Control + 1 – Block Headings
**Japan BMD Neg**
***Topicality 3
*1NC T Substantial [1/2] 3
*1NC T Substantial [2/2] 4
2NC Violation Ext 5
*1NC T Presence [1/1] 6
2NC Limits Ext 7
2NC AT: Interoperability 8
***MTCR Conditions CP 9
*1NC MTCR Conditions CP [1/4] 9
*1NC MTCR Conditions CP [2/4] 10
*1NC MTCR Conditions CP [3/4] 11
*1NC MTCR Conditions CP [4/4] 12
Net Benefit – 2NC Impact OV [1/2] 13
Net Benefit – 2NC Impact OV [2/2] 14
Net Benefit – 2NC AT: Alt Caus 15
Net Benefit – 2NC MTCR Solves 16
Net Benefit – 2NC China Bashing I! 17
Net Benefit – 2NC Hegemony I! [1/2] 18
Net Benefit – 2NC Hegemony I! [2/2] 19
Counterplan – 2NC Say Yes Wall 20
Counterplan – 2NC Say Yes – Empirics 21
Counterplan – 2NC Say Yes – AT: Taiwan* 22
Counterplan – 2NC AT: MTCR Membership 23
Counterplan – 2NC AT: Contractor Sales 24
Theory – 2NC AT: Perm do Both 25
Theory – 2NC AT: Perm do the CP 26
Theory – 2NC AT: Condition CPs Bad 27
***Block 2A PIC 28
*1NC Block 2A PIC [1/2] 28
*1NC Block 2A PIC [2/2] 29
2NC Solvency – Exports 30
***Relations DA 31
*1NC Relations DA [1/4] 31
*1NC Relations DA [2/4] 32
*1NC Relations DA [3/4] 33
*1NC Relations DA [4/4] 34
2NC Uniqueness – Brink 35
2NC Link – Cooperation 36
2NC Link – Security Guarantee 37
2NC Impact – Warming [1/2] 38
2NC Impact – Warming [2/2] 39
***Normalization 40
No Revision – No Vote [1/2] 40
No Revision – No Vote [2/2] 41
Ext No Revision – No Vote [1/2] 42
Ext No Revision – No Vote [2/2] 43
No Revision – De Facto Mod 44
Ext No Revision – De Facto Mod 45
No Impact – Loopholes 46
No Rearm – Technical Barriers [1/2] 47
No Rearm – Technical Barriers [2/2] 48
Ext No Rearm – Technical Barriers 49
No Rearm – Structural Barriers 50
Ext No Rearm – Structural Barriers 51
***Regional Security 52
Non-Unique – Taiwan PAC-3 52
Ext Non-Unique – Taiwan PAC-3 53
Non-Unique – Sea-Based BMD 54
No China War – Minimal Deterrence 55
No Asia War – Tensions Low 56
No Asia War – Structural Checks 57
China Mod Inev – Regional Fears 58
Non-Unique – China ASAT Now 59
Non-Unique – Space Debris Now 60
Diversionary Theory Wrong 61
***Japan Spending – General 62
No Internal – BMD Too Small 62
No Internal – No Tradeoff 63
***Japan Spending – JET 64
Gannon Bad – No Quals 64
Gannon Bad – Vested Interest 65
AT: Japan Soft Power 66
JET Stupid 67
***Japan Spending – Science 68
Squo Solves – Budget Fix Now 68
Squo Solves – iPS Now 69
No Solvency – iPS Fails 70
***Weapons Exports 71
No Internal – No Policy Shift 71
No Internal – Export Exemption 72
***Europe BMD 73
No Solvency – Export Exemption 73
No Internal – Russia Doesn’t Care 74
Europe BMD Good – Russia/Iran 75
Europe BMD Good – Iran/North Korea/Modelling 76
***Disads 77
2NC START DA 77
1NC Japan Rearm DA 78
2NC Japan Rearm DA 79
1NC Six Party Talks DA 80
***Topicality
*1NC T Substantial [1/2]
A. Interpretation – presence refers to the totality of US military power in a country
Blechman et al, 97 – President of DFI International, and has held positions in the Department of Defense, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget (Barry, Strategic Review, Spring, “Military Presence Abroad in a New Era: The Role of Airpower,” p. 14)
The highly complex nature of military presence operations, with manifestations both psychological and physical, makes their effects difficult to identify and assess. Nonetheless, presence missions (whether employing forces stationed abroad or afloat, temporarily deployed or permanently based overseas, or based in the United States) are integral parts of U.S. defense strategy. Through routine presence operations, the United States seeks to reinforce alliances and friendships, make credible security commitments to crucial regions, and nurture cooperative political relations. More episodically, forces engaged in presence operations can dissuade aggressors from hostile demands, help prevent or contain regional crises, and, when conflict erupts nonetheless, provide an infrastructure for the transition to war.
Given its multifaceted nature, neither practitioners nor scholars have yet settled on a single definition of presence. Technically, the term refers to both a military posture and a military objective. This study uses the term “presence” to refer to a continuum of military activities, from a variety of interactions during peacetime to crisis response involving both forces on the scene and those based in the United States. Our definition follows that articulated by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Presence is the totality of U.S. instruments of power deployed overseas (both permanently and temporarily) along with the requisite infrastructure and sustainment capabilities.”2
A substantial reduction is 25%
US Code, 10 (TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW PART IV. SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT CHAPTER 148. NATIONAL DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE, DEFENSE REINVESTMENT, AND DEFENSE CONVERSION SUBCHAPTER II. POLICIES AND PLANNING, Current as of 5/17/10, lexis)
"(f) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
"(1) The term "major defense program" means a program that is carried out to produce or acquire a major system (as defined in section 2302(5) of title 10, United States Code).
"(2) The terms 'substantial reduction' and 'substantially reduced', with respect to a defense contract under a major defense program, mean a reduction of 25 percent or more in the total dollar value of the funds obligated by the contract.".
*1NC T Substantial [2/2]
B. Violation –
1. We spend $4 billion a year on Japan
AP 10 (AP writer Mari Yamaguchi in Tokyo and AP National Security Writer Robert Burns in Washington, D.C. contributed to this report, “Japan balks at $2 billion bill to host U.S. troops”, )
Facilities such as on-base golf courses represent a small fraction of the sum U.S. taxpayers chip in for the defense of Japan—about $3.9 billion a year, according to a U.S. State Department official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the details.
2. We spend $400 million a year on block 2A codevelopment and SM-3 procurement – that’s 9.8%
O’Rourke 10 (Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, June 10, 2010, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, )
Table 3. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Program, FY2011-FY2015
(Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)
FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
PE0603892C / Project MD09 1,412.6 972.0 1,063.4 1,030.0 886.0
PE0603892C / Project MD40 54.7 49.9 49.3 46.7 37.3
PE0604881C / Project MD09 318.8 405.5 416.3 337.3 227.5
PE0208866C / Project MD09 94.1 701.9 712.7 681.7 669.7
SM-3 quantities funded in the
above line
8 66 72 72 72
Subtotal above 1,880.2 2,129.3 2,241.7 2,095.7 1,820.5
PE0604880C / Project MD68 281.4 345.9 187.1 93.5 139.6
TOTAL 2,161.6 2,475.2 2,428.8 2,189.2 1,960.1
Source: Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 President’s Budget, Missile Defense Agency, Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide – 0400, Justification Book, February 2010, Volume 2b and Volume 2c, and Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimates Overview, p. 25.
Notes: Table includes only MDA funding for Aegis BMD program; it does not include Navy funding for Aegis BMD program. PE is program element (i.e., a research and development account line item).
PE0603892C / Project MD09 is the Aegis BMD project within the BMD Aegis program element.
PE0603892C / Project MD40 is program-wide support within the BMD Aegis program element.
PE0604881C / Project MD09 is U.S. funding for the SM-2 Block IIA co-development project with Japan.
PE0208866C / Project MD09 is procurement of SM-3 missiles.
PE0604880C / Project MD68 is the Aegis Ashore development project within the land-based SM-3 program element.
C. Voting issue –
1. Limits – allowing minor reductions allows countless variations of small affs likes reducing a single type of intelligence gathering or a covert op in Afghanistan or any arms transfer to Japan; makes adequate research impossible
2. Negative ground – topic disads won’t link to minor modifications, and generic ground is vitally important to protect since there are 6 different countries with diverse literature bases
2NC Violation Ext
Burdensharing means Japan pays the majority.
Kawasaki 2010 (Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10, “Japan's Military Spending at a Crossroads”, )
The third characteristic requiring attention is expenditures on ballistic missile defense. In 1998, when North Korea conducted a test that sent a long-range rocket over Japan, Japan decided to commence joint research on ballistic missile defense with the United States. Over the next five years, Japan spent around $150 million on this joint research. Then in 2003, Japan decided to introduce both the Aegis ship-based BMD (SM-3) and the PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3) systems, announcing that the “high technical feasibility” of the systems was confirmed.
In announcing the decision to acquire BMD, the cabinet made the following comment in relation to overall defense expenditures:
When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the Government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organization and equipment of the Self-Defense Forces . . . . in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, make efforts to reduce defense-related expenditures to take the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan into consideration.
This policy of “selection and concentration” mandates the investment of huge sums into BMD even if this requires reductions in expenses in other fields.
Since then, Japan's spending on the BMD systems has been $1.1 billion in 2004, $1.2 billion in 2005, $1.4 billion in 2006, $1.8 billion in 2007, $1.1 billion in 2008, and $1.1 billion in 2009. In addition, in a separate category from BMD are closely related “key categories” that include “dealing with developments in military scientific technology” ($1.2-1.8 billion per year) and the “building of an advanced information communications network” ($1.6-2.1 billion per year). The expansion of investments in high-tech military technology and information communications networks related to BMD has also been integrated in the military transformation begun under the U.S.-led Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the 1990s.
