Draft Gl Report



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Original: English

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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

afghanistan: 2014 and beyond

General Report

Sven MIKSER (Estonia)

General Rapporteur

nato-pa.int 12 October 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction 2

II. Assessing the Transition 2

A. EVOLUTION OF THE ISAF MISSION AND SUSTAINED INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT 2

B. TRANSITION PLANS AND ANSF GROWTH 3

C. THE IMPORTANCE – AND LIMITATIONS – OF METRICS 6

III. Addressing the Challenges to a Successful Transition: A Roadmap for NATO’s 2014 Summit 8

A. MAINTAINING ALLIANCE COHESION FOR A SUCCESSFUL SECURITY TRANSITION 8

B. ASSESSING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE AFGHAN FORCES – BEYOND THE NUMBERS 8

C. COMPLETING PLANS FOR THE POST-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION 9

D. BUILDING ON THE ENDURING PARTNERSHIP 10

E. MAINTAINING TRUST 10

IV. sustaining the ansf up to and beyond 2014 11

V. Afghanistan after karzai: addressing governance challenges and democratic oversight of the armed forces 12

A. THE 2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: A CRITICAL MILESTONE 12

B. A RENEWED REFORM AGENDA 14

VI. External factors in Internal Security – Engaging Afghanistan’s Neighbours 14

VII. Maintaining the Peace – the Unknowns of Reconciliation with the Taliban 16

VIII. Conclusions 18

BIBLIOGRAPHY 20

Introduction

1. Afghanistan continues to be a multifaceted challenge for the Alliance. The long-term stability of the country will depend not only on the abilities and capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), but also on political, social and economic progress. To date, Afghan civil society, governance and economic growth need to improve significantly for a stable future state. The disarmament, demobilisation, and reconciliation with existing and future spoilers to the efforts to establish peace on the ground, as well as relationships between and among its regional neighbours, continue to present both short and long-term challenges. The changing shape of these variables will ultimately define the role that NATO coalition and partner forces as well as international organisations play in the region beyond 2014.

2. After nearly 12 years of combat operations, counter-insurgency and state-building efforts, the situation in Afghanistan continues to vex the outside observer. The country is wracked by persistent insecurity, dysfunctional governance, and rampant corruption. Any efforts to build solid standing state institutions confront deeply entrenched ethnic fragmentation which poses significant challenges to construct a viable civil society and coherent, integrated domestic security forces. Still, there is evidence that progress on the ground augurs a better future for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan than many expect.

3. NATO and its partner nations’ forces, along with the myriad national and international organisations attempting to build a viable Afghan state, will need to reinvest politically and economically in 2014 in parallel to the drawdown of combat forces in order to reach a viable status quo for both the majority of the Afghan people, the country’s neighbourhood, as well as the broader international community. Such an effort would require the international community to re-energise governance reform efforts, give a credible commitment to enduring financial support, and continue in its efforts to strengthen and unify the country’s various security services, from the army to the police. The April 2014 elections provide a challenging benchmark for implementing and achieving these goals, the success of which will establish a pathway forward for the state as it works to stand up on its own amidst the drawdown of foreign forces.

4. In line with the agreement reached between President Obama and President Karzai in January 2013, NATO forces reached a critical juncture with the implementation of ‘Milestone 2013’ on 18 June 2013. ‘Milestone 2013’ marked the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) transition to a Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission with its primary function being to train, advise, and assist the ANSF as it assumes full responsibility for the fight against the insurgency. As ISAF continues with its transition to an SFA mission, and NATO’s new Resolute Support mission takes over on 1 January 2015, NATO and its partner nations will be asked to heed the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe’s (SHAPE) call for SFA teams (SFATs) to assist the ANSF levels until they are able to operate independently. To date, the ANSF is in the lead on over 90% of all combat operations (United States Department of Defense (US DoD), July 2013).

5. This report focuses on the inherent challenges facing the ANSF as it is positioned to take over both domestic and external security for the country. It will seek to highlight the progress of the development of the ANSF, while underlining the domestic, regional, and international hurdles it faces. Several critical junctures facing the ANSF and Afghanistan as a whole will be underscored, such as the 2014 elections and the stakes of working toward a negotiated settlement with the Taliban.

6. The deadline for the end of NATO’s combat mission at the end of 2014 is fast approaching, and the transition will be a true test of the international community’s commitment to the long-term stability of Afghanistan. As planning for post-2014 involvement takes place in Brussels and capitals across the Alliance, this report hopes to highlight the imperative of a sustained international commitment to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) – without such a commitment, the broader objectives driving the international actions in Afghanistan over the past 12 years will be at risk of failure.

Assessing the Transition

1 Evolution of the ISAF Mission and Sustained International Commitment

7. The NATO mission in Afghanistan is quickly approaching a critical juncture in the country: the relatively heavy military footprint of ISAF forces will transition away from the battlefront completely and a new mission to train and assist the ANSF will take its place. The official term for the transition to Afghan leadership in the security arena is ‘Inteqal’. Inteqal encapsulates NATO efforts since the 2010 Lisbon Summit (and reaffirmed in Chicago in 2012) to ‘Afghanistanise’ the security situation in the country – as the ANSF stands up, the NATO International Security Assistance Force is standing down.

8. In accordance with the commitments made by both Presidents Obama and Karzai during the Lisbon and Chicago summits, and reaffirmed in their January 2013 meetings, the ANSF took the lead throughout all of Afghanistan in providing security on 18 June 2013 – the turning point was marked as ‘Milestone 2013’. While ISAF’s principal mission is now one of training and support, ISAF will continue to offer key combat and air support, mostly in extremis, through the end of 2014[1].

9. In conjunction with the ‘Milestone 2013’, NATO forces’ primary mission transitioned from combat to Security Force Assistance (SFA). The SFA model calls upon NATO member countries to pledge advisor teams to train, advise, and assist the ANSF at the tactical and operational levels until they are able to conduct operations independently (US DoD, July 2013). The concept of the Security Force Assistance Teams changes the way NATO solicits Allied and partner nation troop contributions: the previous model of allocating geographic responsibility has been replaced by a model focusing on specific ANSF unit sponsorship. SFATs are designed to match the skills of the ANSF unit to which it is assigned, and then each troop-contributing nation determines the composition of the SFAT according to ISAF requirements. SHAPE is currently seeking enough contributions for 460 SFATs, by the time of writing there were approximately 400 SFATs operating in the field (NATO, US DoD July 2013).

10. With the termination of the ISAF mandate in 2014, NATO and its partners will align with the ANSF under the aegis of Operation ‘Resolute Support’. As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated during the 5 June 2013 meeting of Defence Ministers: “The new mission will not be ISAF by another name. It will be different and significantly smaller. Its aim will be to train, advise and assist Afghan forces, not substitute for them” (NATO, 5 June 2013). While NATO Defence Ministers approved of a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for ‘Resolute Support’ on 5 June 2013, the mission’s size and security arrangements have yet to be determined[2] – the shape and scope of the operation will clearly be determined by the progress of the transition, the political and security developments of 2014, as well as the will of the international community.

