Give a presentation and a critical discussion of John ...



Give a presentation and a critical discussion of John Rawls’s theory of distributive justice.

Introduction

Before John Rawls’s influential treatise, a theory of justice, there was this strong notion that only an improved version, if there was one, of the classical utilitarian argument could lead us toward a greater understanding of political morality. Utilitarianism was quite attractive from a philosophical standpoint, but its appeal seemed to collide with our basic intuitions about fairness. This criticism came after Rawls published his book, and was partly due to him. Rawls sets himself the task of breaking this “utilitarianism vs. intuitionism” deadlock (Kymlicka; 2002:55). For this purpose Rawls draws on the tradition of Enlightenment thinking, that of a hypothetical agreement on a ‘social contract‘, and his foundational idea is that justice has to be seen in terms of the demands of fairness (Sen 2009:53). This essay will give a presentation of John Rawls’s theory of distributive justice. I will start by introducing his principles of justice and give his arguments for why these principles would unanimously be chosen by members of the society from the ‘original position’. The presentation will be followed by a critical discussion. A special emphasize will be given to critique raised by Amartya Sen. The discussion is centered around difficulties with Rawls’s system of thought and will not get into alternative theories.

Rawls’s approach and the principles of justice

Rawls’s work is a philosophical argument for the liberal welfare state. But Kymlicka argues that the welfare state is necessary, not sufficient for Rawlsian justice. The argument is that the liberal welfare state is the right one, because this way of organizing the state would be preferred by tolerant and reasonable human beings, if they were given the opportunity to engage in a social contract under terms that guarantees equal consideration of the individual (Malnes & Midgaard 2004:235).

Rawls perceives the society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage; however this cooperative venture is both marked by conflicting interests as well as shared interests. There exists mutual advantage of interest, since social cooperation benefits the all members of the society. Cooperation increases their living standard to a level unattainable for the individual to reach solely by its own effort. The conflict of vested interests arises because people are not just simply indifferent to how products of collaboration are distributed (Solomon & Murphy 2000:101). Since individuals have their own plans and/or conceptions of the good life, they have different purposes and ends, and therefore they make different claims on the natural and social resources available (ibid). Rawls assumes that individuals are mutually disinterested towards each other (not in this context) and further assumes that both natural and social resources are moderately scarce. Explain! Under such conditions justice obtain is relevant whenever individuals put forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages (ibid). This paragraph summarises Rawls argument for why a theory of distributive justice i necessary and relevant. (CF Nozick, who claims the opposite)

The various claims set forward by the conflicting parties are connected to the distribution of social primary goods such as liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self respect. He rejects individual welfare as the good to be equally distributed. For him social justice cannot build on an assumption that individual welfare in the sense of personal happiness is the one, final good for all persons (Bojer 2003:43). As mentioned, primary goods are the goods to be distributed, since these are the goods that determine social and economic inequalities in lifetime prospects (ibid). Rawls thinks that these goods are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of one or all of these goods is to advantage of the least favored (Kymlicka 2002:55). However this doesn’t imply that we should remove all inequalities. If some inequalities benefit everyone, that is they don’t make anyone worse off, then they should be allowed. The idea is that inequalities are allowed if they improve an individual’s initial equal share, but are not allowed if they invade his or her fair share (ibid).

The problem of choosing between various social arrangements could be solved by defining a set of principles which in turn determines the division of advantage. These principles are to be chosen in light of the consequences born for those complying with them (Solomon &Murphy 2000:101). To overcome the problem of conflicting principles Rawls breaks down his general conception of justice into three two parts and arranges them according to a principle of ‘lexical priority’ Explain lexical (Kymlicka 2002: 55). His first principle states that, ‘each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all’. The second principle says that, ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantage (difference principle), and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity’ Explain equality of oppotrunity. (Difficult) (Kymlicka 2002:56). Rawls gives the first priority to the first principle, he says that, ‘liberty can only be restricted for the sake of liberty‘. Further the second principle is to be given priority over the principle of efficiency, and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle (ibid). Rawls gives two arguments for his set of principles. The first argument is connected to and contrasts the prevailing ideology that equal opportunity is fair. The second argument is that these set of principles will be chosen from an original position of equality, which is a hypothetical situation were the participants are constrained by a ‘veil of ignorance’.