*1NC T Presence [1/1]
A. Interpretation – Presence is forces and their equipment for military operations
General Accounting Office 99
Report to Congressional Committees United States General Accounting Office GAO November 2001 MILITARY READINESS Effects of a U.S. Military Presence in Europe on Mobility Requirements
The Department of Defense defines overseas presence as the right mix of permanently stationed forces, rotationally deployed forces, temporarily deployed forces, and infrastructure required to conduct the full range of military operations. Historically, these forces have been concentrated in three regions—Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Southwest Asia. Forces in Europe include the major elements of two Army divisions; six Air Force wings, which include fighter/attack, refueling, and transport aircraft; one Navy aircraft carrier battle group; and one Marine Corps amphibious group. 5 Prepositioned items include Army stockpiles of equipment for three heavy brigades, equipment and supplies for the lead unit of a Marine Corps expeditionary unit, and six Air Force air base support sets.
B. Violation – Arms sales are contextually distinct from presence – it’s a compensation for reduced presence
Beard 95 (Michael N. Beard Lt Colonel, USAF, United States Foreign Military Sales Strategy: Coalition Building or Protecting the Defense Industrial Base)
Second, we can afford to reduce our forward presence overseas because of the access and influence that the United States maintains within regions. We have access, the ability to visit and use strategic areas, to many countries through our military -to-military contacts and our support of the weapons systems they have purchased from us.
C. Voting issue –
1. Limits – arms sales allow cooperative development on any weapon system with a topic country, creates an infinite number of affs because there’s no limit to what weapon we could sell or compensate with.
2. Makes the topic bidirectional – arms sales are a component of overall force reduction strategy
Beard 95 (Michael N. Beard Lt Colonel, USAF, United States Foreign Military Sales Strategy: Coalition Building or Protecting the Defense Industrial Base)
Another factor that supports foreign military sales of U.S. military equipment is the reduction in the overseas presence of U.S. forces. The defense drawdown coupled with governmental budget cutting measures and the end of the Cold War, the United States has reduced its overseas military presence by as much as sixty-eight percent. As of September 30, 1993, U.S. military presence in Europe was down forty-nine percent from 344,078 troops in 1989 to 166,249 in 1993 and in the Pacific, total troop strength is down sixty-eight percent from a 1989 high of 146,026 to a total of 99,022 troops in 1993.30 This is significant as measured, for example, by the increase in the time it takes the United States to respond to a crises. By arming our allies and partners with state-of-the-art military equipment and training, they are more capable of "holding an adversary" in place while the United States deploys our fighting forces from CONUS bases to the crises area. Additionally, common military and support equipment within a host country greatly reduces our strategic lift requirements in the early days of a crises.
2NC Limits Ext
Arms sales presence is a tiny limit case that should be excluded for any limit
Harkavy 89 (Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, Bases abroad: the global foreign military presence, p. google books)
At least three other methodological or boundary issues bear mention at the outset, as they relate to a clear, full definition of FMP: ship port visits, aircraft overflights and small military advisory groups. Each involves daunting problems of data collection as well as difficult grey area boundary problems in relation to more obvious (for inclusion) aspects of FMP.
Regarding naval facilities, at one end of the spectrum are the main naval bases replete with dry-docking facilities and the like. At the other end are occasional port visits for essentially diplomatic or symbolic 'showing the flag* purposes. In between, however, are more routine and maybe (in a deterrence sense) more militarily relevant ship visits for provisions, refuelling, rest and recreation (R & R), and so on, involving numerous grey area cases in which it is arguable whether or not a 'facility' or 'base' can be discerned; such visits arc perhaps also subject to fairly frequent fluctuations.60
If all port visits were considered indicative of FMP, the data management problem would, obviously, be formidable as it would also be for aircraft over- flights. Yet, this is a terribly important matter at times, the circumstances surrounding the 1973 airlifts to the Middle Eastern combatants, those in 1977- 78 to Ethiopia and Somalia, and US problems in connection with its recent raid on Libya being illustrative. About all we can do with this subject is to discuss its parameters, highlight its importance and illustrate the latter with some salient eases.61
Finally, there is the grey area regarding ground-force FMP between actual units (combat or otherwise) deployed in other nations, and the routine small training missions which accompany almost any arms sales transaction, of which obviously there arc many. The celebrated issue of the Soviet 'brigade' in Cuba, which helped torpedo SALT II in 1979, is illustrative of the issue as are also, for instance, periodic rumours about Israeli 'advisers' in Guatemala or Ethiopia, Taiwanese pilots in North Yemen, and so on. For the sake of economy, the present analysis is relegated to significant, operating field units clearly beyond the level of handfuls of seconded advisers, while still highlighting the close relationship between security assistance and basing access.
2NC AT: Interoperability
Arms sales aren’t big enough – any associated military presence isn’t substantial. Even the broadest definition of military presence demands a bigger force number
Harkavy 89 (Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, Bases abroad: the global foreign military presence, p. google books)
The above discussion of definitions—revolving mainly around the terms foreign military presence, access, strategic access, base, facility, installation, and so on— serves to initiate a discussion of the boundaries of this study. Those boundaries are cast rather wide to encompass virtually anything that might satisfy the virtually self-explanatory criterion of fitting all three of the words which con- stitute FMP—'foreign', 'military' and 'presence'. That would incorporate not only the obvious—large air and naval bases, satellite tracking facilities, etc.— but also port visits, overflights and perhaps cadres of military advisers beyond the usual handful normal to an arms transfer relationship.
***MTCR Conditions CP
*1NC MTCR Conditions CP [1/4]
Text: The United States federal government should offer to [plan], if and only if the People’s Republic of China adheres to export control and behavior standards per the Missile
Technology Control Regime.
Contention One – Theory
Missile defense reductions should be conditioned on Chinese export restrictions – China will say yes to concessions.
Moltz 1997 (James Clay Moltz, PhD, Assoc. Prof. Nat’l Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School, “Missile Proliferation in East Asia: Arms Control vs. TMD Responses,” in the Nonproliferation Review, Summer, )
Another area where Chinese behavior has clashed with U.S. policies has been in sale of missile technologies, especially to Iran, Pakistan, and other states which Washington regards as having dangerous proliferation intentions. Therefore, another missile initiative worth discussing with China would be new CBMs that would put teeth into Chinese promises regarding the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). To date, U.S. efforts have largely failed in this regard. The problem relates in part to the lack of positive incentives offered by the United States to date in areas that China cares about. If Washington agreed to halt arms sales of TMD technologies to Taiwan, however, it is likely that Beijing would begin to treat more seriously U.S. efforts to reach a quid pro quo on halting exports of missile technology to countries of U.S. concern.
Contention Two – Proliferation
China is rapidly increasing rogue state weapons proliferation.
Kan 2009 (Shirley A. Kan, specialist in Asian Security Affairs, works in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” in CRS Report for US Congress, )
Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China’s technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China’s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a “key supplier” of technology to North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan for use in programs to develop ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, or nuclear weapons. Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another promise from China on missile nonproliferation. However, continued PRC proliferation activities again raised questions about sanctions. In contrast to the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration repeatedly imposed sanctions on PRC “entities” for troublesome transfers. Since 1991, the United States has imposed sanctions on 26 occasions on over 30 different PRC “entities” (not the government) for transfers (related to missiles and chemical weapons) to Pakistan, Iran, or another country, including repeated sanctions on some “serial proliferators.” Among those sanctions, in September 2001, the Administration imposed missile proliferation sanctions that effectively denied satellite exports (for two years), after a PRC company transferred technology to Pakistan, despite the November 2000 promise. In September 2003, the State Department imposed additional sanctions on NORINCO, a defense industrial entity, effectively denying satellite exports to China. However, for six times, the State Department waived this sanction for the ban on imports of other PRC government products related to missiles, space systems, electronics, and military aircraft, and issued a permanent waiver in March 2007.
Skeptics question whether China’s cooperation in weapons nonproliferation has warranted the U.S. pursuit of closer bilateral ties, even as sanctions were required against some PRC supplies of sensitive technology. Some question the imposition of numerous U.S. sanctions targeting PRC “entities” but not the PRC government. Others question the effectiveness of any stress on sanctions over diplomacy. Since 2002, the United States has relied on China’s “considerable influence” on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear
*1NC MTCR Conditions CP [2/4]
weapons and praised its role, but Beijing has hosted the “Six-Party Talks” with limited results, while the United States also resumed bilateral negotiations with North Korea. China has evolved to vote for some U.N. Security Council sanctions against nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran. But it also has maintained balanced positions on North Korea and Iran, including questionable enforcement of sanctions and business as usual (particularly energy deals). Some have called for pressing Beijing to use effective leverage against Pyongyang and Tehran. However, North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 2009 prompted greater debate about the importance of China and the Six-Party Talks. Still, at a summit in Beijing on November 17, 2009, President Obama discussed China’s “support” for nuclear nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran.
Weakened MTCR leads to Indo-Pak conflict that escalates to global nuclear war – it’s the most probable scenario.
Blank 2009 (Stephen J. Blank, Assoc. Prof. Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine – Maxwell Air Force Base, SSI expert on the Soviet bloc and post-Soviet world, Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation, March, Strategic Studies Institute, )
Other reasons for concern about cruise missiles relate to developments like the Ukrainian revelation in 2005 of illicit missile transfers of the Kh-55 cruise missile, a long-range nuclear-capable cruise missile (NATO designation AS-15 Kent) to Iran and China, and the Indo-Russian joint Brahmos project. The Kh-55 has a range of 2-300Km at subsonic speed with high precision, and represented Irano-Chinese access to a higher level of technological sophistication than was previously the case. The Brahmos (PJ-10) is a supersonic anti-ship ramjet-powered cruise missile and has a 300Km range and identical configuration for land-sea, 190 and sub-sea launching platforms.77 The spread of these systems and the fact that countries as diverse as Sweden, France, China, and Taiwan were working on advanced cruise missiles in 2005, underscore the porosity of existing anti-proliferation regimes, including the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the ensuing rising threat from missile proliferation which has continued without letup since 2005.78
Furthermore Gormley’s evidence of trends in cruise missiles proliferation and improvements to them underscores the danger of missile and nuclear proliferation from another angle. According to his evidence, “signs of a missile contagion abound.” Pakistan surprised the world by test launching Tomahawk look-alike cruise missiles. India, together with Russia, is developing the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which will have the capability to strike targets at sea or over land to a range of 290 kilometers.