11. While the security arena lacks a new definitive framework for the status of foreign forces in the country, the 2012 Tokyo Conference produced a framework to define the international community’s continued commitment to a plan for domestic reform and the path toward good governance. The framework calls for a transformative decade of continued support towards Afghanistan’s long-term economic growth and fiscal self-reliance, for an emphasis on the need for greater Afghan effort to combat corruption, and for pledges of financial support. The Mutual Accountability Framework was drawn up to give incentives for achieving and supporting good governance goals and indicators across five areas for both Afghanistan and the international community: ownership, harmonisation, customisation, criticality, transparency and predictability (USGAO, 2013) (Byrd, 2012). As this report will highlight further on, the importance of domestic governance reform in Afghanistan is an essential element of the implementation and continuation of sustainable security sector reform.

2 Transition Plans and ANSF Growth

12. Final decisions regarding the specifics of the operational transition were confirmed by the Afghan Government and in accordance with the recommendations of the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) (NATO, 5 April 2013). Implementation started on 22 March 2011 with the ISAF handover of the first of five tranches, and tranches 2-4 continued apace through the end of 2012. With the transition of tranche four to Afghan security responsibility on 31 December 2012, 87% of the Afghan population was declared to be under the security umbrella of the ANSF. Despite the increased difficulties of incorporating the fourth tranche, as some of the areas were known not to be fully ready for transition, ISAF viewed the incorporation of these areas as an important test for the ANSF, yet it still had the ability to fall back on the substantial resources of ISAF if necessary.

13. As 2013 has advanced, the ANSF has increasingly taken charge of the country’s 34 provinces, and the measured successes of the transition of the first four tranches allowed President Karzai to announce the transition of tranche five (the remaining 91 districts) to come under the ANSF command as the summer progressed. Tranche five is the most difficult geographic region for the GIRoA to incorporate into the operational control area of the ANSF as most of the remaining districts that comprise the fifth tranche are situated along the border with Pakistan.

14. While there have been many success stories associated with the transition, there have been areas that have seen a slower integration process than others, while some have even seen an increase in violence (ICG, 2012). The uneven pace of the programme, however, is teaching valuable lessons to the ANSF, and there is a concerted effort to incorporate these lessons learned into future operations. As may be expected, co-ordination between the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Uniform Police is proving difficult in many transitioned areas, not only due to differences in competencies, but also due to the confusion over the division of tasks and responsibilities. Inteqal is slated to be completed in all provinces by the end of 2014. At this point, the ANSF will be fully responsible for security nationwide, with all of the provinces and districts no longer considered to be in transition but fully incorporated into the ANSF area of operations.

15. The following maps outline the succession of tranches and the locations of the hand-overs from ISAF to Afghan security operations.

|Transition Tranche 1 |Transition Tranche 2 |

|[pic] |[pic] |

|Transition Tranche 3 | |

|[pic] |Transition Tranche 4 |

| |[pic] |

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|Transition Tranche 5 |Source: NATO |

|[pic] | |

16. The GIRoA is targeting a total ANSF force structure of 352,000 persons at full operational capacity; including the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Air Force, and ANA Special Operations Command. Specifically, the ANA makes up around half of the ANSF with troop numbers at around 179,000 in June 2013 (SIGAR, 2013). It is still very much a force in transition, but with a growing number of effective combat elements – known by their Afghan term, Kandaks.[3] The ANA has seven corps the size of US divisions and approximately 45,000 troops (13% of the entire ANSF) assigned to billets in supporting elements. The Afghan National Army is the element of the ANSF which is the least affected by corruption. However, whether it will become a fully developed and operable force by 2014 is dependent on the number of qualified officers and trainers, proper resourcing and equipping, and its interplay with governance (US DoD, December 2012). Further, due to the hefty $6.7 billion price tag associated with the maintenance of such a large force, participants at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago agreed to fund the force at the 352,000 target level until 2017 after which they will work toward a “managed force reduction…to a sustainable level” equalling approximately 228,500 personnel. (NATO Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan).

17. Air power is vital to many security operations in Afghanistan, a capable air force will be a key enabler of the future survival and prosperity of the ANSF. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) currently numbers approximately 6,700 personnel, including aircrew and maintenance and support personnel. The AAF is expected to reach its goal of inducting 8,000 airmen by December 2014, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by 2018 (US DoD, July 2013). With its combination of fixed-wing and rotary aircraft (Cessna 208s; MI-17 and MI-35 Helicopters), the AAF will ultimately need to support all ANSF ground operations – troop movement, airlift operations, and personnel deployment across the country.

18. The AAF pilot training programme currently graduates 100% of its cadets. The success rate, however, is skewed by the relatively high admission standards for the programme; recruits are often denied entry due to the required high levels of literacy, English language understanding, and technical know-how. In addition to the airlift capabilities that the AAF currently trains for, the force is expected to receive its first batch of 20 A-29 Super Tucanos in 2014 to begin training in air combat and strike operations.

19. Due to the abovementioned barriers to entry, the AAF faces greater challenges in recruitment than the ANA or ANP, and will thus take longer to operate independently. Some claim that due to its relatively large budget, it is also the security service the most vulnerable to corruption (Cordesman & Burke, 2013). It is unclear, however, if this has been born out in practice to date.

20. NATO and partner support for the AAF has also recently been boosted, with the NATO-Russia Council’s decision to expand its support by providing training to technicians on more types of helicopters and in new areas such as the development of an AAF medical evacuation capability. The second phase of the NATO-Russia Trust Fund was also launched in spring 2013 in order to provide training for aircraft technicians and to supply required spare parts (NATO, 23 April 2013).

21. The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) comprises the largest component of the Afghan police force, having over 108,000 personnel in 2013, which is approaching the stated goal of 110,279. However, the AUP is widely considered to be ineffective due to its internal divisions, corruption and links to local power brokers. Similar assessments have been made of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) which consisted of approximately 21,500 personnel in mid-2013 (SIGAR, 2013). Porous borders and corrupt policing within the existing border security services is a serious problem not only in terms of lost government revenues, but also in terms of progress in security sector reform writ large. The ABP has been reported to be involved in nefarious activities, ranging from extortion rackets to press-ganging boys into joining insurgent groups. Both the AUP and ABP lack the strong support of the government and the justice system. As a result, they are often either ineffective to absent in areas where the insurgency operates or, worse, co-operating with the insurgents. There are valid fears that after 2014 these institutions might collapse entirely, or come under the control of insurgents and local power brokers.

22. In contrast, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the special police unit branch of the ANP, has proven to be a rather effective paramilitary force and is the only element of ANP consistently capable of co-operating with the ANSF in counter-insurgency operations. Currently ANCOP is made up of around 14,000 personnel, and is strategically loyal to the current central government, but as leadership changes in the 2014 elections, this relationship too may change, which presents a risk to ANSF operational readiness (Cordesman & Burke, 2013).

