13th ICCRTS: C2 for Complex Endeavors



13th ICCRTS: C2 for Complex Endeavors

13th ICCRTS

‘C2 for Complex Endeavors”

Mitigating C2 Complexity through Semantic Communications: A Model-based Communication Network Approach

Topics: (2), (7), (8)

LtCol Carl Oros, USMC, “Student”

Naval Postgraduate School

1 University Circle

Monterey, CA 93943

831-656-3386

cloros@nps.edu

Title of Paper

Mitigating C2 Complexity through Semantic Communications: A Model-based Communication Network Approach

Abstract (To be revised)

Recent CCRP sponsored workshops have addressed the challenges of command and control (C2) through the theoretical lens of complexity theory; recognizing the importance for C2 organizations to be agile in the face of complex, dynamic, uncertain, high risk environments. Today, military forces are increasingly operating in smaller, highly equipped, distributed teams. Conceptually, this places a high demand on the emerging operational level C2 network to deliver actionable intelligence, situational awareness, and time sensitive fire support. Further, as these combat teams conduct geographically dispersed, beyond line of sight operations, the ability to self-synchronize, collaborate, and dynamically assign resources becomes extremely limited. Current envisioned network centric approaches to C2 treat the network, and the associated pursuit of reducing information uncertainty, much like Shannon did; as an engineering problem. Though the reduction of uncertainty in the communication channel is desirable, it does not take into account the resource constrained bandwidth limitations of numerous battlefield self-synchronizing C2 peer to peer systems nor address user cognitive bandwidth constraints and potential for InfoGlut. A model-based communication network (MCN) architecture enabled by valuable information at the right time (VIRT) services provides one promising alternative. This paper provides an operationally relevant, ontologically based, MCN communication architecture approach to address C2 complexity challenges and reduce uncertainty.

Keywords: C2, Complexity, Focus & Convergence, VIRT, Model-based Communication Networks, semantic communications

I. Problem Space

-What’s changed: Complexity of actions, vs. complicated, threat & mil response to change org structure_ distributed operations, technology has increased the complexity by providing more options of c2/fires, and allowing access (interconnectednesss) to a diverse, geographically separated force.

What’s changed: A new C2 awareness: agility, focus, convergence

Focus, and convergence has recently been introduced in the CCRP literature (Alberts 2007) as a potential replacement for the traditional Command and Control (C2). This welcomed change stems from the growing realization that many of the endeavors the military is engaging in are becoming extremely complex. That is, they can be characterized as non-linear by nature, consist of vast potential of outcomes that defy prediction, challenge traditional Napoleonic forms of organizing, and are beyond mere Newtonian first and second order effects. Traditional C2 is also problematic when one considers that technology today is enabling the distribution of information not only laterally through the organization but also vertically to the lowest actionable entities, i.e. the infantryman. This is in stark contrast to the legacy communication structure that typically mirrors the command hierarchy. Today, the “chain of information is not the chain of command and the customer is not the commander” (Cartright 2007). Additionally, we are increasingly engaging in multinational endeavors. Our coalition partners are politically diverse, quite often are unwilling to subscribe to our unified command hierarchy, and thus may not be in complete harmony with the endeavor’s unity of purpose.

A new theoretical lens: Complexity

Though, numerous definitions of complexity exist, it is generally accepted that simple cause-effect relationships are no longer valid, that the potential options are so numerous that they elude optimization, and that action-outcome predictability is significantly reduced (Grisogono 2006). Bar-Yam describes complex systems as “formed from multiple interacting elements whose collective actions are difficult to infer from those of the individual parts, predictability is severely limited, and response to external forces does not scale linearly with the applied force” (Bar-Yam 2003).

When viewed through the complexity lens, the concept of control is inappropriate and in fact illusionary (Alberts 2007). Thus, in the network centric operations context, control becomes more of an emergent property and efforts should focus on establishing the conditions to foster it’s creation.

It is in this light that endeavor, once viewed as a complicated, has become increasingly complex and the relationships between the action and effects spaces further contribute to the complexity (Alberts-Hayes 2007). These authors also submit that “new approaches to both command and control are necessitated by (1) a need to accommodate the realities of complex operations such as coalition and civil-military operations and (2) a desire to increase awareness and leverage shared awareness across a large, distributed enterprise consisting of many different kinds of participants.” This paper addresses the later and describes a concept for sharing, dynamically updating, and synchronizing diverse actions in an operational context.

