER(S) Prime contractor: The 4th Machine Industry Bureau, Pyongyang, North Korea Subcontractors: No. 26 General Plant, Kanggye, North Korea (missile subcontractor) Changgwang Sinyong Corp., Pyongyang, North Korea (exporter) May also be in domestic production in Iran.USERS/PLATFORMS Iran [N/A] North Korea [10] (No Dong 1/2) (estimates vary widely)CHARACTERISTICS No Dong MRBM WEIGHTS Launch 35,825 lb (16,250 kg) Warhead 2,553 lb ( 1,158 kg) DIMENSIONS Length 52 ft 6 in (16.00 m) Diameter 4 ft 4 in ( 1.32 m) Configuration cylinder with tapered nosecone, slightly smaller diameter cylinder at rear of missile, 4 clipped delta tail fins PROPULSION Engine single-stage 1-chamber liquid-propellant rocket Thrust 58,643 lb (26,600 kg) Fuel TM-185 Oxidizer AK-27I Propellant mass 28,466 lb (12,912 kg) PERFORMANCE Range 729 nm (839 mi, 1,350 km) CEP 208 yd (190 m) Launch preparation 60 min Burn time 110 sec Deployment mobile WARHEAD Nuclear possible, but type unknown Chemical thickened VX Conventional 2,553 lb (1,158 kg) HE GUIDANCE Type inertialVARIANTSNo Dong-1 MRBM (Ro Dong-1, Scud D) An improved range variant alternately called the Ro Dong-1, Scud D and Scud Mod D. Characteristics are identical to those above, except that it carries a 1,676-lb (760-kg) warhead and has a range of up to 810 nm (932 mi, 1,500 km). No Dong-2Variant with a longer range, an improved guidance system and a smaller warhead. The No Dong-2 likely served as the design used by the North Koreans for the Iranian Shahab-3 and Pakistani Gauri (Hatf-5 , see separate record) missile programs. The Shahab-3 and Gauri are probably not exact copies of th e No Dong-2 since the North Koreans likely made modifications to the missile's dimensions and weight depending on the user nation's specifications. According to Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, dated January 2009, the North Korean No Dong 2 might also be the North Korean Musudan missile. Shahab-3 MRBM Iran uses the original shorter-range version of the No Dong. Iran may be experimenting with imported Russian design systems to increase guidance and accuracy, possibly explaining several failed missile flight tests (see separate record). ISSUES AND NOTESNorth Korea has certainly received extensive technical support from Russian and Chinese scientists in developing the No Dong. The addition of Iranian and Pakistani efforts to this multi-national program have permitted the production of a wide variety of MRBMs based on the original No Dong design. Libya: Some reports have suggested that Libya may have also been involved with the development of the No Dong, with the intention of purchasing some missiles at a later date. Reports about the No Dong exports to Libya were shown to be false after Libya abandoned its WMD and missile programs in December 2003, and invited inspectors to verify the dismantlement of the programs, as noted in a study by Daniel Pinkston for the Strategic Studies Institute published in February 2008 -- which also estimated that at the time North Korea had about 200 No Dongs, said to be capable of striking Ja pan. Pakistan: No Dong sales to Pakistan in the late 1990s were made as part of a deal allowing Pyongyang access to technology and/or materials for a secret uranium-enrichment program. The international intelligence community is virtually unanimous in this conclusion. However, Islamabad insists its Gauri missile was developed indigenously. Iran: In early 1992, North Korea and Iran reportedly signed an agreement that included Iranian financial support to further development of the No Dong, as well as an option for Tehran to purchase No Dongs at a later date. One source says No Dongs were delivered to Tehran later in 1992. In M arch 1993, an Iranian military delegation visited Pyongyang, supposedly seeking 150 No Dong missiles. Nuclear proliferation: There has been speculation that some of the nuclear warheads assembled by North Korea may have been fitted to No Dong-1 and -2 missiles. It is unknown whether North Korea has been able to fit a nuclear warhead on a delivery device such as the No Dong. OPERATIONAL NOTESNone. LATEST UPDATE: 1 October 2010? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. MRBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- IRIS (space-launch variant)---- Shahab-3D (space-launch variant)---- Zelzal MRBM (alternate designation)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Land Attack/Theater COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Iran PICTURES OF: Shahab-3 MRBMDESCRIPTIONThe Shahab-3 (Meteor , Shooting Star) is an Iranian medium-range ballistic missile derived from the original design of the North Korean No-dong . Iran is believed to have received extensive help in designing the missile from North Korea. Russia may also have given assistance, allowing the Shah ab-3 to attain greater range and accuracy. It is also called the Zelzal-3 (Earthquake). The Shahab-3 is a legacy of Iranian financial assistance to North Korea, which combined Soviet technical information with Chinese contributions to produce the No-dong . In exchange, Iran received the results and began to work on the Shahab-3. Iran reportedly received a dozen No-dong missiles from No rth Korea by 1996 as the basis for the program. As with the No-dong , the Shahab-3 is believed to use steel tankage, an improved Isayev engine and a lengthened cylinder for greater fuel capacity. It is a single-stage liquid-propelled rocket and capable of carrying a convention or chemical weapon-capable warhead. It could also conceivably carry a nuclear warhead, though there is no confirmation of the existence of any nuclear warheads in Iran. The rocket uses a fuel mixture of 20 percent gasoline and 80 percent kerosene, with an oxidizer consisting of 27 percent dinotrogen tetroxide and 72 percent nitric acid with an imodium inhibitor. It is designed for launch from a specially designed cross-country transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). I ran is developing its own TEL based on a Mercedes Benz vehicle, though it may only be an adaptation of the North Korean launch vehicle design onto a new chassis. PICTURESSTATUSInitial operational capability (IOC) in February 2000 with an estimated 15 missiles. Initial production began as early as 1999, with serial production reportedly starting in early 2001. Serial production capacity believed to be 20 missiles per year. Missile Testing In the first flight test on July 22, 1998, the test missile exploded after 100 seconds of flight and traveling 620 mi (998 km) downrange over northern Iran. It is unknown if the explosion was accidental or a deliberate termination of the test. Some analysts believe a deliberate detonation was h ighly unlikely and that the missile likely had problems due to steering vane disintegration failure or instrumentation/guidance failure. However, some experts believe the test was at least partially successful. A full end-to-end flight test of the Shahab-3 took place on July 15, 2000. The missile is believed to have used an engine purchased from North Korea, rather than one produced domestically in Iran. A subsequent test failed on Sept. 21, 2000, probably of a Shahab-3D (see "Variants" below), with the missile detonating shortly after liftoff. In July of 2003, Iran successfully tested the Shahab-3, then estimated to have a range of 746 miles (1,200 km) and a payload of 2,646 lb (1,200 kg). On Aug. 11, 2004, Iran tested the Shahab-3 missile. From Sept. 12-18, 2004, Iran conducted exercises including the launch of a strategic missile; there were no reports on the design. On Oct. 20, 2004, Iran launched what was said to be a more accurate Shahab-3 ballistic missile, with a range of 1,243 mi (2,000 km), according to Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani. On Jan. 17, 2006, Iran tested a missile that may have been the Shahab-4, collecting flight telemetry information. In a Feb. 4, 2008, test flight of the Shahab-3, one of the jet vanes fell off during flight; however, the loss was no enough to cause critical instability. On Sept. 27, 2009, Iran conducted a successful test flight of the Shahab-3 missile, though the accuracy of the missile was called into question. By 2003, two Iranian ballistic missile squadrons were equipped with the Shahab-3. Unspecified strategic missiles were delivered to the military following testing in September of 2004. On Sept. 22, 2005, six Shahab-3 missiles passed the presidential viewing platform during a parade. Iran had the Shahab-3 on display during National Army Day on April 19, 2010. BUILDER(S) Shahid Hemat Industrial Group, Tehran, Iran (design bureau) Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, Tehran, Iran (design bureau) Acad. V.P. Makeyev OKB, Russia (original Scud-B design bureau) Isayev OKB, Russia (original engine design) Great Wall Industries Corp., China (guidance control, solid-propellant motor technology, telemetry equipment) State factories, North Korea (imported rocket motors)USERS/PLATFORMS IranCHARACTERISTICS WEIGHTS Launch mass 34,948-35,825 lb (15,852-16,250 kg) Dry mass 3,924- 4,806 lb ( 1,780- 2,180 kg) Stage mass 33,272 lb (15,092 kg) Warhead 1,676 lb ( 760 kg) or 2,176 lb ( 987 kg) or 2,553 lb ( 1,158 kg) DIMENSIONS Length 52 ft 6 in (16.00 m) Diameter 4 ft 5 in ( 1.35 m) Configuration cylinder with tapered nosecone, slightly smaller diameter cylinder at rear of missile, four clipped delta tail fins PROPULSION Engine single-stage one-chamber liquid-propellant rocket Thrust effective 57,433 lb (26,051 kg) actual 58,996 lb (26,760 kg) Fuel TM-185 (20/80 gasoline/kerosene) Oxidizer AK-27I (27/73 dinotrogen tetroxide/nitric acid with imodium inhibitor Propellant mass 28,466 mi (12,912 kg) GUIDANCE Type inertial PERFORMANCE Range 810 nm (932 mi, 1,500 km) max est. CEP 208 yd (190 m) Launch preparation unknown, probably around 60 min Burn time 110 sec Deployment mobile TEL speed 44 mph (70 kmh) TEL range 342 mi (550 km) WARHEAD Nuclear possible, though no known warheads in Iran Chemical capable of carrying chemical warheads Conventional 2,553 lb (1,158 kg) HEVARIANTSShahab-3D/IRIS A test on Sept. 21, 2000, may have been a test of the Shahab-3D, a liquid-/solid-propellant missile that Iran has reportedly been developing as a space launch vehicle, also called the IRIS booster. The IRIS launch vehicle consists of what appears to be a Shahab-3 first stage with a bulbous front se ction designed to contain a second-stage solid rocket motor and a payload. Such a design is unlikely to be used to launch a significant payload unless mated to additional stages below. The failure of the test may have represented a significant setback to the Iranian space program. Shahab-3D could a lso be a ballistic missile variant of the IRIS . The Shahab-3D strongly resembles the North Korean Taepo-dong 2 second and third stages, indicating possible Iranian and North Korean cooperation on a joint space program. Shahab-3BThe Iranians developed this variant in order to incorporate a steerable re-entry vehicle during the terminal dive phase of the missile's trajectory. The regular Shahab-3 has spin stabilization, but the 3B reportedly includes a rocket-nozzle control system. This nozzle-control system is supposed to enable the Shahab-3B to be guided and course-corrected during all phases of the missile's flight. ISSUES AND NOTESIran announced that it successfully tested a solid-fuel motor for its Shahab-3 in May of 2005. The Shahab-3 previously was reported to use liquid-fuel technology. The Shahab-3 ballistic missile had been known as a single-stage device. Military experts said the development of a second motor demonstr ated a significant improvement in Iran's missile program. Former top Russian defense official Gen. Leonid Ivashov said he was not surprised by such progress. OPERATIONAL NOTESAn unclassified report from the U.S. Defense Dept. has suggested that a variant of the Shahab-3 could reach the United States by 2015, as reported by Reuters. LATEST UPDATE: 1 November 2010? