Fatih Birol Presents the IEA World Energy Outlook 2007
Fatih Birol Presents the IEA World Energy Outlook 2007
Posted by Chris Vernon on December 7, 2007 - 10:00am in The Oil Drum: Europe
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: carbon dioxide, coal, fatih birol, growth, iea, oil (list all tags)
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On 5th December 2007 Fatih Birol, Chief Economist and Head of the Economic Analysis Division of the International Energy Agency (IEA) gave a presentation in London at the Shell Centre, hosted by the British Institute of Energy Economics (BIEE). Mike Pepler attended the meeting and took the following notes (his personal comments are in italics):
Introduction
• We are on the eve of a new world energy order.
• On the supply side, we have oil production outside the core OPEC countries reaching a peak, which is not good news for the International Oil Companies (IOCs). The National Oil Companies (NOCs) will determine future oil supply.
• On the demand side, China and India are transforming global energy markets through their sheer size and rate of economic growth.
• Between now and 2030, China and India will account for 70% of new global oil demand, and 80% of new coal demand.
Approach
• Chinese and Indian experts joined the IEA team to write WEO 2007, and extensive peer reviews from their countries were used.
• Three scenarios are used:
o Reference scenario. All government policies and economic developments continue as they are at present. This leads to two threats: risks in security of supply for oil and gas, and climate change.
o Alternative scenario. 1,500 policies currently under discussion across the world are put into practice in 2008. This scenario also includes an option to stabilise atmospheric CO2 levels at 450ppm.
o High growth scenario. Economic growth in China and India is the biggest unknown in these studies. The predictions have been wrong in the past, underestimating the growth. This scenario assumes an increased rate of growth for China and India.
• The analysis of China and India’s impact on the global economy, environment and energy market is a key part of WEO 2007.
Reference scenario
• The continuation of existing policy leads to a fossil-fuel future.
• Coal will see the biggest increase in use.
• China and India are responsible for 45% of total energy demand growth from 2005 to 2030, and 80% of coal demand growth.
• By 2010, China will be the world’s largest energy consumer, overtaking the USA.
• Oil supply projection to 2015:
o The supply/demand balance will remain tight.
o By 2015, an extra 37.5 mb/d (million barrels per day) of production will be required. 13.6 mb/d of this is to meet new demand, while 23.9 mb/d is to replace declines in existing oil fields – a factor that is often overlooked.
o Oil producing countries have policies that should lead to an extra 25 mb/d by 2015. A further 12.5 mb/d will be required, or a supply crunch can not be ruled out.
o As well as finding new production, we will also need to find ways to curb demand for oil.
o The top 5 IOCs have had reserve replacement ratios declining steadily between 2001 and 2006. If they do not redefine their business strategies to move away from oil they will have serious difficulties.
Vehicle sales in China
• China will be importing 13 mb/d of oil by 2030, as car ownership rises from 20 per thousand people to 140 per thousand.
• Car sales in China are predicted to overtake those of the USA in 2016.
• However, Western countries should not criticise China for this – car ownership in the EU is 680 per thousand people, and 860 per thousand in the USA.
Coal demand in China and India
• In 2005, China exported coal, while India imported, so the net import for the two together was close to zero.
• China is now importing coal as well, and the global coal price has doubled in the past year.
• By 2015, China and India will be importing 170 Mtce (million tonnes coal equivalent), and by 2030 they will be importing 330 Mtce. (figures are approximate, as they were read from a graph)
• Before criticising these imports, we should remember that in India there are 420 million people with no access to electricity. How can we tell them not to use coal, which is the cheapest way of providing electricity?
CO2 emissions from China and India
• It is worth looking at the cumulative emissions from 1900 to 2005. The USA emitted 340 Gt (Gigatonnes), the EU 240 Gt, China 90 Gt and India 25 Gt. (figures are approximate, as they were read from a graph)
• The projection in the reference scenario brings China’s cumulative emissions close to those of the EU by 2030.
• On a per capita basis, China deserves to be allowed higher emissions, although by 2030 they could be similar to those of the EU.
• The top five CO2 emitters are predicted as follows:
o 2005: USA, China, Russia, Japan, India.
o 2015: China, USA, Russia/India, Japan
o 2030: China, USA, India, Russia, Japan
• By 2030, China, India and the USA will together emit more than 50% of global CO2.
CO2 from coal power plants in China and India
• China and India will add 800 GW of electrical generation capacity between 2006 and 2015. This is equivalent to all capacity built in Europe between 1945 and 2006. 90% of the new capacity will be coal fired.
• Coal power plants have an economic lifetime of 60 years. Once built, it is unlikely that these power plants will be closed early. We would not do this in the West, so can not ask China and India to do so either.
Energy efficiency
• At present, half of all new building is in China, measured on a square meter basis. The energy efficiency standards of the new buildings are generally not good. As with the coal power plants, once these buildings are there, they will continue to be used for many years.
Investment
• $22 trillion is needed between 2006 and 2030. Half of this is in developing countries, with 17% in China and 6% in India.
• We are not running out of energy, or out of money, but we are running out of time.
Alternative scenario
• Assume that 1,500 current draft policies are put into place in 2008. These include energy efficiency, building renewable energy and building nuclear power.
• The result is lower growth in net oil imports, leading to growth being reduced by 14 mb/d by 2030. (note that this is still a rise in demand, it’s just a smaller rise than in the reference scenario)
• In the reference scenario, CO2 emissions rise by 57% by 2030, ending up at 42 Gt per year and possibly causing a global temperature rise of 6C, which would be disastrous. The alternative scenario results in emissions levelling off at 34 Gt, possibly leading to a 3C temperature rise, which could still be too much.
• The cost effectiveness of this scenario is important. For example, by 2030 China could save 170 TWh/year simply through the use of more efficient refrigerators and air conditioning, as the current standards are low. This is equivalent to twice the annual output of the Three Gorges Dam.
