HYPOTHETICALS



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Northwestern Illinois State’s Attorneys

October 1, 2009

Wendy J. Muchman

ardc

Litigation Group Manager

Director outreach and mcle Chicago office

HYPOTHETICALS

Your Turn!

What’s a Prosecutor to Do?

Prosecutor is involved in a criminal proceeding regarding child-abduction of a minor child. The natural father had abducted his child and would not return the child until several conditions were met, one of which was that he wanted an appellate court order allowing him annual visitation with the child. There was no case pending in an appellate court. Prosecutor, being concerned about the safety of the child, prepares a court order that purports to be an order of the Illinois Appellate Court and signs the name of a retired Justice of the Court to the document. The prosecutor’s defense is “What’s a lawyer to do? I was worried abut the kid.”

What’s a Prosecutor to Do, Question Two?

Prosecutor is an Assistant State’s Attorney assigned regularly to the courtroom of the same judge, Judge Meanswell. Meanswell is longstanding friends with Judge Helpinghand. One day over coffee, Helpinghand tells Meanswell that his good friend and neighbor owns a trucking company and one of the drivers has an overweight citation pending in Meanswell’s courtroom. Helpinghand asks if Meanswell could have his State’s attorney “help” a friend. Later, Judge Meanswell calls the prosecutor in at lunch time and tells him that there is a hearing coming up on an overweight citation for a truck. The judge asks the prosecutor to “take a look at it” and see what he can do to “SOL it or whatever.” The case is called after lunch. The prosecutor stated: “I’m looking at the ticket and I don’t think I’m going to be able to meet my burden of proof on this matter. Motion State SOL.” Judge Meanswell granted the motion. The police officer who issued the citation was in Court that day and was surprised at the result. The Prosecutor had never talked to him before calling the case. After the case was SOL’d the officer whispered: “I guess money talks around here.” The prosecutor told the officer,” what’s a lawyer to do? I had to do it for the judge.” The police later complained of blatant “ticket fixing.”

Is There Something Wrong?

Prosecutor, Billy Bravo, is first assistant in a small town of Mayberry. His best friend is a judge and is also the sister of the wealthiest builder in town, Ernie Evil, who has a lot of influence in Mayberry. Ernie’s daughter is dating a guy from the wrong side of the tracks, Freddie Fearless. The felony criminal sexual assault statute requires that there be a five year age difference between the offender and the victim in order to charge the felony violation. Billy does the math and figures out that for one month out of the year, Freddie is five years older than Ernie’s minor daughter. He talks to the judge and explains he is slightly concerned about charging the felony violation. “Is there something wrong?” she asks him. “That scumbag Freddie will walk if you only charge a misdemeanor sex crime. You have to slap him with the felony charge.” Billy charges the felony crime.

Illinois Lawyer Disciplinary Case Summaries: The Criminal Prosecutor as a Lawyer-Respondent.

The following case summaries do not include disciplinary proceedings instituted against lawyers on the staff of the Illinois Attorney General, Special Illinois Assistant Attorney Generals, municipal lawyers, or other government employees and public officials. Many of the Board reports and Supreme Court orders for the following cases are available on-line at .

In re Eugene Lee Armentrout, Charles E. Petersen, Jay Robert Grodner, Kim Edward Presbrey, William H. Weir, and William John Truemper, Jr., 99 Ill.2d 242, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983). The Kane County State's Attorney was suspended from the practice of law for two years after he organized a massive forgery of voter signatures on a referendum petition. The forgery, consisting of ‘round-tabling’ signatures at a table located in the County Grand Jury room. The Court imposed lesser sanctions on the attorneys who assisted him in forging voter signatures; his chief assistant was suspended for six months and a second assistant State's Attorney and two attorneys in private practice were censured.

In re James F. Baba, M.R. 22324, 07 SH 74 (Ill. May 19, 2008). Mr. Baba, who was licensed in 1995, was disbarred on consent. While employed as an Assistant Coles County State’s Attorney, he withdrew three bags of cannabis from an evidence locker maintained by the Coles County Sheriff’s Department. He represented that he needed the items for court purposes. No court cases involving the items were, however, pending at the time and he never returned the items to the evidence custodian.

In re Michele Lynne Berkel, 97 SH 115 (ARDC Hg. Bd. Reprimand, Mar. 24, 1999) The respondent, a young assistant county prosecutor, improperly attempted to gather information for use in a friend’s contemplated divorce proceeding. Berkel sent a letter to the Secretary of State's office using the State's Attorney's letterhead and inquired whether the friend’s husband was publicly listed as an officer or agent for any registered business entities. In the letter, Berkel falsely represented that the State's Attorney's office was investigating the husband. She also telephoned the Madison County Recorder's office and requested a search of their records for any public information relating to the husband without disclosing that her request was unrelated to her official duties. The respondent was reprimanded.

