Suzanne A. Celmer-Harter, MA, BS, MT(ASCP) - Home



Serious Communicable Disease Unit Laboratory Business PlanSuzanne Celmer-HarterLDR 609Dr. John Fick, FACHEA project submitted in partial fulfillmentof the requirement for the degreeMaster of Arts Siena Heights UniversityJune 26, 2017Table of ContentsExecutive Summary-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3Strategic Direction-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4Environmental Scan-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5External Factors-U.S. Preparedness Strategies----------------------------------------------------------5Regional Factors-State of Michigan Tiered Response System----------------------------------------6Internal Factors-Risk Assessment for Beaumont Wayne Laboratory--------------------------------7Laboratory Preparedness Process-------------------------------------------------------------------------8Facility Planning-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10Financial Budget and Capital Resource Requirements-----------------------------------------------11Implementation Plan--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12References--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15Appendix A Biosafety Risk Assessment Worksheet-------------------------------------------------17Appendix B Renovation of Laboratory for Creation of SCDU Laboratory-----------------------25Appendix C Financial Costs Associated with Creation of SCDU Laboratory--------------------26Appendix D Serious Communicable Disease Unit/Laboratory Training Curriculum------------27Serious Communicable Disease Unit Laboratory Business PlanExecutive SummaryBeaumont Wayne serves the Western Wayne County region in Michigan as a 215-bed community hospital with a level III trauma center accredited by the American College of Surgeons (ACS) (Beaumont Health, Beaumont Hospital, Wayne, 2017). Beaumont Wayne’s emergency department is equipped with 47 beds, and the intensive care unit has 18 monitored beds to provide critical care to its patients. The hospital is located four miles from Detroit Metropolitan Airport (DTW) and has a long-term relationship with the airport for emergency response and provision of care.Beaumont Wayne is an active member of the Region 2 South Healthcare Coalition, participating in emergency preparedness planning and drills ranging from mass casualty incidents to rapid emerging serious communicable disease scenarios. As hospital most proximal to the DTW international airport, Wayne has maintained a contract with the CDC Quarantine Station since the SARS outbreak of 2005 as the primary referral facility for evaluation of ill air travel passengers screened through the station. (J. Cargill, personal communication, September 22, 2016)This plan provides specific guidance for Beaumont Wayne’s laboratory response to Ebola and other serious communicable diseases. Creation of a serious communicable disease laboratory, which will allow early identification of the disease and diagnostic treatment, is critical for infection control, providing medical care, and keeping staff safe from transmission of the disease. The principles and specifics of this plan pertain to Beaumont Wayne and follow the guidance and recommendations of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services. Strategic DirectionBeaumont Health is committed to providing the highest quality of care to all patients, which it serves regardless of the type of illness or disease. Compassion is a fundamental attribute to be a Beaumont Health physician, employee or volunteer. It is so critically important, compassion is reflected in our mission, vision and values: Our mission-Compassionate, extraordinary care every day; Our vision-To be the leading high-value health care network focused on extraordinary outcomes through education, innovation and compassion. Our values:CompassionRespectIntegrityTeamworkExcellence. (Beaumont Health, About us: Mission, vision and values, 2017, para. 1-4)An integral part of the mission, vision and values of Beaumont Health is providing the highest level of readiness for public health events by providing a strategic and operational framework, along with the resources to respond and protect patients, visitors, staff, and communities in the event of a serious communicable disease threat. The goal of Beaumont Health is to coordinate, communicate, and collaborate with hospitals within the system, the airport, and local/state departments of health to meet the demands of a public health emergency through mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Beaumont Health is committed to providing a safe environment for all that meets the CDC and MDHHS recommendations and regulations for care.Environmental ScanIn 1976, Ebola appeared in “two simultaneous outbreaks in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Ebola disease is named for the Ebola River, located in a village in the Congo” (World Health Organization, 2017, para. 1). Ebola is a virus that is