• To achieve stabilisation of atmospheric CO2 levels at 450 ppm, for a 2C rise in global temperature, emissions need to drop from 27 Gt per year today, to 23 Gt by 2030. This is 19 Gt less than the reference scenario, and to achieve it requires:
o All power plants built after 2012 to emit no CO2.
o Early retirement of coal plant in OECD countries.
o CCS (carbon capture and storage) to be economically viable within 10 years.
o Improvement in efficiency (energy intensity of economies) to increase from 1.6% per year to 2.7% per year.
o All the countries in the world to agree on a framework and put it in place within 5 years.
High growth scenario
• The reference scenario has Chinese economic growth at 7.5% for the next few years, falling to 6% up to 2030.
• The high growth scenario has Chinese growth at 9.5% initially, falling to 7.5%.
• The result is more than 20% increase in oil demand by 2030.
Summary
• The global energy system is on an increasingly unsustainable path.
• China and India are transforming global energy markets.
• All countries need to transition to a more secure, low-carbon energy system.
• New policies now being considered could have a major impact.
• The next 10 years are critical
o Significant generating capacity is being built.
o Technology lock-in means what we choose now will be there for decades.
o There will be growing tightness in oil and gas markets.
• These are global challenges, and we need global solutions.
• The OECD countries must show leadership.
Question and answer session
Where will the projected extra 25 mb/d oil production come from?
• We know of approved projects around the world that will bring 25 mb/d by 2015 (note that this is still less than the 37.5 mb/d actually required). If the supply turns out to be less than this, we are in serious trouble. If these projects do not come online, the wheels will fall off our energy system. (Yes, those were his exact words)
What oil price is required to cause a reduction in demand, and how will this reduction manifest itself?
• The bad news is that the price elasticity of oil is declining, so that a rise in price only produces a small reduction demand. The reasons for this are:
o Oil use is becoming more and more focused on transport, where there are no significant alternative fuels to substitute.
o The OECD is wealthier than during the last oil price shocks, and can afford to keep buying fuel at much higher prices.
o Much of the current oil demand growth is coming from subsidised markets, such as China, India and the Middle East, so oil market price rises do not impact demand.
• We currently expect WTI crude oil to be at or above $65 a barrel in real terms, and this is not enough to reduce demand. If consumers perceive that prices above this level are here to stay, then there will be some impact on demand. However, this price mechanism will not act fast enough, and government policies are also needed to reduce demand. For example, we would like to see fuel subsidies reduced.
• Also, we do not believe that high oil prices hurt the global economy, which is more than just the USA and EU. Some countries may be hurt by high prices, but others benefit.
• Note that in the last few years Africa has lost 3% of GDP growth to rising oil prices, but this does not even make headline news, while slight falls in USA growth get everyone worried.
High oil prices are on the way, which will incentivise efficiency – do you anticipate any surprises?
• We expect high prices for the next decade, and maybe even higher after that.
• In the developing world $250bn in energy subsidies is paid out each year. If subsidies were removed for energy, then the payback on efficiency measures would be extremely rapid – at present there is little incentive as energy is too cheap. However, subsidies can not be quickly removed in some cases, due to the effect on people. In practice we have found that energy subsidies in India actually divert more money to the upper and middle classes than to poor people.
• Regulations on efficiency are needed in developing countries.
We need a lot of investment in oil production – what constraints do you see?
• There is currently a problem in the availability of manpower. However, this can be resolved over a few years simply by increasing the pay of the engineers.
• Willingness to invest – the Middle East has the money, but is not necessarily willing to invest it in new oil production.
• Iran doesn’t have the domestic capital to invest, and also has challenging geology in its oil fields, leading to production declines of up to 20% a year in some fields. However, Iran does not have access to international capital in the way that other countries do.
• The rapidly declining production in OECD countries is clearly a constraint.
CCS leads to reduced efficiency in power stations – is this included in your assessment?
• I am not strongly in favour of CCS. In normal circumstances CCS would have little impact in the next 10 years as it is expensive and not yet commercially proven. There are also regulatory issues on where the CO2 is stored.
• I would look at other technologies, such as nuclear power, ahead of CCS.
• Before China and India can be expected to use CCS, the OECD will need to spend a lot of cash developing it.
• Time is an issue – China and India are building cola power plants now, and retro-fit of CCS will be expensive.
China plans a target of 16% renewable energy by 2020, and higher targets after that.
• It is good to have such targets, but we are not convinced they will reach them.
What do you think on the role of Russia in future?
• Russia is very energy rich, and also close to Europe.
• The government in Russia has had a strong influence on energy, both domestically and in exports.
• 50% of global proved gas reserves are in Russia and Iran, while Qatar is third.
• There is a significant decline in gas production from several Russian fields, and there is insufficient investment in new production – they may not be able to honour their export commitments in future.
Further comments from Fatih Birol on oil
• The market price of crude is now well above the actual cost of producing it in most fields.
• In many countries the tax on fuel is more than the raw material cost.
• In producing countries fuel is very cheap, but their populations often suffer from energy poverty despite this.
* * * * * * * * *
Mike lives in Rye, UK, and works from home for the Ashden Awards for Sustainable Energy (). He is also one of the founding members of PowerSwitch (.uk), and together with his wife Tracy manages eight acres of coppice woodland near Rye.
59 comments on Fatih Birol Presents the IEA World Energy Outlook 2007
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Chris Vernon on December 6, 2007 - 4:17pm | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Birol stated that 23.9mbpd is needed to replace declines in existing production by 2015. Assume we are currently producing 85.5mbpd. Losing 23.9mbpd from 85.5mbpd over 7 years leaves just 61.6mbpd and represents a 4.0% decline rate from the fields already in production.