23. Still, clearly enumerating the current make-up of the ANSF does not tell the entire story. One key variable that has yet to be discussed is the virtual ethnic mosaic from which the ANSF must draw in order to construct a truly diverse Afghan National Security Force. In a country riven by such strong ethnic divisions, the attempts to construct a broad-based ANSF at the ethnic level could progress in one of two essential directions: the ANSF could become a unifying structure for the country, or a dividing force that would permit a Lebanon-like scenario in the event of renewed conflict-meaning the ANSF would splinter and its well-trained and armed ethnic groups would retreat to protect and fight for their ethnic kin (SIGAR, 2013).

24. To prevent the latter scenario, ISAF has made great strides in co-ordinating an ethnic balance in the forces that generally aligns with the national ethnic make-up of the country. Over the past several years it has done so by working to reduce the Tajik domination of command posts in the ANA, a fact widely resented by Pashtuns. In 2008, approximately 70% of Afghan commanders were Tajiks. As of spring 2013, that number has been reduced to 39%. The ANA has also struggled to recruit southern Pashtuns. Their recruitment, however, although still low, has increased over the past two years.

3 The Importance – and Limitations – of Metrics

25. While the plan for the handover looks rather clear cut on paper, the Afghan transition requires a broader security strategy beyond the transfer of ownership of kinetic operations against insurgents. It requires a clear understanding of the constantly evolving security and political situation on the ground, as well as the ability for ISAF planners to detect and understand trends, interpret their meaning, and assess what impact changes and evolutions in operations might have on other elements of stability (i.e. governance, local economies, and allies in local leadership). It is a plan that requires metrics with meaning, rather than just the reporting of rough numbers. Yet so far, the key metrics used have related to levels of violence and ANSF numerical growth.

26. Military analysts have often attempted to assess the success or failure of the Surge and Transition strategies by measuring levels of violence against military forces or civilians. For example, Enemy Initiated Attacks (EIAs), peaked after the 2009 surge, but some reports suggest that their levels began to drop dramatically in 2010, especially those reporting civilian casualties. Further, US DoD reports suggest that improvised explosive attacks have declined by 10%, direct fire attacks have increased by 8%, and indirect fire attacks are down by 26% (US DoD, 2013). Potentially of strategic importance, the latest US DoD report shows that there has been a sharp decline in the ISAF-caused civilian casualties. These have declined by 60%, whereas insurgent-caused civilian casualties increased by 2% (US DoD, 2013).

27. However, a detailed analysis of these trends, conducted by the US Government Accountability Office (USGAO, 2013), shows that although the numbers of attacks on coalition forces went down in the latter half of 2012, insurgents maintained a steady pace of attacks by shifting from ISAF targets to the softer ANSF and civilian targets. This correlates with insurgency tactics that strive to undermine the local population’s trust in foreign forces, foreign-trained national forces, and other governmental institutions. In the first quarter of 2013, the number of attacks by the Taliban and other insurgent forces greatly increased. An independent study by the Afghan NGO Safety Office suggests that there was a 47% increase in attacks during this time period, since the first quarter of 2012, and that 73% of these attacks were against Afghan security or government targets (Norland, 2013).

28. The rise in the number of attacks on the ANSF and other GIRoA targets is likely due to several factors. First, as ISAF forces draw down in the country, their reduced footprint makes them more difficult to target. Second, as the ANSF assumes responsibility for country-wide security and counter-insurgency operations, it is exposed to far greater risk of attack. Third, as the Taliban has slowly been in retreat, losing forces, and generally diminished after years of attrition, it is likely realising that it has failed in its original mission of defeating the foreign forces. As a recent US DoD report notes: “The enemy [Taliban] is now less capable, less popular and less of an existential threat to the Afghan government than in 2011.” (US DoD, 2013). As a result, it is likely shifting its tactics to undermine the ability of the foreign-funded Afghan government to provide security, and thereby undercut its credibility in the eyes of the population.

29. Just as levels of violence have proven to be an ambiguous metric, ‘security’ is also a challenging condition to measure. NATO’s current training mission NTM-A has thus far focused on the inputs to ANSF capability – how many personnel have been recruited and are at some level of training, equipping, and readiness. Quantitative goal posts are certainly useful in force-building exercises, which the transition is, to some extent. However, a simple enumeration of the various component parts of the Afghan forces cannot provide a clear understanding of whether or not these forces are able take over responsibility for control of territory, carry out the will of the government, or hold the trust of the population. Questions remain about the ANSF’s ability to produce a strategically sound use of force, to “make effective use of tactics like night raids, air strikes, detentions, and other measures which require careful balance between military effectiveness and the political and popular impact of the tactics involved” (Cordesman & Burke, 2013). Further, it seems that the ANSF is still quite challenged when it comes to providing its own units operational support, air control, and specialised assistance (IED detection for example) (ICG October 2012, The Economist 2013). As such, it remains to be seen if the ANSF has the capability and credibility as a fighting force against the Taliban and as a security provider for the Afghan people.

30. This is not to say that metrics on the input side of the equation hold no value. These numbers do matter, especially when reporting basic trends to Allied governments and the public. However, transition operations are made up of multiple layers of tactical and operational successes, each which builds upon the last. Thus, during this last critical year of transition, understanding the ‘output’ – how capable the Afghan forces are against insurgents in the field – is essential. If the metrics for transition continue to look solely at manpower produced by NTM-A, rather than striving to understand failures (or potential weaknesses) in their capabilities, the risk of handing over operational control before the Afghan forces are ready becomes very high.

31. ANSF forces have only recently become operational as a standalone fighting force. This development has allowed ISAF and the US DoD to begin to measure and report what appears to be a potentially more useful point of evaluation: the level of ISAF-led vs. ANSF-led operations. In many respects, this appears to be more of a ‘good news story’ (as it is claimed that the ANSF is leading between 85% and 95% of all combat operations in the country) than any kind of useful metric by which to value the effectiveness of the ANSF operations themselves. The reason being that there is no real indication as of yet to understand the level of difficulty or success of these operations.

32. However, it is vitally important to note that regardless of the “readiness” of the ANSF under ISAF’s metrics, it will ultimately be the Government of Afghanistan which will put their forces to the test. It will be the Afghans who define the political aims and thus the strategic and military strategies pursued by the ANSF. The Afghans will decide whether to continue to fight insurgents, and if they do, the Afghan government will decide which forces are appropriate and the manner in which they will be used.

Addressing the Challenges to a Successful Transition: A Roadmap for NATO’s 2014 Summit

1 Maintaining Alliance Cohesion for a successful Security Transition

33. Over the past decade the numbers and types of troops committed by each Allied and partner nation have fluctuated as the situations on the ground and at home have changed. Between 1 March and 30 September 2012 the United States reduced its combat forces by 25% in Afghanistan in accordance with the planned withdrawal of ‘surge’ forces and the transition, while the other coalition forces ahead of schedule grew slightly over the same time period. While France withdrew its combat forces due to domestic pressures, the United States, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, currently providing the bulk of the combat and training forces, do not plan to reduce their numbers ahead of their currently scheduled redeployments. While France’s withdrawal of all of is combat troops in November 2012 caused some operational stress, American forces are in the process of assuming full responsibility of the Kapisa and Sarobi Provinces, as well as a particularly challenging district in Kabul province previously commanded by the French.