In re Charles Luther Bretz, M.R. 12243, 96 CH 118 (Ill. Mar. 24, 1999). Bretz was suspended on an interim basis and until further order of the Court in 1996. The interim suspension was imposed after he was convicted of attempted official misconduct. While serving as a county prosecutor, he improperly charged a criminal defendant with felony aggravated criminal sexual abuse when he knew that a felony charge requirement of a five-year age difference between a victim and the defendant did not exist. Because there was no five-year age difference, the defendant's offense only warranted a misdemeanor charge. In addition, while serving as the First Assistant State's Attorney, he hid a file in his office during an ongoing criminal investigation of illegal storage of hazardous waste in order to impede further investigation or prosecution of a defendant. He was also disciplined for his role in a criminal trial where he failed to disclose on the record that he had a prior professional relationship with the judge. Finally, shortly after being appointed First Assistant, but while acting as a private attorney, he handled an “emergency” legal matter for a friend. In that matter, he failed to conduct a reasonable factual investigation before filing a petition for an emergency restraining order and failed to give notice to the opponent’s counsel when he presented the petition. He was suspended for three years retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.

In re John Hawthorne Campbell and In re Bradley W. Murphy, M.R. 21566, 06 SH 74 and 06 SH 75 (consolidated) (Ill. May 18, 2007). Murphy, who was licensed in 1973, and Campbell, who was licensed in 1978, were censured. Both are federal prosecutors. While co-prosecuting a cocaine and weapons case, they failed to disclose to the defense certain statements that one of their primary witnesses had made to government agents. Police officers had arrested a man named Childs for multiple deliveries of crack cocaine to three different cooperating individuals. The evidence against Childs included that, on four occasions, one of the three, Alan Logston, purchased crack cocaine from Childs in controlled transactions. The police supplied Logston with money to make the purchases. Respondents’ office filed an indictment against Childs and a codefendant in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Peoria Division. Campbell was lead prosecutor and Murphy assisted him. On Friday, April 2, 2004, three days before trial began, Logston confided to a detective that he kept some of the crack cocaine that he had purchased from Childs in the controlled transactions. The detective immediately informed Campbell, who then informed Murphy, of Logston’s statement. Prior to that time, on at least two occasions, Logston had denied keeping any of the drugs. On April 6, 2004, upon entering the courtroom and immediately prior to testifying, Logston stated directly to Campbell that he had taken one-half of the crack cocaine that he had purchased in three of the transactions, and he apologized to Campbell for lying previously. Campbell told Murphy of Logston’s statements. At no time prior to or during the trial did Respondents disclose to the defense Logston’s statements that he kept some of the crack cocaine that he had purchased. However, under cross-examination, Logston testified that he had kept some of the crack cocaine, and he testified that he had previously advised the police and prosecutors of his conduct. Defense counsel moved for dismissal of the indictment on the basis that the failure to disclose Logston’s statements violated Childs’ constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland. The district court found that the prosecutors wrongly failed to disclose Logston’s statements, but denied the motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of prejudice. Subsequently, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts, which were affirmed on appeal.

In re John Matthew Chancey, M.R. 10266, 91 CH 348 (Ill. Sept. 23, 1994). While serving as the First Assistant Lake County State’s Attorney, Chancey prepared a false document that purported to be an order of the Illinois Appellate Court and signed the name of a retired appellate justice to the document. At the time, Chancey was involved in a criminal proceeding regarding an alleged child-abduction. A natural father had purportedly abducted his child and would not return the child until several conditions were met. One of the conditions was that he wanted an appellate court order allowing annual visitation with the child. Chancey knew it would be impossible to obtain a legitimate court order because no case was pending in the appellate court. He was, however, concerned about the safety of the child. The Review Board found that, although he may have had a good motive, he still engaged in dishonesty and deceit, and recommended that he be reprimanded. The Supreme Court permitted the Review Board reprimand to stand.

In re Brent Allen Cain, 02 SH 19 (Hg. Bd. Reprimand, September 26, 2002). While an assistant state’s attorney for Macoupin County, Cain left a bar after drinking about 6 beers on a Friday night and drove off in his SUV on South Plum Street in Carlinville, Illinois. He hit an 18-year-old woman who was walking on the road and left the scene without providing assistance. As a result of the collision, the woman was knocked from her feet, fell down and struck her face on the curb. He pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eighteen months of conditional discharge conditioned on his paying court costs, his submission to a substance abuse evaluation, and his completion of any recommended treatment within six months.