Technology has also contributed to the complexity of the endeavor by providing dispersed entities and commanders with a greater number of options (Bar Yam). Though advances in information technology have vastly improved the military’s ability to communicate at great distances, increased the span and speed of maneuver, and associated lethality of action, the mere networking entities via information technology (IT) is an insufficient guarantor of adaptability and agility.

Today’s response to operating in complex environments has been principally techno-centric; emphasizing the hardware in disproportion to the software and wetware (i.e. human). Even Col John Boyd, the father of the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) C2 decision cycle construct, vehemently critiqued the “institutional response to overcoming the real world [C2] fiascos[1].” The desire to attain “more and better sensors, more communications, more and better computers, more and better display devices, more satellites, more and better fusion centers, etc. ..all tied into one giant fully informed, fully capable C&C [command and control] system” was as lofty in the pre-internet days of 1987 as is it today. This lead Boyd to suggest an alternative way that focused on the “implicit nature of human beings” going so far as to re-define C2 as “Appreciation and Leadership” (Boyd 1987). He referred to appreciation as not only recognition of worth, but also clear perception and understanding. Leadership was viewed more as the art of inspiring action towards a common goal vice the hierarchical issuance of orders. Though the hierarchy may play an important role in complex endeavors, desired “C2” attributes and behaviors are viewed more as emergent rather than discrete artifacts of design and observation.

C2 Agility:

One of the major tenants of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has been the ability of battlespace entities to not only share a distributed understanding of the battlespace, but more importantly to be able to self-synchronize. Quite simply, synchronization refers to activities purposely organized in time and space (Alberts-Hayes 2007). NCW postulates that “empowered by knowledge, derived from a shared awareness of the battlespace and a shared understanding of commanders’ intent, our forces will be able to self-synchronize, operate with a small footprint, and be more effective when operating autonomously. A knowledgeable force depends upon a steady diet of timely, accurate information, and the processing power, tools, and expertise necessary to put battlespace information into context and turn it into battlespace knowledge” (Alberts, Garstka, Stein 1999). The NCW maturity model (Alberts-Hayes 2005) represented the highest maturity level (level 4) as the C2 domain where shared awareness and self-synchronization are integrated. The NATO Network Enabled Command and Control Maturity Model (N2C2M2) defines Agile C2 as a level of maturity characterized by a high degree of shared understanding of common (collective) intent, rich and continuous participant interactions, widespread information exchanges, and the willingness and ability (where appropriate) to self-synchronize (Alberts-Hayes 2007).

Though the conceptual requirements for distributed awareness, understanding, and synchronicity are entrenched in the C2 literature, no clear framework exists that describes exactly how this dissemination of information will occur. Unless one subscribes to mental telepathy, entities will increasingly rely on the network for these essential NCW attributes. It is understood that organizational adaptation also plays an essential role that is inextricably linked to the technology, people, task, and structure (Leavitt 1965, Dotterway 1992), it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the role of the network for delivery of valuable, timely, relevant information should not be trivialized. Geographically dispersed, diverse entities (man & machine), operating in extreme topographic terrain, interacting in a dynamic, often hostile environment, place high demands on the network to deliver the requisite agile C2 functional attributes. This is problematic for several reasons. First, physical bandwidth (BW) is a fixed quantity. Bandwidth and information processing demands will increase tremendously as the number of networked entities proliferates. To put the BW constraint in perspective, consider today’s Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The MEF is a corps level warfighting organization that is doctrinally provisioned 2 MBps of bandwidth. This BW allocation is further segmented between Normal and Secure Internet Protocol Router Networks (NIPRNET/SIPRNET). This leaves command elements down stream with BW measured in kilobytes. Though it is expected that tactical BW will increase in the future, it is a commodity that will always remain in high demand and short supply. Second, human bandwidth is fixed. Advances in IT have created a condition where computer generated information vastly exceeds the human capacity to process it. This InfoGlut (Denning 2006) has amounted to users “drowning in a sea of data and information while frequently lacking real knowledge” (Gersh, McKneely, Remington 2005). Even today, broadband tactical networks are continuously being used to transmit continuous sensor video streams, conduct VTCs, and disseminate PowerPoint briefs.

A potential solution to this impending “tragedy of the commons”[2] is to adopt an information architecture strategy that is based on the communication of meaning vice transmission of “dumb” bits. Simply implementing interoperability via the open systems interconnection (OSI)[3] model (i.e. the “pipes”) fails to address the cognitive and physical system BW issues. Furthermore, shared understanding and self-synchronous qualities can not merely be Googled for via a smart pull architecture alone. If one accepts the notion that shared understanding is a necessary precursor to attain self-synchronous behavior, then the C2 network should be architected to not only deliver it, but more importantly, to dynamically update it as well.