34. According to the drawdown plan, the number of coalition forces by the end of 2013 will be 98,000, another 45,000 will be withdrawn in the first half of 2014 with the goal of reaching only 12,000 to fulfil the obligations of Operation Resolute Support by the end 2014. However the Allies still need to agree and to commit to providing a reserve force to protect the ‘train and assist’ troops should security deteriorate post-2014.

35. There is a strong sense that for the transition strategy to be successful, NATO’s withdrawal must be a phase-out, not a walk-out (Coffery, 2012). The Allies agreed at the 2012 Chicago Summit to strengthen their commitments to the mission and that they would not use the transition from ISAF to Afghan control of security as an excuse to leave Afghanistan prematurely. The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreements between both the United States and NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan outlined the dual-pledge to designate Afghanistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. While this status does not entail specific security commitments to the country, it qualifies Afghanistan for certain privileges supporting defence and security co-operation and is another institutional tie between the Government of Afghanistan and NATO.

2 Assessing the Capabilities of the Afghan Forces – Beyond the Numbers

36. As detailed above, although there is a structured timeline under which the transition of territory from NATO to ANSF control continues to take place, the handover of responsibility is contingent upon a ‘conditions-based’ approach. These conditions have previously been defined by force building metrics – numbers of Afghan Army and Police forces recruited and trained – rather than by a more comprehensive assessment of their capabilities. A more qualitative and comprehensive evaluation would look at the ANSF units’ ability to operate effectively within their areas of responsibility, taking into account the impact that local governance can have on corruption within the ANSF ranks as well as the forces’ connections to insurgency in the area (e.g. are the local forces able to contain insurgents through military means or are there other ethnic or tribal forces at play?).

37. The ANSF does not operate in a vacuum and so an important component of Afghan force effectiveness will continue to be tied to effective governance. Weak local governance can undermine Afghan forces’ ability to provide security to the population because it reinforces corruption, local power brokers (warlords) in its area of operations, and can even benefit insurgents’ fighting against Afghan forces in the region.

38. A key consideration is whether or not the ANSF can provide safety and security to the majority of the Afghan population, in a way that ideally supports, or at least does not undermine, legitimate governance. Without the understanding of the relationship between the Afghan Security Forces and governance, ISAF will ultimately fail in its mission to use security to provide ‘breathing space’ for good governance and stability to take hold. On the other end of the spectrum, the ANSF cannot succeed without long-term Afghan leadership and national unity. Ethnic divisions also come into play as they present the risk of ethnically defined lines of patronage, encourage corruption, and may exacerbate ethnic tensions and fractionalise the forces at the critical 2014 juncture.

3 Completing Plans for the Post-2014 Resolute Support Mission

39. A key factor in determining the size and shape of the international forces operating in Afghanistan post-2014 will be the resolution of the long-awaited Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and Afghanistan. The BSA is intended to replace the 2003 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and the GIRoA and will be the legal framework for the continued presence of US forces in the country after 2014 (US DoD, 2013). It should be clear, however, that the BSA will not define the number of US forces in the country after 2014, but rather the activities in which they would engage; such as training and assisting the ANSF, counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda, etc. It is unlikely that an agreement on the BSA will be reached before the end of the year, or even before the April 2014 elections, making the resolution of a post-2014 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) an elusive key variable to understanding the future relationship between the GIRoA and foreign forces. In parallel to the US-Afghan negotiations of the BSA, NATO is attempting to negotiate a separate SOFA with the GIRoA for the forces supporting the post-2014 Operation Resolute Support. A resolution of the BSA will certainly serve as a framework for a SOFA between NATO and Afghanistan, and is therefore seen as the key variable to defining the presence of foreign forces in the country after 2014 writ large.

40. Although NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen has reiterated that “more detailed decisions” are expected later this year, ISAF has not outlined a more detailed mission for its forces beyond training of the ANSF for after the end of combat operations (Millham, 2013). And perhaps more critically, because the Alliance’s post-2014 training mission will not proceed without an agreement with the Afghan government defining the status of foreign troops, it is unclear which specific capabilities will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 to support the Afghan forces. As such, it appears that there is some risk that the same complications that the United States faced in negotiating a final Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq are present in Afghanistan. In Iraq the lack of agreement led the United States to pull its forces out of that country completely and along an unanticipated and unplanned for abrupt timeline at the end of 2011. The status of any continued mission for NATO in Afghanistan post-2014 is entirely dependent on a Status of Forces Agreement authorised by the GIRoA.

41. This is crucial to take into consideration as it will dictate not what types of outside support will be required (in the form of airpower, intelligence, logistics, support elements, and further specialised training), but what types of outside support will be allowed in the country at all. Anders Fogh Rasmussen has appeared optimistic, however, that such an agreement will come into being, and, as noted above, that the US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement might serve as a guideline for a broader Status of Forces Agreement between NATO and the Afghan government.

42. As it is more than just a transition strategy, NATO needs to work towards defining its post-2014 mission as swiftly as possible, so that individual Allies can go about resourcing this mission appropriately. Lack of a clear strategic direction, while relying on a strong operational justification, makes Allied governments more vulnerable to public pressure, and calls for shifting resources elsewhere. As discussed further below, the ANSF will continue to require substantial support, particularly through the provision of key enabling capabilities. The sooner member states can assess these requirements and explain them to war-weary publics, the greater the odds that they will be able to maintain support for an on-going commitment.

43. Allied governments should be encouraged to reinvest a portion of their ‘peace dividend’ into the sustainment of both the ANSF and the Afghan government. This will, of course, be challenging for leaders who must answer to impatient and war-weary publics. But it is only with stable, long-term, and concrete investment that trust can be built, and the strategic aims of NATO and partner states can be achieved: that Afghanistan will not again become a safe-haven for terrorism. Achieving this goal is a job that requires the attention and investment of not just NATO, but the international community as a whole.

4 Building on the Enduring Partnership

44. NATO leaders moving forward with negotiations about the size and scope of NATO assistance to Afghanistan after the 2014 force withdrawal deadline should be focused on what amounts to a strategic re-investment in the country. Post-2014 Afghanistan should be seen as an arena to reap the dividends of over a decade of investment in the institutions of the new Afghan state. The benefits of stable and enduring partnership between NATO and the GIRoA will be felt not only in Afghanistan and among is neighbours, but throughout the international system.

