Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition

Deleuze's Difference and Repetition

An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide

Henry Somers-Hall

? Henry Somers-Hall, 2013

Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LF



Typeset in 10.5/13pt Monotype Baskerville by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire, and printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY

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ISBN 978 0 7486 4678 4 (hardback) ISBN 978 0 7486 4677 7 (paperback) ISBN 978 0 7486 6967 7 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 0 7486 6968 4 (epub) ISBN 978 0 7486 6969 1 (Amazon ebook)

The right of Henry Somers-Hall to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Contents

Series Editor's Preface

vi

Acknowledgements

vii

Abbreviations

viii

Introduction

1

1. A Guide to the Text

7

Introduction: Repetition and Difference

7

Chapter 1. Difference in Itself

21

Chapter 2. Repetition for Itself

55

Chapter 3. The Image of Thought

96

Chapter 4. Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference

128

Chapter 5. The Asymmetric Synthesis of the Sensible

166

The Two Prefaces

188

2. Study Aids

191

Glossary

191

Further Reading

194

Tips for Writing about Deleuze

199

Bibliography

200

Index

206

A Guide to the Text21

The inner principle which allows internal difference to emerge in the case of Kant's thought is the nature of space itself, and this remains the same whether space is taken to be absolute, as in Kant's early writings, or transcendental, as we find in his critical writings. Rather than remaining at the level of spatial difference itself, Deleuze will want to provide a transcendental account of the operation of this principle of difference which explains why cases such as left and right handedness appear in the first place. As well as the surface repetition of the incongruent counterparts themselves, therefore, there is a deeper repetition, `the singular subject, the interiority and heart of the other, the depths of the other' (DR 24/27) that gives rise to this repetition. In other words, Deleuze wants to provide an account of the genesis of the kind of spatiality which Kant takes as his starting point.

The relationship between Leibniz and Kant sets out the project of Difference and Repetition clearly. Normally when we look at difference, we have two choices. Either we see it as conceptual difference, as in the case of Leibniz, in which case we have not really understood what difference is, or we take Kant's path, and recognise difference as non-conceptual. This then leads to the end of our enquiry since we lack the (conceptual) tools to do justice to it. In the two cases we have looked at here, what is responsible for repetition, whether atoms or space, is simply taken as given, rather than explained (and this holds true of Freud's account as well, which ultimately will presuppose the kind of physical repetition we find in law). Deleuze's project is therefore going to be to perform an enquiry into the principle of difference which neither sees it as conceptual nor sees its non-conceptuality as the end of our enquiry. In doing so, he will develop an account of difference which allows us to explain the kinds of differences presupposed but not explained by Kant and the atomists. Developing this new concept of difference is the primary aim of chapter one of Difference and Repetition.

Chapter 1. Difference in Itself

1.1 Introduction (28?30/36?8) Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of indifference, or the absence of difference. Deleuze's aim in the opening few paragraphs is to provide an account of why representation emerges as an attempt to make difference `leave its cave and cease to be a monster' (DR 29/38). What would a state of indifference involve? Deleuze gives two examples:

22Deleuze's Difference and Repetition

1. `The undifferenciated abyss. The indeterminate animal in which everything is dissolved' (DR 28/36). 2. `The white nothingness, the once more calm surface upon which float unconnected determinations like scattered members' (DR 28/36).

The first of these represents a space that has not been differenciated. Without difference, we cannot have anything other than pure abstract identity. Difference as a concept is what allows us to draw distinctions within this identity (`this differs from that'). The second quotation brings out the second role of difference: difference is a relation, and therefore allows things to be related to one another. Clearly, therefore, we need a concept of difference. Deleuze here outlines two ways in which we might understand difference. The first is that difference is imposed on the world, the second is that difference emerges of its own accord, or immanently from the world. Traditionally, difference has been conceived as operating in the first of these ways. The first of these is tied to representation and judgement, the second to immanence and univocity.

Deleuze associates representation with the question, `what is it?', and this question implies an answer of the form, `it is x'. This structure is the basic structure of judgement: the attribution of a predicate to a subject. The proper functioning of representation therefore requires two parts to it. First there is the subject (the `it'), which defines the `what' that is being asked about. Second there is the predicate, or property (the `is x'), which is attributed to the subject. So in order to make a judgement about something, we need both a subject and a predicate. The undifferenciated abyss presents a situation whereby one of these conditions has not been met. There are no properties present in the subject, and so there is no possibility of making a judgement. In fact, we could take this further and say that as there are no limits to the abyss, there is no such thing as a subject present, either. The properties lacking a subject represent the second type of indifference. There are properties but no subjects to attribute them to. The process of representation therefore collapses again, and thinking is suspended.

The first of these possibilities, the abyss, brings us to the central problem of representation. While representation is able to qualify forms and subjects (`this square is red'), it is unable to account for the genesis of form itself. Form simply has to be imposed on something fundamentally non-representational; something that simply cannot be captured within the formal structures of judgement. Such an abyss is in a literal

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