In East Asia, China, Taiwan, and South Korea are rushing to develop and deploy new Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) with ranges of 1,000Km or more, while Japan is contemplating the development of a LACM for “preemptive” strikes against enemy missile bases. In the Middle East, Israel was once the sole country possessing LACMs, but now Iran appears to be pursuing cruise missile programs for both land and sea attack. Iran has also provided the terrorist group Hezbollah with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles, one of which severely damaged an Israeli vessel and killed four soldiers during the 2006 war in Lebanon. In April 2005, Ukraine’s export agency unveiled plans to market a new LACM called Korshun. The design of this new missile appears to be based solely on the Russian Kh55, a nuclear-capable, 3,000Km-range LACM, which 191 Ukrainian and Russian arms dealers had illegally sold to China in 2000 and Iran in 2001.79
When we bear in mind what Lennox had to say about the impact of the illicit Kh-55 transfers, the dangers of that particular missile or its Ukrainian “clone” become quite real. Furthermore, as Gormley points out this “epidemic” or “contagion” could not have happened without the willing participation of other parties. Thus, Chinese fingerprints are all over Pakistan’s newly tested LACM, while Russian engineering is known to have enabled China to produce a workable propulsion system for its new LACMs. Russian technical assistance, formalized in a joint production agreement, has helped India to produce and deploy its first cruise missile, the supersonic Brahmos. Iran’s three new cruise missile programs depend heavily on foreign-trained engineers who honed their skills in France, Germany, Russia, China, and North Korea. Thus while the flow of technology components is necessary, it is not sufficient to enable cruise missile proliferation without the critical support of a small and exceptionally skilled group of engineering practitioners.80
Certainly such trends raise the question of missile defenses, but they should also stimulate greater cooperation against missile and nuclear proliferation. And it is not only a question of missile defenses. As we shall see, in South and East Asia, for example, states and governments are also trying to counter their rivals’ offensive missile programs by developing their own “superior” programs whereby both sides rely on a purely offensive missile capability race against their rivals. Moreover, the universality of these trends makes clear that it is not only in the Middle East that we must worry about proliferation.192
For example, we find this competitive offense model in East Asia. Because of its concerns about the consequences of the DPRK’s proliferation, Washington, in 2001 persuaded Seoul to accept a 300Km range and 500Kg payload limit on ballistic missiles as a condition of South Korea’s entry into the MTCR. Yet Washington allowed Seoul to develop LACMs with no conditions. The consequences were not long in coming, especially as South Korea, mindful of Chinese pressure, the costs involved, and its own strategic vulnerability to North Korea, has rejected participation in the U.S. missile defense system and the U.S. proposals to sell it the Patriot missile defense system. As Gormley notes,
*1NC MTCR Conditions CP [3/4]
Shortly after Pyongyang’s October 2006 nuclear test, South Korean military authorities leaked the existence of three LACM programs, involving ranges of 500Km, 1,000Km, and 1,500Km. The South Korean press took immediate note of the fact that not just all of North Korea would be within range of these missiles, but also neighboring countries, including Japan and China. Nearly simultaneously Seoul’s military rolled out a new defense plan, involving preemptive use of “surgical strike” weapons, including its LACMs, against enemy missile batteries.81
The same kind of dominance of the offensive based on mutual deterrence, an inherently hostile posture between two states armed with missiles, not to mention nuclear missiles, is occurring in Taiwan. Although Washington has successfully persuaded Taiwan to steer clear of ballistic missiles, faced with China’s relentless buildup of conventional missiles against it, Taiwan bought Patriots but demurred from buying the latest U.S. hit-to-kill missile defense due to the Chinese buildup and the cost of the U.S. system. Instead, it started developing its own LACMs in 2005, originally 193 with a range of 500Km, but with the intention of ultimately deploying 500 of them with ranges of 1,000 Km on mobile launchers. Taiwanese military leaders spoke increasingly of a “preventive self-defense” strike option, to disrupt China’s plans. And recent evidence suggests that Taiwan also now has started a ballistic missile program.82
South Asia.
As the foregoing analysis strongly argues, the urgency of reviving great power cooperation on proliferation and the enhanced capability of missiles and regimes is not confined to the Middle East or Northeast Asia where nonproliferation appears to have succeeded to some degree vis-à-vis North Korea. Indeed, there is a distinct spillover of proliferation trends or events from Northeast Asia to South Asia and vice versa. The North Korean-Pakistani reciprocal supply relationship of missile and nuclear technologies is an outstanding example of such spillover. At least in part due to this relationship, pressures for not only proliferation but also missile defense programs are growing in both Japan and India. In turn, those programs could ultimately have transformative strategic implications across Asia.83 Both Russia and China have already registered their strong opposition to Japan’s missile defense program and its strengthening of its alliance with America as a result of that program.84 Were India to be added to this relationship, the consequences throughout Asia and world politics would be immense and profound.
In the context of that DPRK-Pakistani relationship, we need to remember that the single biggest proliferator in the last generation has been Pakistan through the A. 194 Q. Khan operation that has been extensively described at least as regards its public record.85 Khan (whom it is difficult to believe was not working with the knowledge and consent of Pakistani military and political authorities) sold centrifuge and other technologies to North Korea and Iran as well as to other proliferators like Libya.86 As noted above, India and Pakistan are expanding the number, range, and type of their nuclear weapons and missiles, e.g., moving to submarine-based systems and developing the capability for strikes across a greater distance with conventional missiles, e.g., the Agni missile.87 Both states are also developing new and advanced conventional weapons that could be used in a bilateral or proxy war between them or between one of them and the other’s proxy. Indeed, recently there have been charges that Pakistan continues to sell nuclear technology and that Khan’s former middlemen are still trying to acquire those technologies.88
Thus the danger of a conventional war between India and Pakistan or proxies acting in their behalf presents the real possibility of an escalation first to missile war and then nuclear war. Indeed, as the stability-instability theory tells us, the possession by both sides of nuclear war capability paradoxically “makes the region (or the world) safe for conventional war” in the belief that the other side will be deterred due to the aggressor’s possession of a nuclear capability. Thus stability at the nuclear level creates the paradox of giving openings to governments or even to terrorist groups to trigger instability at lower levels of conflict. Those crises could then spiral out of control into bigger wars. The many crises in the region, the last one being in 2001-02, indicate just how precarious regional stability is, and Pakistan’s continuing ambivalence about supporting 195 terrorist and Islamist military forces in Kashmir and against Afghanistan provide ample opportunities for such a war to break out.
*1NC MTCR Conditions CP [4/4]
MTCR compliance solves – export controls dramatically slow proliferation.
Hebert 2002 (Adam J. Hebert, senior editor – Journal of the Air Force Association, "Cruise Control,” Air Force Magazine, December, Vol. 85, No. 12., )
Nonetheless, MTCR has slowed proliferation of advanced ballistic missiles, Gormley testified, with "the major consequence ... that the ballistic missile technology that has spread thus far is largely derived from 50-year-old Scud technology, a derivative itself of the World War II German V-2 missile program."
Gormley argued that cruise missile technology will inevitably continue to spread, but if MTCR can be used to control land attack cruise missile technology, US defenses "can conceivably keep pace with evolutionary improvements."
Vann Van Diepen, a State Department nonproliferation official testifying at the same hearing, agreed it is important to slow the spread of technology. Although there have been well-publicized developments, such as Iraq's conversion of Czech L-29 trainer aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles "for probable CBW [Chemical and Biological Weapon] use," export controls have helped deny access to the best technology, he testified. Enemy acquisition of cruise missiles is therefore "slower, more costly, and less effective and reliable."
Van Diepen said the US is attempting to stay ahead of the problem by pushing for the necessary export controls and--when necessary--using interdiction, sanctions, or the threat of military action to interrupt transfers. "Good intelligence is central to nonproliferation," he said, and these tactics have made cruise missiles "a less attractive option for our adversaries to pursue."
And, China is key – other countries give technical expertise, but they’re the clearing house.
Sokolski 2002 (Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Heritage Lecture #761,” September 6, )
Second, with renewed transfers of U.S. satellite and satellite launch integration technology to China, U.S. missile guidance-related technology might well make its way to North Korea through China. Certainly, the Chinese missile effort will continue to benefit from both direct Russian, Israeli, and European Union technical help and from indirect American missile technology transfers (e.g., from the U.S. through Israel and Europe to China). In another decade, Chinese theater solid rocket systems may have terminal guidance while longer-range Chinese rockets are likely to have multiple independently targeted reentry warheads (MIRVs). A robust UAV and an emerging UCAV Chinese export product line is also likely. Without new nonproliferation restraints, China, in short, could become a major clearinghouse for Western missile technology.
Net Benefit – 2NC Impact OV [1/2]
Weak missile proliferation regime makes rogue state proliferation inevitable – China uses US and Russian expertise to shore up missile technology and exports to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan, that's Kan and Sokolski. Blank says it destabilizes South Asia – it is the driving factor in regional the current regional arms race. Historical tensions make India-Pakistan the most likely scenario for conflict, and instability-theory indicates nuclear escalation is probable.
Even a limited nuclear exchange would cause megafires that destroy the ozone layer.
Reuters 2008 (Maggie Fox, Reuters – Economy and Politics, "India-Pakistan nuclear war would create ozone hole," April 8, Live Mint & the Wall Street Journal, )
Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons, and Pakistan and India are believed to have at least 50 weapons apiece, each with the power of the weapon the US used to destroy Hiroshima in 1945.
Mills said the study added a new factor to the worries about what might damage the world’s ozone layer, as well as to research about the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange.
“The smoke is the key and it is coming from these firestorms that build up actually several hours after the explosions,” he said. “We are talking about modern megacities that have a lot of material in them that would burn. We saw these kinds of megafires in World War II in Dresden and Tokyo. The difference is we are talking about a large number of cities that would be bombed within a few days.”
Nothing natural could create this much black smoke in the same way, Mills noted. Volcanic ash, dust and smoke is of a different nature, for example, and forest fires are not big or hot enough.
The University of Colorado’s Brian Toon, who also worked on the study, said the damage to the ozone layer would be worse than what has been predicted by “nuclear winter” and “ultraviolet spring” scenarios.