transmitted through blood and body fluids. According to the WHO (2017), Ebola patients are contagious only when the disease has progressed, and the patient becomes symptomatic. Symptoms appear 2 to 21 days after exposure and include fever, muscle pain, headache, fatigue, diarrhea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and hemorrhaging. The primary treatment for Ebola patients is supportive care with electrolyte replacement, blood pressure control, and respiratory support (Guarner, 2014). External Factors-U.S. Preparedness StrategiesIn 2014, the largest to date Ebola epidemic occurred, which affected multiple countries in West Africa. The overall risk of Ebola in the United States was and currently remains low. The United States implemented safeguards against Ebola by requiring travelers from the three primary affected countries to fly into one of five major airports, which conducted intensive screening for the virus. Travelers were required to have their temperatures checked for signs of fever, which may have indicated symptoms of the Ebola virus. Upon absence of fever, travelers were entered into a public health registry as a Person Under Investigation (PUI) and were monitored daily by their local health department. Any change in a person’s status regarding symptoms within 21 days after arrival from the West African countries resulted in a public health alert, and the traveler admitted to a local hospital that was set up to accept potential Ebola patients. Patients assessed as having a high risk of Ebola were admitted to an isolation unit at the hospital, and evaluated by infection control specialists, the local and state health departments, and the CDC. If a diagnosis of Ebola was being considered, laboratory confirmation of the Ebola virus was required (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016).Regional Factors-State of Michigan Tiered Response SystemIt was an unrealistic expectation that all potential Ebola patients coming from outside of the United States would have been diverted to one of the five selected airports for screening and evaluation and remained close to the airport location for up to three weeks after arrival. The CDC distributed contact information about screened passengers to state health departments based on the traveler’s residence. The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) assessed individuals arriving in Michigan after travel to an affected country for risk of development of Ebola for up to 21 days. In addition, all patients that presented to hospitals for treatment needed to be screened for recent travel history utilizing CDC and MDHHS algorithms. Once a potential Ebola patient was identified, the hospital should have initiate an internal response protocol.MDHHS, in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), has created a tiered system to designate the response capabilities of hospitals. There are four tiers established, each with different requirement needs to provide treatment, transfer or receive patients. Local and state public health departments, hospitals, and emergency responders are aware of the tier designation for each facility in its region to ensure patients are transported to the correct location every time. Tier 1 and Tier 2 hospitals are required to treat patients. Tier 1 facilities will accept transfers from all other facilities in the region. Tier 2 facilities will only accept transfers from facilities within the same hospital system. Tier 3 and Tier 4 facilities are required to isolate and hold patients for up to 24 – 96 hours and then transfer patients to a Tier 1 or Tier 2 treatment center (Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, 2017).As previously stated, in 2014, Beaumont Wayne was designated as Beaumont Health system’s Tier 2 hospital for evaluation and treatment of patients with serious communicable diseases. This designation required Beaumont Wayne to provide the capability to intake, isolate, screen, test, and treat the serious communicable disease patient for the duration of their care and recovery (Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, 2017). Beaumont Wayne was selected for this designation because of the close proximity to the airport, and the physical features that permitted effective patient intake and isolation, including direct access to the ED and ICU negative pressure isolation rooms from the exterior of the facility. Tier 2 capability requires the ongoing dedication and commitment of significant planning, financial, equipment, personnel, training, and physical structure resources according to CDC guidelines.Internal Factors-Risk Assessment for Beaumont Wayne LaboratoryThe risk of acquiring Ebola through laboratory testing is low but not zero. “Biosafety practices should be adhered to in all laboratories that receive potentially infectious material in order to ensure laboratory personnel, public and environmental safety” (Association of Public Health Laboratories, 2015, p. 1). Laboratories considering performing serious