University of Manchester



Limits of Deconstruction, Deconstructing limitsErica BurmanErica.burman@manchester.ac.ukI am honoured by Feminism & Psychology (F&P) devoting this Issue to a reassessment of Deconstructing Developmental Psychology (hereafter DDP) 20 years on. The nine articles in this Issue thrill me not only by virtue of the unexpected narcissistic gratification of serious and appreciative scholarly engagement with this text, but in particular because they apply and extend its arguments to domains of theory and practice I could not have envisaged. Significantly, the commentaries elaborate critiques in a number of different directions, which speak to importantly distinct possibilities of and for intervention. These include the question of the status of (its) critique, its location inside or outside psychology, policy applications, cultural critiques, and pedagogical interventions and challenges.Contexts and conditionsMuch has happened since 1994 - personally, politically, institutionally and disciplinarily - that complicate evaluation of DDP's original intervention and its current contributions. As I outline elsewhere (Burman, 2012; in press, a), DDP rode on the wake of the first translations of Foucault, Lacan and Derrida into English. I n particular DDP built from and on the work of those commentators and interpreters who were applying those ideas to formulate a cogent critique of the rational unitary subject of psychology (Henriques et al., 1984). Hence it participated in the broader wave of critique that is sometimes called the 'turn to language', the 'turn to discourse' or even the 'crisis of representation' that transformed the social and human sciences during the 1990s. Euro-US, and in particular Anglo-US psychology - with its positivist and empiricist hegemony, its colonial and imperialist heritage was the object of critique (see also Weedon, 1987). In terms of the relationship with feminist interventions, it is worth noting that this discursive turn in psychology was, in its earliest days, almost synonymous in the UK with feminist interventions (as indicated by the 1992 conference held in London on 'Feminism, Psychology and Discourse Analysis', with the diversity of forms and engagements of feminist psychologists with discursive approaches also indicated by Wilkinson and Kitzinger's, 1995, edited volume which followed shortly after). There were, and still are, many good reasons for critiquing psychology, and many other texts before and after DDP have done that work (Parker, 1989; Parker and Shotter, 1990; De Vos, 2012; Brown and Stenner, 2009). Still, the question of the relevance of DDP to the concerns of F&P demands some attention.This is not only a personal biographical issue - since I should gratefully acknowledge that my first journal publications were in F&P (Burman, 1991; 1992) - although my first academic publication was an edited book (Burman, 1990). DDP parallels the increasing confidence and visibility of British feminists in and around psychology, including the formation of (what became called) the Psychology of Women Section of the British Psychological Society, which in turn built on various previous mobilisations and movements of feminists in and around psychology (around such names as 'Women in Psychology' or the 'Alliance of Women in Psychology') - that is, history that has been well documented (and debated) in the pages of previous issues of F&P. Clearly such consideration could seem to indulge a parochiality whose exclusions recapitulate the obvious trajectories of privilege. Yet Palmary and Mahati's (2015) argument in this volume in relation to DDP is relevant: they suggest that, rather than limiting the strength of its claims, its specificity actually enhances these. So in this spirit I want to situate some institutional conditions of possibility for both the writing and reception of DDP. In particular, DDP was written alongside emerging feminist critiques of psychology, but before the formation of any obvious signs of a 'feminist psychology', let alone feminist developmental psychology (c.f. Miller and Scholnick, 2000).Feminisms and/in Developmental PsychologyAs is explicitly addressed, or else presumed, by the various commentaries and reassessments in this Issue, a feminist commitment informs DDP. This commitment would now (I hope) be understood as engaging not only with the gendered positions, marginalisations and exclusions elaborated by the theories and practices informed by developmental psychology but also their intersections with classed, racialised and sexualities positions. This reciprocal engagement between F&P and DDP is not, of course, arbitrary. Driven by women's historical marginalisation and pathologisation in psychology (as addressed in detail by the previous volumes in the 'critical psychology' series published by Routledge in which DDP appeared, Ussher, 1989; Squire, 1989), feminists have long engaged with psychology's impacts on women's lives. This is because of women's historical conflation with the (usually unpaid and undervalued) business of care - not only of children but as originating from that attributed, normative childbearing and caring role, with its wider effects not only on gendered positions (including gender divisions and power relations) but also institutional practices (see also Burman, 2008a). The evaluation of women's lives through professional and state practices around children and families, and the ways developmental