A promising approach to distribute shared awareness is to communicate meaning vice information. For example, the legend of Paul Revere states that a binary signal (one by land, two by sea) was transmitted from the Old North Church steeple, thus commencing the American Revolution. Though only one binary digit (bit) was transmitted, it “carried a vast amount of meaning” (Miller 1978). Similarly, the military today attempts to share understanding through a standardized planning process known as JOPES[4]. Collaborative, integrated planning eventually culminates in the force’s mission statement, identified tasks, clear mission intent, and formalized procedures and rules essential for both unity of effort and deconfliction. For example, the Airspace Control Order (ACO), Air Tasking Order (ATO) and associated SPINS (Special Instructions) friendly and enemy air and ground orders of battle, etc. Thus the operational plan provides for distributed unity of intent, focuses the joint force on command objectives, and provides the framework for how we orient on the enemy and on each other in the battlespace. When members of the force climb into their cockpits, embark aboard ship, or cross the line of departure, they are taking a mental model of the battlespace with them. The reason the plan never survives the first shot is that it is mainly an electronic word document with associated information embedded in a myriad number of C2 systems (GCCS, TBMCS, C2PC, FBCB2, etc.) that are not dynamically linked to execution nor with each other. What is missing is the capability for battlespace entities to dynamically update their planning model (time dependent collection of beliefs, plans, understanding, assumptions) during execution. The challenge is to do so within human and system bandwidth constraints. Networking alone is insufficient. Thus, sharing a distributed model is not a radical departure from how military forces communicate today. The issue is how is the model actually distributed, updated, and tailored to deliver valuable information to a diverse set of actors and entities. Adopting a Model-based Communication Network (MCN) (Hayes-Roth 2005) approach is one promising alternative.

Communicating Meaning: Towards a model-based communication network.

“A Model-based Communication Network (MCN) is a state-full distributed system of collaborating nodes that maintains an optimal shared understanding of the situation” (Hayes-Roth 2005b). Thus each entity is a network node possesses a filtered model that is focused on the endeavor and tailored to each entity’s mission and influence space. A MCN is state-full in that each node is “aware” of the state of other collaborating nodes that comprise the mission space. Attempting to maintain a dynamic, continuously updated, synchronized battlespace world model for the entire endeavor would conceivably exceed the physical bandwidth and computational processing capability of the entire network. An MCN however, departs from traditional networking in that like Paul Revere’s lanterns, communicates contextually relevant, meaningful bits rather than a voluminous stream of information (perhaps streaming video today). Since all entities share a model, only changes to the model (violation of assumptions, changes in plans, etc.), the “delta”, are transmitted. Furthermore, it is not required that each node be state-aware of every single node, at time “t” throughout the endeavor. Rather, each node is only compelled to communicate changes in the model’s state that violate its planned assumptions and beliefs or the beliefs that effect its peers. When these conditions of interest (COI[5]) occur, i.e., the British ships are observed, the “delta” is transmitted and the model is updated.

VIRT (valuable information at the right time) services (Hayes-Roth 2005a) are integral to the MCN framework. The function of VIRT is to filter and distribute timely, relevant information tailored to the COIs determined by each entity. Thus the combination of a shared dynamic model coupled with VIRT services has the net positive effect of distributing shared awareness while minimizing physical and cognitive bandwidth.

Development of a world model requires a common ontology generated from user defined semantics. An ontology provides a common means to share understanding of the structure of information among people or software agents (Noy, McGuinness 200?). Additionally, it provides a machine-interpretable, common vocabulary that enables entities to share information based on user-defined, meaningful concepts. In order for the ontology to be responsive to a diverse set of entities, it must incorporate objects and concepts that are contextually meaningful. Ultimately, the ontology must contain sufficient information to answer all user COIs. It should also be capable of evolving in order to adapt to changing environments, missions, and future information needs.

A MAGTF-VIRT[6] Mission Thread example

A useful approach to generating a relevant ontology, is through development and analysis of mission threads (use cases). The mission threads provide the context for generating the semantics essential to developing shared battlespace understanding. The mission thread, when analyzed from multiple user perspectives, can yield a rich ontology capable of supporting the endeavor’s diverse information requirements. For example, a platoon performing a High Value Target (HVT) raid should be analyzed from the Platoon Commander, Platoon Sergeant, Squad leader, fire team leader, and riflemen perspectives. Additionally, close air support (fixed wing/rotary wing) and fire support (artillery), etc. perspectives should also be incorporated.