In re Randolph G. Cook, M.R. 4712, 88 CH 11 (Ill. March 28, 1988). Cook was disbarred on consent, with the sanction effective as of February 1, 1987. He pled guilty to four counts of official misconduct and four counts of theft and was sentenced to a two-year prison term. The disbarment was ordered, in part, due to his conduct while he was serving as the First Assistant State’s Attorney for DeKalb County. A man named Rogers was charged with multiple traffic offenses and DUI while driving through the town of Roscoe in Winnebago County. Rogers contacted Cook regarding the charges. Cook told Rogers that he, Cook, would “take care of it” and that it would cost $2,000. Later, Cook contacted the Roscoe City Prosecutor, identified himself as the First Assistant State’s Attorney for DeKalb County and falsely informed the man that Rogers was an informant working for the Department of Criminal Investigations and the DeKalb County State’s Attorneys Office. Cook requested that the city prosecutor give consideration to Rogers given his “informant” status. Thereafter, Rogers met with Cook and gave him $2,000 in cash. Cook falsely related that he was not going to keep the money but instead give it to a TASC fund.

In re Thomas Gerard Cosgrove, M.R. 19629, 01 CH 76 (Ill. Sept. 27, 2004). Cosgrove, who was licensed in 1991, was censured. He served as an assistant state’s attorney assigned to Courtroom 204 in the Markham courthouse and was the only assistant state’s attorney assigned to that courtroom when Judge Paul Sheridan presided there. Each day in Courtroom 204, there were approximately two hundred cases on the court call. Cosgrove described Sheridan as a judge who wanted to move the court calls along. Judge Sheridan had never indicated to Cosgrove that he had a particular interest in any case. Sheridan and another judge, Harry R. Buoscio, had known each other for more than twenty years and were friends. Buoscio had neighbors and long-time family friends who owned a trucking company, Cress, Inc. One of the truck drivers for Cress Inc. received a citation for driving an overweight truck. The citation was scheduled for hearing in Courtroom 204. At some point, Buoscio learned that Sheridan was assigned to Courtroom 204. Buoscio told his colleague about the overweight citation for Cress Inc. and asked whether Sheridan could have the assistant state’s attorney assigned to the courtroom “help” a friend. On the date of hearing on the overweight citation, Sheridan and Cosgrove had a conversation in Sheridan’s chambers. Sheridan told Cosgrove that there was an overweight citation coming up and that Cosgrove should “take a look at it” and see what he could do, to “SOL it or whatever.” When the case was called, Cosgrove stated: “I’m looking at the ticket and I don’t think I’m going to be able to meet my burden of proof on this matter. Motion State SOL.” Sheridan then granted the motion. The police officer who issued the citation was in Court that day and was surprised at the result, as Cosgrove had never talked to him before calling the case. After the case was SOL’d, the officer whispered: “I guess money talks around here.” Cosgrove then told the officer that he “had to do this for the judge, or because of the judge.” Later, the officer’s commander wrote a memorandum to Sheridan’s presiding judge and complained of what he described as a case of “blatant ‘ticket fixing’”. At the time of the events in question, Cosgrove had been a lawyer for two years. At the disciplinary hearing, he testified that he should immediately reported the Sheridan ex parte conversation to his supervisor. He said that he did not call his supervisor because of the pressure to keep moving cases in the courtroom.

In re J. Earl Crisel, 101 Ill.2d 332, 461 N.E.2d 994 (1984). Crisel served as the Edwards County State's Attorney. The conduct at issue took place in 1980, when he was seeking reelection to the State's Attorney position. He was reelected in 1980. Late in the evening of May 24, 1980, Crisel got into his car and drove to a remote spot near the Little Wabash River, intending to commit suicide. Unable to carry out this plan, he fired his shotgun twice into his automobile. Early the following morning, he contacted the Edwards County sheriff's department, relaying a fabricated report that he had been shot at by unknown persons. Soon thereafter, he left town for approximately a week without telling anyone that he was leaving or where he could be found. Law-enforcement officials in the area initiated a search. At the disciplinary hearing, Crisel indicated that the disappearance was prompted when he learned that the local media was going to release a story containing the "true facts" involved in the attack on his automobile. He further testified that it was during this period that he decided to seek psychiatric care. The Supreme Court held his fabricating a report suggesting that he was a crime victim warranted a three year suspension, with stay of suspension and imposition of probation, in light of a finding that his actions were the result of a depressive neurosis. The Court held:

Respondent's intentional misrepresentations were closely related to, and in complete contravention of, his responsibility as a State's Attorney, to enforce the law. These acts were evidence of his lack of professional and personal honesty, threatening the integrity of the legal profession and the administration of justice. We would not hesitate in imposing a substantial period of suspension if the evidence of psychological impairment had not been introduced…

In re John Joseph Edwards, M.R. 22619, 07 CH 129 (Ill. Nov. 18, 2008). Mr. Edwards, who was licensed in 1998, was suspended for a period of two years and until further order of the Court, with the suspension stayed after one year by probation with conditions. He was convicted for possessing methamphetamine while he was employed as an Assistant State’s Attorney in Cook County. The suspension is effective on December 9, 2008.