45. By working with the GIRoA as an equal partner, NATO and its partners will create a mutually-beneficial relationship based on trust. The enduring partnership provides a longer-term political framework for co-operation at the security, political, economic, and civil society levels. In practice, this has meant the following:

- Capacity-building efforts in both political and security institutions through the Building Integrity Programme to foster better civil military relations, counter corruption through the promotion of good governance initiatives, and develop professional military education;

- The ‘Afghan First’ initiative which helps to identify Afghan companies eligible for ISAF contracts;

- Assistance with the civil aviation sector to conform to international standards;

- The provision of affordable high-speed Internet access to Afghan government institutions and universities under the SILK-Afghanistan programme; and,

- Training and equipping of the domestic civil emergency and disaster response preparedness.

NATO and its partners must continue to support such programmes and even expand the breadth and depth of such co-operation in the future.

maintaining trust

46. While Hamid Karzai has always been a mercurial figure, he has recently elevated his rhetoric to a new level, going so far as to declare that that recent attacks against Afghan forces and government personnel proved that the Taliban “are at the service of America” (The Christian Science Monitor, 2013). The implication was clear, though the logic confounding: terrorists were colluding with the United States to sow chaos before America’s planned withdrawal in 2014. The use of the West as a rhetorical target may become even more pronounced and widespread as the election approaches and contenders for the Afghan presidency feel the need to assert their independence from foreign actors. Allied governments must do what they can to mitigate such rhetoric as it may ultimately undermine the tenuous trust that the Afghan population currently has in the West to stay the course, as well as – equally importantly – the trust that public opinion in NATO member states has in the mission.

47. On an operational level for military forces, this trust deficit has been caused by a steep rise in insider attacks in 2012. These attacks accounted for 13% of ISAF deaths in 2012 and had an adverse impact on the Coalition mission – causing the suspension of the Afghan Local Police training mission in the autumn of 2012 and an overhaul of the vetting process for police recruitment. The steep rise in the number of these attacks was both an indicator and a cause of sharp tensions between the ISAF forces and their ANSF partners. The reasons behind the attacks are far-ranging and somewhat ambiguous; varying from cultural misunderstandings, vendettas, Taliban infiltration, to simply the strain and stress of combat on sometimes poorly prepared soldiers. The greatest risk of the attacks, in addition to unnecessary bloodshed, is that they foster behaviours that create barriers between forces whose entire aim is to operate ‘shoulder to shoulder’.

48. There is a substantial risk for the ‘trust deficit’ that has grown between Afghan and ISAF security forces, and between the Afghan Government and the West, derailing post-2014 NATO plans. This deficit is particularly worrisome, as the transition is founded on a strategy which gives more and more responsibility to the Afghans, and requires more and more trust from the West in how governmental programmes and military operations will be pursued. The importance of working to create a strong sense of trust and co-operation, therefore, cannot be underestimated.

sustaining the ansf up to and beyond 2014

49. This latest transition process will produce not only a major economic and military transformation, but also the end of a political era (Felbab-Brown, November 2012). As ISAF forces hand over security responsibility to their Afghan counterparts, there is great risk that foreign aid and development spending will decrease markedly, just at the point when Afghanistan’s nascent political processes will be tested to the fullest extent, especially during the April 2014 presidential election. It is vital that Allies and partner countries have the tenacity to maintain their support at this critical time.

50. As mentioned above, the dynamics between civilian institutions and the ANSF are crucial to the capabilities of the military forces, particularly regarding the funding and resourcing of the force. There has been a historic pattern of both erratic and insufficient funding of the ANSF by outside states, which originally led to shortfalls in areas such as ISAF trainers and payments to ANSF personnel.

51. As it stands, future funding for the ANSF is somewhat uncertain. The Chicago Summit produced a funding plan, which included both Afghan government and international funding pledges through 2017, aimed at funding the estimated USD 4.1 billion cost of the planned 228,500 ANSF personnel. Currently the amount pledged to support the ANSF between 2015 and 2017 falls short by some USD 1.8 billion (USGAO, 2013).

52. NATO political leadership decided to review the manner in which its special allocation fund will be used in order to ensure the continued funding of the ANA after 2014. (Europe Diplomacy and Defence, 25 April 2013). Pledges made at the 24 April NATO Defence Minister meeting focused on greater transparency and efficient management of the fund – with the hope that better management of these funds would persuade a greater number of the 50-nation ISAF coalition to pay up to one billion USD annually beginning in 2015 and with an unspecified end date. The Foreign Ministers of the NATO member states and other ISAF partners came to an agreement that NATO’s special allocation fund should be adapted in four areas: expenditure (budget support of forces instead of material support); planning and commitment process (timetables for the payment of contributions, greater control on the part of the donors to the annual budget of the Afghan Ministry of Defence); reporting and monitoring (creation of a donors’ council); and the production of an audit (by NATO’s international college of audit commissioners) (Europe Diplomacy and Defence, 25 April 2013).

53. Currently only 23 of the potential states participate in the fund, and their contributions range from 166 million EUR from Germany, to less than a thousand EUR from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*.[4]These changes and institutional oversight measures will hopefully convince some of the 27 ISAF partners that do not currently donate to the fund to participate in the years to come. Still, it should be noted that participation in funding the ANSF is in the interest of the entire international community, not just NATO/ISAF nations. The former Taliban government’s support of international terrorism by giving sanctuary to al-Qaeda drove coalition forces in to protect an important international norm: rejecting state sponsorship of terrorism. As the coalition continues to build up the ANSF to provide a local guarantor that the state will not become a wellspring for regional or global terrorism again, every state that can do so should work to support this effort.

54. The Afghan Government itself has committed to devoting at least USD 500 million of its annual budget to funding the ANSF, which, however, would only cover little more than 12% of the cost of the forces as they currently stand. In addition to the dynamic between governance and the security forces, consistent funding of the ANSF will likely be a determinant variable upon which the success or collapse of the entire institution itself depends.

55. ANSF force levels are not the only personnel numbers in question. The top line goal of 352,000 does not include plans for 30,000-40,000 Afghan Local Police, 11,000-23,000 Afghan Public Protection Force personnel, and an unknown number of paramilitary forces (militias) receiving some sort of government funding. These forces are potentially problematic, in that their loose connections to government resources, their close relations with local power players, and their less than strong institutionalisation have the potential to produce organised and equipped insurgents, rather than forces which support legitimate strategic aims.

56. In operation, the ANSF is holding its own against the insurgent forces. They have not lost any major bases or district centres during their independent operations, and can now claim to be responsible for 90% of all fielded operations and protecting over 90% of the population. The Ministries of Defence and Interior are also fully responsible for 85% of ANSF training.

57. The ANA’s main challenge in equipping its units continues to be the delivery of equipment from depots to the units deployed in the field. By the end of ISAF’s mission in 2014, US and coalition enabler support (close air support, medevac, direct fire, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) to the ANSF will be withdrawn, creating gaps which, if not addressed, will reduce the GIRoA’s ability to provide security for its populace and deter external threats. Many of the problems facing the ANSF are the result of a lack of basic training, communication, and confidence in the existing system and chain of command (US DoD, July 2013).