The following example demonstrates how the physical mission space can be semantically represented via a relevant ontology capable of supporting dynamic user COIs.

Previous research by the author[7] and subject matter experts focused on gathering information requirements from a Platoon Commander’s perspective during a notional platoon sized HVT raid. The information collected from this mission thread was used to elucidate the C2 practitioner’s critical information requirements or Conditions of Interest (COIs). The semantics and information ontology was then constructed to support VIRT service delivery of the COIs. Figure 1 depicts the notional HVT raid scenario that was used to obtain the information requirements. The user information requirements were obtained for each phase and listed in Appendix A.

[pic]

Figure 1. Notional High Value Target (HVT) Raid Scenario

The database design tool -Table Designer[8] was used to create the thread’s semantic object model (SOM). Figure 2 depicts the resultant SOM. It should be noted that this initial model, however, did not incorporate network management semantics. Once the information requirements were identified, the SMEs determined, by phase, which elements of information were particularly critical.

[pic]

Figure 2a. MAGTF-VIRT HVT Raid Semantic Object Model

Example COIs are:

• Notify me if the target location is not as planned or expected.

• Notify me if organic blue force (friendly) injuries exceed my Go-No-Go criteria.

• Notify me if my squad locations are not as planned or expected.

• Alert me if I am training my weapon system on a blue force member.

A similar approach can be taken to network management. Figure 2b is a preliminary example of the network management (SOM) (i.e. 8th Layer) model that was added to the overall object model. Thus in the context of the above mission thread (Platoon Commander perspective), potential 8th layer network management COIs could be:

• Tell me if my C2 device has been compromised

• Alert me if I am exceeding my C2 device’s communication threshold (power, bandwidth, BER, etc.).

• Alert me if failure of my critical C2 devices exceed my Go-No-Go criteria.

[pic]

Figure 2b. MAGTF-VIRT HVT Raid Semantic Object Model (Cont.)

These COIs are principally human-centric. Additionally, network management COIs, generated from the C2 management level or the machine entity perspective, are required to develop the shared model. Example COIs for a network aware C2 device might be:

• What is the current/expected/forecast tactical network topology?

• What and where are the critical C2 nodes?

• Alert me when any critical C2 nodes have impending power/hardware/software failures.

• Alert me if peer node transmission packet loss exceeds “x %”,

• Do any adjacent nodes have available CPU processing time available?

• Notify me when I am approaching my C2 device’s communication/reception threshold (bandwidth/RSSI/Signal Correlation/SNR, etc.).

Thus conditions of interest are essentially standing, state-full queries that when satisfied are “smartly pushed” to the operator who needs the information. This is the essence of the MCN-VIRT architecture. It is modeled from the ground up, inextricably linked to a diverse set of C2 practitioner’s needs, contextually derived for relevance, and incorporates an ontology that enables meaning to be shared throughout the endeavor.

Conclusion

………………..

Appendix A

HVT Information Requirements

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[1] Quotes from Boyd’s original briefing slides titled “Organic Design of Command and Control”, Ma7 1987.

[2] Denning

[3] Information Technology –Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) – Basic reference Model: The Basic Model, International Standard, ISO/IEC 7498-1, 2d edition, Nov 1994

[4] Joint Operational Planning and Execution System

[5] A COI is an event that warrants immediate user notification. In the context of a MCN, it can be thought of as a standing query I time. Once satisfied, it is pushed to the relevant user(s).

[6] Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Valuable Information at the Right Time (VIRT) is a notional MCN mission thread that was used to develop the semantic object model in this paper. Marines always fight as MAGTFs. MAGTFs are scalable force packages that include the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

[7] The author taught a directed study course to two Marine officer graduate students in the JC4I curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2006. One officer was a prior enlisted heavy weapons Platoon Sergeant and after commissioning served as a Platoon Commander and Communications officer in combat operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Officer #2 was an experienced heavy lift assault support helicopter pilot who had flown extensively in OIF.

[8] Table Designer is a semantic object modeling software tool developed by Dr. David M. Kroenke and is available for download at: som.htm. It should be noted that this tool was used strictly for visual modeling only of the semantic object model. The output of table designer is a MicroSoft Access or Sequel database. These database archetypes are incapable of supporting the dynamic, state-full, information storage and query requirements essential to creating a MCN-VIRT architecture. More research is needed in this critical area before MCN can come to fruition.

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