If we assume the 23.9mbpd will come off the 73mbpd crude production rather than the 85.5mbpd all liquids figure, the decline rate is 4.8%.
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ace on December 6, 2007 - 11:25pm | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Thanks, Mike and Chris! The IEA is sounding the alarm about peak oil. They are admitting that supply will not be able to keep up with demand by the question below.
Where will the projected extra 25 mb/d oil production come from?
We know of approved projects around the world that will bring 25 mb/d by 2015 (note that this is still less than the 37.5 mb/d actually required). If the supply turns out to be less than this, we are in serious trouble. If these projects do not come online, the wheels will fall off our energy system. (Yes, those were his exact words)
I added up all of the peak flows from projects on the soon to be completed . Excluding the unapproved Kashagan project and including a small percentage of 2007 projects, the total new optimistic peak capacity project additions from 2007 to 2012 is just over 27 mbd. This number is close to Birol's 25 mbd.
The IEA has admitted above that non OPEC production is about to peak. Birol says that there are only 25 mbd of approved project capacity. As this is just barely enough to replace lost capacity from his estimate from above of 23.9 mbd for existing field decline, Birol is effectively admitting that world oil production is on a peak plateau now. If a slightly higher underlying decline rate of 4.5%/yr is used then world total liquids supply is in slow decline now, rather than a plateau.
The peak oil plateau is forecast by Sadad al Husseini, ex Exec VP Saudi Aramco, in the chart below
[pic]
click to enlarge - Oil & Money 2007 Conference, October 31, 2007, London source:
Also an interview with Husseini here
Husseini says "global production has reached its maximum sustainable plateau and that output will start to fall within 15 years"
Wonder if Birol is in communication with Husseini?
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garyp on December 7, 2007 - 5:36am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Careful ace, something doesn't add up here.
If you total the megaprojects list then you indeed get ~25Mb by 2015. That comes out at ~4Mbpd addition each year on average. However if you take that 4% decline number then you should be seeing increases each year of 0.5-1Mbpd.
But
This year, according to the table, we should be seeing 4.7Mbpd extra. Take the assumption of that 3.5Mbpd decline rate and we should have seen a good million extra barrels this year. Needless to say, we haven't. So either the table data is wrong, the decline rate is wrong, or someone is holding back on supplies.
I also have to say, something about the megaprojects data for 2008 seems wrong. At 7Mbpd extra we should be swimming in the stuff next year. Its anomalous and even taking into account the time for production to reach peak I'd question if there's not some company spin in there.
Given the numbers for this year, we should also consider that maybe the decline rate of existing wells is not 4% but maybe more like 5%, bringing us to somewhere around 28-29Mbpd required to stand still. That puts us on the other side of break even.
It comes down to where does 23.9Mbpd needed to deal with declines come from? It seems to be to be unsupported and the numbers we see for major fields in decline don't match it. A sneaky way to massage the figures is to do so on the factors that people aren't focused on. Everyone looks to new production, so adjusting the physical decline number can slide by.
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westexas on December 7, 2007 - 8:10am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Ask me about the weather, and I talk about net oil exports.
A reminder: Our (Khebab/Brown) middle case is that the top five net oil exporters (about half of current net exports worldwide) hit zero net exports in 2031. Our model and recent case histories, e.g., the UK and Indonesia, show that net export decline rates tend to accelerate with time (worse than an exponential decline rate).
Even if we assume flat total liquids production for Saudi Arabia (11 mbpd in 2005), at their current rate of increase in consumption, their overall long term net export decline rate (2005 to 2030) would be -10%/year, resulting in zero net exports in 2036 (and again, the net export decline rate would start out at a low rate and accelerate).
I think that the big surprise is going to be a rapid decline in net oil exports from Russia.
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Chris Vernon on December 7, 2007 - 8:35am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Our (Khebab/Brown) middle case is that the top five net oil exporters (about half of current net exports worldwide) hit zero net exports in 2031. Our model and recent case histories, e.g., the UK and Indonesia, show that net export decline rates tend to accelerate with time (worse than an exponential decline rate).
Remind me how this works. I would say the UK was able to hit zero exports as oil is/was a tiny part of the total economy (1.7mbpd x $90 = ~$56bn per year from a ~$2 trillion economy). The same can not be said for major exporters like Russia and especially Saudi. When a country’s economy depends in large part on the revenue generated from oil export, a sizeable proportion of exports have to remain. It is folly to suggest that the Saudi economy could maintain/grow internal consumption as exports fell to zero. Without oil exports there is no Saudi economy, no money, without money there are no imported BMWs. (CIA World Factbook has this sentence “The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 75% of budget revenues, 45% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings.”) Unless you are suggesting Saudi develops a complete economy that doesn’t require imports – I’d say impossible with 28 million (+2% pa) living in a desert – we can be certain Saudi will be a significant exporter for just as long as they remain a significant producer and consumer of oil.
Zero net exports from Saudi in 2036 despite constant 11mbpd production? Not a chance.
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westexas on December 7, 2007 - 8:42am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
First and foremost, the severe problems for importers arise not from the proximity to zero net exports, but from the first 50% or so decline in net exports. Also, note that as oil prices skyrocket, an exporter can and will generate more cash flow from declining net exports.
I thought that the UK and Indonesian case histories were interesting.
The UK is rich, taxes energy consumption and had basically flat liquids consumption over the decline period.
Indonesia is relatively poor, provides energy subsidies and had increasing liquids consumption over the decline period
Result?
The UK crashed to zero in seven years. It took Indonesia a little longer; they crashed in 8 years.
I would think that virtually every net oil exporter in the world would fall somewhere along a demographic continuum from Indonesia to the UK.
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Chris Vernon on December 7, 2007 - 9:10am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
I certainly agree that declining net exports driven in large part by increased exporter consumption is a major, perhaps the most significant, problem faced by importers. However this talk of zero net exporters from countries like Saudi who are so reliant on exports seems highly unlikely and in my mind distracted from what is otherwise a very valid point.