psychological ideas function or are mobilised within these, make developmental psychology a particular object of feminist critical scrutiny (Walkerdine & Lucey, 1989; Phoenix, 1987; Phoenix et al., 1991). Significantly, this is not only as those who are subjected to those scrutinising practices, but also as its practitioners. Women practice psychology as well as being objects of its practices. As someone whose interests in developmental psychology were originally conceptual, methodological and epistemological, it was (as I discuss in Burman, 1998) my teaching experience that brought home the impacts and inscriptions of developmental psychological knowledge into social practice. At a British inner city polytechnic providing qualifying and post-qualification courses to midwives, health visitors, (what were then called) psychiatric and mental handicap nurses, as well as trainee social workers and youth and community workers, I was immediately put to work doing 'service teaching' on modules that were variously titled 'child development', 'human development', even sometimes 'milestones in infancy and child development'. It was these students' reactions and responses - most of whom were women, almost entirely working class and many from minority ethnic backgrounds - that highlighted the problems with the knowledge base I was supposedly expert in. They showed me not only the (rather odd and presumed) practice connections between developmental psychology and child development, which itself retrace the ideological conditions of emergence of the discipline (Rose, 1985), but also the need to link theoretical critique with attention to contexts of practice. These students' resentment at, in many cases, being obliged to study (it was at the time when many professions were upgrading academically), alongside being taught by someone half their age, was put to good use in expressing their dissatisfaction with the models on offer. It was these mature professionals, practitioners who were both subject to psychological knowledge and had to dispense it in various forms in their daily lives, who taught me about its limits, its injustices, its ambiguities, and in particular how considerations around the child, or children, cannot be separated from those of the others around or with whom children live - their parents, especially their mothers, families, communities. They were far more expert in the practice of psychology and its limits than the - in general younger - cohorts of psychology students to whom I taught developmental psychology for more than 20 years. Indeed arguably the latter who were already therefore signed up to the project of psychology, and increasingly oriented to its project of surveillance and evaluation rather than self-knowledge or self-help as the years went on. Far from seamlessly absorbing or applying the content of this supposed 'developmental psychological' contribution to their professional training, it was those professional students' resistance to this knowledge that inspired me to conceptualise their criticisms. Of course this resistance did not always take the form of outright rejection or politicised critique. As Burck and Speed (1996) highlighted in relation to social work, feminists can also have complicated responses to their women clients precisely by virtue of managing their (dis)identifications. Inside or outside psychology?A question posed by various of the commentaries is whether DDP should be claimed as part of psychology. This is of course a political question, so that any answer must, after Richards (1997), be placed in its relational context: who is asking, and why?. DDP is clearly also not only psychology, in the sense that it distances itself from psychology and draws on resources and perspectives not commonly included within the discipline. Nevertheless, the final pages of DDP assert that it should be regarded as part of developmental psychology (even if it is also clearly allied elsewhere). This is because, especially amid these days of intensification of professionalisation and gatekeeping of particular disciplinary knowledges, critical voices from outside the discipline are too easily marginalised and dismissed. Think of the longstanding sociological critiques of developmental psychology (e.g. Badinter, 1981; Lieven, 1981; Everingham, 1994), and how little impact these have had in psychology textbooks, if not teaching. The project of DDP was to legitimise such critiques within the discipline, via a familiar genre. After all, the antipsychiatry movement has - for better or worse - been led by psychiatrists, so why should we surrender our critical allegiances and concede antipsychology (c.f. Squire, 1990) as only functioning outside psychology? Moreover, I would not, nor could not, deny my disciplinary formation and institutional history which is in, specifically, developmental psychology, and as a teacher of developmental psychology. Further, the literature on textbook construction has long highlighted the ways in which critique becomes incorporated (Lubek, 1993; 1997), and DDP is also likely subject to such processes (as Reel and Athan, 2015, highlight here). Nevertheless, the fact that DDP has had greater impact outside academic psychology in professional training and practice (in education, social work, counselling, nursing etc) perhaps tells us more about the 'ivory tower' of psychology, or perhaps of psychology in the US context (which is after all its current