Afghanistan after karzai: addressing governance challenges and democratic oversight of the armed forces

A. THE 2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: A CRITICAL MILESTONE

58. The 5 April 2014 presidential and provincial council elections and the 2015 parliamentary elections are momentous for several reasons. If organised in line with the Tokyo framework obligations as ‘credible, inclusive and transparent’ the Afghan government will show to the Afghan people that it has both the legitimacy and capacity to take the country forward. This is very important for achieving internal cohesion since only 39% of Afghans report some degree of satisfaction with how democracy works in the country (SIGAR, July 2013). Moreover, the fair elections will prove that the Afghan political leaders are prepared to employ democratic practices, contrary to the fears that dysfunctional governance, rampant corruption and ethnic fractionalisation are diminishing the decade long efforts of the international community. If Afghanistan does not demonstrate a satisfactory level of democratic progress, the future support from the international community, be it political, financial or military, will be put into question.

59. However, it will be a perilous path towards functioning democracy for Afghanistan as many obstacles remain. The lack of developed political parties’ narrative, the limited institutional capacities and legal lacunae are challenges that need to be addressed. The political situation is rather complex since the power games are bringing to the surface a very ethnically and ideologically diverse set of political actors. This elevates the risks that any pre-election displays of political strength may devolve into violence (ICG, 2013). As President Karzai is legally barred from standing in the elections, his absence is creating the space for bargaining, coalitions and alliances. At the time of writing, no official contenders had been announced even though the candidates are to register their nominations between 16 September and 6 October 2013. In spite of his declared impartiality, it is clear that the influence of the acting president should not be disregarded. His support for close collaborators such as Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a former mujahideen in the war against the Soviet Union, legislator and religious scholar from the ultra-strict Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam (Tribune express, 2013) or his older brother Qayum Karzai, a businessman residing in the US will definitely set the tone of the elections (Washington post, 2013). Other names are also floating about, Umer Daudzai, an ethnic Pashtun, and the current Afghan ambassador to Pakistan (Tribune express, 2013) and the former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah (Washington Post, 2013).

60. Success in 2014 will set a precedent for future elections, and a strong commitment to pluralism in 2014 would help lend legitimacy to the planned 2015 parliamentary elections (ICG, 2013). This would require a comprehensive legal reform which entails moderate party regulation and the establishment of functioning electoral bodies. The overregulation of past election rounds has diminished the capacity of a significant number of political parties to participate in elections, thus excluding most of the moderate political movements and emerging youth organisations, and limiting the choices to the biggest former mujahidin parties (ICG, June 2013). For example, 700 registered members were required for a party to be officially registered in 2003, in 2009 that number was increased to 10,000. Further, given the short nine month compliance period, only 5 parties fulfilled the requirements for the 2010 elections. Such requirements encourage the creation of dubious membership lists.

61. It is no surprise that the political party scene in Afghanistan is a dynamic one given the immensely complex history, ethnic diversity and fragmented society along ideological and cultural lines. Regardless of the regulatory hurdles for political activity, Afghanistan has powerful parties represented in the Parliament. The largest is Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan, the dominant Tajik party active in northern Afghanistan, followed by Junbish-i-Meli-Islami Afghanistan, which represents the Uzbek enclaves of the north and currently is in opposition to Karzai. The Afghan Millat party is supported by mostly educated urban Pashtuns in the East and is one of the rare parties to hold internal elections. The Hizb-e Islami, which started off as an armed opposition group, is now functioning as a hybrid organisation with an insurgent wing that is fighting international forces, and a political party with its members at the highest levels of government (ICG, 2013).

62. In spite of this diversity, co-operation is possible when political interests intersect, such as in the case of the electoral reform. The Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan (CCPPCA) is a strong and diverse opposition block formed in 2012 mostly by former mujahidin group leaders including former communists, emerging politicians and prominent Karzai aids. This alliance was instrumental in pushing forward the electoral reform and the timely publishing of the electoral calendar. However, it should be noted that the Taliban have shown little enthusiasm for entering party politics and are still inclined to pursue their goals on the battlefield.

63. Important progress was achieved in early July 2013 with the adoption of the new Electoral Law. This law did not remove the highly criticised Single Non-Transferrable Vote system but it made significant changes to the women representation in provincial councils setting a 20% quota. The electoral architecture was strengthened with the adoption of the Law on the Duties and Structures of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC). These laws are to provide for a more independent IEC, an impartial complaints mechanism and transparent and fair elections. The IEC already started registering voters in all 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces in May 2013 which already is a challenging endeavour. According to estimates there are 17.5 million voter cards in circulation out of which 6 million belong to illegitimate voters. The problem was to be solved with the issuing of E-Tazkira, a single electronic national identification card, but the limited time and capacity of the distribution centres and the persisting security issues render this plan unfeasible (ICG, 2013).

64. Probably the most problematic issue for both Afghanistan and the Alliance is providing security for the forthcoming election rounds. The task is to secure 17,000 polling centres and the Ministry of Interior is in the process of developing a province by province security plan. The ISAF will be prepared to provide assistance if requested (logistics, route clearance and other security related tasks, ISAF will deploy rapid reaction forces to protect international observers and in the event that security deteriorates and the ANSF is not able to establish authority) (US DoD, 2013).

B. A RENEWED REFORM AGENDA

65. As NATO winds down its combat mission, the need for good governance becomes paramount in order to promote and reinforce a stable transition in Afghan leadership. “A repeat of previous election chaos and chicanery would trigger a constitutional crisis, lessening the chances that the present political dispensation can survive the transition” (ICG, 2012). Both the United States and the UN report that there has been “progress in the capacity of Afghan institutions to provide services, but significant deficiencies remain” (Katzman, 2013). The “EU has committed for the long term,” suggested Andreas Fischer-Barnicol, of the European External Action Service, at a recent event on the future of Afghanistan (SDA, 2013). The EU and UN are certainly oriented to take on a greater role in institution building. If they were to do so, this would help to assuage fears in Allied capitals as well as in Kabul, as the nascent political processes begin to take hold.

66. Recent assessments by Allied governments gauge that the risk of ethnic fracturing either during, or after the 2014 election and the NATO hand-off, is quite high. A fraudulent election or a clearly corrupt future leader would also provide good reason for many NATO members and their partners to withdraw financial support post-2014. This cannot be the case. A renewed reform agenda, building on the existing platforms outlined in the discussion of the NATO-Afghanistan enduring partnership above must be a priority. Good governance is the sine quo non of a functioning and durable Afghan state – no government institutions will endure without it.

External factors in Internal Security – Engaging Afghanistan’s Neighbours[5]

67. Afghanistan’s relationships with its neighbours will impact internal security in a number of ways: from financing of insurgent groups, to shaping its nascent foreign policy, to the growth of the economy. Analysts agree that a stronger Afghan state is the best guarantee against any predominant foreign influence in the country (The Economist, 2013). While many of Afghanistan’s neighbours may become involved in the state’s development through economic, transport, and even energy initiatives, Pakistan, China, and India have possibly the greatest influence and stake in the realm of security.