Indonesia is more like the UK than Saudi in terms of how important oil is to its economy. Indonesia has a GDP of $264.7bn, virtually the same as Saudi at $282bn. Their relative oil production (and historic export proportions) shows how less important oil exports are compared to Saudi and how Indonesia (like the UK) could afford to run net exports down to zero.
I don’t accept that the UK and Indonesia provide the endpoints of a continuum of important variables for the ELM.
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westexas on December 7, 2007 - 9:23am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Consumption is only part of the story.
The key indicator of the net export decline rate is consumption as a percentage of production at the final peak. And the overall UK net export decline rate was -55%/year, with flat consumption, because of their high consumption as a percentage of production. In any case, it's just a question of how rapid the net export decline rate is.
But a key point to keep in mind is what I call Phase One and Phase Two Net Export Declines. In Phase One, cash flows from export sales increases, even as volumes decline, because of rising oil prices. In Phase Two, cash flows from export sales decline, as volumes decline, because rising oil prices can't offset the volume decline.
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CLZ09 on December 7, 2007 - 10:08am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Westexas:
I love your work, man, but this is silly. The UK and Indonesia could only go to zero because there was someone else exporting. You can't use the same decline rates for Iran, Russia and SA because the effect on the world price will be totally different when the exports from the last few big exporters start to decline and that will affect domestic consumption.
Now, the asymptotic approach to zero isn't going to be a picnic, but it seems certain that exports will continue at gradually diminishing levels until the end of the oil age. The threat of military action by the US on behalf of energy importers (whether they wish to acknowledge it or not) will keep markets "well supplied" as OPEC ministers love to say.
At what prices we will have to see. But the oil will be flowing.
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westexas on December 7, 2007 - 1:33pm | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
As I said elsewhere, it's not the last half of the net export decline that causes the immediate problems for importers. It's the first half. Whether some key net exporters maintain some low level of exports for a long time is not really relevant once the world net oil export market has largely collapsed.
In "our" (Khebab did all of the hard work) presentation at ASPO-USA, we used low case, middle case and high case projections of production (based on HL) and consumption (based on a Monte Carlo analysis of prior consumption).
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Euan Mearns on December 7, 2007 - 10:35am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
The shape of things to come? Consumption crashing ahead of production - in order to maintain export status. Which part of the ELM was it that forecast this?
[pic]
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 10:50am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Hey, I can hardly see that yellow bit in 2007 ;)
That's what the ELM is all about: things get ugly when consumption growth and production growth have oposite signs (and the first is positive).
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westexas on December 7, 2007 - 1:47pm | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Euan,
Are you sure you are not trying to support the ELM here? In any case, note that we don't have the final 2007 data yet. The EIA shows Indonesia (I believe a founding member of OPEC) at about 65,000 bpd net imports for 2005 and 2006.
As I have said elsewhere, whether some exporters maintain some low level of net exports or whether they actually precisely hit zero net exports and stay there is not really relevant to the big picture. What is going to torpedo the SS World Industrial Economy is the first 50% decline in world net exports.
In any case, in what I have described as the Phase One net export decline, I anticipate that their cash flow from export sales will increase, even as export volumes decline, because of rising oil prices.
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shargash on December 7, 2007 - 8:57am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
The Saudi ruling class has enough money to keep the Mercedes coming till long after the oil is gone. The Saudi economy is another story. Per capita income in the KSA is dropping from population increase (down from 24k to 8k according to Crude Awakening). As oil production declines, the Saudis will have to choose between money from oil exports that drives the economy and energy from oil consumption that powers the economy. I would argue that either of those options will increase social unrest. I would not expect the KSA to still exist in 2031.
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SamuM on December 7, 2007 - 10:17am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Chris, just a small comment in between here.
Many ME nations are acutely aware of this.
Hence the scramble for nuclear power.
Hence the very vocal plans to build the countries (like UAE) into tourism meccas that will generate revenue (i.e. diversify the economy).
Hence the quote from Sheikh Rashid: "My grandfather rode a camel, my father rode a camel, I drive a Mercedes, my son drives a Land Rover, his son will drive a Land Rover, but his son will ride a camel."
And I do agree that they may not be able to give up on exporting oil as easily as UK. That should be painfully obvious.
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Chris Vernon on December 7, 2007 - 10:24am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
I'd like to see the Middle East nations with large trade surpluses today invest large amounts - literally a few billion dollars - into solar research. Primarily concentrating solar power (CSP). What could be done over a decade with that kind of investment? No idea, but I think it would be a worthy avenue for a cash rich, solar rich, current oil exporter to explore. Also likely more profitable than nuclear, given the geopolitical implications and uranium scarcity in the Middle East.
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WNC Observer on December 7, 2007 - 10:45am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Investment in new production really is looking like a key variable, isn't it? You can have all the theoretical oil and "liquids" in the ground that you can imagine, but if the investments are not actually made to actually extract the stuff, there it continues to sit. I don't have the expertise of many of the others on this board, but it sure is sounding to me like the investments simply are not being made at a pace or extent that is consistent with a continuing expansion of global supply. If anything, it is really looking iffy for even keeping up with depletion, forget about any increases. Truly peak plateau time.
Which raises the question: What is really even possible when it comes to further investments. How much capacity does the earth have to ramp up production, even assuming that the oil is there to extract? How much investment capital is available for these projects, and how high AND STABLE must the price of oil be for the spigots to open up on the capital flows? And what happens if (when) we are in a global recession?
Maybe these are all "above ground factors", but I suspect they are going to loom very large indeed over the next decade or two.
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Alfred on December 7, 2007 - 3:27am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
I think that it is worth emphasizing that these are annual rates of decline - when I first glanced at these percentages, I thought they were rather low.