communicable disease testing are required to perform a risk assessment to mitigate hazards. This assessment represents the precautions that have been taken at Beaumont Wayne laboratory to safely handle specimens from persons under investigation for serious communicable diseases. Analysis of equipment, procedures, and processes was accomplished by evaluating engineering controls, administrative practices, and process pathways (see Appendix A Biosafety Risk Assessment). Laboratory PreparednessAs previously stated, Beaumont Wayne was designated to be a Tier 2 hospital. Initial preparation was done to set up a Serious Communicable Disease Unit (SCDU) lab. Equipment and instruments were purchased and validated. Laboratory volunteers were selected, but no drilling was performed for specimen collection, transportation, analysis, waste containment and donning/doffing of PPE. The Ebola outbreak was contained, and the laboratory was dismantled in January 2016. In September 2016, MDHHS performed an unannounced drill to determine the site’s preparation for communicable diseases. No departments were ready, and leaders were given the directive to reinitiate SCDU units and provisions for care. The first step was to do a SWOT analysis.StrengthsExecutive confirmation for Beaumont Health to have a SCDU program to align with our mission to provide compassionate care every dayAt system level, large clinical staff to recruit resourcesWealth of research now published related to SCD Units including templates, processes, and proceduresMost instrumentation is currently in place in the laboratoryWeaknessesLeadership at executive level-corporate steering committee was not formed Lab team was formed in 2014 from volunteers but never drilled -No training for donning and doffing PPEFacility without renovations does not support programBSC was moved offsite. Will need to bring back and recertify prior to useCosts excessive to maintain SCDU, which may never be used for patient careOpportunitiesCreation of steering committeeNew policies allow for core instruments to be usedRe-frame program to create additional benefit to Beaumont for emerging diseases, research and fundingThreatsInadequate training could cause harm to staffPoor public image/financial impact if hospital is perceived to be unpreparedNegative impact on employee retention if they feel unsafeIn addition to the SWOT analysis, a preparedness evaluation for the current state of Beaumont Wayne was conducted in conjunction with laboratory, infection control, nursing, environmental services (EVS), employee health, and emergency/trauma services. PeopleWho would be in charge and direct the SCDUHow would volunteers be recruitedWould have to prepare for 96-hour staffing roosterTrain all personnel in PPEDrill in all activities: Intake, care, lab, imaging, procedures, waste handling, body managementProcessED intake and identificationIsolation, selection, and preparation of treatment areaTransfer of patient from ED to SCDUTreatment area processes: patient care, laboratory, imaging, cleaning, waste management, equipment protection and reprocessingPost care HCW monitoringEnvironmentSCD area: OBS A versus ICU, window needed by state requirements to view outsideHow to handle visqueen wall placement to separate SCD patients from ICU populationSCD area mapping, steps to prepare and drillingClean to dirty HCW flowIsolation integrity prevention maintenanceLab specimen collection, handling, processing, transport and testing flowWaste collection, storage, disposalTerminal clean of areasEquipmentPPE, on-hand and replenishing suppliesNo PAPRS currently purchasedDisposable bedside equipmentIdentification of non-disposable equipment, contamination mitigation, and decontamination in terminal processAV patient and staff monitoring including communication equipment neededPatient internet and phone communication neededEvaluation of utilization of lab point of care instrumentation versus core analyzersRecertification of BSC How do you handle need for radiography procedures i.e. CT, MRI, IRSince the unannounced drill transpired in September 2016, monthly meetings of Beaumont Wayne’s SCDU planning committee have occurred. Members have been charged with preparing their departments for initiation of a SCDU event. The drill made it painfully apparent that Beaumont Wayne was far from being able to sustain a SCD Unit and laboratory. In the laboratory, reestablishment of point of care instrumentation, manual kit testing, and policies and procedures have been developed or reevaluated for current established practices in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases caused by special pathogens. Preparation is ongoing. The ultimate goal is to be able to support Beaumont Health’s mission, vision and values as well as providing staff a safe workplace that is free from personal harm or danger.Facility PlanningThe former glass washroom adjacent to the main lab where the deionized water system is currently located was selected as the area to configure for the Serious