“The big surprise is that this study demonstrates that a small-scale, regional nuclear conflict is capable of triggering ozone losses even larger than losses that were predicted following a full-scale nuclear war,” Toon said in a statement.
Extinction.
Greenpeace 1995 (“Full of Homes: The Montreal Protocol and the Continuing Destruction of the Ozone Layer, )
When chemists Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina first postulated a link between chlorofluorocarbons and ozone layer depletion in 1974, the news was greeted with scepticism, but taken seriously nonetheless. The vast majority of credible scientists have since confirmed this hypothesis.
The ozone layer around the Earth shields us all from harmful ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Without the ozone layer, life on earth would not exist. Exposure to increased levels of ultraviolet radiation can cause cataracts, skin cancer, and immune system suppression in humans as well as innumerable effects on other living systems. This is why Rowland's and Molina's theory was taken so seriously, so quickly - the stakes are literally the continuation of life on earth.
And, it turns the case – continuing South Asian proliferation makes U.S.-China antagonism inevitable.
Malik 2006 (Mohan Malik, PhD, Prof. Geopolitics and Proliferation @ Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang,” KIDA, )
For China, what is at stake is the unraveling of Beijing’s carefully crafted grand strategy with potentially destabilizing consequences. Beijing cannot hope to strengthen its ties with Washington as long as North Korea and Pakistan are in serious crises and pursuing policies counter to important Chinese and US interests. For Beijing to continue to have close ties with unpredictable and seemingly irrational regimes, that starve and brutalize their own citizens, violate agreements, threaten neighbors, build and export WMD, no matter how genuine China’s own security concerns happen to be, it has a tremendous potential of driving a wedge between China and the United States. If China wants to escape from its status as a patron of rogue states and emerge as a responsible great power, it may have to distance itself from troublesome allies. China is increasingly uneasy over the growing talk in Washington and Tokyo’s policy circles that wants to hold Beijing accountable for Pyongyang’s actions or blames Beijing’s “indirect strategy” of using allies to thwart American influence and further its own military political aims instead of coming into direct confrontation with Washington over such issues like Taiwan arms sales, the Middle East, or missile defense.
Net Benefit – 2NC Impact OV [2/2]
Following the September 11 terror attacks, China was pleased with the pro-Pakistan tilt in the Bush administration’s South Asia pol icy, after a decade of estrangement and abandonment by Washington of China’s closest ally. Beijing wants to see closer US-Chinese-Pakistani ties so as to foil New Delhi’s designs to align itself with Washington to contain China and Pakistan. That policy is, however, in danger as disenchantment grows with Islamabad’s half-hearted measures against al-Qaeda and the widely-held perception in Washington’s policy circles that both China and Pakistan are “double-dealing” with the United States: on the one hand they claim to be US allies in the “War against Terror,” and on the other maintain ties with North Korea which has exacerbated the current nuclear tensions in Northeast Asia. Many observers argue that Washington may have to rethink its policies if the global campaigns against terrorism and WMD proliferation are to be decisively won. Soon after accusations were leveled against Pakistan for supplying North Korea with equipment for enriching uranium, The Washington Post’s Jim Hoagland wrote an article that declared that “[President] Pervez Musharraf’s Pakistan is a base from which nuclear technology, fundamentalist terrorism and life-destroying heroin are spread around the globe. . . . This nuclear-armed country is in part ungoverned, in part ungovernable.”71 Other reports quoted US officials as saying that after Iraq and North Korea, Pakistan would be Washington’s next headache.72 The prospect of the United States exercising greater control over Pakistan’s nuclear program, including the command and control of weapons and missile deployment is equally discomforting for China as it could both reveal and jeopardize the mutually-beneficial Sino-Pakistani military collaboration. Chinese strategists have expressed alarm over the growing entente cordiale between Japan and India based on the understanding that united they contain China and divided they are contained by China and its allies. Beijing is now concerned that Japan and India will seize on the opportunity to play up North Korea’s and Pakistan’s “roguish behavior” and take additional measures to bolster their defenses against China.73
Though preoccupied with the Iraqi and al-Qaeda threats in the short term, Washington will eventually have no other option but to act tough to neutralize the challenge posed by the Beijing-IslamabadPyongyang axis. The growing threat of nuclear terrorism post-September 11 has already resulted in the imposition of sanctions against Chinese entities three times in less than a year (Sept. 1, 2001, Jan. 24, and May 9, 2002). Beijing’s unconditional support for the “War on Terror” notwithstanding, the US ambassador to China, Clark Randt, describes China-assisted proliferation of WMD technologies as “a make-or-break issue.” By openly defying attempts to limit WMD proliferation, Kim Jong-il has undermined the credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrence guarantees throughout the region. And credibility is an integral part of deterrence. The worst-case scenario is a “nuclear domino effect” where an overtly nuclear-armed North Korea forces Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan to go nuclear, setting off a proliferation race in Asia with serious consequences for China’s great power ambitions and regional stability on which China’s economic growth depends. This would profoundly reshape the security environment in Northeast Asia and prompt the United States to accelerate deployment of ballistic-missile defenses. In response, China would likely want to boost its arsenal, which would prompt India to expand its nuclear arsenal, which in turn would spur Pakistan to do the same—and so on and on into an ever more perilous future. Clearly, Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship has the potential to derail Chinese objectives of economic development and a peaceful security environment.
As Stephen Blank points out: “Despite Chinese support and assistance in the development of those missiles and North Korea’s nuclear program, Beijing cannot be interested in North Korea flaunting them, because that ties Japan closer to Washington’s missile defense program, justifies US arguments as to its necessity, and restricts China’s military freedom of maneuver.”74 Even more worrying is the possibility that North Korea, a long-time proliferator of missile technology, could easily go into the ‘loose-nuke’ business once it starts churning out the weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium. Should Kim Jong-il find out the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, President Bush’s worst nightmare would become a reality. Another danger to China is that North Korea-assisted nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and sales of ballistic missiles could solidify an alliance of Israel, the United States, India and Japan, thereby fulfilling Beijing’s own paranoia of encirclement that it claims it wants to avoid.
Net Benefit – 2NC AT: Alt Caus
Chinese proliferation accelerates Indo-Pak conflict – it pressures India, bolsters Pakistan’s arsenal, and obstructs US stabilizing efforts.
Saunders et al 2k (Phil Saunders, Director of the East Asia Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, with Jing-dong Yuan and Gaurav Kampani, Senior Research Associates at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "How and Why China Proliferates Ballistic Missiles to Pakistan," August 22, Rediff, )
Continuing Chinese missile proliferation to Pakistan will have the unfortunate effect of accelerating the nuclear domino dynamics in South Asia. During the 1980s China helped Pakistan acquire a nuclear weapons capability. It followed up this policy in the 1990s by proliferating ballistic missiles to Islamabad. India's own nuclear and ballistic missile advances played a role in China's decision to help Pakistan develop missile capabilities; but India cited China's policy of covert proliferation as one of the principal reasons why it made its own nuclear capability overt. Renewed Chinese missile assistance will not only help Pakistan weaponise its nuclear forces, but it will also increase pressures in New Delhi to operationalise India's proposed minimum deterrent.
Weaponisation and deployment of nuclear forces by India and Pakistan will further obstruct the US goal of arranging a formal cap or nuclear "restraint regime" in the region. Fledgling nuclear arsenals are usually characterised by complex organisational and management problems such as weak command and control, poor real-time surveillance and intelligence gathering, force stability, etc. These problems will increase the chances of a dangerous nuclear crisis in South Asia significantly.
Regardless of whether Pakistan's ballistic missile programme is the result of India's own advances, analysts in New Delhi have interpreted the Chinese transfers as another example of Beijing's attempts to contain India. In the United States, conservatives and China-bashers have begun citing China's recurring missile transfers in apparent violation of its earlier pledges as an example of Chinese perfidy. They have used the episode to press their case for robust theater and national missile defenses and have threatened to enact a China nonproliferation law that would mandate sanctions if China continues its recent proliferation behaviour.
As a result, the emerging nuclear and missile race between India and Pakistan has the potential to damage US-China relations and affect both regional and global stability. Indeed, unraveling the proliferation connection between China and Pakistan remains one of the most important and difficult challenges for global nonproliferation efforts.
Net Benefit – 2NC MTCR Solves
MTCR is the missing link – adhering to export controls ends Pakistani proliferation.
Saunders et al 2k (Phil Saunders, Director of the East Asia Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, with Jing-dong Yuan and Gaurav Kampani, Senior Research Associates at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "How and Why China Proliferates Ballistic Missiles to Pakistan," August 22, Rediff, ]
MTCR and the M-11 controversy
China reportedly began negotiating the sale of M-11 ballistic missiles with Pakistan in the late-1980s and signed a sales contract in 1988. In 1991 US intelligence discovered that China had begun transferring the M-11s to Islamabad. Despite Chinese denials, the United States imposed sanctions against Chinese and Pakistani entities engaged in the trade in May 1991. In November 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US Secretary of State James Baker reached a verbal agreement whereby China agreed to "informally abide by the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR" in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions. After China sent a letter to the US State Department in February 1992 affirming the agreement, sanctions were lifted.
China's 1991 commitment to informally adhere to the MTCR guidelines did not end the M-11 controversy. In December 1992, reports surfaced that China had transferred 34 complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan in violation of its 1991 pledge. As a result, in May 1993, the Clinton administration re-imposed MTCR-related sanctions on Chinese entities after determining that Beijing had engaged in missile trade with Pakistan.
During post-sanctions negotiations with the United States, China argued that the deal did not violate the MTCR as the M-11 could deliver only a 500 kg payload over an advertised range of 280 km; in a narrow technical sense therefore, the missile's capabilities did not exceed the MTCR parameters. But the Clinton administration held its ground.
The impasse was resolved in October 1994 when the United States agreed to lift sanctions in return for a Chinese pledge that it would abide by Category I of the MTCR and ban exports of all ground-to-ground missiles exceeding the primary parameters of the MTCR. More significantly, China also agreed to the concept of "inherent capability" which binds it from exporting any missile that is inherently capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over 300 km. For example, the Chinese M-11 can deliver a 500 kg payload over a range of 280 km; but the missile's range can be extended to cover distances beyond 300 km with a reduced payload. Hence, by agreeing to the inherent capability clause, China agreed to prohibit future exports of the M-11 missile and other longer-range missile systems.