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westexas on December 7, 2007 - 8:19am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Note that the Rule of 72 works going up and going down. You can round it off to 70. For example, let's assume a country producing 10 mbpd. Their decline rate is -5%/year and their rate of consumption increase is +5%/year, starting at 2 mbpd.
Their production would be down by half in 14 years (70 divided 5) and their consumption would double in 14 years.
So, in 14 years, their net exports would be 5 mbpd - 4 mbpd = 1 mbpd, or a decline in net exports from 8 mbpd to 1 mbpd in 14 years (UK and Indonesian net exports crashed to zero in 7 years and 8 years respectively).
As noted above, the net export dynamics result in an accelerating net export decline rate, worse than an exponential decline rate.
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Chris Vernon on December 7, 2007 - 8:44am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
How does your analysis account for the fact that internal consumption can be a factor of the revenue generated from exports? It appears you are looking at internal consumption independently from the affect of falling exports has on the economy, on the propensity to consume. This can only be the case where the export revenue is small - not the case for the world's major exporters.
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westexas on December 7, 2007 - 9:15am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
As noted above, I would think that most net exporters in the world fall along a demographic continuum from Indonesia to the UK.
Regarding Saudi Arabia, we can say with near certainty that they will show, as the model predicts, an accelerating net export decline rate from 2006 to 2007, versus 2005 to 2006.
An excerpt from my Net Exports/Inventories article follows. I assumed a fourth quarter Saudi C+C production rate of 9 mbpd. The rapid increase in consumption is based on a report (from a source in Saudi Arabia) indicating that total Saudi liquids consumption is going up by 500,000 bpd in 2007 and 2008, because of the shortfall in natural gas production. Note that Rembrandt put Saudi consumption up at close to 10% in the first half of 2007.
The 2005 to 2006 numbers for Saudi Arabia are as follows (exponential increase/decrease per year, EIA, Total Liquids):
Production: -3.7%/year
Consumption: +5.7%/year
Net Exports: -5.5%/year
Extrapolating from year to date numbers, my estimates for 2006 to 2007 Saudi numbers are as follows (I am adding in some increased liquids consumption, because of their ongoing natural gas shortfall):
Production: -5.6%/year
Consumption: +10%/year
Net Exports: -9.5%/year
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mikepepler on December 7, 2007 - 4:18am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
And I guess that's the decline rate *after* every effort has been made to stem the decline. I wonder how low it would be if that work wasn't happening...
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Euan Mearns on December 7, 2007 - 5:49am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Mike and Chris - thanks very much for this. This statement is stunning:
By 2015, an extra 37.5 mb/d (million barrels per day) of production will be required. 13.6 mb/d of this is to meet new demand, while 23.9 mb/d is to replace declines in existing oil fields – a factor that is often overlooked.
... is often overlooked by who? Its as if the IEA have only just realised that decline chews most new production every year and understanding this basic fact has led them away from a world awash with oil - to Holly Crap - these pesky Oil Drum kids are right.
I suspect the decline will be calculated on C+C+NGL - all of which suffer from petrophysical declines - which does not affect bio-fuel or syncrude in the same way. So I'd guess that 4.5% will be close to the number they are using. This is the absolute minimum decline that will occur. Its possible to think of a number of reasons why actual declines may be higher and why new capacity may not come on as scheduled - undulating low altitude plateau here we come!
This statement is also fundamentally depressing:
The OECD countries must show leadership.
The leaders of the OECD currently operate on a principal of followship - and that is following pig ignorant public opinion and media hype.
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biggerpicture on December 7, 2007 - 2:03pm | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Euan-
To a large extent, I think decline rates are overlooked by many financial/investment analysts and others (CNBC, etc.) who semm to focus exclusively on how a slowdown in U.S. demand might impact oil prices. In fact, many argue that oil will trade in the mid $70 as the U.S. economy slows down. Of course what I find missing from this logic is that (1) China will likely buy any barrel the U.S. doesn't, but more importantly (2) decline rates make up significantly more of what is needed in terms of new supply than demand growth. Maybe Mr. Birol's breakdown of the numbers will get some of the less knowledgeable thinking. What is concerning about what he says is that if decline rates are 5% and we have project slippage of 20-30% (see Kashagan, Jack 2, etc.), we cannot begin to maintain existing production levels.
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ThatsItImout on December 7, 2007 - 4:23am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Chris,
Excellent post, and fascinating remarks by Fatih Birol. This post will be seen by several of my friends, by way of me, it is a great "big picture" view.
There is so much that can be discussed about Birol's remarks, but I will leave them for later, after I can re-read and digest all of the available information.
Two sentences stood out to me in the first reading:
"The reference scenario has Chinese economic growth at 7.5% for the next few years, falling to 6% up to 2030."
Is there any way we can get the Chinese economists to defect to Europe or the U.S.? What a fantastic run that would be, 23 years of 6% plus growth! It would make Ronald Reagan and Maggie Thatcher green with envy!
And that is the "reference scenario", the high growth calls for even more!
(my bet, they don't pull it off, but only time will tell!)
The other sentence of interest, ragarding demand for oil:
" Oil use is becoming more and more focused on transport, where there are no significant alternative fuels to substitute."
This is often forgotten. In the U.S. in particular, and also in Europe, the oil problem is essentially a transportation fuel problem. In the U.S., with only a few statistically marginal exceptions, almost all oil is used in transportation.
That is why the transportation consumption is where we MUST work first, hardest and fastest.
This is why the idea of "grid" based transportation is so revolutionary. It brings in all the energy producing methods that the grid is already using (solar, wind, nuclear, coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, etc) and puts them in direct competition with oil. It will be revolutionary, but we MUST get to work on this now, and in a big way. Birol makes this point perfectly:
What we do now will determine what happens over the next 20 years.