Communicable Disease Unit Laboratory. Renovations will require the room to be gutted, and the deionized water system that serves the chemistry analyzers relocated. The room will need it be divided into three sections. The largest section, which will be referred to, as the (red zone), will be against the back wall where the deionized water was located. A stainless steel counter will need to be constructed that runs parallel to the wall. The biological safety cabinet will be placed on the counter. A sink with an eyewash station is required in the room. A refrigerator, packaging area, and supply shelves will need to be located in the area. The front section of the divided room closest to the door will have to be subdivided into two small rooms: one for donning and one for doffing. All traffic must flow in a circle from clean/donning (green zone) to BSC room (red zone) to doffing room (yellow zone). It was also suggested to make the room negative pressure to accommodate potential contamination from doffing and in consideration of future pathogens. The ceiling will have to be constructed of a solid material without separate acoustical tiles. The walls dividing the rooms will have to have glass windows. Because rooms are small, traditional doors that open inward are not a possibility. The SCDU lab will need glass doors that would slide open with a push pad (operated by an uncontaminated elbow) for all three rooms. A shower and eyewash station is also required in the doffing area (yellow zone), along with space for biohazard waste bins. Finally, the donning room (green zone) will need to have storage spaces for clean PPE. All dimensions must follow the CDC guidelines for the creation of Biological Safety Laboratories (see Appendix B Renovation of Laboratory for Creation of SCDU Laboratory).The operational impact of not creating a separate Serious Communicable Disease Laboratory would be severe to Beaumont Health System and affect the diagnostic testing that we could perform for critical patients. This construction is required to provide the SCDU level of laboratory services needed for Beaumont Wayne as the Tier 2 for Beaumont Health system. If the SCDU laboratory renovation is not approved, the laboratory will not be able to support the system initiative of providing care for these potentially highly contagious patients.Financial Budget and Capital Resource RequirementsDuring the initial pandemonium of the 2014 Ebola presence in the U.S., hospitals and laboratories rushed to set up SCD units without much forethought about costs and sustainability. A survey done in 2015 showed, “45 of the US hospitals spent a cumulative total of $53.9 million (nearly $1.2 million per facility) to stand up their specialized isolation units” (Herstein, et al., 2017, p. 965). At Beaumont Wayne, there was a proposal done in 2014 to build a new addition to the hospital to house the SCDU (patient care and laboratory) at the cost of over $3 million dollars (J. Cargill, personal communication, May 19, 2017). Funding and project approval was never obtained, and the hysteria of Ebola preparedness died down by the end of 2015. “Without the impending threat of Ebola virus disease (EVD) or another highly infectious disease (HID) on the immediate horizon, public attention on HID preparedness tends to waver, and governments tend to prioritize and shift funding elsewhere” (Herstein, et al., 2017, p. 967). However, hospitals must remain vigilant for current or new threats to public health. Healthcare organizations must be in a state of continual readiness to manage public health events including the new emergence of pathogens that are not yet on anyone’s radar. In regards to Ebola and many other pathogenic diseases, “early diagnosis and treatment are essential to initiate supportive treatment before irreversible shock occurs to prevent further spreading of the disease” (Cao, Senn, Castaneda, Humphries, & Karger, 2017, p. 189). If an healthcare system is to remain dedicated to this type of patient care, it will require the ability to commit organizationally and financially to the project. A report of all of the costs that have been spent by the laboratory to establish a SCDU laboratory along with the projected future costs is attached (see Appendix C Financial Costs Associated with Creation of SCDU Laboratory). A dedicated and supported SCDU laboratory will not be limited to care of Ebola patients but could be used for other serious communicable disease including multi-drug resistant TB, Botulism, Tularemia, Anthrax, SARS, MERS, Avian Influenza, Monkeypox, Smallpox, and Plague.Implementation PlanProviding effective testing and diagnostic care for a serious communicable patient in a safe environment for laboratorians is the prime focus of this plan and our organization. Education of healthcare workers and prevention of exposure is crucial. It is imperative that laboratory staff receive the most current specialized training and is confident in their comprehension of policies, procedures, and protocols. Creating