bastion) than about DDP. Like the material it metaphorizes, the 'ivory tower' is a product of particular, perverse modes of socioeconomic and species exploitation. In the case of psychology, its claims to abstract, disinterested, 'academic' knowledge seem particularly questionable in the light of the social agendas and functions inscribing its institutional emergence and development. Since I concur with Bradley that DDP is neither my best nor probably my most interesting writing (significantly, in their discussion of applications of DDP outside psychology, Palmary and Mahati, 2015, align themselves rather with what they endearingly call its 'sister' or companion volume, Developments, Burman, 2008b), arguably the relatively greater 'success' of DDP paradoxically reflects the continuing authority or legitimacy wielded by developmental psychology.Alongside the question of the location of critique, is that of the claims DDP makes for the developmental psychological project. Far from proscribing its possibilities in DDP, its focus is rather one of highlighting shortcomings of existing theories and practices. Indeed my view is that we are far from knowing or being able to deliver on models, theories and practices concerning what developmental psychology could be. As Adlam et al. (1977) highlighted, the question of the (pre)figuration of models of subjectivity, of the relations between individual and social change – including individual resistance to change – is too important to leave only in the hands of psychology. As Parker (2007) also argues, the proper domain of the psychological, and here in particular the developmental psychological, remains very unclear. This is a key political question. What is particularly lamentable is the retraction of arenas of inquiry and critique outside psychology that even contemplate this question, an 'austerity' of the intellect as well as the economy perhaps. Deconstruction, or not?Bradley's contribution repeats arguments from his earlier review (Bradley, 1999). Rather than respond here to specific criticisms levelled at DDP, which does not seem the best use of F&P space, I will address three general points his commentary raises. Firstly, Bradley focuses on whether or not DDP delivers on its titular claim to practice deconstruction. This does not appear to interest the other commentators, perhaps because they are more interested in the politics of what deconstruction does, rather than what it is. Nevertheless, it is a relevant question to pose (although most of his complaints' are in fact addressed in Burman, 2008b). The answer Bradley provides, assumed by the other commentators, is that DDP is a feminist critique that mobilises a range of critical - including aspects of deconstructionist - methodologies (see also Davies, 1994; MacNaughton, 2005; Weedon, 1987). Foucault, rather than Derrida, could be a more relevant theoretical resource for critiques of developmental psychology. Indeed, when Ian Parker and I founded the Discourse Unit () in 1990 we identified Foucauldian perspectives explicitly as one of its key resources (together with Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis), although now we would also add postcolonial and critical race theory, queer theory, disability studies and many more critical frames. Kathy Ferguson's discussion of the fruitful political tensions at play between interpretive, hermeneutic positions (of the kind informed by feminist political commitments) and a reflexive, destabilising genealogical stance expresses my own position. She concludes: 'genealogy keeps interpretation honest, and interpretation gives genealogy direction' (Ferguson 1991, p. 327).This ironic - but politically engaged - stance is important, she argues, '....to hold together much needed incompatibilities, both to stay honest and to keep moving' (ibid. p.329). Or as Foucault's student, the philosopher Michel Pêcheux put it, warding off the apolitical relativism of '...endless interpretations in which the interpreter acts as an absolute point without any other real, it is for me a matter of ethics and politics: a question of responsibility' (Pêcheux, 2014, p. 94). This relates directly to the question of evidence and its epistemological status that Bradley poses - which resonates across any field of critique. For example, a conceptual point of departure for Palmary and Mahati's piece is the contention that there is a disjuncture between the imagined child and the everyday lives of children. This disjuncture is one that is commonly drawn upon by child rights researchers, and, yes, by me too at times. However, this poses not only questions of whether and how we can know about children's lives, but also what status this knowledge is accorded: do we posit such claims as constructions or as realist, improved, claims to 'experience'? The status of the 'empirical' must surely remain crucially open as we struggle to forge better representations of, and interventions for, people' s - including children's - lives, and where such struggles require contestation (via deconstruction, perhaps) of those received, dominant representations in order to open up the discursive space for formulating alternatives. Bradley complains that DDP is idealist rather than empirical. Psychologists have a notion of the empirical that DDP takes issue with, certainly. But surely Bradley would not adopt that model of the empirical? More puzzling is how the defence of Foucault he provides (in his Footnote 4) - he notes Foucault was criticised for taking an idealist position in support of the elaboration of his critical framework - is precisely equivalent. In relation to Bradley's question about positioning, therefore, it is relevant to consider the status of the framing signifier used to frame his position. Bradley appears to demand a fixed position - whether on deconstruction, or feminism for that matter. He mobilises the notion of 'ethics' as a fixed signifier, that functions rhetorically to imply ethics = good. This surely is an idealist position too. It seems ironic that, within the rhetoric of a saleable commodity of a refereed journal (which 'counts' for much more than a mere textbook such as is DDP), the signifier 'ethics' is appealed to as it if were self-evident, fixed and appropriable (see also Neill, 2005).What Bradley rather strangely - from his political framework - only addresses as a personal choice is the ways a textbook is itself a particular genre, one that draws together a wide range of sources and arguments and attempts to convey them in an engaging and accessible way (not always achieved in DDP, I suspect). This makes the charge of being derivative somewhat redundant. As is explicitly discussed within and beyond DDP (and in my other accounts of the conditions for and forms of critical or deconstructionist developmental psychology, Burman, 2012; 2015), the book clearly relies upon - and hopefully has done some work to popularise - a developing body of critical work discussing infant and child development alongside political, conceptual and methodological arguments about the forms and status of developmental psychology that have emerged. Indeed, Bradley's own work is drawn upon and acknowledged along with other contemporaries such as Morss (1990; 1996), as well as that of the series editors John Broughton, David Ingleby and Valerie Walkerdine, whose formative contributions are also reflected in the text.Alternate psychologies?At least two of the commentaries (on executive function, Miller and Scholnick, 2015, and autism, O'Dell, 2015) claim relevance for new topics within developmental psychology. In particular Miller and Scholnick make a strong case for how aspects of DDP's claims - of decontextualisation, androcentrism and covert political frameworks - could and should be mobilised to formulate an improved developmental psychology. Their critical engagement and reformulation of 'executive function' (as they put it, the new 'hot topic in developmental psychology') insists on the need to theorise location, reconsider the form of tasks, topics and models in relation to assumptions about class, gender and maturity, and argue for the need for psychology to recognise its implication within specific economic and political conditions. Doing this, they suggest, completely changes the research questions and practices of work around executive function. This includes reformulating this notion to reconsider other relationships with creativity and lateral thinking - qualities increasingly required for postindustrial modes of labour. Moreover - as they point out - creativity and lateral thinking may be especially important for people living in precarious contexts (of insecure or uncertain environments, and poverty). Hence the way is opened up for enriching and developing developmental psychological research, rather than abandoning it. While also situating her account within the domain of 'developmental science', O'Dell addresses the application of critiques such as those formulated by DDP beyond their original focus on the development of young children and their relationships. She focuses on critiques of universalisation and normalization of childhood to offer new perspectives on understandings of trauma that ward off its overlooking of cultural-political conditions, and - like Miller and Scholnick – reconsiders understandings of autism to engage with alternative readings of disability that celebrate difference rather than subscribe to the traditional developmentalist deficit model. So in terms of readings of the status of critique in DDP, these authors are not yet willing to give up on the project of reforming or reformulating developmental psychology from within, to construct a 'more complete' version.In more narrative and reflective mode, addressing a debate within psychology, Crafter (2015) offers an intriguing reading of DDP in relation to her own parallel engagement with cultural psychology. Her argument that each offers complementary resources, with different strengths and weaknesses deepens my own developing reading of cultural psychology - across its various forms (from the symbol theory of Vygotsky to more recent versions of activity theory and its connections with discussions of situated or distributed cognition), which has also been reflected in the book's revisions. That Crafter usefully embeds her evaluation within an account of her own work on home-school relations enables her to highlight key convergences between both deconstructionist and cultural psychology perspectives, whereby both dispute the normalization of childhood and argue for the study of childhood in context. The contrasts she identifies between the two positions are illuminating. She points out that DDP focuses more on critiquing developmental psychology as a narrative, while cultural psychology in its focuses on mediation or other cultural activity, claims to provide a different psychology. The