One more thing, and I know others will discuss this...what a logistical challenge for China to get that much coal out of the ground and or import it!
It will require massive infrastructure, rail cars, barges (coal is annoying to move in that it cannot be pipelined). What a challenge. Billions of investment will be required, opportunity for someone!
Roger Conner Jr.
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kenny on December 7, 2007 - 12:05pm | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Chinese growth simply cannot continue at the predicted rate of even the reference scenario. Resource competition will precipitate a broad global economic downturn long before 2030.
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 4:18am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Thumbs up to Fatih Birol, in my view he is sending the right message. Of course it is a belated one, based on unsound numbers but still an important shift away from the IEA's "don't worry be happy" traditional message.
Some points:
• The decline rate used for fields in production is 4%. Optimistic to say the least, given that CERA itself points to 4,5%;
• Even with those 4% we need a new Saudi to meet forecasted consumption growth;
• Given that the reporter meant Mtoe when he wrote Mtce, we have a Coal crunch on our way.
• [...] but we are running out of time.
Exactly the point; has Fatih Birol been reading TOD lately?
• In the reference scenario, CO2 emissions rise by 57% by 2030, ending up at 42 Gt per year and possibly causing a global temperature rise of 6C, which would be disastrous. The alternative scenario results in emissions levelling off at 34 Gt, possibly leading to a 3C temperature rise.
IEA's forecasts for fossil fuel use are still considerably above geologic/mathematical based ones. The assessment made by Dave Rutledge on this issue resulted in a total increase of 1.8º C over a period of 150 years;
• To achieve stabilisation of atmospheric CO2 levels at 450 ppm, for a 2C rise in global temperature, emissions need to drop from 27 Gt per year today [...]
These numbers also mismatch Dave Rutledge assessment, wich has higher fossil fuel use in 2030 than today but still resulting in a temperature increase below 2ºC;
On the Q&A very interesting comments on CCS. I'd would add that it looks really difficult for Europe to invest on an energy source that's not widely available internally and that could be facing a market crunch in the years ahead. Going for Renewables and if we can Nuclear looks indeed a much better choice than researching CCS for Coal.
Finally a point that should really alarm everyone in Europe, Fatih Birol raised skepticism on Russia's ability to fulfil present Natural Gas supply contracts. If it turns out to be so, Natural Gas can become a much deeper problem in Europe than Oil or Coal.
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mikepepler on December 7, 2007 - 4:26am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Given that the reporter meant Mtoe when he wrote Mtce, we have a Coal crunch on our way.
I copied down what was on his slides, but I agree, it's a bit weird to talk about Mtce for coal! Unless he meant various grades of solid fuel, in an equivalent tonnage of hard coal?
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 6:14am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Hi Mike, here's the difference:
1 tce = 29.3076 GJ
1 toe = 41.868 GJ
The problem is that the amount of Coal transactioned internationally today is about 300 Mtoe. If Birol had been using toe then we would be talking about China and India importing the equivalent to all the Coal coming to the international market today by 2030. If it's tce it's not as bad but still a worrisome scenario.
Ton of Coal Equivalent is indeed a rare measure, toe is much more common.
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mikepepler on December 7, 2007 - 7:18am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Hard to say which he meant then, but Mtce is what was on the screen. Maybe it should have just said Mtc?
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DaveR on December 7, 2007 - 7:47am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Hi Mike,
tce is a bad unit, because it does not correspond to the actual average energy in coal. The world average, from the BP Statistical Review, is 21GJ/t.
Dave
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 8:22am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Well Dave i think tce refers by default to hard Coal, hence the higher number. But I'm not certain.
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DaveR on December 7, 2007 - 11:14am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Hi Luis,
Agreed. The place I see tce most prominently is in the German BGR resource reports. This is ironic, because it is an anachronism even in Germany, where the focus is on lignite production, which has very low energy density.
Dave
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stiv on December 7, 2007 - 8:09am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
China's projected use of coal on top of existing uses is nothing short of terrifying. I don't think I need any mathematical models to come to the conclusion that humans are risking everything like a drunken gambler.
At some point, the "wheels are coming off"--better sooner than later.
We need more aggressive measures all around.
Immediately.
People must step up, switch to RE/conservation NOW,
so that a future might be possible!
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mikepepler on December 7, 2007 - 9:10am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
The fact that China/India are building 800GW of power plants between 2006 and 2015, which was said to be equivalent to all plants built in Europe 1945-2007, explains where the huge demand in coal is going to come from, as 90% will be burning it. I hope the rest of the world isn't counting on coal, unless they have their own reserves...
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 10:16am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Mike, this is really a point worth noting, we may in fact be facing a Coal crunch if this growth forecast comes to unfold.
The amount of Coal transactioned internationally is only 10% of what is extracted every year. In a very short number of years we could have too many importers for too few exporters.
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Chris Vernon on December 7, 2007 - 10:33am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
The amount of Coal transactioned internationally is only 10%...
That is a good point. In some respects coal is a more regional resource even than natural gas and clearly nothing like oil. Anyone have any details on oil-miles, gas-miles and coal-miles? i.e. how far the average unit of oil, gas or coal travels before being used? I suspect coal is the shortest with most being bunt no more a few hundred miles from its source.
This makes the distribution of coal critical for future global production – and here again coal is at an extreme with reserves even more concentrated in a small number of countries than oil. When China coal production peaks – the world coal production peaks, even if the US is still sitting on very large reserves.
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 10:45am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
The information I have from the national electric grid operator is that all Coal burned in Portugal for electricity generation comes from New Zealand, a country that is exactly in the antipodes. Some of the Coal exported by New Zealand also ends up in the UK.
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mikepepler on December 7, 2007 - 10:48am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
I guess the US will be OK, with its large reserves. The UK is opening up old coal mines right now, but I don't have the figures on whether they could ever replace our imports...