a team of dedicated laboratorians is the first step in the implementation of the Serious Communicable Disease Unit Laboratory. Education about infection control and correct utilization of personal protective equipment (PPE) is required. Healthcare workers must understand and have the knowledge of how to protect themselves by donning and doffing PPE in a methodical manner, so they do not accidentally contaminate themselves with blood or body fluids from patient samples. In addition, staff must be able to perform testing while garbed in PPE. Initial donning and doffing training will be done in a three-day hospital workshop with facilitators who will take each team member accurately and precisely through each step (see Appendix D Serious Communicable Disease Unit/Laboratory Training Curriculum). One day will be dedicated to the performance of testing, including utilizing the biological safety cabinet and packaging specimens for internal and external transport while in PPE. Continual preparedness will be accomplished through quarterly refresher training days, as well as, unannounced emergency responder drills. All team members will be educated in how to use the laboratory equipment including set-up, reagent loading, calibrations, performing and documenting daily quality control, performing patient analysis, result entry, maintenance, and troubleshooting instrumentation. Per accreditation regulations by College of American Pathologists (CAP), technologist (and nursing staff that performs point of care testing at the patient’s bedside) will be assessed for competency at the initial learning event, six months after initial learning, and annually for the remainder of their tenure on the team. Additionally, technologists will be assessed for competency regarding specimen procurement, handling, transport, packaging, and waste management. Checklists will be created for staff to use to verify every step in a procedure or protocol for anything requiring competency assessment. Any changes in protocols will be communicated to team members verbally and through written communications via policy and procedural changes in document control. Team members will have to sign off to verify they understand the changes and will adhere to the updated policies and procedures. Timelines for implementation is dependent on the organization’s ability to determine financial support for the renovation of the SCDU and laboratory. If the financial support is approved, it will be approximately three to six months for site construction to be completed. The laboratory is currently able to perform testing for SCD patients on closed tube specimens on the current automated instrumentation. Personnel can be trained on all instrumentation and PPE within a month. All testing that requires opening specimen tubes will need to be sent to MDHHS laboratory for testing until the laboratory can establish a permanent site for the biological safety cabinet and staff are trained in donning and doffing of PPE.ConclusionAs one can see from the frequency of medical headlines in the news to serious preparation regulations directed by federal and state health agencies, preparation for future critical pathogenic diseases is necessary. Facilities must take action to prepare themselves for biological attacks made on our communities. It is a healthcare organization’s commitment to public health that requires facilities to adopt measures to prepare for potential attacks and keep our citizens and employees cared for and safe.References BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 Association of Public Health Laboratories. (2015, April). A biosafety checklist: Developing a culture of biosafety. Retrieved from Association of Public Health Laboratories: Health. (2017). About us: Mission, vision and values. Retrieved from Beaumont Health: Health. (2017). Beaumont Hospital, Wayne. Retrieved from Beaumont Health: , J., Senn, C., Castaneda, P., Humphries, S., & Karger, A. B. (2017). Establishing a stand-alone laboratory dedicated to the care of patients with ebola virus disease. Laboratory Medicine, 48(2), 188-194. doi:10.1093/labmed/lmw072Guarner, J. (2014). When the rubber meets the road: Dealing with a returning traveler from West Africa during the ebola outbreak of 2014. American Journal for Clinical Pathology, 142(4), 428-430. doi:10.1309/AJCPEPQB4G3ECCOPHerstein, J. J., Biddinger, P. D., Gibbs, S. G., Le, A. B., Jelden, K. C., Hewlett, A. L., & Lowe, J. J. (2017). Sustainability of high-level isolation capabilities among US ebola treatment centers. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 23(6), 965-967. doi:10.3201/eid2306.170062Michigan Department of Health and Human Services. (2017). Four tiers of MI hospitals ebola virus disease: Preparedness and response. Retrieved from Michigan Department of Health and Human Services: . Department of Health and Human Services. (2016, July 8). CDC’s response to the 2014–2016 ebola epidemic West Africa and United States. CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 65(3), 1-112. Retrieved from Health Organization. (2017, May). Ebola virus disease. Retrieved from World Health Organization: A: Biosafety Risk Assessment WorksheetBeaumont Health WayneLaboratory Biosafety Risk Assessment WorksheetCDC and MDHHS Recommendations (APHL Template)Hospital Laboratory Name:Beaumont WayneDate of Assessment:June 17, 2017Name of Assessor:Suzanne Celmer-Harter, BS MT(ASCP)Laboratory Director/ManagerBiosafety Level:BSL 2 LaboratoryName of Organism/Agent:Ebola VirusProcedurePotential Hazard(s)ControlRecommended GuidelinesSpecimen Collection from potential SDU patient-Nursing to obtain specimen(s)Needle stick injuriesOnly trained personnel allowed to perform specimen collection following universal precautions protocols.Appropriate PPE is required.Only plastic tubes can be used: no glass.Dispose of sharps in approved designated container.Doff hand PPE per protocol; immerse site of injury with 70% alcohol for 30 seconds, wash with soap and water.Immediately seek medical evaluation.Report and document incident per EHS protocol.Handling of Specimen(s)-Nursing to package specimen(s) in patient room according to protocol-triple bagged wiping the specimen(s) and bags with bleach wipes and allowing drying between bags.)Dropping or failure to tighten specimen container lid(s) resulting in specimen tube leakage or breakageEnsure all specimen tubes collected are tightly sealed.If cap has to be removed from tube to fill with specimen, make sure that it is put firmly back in place and wrapped with parafilm.Follow protocol for biological spills notify management.Decontaminate and collect waste according to protocol.Don new PPE after cleanup.Redraw or collect new specimen(s).Leaking of specimen(s) in bagInspect each individual bag to ensure it is free of tears, rips, or holes before placing specimen(s) inside.Individually bag specimen(s) collected and decontaminate each exterior.Follow protocol for biological spills.If leakage is within the first bag, but contained inside the second bag, discard specimen(s) according to protocol.If leakage has occurred through all bags, follow protocol for disinfection of specimen(s)/bags and transport container.Immediately notify nursing personnel of unacceptable specimen(s) and document on log sheet.Transport of Specimens(s)Dropping of specimen(s) collected causing tube(s) to break/leakOnly trained personnel in appropriate PPE are allowed to transport specimen(s).Carefully handle all specimen(s) wearing PPE and place transport box on cart (never hand carry).Do not use pneumatic tube systemUse less populate routes for intra-facility transport with security clearance.Follow protocol for biological spills.If leakage is within the first bag, but contained inside the second bag, discard specimen(s) according to protocol.If leakage has occurred through all bags, follow protocol for disinfection of specimen(s)/bags and transport container.Immediately notify nursing personnel of unacceptable specimen(s) and document on log sheet.Breakage of specimen(s) in transportation boxSpecimen(s) must be transported in a durable, leak-proof transport container.Ensure specimen transport box is fully intact with no cracks or breakage before placing specimen(s) inside.Don new PPE per protocol if integrity has been broken.Place specimen(s) into new specimen transport box.Immediately notify management.Processing and Testing of Specimen(s)Aerosolization, Splash, or Splatter due to vortexing or centrifugationWear appropriate PPE to prevent from contact with skin, eyes, and clothing.Only perform vortexing or centrifugation in BSC with sash at appropriate level.Limit traffic around BSC and minimize number of personnel in PPE handling specimen(s).Make sure all lids on specimens are on tight before vortexing or centrifuging.Use sealed rotor in centrifuge.Follow all acceptable BSC practices.Rapid/kit testing must be performed inside BSC.If specimen(s) break inside centrifuge, wait 60 minutes for aerosols to settle before opening lid and assessing spill.Wash exposed skin with soap and water.Utilize Eye wash according to protocol for exposure to eyes.Remove contaminated clothing or shoes.Follow Infection Control Protocols for exposure, which may include showering.Specimen(s), equipment and all materials must be decontaminated before removing from BSC.Immediately notify management.Transfer of contaminated material from the BSC or contamination of BSC surfacesOnly trained personnel in PPE are allowed to perform testing.Ensure personnel don appropriate PPE to be protected from exposures.Wipe all tube(s) with disinfectant wipes. Place tube(s) into a bag (inspected for tears) along with a disinfectant wipe. Seal and wipe outside of bag with disinfectant wipe and place in second bag. Repeat with third bag and wipe outside of bag.Discard specimen(s) in appropriate waste container.Wipe inside of BSC with disinfectant. Immediately notify management.Aerosolization, Splash, or Splatter due to analysis on instrumentation-no vents are present on instrumentation to