Starting with his first argument, we could ask; why do we assume that equal opportunity is fair? Rawls claims that there is this attractive idea that individuals deserve unequal shares of social goods, if they are the product of the individual’s actions and choices. As such it has a strong appeal because it ensures that people’s fate is determined by their choices (Kymlicka 2002:58). Rawls thinks differently and says that both natural talents and social circumstances, which can disadvantage or privileged some, are both matters of brute luck. Since brute luck is something out of our reach it must be excluded when people make moral claims, only this can ensure a ‘right fair to go’??) (ibid). But eliminating these arbitrary contingencies is not the way to go forward, instead Rawls argues that the basic structure of the society can be arranged so that these differences can work to benefit the least fortunate. Such a system is only possible if we were to arrange the society according to the difference principle (Kymlicka 2002:59). In other words no one is entitled to benefit from their greater natural capacities; however it is not unfair if these greater capacities are used to advance the initial share of those less fortunate. Rawls point is that equality of opportunity is necessary, but not sufficient, for justice.

The original position

To Rawls the common ground of a society is an agreement between its inhabitants on what institutions and arrangements are just. He himself defines a liberal society as ’a society that allows for a plurality of different and even incommensurable conceptions of the good…’ (Bojer 2003:36).

To ensure a unanimous agreement, his second and main argument draws on the tradition of a hypothetical ‘social contract’. The main reason for this usage, is to ensure that people is treated as moral equals. Since such a point of departure ensures that none of us is subordinate to the will of others, we might think that the outcome will be somehow fair. But this is not the case, considering the arbitrary contingencies mentioned above, individuals are inclined to abuse their favorable starting points in society and/or their greater natural capacities to their advantage when negotiating the principles of just distribution. At this junction we need a different mechanism that excludes some individuals bargaining power over others. Rawls develops here a construction which he calls ’the original position’ in this position people are no longer aware of there vested interests or their position in society, nor do they know their natural capacities, they are behind a ’veil of ignorance’. Rawls even assumes that they don’t even know their psychological propensities, all to ensure that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or their social circumstances. From this original position no one can design principles who favor them directly or indirectly. Furthermore he assumes that the participants haves general knowledge about the nature and human societies, they understand the workings of politics and economic theory, they are also assumed to be acquainted with the laws of human psychology, and they are fully aware of the benefits of social cooperation and organizational life (Kymlicka 2002:63). There are no limitations on general laws and theories, since conceptions of justice must be adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of social cooperation which they are to regulate (??) (Solomon & Murphy 2000:104). Rawls says it is unfair that people's lack of general knowledge should have anything to say, for the outcome of the ’social contract’ (Malnes & Midgaard 2004:239). The principles of justice chosen from this ’original position’ are thus thought to be fair.

This brings us over to his central idea. Rawls argues strongly that justice should be thought about in terms of fairness, ‘justice as fairness‘. Since individuals are assumed to be mutually disinterested, they fail to see just distribution in terms of fairness. Why fairness? Fairness, because central to the concept of fairness is a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking note of the interests and concerns of others as well, and in particular the need to avoid our propensity to be influenced by our respective interests, or by our personal priorities (Sen 2009:54). I would say impartiality is the point, and I think that is what Rawls means by `fairness' So the main purpose of the ‘veil of ignorance’ is that it functions as an intuitive test of fairness, none is able to tip the table in their favor, in addition to this, Rawls claims that the principles chosen behind a ’veil of ignorance’ is also unanimously chosen (Kymlicka 2002:64).

But as Kymlicka (2002) argues it isn’t clear that individuals behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ would chose the difference principle. Why is Rawls assuming that this would be the case? Well, we have to ask; what is the rational thing to do in such a scenario? Rawls argues, by drawing on the social choice theory of choice under uncertainty that it would be highly unwise to gamble with the means to ones lifetime prospects, since none of the individuals know their position in life they have to choose under uncertainty. The most rational thing to do in a situation like this is according to Rawls, to try to minimize the damage if you were to end up in a disadvantaged position. Even if the were low probability for this to incur. By other means, you should adopt a ‘maximin’ strategy, which is to maximize what you would get if you by chance should end up in the minimum. And this, Rawls concludes, is the same as choosing the difference principle (Kymlicka 2002:66).

Difficulties with the Rawlsian system

The task for Rawls was to create a theory that was more in aligning with our intuitive conceptions about fairness, both with respect to institutions and actual behavior.

But Sen (2009) argues that ’ in the Rawlsian system of justice as fairness, direct attention is bestowed almost exclusively on ‘just institutions’, rather than focusing on ‘just societies’ that may rely on both effective institutions and on actual behavioral features‘ (Sen 2009:67). Sen has a point. It seems like Rawls thinks that the two principles are seen to both ensure the right choice of institutions and to lay the ground for the emergence of appropriate actual behavior. This is not so obvious. Sen (2009) further says that this makes individual and social psychology thoroughly dependent on a kind of political ethics (ibid). Rawls on the other hand is mostly concerned with the basic structure of the society, because the way these institutions are specified and integrated into a social system deeply affects peoples characters in countless ways, it both influence and shape their desires and plans, as well as the persons they aspire to be. This is a strong argument for considering the basic structures of society as ’the primary subject of justice’ (Freedman 2003:3-4).