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obdacher on December 7, 2007 - 8:59am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Energywise Russia will split in an eastern system supplying the asian market, with Europe beeing stuck with old,tired and rapidly declining wells in western siberia.
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ccpo on December 7, 2007 - 10:13am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Fist time poster. Hope you all don't mind.
Luis said:
IEA's forecasts for fossil fuel use are still considerably above geologic/mathematical based ones. The assessment made by Dave Rutledge on this issue resulted in a total increase of 1.8º C over a period of 150 years...
These numbers also mismatch Dave Rutledge assessment, wich has higher fossil fuel use in 2030 than today but still resulting in a temperature increase below 2ºC;
Global warming of an additional 3°C would be a guarantee of ineffable disasters for humanity and other creatures of the planet. It is inconceivable that the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets could survive 3°C additional global warming, with expected warming 2-3 times larger at the location of the ice sheets.
A more realistic assessment is that global temperature should be kept approximately within the range of prior interglacial periods of the past million years, which implies that additional global warming (above the temperature in 2000) should be less than 1°C. If recent evidence of instability of the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets continues to increase, it may be that even 1°C additional global warming is dangerous for humanity.
Dangerous CO2.
A global warming limit of 1°C above the temperature in 2000 implies a CO2 limit of the order of 450 ppm. However, the CO2 limit is a function of the course of non-CO2 climate forcings (Hansen and Sato 2004).
I'm not familiar with Rutledge, but the new data on climate sensitivity is scary. This from Hansen at NASA:
This work indicates sensitivity is far higher than previously suspected. If you take out coal, it's doable. All that coal? It kills.
If the bulk of coal resources are removed from the equation, via use only at power plants with carbon capture and sequestration, it is readily possible to keep future CO2 well below 450 ppm (Kharecha and Hansen 2007).
Cheers,
ccpo
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 10:29am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
I do mind that you never posted before. Welcome to TOD ccpo (are you a robot? ;) )
Jim Hansen has papers for all tastes. Chris Vernon has been covering this issue for some time, check out this post based on one of Hansen's papers.
With this post it became clear that problematic temperature rises will occur solely if considerable amounts of Coal can be burned in the next decades. Later Dave showed how this hypothesis is improbable using the same models that backup the work made for the IPCC. Check this Coal round-up also by Chris.
As for the sensitivity analysis, that's a ground that I'm not comfortable to dive into.
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stiv on December 7, 2007 - 11:18am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Global warming is sucker punch that some people on TOD are not going to see coming.
Look around, look at the devastation.
Want more of that? You got it. Just burn coal.
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 11:46am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Skewed views do not interest me.
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goritsas on December 7, 2007 - 12:26pm | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Jim Hansen has papers for all tastes.
I'm not entirely clear as to what you're suggesting. Perhaps you could explicitly state your position?
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 1:06pm | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Follow the links to the different articles above and you'll get the idea.
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Boof on December 7, 2007 - 5:31am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
In my opinion Australia should not help out China and India with their extra coal needs. If through cap and trade Australia can cut domestic consumption by x% then export customers should take an x% cut also. Think of it as a kind of depletion protocol. Note that currently western Asia is a minor coal importer compared to Europe, Japan and South Korea.
The standard response may be that China and India will get the coal somewhere else. Well let them. However there is an ominous development. A month ago George Bush used to phone his mate John Howard for a chat. Now is Premier Jintao who phones Kevin Rudd who speaks Mandarin. I believe they may have discussed iron ore prices. Did the Premier also ask for a coal supply assurance?
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Chris Vernon on December 7, 2007 - 6:12am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
In my opinion Australia should not help out China and India with their extra coal needs.
Agreed. I think one of the most effective (and vaguely possible) responses to the climate change threat would be an Australian coal extraction/export cap. To burn coal and emit CO2 first one must dig it out of the ground. Rather than focus on the demand (electricity generation) side we could focus on the extraction. The new “green” Australian government could, conceivably, introduce coal extraction caps and in so doing apply the breaks to the growth in global coal combustion.
The bottom line when it comes to climate change is working out a way of leaving significant volumes of otherwise economically extractable fossil fuel in the ground.
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Luís de Sousa on December 7, 2007 - 6:26am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Boof you're an evil resource nationalist.
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DaveR on December 7, 2007 - 7:43am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Boof, Chris, Luis,
Australia is the leading coal exporter (net is 3Mboe/day, from the BP Statistical Review) and exports are up 50% since 1997. It does seem that Kevin Rudd should not get credit for signing up Australia for the Kyoto Protocol unless he also figures out how to roll back coal exports to the earlier level.
Dave
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tirwin on December 7, 2007 - 6:42am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
If they burn the amount of coal suggested here, the northern hemisphere burns as well as most of Australia. 450 ppm CO2 is bad enough. This will exceed it.
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DeltaGreen on December 7, 2007 - 7:19am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
This is some scary shit, to be sure. Sorry for the language, but it was the first thing that came into mind.
I need to re-read this whole piece and put it together in my mind, but it seems to me that we are entering a strange Twilight Zone here. The numbers for China and India are astonishing, but they tell no lies. We are not going to make it to 2015 in one piece, I think, there won't be enough oil to mitigate the decline, much less keep up with demand growth. The only good thing about this is that a hard economic crash will surely slow down this growth frenzy on the two giants, along with the rest of the world. A massive recession would definetly help to "destroy demand". It seems that TPTB are finally saying that peak oil is true, but they are still ignoring the writing on the wall (recession, suburban crash, decreased agricultural production, etc).
We are bound to see some very interesting times in the next 10 years, and that's for sure.
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Matt on December 7, 2007 - 7:49am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
NASA climatologist James Hansen:
Assuming that proven oil and gas reserves do not greatly exceed estimates of the Energy Information Administration, and recent trends are toward lower estimates, we show that it is feasible to keep atmospheric CO2 from exceeding about 450 ppm by 2100, provided that emissions from coal and unconventional fossil fuels are constrained. Coal-fired power plants without sequestration must be phased out before mid-century to achieve this CO2 limit.