differences between these two, as she concludes, occur at the level of explanation; for, as she notes, while DDP takes issue with the dominant story of psychology and remains suspicious or agnostic about possible reformulations, cultural psychology does make claims to provide an alternative version.Pedagogical challengesTwo commentaries, addressing pedagogical issues, invite juxtaposition. Reel and Athan (2015) pose important questions that have exercised me over the years, and doubtless reflect many a critical (feminist) psychologist's frustrations. Their critique arises from their concern with the regulation, and often evacuation, of maternal subjectivity. They ask: why DDP has had so marginal an impact on developmental psychology, and, alongside this, what the risks of engaging with these arguments are for students. Significantly, both these questions demand analysis beyond the ways the discipline maintains itself through its traditional organs of publication, and the conservative gatekeeping of journals and textbooks. For students have a more fragile and uncertain relationship with the discipline. This is why some of them - especially those whose life experience and positioning outside the classroom diverge from the depictions they encounter within developmental psychological models - can take to critique with relief and passion; while others struggle, complain or simply overlook it. We need to recall that students encounter the epistemological tensions and contradictions we present to them relationally as well as epistemologically; that is, often via the task of pleasing different teachers who may indeed espouse radically different psychological orientations. So the confrontation between paradigms becomes embodied in the student and materialised in her/his assignments. As is also recapitulated within the debates over quantitative vs. qualitative research, interpretivist positions (of the kind also assumed within DDP) are expressed in provisional, contextual terms which can be heard as weak or insecure compared with the strong, universalist, abstracted claims associated with positivist research. But perhaps the conundrum, of disparaging the discipline in which students are labouring to qualify as legitimate participants demands further analysis in terms of the affective problematic and conflicts this could pose (see also Burman, in press b).Yet the account by Brink et al.'s (2015) of the reception and use of DDP in their teaching and training practice in New Zealand offers some counterarguments to Reel and Athan's, in particular by directly contradicting the latter's claims (about lack of uptake and engagement), even as they articulate a similar account of which features of DDP are relevant. However what may be significant here is that they write explicitly from a context that is not at psychology's centre, but from one of its postcolonial contexts, albeit further amenable to cultural colonisation as Anglophone. Their three different intellectual trajectories, also trace different geographical lines of migration. So, it seems, location of reading can make a difference, as also disciplinary orientation. Brink et al.'s discussion of their use of DDP in their teaching across educational and counselling as well as psychology trainings, highlights how they challenge the modes of measurement that underlie normalization practices, heteropatriarchal constructions of familial composition and relationships. What comes into particular focus here (unlike other accounts) is the case for indigenous psychologies, as connected also with New Zealand's bicultural political and pedagogical commitments to reflect Māori perspectives in teaching and practice. Indeed the authors have pioneered new textbooks that reformulate human and individual psychological development outside Euro-US-dominated models, as has also been the case in South Africa (Claiborne and Drewery, 2009, 2013).DDP outside PsychologyAvdi argues for DDP's applicability outside psychology, to the related domain of family therapy practice. This move takes critiques of developmental psychology into a crucial arena of related professional practice. Her focus is on how developmental psychological discourses inform understandings of the competences and speaking positions accorded participants in family therapy settings, and her analysis indicates how these contribute to children's diminished status in these therapeutic conversations. Of particular note is how her analysis of such conversations demonstrates the therapists' inadvertent collusion in this disempowerment via subscription to these developmental notions. What her analysis of the therapy sessions highlights is how in such applied therapeutic practice developmental psychological ideas are mobilised to naturalise both the biological family and the relational and generational order to which 'the child' is subject. Not do such commitments impede the therapeutic project, but what is also illustrated is how the sense-making of the family members drew upon culturally dominant representations of the biologically organised nuclear family. Her argument, that attending to such critiques can be applied to enhance clinician's reflexivity, with implications also for their training, aligns with my own attempts to apply discursive and deconstructionist approaches with education and social care professionals.Beyond the more immediate domains of application of psychology, it is worth reflecting on how