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. Published on Arms Control Association ()Home > Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North KoreaArms Control and Proliferation Profile: North KoreaThis profile details which major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of North Korea, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and TreatiesSignedRatifiedBiological Weapons Convention - - -1987Chemical Weapons Convention - - -- - -Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - - -- - -Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)-Announced its withdrawal Jan. 10, 2003.- - -1985Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons- - -- - -Outer Space Treaty - - -- - -Ottawa Mine Ban Convention - - -- - -Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and SafeguardsAustralia Group: Not a member.Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member, and has frequently exported missiles and related materials.Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member.Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: None.Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Not a participant.Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant.UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: North Korea has not filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions.Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and PracticesBiological Weapons:Despite having signed the Biological Weapons Convention, North Korea reportedly maintains a biological weapons program. In 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that over the previous six months “North Korea was believed to have possessed a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize [biological weapon] agents, and may have such weapons available for use.”[1]Chemical Weapons:North Korea is widely reported to possess a large arsenal of chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene, and sarin agents. According to U.S. military estimates, North Korea “can deploy missiles with chemical warheads.”[2]Missiles: * Ballistic Missiles: North Korea is actively expanding its ballistic missile arsenal and allegedly working toward developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It initially relied upon assistance from the Soviet Union and China to develop its arsenal, but North Korea is now a chief exporter of ballistic missile systems and technology. The North Korean military currently deploys short-range Scud and medium-range missiles. The inaugural flight test of North Korea’s longest-range missile, the Taepo Dong-2, ended in failure about 40 seconds after launch on July 5, 2006. The sole flight test of its predecessor, the Taepo Dong-1, also failed in August 1998. * Cruise Missiles:The most recent flight tests of surface-to-ship cruise missiles occurred in early 2003. General speculation is that North Korean cruise missiles are derived from Chinese Silkworm missile designs.Nuclear Weapons:The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered in 1992 that North Korea had diverted plutonium from its civilian program. The resulting crisis eventually yielded the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, in which North Korea committed to freezing its plutonium-based weapons program at Yongbyon in exchange for two light-water reactors and other forms of energy assistance.The Agreed Framework collapsed after the United States accused North Korea of cheating on the arrangement. U.S. intelligence increasingly had suspected North Korea of pursuing a uranium-enrichment program as an alternative path to nuclear weapons, thereby violating the agreement’s spirit, as well as that of an earlier Korean peninsula denuclearization agreement (see “Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities” below). U.S. officials say that North Korean negotiators admitted to having such a covert program when challenged October 2002 on the issue. North Korean officials, however, have denied that alleged admission and continue to deny ever pursuing an uranium-enrichment program.The Korean Economic Development Organization (KEDO), the multilateral body created to provide energy assistance to North Korea under the Agreed Framework, halted its energy aid to North Korea in November 2002. A year and one month later, KEDO suspended construction of the two light-water reactors.North Korea ordered IAEA inspectors to leave the country Dec. 27, 2002, and announced its withdrawal from the NPT Jan. 10, 2003. In response, the IAEA referred the case to the UN Security Council. In August 2003, Russia, China, Japan, the United States, and the two Koreas also launched a multilateral diplomatic process, known as the six-party talks.The talks initially failed to resolve the disputes, and on Feb. 10, 2005, North Korea announced that it had assembled nuclear warheads. In September 2005, the six-party talks realized its first major success with the adoption of a joint statement in which North Korea pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs and return to the NPT. The talks faltered shortly after. On Oct. 9, 2006, North Korea conducted its first, and so far only, nuclear test. The UN Security Council responded by adopting resolution 1718, enacting a variety of multilateral sanctions and demanding that Pyongyang return to the NPT.On Feb. 13, 2007, the six-party participants agreed to an action plan detailing initial steps to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement. That action plan included shutting down North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor in return for energy aid. Using the Yongbyon facilities, North Korea is thought to have produced sufficient plutonium to assemble 6-12 nuclear devices.[3]The six parties concluded a follow-up agreement to the Feb. 13 action plan on Oct. 3, 2007. In that later agreement, North Korea agreed to disable its plutonium-production program at Yongbyon and provide a full accounting of all nuclear activities. In exchange for these actions, North Korea received the remaining energy aid pledged in the Feb. 13 agreement. The United States also committed to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and to stop applying the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act against Pyongyang.Proliferation RecordNorth Korea is a leading supplier of Scud missiles and longer-range missile technology to “the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa,” according to the Central Intelligence Agency. It concluded in a 2003 report that “exports of ballistic missiles and related technology were one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which supported ongoing missile development and production.”[4] North Korea’s primary missile trading partners are Iran, Libya, Egypt, Pakistan, and Syria. There is ample speculation that North Korea bartered missiles for uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan.Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation ActivitiesIn December 1991, the two Koreas signed a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the declaration, both countries agreed not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” The parties also agreed to mutual inspections for verification, which have not been implemented.-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.ENDNOTES1. Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, . Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, March 5, 2002.3. Arms Control Association, Arms Control Association Condemns North Korean Nuclear Test Threat; Experts Call for More Effective, Energetic U.S. Diplomacy, October 4, 2006, . Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, . * Fact Sheets & Briefs * North Korea * Country ProfilesThe Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based organization.If you find our resources useful, please consider joining or making a contribution.Arms Control Today encourages reprint of its articles with permission of the Editor.? 1997-2009 Arms Control Association1313 L St., NW, Ste. 130Washington, DC 20005Tel: (202) 463-8270 | Fax: (202) 463-8273Source URL: Korea: S. Korean Report Sees North With 200,000 Special Ops ForcesOctober 13, 2010The South Korean Ministry of Defense says North Korea has significantly increased its special operations forces, reports the Korea Times. According to a ministry report, Pyongyang now has more than 200,000 commandos who are trained for irregular warfare against the South, up from around 120,000 in 2006. The North Korean military is also said to have about 1,000 ballistic missiles, 2,500 tons to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, some 700 long-range artillery weapons and around 70 submarines. Pyongyang also maintains a cyberwarfare force of as many as 700 hackers, according to the South. In addition, North Korea has hundreds of Scud missiles and around 200 Rodong missiles. It is also believed to have developed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of 1,900 miles (3,000 km). The report says Pyongyang may be developing the Taepodong-2 missile with a range of 4,200 miles (6,700 km). Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the Scud, Rodong and Taepodong-2 at: SS-1C Scud-B** SRBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- SS-1D Scud-C** SRBM ---- SS-1E Scud-D** SRBM ---- 8K14 (Russian system designation) ---- R-300 (Russian missile number) ---- Al-Abas Iraqi Scud-B** modification ---- Al-Hussein Iraqi Scud-B** modification EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Land Attack/Theater Nuclear/Biological/Chemical -- Nuclear COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia PICTURES OF: SS-1C Scud-B** SRBM**US/NATO code name or designation DESCRIPTIONThe Scud series are mobile, nuclear-capable, short-range ballistic missiles for battlefield support of front and army levels within the Russian army. These liquid-propelled missiles are not affected by the December 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The design earned international attention when several dozen Scud derivatives were fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. Scuds were first deployed on converted IS-III heavy tank chassis; all of these are now out of service. The current missile launch vehicle is an MAZ-843 8 x 8 wheeled carrier known officially as the Uragan (Hurricane) and more informally as the Kashalot (Sperm Whale). The missile rests along the veh icle's centerline between the driver's and commander's cabs. When raised to its vertical firing position, the Scud is positioned behind the vehicle. The most common variant -- the Scud-B -- is relatively inaccurate. Its storable-liquid fuel (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) with an oxidizer of inhibited red fuming nitric acid (RFNA)) powers a boost phase that accelerates the missile to Mach 5. After burnout, the Scud follows a ballistic p ath until it nears impact when the warhead separates from the missile with a loud bang and a flash. Conventional high-explosive, sub-munitions, nuclear and chemical warheads can be fitted. In service with Russian ground forces and deployed in an army- or front-level SSM brigade. Each brigade consis ts of three battalions of two or three missile batteries each; total Scud strength per brigade is 12 to 18 missiles and an equal number of reloads. Each Scud brigade has three End Tray** meteorological radar trailers. Estimates of the number of missiles available to Iraq during Desert Storm ranged from 300 to 1,000. All surviving Iraqi ballistic missiles were claimed to have been destroyed by Iraq under United Nations oversight in July 1991. Under pressure, Iraq provided evidence in March 1992 that its forces ha d destroyed more Scud missiles. In March 1991, Syria reportedly received 24 modified Scud-C missiles from North Korea, which has been producing them for its own forces and for export. Iran, Egypt and Libya were said to be capable of manufacturing the missiles. An October 1991 Israeli newspaper report claimed that Iran and Syria w ould jointly produce a Scud-C variant. More missiles were reportedly shipped to Syria through Iran in February and March of 1992; see "Variants" and "Issues." Libya displayed 24 refurbished Scud B TELs and missiles in 1999. North Korea was suspected of providing assistance to the Libyans, who were reported to possess approximately 150-250 missiles and some 60-70 MAZ 543 TELs. PICTURESSTATUSInitial operational capability (IOC) in 1965. No longer in production. BUILDER(S) Makeyev OKB Design Bureau -- RussiaUSERS/PLATFORMS Afghanistan [N/A] Belarus [60] Egypt [9] Iran [300] [Scud-B/C] North Korea [N/A] Russia [N/A] Syria [18] [SS-1C Scud-B/SS-1D Scud-C] Ukraine [72] United Arab Emirates [6] Yemen [6] Vietnam [N/A]CHARACTERISTICS Scud-B Missile WEIGHTS Combat weight 13,889 lb (6,300 kg) Warhead nuclear 1,697-1,896 lb (770-860 kg) conventional 2,100 lb (953 kg) DIMENSIONS Configuration Long cylinder with blunted conical nose, 4 small tail fins Length 36 ft 11 in (11.25 m) Diameter 2 ft 11 in (0.88 m) PROPULSION Type Single-stage storable UDMH liquid propellant with RFNA oxidizer (Russian SG-02 Tonka 250) PERFORMANCE Speed at motor cutoff 2,865 kts (3,300 mph; 5,310 kmh) Mach 5 at impact >990 kts (1,140 mph; 1,835 kmh) Mach 1.5 Range Scud-B 162 nm (186 mi, 300 km) Scud-C 310-324 nm (357-373 mi, 575-600km) Pre-launch preparation 2-4 hours Time into action 1 hour from pre-surveyed site Warhead 5-80 kiloton nuclear --or-- Conventional unitary blast fuel-air explosive 40 runway-penetrator sub-munitions with 410-ft (125-m) total blast-damage radius --or-- 100 11-lb (5-kg) anti-personnel bomblets with 820-ft (250-m) total blast-damage radius --or-- Chemical warhead Circular Error Probable (CEP) 0.5 nm (900 m) SENSORS/FIRE CONTROL Guidance Simplified inertial guidance using 3 gyroscopes rocket steered by small vanes on each fin extending into effluxVARIANTSMAZ-543 8 x 8 Wheeled Launch Vehicle WEIGHTS Combat 63,934 lb (29,000 kg) DIMENSIONS Length 39 ft 4 in (12.00 m) Width 9 ft 10 in ( 3.00 m) Height 8 ft 6 in ( 2.60 m) PROPULSION Type Liquid-cooled, V-12 diesel engine Max power 580 hp PERFORMANCE Speed 43 mph (70 kmh) Range 342 mi (550 km) Fuel capacity 211 U.S. gal (800 liters) Obstacle vertical 2 ft 7 1/2 in (0.80 m) trench 11 ft 2 in (3.40 m) fording 3 ft 3 in (1.00 m) gradient 30 percentSS-1b Scud A/R-11/R-175 Initial operating capability in 1957; retired by 1978. Smaller, lighter predecessor, having a more primitive design with a shorter range of 70 nm (81 mi, 130 km), 40-kiloton warhead and CEP of 2.15 nm (4,000 m). Kerosene fuel with nitric acid oxidizer. SS-1d Scud-C Initial operating capability in 1965; has longer range, but is less accurate than Scud B and deployed in fewer numbers. Some remain in service in Russian ground forces. Believed to be the basis for North Korean production variant sold to Syria in March 1991. Syria and Iran were reported to be plann ing joint production of this variant; in March 1992, missile production facilities near Hamah and Aleppo were reported by the Washington Timesto be under construction. Egypt's Arab-British Dynamics Company (ABD) has reportedly received assistance from North Korea in building a factory to pr oduce Scud copies and upgraded designs. In 1992, British Aerospace was pressured by the British government to give up its 30 percent stake in ABD because of the latter's involvement in the Scud production project. SS-1e Scud-D Improved guidance system, possibly active radar terminal homing and a wider choice of warheads. This missile has a range of 434.7 miles (700 km). Initial operating capability in the 1980s, but may not have been deployed by former Soviet ground forces. Libya was said to be capable of manufacturing S cud-Ds by 1992. Syria can also manufacture Scud-Ds, but it is unclear whether the parts are produced domestically or imported from North Korea. The Scud-D was sold by North Korea to Syria and Libya, according to a May 30, 2000, release in the Middle East Newsline. That report also stated that North Korea intended to sell the missile to Egypt. Some confusion exists in nomenclature whether the Scud-D is an independent system or an early Western designation of the North Korean No-dong MRBM (see separate record). SS-300 Brazilian variant. Its IOC was planned for 1991, but delayed. It is larger than the Scud-B at 37 ft 9 in (11.5 m) long; 3 ft 3 in (1.0 m) in diameter; and weighs 17,637 lb (8,000 kg). It has the same range and an unknown accuracy. Under development by Avibras Aeroespacial SA, San Jose dos Campos, B razil. There were unconfirmed reports that Iraq wished to purchase the SS-300 in 1988. A 621-mile (1,000-km) range version, the SS-1000, was also under development. Al-Hussein Also al-Husayn or El-Hossein. Iraqi-modified Scud-B. Length is 40 ft (12.2 m); weight, 5,432 lb (7,000 kg). Effective range increased to 324 nm (373 mi, 600 km). Payload decreased, possibly to 298 lb (135 kg), later improvements raised ayload to 551-1,102 lb (250-500 kg). Carries an HE or chemical warhead. Its CEP is approximately 0.27-0.54 nm (500-1,000 m). The missile is truck-mounted. IOC in 1988. Approximately 200 Al-Husseins were launched at Iranian cities between February 29, 1998, and mid-April of that year. Several dozen were fired against Israel and Saudi Arabia in January-February 1991. Al-Abas Also Al Abbas. Further Iraqi modification of Scud-B. Its IOC was in 1990. First test-fired in April 1988. Length is 45 ft 1 in (13.75 m); weight, 17,637 lb (8,000 kg). It has an increased range of 486 nm (559 mi, 900 km). Payload estimated at 660 lb (300 kg). The Al-Abas carries an HE or chemical w arhead. CEP estimates range from 0.16 nm (300 m) to 0.81 nm (1,500 m). Syrian warheads Some Syrian Scud-Bs were reported to have 2,150-lb (984 kg) chemical warheads with 1,200 lb (544 kg) of VX agent. ISSUES AND NOTESIf such weapons had been in the hands of Moscow, the extended-range variants of the Scud-B developed in Iraq would be eligible for scrapping under the 1987 U.S.-Soviet treaty for the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces. Although Scud-Bs may pose little threat due to their inaccuracy, o ther more modern shorter-range missiles in service with non-Soviet/Russian forces could receive similar upgrades and be tested in the new configuration without violating the terms of the INF Treaty. Soviet sources disagreed on the number and timing of Scud missile supplies to Iraq. Some publications claimed that the last missile was delivered in the mid-1970s. The Sept. 4, 1990, issue of New Times (Moscow) stated that 300 went to Iraq in 1985, possibly confirming earlier Western reports that 300 had been exported in 1986. In 1991, however, the Soviets stated that Moscow had sold 819 missiles to Iraq over the years. Despite its military insignificance, however, the Iraqi missile barrage against Israel and Saudi Arabia had several effects, including: 1) delaying the execution of the coalition's air plan by diverting aircraft and reconnaissance resources to finding mobile launchers; 2) demonstrating the value of an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability; 3) threatening to bring Israel into the war as a "wild card" and possibly breaking up the Arab-Western coalition; 4) improving Israel's international standing when it agreed not to respond; and 5) drawing attention to other Scud acquisition pro grams in the region. After Desert Storm ended in a cease-fire, North Korea delivered 24 Scud-C missiles to Syria in March 1991, a transaction allegedly paid for by Saudi Arabia as part of a total order of 150, according to the Wall Street Journalfor July 19, 1991. Iran and Libya also were reported to have purch ased North Korean-built Scuds, some of which were modified; production of Scuds in Libya and Egypt were also said to be imminent. In March 1992, a North Korean freighter put into the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas reportedly loaded with Scud-C missiles that were to be flown from Iran to Syria. North Korea, Iran and Syria denied any agreement to supply, transit or purchase missiles, although Syria stated that it would buy more S cuds if it needed them. OPERATIONAL NOTESIran and Iraq launched more than 630 Scud-B missiles at each other's capitals during the "War of the Cities," which began in 1985. In February 1988, Iraq began using Al-Husseins with smaller warheads and greater range. Some were fitted with booster rockets. The missile's inaccuracy prevented a syst ematic attack on military targets, with most falling on civilian areas. After the U.S. air attack on Libya in April 1986, Libya retaliated by launching two Scud-Bs at the U.S. Navy's navigation station on Lampedusa Island in the Mediterranean. Both missiles fell short. In August 1991, Afghan rebel leader Jalaluddin al-Haqqani claimed that approximately 3,000 Scuds had been fired against anti-government mujahadeen forces since 1979. Fixed Scud missile sites in western Iraq were among the first targets attacked by U.S. and allied air forces initiating Operation Desert Storm on Jan. 17, 1991. Pre-war estimates of the number of Iraqi missiles proved too low and these attacks did not prevent Iraq from launching a total of 81 missi les against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia over the next several weeks. Forty-three of these fell on Saudi Arabia and 38 on Israel. Most or all of these missiles were believed to be Al-Hussein or Al-Abbas modifications of the original missile. Except for a few that may have had concrete warhead s, all were conventionally armed; no chemical or biological warheads were used. U.S. MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missiles were at first credited with hitting virtually all of the missiles launched. By April 1992, however, the number of "confirmed" Scud "kills" was reduced to 10, with another 14 listed as possible; additional missiles were claimed to have been diverted from their targets and classed as "mission kills." Many of the