In re Jerry Finney, M.R. 20365, 04 SH 6 (Ill. November 22, 2005). Finney, who was licensed in 1974, was suspended for one year and until further order of the Court. Finney was an Assistant Macon County State’s Attorney. One day, two employees of A-1 Recovery Services were directed to repossess his 1999 Buick Century because he had failed to make payments on an installment loan. The two repomen, Messrs. Alderson and Starbody, identified Finney’s car, which was parked in a parking lot west of the Macon County Courthouse in Decatur, Illinois. From the courthouse window, Finney spotted the men preparing to tow the car. He ran out of the courthouse, approached the car, and told Alderson and Starbody that they were not going to take his vehicle. Finney proceeded to get into the car and Alderson stood behind the vehicle to stop him from leaving the parking space. Finney then put the car into reverse and accelerated into Alderson. After Finney hit Alderson with his car, Alderson ended up on the back of the Buick. Finney then accelerated and stopped the car with a jolt. When Alderson remained on the back of the car, Finney accelerated rapidly and Alderson eventually fell from the car. Finney left the area without stopping. Alderson suffered minor injures as a result of the incident. Following a bench trial, Finney was found guilty of two counts of reckless conduct and two counts of reckless driving and was sentenced to a twelve-month term of probation. He violated almost every term of the probation and it was subsequently revoked by the sentencing judge. Finney was previously disciplined for unrelated misconduct. He now resides in Indiana.

In re Dennis Dowe Fisher, M.R. 14758, 98 RC 1507 (Ill. May 29, 1998). The Respondent was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 1978 and in North Dakota in 1984. From November 1978 to May 1997, he was employed as an Assistant United States Attorney. On December 5, 1997, the Supreme Court of North Dakota imposed a 24-month suspension against him for shoplifting items on two occasions. The entire suspension was stayed subject to the condition that he commits no further acts of theft during that period. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered him suspended for 24-months, and stayed the suspension as reciprocal discipline, under the same terms as his discipline in North Dakota.

In re Justin T. Fitzsimmons, M.R. 20581, 05 CH 21 (Ill. January 13, 2006) Fitzsimmons, who was licensed in 1998, was censured for engaging in misconduct while employed as a DuPage County Assistant State’s Attorney. While he was there, the State’s Attorney had in place a policy regarding the ethics and conduct of his assistants. The policy provided, in part, that every employee of the office was to “refrain from misusing one’s job or knowledge gained from that job for personal profit or gain or for the gain of one’s family or friends.” Fitzsimmons was aware of this policy. In December 2003, Fitzsimmons was contacted by a friend who had formerly been his colleague at the State’s Attorney’s office and who had entered private practice. The friend’s new employer had recently received a traffic citation and had asked his new associate to represent him in connection with the citation. Fitzsimmons agreed to look into the matter. As a favor to his friend, Fitzsimmons contacted an assistant state’s attorney named Arnel, who was handling the traffic citation, and asked that the citation be dismissed, without stating a reason for the request. Under the policy of the State’s Attorney’s office, it was permissible for such a request to be made in connection with a plea agreement in another case, and Fitzsimmons assumed that Arnel would believe his request to have been made for this reason. In fact, when Arnel moved to nolle pros the citation, he represented to the court that his motion was being made on the basis of a plea agreement in another matter. When the State’s Attorney’s office learned the reason for dismissing the citation, Fitzsimmons was permitted to resign his employment, and the traffic matter was reinstated in the circuit court.