Persistent US diplomatic efforts since then led China to reaffirm its 1994 pledge. China also agreed to actively consider joining the MTCR. In June 1998, after India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, China and the United States issued a joint statement affirming that they would strengthen their export control laws to "prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India and Pakistan for nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons."
However, several issues pertaining to China's missile export policy remain unresolved. According to US government sources, China has interpreted its missile export controls very narrowly. Although Beijing has complied with the MTCR's Category I restrictions and had stopped the transfer of complete missile systems, it has not extended the ban to cover specific missile components and related technologies covered under Category II of the MTCR. In addition, China has kept the precise scope, content and extent of its internal missile export control list a secret. It is also unclear if this control list approximates MTCR guidelines.
Continuing Chinese Transfers?
New US intelligence reports suggest China has violated its 1994 pledge and has resumed missile-related technology transfers to Pakistan. Suspicions persist that Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and II medium-range ballistic missiles correspond closely to China's M-series of ballistic missiles, although there is no concrete evidence that Pakistan obtained either missile from China.
For example, a CIA report on global weapons sales submitted to the US Congress in August 2000 states, "Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during the reporting period (July-August 1999)." Similarly, another CIA report made public in February 1999 stated, "Chinese and North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile programme during the first half of 1998. Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballistic missiles..." This allegation was repeated in a February 2000 CIA report to the US Congress which said, "Some [Chinese] ballistic missile assistance [to Pakistan] continues."
Net Benefit – 2NC China Bashing I!
The plan makes Obama look weak on China – he’ll compensate with China bashing.
China Comment 2008 (the author, Francis, possesses a BS double major in Political Science and International Studies and graduated summa cum laude, and he has worked in the United States and Pennsylvania state governments, “China and the American Election,” September 1, )
Despite Obama’s anti-trade rhetoric, one Chinese journalist believes that because much of Obama’s expert team consists of Clinton-era officials, his relationship will be pragmatic. Still, that same journalist believes “an Obama administration would put more pressure on China, even to the point of being more likely than the Bush administration to use the WTO to confront China in court on related issues.”
On the positive side with Obama, he will probably talk to Hu Jintao, and not overtly pressure China beyond token expressions of dissatisfaction. At least, talks will happen if Obama isn’t forced to burnish an image of diplomatic weakness, like former US President Kennedy needed to do in order to establish credibility. If Obama is perceived as “weak” after having unsuccessful talks with Iran or Syria or Hamas, then he will need to regain his political capital somehow– and that somehow could be through bashing Russia or China- traditional bugaboos.
China bashing turns the aff—creates US-China hostility and blocks cooperation.
Gosset 2008 (David Gosset, director of the Academia Sinica Europaea at China Europe International Business School, Shanghai, and founder of the Euro-China Forum, “China-bashing is a blind man's game,” May 7, in Asia Times, )
But the Western "China-bashing" is also highly counterproductive. Anti-Chinese rhetoric or behaviors can only generate anti-Western attitudes within China. While Beijing and the West need to join forces to solve the immediate environmental, political and economic problems threatening global equilibrium, irresponsible activists and politicians are taking the risk to ignite new sterile antagonisms. There would be no winner in such a confrontational configuration.
Western officials have also to realize that by their harsh, accusatory and unfair criticisms, they reinforce China's most conservative forces. The Chinese reformers working for the deepening of Deng Xiaoping's "Reform and Opening-up" need constructive and subtle international partners, not arrogant foreign demagogues manipulating issues for their own domestic and short-term political gains.
Moreover, and over the longer term, inaccurate reports or insulting remarks by Western commentators undermine the West's intellectual and moral credibility. It is the emulation between rich and nuanced analyses, and not new forms of opposition between dogmatic statements, which can enrich the debate.
Net Benefit – 2NC Hegemony I! [1/2]
US has to pressure China on proliferation to avoid looking like a paper tiger – missile defense is key.
Sledge 2001 (Lt. Col. Nathaniel Sledge, US Army, MA candidate @ the US Army War College, “Broken Promises: The United States, China, and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” USAWC Research Project, , )
On the other hand, given the gains in nuclear nonproliferation and the unwritten ultimate goal of denuclearization, detractors of NMD are mystified by the mere consideration of NMD. Daniel Plesch, the director of the British-American Security Information Council, a security and defense issues research group, asserts, “With increased focus on creating a national missile defense system, the U.S. is no longer a reliable leader in the area of international legal controls on nuclear and other armaments. Its actions reinforce a steadily strengthening view against relying on mutual nuclear deterrence in national strategy.”54 More troubling is the message that this perceived lack of leadership sends to China and the weakening effect it could have on nonproliferation regimes and nuclear weapon-free zones.55 It is hard to predict what, if any, impact the NMD policy battle will have on Pakistan and India, which are considering a moratorium on nuclear tests.56 But the effect is unlikely to be positive.
In sum, U.S. flirtation with the idea of another Star Wars-like missile defense program provides Beijing and states of concern political cover for their proliferation activities. Further, it undermines U.S. credibility and leadership on nonproliferation issues.
Recommendations
The U.S. strategic goal is to impede the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, and missile delivery systems from China to states of concern. Additionally, U.S. interests are best served by the emergence of a strong, stable, open, and prosperous China.57 The recommendations that follow support these goals. Recommendations are systematically presented in the context of ends, ways and means, and elements of national power.While the recommendations call for exploiting U.S. strengths, they are constructive. In general they do not call for exploiting China’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Instead, they focus at the level of national (or grand) strategy.
General
The United States should retain the policy of comprehensive engagement with China to integrate further a freer, more prosperous China into the international community and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and related material and technology to states of concern. America, however, should redouble its efforts to implement the policy consistent with its declarations, something that has been lacking in U.S. policy implementation. Comprehensive engagement requires consistent and focused engagement and enforcement, which are the keys to successful policy.
Engagement means that the United States should continue to develop a dialogue with the Chinese government and nonproliferation professionals. In doing so, U.S. officials should avoid mirror-imaging when engaging the Chinese.58 Instead, America should attempt to understand better Chinese culture, values, and objectives, including their commitment to and timetable for reforms. Such a critically informed environment will provide truly comprehensive engagement and the realization of real progress toward the goal of ending Chinese nuclear proliferation.
The United States must avoid the appearance or fact of being a paper tiger on nuclear nonproliferation. Enforcement means that the United States must exercise the political will to discipline China informationally, politically, and economically in a global context, through multilateral and transnational economic and political institutions. America must do as President Ronald Reagan once said of nuclear arms control, quoting an old Russian proverb, “Trust, but verify.”
China, as a member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, is a major power. Therefore, the alternatives of threatening to use military force against and/or to contain China in support of nonproliferation objectives are counterproductive, impractical, and contrary to encouraging a freer and more prosperous China. Further, such aggressive options do not advance U.S. nonproliferation goals. Military force and containment should be avoided if possible. The United States can call upon a host of other military, economic, and political ways and means.
Net Benefit – 2NC Hegemony I! [2/2]
That kills hegemony.
Sartori 2001 (Anne E., Assoc. Prof. Poli. Sci. @ Northwestern U, in International Organization 56, Winter pp. 121–149)
I demonstrate formally that diplomacy works in the absence of domestic audiences. It works precisely because it is so valuable. When states are irresolute, they are tempted to bluff, but the possibility of acquiring a reputation for bluffing often deters a state from bluffing. A state that has a reputation for bluffing is less able to communicate and less likely to attain its goals. State leaders often speak honestly in order to maintain their ability to use diplomacy in future disputes.6 They are more likely to concede less important issues and to have the issues they consider most important decided in their favor. The model thus suggests that in the (more complicated) real world, states use diplomacy to attain a mutually beneficial “trade” of issues over time.
States sometimes do bluff, of course. It is impossible to measure how often they do so because opponents and researchers may not discover that a successful deterrent threat was actually a successful bluff. Nevertheless, the model I present here has a theoretical implication about when bluffs will succeed: Diplomacy, whether it be honest or a bluff, is most likely to succeed when a state is most likely to be honest. A state is most likely to be honest when it has an honest reputation to lose, a reputation gained either by its having used diplomacy consistently in recent disputes or having successfully bluffed without others realizing its dishonesty.
Since a state that uses diplomacy honestly cannot be caught in a bluff, concessions to an adversary can be a wise policy. When a state considers an issue relatively unimportant and the truth is it is not prepared to fight, bluffing carries with it the possibility of success as well as the risk of decreased credibility in future disputes. The term appeasement has acquired a bad name, but not all states in all situations are deterrable. Many scholars believe that Hitler would have continued his onslaught regardless of Britain’s actions in response to Hitler’s activities in Czechoslovakia.7 If Britain had tried to bluff over Czechoslovakia, its attempts to deter Germany’s attack on Poland would have been even less credible. Similarly, the United States’ acquiescence to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was not a high point of moral policymaking; however, given that any threats regarding Czechoslovakia would have been bluffs, honest acquiescence was the best way to preserve credibility. In the latter case, U.S. leaders seemed to realize the benefits of honesty; when Russian ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin told U.S. president Johnson that U.S. interests were not affected by the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, “in response he was told that U.S. interests are involved in Berlin where we are committed to prevent the city being overrun by the Russians.”8 Johnson’s words reveal that he saw a difference between Czechoslovakia, where he was honestly admitting that there was no strong U.S. interest, and Berlin, where he was threatening and prepared to go to war.
Counterplan – 2NC Say Yes Wall
1. China will say yes - Moltz evidence says concessions are key – they'll comply with export restrictions if we offer them a quid pro quo, and BMD is critical.
2. We should not have to read any evidence – remember that the thesis of their advantage is that China is afraid of theater missile defense and will do whatever necessary to avoid encirclement – they’ll probably make a concession on something as small as non-proliferation.