68. Historical complexities and relationships between segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations make the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan especially fraught. Pashtuns, on both sides of the Afghan–Pakistani border, are supportive of their Taliban tribesmen and the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains unrecognised by Kabul.

69. However, several attempts have been made to build a more productive working relationship with Pakistan. In early February 2013 Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari met in London at the invitation of British Prime Minister David Cameron. The meeting resulted in an agreement by the countries to co-operate on a peace agreement with the Taliban within six months. Both parties have identified mutual interests in working towards a stable region with each dreading the possibility of increased insecurity upon the withdrawal of foreign combat troops. Pakistan will certainly be essential in the efforts to bring militants to the negotiating table. It should be clear, however, that Pakistan’s support for the negotiations will also depend on how its own interests are reflected in any final settlement.

70. Although entities within Pakistan, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (IS), have periodically supported various branches of the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan government now fears that Afghanistan will provide refuge for terrorist groups targeting the Pakistani state. This fear of Afghan-sponsored terrorism may potentially prevail to some extent over the traditional Pakistani anxieties about India’s influence in Afghanistan or the resurgence of Pashtun territorial claims (Grare, 2013).

71. Following the Pakistan elections in May 2013, however, Afghan-Pakistani relations have entered a new and highly welcomed phase of co-operation. In late August 2013, President Karzai met his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif and both officials acknowledged their joint interests in bringing peace to the region. Karzai noted that previous meetings with Pakistani officials had not helped improve security in Afghanistan but that efforts to do so must continue. Pakistan’s assistance in the talks with the Taliban is instrumental to the overall regional stability and both Karzai and Sharif expressed commitment to the inclusive, Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace and reconciliation process (BBC, 2013).

72. Other than Pakistan, China is likely to be the greatest regional player in Afghanistan’s future. Though the two countries share a comparatively miniscule forty-six mile (75 km) long border, China has significant economic investments in the country’s mineral resources with its myriad mining operations. In addition, China has a great stake in Afghanistan’s security and stability and the country’s co-operation vis-à-vis Chinese separatist movements (Wagner & Cafiero, 2013). The Chinese are very concerned with potential external support to Ughur separatists, the safety of Chinese workers in Afghanistan, and narcotics trafficking into western China. Xinjiang Province, which borders Afghanistan, is home to millions of Muslim Ughurs who have been seeking an independent homeland in Western China for decades. Ughur separatist groups could use the porous borders to establish sanctuaries for training, planning, and launching attacks inside of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

73. Criminal groups in alliance with the Taliban organise the regional heroin trade and traffic narcotics throughout China. Thus China has an interest in ensuring that they do not return to power. Efforts to improve Afghan-Sino bilateral relations were strengthened with the signing of a Declaration on Cooperation on Security Measures in 2012, with a stated objective of combatting "terrorism, separatism and extremism" which clearly reflects Beijing's concerns about turmoil in Afghanistan creating instability in Xinjiang (Wagner & Cafiero, 2013).

74. China maintains a strict policy of non-involvement with ISAF security operations, but it has provided ANSF personnel with a variety of non-lethal, China-based training. China has also offered basic, advanced, and senior military courses for ANSF officers at Peoples’ Liberation Army military training colleges and universities (US DoD, 2012). Since 2002, China has committed only approximately USD 180 million in aid to the Afghan government, and in 2009, Beijing announced that it would provide an additional USD 75 million over the next five years (US DoD, 2012).

75. These investments have been criticised as China acting as an economic ‘free-rider’ on the NATO-led efforts to stabilise Afghanistan. Critics also point out that China is benefiting from a public good – security – provided by the United States and its partners in Afghanistan, and to which it has not contributed (Downs, 2012). However, China’s investments in Afghanistan are not inimical to the international community’s interest in building a stable and developed Afghanistan (Downs, 2012). Still, the PRC government could do much more to help the GIRoA, even if it only viewed such an effort as a means of safeguarding its investments.

76. As India’s economic and military power continues to rise, New Delhi is very interested in maintaining peace and stability in its neighbourhood (Balachandar, 2012). India has historic cultural ties to the Afghan people dating back centuries. In terms of concrete co-operation with Afghanistan, New Delhi, thus far, has supported a variety of high-visibility projects and initiatives, such as the funding and construction of a new Afghan Parliament building and the investments in the energy sector, and according to recent public opinion surveys the Afghans favour the Indian presence in their country. India has provided very limited support to the ANSF in the form of scholarships for officers and senior personnel to study in India (US DoD, December 2012).

77. Recently, Indian diplomats have indicated that New Delhi may look towards other (hard-power) options if Afghanistan appears that it may once again become a safe haven for terrorists. There is also the view that if the Taliban were to attempt to take power post-2014 by force, then “India would reassess what its approach would be" and may resort to the idea of supporting another “Northern Alliance” against a “Talibanised” Afghan government (Hindustan times, 2013).

78. New Delhi has also been accused of using the strained Afghanistan-Pakistan relations to advance its own issues with Pakistan. If India wants to avert this claim, it must accept the realities of post-2014 Afghanistan and at least tacitly accept the legitimacy of all interested parties’ involvement in the process - including the Taliban. India will have to acknowledge Pakistan's legitimate interests and welcome the prospects of a genuine reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a crucial aspect of the stability of its North-Western frontiers (Mohan, 2013).

79. The transition is perceived by some as a key opportunity for more vibrant trilateral economic and political co-operation between New Delhi, Islamabad and Kabul, which would have beneficial impact on the whole region (Mohan, 2013). However, Pakistan has expressed strong opposition to the creation of any sort of regional body to oversee the economic and security situation in Afghanistan (Mohan, 2013).

Maintaining the Peace – the Unknowns of Reconciliation with the Taliban

80. The engagement with the Taliban at the bargaining table is an equally important tool as the growing strength and capacity of Afghan forces is applying pressure on the insurgency. As Stephen Biddle, professor of political science and international relations at George Washington University, noted in a May 2013 address to the NATO PA in Luxemburg, the war in Afghanistan will not end in theatre of combat, but rather on the negotiating table. It is clear by now that the decisive defeat of the Taliban is not feasible by the end of 2014, making the ANSF goal of commanding full control of the areas still under Taliban control very unlikely. As noted above, however, the Taliban has likely come to a parallel understanding that it will not be able to defeat the ANSF either. Years of counterinsurgency operations by the coalition of foreign forces and now the ANSF have left the Taliban in strategic retreat, with less capable forces than ever before in the conflict. As such, both sides in the conflict are at a standstill, with neither side capable of delivering a knockout blow to the other.

81. As the 2014 transition is irreversible, now is the time to push even harder against the Taliban and thereby force it to negotiate. NATO governments planning for post-2014 Afghanistan must realise that once the ISAF leaves, the Taliban will continue to fight. In the face of continued conflict, the ANSF will depend on substantial financial injection from the Allies. For the war-weary domestic populations and spending conscious governments of NATO members, this is a less-than-desirable outcome.