In re Morton Efram Friedman, 76 Ill.2d 392, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (1979). Friedman was the chief of the criminal division of the Cook County State's Attorney's office. On two occasions, he was advised by police officers that defense attorneys had offered them bribes in return for false testimony in pending cases. In each instance, Friedman instructed the officers to testify in conformity with the attorney's request, and the officer did so, subsequently receiving a bribe. In each case, the judge presiding over the case was notified immediately after disposition of the case of what had occurred. Both attorneys were prosecuted for bribery; one was acquitted. While there was no majority opinion in Friedman, four justices concluded there was a violation of relevant ethics guidelines. Two justices would not have found a violation. No discipline was imposed, however, because two of the justices who found a violation viewed discipline as not warranted because Friedman was acting without clear guidance of precedent. A majority of the Friedman Court, however, rejected the Respondent’s argument that, in essence, the ends justify the means. The Court concluded that such reasoning is inappropriate, particularly when the actor is a government official who attempts to justify the use of unlawful tactics. Justice Clark, who filed a separate dissenting opinion, would have found that the Code was violated and imposed discipline. In Justice Clark's view, neither the motive nor the immediate impact of the misrepresentations before the trial judge was determinative of the issue of misconduct. Justice Clark also considered it to be the prerogative of the court to be informed of the Respondent's plan and to be put in a position to rule upon its propriety before any testimony had been presented.

In re Raymond Paul Garza, M.R. 4206, 86 CH 21 (Ill. Apr. 3, 1987). The Respondent, while serving as an Assistant Cook County State’s Attorney in the felony trial division, referred to a defendant’s medical expert, Dr. Marvin Ziporyn, as a member of the oldest profession known to man, repeatedly used the phrase “liar” rather than “I object,” and used profane language. He was censured.

In re Maribel Jessie Guzman, M.R. 18943, 03 SH 15 (Ill. Nov. 14, 2003). Ms. Guzman, who was licensed to practice in 1995, was censured. While serving as an assistant state’s attorney, Guzman met with Theresa Gariott at the request of one of Guzman’s friends. Gariott told Guzman that Gariott’s neighbors, Lorena Lutz and Alejandro Rodriguez/Ferreyra played their music loudly and swore at Gariott on several occasions. Gariott told Guzman about one specific incident where the police had been to the neighborhood, but the responding officer, rather than arresting Rodriguez/Ferreyra, had merely written a report. Garriot also told Guzman that, on at least one occasion, Lutz had threatened Gariott. Guzman later reviewed the police report and obtained other information, including arrest information regarding Rodriguez/Ferreyra from a police lieutenant in the Moline Police Department. Guzman then wrote a letter to Lutz and Rodriguez/Ferreyra on letterhead from the State’s Attorney’s office. The letter threatened that, if Gariott had cause to complain of them in the future, “please be advised that criminal charges will immediately be filed and warrants for your arrest will be issued and DCFS will be contacted at that time to secure your children,” although Guzman had no good faith basis or probable cause to make those statements. Other statements in her letter had no substantial purpose other then to embarrass or burden Rodriguez/Ferreyra and Lutz, including a threat to contact INS regarding Rodriguez/Ferreyra/s right to remain in the country and a warning that it was illegal for him to use two different last names “even if they are the last names used by your father and/or mother unless you have a legally hyphenated last name and documentation to prove such,” adding that “the practice of using both last names is only in Mexico – NOT here.”

In re Leonard Keith Hays, Jr., and Roger Allen Simpson, 91 SH 331 (ARDC Hg.Bd., Mar. 9, 1992). Simpson was the Piatt County State's Attorney, and Hays was a private practitioner representing a woman named Dorothy Courson in regard to certain investments that Courson had made with a company known as Network International, Inc. (N.I.I). During the course of his investigation, Hays became convinced that his client had been the victim of a criminal conspiracy concerning the investments. In addition, he believed that the conspirators had committed a homicide at Zion National Park, Utah. The victim of the homicide was Mrs. Courson's daughter. Hays discussed the findings of his investigation with Simpson who, in turn, contacted Federal Bureau of Investigation authorities in Utah. Simpson learned that the persons Hays had described were indeed suspects in a murder. Eventually, Hays, on behalf of his client, filed a civil suit against N.I.I. and the man they suspected of the daughter’s death. Later, criminal charges were filed against the conspirator suspected of the death, and Hays and Simpson agreed to make an attempt to lure the man into Piatt County so that the outstanding criminal warrant could be served upon him and his capture effected. They did so by sending him a falsified notice of a hearing at which he could appear to claim a purported inheritance. Both men were charged with misconduct in regard to their attempt to lure the man into Illinois. Hays was reprimanded by the Hearing Board on September 9, 1992. Simpson, however, was dismissed from the case on motion on September 27, 1991. The dismissal against Simpson was never appealed by the Administrator.