3. BMD is a unique bargaining chip.
Godwin and Medeiros 2k (Paul Godwin, Prof. IR @ the Nat’l War College, and Evan Medeiros, senior research assoc. in the East Asia Program @ the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Current History, China, America, and Missile Defense: Conflicting National Interests,” September, cns.miis.edu/archive/country_china/pdfs/godwinma.pdf)
Although challenging, theater defenses to be deployed in East Asia are more amenable to negotiation and deal-making than are bilateral NMD programs. The issue of Taiwan presents major difficulties, however. Before making any final decision, the United States must decide whether lower or upper-tier TMD enhances or degrades Taiwan’s security. Because China can simply overwhelm TMD with a barrage attack or countermeasures, the security benefits from TMD may be ephemeral, at best, and provocative, at worst. The value of TMD for the United States and Taiwan lies in its potential use as a bargaining chip. Theater missile defense transfers to Taiwan could be limited to the land-based PAC-2 or the least-advanced model of the PAC-3 in exchange for China’s restraint in deploying shortrange ballistic missiles in coastal provinces. Linking TMD sales to Taiwan with curbs on Chinese missile technology exports to both Pakistan and Iran is also in the United States security interest.
4. China explicitly links BMD and MTCR compliance – they use it to get concessions now.
Saunders et al 2k (Phil Saunders, Director of the East Asia Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, with Jing-dong Yuan and Gaurav Kampani, Senior Research Associates at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "How and Why China Proliferates Ballistic Missiles to Pakistan," August 22, Rediff, ]
But China's policies are not monocausal. China also uses missile sales and the ambiguity of its commitment to MTCR standards as a bargaining chip to achieve other foreign policy goals with the United States. For example, during negotiations with American diplomats, China linked the M-11 transfers to Pakistan with the US sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan. Similarly, continuing technological assistance to Pakistan may be linked to US threats to transfer theater missile defense systems and other sophisticated conventional arms to Taiwan. China probably hopes to use the threat of ballistic missile proliferation and the carrot of full MTCR compliance to persuade the United States to forego any potential transfer of theater missile defense systems currently under development to Taiwan.
Counterplan – 2NC Say Yes – Empirics
Pressure is empirically successful – China wants a quid pro quo.
Meise 1997 (Gary J. Meise, JD candidate – Vanderbilt, “NOTE: Securing the Strength of the Renewed NPT: China, the Linchpin "Middle Kingdom",” May, 30 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 539, Lexis)
Past efforts by the United States and other countries to control China's proliferation activities have had some degree of success. China acceded to the NPT only after France had announced it would accede to the treaty. n198 China's acceptance of MTCR guidelines was actually a quid pro quo with the United States to lift the embargo of satellite components and high-speed computers imposed on China because of its transfer of missile parts to Pakistan. n199 Furthermore, the U.S. Congress had threatened to terminate China's most-favored-nation (MFN) status if China failed to comply with the MTCR. n200 Finally, an escalated dialogue with China to reassure it of U.S. cooperation, [*570] commencing with former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the ASEAN conference in Brunei on August 1, 1995, n201 led to Chinese willingness to forego sales of nuclear reactors to Iran, n202 implying a possible abandonment of future transfers of nuclear technology to threshold states.
China has shown a limited response towards U.S. efforts in other areas as well, indicating that U.S. attempts to affect Chinese policy can be successful. Criticisms of U.S. efforts to curb Chinese nuclear proliferation stress the lack of consistency or systematic pressure by recent U.S. administrations.
Counterplan – 2NC Say Yes – AT: Taiwan*
China specifically wants concessions on Japanese BMD – they’re afraid of Taiwanese protection. *
Brad Roberts, 1AC Author, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses with expertise on the proliferation and control of weapons of mass destruction. · Adjunct professor at George Washington University · Member of DoD’s Threat Reduction Advisory Committee and chairs its panel on implementation of the National Strategy to Combat WMD · Advisor to the STRATCOM Senior Advisory Group · Member of the board of directors of the United States Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, September 2003, “China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond”,
There is another possibility for China’s arms control strategy: that it will become directly concerned with establishing “red lines” in the U.S. BMD deployment strategies. Chinese experts and policymakers have sometimes suggested that if BMD is inevitable, then the United States should go about it in a way that minimizes its destabilizing implications. For example, the deployment by Japan of sea-based systems is seen in China as more destabilizing than the deployment of ground-based systems, as this suggests the possibility that those systems would be deployed to protect Taiwan in time of crisis or war. As another example, the deployment by the United States of space-based boost-phase interceptors is seen in China as more destabilizing than the deployment of ground-based interceptors in the continental United States, as the latter can more easily be overwhelmed by Chinese responses. More generally, Chinese experts are keenly aware of the assurances provided Moscow on the limited nature of the defenses that the U.S. will seek to deploy over the period of the Treaty of Moscow (i.e., to 2012) and wonder what assurances Washington is prepared to offer Beijing on a similar score.
And, China’s specifically delinked non-proliferation with Taiwan – they want broad assurances on our military posture.
Pei 2002 (Pei Minxin, senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Bush's Beijing trip - high hopes,” February 19, the Straits Times, Lexis)
In the past, Washington and Beijing remained divided over this issue. China tried persistently to link its cooperation in the non-proliferation area with US weapons sales to Taiwan, while the Americans steadfastly rejected the linkage and used threats and sanctions to coerce Beijing into compliance.
IN THE post-Sept 11 world, however, progress is more likely. The Bush administration has put more pressure on Beijing to be more forthcoming.
China has also come to understand the futility of linking its cooperation in non-proliferation with the Taiwan issue.
More importantly, Beijing is beginning to understand the dangers of WMD proliferation, especially because it faces threats from domestic and international terrorism.
So, the most likely 'deliverable' is a deal in which China publishes a list of dual-use items subject to export control, in exchange for American relaxation of export controls over the transfer of high-technology products and satellites to China.
A related objective for the American President is to obtain Chinese cooperation in the next phase of the war on terrorism.
Given the concerns aroused around the world by his 'Axis of Evil' speech, Mr Bush may want to reassure his Chinese hosts that the US has no imminent plans for military action, especially against China's long-time but troublesome ally, North Korea.
Counterplan – 2NC AT: MTCR Membership
1. This is our argument – the MTCR rejected China because it didn’t have adequate export controls, the counterplan solves.
2. MTCR membership is irrelevant – it’s a question of whether or not China complies to MTCR standards.
3. And, the counterplan results in MTCR membership – export control standards are the last barrier.
Arms Control Today 2004 ("Missile Regime Puts off China," November, )
More than 30 countries dedicated to limiting the spread of ballistic missiles decided in October against letting China join their group because of Beijing’s alleged failure to meet their nonproliferation standards. They also expanded the list of items that governments should be more cautious about exporting.
After gathering Oct. 6-8 in Seoul for an annual decision-making meeting, the 34 members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) made no mention of China’s membership bid, but a U.S. government official told Arms Control Today Oct. 15 that the absence of such a statement was evidence of Beijing falling short. Members could not reach the necessary consensus to offer China membership because of concerns about Beijing living up to the regime’s export control and behavior standards, according to the official, who added, “They’re not there yet.”
In the weeks preceding the MTCR meeting, the United States imposed proliferation sanctions on eight Chinese companies. One of those, Xinshidai, was specifically accused of missile proliferation. The others, two of which the Bush administration previously penalized for missile proliferation, were punished for unspecified deals with Iran, which Washington charges is covertly seeking nuclear weapons and developing ballistic missiles to deliver them.
Beijing vehemently objected to the U.S. accusations and sanctions. “We are firm and rigorous in our attitude, position, and laws and regulations on opposing the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] and their delivery vehicles,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan stated Sept. 23. Deeming U.S. sanctions as “wrong practices,” Kong also warned that they “will not help expand China-U.S. cooperation on nonproliferation.”
Although it failed for now to win MTCR membership, China has made some headway this year in its campaign to gain acceptance as a responsible exporter. Beijing successfully acceded in May to the now-44 member Nuclear Suppliers Group, whose members restrict their nuclear trade. (See ACT, June 2004.)
Counterplan – 2NC AT: Contractor Sales
The government controls exports.
Cabestan 2009 (Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Prof. and Head of the Dept’ of Gov’t and Int’l Studies @ Hong Kong Baptist U, assoc. researcher @ the Asia Centre, “China’s Foreign- and Security-policy Decision-making Processes under Hu Jintao,” in Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 38, 3, , p. 63-97)
Although, under Hu and because of intense US pressure, the Chinese government has shown a stronger willingness to better control nuclear- and conventional-arms proliferation and exports, some PLA-controlled companies continue to sell weapons, in particular light arms, to unreliable intermediaries or final users, but it can be argued that these decisions have been motivated by business rather than strategic interests. It is true that China’s large-arms deals (e.g., with Sudan, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe) are closely managed and controlled by the government; they are a deliberate element of China’s assistance and foreign policy. However, the “soldier” does not appear to always be able to impose its view on the “merchant”. While national-security or interest considerations have influenced some major business decisions made by Chinese national companies, the CCP leadership is not a Big Brother capable of controlling each move made by each pawn on the country’s chessboard. Any discussion of the degree to which nationalism influences foreign- and security-policy decision-making processes may take us beyond the limits of this article. Suffice it to say here that the CCP leadership under Hu Jintao has been tempted, probably more than it was under Jiang Zemin, to instrumentalize nationalism as a form of leverage against certain foreign countries; this has been particularly true of China’s relations with Japan, the USA, the European Union and – more recently – France (Hao and Su 2005).
Theory – 2NC AT: Perm do Both
1. Doesn’t solve the net benefit – if China doesn’t have to take the condition, they won’t.
2. Severance, if they win “say no,” China would reject the plan—if we win “say yes,” vote neg on a risk of a net benefit.
3. China is moving toward more restrictive non-proliferation mechanisms now, but pressure is key.
Roy 2006 (Denny Roy, PhD, senior fellow and supervisor of POSCO Fellowship Program @ the East-West Center, “Going Straight, But Somewhat Late: China And Nuclear Nonproliferation,” February, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, )
Generally speaking, the desire to gain the benefits of improved relations with the United States and of a favorable international image has gradually prodded Beijing to move through different phases of nonproliferation policy. Initially China rejected participation in international nonproliferation regimes, characterizing them as part of a hidden agenda to deny nuclear energy to the developing world. Later China sought to enjoy the international respectability that came with committing to support international nonproliferation guidelines, while at the same time reaping the under-the-counter political and economic benefits of violating these guidelines. This proved unsustainable, as the accumulation of evidence of Chinese cheating harmed China’s image and opportunities for increased cooperation with the United States and other countries that value nonproliferation. In the present phase of this evolution in Chinese policy, the government has made serious efforts to curtail nuclear proliferation proscribed by widely-accepted international guidelines, and some Chinese officials appear dedicated to supporting in deed the nonproliferation principles often proclaimed by Chinese authorities since the 1980s.