82. As such, a hard pill to swallow for all parties involved will be the inevitable realisation that negotiating with the Taliban is likely the only real solution to a durable peace in Afghanistan. There is no doubt, negotiating with the Taliban will be a challenging process which will ask for patience, tact and difficult concessions by all the parties involved. As Biddle noted, the unfortunate reality that the Alliance will face is that the negotiations will likely erase some of the gains the international effort in Afghanistan has produced, particularly in terms of human rights.

83. To date, Kabul has been very cautious in its engagement with the insurgents, as memories of the Taliban’s ruthless rule are still very present in many parts of the country. The Taliban on the other hand are embroiled in internal fighting among members and factions, between those who reject the peace process until international forces leave the territory and others who see reconciliation as a tool to regain political power and influence in Afghanistan. These factors underscore the high hurdles of getting both sides to the negotiating table.

84. The United States has actively participated in the efforts for establishing the talks between the Karzai-appointed High Peace Council (HPC) and Taliban representatives. Initially, the opening of the Qatar office of the Taliban was seen as a potentially positive step forward to finding a representative body for the Taliban in future negotiations, but this was almost immediately undercut by the raising of the Taliban flag and placement of a nameplate outside the office denoting the "Political Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." Such a reference to the name of Afghanistan when it was under Taliban rule from 1996-2001 provoked Karzai to pull out of the negotiations. Even though the Taliban have removed the provocative nameplate, the episode underscores the very tentative and sensitive nature of any future attempts to negotiate. In light of this, NATO allies should employ additional energy to deliver a coherent settlement proposal to both sides, as well as prepare themselves internally for the possible concessions that may come out of the negotiations.

85. There is an active Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme in the country: Insurgents are offered a chance to reintegrate back into society through the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) established in June 2010. The APRP is managed by the HPC and executed at the national level by the Joint Secretariat (JS). The HPC and JS work with the Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs) and Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) to execute the programme at the provincial level effectively. The crucial aspect of the APRP is the offer of grievance resolution, which helps the former soldiers to deal with the atrocities of the war and keeps them from returning to the insurgency (US DoD, December 2012). Since the establishment of the APRP in 2010, 6,277 former fighters participated in the programme (US DoD, July 2013).

86. The APRP is a costly programme and international donors have pledged USD 220 million. Twelve nations provided funding thus far: United States, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Australia, Finland, Estonia and South Korea. The bulk of the funds came from Japan (USD 52 million) and the United States (USD 50 million) (ISAF NATO, 30 August 2013). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provides financial oversight for the programme and helps manage the Peace & Reintegration Trust Fund.

Conclusions

87. Three themes should guide NATO and its partner nations as they move to negotiate their future relationship with Afghanistan – Reinvestment, Partnership, and Consolidation. Alliance members must strive to view the negotiation of the post-2014 agreements with Afghanistan not just as something they must find room for in their budgets, but rather as an opportunity to reinvest in the future of the Afghan state they have helped stand up over the last decade. A reinvestment in Afghanistan will allow for a successful partnership that will help consolidate gains made over the past 13 years – a mutually beneficial prospect for all. To get to this level of desired co-operation, the international community must establish clear and achievable benchmarks for the continued evolution in the strength, transparency, and efficacy of all Afghan state institutions, particularly the ANSF as it serves as the bedrock upon which the future viability of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is founded.

88. Discussions are currently taking place within NATO’s military structure and within Allied capitals as to the level and type of support that will be provided to Afghan institutions and the NATO mission post-2014. Parliaments and contributing governments must understand that the interplay between the development of functioning political institutions and the evolution of the ANSF’s capabilities cannot be overemphasised. The security forces have become the strongest and most trusted institution of the Afghan state, and they may yet emerge as the strongest unifying force in such an ethnically divided society. The ANSF still faces undeniable challenges: it has a foreign-financed budget that far exceeds the total tax revenue of the government; and it is nominally under the control of a weak, corrupt, and relatively unpopular political leadership. These challenges hardly bode well for healthy civil-military relations, but they are not insurmountable.

89. Difficulties encountered in the political arena, however, should not distract attention from the progress made by the ANSF. While they are still overcoming growing pains, the ANSF is currently holding its ground in the fight against the insurgency. The insurgent forces are weak and getting weaker. With NATO’s lighter footprint, the population is accepting the ANSF as their principal security provider. Maintaining the Afghan forces’ funding while they continue to consolidate their gains, hone their capabilities, and strengthen their capacity for operations and inter-service co-operation is in its most crucial phase.

90. Still, it is clear that, while the Taliban may be weakened and in strategic retreat, it will not be defeated on the battlefield. The fact that neither side will be able to deliver a knockout blow to the other means that future peace and stability in Afghanistan will only come by way of a negotiated settlement between the two sides.

91. While improvements in the rights of the great majority of Afghan women and girls have been less than what many nations involved in the international effort had hoped for, they do exist. The question is whether these gains become sustainable and even expanded. Alliance leaders must substantively evaluate how they can implement the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in a manner that is practical and organic to Afghanistan, but also to produce tangible results that uphold the very underlying values upon which the Alliance is founded.

92. Nearly a decade after the first elections, the Afghan Parliament is only notionally responsible to the Afghan people. In addition, the role of the president has been driven entirely by the man who holds the office. Afghan government institutions must develop in parallel with its security forces. The significant financial and human investments into the ANSF as the guarantor of security and stability in the country will not produce the desired security and stability if the future Afghan government fails to provide a governing structure, resources, and a coherent strategy for their use. Regardless of how well trained the forces are, the role of the ANSF in the years after 2014 will ultimately be determined by the Afghan government, not by NATO. Thus, time is of the essence, as NATO’s role in determining how these forces will operate, their culture, their doctrine, and their ability to function as a unifying force for the country, is now.

93. ISAF operations in Afghanistan have been a true test of the capabilities, commitment, and credibility of the post-cold war alliance. The cost of renewed investment in the post-2014 Afghan state is relatively minor when compared to the previous decade’s expenditures of vast amounts of blood and treasure. Much has in fact been gained through the combined efforts of NATO and its partner countries - this effort must not be cast aside due to pessimistic perceptions of a future not yet determined.

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[1] As of August 1, 2013, ISAF’s configuration consisted of the 49 troop contributing nations comprising some 87,207 forces deployed across Afghanistan. ISAF forces were divided into NATO Command Headquarters ISAF, ISAF Joint Command, the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), and six regional commands: RC-North (under German command); RC West (under Italian command); RC-Capital (under Turkish command); and, RC-South, RC-Southwest, and RC-East (all under United States command).

[2] Current estimates by the US Department of Defense put the force size requirements for Operation Resolute Support between 8,000 and 12,000.

[3] Kandaks are comparable to a battalion, and consist of approximately 600 troops.

*[4] Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

[5] Previous Assembly reports touch upon the regional political and security dynamics of Southwest Asia; particularly Rapporteur Bacquelaine’s Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships 2012 report, “Afghanistan and Southwest Asian Security” [152 PCNP 12 E bis].

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