The Stern Review has a 450 ppm CO2e stabilization path which requires a reduction of annual emissions by 30% by 2020 and another 30% by 2030.
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galacticsurfer on December 7, 2007 - 8:27am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Good to hear the PO meets GW finally at the big level of Hansen, et al. this saves us the head butting. Perhaps this stuff will finally come up in bali as they working from a false premise. As long as they are all there talking about limiting emissions maybe they could make a deal on enrgy usage restriction like the depletion protocol as that is more urgent to prevent conflict. We have to get used to the idea of Powerdown and sharing at the international level and such massive conferences are few and far between. If PO consciousness takes on in one to two years I suspect such a confeence as is now happening will be made for just this purpose with Kyoto/Bali, etc. as the model. We don'T need a peace conference after an energy war for Australia's coal and Saudi's oil but beforehand to avoid such a war. If an Obama or somebody actually comes to this realization (does he "get" PO?) before or after getting elected and then a true and serious energy crisis hits, apparent to all then such a course might just work as only a US president can press such change effectively, otherwise the whole system gets blocked up as has been the case since Bush took over.
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galacticsurfer on December 7, 2007 - 8:14am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
So the officaldom is just telling us we were right all along?
Now we can forget being a small rabblerouser sect when the press interprets this correctly, if they are numerate, which I doubt.
Shock in the press will presumably only occur when it cannot be avoided due to shortages and price shocks. Otherwise even when IEA makes a panic (and this is not that, at least officially, that might take a couple of years) like IPCC on climate it will be ignored as not being an everday problem but something manageable.
Slowly our PO opinion is becoming more main stream but it still means nothing to general public policy until... what?
I cerainly hope that by the elections or before the first SOTU address for the new president in Jan. 2009 there will be very drastic problems which make real action undeniable.
2008 should be fun, at least for us as we are mentally prepared and ready to give advice and lead.
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Matt on December 7, 2007 - 9:18am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Here is a video:
World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights
with Fatih Birol speaking, introduced by David G. Victor from the Council on Foreign Relations
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SamuM on December 7, 2007 - 10:26am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
This is quite a shocker, even if Faith/IEA has been hinting at this all year long.
Let me try and summarize:
1) There will not be enough oil at current consumption growth levels
2) If there's a significant oil shortage, economy will go run into serious problems (chaos? depression?)
3) Coal will be used, CSS or not and CSS does not look too promising yet.
4) CO2 emission growth looks bad, efficiency may not solve all issues.
5) China's economy is to continue to grow really fast, devouring lots of energy, growing in CO2 emissions.
6) All of the above combined is totally unsustainable (from many points of view)
he didn't mention anything about biofuels this time? Nevertheless IEA's stance has been so far:
7) Biofuels are fool's gold and won't scale to more than 10% of demand.
That is quite a mouthful (a powerpointful?) from an official still holding an important position.
So far most important energy officials saying unpleasant things about oil/coal/climate have all been retired or somehow out of the daily running.
If this doesn't show up in the media everywhere, I'll be sure to at least act surprised :)
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Prof. Goose on December 7, 2007 - 10:34am | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
thanks for your support!! :)
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Robert Marston on December 7, 2007 - 2:18pm | Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Cheers to Chris for this post! Not only did I find it informative, I think it's telling the IEA has admitted to so much uncertainty ahead for future oil supply and demand.
In the face of a crisis, leadership is often required to steer people through. Part of that is shifting focus away from the problem and toward workable solutions. But if this shift in focus essentially amounts to denial and perpetuation of the status quo (which now amounts to sunbathing on a sinking ship), then no viable solutions are proposed and leadership becomes an act of failure.
In 2004, 2005, and 2006 it seems most information coming out of the major energy watch dog groups around the world amounted to little more than denial. Now it seems we have a slow awakening to the problem represented by peak oil. I don't know about you guys, but it's excruciating for me to watch -- like a man standing a mere hundred feet away from an onrushing stampede of bulls who suddenly says -- "did you hear something?"
Not only am I disheartened by this excruciatingly slow awakening to the problem I also feel the proposed solutions are laughable.
In a continuation of the comic dialog above our leader says "Ah, that might be hoof beats! Which means there may be some bulls coming toward us! Maybe we should prepare to get off the path in a few hours?" Of course, if he just lifted his head and looked he could stare right into the horns of the oncoming stampede.
As many of you well know carbon capture coal plants, marginal gains in renewable energy supply, and more rigs poking more holes in the earth are not going to solve our energy problems. Rather, they would prolong and intensify. Given the dual problems of imminent depletion and increasingly damaging climate change, carbon based energy must be first marginalized and then phased out.
Timescale? Given current information it looks like we'll need to start yesterday and finish within 30 years.
What I'm looking for is not only recognition of the current problem which, with each passing year, seems to become more and more obvious and hard to ignore, but also a proposed and adhered to set of solutions that leaves the civilized world intact after the coming crisis.
In my opinion, this involves significant and decisive action toward a renewables based economy. The technology for most of this stuff is available now. It is simply a question of:
1. Political will to change
2. Tax incentives to encourage efficiency and development of renewable infrastructure.
3. Direct investment in the technologies that are proven to work NOW.
4. Turning a deaf ear to the howls of the dying oil and fossil fuels industries.
In the end, there is no civilized future in fossil fuels. The future they perpetuate is one of poverty, brutality, war, and collapse of global civilization.
As ones aware of this problem, we need to do our best not only to inform people about the dire danger we face but also turn people's eyes to its obvious solutions. If we allow the immensity of the problem to captivate and paralyze us then we will be almost as bad as those who still deny the problem exists in the first place.
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