In sum, one of the long-standing areas of bilateral friction may recede because of the apparent trend toward greater Chinese alignment with international nonproliferation norms. The modernization of China’s economy, the continued development of the Chinese legal infrastructure, and the global outlook engendered by China’s rise to great power status should reinforce this trend. In specific cases, however, the North Korean crisis shows that even if Beijing’s commitment to nonproliferation is presumed to be sincere, it remains subject to being compromised by competing, higher-ranked political or economic interests.
4. China will pocket the plan—Dalai Lama, currency, and human rights prove.
Klug 2010 (Foster Klug, staff writer - Associated Press, "Obama still seeking Chinese help on many fronts," January 16, Lexis)
The stern words of his presidential campaign, however, faded almost as soon as Obama settled in at the White House one year ago. During his first year, Obama's administration postponed a meeting with the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan monk reviled by Beijing, declined to label China a currency manipulator and was cautious in its criticism of China's human rights record.
Obama's China policy has been designed to gain concessions from a country crucial to solving global crises. Yet the United States has seen little benefit on many of its pressing problems, including nuclear standoffs with Iran and North Korea and tackling climate change and economic worries.
Theory – 2NC AT: Perm do the CP
1. Severs “resolved” which is to make a firm decision and “should which is used to imply obligation or duty [AHD @ ] and “should,” voting issue because it co-opts the status quo which is neg ground and kills clash and education.
2. Severs immediacy.
Summer 1994 (Justice, appeal from the District Court, "Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant," OK 123, 885 P.2d 1353, )
4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti. [*14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).] The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record. Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State.
4. Durable fiat is good
A. Aff ground – certain passage checks bad rollback arguments and it’s the only way fiat can logically function
B. Neg ground – key to predictable disad links, prevents aff conditionality and moving targets.
5. Distinctions in implementation are key to education
Elmore 1980 (Richard F. Elmore, Prof. Edu. Leadership and Director of Consortium for Policy Research in Education @ Harvard,
Political Science Quarterly, “Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions,” pg. 605-608)
The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by policy analysts that decisions are not self-executing. Analysis of policy choices matters very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In answering the question, "What percentage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified?" Allison estimated that, in the normal case it was about 10 percent leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation. Hence, in Nelson's terms, "the core of analysis of alternatives becomes the prediction of how alternative organizational structures will behave over...time." But the task of prediction is vastly complicated by the absences of a coherent body of organizational theory, making it necessary to posit several alternative models of organization.
Theory – 2NC AT: Condition CPs Bad
First, offense
1. Neg ground – the counterplan tests key words in the resolution which is the basis of topic education. That outweighs – international fiat is an on-face worse form of abuse and new affs multiply aff bias.
2. Aff ground – Probabilistic solvency mechanism means they just have to win China says no or impact turn the condition.
3. Strategic thinking – force them to think on their feet and defend the entirety of the plan.
Now, defense
1. Solvency advocate - 1NC Moltz evidence says the only way to get concessions on non-proliferation is a quid pro quo involving BMD, that ensures the counterplan is predictable and solves infinite regress
2. Best policy option – a logical policymaker would vote for the counterplan which is key to education and to test the opportunity-cost of the plan.
3. Counter-interpretation – we can only condition on international actors with a solvency advocate – solves predictability.
4. Time skew inevitable – speed and good strats
5. Reject the arg not the team – reasonability means not bad is good enough and voting against us won’t stop people from reading bad affs and abusive counterplans.
***Block 2A PIC
*1NC Block 2A PIC [1/2]
The United States federal government should end joint intercontinental missile defense development programs with Japan. The United States federal government should end conditions on joint missile defense deployment with Japan that involve third-party exports of the Standard Missile-3 Block 2A missile.
The counterplan competes – Block 1A is deployed with U.S. cooperation now, Block 2A is still under development.
Ko, 1AC Author, 2010 (Ko Young Dae, contributor to Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea, “U.S. Military Strategy on the Korean Peninsula and Missile Defense in Northeast Asia”, May 9, )
The United States regards Japan as its most significant international BMD partner. Japan’s MD system is part of the US MD system. Japan’s MD system is being constructed through technical and operative cooperation with the United States. Japan has deployed the US FBX(Forward-based X band) Radar, and has interfaced its 28 ground radar networks with U.S. spy satellites. The principal weapons systems of Japan’s MD are the Aegis BMD system and the PAC-3 system. In January 2008, Japan operationally deployed SM-3 block IA, capable of intercepting long-range missiles. Currently Japan is developing SM-3 block IIA, capable of intercepting ICBMs, and scheduled to debut in 2015. Reversing its previous policy of non-deployment of THAAD, Japan intends to introduce THAAD as a higher tier defense system than a PAC-3. Japan has also deployed its self-developed FPS-XX (L Band) Radar. The FPS-XX Radar is known to have succeeded in detecting and tracking Russian long-range missiles launched from the Sea of Okhotsk.
The counterplan solves all future BMD deployment – ending pressure ends Japan’s only incentive for exports.
Kyodo News 2010 (“Tokyo to relax export ban, send missiles to third countries,” July 25, )
The government is set to allow exports to third countries of a new type of ship-based missile interceptor being jointly developed by Tokyo and Washington, sources close to Japan-U.S. relations said Saturday.
Europe is considered a likely destination for the Standard Missile-3 Block 2A missile, an advanced version of the SM-3 series, if it is allowed to be shipped to third countries in a relaxation of Japan's decades-long ban on arms exports, the sources said.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked Tokyo to consider exporting SM-3 Block 2A missiles in a meeting with Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa last October. The move followed President Barack Obama's September announcement that Washington was abandoning plans for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe.
The United States subsequently decided to base its missile defense strategy around SM-3 interceptors, notably for responding to threats from Iranian missiles. SM-3 interceptors are designed to be launched from warships equipped with the sophisticated Aegis air defense system against intermediate ballistic missiles.
The United States recently notified Japan of its plans to begin shipping SM-3 Block 2A missiles in 2018 and asked Tokyo to start preparing soon to strike export deals with third countries. Washington's request also concerns the export of advanced versions of the new interceptors, which can also be deployed on the ground, according to the sources.
The U.S. wants Japan to respond by the end of the year — a demand that a senior Defense Ministry official said is hard to refuse as Tokyo wishes to continue the joint missile development project.
Japan has a policy of not exporting weapons or arms technology in principle. The policy dates back to 1967, when Eisaku Sato, the prime minister at the time, declared a ban on weapons exports to communist states, countries to which the United Nations bans such exports to and parties to international conflicts.
But Japan excluded exports of arms technology to the United States, with which it has a bilateral security pact, from the ban in 1983.
When Tokyo signed an agreement with Washington in 2005 for bilateral cooperation on a ballistic missile defense system, U.S.-bound exports of missile interceptors to be deployed by the two countries were also exempted from the ban on arms exports.
In exporting SM-3 Block 2A missiles to third countries, the government plans to follow the policy adopted when it reached the accord with the United States, under which exceptions to the export ban are acceptable from a national security standpoint on the premise that the weapons should be strictly controlled.
*1NC Block 2A PIC [2/2]
No risk of offense – Block 1A isn’t destabilizing.
Rubinstein 2007 (Gregg A., consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, “US-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects”, )
Summary: So far developments in US-Japan missile defense cooperation have not had the destabilizing effect on regional security forecast by various critics. Current and projected work on regional BMD systems by the US and Japan will impact the threat of short to medium range ballistic missile deployments by China and North Korea, but there is no serious evidence to support fears that BMD is feeding a more aggressive military posture by either country. Even in the case of Taiwan US-Japan missile defense programs are unlikely to have a serious effect on current tensions. On the other hand, joint BMD activity can contribute to regional security as a complement to arms control/non-proliferation efforts – per nuclear dialogue with North Korea – and a promoter of multilateral engagement in defense planning and operations.
2NC Solvency – Exports
2010 ("Japan considers exporting SM-3 missiles," August 5, )
TOKYO, Aug. 5 (UPI) -- Japan may export the ship-launched Standard Missile-3 system, a change from the country's current ban on selling arms and weapons.
Raytheon's Standard Missile-3 block 2A system is an advanced version of the SM-3 series jointly under development with the United States and other countries.
The apparent move comes after a request last October by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to Japan's Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. Japan is set to receive the first of the missiles in 2018.
The United States is expecting an answer by the end of the year, a report in Japan Times newspaper said.
The 21-foot SM-3 missile, designated RIM-161A in the United States, is a major part of the U.S. Navy's Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and is a compliment to the Patriot missile.
***Relations DA
*1NC Relations DA [1/4]
A. U.S.-Japan relations are fragile – domestic turmoil puts the alliance on the brink.
Washington Post 2010 ("Japan, America's top Asian ally, seems adrift. But it's not time to panic," July 28, )
WHEN THE Democratic Party of Japan swept into power last summer, a new era was proclaimed. The DPJ had turned out a conservative party that had run the country since the U.S. military ended its occupation after World War II. The newcomers to power, with a huge majority in the lower house of parliament, promised to build a European-style social democracy while letting fresh air blow through the long-sealed corridors of power. There would be more openness, less corruption, more straight talk.
But for the DPJ, the first year has been a very long one -- and it's not over yet. Plans for a new welfare state collided with Japan's stagnant economy and mammoth debt. Some of the party's leaders were dogged by corruption charges that sounded a lot like the old days. The party's leader, Yukio Hatoyama, proved indecisive as prime minister and had to step down after less than a year. In elections on July 12, voters delivered a sound spanking, depriving the DPJ of a majority in the parliament's upper house and providing a modest comeback to the conservatives who had been so soundly trounced last year. And the latest prime minister, Naoto Kan, must stand for reelection within the party in September. At the moment he seems likely to prevail, but if he does not, his defeat will lead to the sixth change of prime ministership in Japan in the past five years.