various of the pieces address current national and international policy contexts. Palmary and Mahati's (2015) discussion of the interplay between international child rights discourses and immigration control shows how and why specificity of context and location really matters. This is also where contestations between developmental psychological and rights-based discourses also appear and, significantly, the authors challenge both in their creative and illuminating analysis ofn how the child imagined by South African law - celebrated for its child rights focus - produces the very violence and exploitation it is supposed to prevent. The two borders they discuss flout many of our assumptions about heavily marked boundaries since they were not only porous but also daily traversed by children - with and without papers. Palmary and Mahati's documentation of how these children crossed the borders for economic, domestic and educational purposes - sometimes as regularly as accessing free schooling, or as mundane as making a phone call flouts many prevailing assumptions, not only about migration but also about children's movements, family negotiations and also deconstructing figurations of the inter/national. Of particular value to developmental psychology, child rights researchers and activists and social policy makers is Palmary and Mahati's demonstration of how the mutually constitutive relationship between child and border produces a simultaneous naturalisation of both the family and the state. This is because the attributed vulnerability of the unaccompanied minor can set in motion interventions which further marginalise these children, and paradoxically render them more vulnerable to state violence whilst at the same time further pathologising their families. Implicit connections between familial ideology, social policy and psychology are also elaborated to formulate wider political critique in Gordo López's analysis of the trope of 'the digital family' as it is functioning in the current Spanish context, which he argues is emerging as a key site for the intensification of gender inequalities and greater responsibilisation. Noteworthy here is how current political strategies can rearticulate longstanding cultural themes, whose conceptual premises, resonances or connections take some work to identify. Hence Gordo López's analysis offers an indicative example of how particular socio-economic conditions, such as the current context of economic stagnation in Spain, not only gives rise to a return to a conservative social policy on the family (revising post-dictatorship reforms of the past 40 years), in which developmental psychological research plays a particular role (of legitimation). Through this, the increasing focus on ever younger children - as both users and potential victims of the internet - that align developmental research and early intervention social policy - has resolved and relegated questions of risk and protection to the domain of the family. Beyond the question of whether and how children access the web, the old theme returns of family, especially, mothers' responsibilities to manage this new 'risk'.To connect this range of perspectives with broader philosophical concerns, the question of location inside or outside (reconstructing vs. abandoning) psychology connect with feminist debates on the merits and relations between feminist empiricist, and postmodernist approaches (Harding, 1986). These have their reflection, as Squire (1989) has outlined, in the different epistemological claims of various strands of feminist psychology. All have presumed some kind of feminist standpoint and some have opened up the question of the status of the empirical (for example, in terms of whether DDP destabilises all knowledge or legitimises alternative, perhaps subjugated knowledges). They also interrogate the geographical location of and for authorising canonical psychological knowledge (US, UK, vs. New Zealand, South Africa). Alternatives to deconstruction?If DDP is not only a deconstruction, what else could it be? Some of the papers designate the project as a critical feminist poststructuralist intervention; others talk about it 'shaking up' human development. These days I would also align its intervention with other currents that are gaining critical purchase in and around psychology, childhood studies and educational research. As well as Foucauldian perspectives (see Allen, 2015; Burman, in press c), these would include postcolonial and affect theory, queer theory and posthumanism (as indicated of various of my texts). The rise of childhood studies as a cross-, multi- and transdisciplinary arena engages with (some varieties of, Pain, 2010; Thorne, 2007) psychology, but - significantly - refuses to accord it a privileged place. Taken together these commentaries pose some important general questions - for developmental psychology and for feminist interventions in (relation to) psychology. What is the place or position of critique? Where is (developmental) psychology? In particular, which contexts 'count' as arenas of developmental psychological practice? Does this include people who cannot claim to be professional psychologists but practice other (educational, social work, health care) professions; how about higher educational contexts, or even self help groups? Equally important is what the stakes are in the answers to such questions, and for whom. 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