A second critique raised by Sen (2009) is connected with Rawls perception of the difference principle. primary goods According to Sen, Rawls fails to acknowledge the wide variety between people, with respect to their differences in health, need and mobility (Bojer, Forelesningsnotat.6). Since Rawls considers health to be a natural good, it is regarded by him as not being subject to distribution. What about differences in need? For example, a pregnant woman needs, among other things, more nutritional support than another person, who is not bearing a child. She can do far less with the same level of income and other primary goods (Sen 2009:66). Is it then reasonable to think that individuals value a marginal increase of social primary goods equally? Sen thinks otherwise, and argues that we should move our focus to actual assessment of freedoms and capabilities (ibid).

As we saw earlier, Rawls allows inequalities to exist if it is to the advantage for the least fortunate; there is a pragmatic compromise hiding behind this argument. G. A Cohen arguments in his book Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008), that ’the accommodation of inequality for reasons of incentives limit’s the reach of the Rawlsian theory of justice. The concession to incentives may make good practical sense, but can it be a part of a plausible theory, specifically, of justice?’ (Sen 2009:61). Cohen claims that ‘a society that can be seen as perfectly just should not have the impediment of incentive-based inequality‘. Thus it is not so obvious that individuals in the ’original position’ would appreciate the incentive argument as much as Rawls thinks they would. Sen argues that this is another reason why we shouldn’t concentrate so much on transcendental on ideal justice in developing a theory of justice (Sen 2009:62).

Rawls theory has been subject to a lot of critique. Among them, the absent of direct dialogue between the participants. His assumption that the participants of the ‘social contract’ are mutually disinterested are also a lose one. However I shall limit my self and end this section by critique written from a feminist perspective.

Rawls conceives the just society as consisting of heads of families, and in his argument for the ’social contract’ women’s role are not mentioned any particularly (Bojer, Notes, lecture.6) In ’The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) he insist that the family is outside the public sphere (Bojer 2006:60). Martha Nussbaum oppose this and argues different, she says ’the state is present in the family from the start,… it is the state who says what this thing is and controls how one becomes a member of it’ moreover the family has the role of distributing economic goods to individuals, and thus their role cannot be overlooked in a discussion of distributional justice. Furthermore Rawls imposes the constraint that the social contract should only include the rights and duties of adult citizens. Bojer (2006) argues that, ’the souls know that they will themselves start their life as helpless infants, and that the social contract will govern their own childhood’, and this will help ensure that the contracting parties would choose to view the family as part of the basic institutions of society to be covered by the contract. These individual ’souls’ will in enlightened self-interest seek to ensure that their childhood is protected from abuse, neglect and starvation (Bojer 2006:61). These ’souls’ would furthermore not settle unless equal rights between men and women, with respect to economic independence, where guaranteed. To support this claim, she points to the fact that, in the ’original position’ the parties will realize that there are 50 percent chance for them to be incarnated either as a male or female. If participants of the ‘social contract‘ takes the arguments given above into consideration, Bojer sees no reason why they wouldn’t agree to policies that guarantees economic justice to women and children (Bojer 2006:61).

Conclusion

Rawls contribution was a vitamin injection to the topic of distributional justice. Some of his critics seem to think that his theory could be extended to capture more diverse cases and meet further challenges. However, being subject to critical scrutiny for over three decades, contemporaries seem to have abandoned his basic ideas. But his fundamental idea that justice is to be viewed in terms of fairness, which is a Rawlsian hallmark, is by large still seen as a common point of departure for further elaboration on distributional justice (Sen 2009:54).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bojer, Hilde (2003). Distributional Justice: theory and measurement (Routledge frontiers of political economy).

Freedman??

Kymlicka, Will (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, Oxford).

Malnes, Raino, and Midgaard, Knut (2003). Politisk Tenkning (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo).

Murphy, Mark C. and Solomon, Robert C (2002) What Is Justice?: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford University Press, Oxford New York).

Sen, Amartya (2009). The Idea Of Justice (Penguin Books Ltd, England).

I enjoyed reading this paper, and in particular I appreciate that Rajeevan has gone beyond the strict reading list. It is on the whole fairly well written. But i cannot recommend that you take this paper as a model for your exam paper. There are too may direct quotations from literature that you will not have access to at the exam.

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