In re John Michael Kelley, M.R. 22452, 07 SH 5 (Ill. Sept. 16, 2008). Kelley, who was licensed in 2001, was suspended for two years and until further order of the Court, with the suspension stayed after one year by probation with conditions. During his employment as a Sangamon County Assistant State’s Attorney, he possessed and used cocaine and marijuana. The suspension was effective on October 7, 2008

In re Anthony Arnold Lee, 96 SH 655 (ARDC Hg.Bd. Reprimand, Dec. 9, 1996). Respondent, as Ford County State's Attorney, altered, or directed someone to alter, the face of an arrest warrant issued by Judge William Roberts for the arrest of Michael J. Taylor. Respondent was informed by Chief Investigator Thomas E. Duffy of the Ford County Sheriff's Department that the information on the face of the warrant, which described Michael J. Taylor, including a physical description and date of birth, was incorrect. Duffy also provided Respondent with what was described as the correct identifying information for Michael J. Taylor. Respondent subsequently crossed out the existing identifying information on the warrant, typed on the new identifying information, and delivered it to the Ford County Sheriff's Department for execution. Respondent did not seek to obtain a new arrest warrant and did not seek Judge Roberts' permission to change the information on the warrant. As a result of Respondent's actions, Ford County Sheriff's deputies arrested a man who did not commit the crime for which the warrant was issued. The Hearing Board determined that a reprimand was appropriate for the misconduct in question.

In re Brett D. Mellen, M.R. 14936, 98 DC 1006 (Ill. May 27, 1998). Mellen was licensed to practice in 1994. He was disbarred upon consent after he was found guilty of official misconduct and criminal sexual abuse. The conviction arose out of his conduct while serving as an Assistant Grundy County prosecutor. He forced a young woman to perform sexual acts in exchange for dismissal of a traffic citation. He told her that, if she did not do as he asked, she would face a $2,000 fine and would not be able to get a driver's license for two years. As a result of the criminal conviction, he was sentenced to thirty months probation to expire on August 26, 2000 and 100 hours community service on the official misconduct and twenty-four months conditional discharge (non-reporting probation) on the sexual abuse charge to be served concurrent with the thirty months probation. Mellen also engaged in similar misconduct with other women who had cases pending in Grundy County.

In re William Patrick O’Connor, M.R. 10004, 91 CH 632 (Ill. May 19, 1994). The Respondent was suspended for one year and until further order, in part, due to conduct that occurred while he was serving as an Assistant Cook County State’s Attorney. Specifically, he was assigned to prosecute a defendant who had been charged with the robbery and murder of an elderly woman and the robbery of her companion, Ms. Eugenia Santiago. After Ms. Santiago, the key witness, did not appear in court to testify, and the state was unable to secure her appearance, Respondent and another prosecutor attempted to serve Ms. Santiago at her home. When Respondent arrived at Ms. Santiago's residence he was carrying a handgun and attempted to intimidate the woman. As a result, criminal charges were filed against him and he was found guilty of unlawful use of weapons, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to one year of social service supervision and one hundred hours of community service to be performed in defense of indigent prisoners.

In re Frederick Richard Odendahl, M.R. 2787, 80 SH 69 (Ill. March 26, 1982). Odendahl served as the State’s Attorney of Warren County. During his tenure in office, he also maintained a private practice of law. On several occasions, he represented, in a private capacity, potential prosecution witnessed in civil proceedings for non-support against individuals who could conceivably be the subject of a non-support action. Further, as a private attorney, he caused to be filed in the Circuit Court of Warren County, complaints for divorce and subsequent post-decree proceedings for modification of decrees on behalf of private clients. Finally, a woman named Cynthia signed and caused to be filed a criminal complaint in the Circuit Court of Warren County charging her husband, Jerry, with disorderly conduct. Odendahl, as State’s Attorney, prosecuted the criminal complaint against Jerry. Jerry eventually pled guilty and was convicted, fined, and placed on probation. Later, Cynthia instituted divorce proceedings alleging that Jerry had used drugs, and had engaged in acts of physical and mental cruelty. Odendahl filed an answer to the divorce complaint on Jerry’s behalf, a counter-complaint for divorce, and a motion to quash a restraining order. He argued and won the motion to quash. He was suspended for one year.

In re John Kenneth Peek, M.R. 9461, 93 SH 457 and 94 SH 369 (Ill. Mar. 26, 1996). In October 1991, Peek began working as an Assistant Sangamon County State's Attorney. Initially, he did civil work but, in February or March 1992, he began prosecuting criminal cases. Peek became a felony prosecutor in April 1992. He continued in that position until he resigned in September 1992. The month before his resignation, federal criminal charges were filed against him alleging that he knowingly and intentionally conspired to possess cocaine and marijuana with the intent to distribute. The charges were dismissed and were not reinstated. The Administrator, however, filed a formal complaint alleging the same matters that were the subject of the criminal charges, specifically concerning Peek's relations with a man named Timothy Lewis. In June 1992, Lewis contacted Peek on several occasions. Law enforcement officials surreptitiously recorded the conversations. The conversations, on their face, concerned drug activity. The men appeared to arrange large-scale drug transactions. Their discussion indicated that Peek was involved in significant drug activity, including drug dealing over a course of time. At the disciplinary hearing, Peek denied involvement in any drug activity and stated that he had not known Lewis to be involved in drugs. Peek's defense was that the conversations were staged, and "pretend". An A.R.D.C. Hearing Board found that Peek's testimony was not credible. He was disbarred.