modified Al-Hussein or Al Abbas missiles broke up during flight because the stresses on the missiles were much greater than the original system had been designed to withstand. As a result, the missiles were even more inaccurate than the orig inal design. The military effects of the missile bombardment were negligible in either Saudi Arabia or Israel, except for one hit on a warehouse in Dhahran that killed 28 Americans and wounded 100. Otherwise, damage in Saudi Arabia was insignificant, with many Scuds landed in unpopulated areas. In Israel, there were about 9,700 apartments damaged. Two Israelis died in direct hits, four from suffocation in gas masks and 68 from heart attacks as a result of Scud attacks, according to the Jerusalem Postfor Jan. 17, 1992. Another 289 people were reported to have been wounded. On Feb. 26, 1991, U.S. special operations forces and Air Force aircraft destroyed 29 Scud missiles on mobile launchers in western Iraq. These launchers were believed to be preparing a barrage launch against Israel, according to Armed Forces Journal Internationalfor July 1991. Reports indicate that all Iraqi Scud-Bs were disposed of by December 2002. However, a full accounting by the-then Iraqi government was not made. The U.S. purchased approximately 30 SCUD-Bs and four TELs in 1995, with the missiles converted into targets by Lockheed Martin as part of the Willow Sand program. First Scud-B target missiles test-fired in 1997. There were also test-firings at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., in November 2002. The U.S. Navy has allocated $30 million to study how to modify the RIM-67 Standard Missile 2 (Block 4) to intercept SRBMs such as the Scud-B/Scud-C and SS-21. Syria has introduced major improvements in its Scud-Ds, improving guidance capability and accuracy, according to Jane's Missiles & Rockets (U.K.) dated Jan. 1, 2006. This determination was arrived at in part by an analysis of a Syrian Scud-D that broke up over Turkey's Hatay province on Ma y 27, 2005. North Korea has displayed an improved, 621.4-mi (1,000-km) range version of the Scud-C, according to Jane's Missiles & Rockets(U.K.) date June 1, 2007. LATEST UPDATE: 1 November 2010? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. Taepo Dong-2 IRBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- No Dong-3 IRBM (alternate designation) ---- Hwasong-2 IRBM (alternate designation) ---- Moksong-2 IRBM (alternate designation) ---- Shahab-5 IRBM (Iranian designation) EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Land Attack/Theater Nuclear/Biological/Chemical -- Nuclear COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: North Korea PICTURES OF: Taepo Dong-2 IRBMDESCRIPTIONThe Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) is an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), alternatively called the No Dong-3, Hwasong-2 and Moksong-2. The U.S. intelligence community uses the designation Taepo Dong-2. There is also a probable space-launch vehicle (SLV) based on the Taepo Dong-2. As does the Taepo Dong-1, the Taepo Dong-2 consists of two stages (though some analyses have posited a possible third stage). The first stage may be a modified version of China's DF-3 (CSS-2, Dong Feng 3) missile. The second stage is possibly North Korea's No Dong missile. Both stages use storable TM-185 liquid propellant using an AK-27I oxidizer. Unlike the Taepo Dong-1, the first stage uses four separate No Dong motors, each with one thrust chamber. Some analysts believe the design will have characteristics similar, but somewhat inferior, to the Soviet-built SS-5 . The stages of the Taepo Dong-2 use liquid rocket engines with a propellant combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acrid (IRFNA) and kerosene. Ignition is accomplished with a self-igniting fuel. The propellant feed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The startup and shutdown valves are one-shot devices that are actuated by pyrotechnic charges. Tank pressurization is accomplished by using air stored in a high-pressure bottle heated by th e turbine exhaust gases. The missile's guidance depends on it being orientated prior to launch on a trajectory aimed at the target; the guidance systems keeps the missile in this plane. Two of the three body-mounted gyros are used for attitude. The third gyro is for lateral acceleration control. A pendulum integration gyro assembly measures speed. The fins are fixed and thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes. PICTURESSTATUSDevelopment started as early as 1987. The first reported sighting of the Taepo Dong-2 took place in February of 1994 when U.S. satellites detected a mockup at the San'um-dong Research and Development Center (possibly the Number Seven Factory in Yongsong-kuyok, Pyongyang). Nearby North Korean launch facilities were modified for use with the large missile as of July 1999. U.S. intelligence detected a Taepo Dong-2 vehicle stored near the pad in August 1999, but it reportedly had not been detected on the pad itself. One likely launch site for testing the Taepo Dong-2, Musudan-ri, was seriously damaged in 2002 during a test flight of a liquid-fuel rocket that exploded. The launch site was back in operation by January of 2003. Flight Test Timeline June 1994 - U.S. satellites detected static engine tests for the Taepo Dong-1 and Taepo Dong-2. July 4, 2006 - Pyongyang launched a Taepo Dong-2 missile from Musudan-ri at about 5 a.m. local time. According to some reports, tracking by U.S. forces indicated that the missile had been aimed to impact off the coast of Hawaii However, the missile reportedly exploded 42 seconds after launch (o ther reports indicate the missile failed 35 seconds into flight). This was less than half the rocket's burn time. Some reports claimed that the missile actually flew for two or even seven minutes. These longer periods could reflect the time that the missile took to fall to the ocean as it broke up. The crash was a setback to its development program, but the launch was expected to assist North Korea engineers in refining the Taepo Dong-2. This test utilized the Taepo Dong-2/C design, see "Variants" for more information). Prior to launch, the missile had been placed on its launch platform for more than a month, ample time to be viewed by reconnaissance satellites. The co-director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, M.I.T. physicist David Wright, told Aviation Week & Space Technology, that it was likely the July 4 test utilized four clustered N o Dong engines. April 5, 2009 - North Korea launched a test flight of the Taepo Dong-2C/3 (or Unha-2, see "Variants," below) from the Musudan-ri launch site. The test was considered a failure since it did not result in placing a satellite in orbit. Reports suggested the second and third stages did not separat e successfully or the third stage failed to fire. The first stage fell into the Sea of Japan approximately 335.5 mi (540 km) from the launch site; the second and third stages fell into the Pacific Ocean approximately 2,392 mi (3,850 km) from the launch site. BUILDER(S) State factories of North KoreaUSERS/PLATFORMS Iran North KoreaCHARACTERISTICS WEIGHTS Launch 176,369 lb (80,000 kg) est max total, incl. warhead Stage-1 134,482 lb (61,000 kg) est max Stage-2 33,510 lb (15,200 kg) propellant mass 28,466 lb (12,912 kg) DIMENSIONS Configuration cylinder with tapered interstages to a conical nose section, 4 clipped delta tail fins Length 101 ft 8 in (31.00 m) est total overall Stage-1 Length 52 ft 6 in (16.00 m) est Diameter 7 ft 3 in ( 2.20 m) est Stage-2 Length 45 ft 11 in (14.00 m) est Diameter 4 ft 5 in ( 1.35 m) est max Warhead Length 3 ft 3 in ( 1.00 m) est PROPULSION Stage-1 and Stage-2 Engine TM-185 (20 percent gasoline, 80 percent kerosene) burning liquid propellant rocket Oxidizer AK-27 I (27 percent dinitrogen tetroxide, 73 percent nitric acid, iodium inhibitor) Stage-1 Thrust effective 229,730 lb (104,204 kg) actual 374,874 lb (170,040 kg) PERFORMANCE Range 2,025 nm (2,330 mi, 3,750 km) est with 1,653 lb (750 kg) payload 1,890 nm (2,175 mi, 3,500 km) est with 2,205 lb (1,000 kg) payload Throw-weight 2,205 lb (1,000 kg) est max Burn time stage-one 130 sec est max stage-two 110 sec est max CEP uncertain Launch preparation unknown Deployment soft WARHEAD Nuclear possible, but unconfirmed if North Korea has a viable nuclear warhead Chemical possible, probably concentrated VX Conventional 2,206 lb HE max, though unlikely to use a missile such as this for conventional explosivesVARIANTSThree-Stage Taepo Dong-2 SLV A three-stage version, which may be used as either a space launch vehicle or a longer range ballistic missile, has been produced. Characteristics are identical to those above, excepted as noted below: WEIGHTS Launch 187,392 lb (85,000 kg) est max total DIMENSIONS Length 105 ft 0 in (32.00 m) est total stage-3 13 ft 1 in ( 4.00 m) est max Diameter stage-3 6 ft 7 in ( 0.65 m) est max Configuration cylinder with tapered interstages to flaring blunt conical nose section, 4 clipped delta tail fins PROPULSION Engine solid-propellant rocket motor (stage-3) PERFORMANCE Range 2,322 nm (2,672 mi, 4,300 km) with 860 lb (390 kg) payload 2,214 nm (2,548 mi, 4,100 km) with 1,102 lb (500 kg) payload 2,160 nm (2,485 mi, 4,000 km) with 1,257 lb (570 kg) payload Throw-weight 1,257 lb (570 kg) est max Burn Time stage-3 100 sec est PAYLOAD Type unknownShahab-5 IRBM This is the Iranian designation for its version of the Taepo Dong-2. Iran is conducting static bench tests of Taepo Dong motors. The Shahab-5, however, may use more Russian assistance than from the Taepo Dong-2, as well as assistance from China. As of this update, Military Periscope reports the Shahab-5 to be in service. Taepo Dong-X Variant with solid-propellant missile engine. A report, dated Sept. 17, 2010, provides an estimated range of 1,553 mi to 2,485 mi (2,500 to 4,000 km) for the Taepo Dong-X, sufficient to target Japan and Guam. However, an Oct. 1, 2003, U.S. Congressional Research Service report puts the r ange as up to 9,400 mi (15,040 km). As of 2009, it was reportedly still in development. Taepo Dong-2C/3/Unha-2Taepo Dong-2 with redesigned booster engines for space launch capability. First test flight occurred on July 4-5, 2006, however, it failed 35 seconds after launch. reported that the North Koreans have since further developed the technology to the point that the Taepo Dong 2C "amo unts to a completely new Taepo Dong-3 design." Iran is said to have pursued acquisition of this technology without success, as of this update. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, among other sources, indicates that this new design may also have been designated the Unha-2 by the North Koreans. ISSUES AND NOTESOn Dec. 17, 2004, a U.S. official said North Korea could test a long-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States at any time. Stephen Rademaker, assistant secretary of state for arms control, told a Capitol Hill conference sponsored by the American Foreign Policy C ouncil that Pyongyang was forging ahead with the development of the Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile with a third stage. "This missile could be flight tested at any time," Rademaker said. "Such a three-stage missile could deliver a several hundred kilogram payload up to 15,000 kilometers (8,099 nm, 9 ,321 mi)," enough to hit parts of the United States and Europe. At that range, the Taepo Dong-2 would be classified as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Missile proliferation:Iran is known to have acquired engines and missile technology from North Korea, and to have conducted static thrust bench tests for its version of the TP-2, the Shahab-5, now in service. OPERATIONAL NOTESNone. LATEST UPDATE: 1 November 2010? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. Korea: Pyongyang's Chemical Weapon Threat Exposed By S. Korean Think-TankOctober 13, 2010The government of North Korea is said to have the capability to produce up to 12,000 tons of chemical weapons, says a South Korean think-tank cited by Agence France-Presse. Dealing with the North's chemical weapons is second in importance to Seoul to North Korea's nuclear program, said Kwon Yang-Joo of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. According to the South Korean Defense Ministry, Pyongyang currently has some 2,500 to 5,000 tons of nerve gas, blood agents, mustard gas and other chemical agents. The North could produce chemical weapons deliverable by artillery, missile or aircraft, said the think-tank analyst. The North could build 625,000 to 1.25 million chemical bombs if it used all of its chemical stockpile at once, Kwon said.----- Korea: New GPS-Jamming Equipment Worries S. KoreaOctober 08, 2010South Korean intelligence officials say that imported equipment now allows North Korea to jam GPS signals out to 60 miles (100 km), reports the Yonhap News Agency (Seoul). Pyongyang has imported the vehicle-mountable devices from Russia, said Defense Minister Kim Tae-young. North Korea may have been behind the occasional malfunction of GPS receivers in parts of South Korea's west coast areas during August, Kim said.----- Korea: Manual Describes Camouflage Tactics, Radar-Absorbing PaintAugust 25, 2010North Korea has apparently developed a radar-absorbing paint to help hide its aircraft, warships and tanks, reports South Korea's Chosun Ilbo, citing a field manual obtained by the paper. The newspaper says the 80-page manual, dated 2005, includes detailed instructions on how to make and apply radar-absorbent paint and build a variety of fake facilities, including command posts, foxholes, runways, jet aircraft and naval bases. The manual also describes how to conceal actual facilities or equipment and to make military units look like they are moving in order to deceive South Korean and U.S. reconnaissance.----- Korea: Artillery Fired Into Yellow SeaAugust 09, 2010The North Korean military fired dozens of artillery shells on Monday into the Yellow Sea, Reuters reports. The shelling off the west coast took place near the border soon after a South Korean west coast naval exercise officially ended at 5 p.m., South Korean military officials said. South Korean officials said 100-plus rounds landed on the North Korea side of the border, reported CNN. Earlier on Monday, the U.S.-led United Nations Command said North Korean military officials agreed to a fourth meeting at the Panmunjom truce village scheduled for Tuesday. Tensions have been high on the peninsula since Seoul accused Pyongyang of torpedoing a South Korean warship in March, killing 46 sailors.----- Korea: Satellite Photo Reveals New Air-Cushioned VesselAugust 05, 2010A new North Korean air-cushioned warship has been spotted by satellite photography, reports the Yonhap News Agency (Seoul). A Google Earth photo is said to have showed the vessel, possibly based on older air-cushioned landing craft in North Korean service, stationed at the western port city of Nampo near the Daedong River. The new ship is about 112-feet (34-m) long, about 46 feet (14 m) longer than the older landing craft, according to a South Korean military source. The photo reportedly shows the warship armed with a 57-mm cannon on the bow and a 30-mm gun on the stern. The craft is estimated to be able to reach speeds of up to 56 mph (90 kmh), according to an unnamed military source.----China reportedly refused a request for J-10 fighter jets made by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in May, reports Chosun Ilbo (South Korea). Kim is said to have made the request to Chinese President Hu Jintao. Kim was refused, but told that China would protect and support North Korea if it were to be attacked, said a high-ranking North Korean source. Kim fears a military reprisal for the March sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, according to a former North Korean official who defected. The J-10s would have helped counter U.S. and South Korean F-15s and F-16s, said the defector. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the J-10, F-15 and F-16, respectively, at: J-10 multirole fighterVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- Jian-10---- Qian Shi-10---- F-10 (export designation)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Aircraft -- Fighter COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: China PICTURES OF: J-10 multirole fighterDESCRIPTIONThe result of a 40-year Chinese effort to develop a high-performance fighter, the Chengdu J-10 fighter may become the most common aircraft in China's PLAAF over the next decade. Should China develop aircraft carriers, the J-10 has been cast as the principal design source for carrier aircraft. The J -10 is believed by many to have benefited from technology originally developed for the Israeli Lavi (Lion Cub), which was cancelled under U.S. pressure in the late 1980s. This assistance was augmented by Russian input in the 1990s. Much of the information available in open sources is necessarily speculative. Nevertheless, the Boston Globereported on April 5, 2005, that the J-10, according to U.S. intelligence officials, is on par with the F-16 . It is expected to be the first production Chinese fighter to feature a sta tically unstable design requiring on a fly-by-wire control system. Manufacturing restraints are thought to have limited the amount of composite materials used in the aircraft, differentiating it from the Lavi, and giving it a traditional all-metal structure. As with the Lavi and many other aircraft of that design generation -- such as the Dassault Rafale , SAAB JAS-39 Gripen and the Eurofighter Typhoon -- the J-10 features a close-coupled planform with cropped, double-delta wings and all-moving swept canard surfaces. The wings are likely to have leading -edge sweep, outboard leading-edge flaps, a trailing edge of elevons divided into inboard and outboard sections. Unlike the Lavi, the wings do not have tiprails for air-to-air missiles (AAM) or electronic support measures (ESM) pods. The swept canards are located below the cockpit and differ from t he mainplane in having both leading and trailing edges swept. Like the Lavi, the J-10 appears to have been designed with the ground-strike mission in mind. The close canard design alters and redistributes the overall lift of the airplane in order to enhance aircraft's lift-to-drag ratio and improving air-to-air agility and range. The vertical tail is considerably broader than that of the Lavi and has a lower taper ratio base to tip. The inset rudder is above the parachute brake housing. Small airbrakes are fitted on the fuselage to either side of the vertical tail and small quadrilateral ventral fins angle out from the lowe r fuselage below the fin. It is generally agreed that the Chinese have had ample opportunity to study Western-designed digital fly-by-wire (FBW) systems, particularly those in the F-16 (through Pakistan) and the Lavi (which flew with a quadruple redundant Lear-Siegler system). Even so, the crash of at least one prototype ha s been ascribed to troubles with the FBW system (a fate that befell both the JAS-39 and the Taiwanese Ching-Kuo fighter). The maximum positive g limit is likely to be 9 g and the design is said by some to be more maneuverable than the F/A-18E/F . The military site reports that the ai rcraft is equipped with the Iron Bird four-channel digital fly-by-wire system. The single underfuselage engine air intake has a more rectangular opening and a noticeable rake than those of the F-16 or Lavi. Unable to obtain the Pratt & Whitney F100 that powered the Lavi (although one reverse-engineered prototype may have flown in the early 1990s), Chinese designers turned to the Saturn Lyulka AL-31F. Although in the same power class as the F100, the AL-31F is larger and heavier, necessitating expanded dimensions. The AL-31F as flown in the Su-27 doesn't fit within the Chinese engine bay as designed, so the gearbox has been moved under the engine. In 2001, Russia announced the sale of 300 Saturn AL-31Fs to China. An indigenous design from Wopen (variously identified as the WS-10, WS-12, WPS-12 and WP-15) is in the same power class. Reports in April 2002 suggested that the Chinese were uncertain that the AL-31 engines would be delivered as pl anned (and Russia reportedly denied a Chinese request to produce the AL-31 under license), Beijing was said to be accelerating development of the WS-10. The Chinese version of the engine is not currently equipped with thrust-vectoring capability, though this could be added in a future variant. The selection of the AL-31FN engine also meant that the aircraft would need to be larger than the Lavi design upon which it was based. There is speculation that a carrier-based variant may be under development with two Klimov RD-33 or RD-93 engines. In the June 2002 yearly survey of military aircraft in Flight International, the J-10 is listed with a single Klimov RD-93 engine, which is the powerplant on the FC-1 also in de velopment in China. If a thrust-vectored version of any of these engines is to be adopted, its service-entry date will probably be pushed back. The area-ruled fuselage has a raised forward section with pointed radome housing a multi-mode pulse-Doppler radar and an ejection seat in a cockpit enclosed by a single-piece canopy. The main gear retracts inward, wheels nesting in fuselage bays; the nose gear wheel assembly retracts to the rear un der the intake duct. The J-10 may be equipped with an indigenous radar from China's 14th Technical Research Institute using Russian technology. However, several systems have been considered as candidates for the J-10 including a development of Phazotron's Zhuk multi-mode radar, possibly the PD10 or the Zhem Chung. Phazotron negotiated a contract to supply Zhuk radars to China in 1997. At the time, the system was described as having six times the data and signal-processing power of the original Zhuk and a detection range of more than 80 km (50 mi, 43.2 nm). The radar can track while scanning 24 targets, displ ay up to eight of them and simultaneously provide fire-control solutions for two to four of them. Future variants may include the Phazotron RP-35 Zhemchug, which is an X-band radar with digital fire-control sensors and an electronically scanning phased-array antenna. Other potential radar candidate s included Elta's EL/M-2035. However, after the discovery that Chinese agents were stealing American nuclear secrets, U.S. pressure helped kill Israeli participation in the project. The indigenous pulse-Doppler design, the KLJ-3 from Nanjing Research Institute of Electronic Technology, could be an early variant of AN/APG-66 /68 technology (according to ) with a maximum detecting range of 62 mi. to 81 mi. (attacking range 50 mi. to 56 mi.); it is capable of engag ing two targets simultaneously. The radar system was tested on a Y-7 aerial radar testbed before being fitted on the J-10. In the cockpit, the pilot views flight and target data on three flat-panel liquid crystal multifunction displays (MFDs), one of which is a color unit. A helmet-mounted sight is connected to the wide field-of-view heads-up display (HUD) and the central mission computer. Other features include an int egrated hands-on-throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) system and radar warning receiver. It is considered likely that the pilot would also be equipped with a head-mounted sight, though it is not known if that might be the basic Ukrainian Arsenel sight copied by China's Luoyang Avionics, or a new helmet displ ay featured briefly at the 2000 Zhuhai Air Show. As many as 11 weapons stations carry AAMs, anti-ship or air-to-surface missiles, fuel tanks, bombs, ESM/ECM pods -- the usual array of weapons. A published plan view shows three plumbed pylons for fuel tanks, one under each inner wing and one under the fuselage. Outboard of each wing fuel station a re two more weapons pylons. Four underfuselage stations are available--two under the inlet and two just ahead of the elevon hinge line on either side of the drop tank. The J-10 also has fitting locations on the port side of the engine air take likely intended for an all-weather, night attack target ing pod of some variety. A 23-mm cannon is buried in one of the wing roots. The J-10 is reportedly compatible with a wide variety of Chinese, Israeli and Russian ordnance. In July of 2008, a Military Periscope correspondent was on hand for a sneak peek before the official display of the J-10 in Beijing. For more details, see our special report entitled "Unveiling the J-10 Fighter," dated July 11, 2008. PICTURESSTATUSFirst flight in 1996. Initial operational capability (IOC) in 2006. In service. The J-10 project began in 1988, with the first aircraft mock-up completed in 1993, an all-metal frame used for wind tunnel testing. A J-10 crashed in November 1995 during a test flight, delaying planned deliveries scheduled for 1998. A second J-10 crashed some time later. The program's chief test pilot was killed in one of the crashes. Flight testing resumed by mid-1999. By mid-June 2002, China had 10 preproduction J-10s in operation. The first 10 J-10s were deployed in March 2003 to the Nanjing Military District for operational evaluation. There were reports of 16 aircraft built by May 2004. Published reports predicted that the J-10 would make its first public appearance at the Fourth China International Aviation and Aerospace Expedition (Airshow China 2002), held in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, from Nov. 4-10, 2002. However, the plane did not appear. There were estimates that as many as 30 were to be produced by 2005, which might have been the planned initial operational capability (IOC) date, though there has been no confirmation that this deadline was met. reports that first active PLAAF J-10 squadron will be the 44th Aviation Division based in Sichuan Province. The PLAAF has reportedly ordered 300 aircraft, though some accounts indicate as many as 500 J-10s could be produced. Published accounts suggest that the J-10 may be in a current production run of 50 airplanes. Perhaps the best indication of intended procurement levels on the part of the PLAAF was the Dec. 15, 2004, deal Beijing signed with Moscow-based Salyut engineering production enterprise, a contract worth US $900 million. It called for the delivery of about 250 AL-31FN aircraft engines over the next six years. According to a July 2005 report in Russia's Kommersant, Rosoboroneksport, the Russian state-owned arms trading company, has signed a US$300 million contract to export 100 modified AL-31FN turbofan engines to China. The engines are manufactured by Salyut Moscow Machine Building Production Enterprise . The Chinese state-run Xinhua news agency reported on Dec. 29, 2006, that the Jian-10 (J-10) was already in operational service with the People?s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and had reached its initial operational capability (IOC). This was the first official announcement regarding the J-10. According to a report in 2007, China intends to replace the J-10?s Russian Saturn Lyulka AL-31F with the indigenous WS-10A turbofan engine. Following more than a decade of difficulties in development, the engine was certified for design finalization in early 2006. Once an indigenous Chinese engine is fitted to the J-10, the Chinese government can export it without restriction. Pakistan, Thailand, and Sri Lanka are said to have shown interest in the J-10. Global reports that the Chinese government has begun referring to the J-10 (Jian-10 ) as the "Qian Shi-10" ("Attack 10"), suggesting a change in the tactical role intended for the J-10 from an air defense fighter to a multirole fighter-bomber with air-to-ground mission capability. BUILDER(S) CAC, Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corp., Chengdu, Sichuan, ChinaUSERS/PLATFORMS China [62]CHARACTERISTICS CREW 1 pilot WEIGHTS Empty 21,450 lb ( 9,730 kg) Takeoff 54,344 lb (24,650 kg) max Payload 20,944 lb ( 9,500 kg) max DIMENSIONS Length 54 ft 2 in (16.5 m) Height 19 ft 8 in ( 6.0 m) Wing span 37 ft 1 in (11.3 m) Wing area 490 sq ft (45.5 m sq) Canard span 17 ft 5 in ( 5.3 m) Canard area 51 sq ft ( 4.7 m sq) PROPULSION Engine 1 x Saturn Lyulka AL-31F (see description) Power 27,558 lb (12,500 kg) static thrust Fuel internal 9,855 lb (4,470 kg) external 12,456 lb (5,650 kg) PERFORMANCE Speed 1,190-1,290 kts (1,370-1,480 mph, 2,210-2,390 kmh) Mach 1.85-2.0 max Ceiling 59,055 ft (18,000 m) Range 1,000 nm (1,150 mi, 1,853 km) Radius hi-lo-hi 1,371 nm (1,578 mi, 2,540 km) lo-lo-lo 707 nm ( 814 mi, 1,310 km) WEAPONS Cannon 1 x 23-mm cannon internal Hardpoints 13 (11 external and 2 wingtip rails) AAM PL-8 IR, PL-9, PL-10, R-73/AA-11 Archer, R-77/AA-12 Adder bombs laser-guided missiles CSS-N-4 Sardine** anti-ship, unknown air-to- surface other 3 x external fuel tanks SENSORS/ELECTRONICS Radar KLJ-3 (Elta EL/M-2035 and Zhuk-10PD are suggested alternatives)VARIANTSJ-10 Naval Variant Reports indicate a twin-engine naval variant of the J-10 is under consideration. J-10B Twin-Seat Variant China is developing twin-seat variants of the J-10 for use in the reconnaissance, training and attack roles. A two-seat J-10B fighter-trainer aircraft conducted a successful flight in 2003. The aircraft features a stretched forward fuselage and a higher canopy to accommodate an additional seat and its equipment. Its dorsal spine also may have been enlarged to accommodate electronics displaced by the rear cockpit J-11There are rumors of a variant or further development of the J-10 under a joint Chinese Russian design program. The J-11 could mount China's WS-10 turbofan powerplant if the engine is ready in time. The J-11 reportedly will use design features of the Su-27 family of aircraft, but with more capabilit ies. J-13Chengdu and its subordinated 611 Aircraft Design Institute has begun work on an enlarged twin-engine version of the J-10 to compete with Shenyang's J-12 project for the PLAAF's fourth generation fighter program. The new fighter, which reportedly has been designated J-13, uses the J-10's canard delt a design and resembles the Russian MiG MFI (Project 1.44) fifth-generation fighter demonstrator. The J-13 may be powered by two improved AL-41 turbofan engines with thrust-vectoring nozzles and possibly supersonic cruise capability too, with a maximum take-off weight of 40,000 pounds (9,072 kg). ISSUES AND NOTESThe U.S. military is firm in its belief that the J-10 is derived from the Lavi, as demonstrated in the unclassified report "Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare" by the Office of Naval Intelligence. In the report, ONI said: The design has been undertaken with substantial direct external assistance, primarily from Israel and Russia, with indirect assistance through access to U.S. technologies. As more information seeps out (or is leaked) from Chinese sources, there are growing expectations that the J-10 will go into quantity production. Several main systems, notably the engine and radar, are apparently still to be decided. Of all the Chinese aircraft under development, however, this desi gn has the best balance of improved performance, suitability for likely requirements and the ability to be manufactured with a reasonable expenditure of resources. The J-10 may have been produced based on a single F-16 provided by Pakistan and then included additional technology from the Lavi program, as reported on Dec. 4, 2002, in the Asia Times. The article said the J-10's radar system will be the Israeli ELM-2021, which can simultaneously track six airborne targets while locking on to the four most threatening targets. Chinese contracts with Russia to license-build versions of the Su-27 Flanker (designated the J-11 in Chinese service) may indicate a lack of faith in the J-10 design. However, China also concluded a deal with Russian engine maker SRPC Salyut for AL-31F engines for the J-10 program. OPERATIONAL NOTESThe J-10 flew in exhibition at the 2008 Zhuhai Air Show. Adoption of the J-10 will China fighter technology on par with Taiwan?s most advanced aircraft. LATEST UPDATE: 1 March 2009? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. Korea: Pyongyang Cuts Naval Hotline, Nullifies AccordMay 27, 2010North Korea says it will cut a naval hotline that is designed to prevent accidental clashes with South Korea on their disputed sea border, the New York Times reports. The hotline was installed following a 2004 accord that also stipulated the navies would communicate through a common radio frequency. Pyongyang will "completely nullify" that accord, according to a military statement Thursday. At the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, Pyongyang and Seoul disagreed on a western maritime border. The disputed area has been the site of three deadly naval battles. In a statement issued by the government's agency, North Korea threatened to strike at anyone crossing its self-proclaimed maritime border.---- Korea: N. Korea Blamed For Torpedoing WarshipMay 20, 2010South Korea officially charged North Korea with sinking the South Korean navy patrol ship Cheonan in March, killing 46 crewmen, the Los Angeles Times reports. A joint civilian-military multinational team said that parts of a torpedo found amid the ship's wreckage matched that of a North Korean-made weapon in Seoul's possession. Pyongyang called the report a "fabrication" and said it would send its own team of investigators. North Korea also threatened a "holy war," noted the Korean Times. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has vowed to take "stern action," including severing economic aid to the North. Lee also pledged to bolster naval forces and sensors along the disputed maritime border where the attack took place. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the Cheonan at: Korea: Sinking Of Cheonan Blamed On TorpedoApril 27, 2010The South Korean Defense Ministry believes that a torpedo sank the frigate Cheonan last month, the Scotsman reports. While Defense Minister Kim Tae Young did not directly blame North Korea, Pyongyang's involvement is strongly suspected. "The bubble jet effect caused by a torpedo is the most likely cause for the blast," Kim told a press conference. In such instances, he said, a rapidly expanding bubble caused by an underwater explosion forms a destructive column of water. Damage on the recovered portions of the ship is consistent with such a blast, said South Korean officials. The U.S. also is said to believe a torpedo was the cause, though saying it did not make a direct hit, reported All Headline News. The frigate was split in half by an explosion on March 26. The bodies of 40 of the ship's 104 crew members have been recovered; six are still missing. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the Cheonan at: Korea: Signs Point To N. Korea In Ship Sinking, Say Intelligence ReportsApril 22, 2010South Korean military intelligence officials reportedly suspect a North Korean torpedo sank the naval frigate Cheonan last month, Yonhap News reports. The assessment was made right after the March 26 incident, said an unnamed official. The ship broke in half and sank near the western sea border with North Korea. The site of the sinking is near where Pyongyang and Seoul fought several gun battles. Initial reports by South Korea's chief investigator blamed the sinking on an "external explosion." Military sources in South Korea said they have been told that the attack was carried out by North Korea and midget submarines on the express order of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, reported the Daily Telegraph (U.K.). Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the Cheonan at: Korea: Short-Range Missiles Launched From East CoastOctober 12, 2009North Korea test-fired short-range missiles off its east coast on Monday, the Yonhap News Agency (South Korea) reports. Some reports indicated that two missiles were involved, while others reported there were five. The missiles were launched south of Musudan-ri, North Hamgyeong province, said a South Korean government official. Pyongyang previously issued a ban on the use of waters in that area from Oct. 10 to Oct. 20, which could mean more launches are expected.-----North Korea: Missiles Tested May Have Improved Range, Says S. Korean GeneralOctober 13, 2009The North Korean short-range missiles that were test-fired Monday may have improved range over previous weapons, United Press International reports, citing the South Korean chief of staff. The KN-02 missiles have an estimated range of between 130 kilometers (80.7 miles) and 160 kilometers (99.4 miles), the South Korean general said. Seoul previously estimated the missiles' range at a maximum of 120 kilometers (74.5 miles), which threatened a western South Korean naval port and U.S. military hub south of Seoul. The five KN-02 missiles were thought to be the first such tests in three months. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the KN-02 at: Scarab** SRBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- 9K79 Tochka (Russian system designation) ---- 9M79 (Russian missile designation) ---- 9K79 Tochka-U (improved system designation) ---- 9M79-1 (improved missile designation)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Land Attack/Theater Nuclear/Biological/Chemical -- Nuclear COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia PICTURES OF: SS-21 Scarab** SRBM**US/NATO code name or designation DESCRIPTIONThe SS-21 Scarab is a single-warhead Soviet-era mobile tactical short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) that has nearly replaced the older FROG-7**. Originally, it was mistakenly referred to as the Frog-9 in Western literature. Deployment was on the scale of four launchers in a single tactical missile battalion in a Soviet tank or motorized rifle division. The 9K79 system consists of the 9M79 missile, at least three types of warheads and several vehicles. A single 9P129 tractor-erector-launcher (TEL) is mounted on a BAZ-5921 6 x 6 chassis. The 9T218 transporter (based on a BAZ-5922 6 x 6 chassis) carries two missiles. Both vehicles have a flat top li ne with a short snout and sloped windshield. The axles are spaced fairly evenly. The AKIM 9V818 command and control vehicle, 9T238 crew transport vehicle and the 9V844 maintenance vehicles are all based on the ZIL-131 6 x 6 chassis. The ZIL-131 truck is more typical of a standard 6 x 6 design with conventional cab and closely spaced second and third axles under the flat bed. The missiles are designated according to the warhead they carry. The 9M79B is fitted with a "special" (chemical or nuclear) warhead, including the AA60 tactical nuclear warhead. The 9M79F carries a 265-lb (120-kg) high-explosive fragmentation warhead. The 9M79K delivers submunitions, likely carryin g either bomblets, mines or both. Other warheads may include a terminally guided unit and a smart-munitions bomblet unit. PICTURESSTATUSDesigned by the Kolomna design bureau (KBM). Initial operational capability in 1976. Produced by the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant at Udmurt and the Petropavlovsk Machinery Plant, Kazakhstan, it is no longer in production. East German SS-21s were taken out of service after the German reunificatio n of October 1990. BUILDER(S) Kolomna design bureau (KBM), Russia Nepobidimy (design bureau), Russia Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt, Russia Petropavlovsk Machinery Plant, Kazakhstan Titan OKB, Volgograd, Russia (TEL vehicle design) Barrikady Industrial Association, Volgograd (TEL vehicle production) Soyuz NPO, Dzerzhisky, Russia (solid-propellant motor) Rosoboronexport, Moscow (marketing)USERS/PLATFORMS Azerbaijan [4] Belarus [N/A] Kazakhstan [N/A] North Korea [N/A] (see Variants) Syria [18] Russia [200] Ukraine [90] Yemen [10]CHARACTERISTICSSS-21 Scarab SRBM WEIGHTS Missile 4,409 lb (2,000 kg) Warhead 1,063 lb ( 482 kg) DIMENSIONS Configuration cylinder with tapered nose and four "cropped delta" stabilizing fins at tail, booster section behind fins Length overall 21 ft 0 in (6.40 m) without warhead 13 ft 4 in (4.08 m) Diameter 2 ft 2 in (0.65 m) Wing span 4 ft 0 in (1.20 m) est. PROPULSION Type single-stage solid-fuel rocket PERFORMANCE Speed 1,930 kts (2,220 mph, 3,580 kmh) Mach 3 Range minimum 8 nm ( 9 mi, 15 km) maximum 38 nm (44 mi, 70 km) Reaction time 15 minutes CEP 328 yd (300 m) WARHEADS 9M79B 10 kt or 100 kt nuclear; chemical 9M79F 265 lb (120 kg) HE fragmentation 9M79K bomblet or mine submunitions GUIDANCE Type inertial preprogrammed with terminal optical correlation or passive radar BAZ-5921LTM 6 x 6 Carrier WEIGHTS Launch vehicle 33,000 lb (15,000 kg) est. Transporter/loader 40,345 lb (18,300 kg) DIMENSIONS Length 31 ft 4 in (9.55 m) Width 9 ft 1 in (2.78 m) Height 7 ft 5 in (2.27 m) PROPULSION Engine 5020B 300-hp water-cooled, 4-stroke, 6-cylinder diesel engine PERFORMANCE Speed road 37 mph (60 kmh) water 5 mph ( 8 kmh) Range 311 mi (500 km) PROTECTION NBC collectiveVARIANTSThe missiles are designated according to the warhead they carry. The 9M79B is fitted with a "special" (chemical or nuclear) warhead; the 9M79F has a high-explosive fragmentation warhead; and the 9M79K delivers submunitions. Scarab BVariant with the ability to traverse depressed trajectories. Also can execute pre-programmed maneuvers up to 10 g during terminal phase of flight. Its accuracy has been measured at 311.6 ft (95 m) circular error probability (CEP). Scarab CFlight trials were reported in 1989. Utilizes a smaller missile (approximately 3,968.3 lb; 1,800 kg launch weight) and a redesigned, larger TEL vehicle with two missiles mounted next to each other. A previously reported range of 606.9 ft (185 m) is now thought to be inaccurate. KN-02Improved version of the SS-21. Solid-fuel rocket engine with a range up to 74.5 mi (120 km). ISSUES AND NOTESData published after inspection of former East German missiles indicated a maximum range of 38 nm (43.5 mi, 70 km). Earlier estimates ranged up to 65 nm (75 mi, 120 km). OPERATIONAL NOTESOn Oct. 21, 1999, U.S. satellites, reportedly belonging to the Defense Support Program , tracked two SRBMs launched from the Russian city of Mozdok. The missiles made an impact approximately 60 mi (97 km) northeast of Grozny, hitting a crowded marketplace and a maternity ward. Reports from the regio n indicated that 143 people were killed in the attack. Intelligence analysts believed the missiles were SS-21 Scarabs. The U.S. Navy has allocated $30 million to study how to modify the RIM-67 Standard Missile 2 (Block 4) to intercept SRBMs such as the Scud-B/Scud-C and SS-21. LATEST UPDATE: 1 November 2010? 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. ------- Korea Preps Hovercraft Assault ForceBy David Axe February 3, 2011 ?|? 12:12 pm ?|? Categories: Rogue States Sure, hovercraft are cool, but they’re not exactly the cutting edge of military technology, nor the most versatile vehicles in the world. Most navies only use them for niche missions.But when your country is flat broke, starving and stuck with 1970s hardware, sometimes a little creativity is the only way to retain a military advantage. That might explain why the cash-strapped North Korean military is building a customized base for huge numbers of assault hovercraft, around 50 miles from a vulnerable South Korean island chain.In any event, Pyongyang’s forward-deployed hovercraft force could represent a real threat against an unprepared South Korea — maybe. The new Japan Security Watch blog has all the details.The new base, in the Koampo area of Hwanghae province on Korea’s west coast, can accommodate up to 70 of North Korea’s estimated 130 Kongbang-class hovercraft, armed with guns and together capable of carrying more than 2,000 soldiers. From Koampo, it’s just an hourlong ride — at hovercraft speeds — to the West Islands.Pyongyang allegedly has a plan for conquering the islands. The idea? “To shell the islands with coastal artillery on a moonless night, render South Korean soldiers at military bases on the islands helpless, then take over the territory with soldiers landing on hovercrafts,” a source told South Korea’s JoongAng Daily.This might seem rather, um, provocative. But in reality, a hovercraft-borne island invasion might not spark a full-blown war — and could even benefit Pyongyang in the short term.North Korea repeatedly attacked the South last year, sinking a patrol boat and shelling a small island. Around 50 South Koreans died in the attacks, but still Seoul refrained from major reprisal — and multiparty talks with Pyongyang remain on track. The lesson for North Korea could be that provocation “extract[s] more concessions,” according to one South Korean columnist.North Korea, the columnist wrote, is on a “bad learning curve.” A hovercraft assault could represent the next lesson. So, are the 70-foot-long Kongbang hovercraft really a serious threat? That depends. Amphibious assaults can be among the most perilous of military maneuvers — so perilous that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps spend billions per year buying specialized ships, fighters, tilt-rotor transports, armored vehicles and, yes, hovercraft tailored for softening up and crossing defended beaches.The hovercraft are fragile and lightly armed, so Pyongyang’s strategy depends on audacity and surprise — and on South Korean permissiveness. The Kongbang class wouldn’t stand a chance against an alert, adequately armed and well-trained defender.But it’s not at all clear that South Korea is ready to repel the next provocation from the North, hovering or otherwise. “We must create battle-ready troops getting fully prepared to fight and win if the enemy provokes us again,” South Korea’s army chief said following Pyongyang’s artillery barrage last year. The implication, of course, is that Seoul’s troops aren’t currently prepared.Beginning this year, Seoul vowed tougher and more realistic training exercises. There’s been no word whether the exercises include the “swarm of hovercraft bearing down on your island under cover of darkness” scenario.