Middle East Regional Offi ce

UNCLASSIFIED United States Department of State

and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General

Middle East Regional Office

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security Kabul Embassy Security Force

Performance Evaluation

Report Number MERO-A-10-11, September 2010

IMPORTANT NOTICE This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies or organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

United States Department of State

and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

KEY FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Protection Area of Responsibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 ARMORGROUP OF NORTH AMERICA PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Staffing and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Property Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Training Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Explosives Detection Canine Testing Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Guard Qualifications and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Guard English Language Proficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Explosives Detection Canine Testing Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 SECURITY AND SAFETY AT CAMP SULLIVAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 APPENDIX I ? PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 APPENDIX II ? OIG ANALYSIS OF AMOUNT OWED THE DEPARTMENT FOR GUARDS LACKING REQUIRED ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 APPENDIX III ? TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS SURVEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 APPENDIX IV ? COMMENTS FROM THE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . 43 APPENDIX V ? COMMENTS FROM EMBASSY KABUL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

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KEY FINDINGS

? The Kabul Embassy Security Force (KESF), provided through a contract with ArmorGroup of North America (AGNA), has ensured the safety of chief of mission personnel in Kabul.

? AGNA has not been able to recruit, train, or manage the KESF at the staffing level or the quality required by its contract with the Department of State.

? AGNA has employed Nepalese guards without verifiable experience, training, or background investigations in violation of its contract.

? AGNA cannot account for 101 U.S. Government-furnished weapons that have been missing since 2007. AGNA used U.S. Government-furnished weapons for training rather than required contractor-furnished weapons.

? A pattern of uncorrected disciplinary problems within the KESF preceded revelations of such problems in the media.

? AGNA does not adequately maintain training records. AGNA firearms instructors failed to sufficiently instruct guards to help correct firing errors. Instructors also qualified guards who did not achieve the minimum qualifying score at the firing range.

? Several weaknesses were found in canine explosives detection testing procedures carried out by AGNA's subcontractor, including failure to test for all scents required by the contract, use of expired and potentially contaminated materials, and explosives storage problems that may lead to cross-contamination.

? The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) did not thoroughly scrutinize Nepalese guards hired by AGNA, allowing guards without experience, training, or background investigations to perform security duty.

? DS did not verify that Nepalese guards met contractually required English language proficiency levels; some guards did not have required levels of proficiency.

? When AGNA could not acquire a sample of a certain explosive to test canines, DS changed the contract standards so that the canines would not be have to be tested to detect this particular explosive, which is available in Afghanistan.

? DS does not provide a sufficient number of weapons for guards; some guards share weapons with guards on other shifts, affecting firing accuracy.

OIG Report No. MERO-A-10-11 - DS Kabul Embassy Security Force, Performance Evaluation - September 2010

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? AGNA regularly allows individuals who are not vetted by Embassy Kabul's regional security office unescorted access to Camp Sullivan, a U.S. Governmentowned camp containing sensitive materials.

2 .

OIG Report No. MERO-A-10-11 - DS Kabul Embassy Security Force, Performance Evaluation - September 2010

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INTRODUCTION

In March 2007, ArmorGroup of North America (AGNA), a private security company, was awarded a contract from the Department of State (Department) to provide the Kabul Embassy Security Force (KESF). From the start of the contract in July 2007 until June 2010, DS has obligated to AGNA a total of $97.5 million. Currently, AGNA has more than 700 employees dedicated to the contract in Kabul. Approximately 400 of these employees are security guards who are primarily from Nepal.

The Middle East Regional Office (MERO) of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this work under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended,1 due to concerns about the Department's exercise of control over the performance of security contractors. The objectives of this performance evaluation were to determine: (1) the requirements and provisions of the contract; (2) how well the Department has administered the contract to provide proper oversight of AGNA's performance in Kabul, Afghanistan; (3) whether the contract is being effectively managed; (4) whether AGNA provides a safe and adequate living environment for KESF guards and whether the Department provides proper oversight of the guards' living environment; and (5) whether the Department contract includes FAR clause 52.222-50, which provides for termination of a contract if the contractor engages in severe forms of trafficking in persons.

This report is the second in a series on the Department's management of embassy security forces.2 In developing this assessment, OIG met with officials from DS and Embassy Kabul, and with AGNA management. OIG traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, where AGNA provides guard force protection for various U.S. Government sites. In Kabul, the OIG team visited three compounds and conducted random interviews with guards. OIG also inventoried U.S. Government-furnished weapons and conducted an inspection of Camp Sullivan, where AGNA guards are housed.

1 5 U.S.C. App. 3. 2 See The Bureau of Diplomatic Security Baghdad Embassy Security Force, MERO-A-10-05, March 2010.

OIG Report No. MERO-A-10-11 - DS Kabul Embassy Security Force, Performance Evaluation - September 2010

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OIG Report No. MERO-A-10-11 - DS Kabul Embassy Security Force, Performance Evaluation - September 2010

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RESULTS

The unstable security environment in Kabul requires a highly trained static guard force to allow the U.S. mission to properly function. AGNA's KESF, a cadre of nearly 400 guards, has successfully ensured the safety of more than 1,600 chief of mission personnel across three compounds in Kabul. However, OIG found that AGNA failed in several instances to comply with the requirements of its contract, which could potentially undermine the security of the U.S. mission. Furthermore, oversight of AGNA by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) has been weakened because DS does not hold the contractor accountable to these requirements.

AGNA has been unable to maintain the number of guards or the quality level required by the contract. From July 2007 until as recently as May 2010, various positions have been unfilled, including members of its Emergency Response Team, emergency medical technicians, and vehicle mechanics. These unfilled positions have led to Department-imposed penalties of $2.5 million and the issuance of a notice from the Department to the contractor to "show cause" as to why the contract should not be terminated. To manage staffing shortfalls, AGNA hired and put on duty Nepalese guards without verifiable experience, training, or background investigations, which violates its contract.

AGNA's current control of U.S. Government-furnished property is generally satisfactory, but AGNA cannot account for 101 U.S. Government-furnished weapons that have been missing since 2007. Additionally, from July 2007 until September 2009, AGNA used U.S. Government-furnished weapons to train guards when contractor-furnished weapons were required by its contract. OIG calculates that AGNA's loss and misuse of these U.S. Government-furnished weapons cost the government $431,000.

AGNA does not adequately maintain training records, making it difficult to verify whether guards have received contractually required training. Additionally, existing records indicate that firearms instructors qualified guards who did not actually meet the minimum qualification score on the firing range. During a visit to firing range, OIG observed that AGNA firearms instructors did not sufficiently instruct guards to help correct firing errors.

OIG Report No. MERO-A-10-11 - DS Kabul Embassy Security Force, Performance Evaluation - September 2010

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