In re Andrew S. Pitt, M.R. 14538, 98 DC 1001 (Ill. Mar. 23, 1998). On May 28, 1997, a three-count criminal information was filed against Pitt in the United States District Court for the Central District of California alleging that, between April 1993 and July 1995, while serving as an Assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles, he engaged two counts of wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 1346 and one count of engaging in a conflict of interest in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 208(a) and 216(a)(2). He eventually pleaded guilty to the offenses outlined in that three-count criminal information. While he was assigned to investigate organized crime members and associates, he obtained $33,000 from a confidential source, said funds having been obtained from an unlawful stock transaction, and used the entirety of those funds for his own personal purposes. He also received $98,000 through wire transfers to an account held by his limited liability company, Black Dog Ranch, LLC, from a convicted felon-government cooperator, after taking official actions on behalf of that government cooperator. He also received a $35,000 loan and items of jewelry, valued at approximately $2,300, from a government cooperator, who was a convicted felon, after taking official actions on behalf of that government cooperator. Further, during November 1994, while being assigned to investigate organized crime's influence into the securities industry, he took official action to have six foreign nationals enter the United States, five of the nationals being the relatives of a confidential source. As a result of his official actions, the confidential source caused a total of $760,000 to be invested in, and wire transferred to, BDR Industries, Inc., a public company, in which Respondent's limited liability corporation, Black Dog Ranch, LLC, owned a controlling share. For his criminal activity, he was sentenced to a prison term of 24 months and was placed on three years supervision upon his release from prison. He also was ordered to pay a fine of $7,500.00 and a special assessment in the amount of $150.00. He was disbarred in Illinois.

In re Donald Raymond Schaaf, Jr., M.R. 17387, 99 SH 64 (Ill. Mar. 23, 2001). Schaaf, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 1994, was suspended for twelve months with the last seven months stayed by probation. Several months after Diane Weidler retained Schaaf to represent her in a dissolution of marriage, she discharged him owing $245 in legal fees. In December 1997, three years after he was licensed to practice, Schaaf became a part-time assistant state’s attorney for Jersey County, Illinois. In April 1999, he became a full-time assistant state’s attorney and wanted to conclude all his private matters. On April 28, 1999, he sent, on personal stationery, a “FINAL NOTICE” to Weidler setting forth the billing schedule and stating:

“As stated per our last conversation, there has been no action taken to pay the remaining balance on your account and my patience has been depleted. I have filed a Theft of Services Criminal Complaint. This is a class four (4) felony subject to 1-3 years in the Department of Correction [sic], a $25,000 [sic] plus costs and restitution. In addition to signing the complaint, I will be prosecuting it on behalf of the State.

As a final gesture for you to resolve this matter without having to face jail, fines and a conviction, I advised the Jersey County Sheriff to hold the warrant until May 5, 1999. If the balance due on your account is paid in full prior to May 5, 1999, I will inform the Sheriff not to enter the warrant. If payment in full is not received by 12:00 noon on May 5, 1999, the warrant will be entered and it will take a $500 bond to bail you out of whichever jail you are placed [sic] after arrest.

DO NOT IGNORE THIS NOTICE!”

Schaaf was charged with presenting or threatening to present criminal charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter in violation of I.R.P.C. Rule 1.2(e). In addition, he was charged with falsely representing that he had signed and filed a theft of service complaint, that a warrant was issued, and that he had requested the Sheriff to hold the warrant. At the disciplinary hearing, the Administrator asked for a suspension of at least ninety days, and Schaaf argued for a reprimand.