allow potential exposure while instrument is running.Always follow manufacturer’s recommendations for utilizing instruments.Never operate instruments without protective covers or shields in place.Wear appropriate PPE to prevent from contact with skin, eyes, and clothing.Limit traffic around instrumentation and minimize number of personnel in PPE handling specimen(s).Make sure all lids on specimens are on tight and not broken/cracked before placing specimen(s) on analyzers.Do not remove caps from specimen(s) prior to placement on analyzer.Do not perform dilutions. Accept > linearity range for results.Wash exposed skin with soap and water.Utilize Eye wash according to protocol for exposure to eyes.Remove contaminated clothing or shoes.Follow Infection Control Protocols for exposure, which may include showering.Specimen(s), equipment and all materials must be decontaminated before removing from BSC.Immediately notify management.Malfunction of instrumentEnsure all equipment works according to manufacturer’s instructions prior to specimen(s) arriving in lab.Place specimen(s) in a secure area for storage (BSC or refrigerator in SCDU lab until instrument is operational.Notify nursing that testing cannot be performed immediately.Call technical support hotline for troubleshooting instructions. Place service call for onsite support if needed. Notify management immediately.Accidental exposure to a piece of an instrument that was used for SCDU patient testingOnly trained personnel in appropriate PPE are allowed to operate instruments.Limit number of individuals near instrument during and after analysis (prior to final decontamination).Utilize appropriate PPE to prevent contact.Wash exposed skin with soap and water immediately.If exposure is an injury, which breaks the skin, carefully doff PPE, and wash in 70% alcohol for 30 seconds, wash with soap and water.Remove contaminated clothing or shoes.Immediately seek medical evaluation.Report and document incident per EHS protocol.Packaging of Specimen(s) for External TransportLeaking packageInspect each individual bag to ensure it is free of tears, rips, or holes before placing specimen(s) inside.Individually bag specimen(s) collected and decontaminate each exterior.Pack specimen(s) according to Category A transport procedure.Discard leaking package according to contaminated waste protocol.Immediately notify nursing.Immediately notify management.Waste CollectionExternal contamination of waste containersOnly trained personnel in appropriate PPE are allowed to collect waste for disposal.Ensure personnel don appropriate PPE.Only trained EVS employees can remove waste from lab and facility.Waste containers must be disinfected before removal from BSC and lab.If waste container is leaking, use appropriate PPE to contain spill.Limit the number of people with access to the area.Notify EVS to have trained personnel in appropriate PPE clean and disinfect area.EVS will isolate the waste container and control spill.Storing of Specimen(s) awaiting External TransportMalfunction in designated refrigeratorEnsure storage units are functioning prior to specimen arrival (check temperature and alarm status).Utilize a backup storage unit if available.Pack in dry ice and leave at room temperature for up to four hours.Appendix B: Renovation of Laboratory for Creation of SCDU LaboratoryAppendix C: Financial Costs/Budget Associated with Creation of SCDU LaboratoryHospital NameEbola Treatment CenterActivity DescriptionActivity Time PeriodApproximate/Estimated CostCurrent costsAssure Readiness of Ebola Treatment/Assessment Center activitiesBeaumont Wayne LaboratoryEquipment-Refrigerator12/2014$549.00Beaumont Wayne LaboratoryEquipment-Statspin centrifuge12/2014$2,653.00Beaumont Wayne LaboratoryEquipment-BSL 2 biosafety cabinet12/2014$12,615.00Beaumont Wayne LaboratoryEquipment-Hemochron Elite coag analyzer12/2014$7,100.00Beaumont Wayne LaboratoryEquipment-Hematology Drucker QBC star12/2014$6,950.00Beaumont Wayne LaboratoryEquipment-Hematology Sysmex pocHi-lab5/2017$16,900.00Beaumont Wayne LaboratoryEquipment-Chemistry Piccolo Express12/2014$10,800.00Beaumont Wayne LaboratoryEquipment-Chemistry Abbott i-Stat12/2014$10,493.00Beaumont Wayne Laboratory Testing supplies; QC; cartridges, tubes, calibrators, kits, verification samples12/14-5/17$22,468.00Beaumont Wayne Laboratory CAP proficiency surveys2015-2017$2,610.00Beaumont Wayne Laboratory Salary of technical personnel utilized during lab setup10/16-5/17$37,464.00Total Current Costs:$130,602.00Projected Future CostsBeaumont Wayne Laboratory Enhancements to physical infrastructure to ensure infection control for Ebola/Special Pathogen preparedness and response activities: Lab-250 sq. ft., relocation and renovation of two additional sites-250 sq. ft. Renovation cost estimated to be $350 sq. ft. to include new HVAC for negative pressure and relocation of electrical panel for main laboratory2017-2018$175,000.00Total 2017 Costs SCDU Lab Implementation:$303,987.30Beaumont Wayne Laboratory Maintenance and recertification