All of this has left many Japanese, and some of Japan's overseas friends, wondering if Japan's problems are simply too big for its politics. Such pessimism is understandable but wrong, or at least premature. Japan remains a wealthy, productive, stable society with the world's second-largest economy. The instability of its politics reflects a healthy debate on what is, after all, a daunting problem, and one humans have never had to face in this way: how to maintain economic prosperity while declining birthrates and increasing longevity produce an older and older population. If Japanese voters are unsure about whether it's better to raise taxes or cut spending, well, join the club.
The challenge for U.S. officials is to manage day-to-day relations while safeguarding what remains a hugely important alliance in the shadow of China's growth. The bad news is that the issue that bedeviled the relationship throughout the past year, a realignment of U.S. forces in Okinawa, is likely to get kicked down the road yet again. The more important good news is that the past year's turmoil has only reaffirmed the importance of the alliance for most Japanese. Mr. Hatoyama, who came into office flirting with a more China-centric foreign policy, found little appetite for that among his compatriots. Americans should keep that in mind as the U.S.-Japan alliance bumps along in the coming months.
B. Ending missile defense cooperation destroys the foundation of the alliance.
Rubinstein 2007 (Gregg A., consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, “US-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects”, )
Development of missile defense cooperation has been critical to a process of “alliance transformation” that ranges from an updated concept of roles missions and capabilities for defense cooperation, to a realignment of the US force structure in Japan. 8 BMD matters have had significant impact on key areas of alliance activity: • Policy: Moving from agreement on the need for missile defense to implementing BMD cooperation has brought policy planners on both sides into closer consultation on regional security strategy, arms control/non-proliferation policy, and an expanding scope of bilateral cooperation. The US government has been obliged to rethink its positions on alliance participation in US missile defense programs, as well as the release of sensitive defense technologies to key allies. Similarly, development of BMD activities will compel the Japanese government to reconsider long-standing positions on such policy-sensitive matters as Japan’s self-imposed ban on collective defense operations, and its inflexible approach to arms export controls (see below). • Operations: Cooperation between Japan and the US on BMD operations in Northeast Asia will require a level of coordination between US and Japanese defense forces that gives unprecedented meaning to the term ‘interoperability.’ Issues of concern here include timely sharing of critical intelligence data, development of an effective command, control, and communications (C3) infrastructure, and revision of outdated polices that obstruct joint response to imminent missile threats. • Acquisitions: The SCD project initiated last year is also unprecedented in being the first effort to jointly develop a defense system for use by both countries – and probably third country allies as well. While this effort may not seem remarkable to those familiar with multinational defense projects in NATO or the EU, implementing SCD has required substantial adjustments in interaction among program management bureaucracies and defense industries on both sides. Here too BMD cooperation has brought both sides beyond the limits of long-established practices and attitudes. Missile defense cooperation points to a critical influence on US-Japan alliance evolution often overlooked in discussion of political leaders or key administration officials – the growth of institutional interaction between the US and Japanese defense establishments.
*1NC Relations DA [2/4]
C. Regional confidence in U.S. commitment is key to East Asian stability and U.S. global leadership – the impact is rapid Japan remilitarization, China conflict and war in India-Pakistan and Korea
Goh 8 – Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Univ of Oxford (Evelyn, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,” 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database)
The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations – smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits – and ideational convictions – the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The empirical analysis in the next section shows that regional stability in East Asia in the post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary position in the regional hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of regional states about US commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War. Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to, US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance of the Asian regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American preponderance. Secondly, recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further explains contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining characteristic of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically, successful and sustainable hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain why Japan is not yet a ‘normal’ country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its remilitarization. The reason is that the United States extends its security umbrella over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to perceive no threat from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security community between them (Nau, 2003). Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater independent Japanese strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China, Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the growing clout of nationalist ‘hawks’ in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained ‘normalization’ process cannot take place outside of the restraining framework of the United States–Japan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the United States dominance directly. The United States–ROK alliance may be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual identification – in South Korea, the image of the US as ‘the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North,’ and in the United States, an image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an ‘evil’ state suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States – as indicated by domestic protests and the rejection of TMD – and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang, 2003, pp.79–80). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus, while the United States–ROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis-à-vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007 ). Once again, this is a key regional power that could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function. Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this strategy requires persuading China about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China, with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to ‘choose sides’ between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and why the United States–China relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As discussed earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power – witness the growing concerns about Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests. Regional attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates in US fears about the region being ‘lost’ to China, echoing Cold War concerns that transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security strategy post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central, South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable ‘regional stakeholder’ that will help to buttress regional stability and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide
*1NC Relations DA [3/4]
comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5. Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.
Indopak conflict leads to extinction
Fai 1 (Dr. Ghulam Nabi, Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmiri American Council, “India Pakistan Summit and the Issue of Kashmir,” 7/8, Washington Times, )
The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.
Japan rearm leads to nuclear war
Interfax 6 (Interfax, “Nuclear Japan Would Trigger Terrible Arms Race in Asia,” 06, )
The emergence of nuclear weapons in Japan would trigger an arms race in Asia and neighboring regions, Politika Foundation President Vyacheslav Nikonov said. "The situation would take a very dangerous turn should Japan take this path: the nonproliferation regime would be undermined and a terrible arms race would begin in Asia," Nikonov told Interfax on Tuesday. Nikonov made these remarks while commenting on the Japanese government's statement that Japan could legally possess nuclear weapons "however minimal the arsenal might be." "If this happens, South Korea could claim nuclear status and China would no longer put up with the small nuclear arsenal it has. The chain reaction would then entangle India, Pakistan and Iran," the Russian expert said. "This race could ultimately result in the use of such weapons," he said.
*1NC Relations DA [4/4]
China war leads to extinction
Strait Times 2k (The Straits Times (Singapore), “No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June 25, 2000, L/N)
The doomsday scenario THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
Korea war goes nuclear
Chol 2 (Chol, Director Center for Korean American Peace, 2002 10-24, )
Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people." Continues…The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.
2NC Uniqueness – Brink
Japan-U.S. relations on the brink – DPJ, fiscal issues, and Japan’s dependence on the U.S.
Newsweek 2010 (“Japan-U.S. Relations Could Get Bumpy,” July 16, )
As the government’s fiscal situation worsens, it becomes less and less likely that Tokyo will take up an ambitious security policy agenda. Fixing the government’s finances is a key step to addressing the other pocketbook issues with which voters are concerned. It is unlikely that a government implementing controversial budget cuts and tax increases would also take up the contentious question of how it should contribute to the defense of Japan and security in East and Central Asia. Its fear would be that the public would punish leaders perceived as focused on problems far from Japanese shores as it implements policies that hurt Japanese households. Moreover, for a cash-strapped government, the status quo, in which Japan limits its defense spending while subsidizing U.S. bases in Japan, continues to suit Japan’s interests. The logic of the Yoshida doctrine—which was formulated during the early postwar period, and which called for low defense spending combined with an alliance founded on U.S. bases in Japan—remains relevant today: Japanese leaders once saw the doctrine as the key to postwar economic development, and now the same policies provide resources for shoring up Japan’s social safety net and halting economic decline.
The irony, then, is that despite the DPJ’s desire for a more equal relationship with the United States, the political and economic logic of austerity suggests that Japan will likely grow even more dependent on the U.S. for its security, with the difference being that the relationship will be more fragile. For Japan, every U.S. initiative toward China will be scrutinized for signs that the U.S. is abandoning Japan in the region. Similarly, for Washington, every initiative to deepen cooperation within East Asia that excludes the U.S. will be questioned and may prompt grumbling about Japanese free-riding. In other words, these are the makings of a tumultuous decade for the alliance.
2NC Link – Cooperation
BMD is the lynchpin of U.S.-Japan cooperation.
Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 2007, “US-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects”, | Suo
Can missile defense continue to “lead the way” on defense cooperation between the US and Japan? There can be little question that US-Japan interaction on BMD has been critical to transition from a relatively passive security relationship to a more proactive alliance. From the perspective of capabilities development and operational activities, missile defense has energized engagement between US and Japanese defense institutions to the point where it is almost self-sustaining. Only a major shift in alliance relations would derail the process of BMD cooperation now established. Still, the degree of US-Japan interaction – as summarized in the ‘integrated’ and ‘default’ paths described above – remains uncertain as both countries continue to seek their way through untravelled territory.
Cooperation outweighs differences on BMD
Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 2007, “US-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects”, | Suo
All talk of alliance harmony not withstanding, engagement on missile defense programs will thus encounter significant areas of tension for the foreseeable future.So far US and Japanese officials have managed to reconcile changing and sometimes conflicting agendas in efforts to develop BMD capabilities. Common interests should continue to outweigh differences in advancing missile programs, but US and Japanese policy makers can never take such an assumption for granted. Success in implementation of missile defense cooperation will continue to require close engagement on all levels of concerned government and industry participants.
2NC Link – Security Guarantee
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs and Mary Beth Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation, Congressional Research Service, 2/19/09, “Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests”, Lexis Congress | Suo
U.S.-Japanese joint development of a theater missile defense system reinforces the U.S. security commitment to Japan, both psychologically and practically. The test-launch of several missiles by North Korea in July 2006 accelerated existing plans to jointly deploy Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) surface-to-air interceptors as well as a sea-based system on Aegis destroyers. If successfully operationalized, confidence in the ability to intercept incoming missiles may help assuage Japan's fear of foreign attacks. This reassurance may discourage any potential consideration of developing a deterrent nuclear force. In addition, the joint effort would more closely intertwine U.S. and Japan security, although obstacles still remain for a seamless integration.
2NC Impact – Warming [1/2]
Strong U.S.-Japan relations are key to solve warming.
Calder 2010 (Kent E. Calder, Director of Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at SAIS/Johns Hopkins University, 02/01/2010 “U.S. CLIMATE POLICY AND PROSPECTS FOR U.S.‐JAPAN COOPERATION”, ................
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