---------- Korea’s Kongbang-class ACVBy James Simpson– February 1, 2011Posted in: Analysis, Bases, Hardware, Korea, Navy, News, North Korea, South Korea, amphibious warfare, strategyKoampo, the location of the new hovercraft base, in relation to South Korea points of interest (Adapted from Daniel Sekulich's Modern Day Pirate Tales)According to a Chosun Ilbo report, North Korea have begun construction on a ?combat hovercraft base in the Koampo area of Hwanghae, Province.just 50-60 km from South Korea’s Baeknyeong Island in the Yellow Sea.The base can apparently accommodate up to 70 of North Korea’s hovercraft. Each of the vessels can carry a platoon and travel up to 90 km/h across water and mud flats. Once it is completed, North Korean troops would be able to land on South Korea’s five West Sea islands, including Baeknyeong, in 30 to 40 minutes.Assuming a low-end estimate of 35 soldiers per carrier, that would be a possible amphibious wave of 2450 troops. The base would be able to house almost half of the current estimated total of hovercrafts at North Korea’s disposal. It should be a severely worrying prospect for the South, and particularly for the West Sea islanders.Kongbang ACV (Unknown variant)North Korea is thought to maintain around 130 hovercraft, which would presumably be used to ferry troops onto offshore islands. The most well-known of these is the Kongbang-class air cushion vehicle (ACV), which comes in three variants that can carry between 35-55 marines, depending on who you ask:Kongbang-IKongbang-IIKongbang-IIILength:23m (75.5 ft)21m (68.9 ft)18.5m (60.7 ft)Beam:9m (29.5 ft)8m (26.2 ft)7m (23 ft)Max speed:52 km/h(28 knots)52 km/h(28 knots) 50 km/h(27 knots) Adapted from Global Security: Korea have been holding exercises to practice seizing the five South Korean ‘West Sea’ islands, the very islands put at risk by this new hovercraft base, according to some reports. In their report, JoongAng Daily wrote:North Korea’s plan is to shell the islands with coastal artillery on a moonless night, render South Korean soldiers at military bases on the islands helpless, then take over the territory with soldiers landing on hovercrafts, the source said.Kongbang ACV (Unknown variant)There are only two pictures of these hovercraft available online, but keen-eyed Google Earth users have found them parked on several occasions, such as the shot below: HYPERLINK "javascript://pushin%20hover" 30 yds30 yds? 2011 Microsoft Corporation ? 2010 DigitalGlobe ? 2010 GeoEye ? 2010 Pasco ? 2011 Microsoft Corporation ? 2010 DigitalGlobe ? 2010 GeoEye ? 2010 Pasco 2D3DRoadAerialBird's eyeLabelsSee this location in bird's eye view?Bing Maps 3D has finished updatingIn 2007, the Chosun Ilbo reported that North Korea had developed a new hovercraft to target South Korean high-speed patrol boats.?At 38 m long and 12 m wide, they would be much bigger than the Kongbang-class, but with top speed of 90 km/h (45 knots), they would be far faster. They reportedly have 56 mm and 30 mm machine guns at the head and the stern.In August last year, Arirang TV reported that this new hovercraft had been “caught in a satellite photo off the North’s Daedong River, near the southwestern Nampo City in South Pyeongan Province.”Shin In-kyun, President of the?Korea Defence Network, notes:“It could likely transport medium to large-sized armed forces and tanks. And carrying a 30-milimeter cannon at speeds of at least 45 nautical miles per hour it would be able to raid regardless of the geographical features.”There are currently no publicly-available images of, or further information on this new design; but its development, the construction of the base at Koanpo and the December exercises all demonstrate the Korean People’s Army’s clear move towards expanding its strategic options along the Yellow Sea. With the Yeonpyeong artillery attack so fresh in Seoul’s mind, it should be unsettled by this development and extra effort should be made to develop counter-incursion strategies to defend against the threat this increasing capability poses.---- HYPERLINK "" 110215N.Korea Develops High-Speed Military Hovercraft Chosun Ilbo ^ | 04/02/07 Posted on Sunday, April 01, 2007 9:43:45 PM by TigerLikesRoosterN.Korea Develops High-Speed Military Hovercraft The North Korean Navy has reportedly developed and deployed high-speed military hovercraft. A military source in Seoul said Sunday the North developed the hovercraft with its own technology apparently to target South Korean high-speed patrol boats. The North Korean vessels are 38 m long and 12 m wide with a top speed of 90 km/h. They have 56 mm and 30 mm machine guns at the head and the stern. North Korean hovercraft landing vessels, which are presumed to be similar to Pyongyang’s newly deployed high-speed war hovercraft. South Korean military authorities say they have intelligence that Pyongyang is attempting to export the boats to other Asian countries. North Korea also has 130 hovercraft landing vessels to transport personnel which move at a speed of 50 km/h with 50 people aboard. They are able to ride up the beach and move over mud flats, the South Korean military believes. ----- North Korea Cheonan sinking gets wrist slap from UNNorth Korea agreed to its first talks with the US in a year, and is signaling interest in restarting the six-party talks about nuclear disarmament. By Donald Kirk,?Correspondent / July 12, 2010 A UN Security Council statement that fails to blame North Korea for sinking a South Korean naval vessel may already be reaping diplomatic rewards.At least, that's how North Korea?is playing it. China?and North Korea are moving quickly to try to put the Cheonan sinking behind it.Emboldened by the UN Security Council’s unanimous assent Friday to a statement that “deplores the loss of life and injuries” and “condemns the attack” in which 46 South Korean sailors were killed in March, North Korea agreed Monday to the first talks in more than a year. The talks will be held Tuesday at the border truce village of Panmunjom.Senior North Korean and US military officers, meeting under terms of the Korean War armistice, are expected to discuss the sinking of the South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, as a prelude to broader issues. The North Koreans are sure to repeat oft-stated denials of involvement with the attack while demanding that South Korea call off planned naval exercises with the US that the North has said could lead to war.Analysts agree North Korea came out ahead in wresting a simple statement from the Security Council rather than a strong resolution condemning the North for the attack.North Korea “is right to crow about the UNSC statement,” says Aidan Foster-Carter, a longtime follower of Korean affairs at Leeds University in England. “They sank a ship, and pretty much got away with this act of war.”Return to six-party talks?Mr. Foster-Carter adds, however, that the UN Security Council statement “was the best that could be gotten” in view of Chinese as well as Russian objections. He notes, moreover, that the statement does cite the outcome of the lengthy investigation?in which experts from South Korea and four other countries – the US, Britain, Australia, and Sweden – agreed the North had staged the attack.Mark Fitzpatrick, a former US State Department official, now with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, agrees “the compromise came out entirely because China would not accept a condemnation.” Still, he adds, “it is likely to defuse tensions for the time being.”In what appears to be a calculated campaign to gain diplomatic momentum and international recognition as a nuclear power, North Korea also is expressing an interest in returning to six-nation talks on its nuclear weapons program for the first time since December 2008. North Korea has called for talks “on an equal footing” in order to achieve “denuclearization” of the entire Korean peninsula – the same language the North has used in the run-up to previous agreements.China, as North Korea’s ally and the source of most of its food aid, has also called for resumption of the talks, urging all sides “to remain calm” and “move quickly to the next page of the Cheonan incident.”The Chinese appear still more concerned about antisubmarine warfare exercises that the South Koreans and Americans say they still plan to hold in the waters off South Korea. South Korean defense officials for weeks have been pressing the Americans to agree to stage the exercises in the Yellow Sea, the same general area in which an investigation concluded that a North Korean midget submarine fired the torpedo that sank the Cheonan on March 26.China clearly views any show of force in the Yellow Sea, the large body of water between the Korean Peninsula and the Chinese mainland, as an act of intimidation. As a Chinese Foreign Ministry official put it, China “resolutely opposes” any such activities “that affect China’s security interests.”South Korean officials, responding to complaints from China, now say they may hold the exercises in waters off the Korean Peninsula’s southern or eastern coasts. US officials have said US ships will participate but have yet to confirm whether the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington will lead the flotilla.In any case, US diplomats have been assuring the Chinese the war games are to sharpen the skills of South Koreans in combating North Korean submarine attacks and are not intended to offend Chinese sensitivities. The exercises, even if held in the Yellow Sea, will be well south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), set by the UN Command in South Korea after the Korean War, below which North Korean vessels are banned. The Cheonan was sunk just south of the NLL, in waters that have been the scene of bloody battles between North and South Korean vessels in June 1999 and June 2002.Analysts remain uncertain, however, of the long-range repercussions of compromise in the aftermath of the waffling UN statement and the uncertainty of how to deal with both China and North Korea.“There is a danger,” says Mr. Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “of North Korea drawing the lesson that provocations are cost-free.”Gen. Walter Sharp, commander of the 28,500 US troops in South Korea, agrees. Warning of “more and more provocations,” he said US and South Korean forces had to prepare for “asymmetric” warfare in which North Korea’s ailing leader Kim Jong-il?attempts to assert his authority “through military provocations and threatening neighbors." ................
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