In re Dennis R. Schumacher, M.R. 6662, 90 CH 233 (May 30, 1990). While the Respondent was the Ogle County State's Attorney, he was also a member of the Board of Trustees of a church known as Faith Assembly of Grand Detour located in Ogle County, Dixon, Illinois. The Church was affiliated with a full-time day school known as Faith Christian School, also located in Dixon. The Church Board had full direction and control of the School. The Board voted to construct a school building. In furtherance of this decision, the Church took out a mortgage with the Dixon National Bank in the amount of $150,000. In order to obtain a mortgage, each Board member was required by the bank to sign a personal guaranty for a portion of the $150,000. Respondent personally guaranteed up to $15,000 of the mortgage loan. Sometime thereafter, the minor child of Joseph and Marcia Butterfield was enrolled as a student in the School. The Butterfields filed a complaint with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services alleging that their child had been subjected to an act of physical abuse by his teacher at the School. At the time that the Butterfields filed the D.C.F.S. complaint, both the Church and Respondent were potentially liable for the acts, errors and omissions of Church and/or School employees. Upon receiving the complaint of child abuse from the Butterfields, D.C.F.S. conducted an investigation of the alleged incident. A D.C.F.S. investigator determined that the child abuse complaint was "indicated." Shortly after the "indicated" finding, Respondent contacted the D.C.F.S. employee who had investigated the alleged incident. Respondent asked the employee for a copy of the investigative report and expressed concern that the report indicated that suspected child abuse had occurred. Respondent further told the D.C.F.S. employee that he was concerned that the D.C.F.S. investigation was not thorough enough or as responsive as one that Respondent, as Ogle County State's Attorney, would expect. Respondent stated he was considering convening a Grand Jury investigation into the matter. According to the testimony of Marcia Butterfield, Respondent called her on the telephone and told her that, unless she submitted a letter to Respondent's office indicating that the alleged act of child abuse at the school had not occurred, Respondent would convene a Grand Jury and subpoena her minor child to appear before the Grand Jury to testify. Respondent followed up this telephone conversation with a letter that he mailed to the Butterfield's attorney. Mrs. Butterfield never sent Respondent a letter indicating that the alleged act of child abuse had not occurred. Subsequently, Respondent's office issued a number of Grand Jury subpoenas to the Butterfields and other persons who appeared to have knowledge about the alleged incident. Eventually, a judge quashed the Grand Jury subpoenas. The Court ordered the Special State's Attorney to investigate the alleged child abuse at the School and the actions of public officials, members of the bar and others in connection with the incidents set forth above. Eventually, a Special State's Attorney convened a Grand Jury that heard testimony and returned a finding of no probable cause of criminal conduct. A disciplinary grievance was filed against the Respondent and he was charged with engaging in a prohibited conflict of interest. The Supreme Court censured him on May 30, 1990.

In re Gerald A. Sims, 144 Ill.2d 323, 579 N.E.2d 865 (1991). Sims was State's Attorney of Perry County from 1980 through 1985. He used cannabis in the presence of other individuals from approximately 1979 to 1984. Sims also purchased, possessed, and used small quantities of cocaine in Perry and Jackson Counties, Illinois, between 1979 and 1982. Sims failed to take any action in his role as State's Attorney in bringing criminal charges against those who sold and used controlled substances in his presence. Sims resigned as State’s Attorney when threatened with a federal indictment, ceased his use of drugs, and worked for six years as an assistant Attorney General for the Virgin Islands prior to the imposition of discipline. While finding the evidence of Sims' rehabilitation compelling, the Court observed: “If the only factor to be considered here were Sims' rehabilitation, it would be reasonable to impose a sanction such as censure or reprimand. However, rehabilitation is not the only factor or, in this case, the most important factor. This case involved a flaunting of the law by a prosecuting attorney over a several year period. With all due respect to the respondent and his future career, we have to conclude that any sanction less than the two-year suspension recommended by the hearing board would denigrate the seriousness of his conduct and would erode public trust in the accountability of its elected officials.”

In re David S. Stewart, 98 SH 97, M.R. 15437 (Ill. Feb. 1, 1999). Stewart was employed as an Assistant State’s Attorney for Moultrie County, Illinois when he delivered crack cocaine on three separate occasions to a friend who was also a paid informant of the East Central Illinois Police Task Force. Stewart met the informant at the State’s Attorney’s office to discuss the purchase of crack cocaine. He was terminated from his position and prosecuted. Stewart asserted an entrapment defense and was eventually acquitted after jury trial. Since Stewart, however, admitted in trial that he had delivered the crack cocaine to the informant, disciplinary charges were subsequently filed against him. Stewart agreed to a voluntary disbarment and his name was stricken from the Master Roll.

In re 86 CH 38 (ARDC Hg. Bd. Reprimand, Aug. 27, 1986). The Respondent was an Assistant Cook County State’s Attorney assigned to the felony division. During the course of a trial, she attacked the integrity of defense counsel, charging him with “lying,” misstated the law to the jury, and made improper remarks and statement in closing argument. She was reprimanded by the Hearing Board. At the time that the discipline was imposed, Hearing Board reprimands were private and confidential pursuant to Supreme Court rules.

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