of Biological Safety CabinetTwice/year$1000.00Beaumont Wayne Laboratory Reagents and supplies for testing (estimate)annual$20,000.00Beaumont Wayne Laboratory CAP proficiency surveys, CAP and CLIA license to perform testingannual$3000.00Beaumont Wayne Laboratory Vendor Service agreements for instrumentation (estimate)annual$15,000.00Beaumont Wayne Laboratory Labor costs for quarterly drilling/training/competency of 6-8 technologistsannual$10,000.00Beaumont Wayne Laboratory Labor costs for 2 technologists on-call staffing 24h/d, 7d/wkannual$52, 600.00Beaumont Wayne Laboratory Administrative costs of SCDU technical specialist (0.5 FTE)annual$35,000.00Future Annual Budget Costs$136,600.00Appendix D: Serious Communicable Disease Unit/Laboratory Training CurriculumBeaumont Hospital WayneSerious Communicable Disease Unit/Laboratory TeamTraining CurriculumTeam Member Name:_______________________________________________________Employee ID:______________________________________________________________Date(s) of Training:_________________________________________________________Type of Training (initial or refresher):_________________________________________Name of Preceptor(s):_______________________________________________________Team Member Achieved Proficiency (Yes or No):________________________________Proficiency Reassessment Dates (if needed):_____________________________________(Initials indicate the student has been shown, understands and demonstrates proficiency)Date:PreceptorInitialsStudentInitialsIntroductionPurpose of SCDU TeamMission & Values of BHS and SCDU TeamAssumptions/Commitment Risk Assessment SafetyTraining plan and EducationEmployee HealthCare provider symptom questionnaireExposure and symptom monitoringMDHHS guidance for monitoring and movementImmunizationsSerious Communicable DiseasesReview of select serious communicable diseases, EbolaUniversal infection prevention strategies and practicesInfection Prevention Guidance Summary for HCP Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)PPE Guidance Matrix for Serious Communicable DiseasesEmployee physical evaluation checklistPPE requirements including Fit Testing for N-95 maskPPE and Cleaning Supply ListTrained observer, Trained observer checklistDonning procedurePPE donning checklistDoffing procedurePPE doffing checklistDonning and doffing PPE with N-95 maskDonning and doffing PPE with PAPRS (if needed in lab)Cleaning and disinfecting PAPR battery and tubingBHS Patient Screening and IntakeIdentify Isolate, Inform Algorithm (Figure 2.1)ED Algorithm, ED Job action sheetsAmbulatory Sites AlgorithmCommunication Communication Plan A Communication Plan B Communications TimeLine HICS & Notification of MDHHSSerious Communicable Disease Unit (SCDU)SCDU backgroundStandard Operating ProceduresPhysical characteristics, unit layoutActivation of the SCDUCare of the SCDU Patient related to ancillary servicesSpecimen collection, blood draw for EVDI-Stat, misc. point of care testing (assisting nursing)Blood product administration in SCDUEthics recommendations for the care of the SCDU patient Autopsy and tissue policiesObtaining and Processing Laboratory SpecimensGuidelines for laboratory precautions and safetyLaboratory notification and consultationPatient log sheets for processing and analysisSpecimen procurement and handlingSpecimen procurement and handling checklistTransporting specimens within the hospital to labTransport checklistPacking and shipping specimens to MDHHS or CDCPacking and shipping to an external facility checklistUtilization of Biological Safety CabinetCentrifugation safetyLaboratory test menuAnalysis of Laboratory SpecimensUtilization of Automated Instrumentation ProcedureDXH training and proficiencyTop 500 training and proficiencyDXC/DXI training and proficiencyPreparation for analysis and decontamination proceduresChecklist for decontamination of instrumentsPoint of Care TestingpocHi training and proficiencyHemochron Elite training and proficiencyPiccolo training and proficiencyi-Stat training and proficiencyAlere BinaxNow Malaria training and proficiencyFlu, Strep A, RSV kit testing training and proficiencyUrinalysis multistix dip testing training and proficiencyBlood BankProcedure for blood bank testingSelection and processing of blood products for transfusionEnvironmental Infection ControlCleaning/Disinfection of BSC unit and SCDU laboratoryCleaning/ Disinfection/ Waste management checklistBiohazard waste removal-notification of EVSManagement of Contaminated Equipment Intended for Disposal/Repair/MaintenanceRefresher trainingDonning and doffing proceduresPAPRS (if needed by lab)I have read all policies related to the above topics, have practiced the procedures, and understand the expectations and requirements to be a member of the SCDU team and perform testing.Signature:______________________________________________ Date:_________________Management Review:_____________________________________ Date:_________________ ................
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